Diseased existents or existent diseases? E-Book

Walter Lips

• Herausgeber: RIL Editores
• Kategorie: Ratgeber
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 268

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2024

Beschreibung

This book aims to cover both the ontological determination and the characterization of what we call with terms such as disease and others related. The current edition is a more complete version of the first edition in Spanish that was published four years ago. In this edition, both semantic and gnoseological as well as ontological issues have been developed in more detail and depth. The foregoing is due to the fact that we could establish the meaning of the disease concept based on its explicit ontological reference, namely, the question about the existence of disease. Furthermore, to achieve that aim, it is appropriate to consider the essential properties of live systems. Consequently, this edition has reviewed in greater depth what is related to bioplasticity and macromolecular interactive processes of live systems, including epigenetic processes.

Leseprobe

Table of Contents

Cover

The Author

Cover

Credits

Dedication

Preface

Introduction

Chapter 1: Neurocognition and language

References

Chapter 2: Natural versus cultural

That which is called disease: a construct whose reference is supernatural, natural, or cultural?

References

Chapter 3: About that wich exists

Neurocognitive processes and conceptualization

Existence

References

Chapter 4: Distinguishing entities by their origins

Natural existents

Non-natural existents

Insistents and neurocognitive processes

Abstract constructs or concepts

Human values

Predictions and fictions

References

Chapter 5: The entity called disease: an existent or an insistent?

Content of the construct ‘disease’

References

Chapter 6: Diseased (vital) existents

Material systems

Live systems

Vital properties

Self-regulation and homeostasis

Bioplasticity

Epigenetics and bioplasticity

Cellular bioplasticity: the importance of some macromolecules

1. DNA and RNA

2. Proteins

Intrinsically disordered or flexible proteins

Bioplasticity and adaptation

Healthy and diseased vital states

References

Conclusions

Walter Lips Castro, M.D.

He has worked as professor of Psychiatry at the Universidad de Valparaíso as well as the Universidad Andrés Bello, both situated in Valparaíso, Chile. Also, he worked as Psychiatrist in the Hospital San Borja Arriarán (Santiago, Chile), and in the Hospital Gustavo Fricke (Viña del Mar, Chile).

Currently, he works as Psychiatrist in a public institution for the assistance and treatment of victims of violence (CAVI) (Viña del Mar, Chile).

Walter Lips

Diseased existents or existent diseases?

Diseased existents or existent diseases?

First edition: December 2020

© Walter Lips, 2020

Intellectual Property Number

Nº 2020-A-8044

© RIL® editores, 2020

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Derechos reservados / All Rights Reserved.

To my mother, Viviana Castro Delgado:

For her quietly reassuring disposition and generous nature during our childhood years.

And to my father, Walter Lips Mendoza:

For believing in and sharing what is fair in every care with his loved ones.

Preface

Since the second half of the last century, there has been a noticeable increase in publications concerning some philosophical matters in the area of Medicine. However, despite the great progress achieved both in the clinical area and in biomedical sciences in general, regarding the concept of disease, a certain vagueness persists.

As philosophical reflection should help us to clarify the fundamental concepts of both our general and scientific knowledge, with this book I have tried to emphasize those themes that could allow us to refine our conceptualization of the disease. Indeed, this book aims to cover both the ontological determination and the characterization of what we call with terms such as disease and other related.

The current edition is a more complete version of the first edition in Spanish that was published four years ago. In this edition, not only semantic and gnoseological issues have been developed in more detail and depth —such as neurocognitive processes related to the formation of constructs and their symbolization— but ontological issues as well. The foregoing is due to the fact that a better distinction between what concerns Gnoseology, on the one hand, and Ontology on the other, will allow us to establish the reference of the disease concept with greater clarity. More precisely, we could establish the meaning of the concept disease based on its explicit ontological reference, namely, the question about the existence of disease. Furthermore, to achieve that aim, one must, in my opinion, consider the essential properties of live systems.

Consequently, this edition has reviewed in greater depth what is related to bioplasticity and macromolecular interactive processes of live systems, including epigenetic processes. There is no doubt that there is still a long way to go in the search for greater knowledge about the vital properties of matter. However, a more precise characterization of the concept of disease can only be achieved using a philosophical analysis with scientific support.

