Exploring European Social Policy E-Book

Robert R. Geyer

• Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 528

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2013

Beschreibung

With the growing challenges of economic globalization and national welfare state retrenchment, the development and future of EU social policy has become increasingly important. This exciting new textbook provides a comprehensive, detailed and up-to-date overview of this contested area and examines whether EU social policy is strengthening or weakening European social policy regimes.

The book begins with a general outline of the postwar development of EU social policy and its evolving relationship to the theory and practice of European integration. Then it provides a detailed and theoretically engaged description of the main areas of EU social policy including: labour, gender, anti-poverty, anti-discrimination, elderly, disability, youth, and public health policy. There is also a chapter exploring the social policy role of the structural funds, particularly the European Social Fund. The book concludes by arguing against both sides of the strengthening/weakening debate, calling for a more subtle analysis of the effects of EU social policy on national social policy regimes.

This book is the most up-to-date and comprehensive available and offers the reader a detailed and accessible exploration of the area. It will be essential reading for anyone studying the EU or national social policy, as well as for practitioners in the field.

Leseprobe

Exploring EuropeanSocial Policy

Robert R. Geyer

Polity Press

Copyright © Robert R. Geyer 2000

The right of Robert R. Geyer to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

First published in 2000 by Polity Press

in association with Blackwell Publishers Ltd

Reprinted 2007

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For further information on Polity, visit our website: www.polity.co.uk

This book is dedicated to my wife, Sigrun Skogly, and our sons, Kristoffer and Paul

Contents

Abbreviations

Chronology

Preface

Introduction

The strategy of the book

Chapter outlines

1    European Social Policy 1950–1969

West European policy in the early postwar years

Early European integration theory

EU social policy in the 1950s

EU social policy in the 1960s

Theoretical evolution: the revenge of realism/intergovernmentalism

2    European Social Policy 1970–1999

A brief revival, then collapse: from The Hague Summit of 1969 to the ‘Eurosclerosis’ of the early 1980s

Theoretical developments: confederalism

The SEA and the White Paper on the internal market project

The creation of the social dimension 45 Further theoretical developments: combining Sisyphus and Janus

The Maastricht Treaty and the recovery of EU social policy?

The current state of EU theory

3    Labour Policy: Core Areas

Free movement

Health and safety

4    Labour Policy: Extensions

Employment rights and working conditions

Worker participation

The social dialogue

5    Gender Policy: From Article 119 to ‘Mainstreaming’

Beginnings: Article 119

The 1960s and 1970s

The 1980s and 1990s

6    The Structural Funds and the European Social Fund

Paying for EU Social Policy

The ECSC: buying off losers and creating markets

The Treaty of Rome and the early years of the ESF and European Investment Bank

The first wave of reform: the ESF and ERDF in the 1970s

The Structural Funds in the 1980s: from stagnation to consolidation

The 1990s: expansion, restructuring and uncertainty

Debates over the future: the 1997–1999 reform process

7    Expansion and Extensions I

Anti-poverty policy: from poverty programmes to promoting social inclusion and combating exclusion

EU anti-discrimination policy against racism: from policy laggard to promoter

Public health policy: from occupational to general health policy

8    Expansion and Extensions II

Policy on the elderly: failed entrenchment

Disability policy: partial ‘mainstreaming’

Youth policy: always part of the mainstream?