On the other hand, I would like to share with the reader that the development of this book has brought me not only the great satisfaction of having acquired more knowledge about various topics but also new questions. Although during the process of this version I have had to deal with doubts that generated, at times, discouragement, those who supported me were fundamental to the completion of this work. For this reason, I extend my gratitude to Luis Paredes, who gave me clarity in the face of some conceptual doubts and reminded me that intellectual challenges are always worth taking on. I am also very grateful for the translation work done by Moira Evans, who with fineness, prudence and care managed not only to capture my conceptual proposals but also to accommodate the text of some paragraphs. And, especially, I want to thank my dear Catalina, for supporting my personal projects and vitalizing my ideas.

Finally, I would like to point out to the reader that to facilitate the reading of this book, we have to distinguish between the factual, the conceptual, and the lexicon. To this end, the reader must note that I have considered useful the use of single quotation marks (‘ ’) for the conceptual and the use of italics for the lexical. Likewise, low or Spanish quotation marks (« ») are used to reproduce textual quotations or to indicate the improper or ironic use of a word.

Introduction

This work aims to confirm that the meaning of the construct designated with the word disease and the diverse similar terms that have been used in other languages, is imprecise (1). As our constructs can be named by agreed-upon signs or symbols like for example, the words of some specific language, it is important to establish which are the neurocognitive processes that have allowed us to agree to the assigning of constructs and the subsequent communication of them. Indeed, if we consider that the naming process is the result of a neurocognitive activity and that the development of said process has allowed us to communicate per what goes on in our midst, then the neurocognitive activity involved in the formation of constructs and their naming is founded on processes of interaction with things/facts. More precisely, the creation of the vocabulary of a language begins with our perception-action cyclic neurocognitive interactions when faced with things that happen. Nevertheless, it must be kept in mind that, though a great part of the constructs is the result of those interactions, they are not a faithful reflection of things/facts but only their cognitive representation. If there are things with which we can interact in a neurocognitive way and, as a result, generate constructs, then it could lead to their designation using symbols, as only occurs in our species. Therefore, our language understood as a system of symbols related to constructs, wouldn’t be, either, a faithful reflection of what is real/factual, namely, of all that is independent of any cognitive process.

As symbols are agreed upon signs that relate to constructs, be these either perceptual or abstract, their analysis corresponds, definitely, to the designated constructs. Regarding this, we must note that as perceived things/facts relate to perceptual constructs, then, in general, the relationship between a word (spoken or written) and any concrete entity is always mediated by a cognitive entity.

Complementing the aforementioned, we can point out that if we base ourselves on the results of progress made in neuroscientific investigation concerning the perceptive-executory cyclic activity of our brain, we may observe there is a coincidence with what has been proposed from the semiotic perspective relative to the triad thing-concept-word (2). In this book, we have considered, together with the previous proposals, the contributions of etymological-semantic studies relative to words related to constructs like ‘disease’ and ‘existent’. In effect, we can assert, that, in general, when studying the historic trail of any word created for naming ‘something’, we can establish the interactive context in which it originated. This will allow us to understand that the creation of a word owes itself to a human neurocognitive process that entails our direct or indirect interaction with some facts in our surroundings, that is, with changes in live as well as inert entities. As said interaction is the basis of the cognitive generalization processes and the subsequent formation of constructs, then what is called the content of a cognitive entity is related to what has been designated with the word meaning. Thereby the meaning of any construct is also related to that agreed-upon sign that «carries» it within a proposition system and that of a given social context.

Regarding the invention of symbols and their relationship with our neurocognitive interactions with the surroundings, it has been possible to establish, thanks to diverse paleoneurological studies, that hominids previous to Homo sapiens could have developed some system of lexical-semantic communication. Nevertheless, the emergence of a capacity for communication using a grammatical system would only go back as far as the period in which Homo sapiens appeared (3). We currently know that in an environmental context as adverse as the last Earth glaciation, in which survival was extremely difficult, all hominid species would have been extinguished save for Homo sapiens. In this regard, it is known that the basis of our great capacity for survival and adaptation is related to the evolutionary emergence of neurocognitive functions of incomparable creativity (4). In consequence, since the arising of our species, the neurocognitive processes established in connection with things/facts in our surroundings have allowed us to attain successive states of adaptation, based on what is called the perception-action cycles when facing what is real/factual. Concerning this, thanks to the results of different neuroscientific studies, it has been established that executive-perceptive cortical neurocognitive activity occurs at different levels: from the posterior cortex (sensory-perceptive) towards the frontal cortex (motor-executive), with successive feedback processes at all levels. Effectively, neurocognitive activity in the human brain unfolds in a series of hierarchically organized areas, forming a cyclic process of perception-action. It has been possible to distinguish, as well, that automatic acts, strongly established by multiple repetitions, respond to neuro-integration processes in the lower levels of the aforementioned cycle. On the contrary, all complex behaviour is integrated into higher cortical levels, that is, in cortical areas for a superior sensory association and within the prefrontal cortex (PFC) (5).

As has been already pointed out in previous paragraphs, the successive interaction between the human brain and its surroundings is fundamental to our cognitive adaptation processes. In effect, the perception of changes in the environment may originate complex cerebral processes that allow the formation of constructs in agreement with what is real/factual. Thereby we can propose, roughly, that a large part of our constructs arise from neurocognitive processes whose basis are complex cortical neuro integrations that allow us to generalize what we have perceived at some point in our life cycle. Regarding this, we can point out that depending on the level of neurocognitive generalization the resulting constructs can be more or less basic. For example, what we call a percept corresponds to a basic construct, different from other cognitive entities called abstract concepts, like complex numbers. Also, we can distinguish that some constructs are more simple than others, as can be observed when we compare unitary concepts with propositions or systems of propositions (theories).

Complementing the above we can add that as everything that results from the neurocognitive activity corresponds to what is designated with the term construct and that as human appraisements are based on neuro-cortical processes integrated with other brain processes related to emotions, then what we have called human values are constructs as well (see chapter 4).

On the other hand, it is important to point out that all attempts to pinpoint the meaning of a construct, like for example ‘disease’, require the analysis of that which is related to what we have named with the word existent. In this regard, and in the context of the purpose of this work, it is worthwhile to take note that many discussions about what is named with the English words illness, disease, and sickness are referred to the determination of the type of existents that we have designated with that word or others related, belonging to other languages (for example, enfermedad, krankheit,maladie, etcetera). That is, that those discussions are related to issues concerning whether what is designed with that word is an objective or subjective, real or unreal, natural or conventional entity, etcetera. Therefore, to establish the basis on which we can discuss what we mean by ‘disease’ it is necessary to clarify anything related to the concept named with the word existence.

To the aforementioned we must add that for all theoretical analysis to be useful, it is important to distinguish between constructs and what is real, that is, between all neurocognitively created entities and that which is independent of our cognitive processes. Despite the relevance of this differentiation, it is interesting to note that throughout our history theories have been elaborated which refer to cognitive entities as if they were real. In effect, it has been proposed that some entities are real, even though they are not factual. In this regard, it has now come to be emphatically affirmed that there are entities that are independent of our thinking, that is, it has been accepted that there are real immaterial entities, immaterial «existents», without distinguishing that, in principle, they are only the result of our cognitive activity. Briefly said, it has been sustained that something is, without questioning if its state is factual or a result of a creative cognitive process, be it consensual or not. Nevertheless, if we consider the ongoing neuroscientific research regarding neurocognitive processes related to the formation of constructs, it should be noted that since one cannot interact with what is not really there, it cannot be perceived. Therefore, despite its obviousness, we can point out that not only can no cognoscente interact senso-perceptively with an unreal entity, but also that what is unreal does not interact, that is, does not generate any kind of facts. Consequently, in that context, one could only propose that that which is unreal is only a possibility, a fiction, a construct referring to possible entities. In this regard, an example that stands out in human knowledge is that which is related to the proposition of those «existents» that have been called supernaturals, that is, together with the proposition that there are immaterial entities. It is indisputable that as this type of proposal is not verifiable because there is no interaction with such entities, it can only be either agreed upon or arbitrarily imposed. However, although it is accepted that those entities with which no factual relationship can be established are not real, that is, that strictly speaking, they do not exist, it is important to point out the following: that we cannot affirm that all that with which we cannot interact with does not exist. In effect, science has demonstrated that many existents or real entities are unobservable, that is, they are not within direct or indirect perceptive reach of our cognitive processes.