9    The Future of European Social Policy

The ‘map’ of EU social policy

Implications for EU social policy

The next wave of EU social policy research

Appendix: Accessing EU Social Policy

Notes

References

Index

Abbreviations

CAPCommon Agricultural PolicyCEDEFOPEuropean Centre for the Development of Vocational TrainingDGDirectorate-GeneralDGVDirectorate-General VEAGGFEuropean Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee FundEAPNEuropean Anti-Poverty NetworkECEuropean CommunityECJEuropean Court of JusticeECSCEuropean Coal and Steel CommunityECUEuropean Currency UnitEDFEuropean Disability ForumEEAEuropean Economic AreaEECEuropean Economic CommunityEFTAEuropean Free Trade AssociationEIBEuropean Investment BankEMSEuropean Monetary SystemEPHAEuropean Public Health AllianceERDFEuropean Regional Development FundERMExchange Rate MechanismESCEconomic and Social CommitteeESCBEuropean System of Central BanksESFEuropean Social FundETUCEuropean Trade Union ConfederationEUEuropean UnionEUFEuropean Union of FederalistsEURESEuropean Employment ServicesEWLEuropean Women’s LobbyILOInternational Labour OrganizationNGONon-Governmental OrganizationOECDOrganization for Economic Co-operation and DevelopmentOEECOrganization for European Economic Co-operationOPECOrganization of Petroleum Exporting CountriesQMVQualified Majority VotingSAPSocial Action ProgrammeSEASingle European ActUNICEUnion of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations in EuropeUVUnanimous Voting

Chronology

1948Organization for European Economic Co-operation founded1949North Atlantic Treaty Organization founded1951European Coal and Steel Community Treaty signed in Paris by Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands1957The Treaties of Rome negotiated (signed 1 January 1958), establishing the European Economic Community1961First regulation on the free movement of labour1962European Social Fund becomes operational1965France begins a boycott of Community institutions to register its opposition to various proposed supranational developments1966Foreign Ministers agree to the Luxembourg Compromise; normal Community processes resume1969The Hague Summit: agreement to strengthen European Community (EC) institutions, enlarge membership, establish an economic and monetary union by 1980 and support social policy development1973Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom become EC members1974First Social Action Programme created1974European Trade Union Confederation created1979European Monetary System (EMS) comes into operation1981Greece becomes an EC member1985The Commission publishes its White Paper on the completion of the internal market; Luxembourg European Council meeting agrees the principles of the Single European Act (SEA); qualified majority voting (QMV) established for health and safety issues1986Spain and Portugal become EC members1987SEA comes into force1988Commission proposes a Social Dimension to the internal market1989The Delors Committee presents its report (Delors Report), outlining a scheme for a three-stage progression to EMU; Strasbourg European Council meeting accepts the 1988 Social Charter1989–90Implementation of the 1989 Social Action Programme1991Maastricht European Council meeting agrees to the Treaty of European Union; the treaty expands QMV for social policy and creates the Social Protocol in order to surmount the British veto1993The Maastricht Treaty ratified1994First use of the Social Protocol to pass the Works Council Directive1995First use of the Social Dialogue to create the Parental Leave Directive1995Austria, Finland and Sweden become EU members19951995–7 Medium-Term Social Action Programme launched1997The British Conservative government defeated in May; the new Labour government immediately signs up to the Social Protocol1997Amsterdam European Council agrees to the Treaty of Amsterdam; the Social Protocol is integrated into the text of the treaties19981998–2000 Social Action Programme launched1999Special European Council meeting in Berlin, at which heads of government reach agreement on Agenda 2000 regarding measures for integrating new East European member-state applicants

Preface

The true foundation of this book project was my failure to find ‘socialism’ in France in 1984! As a young American university student and social democrat, disgusted with the constraints of American political dialogue in the 1980s, I was determined to find real democratic socialism in the aftermath of the French Socialist Party’s victory in 1981. However, by the time I arrived in 1984 for an academic year in Paris, Mitterrand had already abandoned most of the Keynesian reflationary economic strategies that had been put in place in 1981–2 and was beginning to embrace the idea of Europe. Global and European forces, combined with French domestic politics, had overrun the Mitterrand socialist strategy. Two questions were increasingly apparent to me and much of the West European left. Could social democracy exist in any one country? If not, could it reassert itself through the European Community?