But, beyond any debate about possible non-factual «existents», what is important is to distinguish that, in general, all propositions are the result of a cognitive elaboration that may, or may not be, based on facts. In that respect, we can affirm that all propositions that are not based entirely on things/facts are what we call fiction or belief. From the above it is important to note that we do not elaborate beliefs or fictions completely unconnected with what is perceived, that is to say, with our memorized experience. In effect, even though it may be very inventive or disassociated from the facts, all propositional constructs designed using a sentence have some relationship with that which has been perceived in our factual interaction with our environment. Nevertheless, despite that which is real being the basis of all conceptualization processes, some conceptual postulates are not questioned and, in consequence, are not subject to factual verifications whatsoever. In other words, they are uncritically established or postulated with no chance of being ratified or being subjected to a factual test, either because most of them do not have a factual referent or because they are considered unquestionable in an emotional or value sense. Notwithstanding, such proposition systems are characterized by their internal coherence. Therefore, in this context, it could be said that the difference between beliefs and fictions resides in the level of certainty with which they are established. The former usually establish themselves firmly, can come to be uncorrectable, that is, accepted without question concerning their reality or factual truth. Whereas the latter can be considered as tentative and creative cognitive exercises, inventions that are more flexibly proposed, which makes them susceptible to be corrected. Hypotheses and suppositions correspond to these last, which are usually proposed with a heuristic purpose. In this regard, as the reader must have noticed, behind the cognitive act assigned with the word fiction, there is a creative effort, reason by which it has some purpose. On the contrary, with the word belief we name a relatively passive process of human cognition because it is based on giving credibility or acceptance to a culturally established proposal, that is, motivated possibly by relevant emotional states.

Regarding the origin of our language, from the activation of our perception-action cyclical neurocognitive processes regarding the environment, we have gradually created our symbol systems. Concerning the creation of the words that are proper to each language, it is important to emphasize that the discipline called etymology can be understood not only as it is traditionally characterized, that is, as the study of the origin of words, but as a discipline that studies the true meanings of words as well. For this reason, etymology does not cease to be linked to semantics (6). In effect, within the less traditional conception of etymology, some authors have made some distinction when referring to etymology’s semantic method (7). In consequence, we have distinguished traditional etymology, understood as the study of the (phonetic) origin of words from modern etymology, whose objective is related to the study of the history of words, their meaning (8). Regarding this, in the platonic work named Cratylus, as well as the orphic writing discovered in the Derveni papyrus (from the IV century BCE), there already existed a discussion whether words and that to which they refer, corresponded or not to human conventions (9). Yet, today we know that we can form symbolic systems referred to constructs that have content or meaning, some of which can be associated either with things or facts. Therefore, the discipline named etymology can be understood in light of what the historic formation of that same word says, that is, that said term derives from the greek ἐτυμολογία, formed from ἔτυμος (etymo: ‘true, authentic, real’), and -λογία (-logy: ‘treatise, study’). It is interesting to note that, subsequently, the word etymology was Latinised by Cicero (106 BCE-43 BCE) by the use of the word veriloquium, formed by veri (‘true’) and loquium (‘word’). Thereby it can be said that, at least in its beginnings, the etymological studies would have referred to the relationship of words with what is true or real (10).

But, beyond words and all types of language, to better understand the development of the subject at hand, we must not neglect all things relative to human communication. Concerning that, it is important to point out that everything that is communicable alludes to something, be it real or unreal, natural or supernatural, observable or unobservable, etcetera. Ultimately, when we allude to something, we are referring to any other being, real or not. Regarding the unreal entities referred to in our communication processes, it is worth noting that these are not only those that have been, that is, the memorized ones, but also those that we cognitively project. Thereby, thanks to our mnesic capabilities, we can refer to what was, but also, thanks to our neurocognitive capability for projecting possibilities and for hypothesizing, we can also communicate what is possible, what could be or come to be.

To achieve the purpose of this work it seems important to me to found its development on the following topics: 1) the relationships between neurocognition and symbolic communication, 2) the distinctions between artificial and natural entities, 3) both the conceptual accuracy about what has been designated with the word existent as well as the differentiation between natural and non-natural existents, and 4) the neuroscientific basis of the conceptualization processes. Considering these themes, in addition to the analysis of vital properties and the bioplasticity of living beings, a characterization of what is called disease is proposed.