Following a year at the University of Essex, I found myself, through a combination of academic interest and fate, working in the last bastion of traditional social democracy in Western Europe in the late 1980s – Scandinavia, specifically Norway. State budgets were still massive, workers’ rights incredible, social policy universal and lavish, and hegemonic social democratic parties dominated the political process. Nevertheless, traditional Scandinavian social democracy was increasingly being pressured externally and transformed internally. During the late 1980s in Scandinavia, traditional Keynesian strategies were increasingly abandoned, state expenditure constrained and the expansion of the public sector curtailed. A key element of this transformation was the relationship of Scandinavian social democrats to the European Community. For ‘modernizing’ social democrats, abandoning traditional strategies and linking to the emerging EC were necessary responses to Europeanization and globalization. Traditional national-level social democracy was dead. The best one could hope for was some type of Euro-social democracy. Traditional social democrats strongly opposed this thinking and in the early 1990s the two sides fought each other ferociously over the issue of membership in the European Union, the Swedes voting to join and the Norwegians to stay out in 1994.

I was fascinated by this political battle and the interplay between the ‘modernization’ of social democratic parties and their relationships to the EU. I spent several years working on this issue while I was a PhD student at the University of Wisconsin, and subsequently published a number of works on it.1 In essence, the fate of these battles hinged on the answers to the questions of the early 1980s. However, as with most political questions, there was no clear answer. On the one hand, traditional national-level Keynesian economic controls had been lost, but national-level welfare states and social policies remained remarkably resilient to radical change. On the other, European integration had made impressive strides in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Nevertheless, EU social policy remained limited and secondary. The welfare states of Western Europe had defended themselves remarkably well, while the European welfare state was little more than a ‘nightwatchman state’. The conclusion which I drew from this conflictual and uncertain state of affairs was that the earlier social democratic debates on the transition from the national welfare state to some form of Europeanized welfare state had been misconceived. The relationship between national-level social policies and the EU level was much more complicated than those earlier debates assumed. Consequently, analysing this relationship was not just a simple matter of observing the transference of policy capabilities from the national to the European level, but a complex one of charting the interplay between the two.

Following the completion of my work on the relationship between the British and Norwegian Labour Parties and the EU and my acceptance of employment in the Department of Politics at the University of Liverpool in 1996, I began to explore the development of EU social policy and its relationship to national-level social policy. Through my studies and having to teach the subject to inquisitive undergraduate and graduate students, I quickly made two discoveries: I was unhappy with the existing works on EU social policy; in order to truly come to grips with the whole complex area of EU social policy, one had to pursue a difficult two-step strategy. First, one had to have an accurate picture or ‘map’ of EU social policy. Second, with this map, one could then turn to the particular national arenas and examine how EU social policy interacted with member states’ social policies. The difficulty in the first step lies in the need to focus on European policy developments without ignoring national factors too much, while the difficulty in the second lies in the danger of undue concentration on national dynamics.

I began my ‘first step’, mapping EU social policy, in 1997. My ‘second step’ is in the planning stages. As I argue in my final chapter, I am certain that this type of study will be at the centre of the next wave of EU social policy research. In the end, my hope is that these two works will provide students and social policy activists with a thorough understanding of EU social policy and its interrelationship with key national-level social policies. Moreover, as I argue below, I firmly believe that the future of EU social policy lies not with the occasional well-publicized actions of the Commission or Parliament, but with the small-scale, unheralded, daily activities of social policy activists and interest groups. Often operating on minimal budgets and under enormous workloads, these groups quietly struggle to move social policies through the often Byzantine EU policy process. The results of their individual efforts are often minuscule, but the cumulative effect is essential for maintaining the future of the ‘human face’ of Europe.

Lastly, I would briefly like to express my thanks to a number of institutions and individuals. The University of Liverpool’s Research Development Fund provided essential funding for my research. Among my Liverpool colleagues, Andrew Geddes was extremely helpful in helping me obtain funding for the book, in reviewing several chapters and in just being a good friend. Beverly Springer helped to give me the confidence to start this project. Rebecca Harkin at Polity Press was everything a writer could look for in an editor. My father, Bill Geyer, whose ‘classical’ education far exceeds my own, significantly strengthened my grammatical and stylistic weaknesses. Friends and colleagues in Brussels, especially Ingrid Sogner, Eamonn Noonan, Arnhild Sauer and David Spence, provided me with a place to stay and special insights into the ‘real’ EU policy process. Special thanks need to be extended to the more than seventy interviewees in the Commission, Parliament, Council and social policy NGOs who freely gave their time and opinions to an often befuddled academic. Most important, I would like to thank my wife, Sigrun Skogly, for her unwavering support and advice. Of course, all errors remain my own.