References

Lips W (2017). La conceptualización de la enfermedad y algunas de sus designaciones: el aporte de un estudio etimológico comparado. Gac Med Mex.153: 134-42.Rastier F (2004). Sign, pp. 392-394. In: Houdé O (2004). Dictionary of Cognitive Science. Psychology Press. Ardila A (2006). Orígenes del lenguaje: un análisis desde la perspectiva de las afasias. Rev Neurol 43: 690-698.Wood B (2005). Archaic and transitional Hominins, pp. 71-83. In: Wood B (2005). Human Evolution: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press; Delson E (2000). Encyclopedia of Human Evolution and Prehistory, pp. 1059-1065. Garland Publishing, Inc; Schick K and Toth N (2013). The Origins and Evolution of Technology, pp. 265-268. In: Begun D (2013). A Companion to Paleoanthropology. Blackwell Publishing Ltd.Fuster J (2004). Upper processing stages of the perception-action cycle. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, vol. 8, no. 4, April.Malkiel Y (1962). Etymology and General Linguistics, WORD, 18:1-3,198-219.Baxter T (1992). Plato’s Ideal Theory: Contrasts and Comparisons, pp. 56-85. In: Baxter T (1992). The Cratylus: Plato’s Critique of Naming. Brill, Leiden.Baldinger K (1959). L’étymologie, hier et aujourd’hui. In: Cahiers de l’Association Internationale des Études Francaises, n. 11, pp. 233-264.Ademollo F (2011). Introduction, pp. 1-22. In: Ademollo F (2011). The Cratylus of Plato. A Commentary. Cambridge University Press.Lewis Ch and Short Ch (1879). A Latin Dictionary. Founded on Andrew’s Edition of Freund’s Latin Dictionary, p. 1974. Oxford at the Clarendon Press; Blánquez Fraile A (1975). Diccionario Latino-Español, volumen K-Z, p. 1818. Editorial Ramón Sopena, SA. Barcelona; Beekes R (2010). Etymological Dictionary of Greek, pp. 474-475. Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands; Bugueño F (2004). La etimología en el diccionario de la lengua. Revista Letras, Curitiba, n. 64, pp. 173-188; Chantraine P (1999). Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque. Histoire des mots, pp. 381 and 625. Klincksieck, Paris; Corominas J (1984). Diccionario crítico etimológico castellano e hispánico, tomo CE-F, p. 819. Editorial Gredos, Madrid; Cruse A (2006). A Glossary of Semantics and Pragmatics Glossaries in Linguistics, p. 57. Edinburgh University Press

Chapter 1

Neurocognition and language

There is no doubt that language has been fundamental in the development of our species, which is why it has been a subject of special interest to both philosophers and scientists. However, only in the last few decades, thanks to neuroscientific research, has it been possible to learn more about the neurocognitive activity underlying the processes of conceptualization and designation (1).

Therefore, it is important to highlight, from a brief historiographical perspective, the philosophical speculations that marked the beginning of successive theorizations proposed concerning human language. In this regard, it is known that in classical Greece the study of language aroused interest among the Presocratics, however, it is generally accepted that one of the first most fruitful analyses is found in the work Cratylo of Plato (428/427 BCE-348/347 BCE). In this work, which is related to the meaning of names was mainly analysed without considering the communicational aspects of language. Later on, Aristotle (384 BCE-322 BCE) reflects on communications, the social function of language. He pointed out that, like other animals, the human being can express his affections through his voice. However, he said that because human conditions are more complex than those of other animals, our species developed a more sophisticated way to express itself, namely, the articulated language or διάλεκτος. He also stated that in the context of articulated language both names and what is called logos are fundamental. Regarding the term logos, we know that he used it to designate a meaningful sound, whose parts also possess it, namely, what we could today call a proposition (2). Therefore, according to Aristotle, the use of language understood as a system of articulated sounds conventionally associated with concepts, is an exclusive faculty of the human species (3). Within the Hellenistic culture, there were also outstanding reflections related to the study of language. In this regard, it was the Stoic philosophy that provided us with a particularly innovative contribution. Indeed, within their interesting contributions, it is worth mentioning the use they gave to the term tò lekton, which would designate what ‘is sayable’, or ‘the expressible’, namely, that which conceptually resembles what we understand by ‘meaning’. Therefore, in the context of the stoic semiotic theory, there would be three components: the signifier (the sign, the utterance), the signification (the lekton) and the object referred to (the real thing). As for the lekton, they proposed that it would be an incorporeal entity in which falsehood or truth would reside (4).

Summarizing, in relation to the precursors in the study about language we can highlight Plato’s analysis regarding the meaning of the names, Aristotle’s reflections on the communicative function of language, and the semiotic theory of the Stoics. But considering, on the one hand, that the main objective of this chapter is not centered on philosophical studies related to language, and, on the other, that the above stoic theory has interesting similarities with current neuroscientific knowledge about the processes of conceptualization and designation, we will now focus on the neurocognitive processes of language.

From various neurobiological studies, it has been shown that human language is the result of complex neuronal synaptic processes in some areas of our brain. Indeed, our ability to communicate through a system of symbols resides in the intricate neurocortical integration processes that are the basis for conceptualization, symbolization, and reasoning. Regarding this, it is currently known that the great communicational ability of our species stands out from those of all other animals not only because it is executed by means of symbols associated with constructs (perceptual, abstract, propositional, etcetera), but also because it has allowed us complex reasoning and the planning of our actions. In effect, symbol systems help us to coordinate our behaviour, to anticipate possibilities, to hypothesize, to describe what exists, and to manipulate our environment. Therefore, such abilities have been fundamental for the integral development of our species in its interaction with a natural as well as a socially changing environment (5).

Concerning the evolutionary brain processes and the consequent neurocognitive abilities that have allowed the emergence of language, there are arguments between those who sustain that it is the result of a gradual process and those that suggest that its emergence was more likely sudden (6). Nevertheless, by means of diverse paleoneurological studies, what has been established without discussion is that the appearance of language would be related to an increase in the volume of the temporal lobe of the human brain. Based on those studies it has been conjectured that hominids before Homo sapiens could have developed some lexical-semantic communication system. Consistent with this, it has been possible to propose that our language would have begun to develop, likely in a gradual way, about 200.000-300.000 years ago. Nevertheless, in what pertains to the origins of the grammatical component of our language, it has been established that it would have occurred after the mentioned date and that its dating would correspond to the period in which Homo sapiens had already emerged. Therefore, the emergence of the ability for communication, with a grammatical as well as lexical-semantic system, would go back about 50.000 years approximately (7). What is important is that beyond any dispute about whether language formed gradually or not, our language was founded, undoubtedly, on interactive processes by means of sounds between individuals belonging to the Homo genus. Later on, around 3000 BCE, thanks to the creation of pictographic writing in the Sumerian culture (8), socially agreed-upon designational relationships were established between graphic signs and some things/facts. As we shall see, this corresponds to the fact that within the context of human neurocognitive processes, the properties of a thing/fact that are perceived and valued as important for a certain situation can be conceptualized and communicated. Therefore, in the last instance, among the cognitive entities resulting from the neurocognitive processes of conceptualization, both perceptual and abstract constructs summarize some properties of those things/facts that we have perceived. Regarding this, it is important to note that with the phrase perceptual construct or the term percept we give to understand what in some contexts is usually called quale (whose plural is qualia), appearance, or phenomena. In effect, percepts are appearances because they form part of the personal sensory memory of each human being. They are not the things/facts as such, but rather an approximate neurocognitive representation of what is real. This approximation occurs on one hand, to the fact demonstrated by various visual and auditory studies, that our ability for sensorial attention is incomplete (9), and, on the other hand, to the fact that our sensors are only able to interact when faced with a certain range of environmental (energetic) facts. Due to this, it is often pointed out that percepts do not relate to what is real in a thorough or complete manner.

Concerning the complex and gradual changes in cerebral properties that occurred in the Homo genus, it is known that they allowed the emergence of privileged communicative processes. Those changes, in turn, were fundamental for the emergence of language within our species. Indeed, the greater ability of hominids for communication and social interaction progressed gradually before the emergence of a language such as we use today. If we consider that a greater neurocognitive ability for communication is closely related to better social interaction, the above may have favoured the emergence of human social organization processes mediated by language. In other words, our language would have co-evolved with the processes for social organization and cerebral development. In consequence, so as to understand how language was formed, we must consider social communication as well as biological adaptability, understanding the latter as the ability of a living being to adapt or to adjust in the face of different environmental conditions (10). In view of this, take note that in the case of our species, adaptability refers not only to what is natural but, more importantly, to what is social. In summary, it is possible to propose that cultural, as well as lexical, development has followed a parallel and integrated path within our brain (11).