An interactive website for this book with further EU social policy links, updated material and further information can be found at www.social-science-forum.org

Introduction

The phenomenal growth of the European Union (EU) in the period after the Second World War and the remarkable acceleration of that growth in the 1980s and 1990s makes the need to understand the development and impact of EU policy areas on Western (and Eastern) European nation-states essential. This point is obvious in the areas of monetary, trade and economic policy. In other policy areas, particularly social policy, the role of the EU seems much less important, secondary at best, insignificant at worst. A cursory view of the early history of EU social policy would seem to support its subordinate role. The few paragraphs in the founding treaties of the EU, minor policy development in the 1950s and 1960s and the aborted expansion of social policy in the early 1970s characterize the insubstantial nature of early EU social policy development. However, with the revival of European integration in the late 1980s under the Single European Act and in the early 1990s with the Maastricht Treaty, EU social policy experienced a remarkable expansion and growth of influence. Through new documents such as the Social Charter, Social Dimension and Social Protocol, EU policies regarding labour, gender, social inclusion and so on rapidly expanded. This recent expansion raises two key questions. Why did this expansion occur and can it be sustained? Is the growth of EU social policy a positive development?

For the first question, interpretations of traditional European integration theories diverge strongly. For intergovernmentalists, representing the realist view of international relations, EU social policy, like European integration in general, is doomed to move in a Sisyphean1 cycle of near success, then collapse. For them, deluded Europeanists and social policy supporters have continually tried to create substantial EU social policy through the founding treaties, EU organizations and specific pieces of EU legislation. However, despite their best attempts, EU social policy has always been undercut by resistance from the member states, key interest groups (particularly European capital), by the institutional weakness of the EU, and by the feebleness of social policy within the EU itself. Hence, despite recent successes propelled by key member states, EU social policy is still subject to the will of the member states and is unlikely to make further sustainable advances.

On the other hand, theorists coming out of the functionalist and neo-functionalist tradition would agree that EU social policy has been one of the most laggard areas of policy development. From the onset of the integration strategy, EU social policy has played a secondary role and often stagnated. Even today, it remains unevenly implemented and poorly financed. Key member states and interest groups have continually opposed its development. In spite of this, theorists would point out that due to the development of the EU, to the activities of the Commission and European interest groups and the impact of ‘spillover’, social policy has grown in scope, importance and influence, paralleling the expanding significance and power of the EU itself. Consequently, social policy has managed to progress and should continue to do so for the foreseeable future.

The answer to the question of whether EU social policy development is positive depends on where one sits on the left–right political spectrum. Generally, for those on the right, particularly free-market liberals, the development of EU social policy has been counterproductive and a potentially dangerous threat. For them, the economic world changed in the 1980s and 1990s. Globalization has stripped Western European nation-states of their ability to control and regulate their economies, and survival in this fiercely competitive environment requires embracing these new forces, reducing national-level controls, deregulating the economy and minimizing social constraints on the functioning of the market. Their support for European integration was based on the free market and deregulatory nature of the common market strategy. As the economies of the EU member states were increasingly forced to open up to each other, European-level market forces would be unleashed, national-level social constraints would crumble and a reinvigorated European economy and society would emerge. EU social policy could undermine all of these potential gains by contradicting the basic deregulatory nature of the new era. It could enable nation-states to maintain existing social policies. It might even introduce new ones at both the national and European level. In short, it represents the growth of the EU state beyond a minimalist, deregulatory, free-market framework.

For others, particularly on the social democratic and Christian left, the growth of EU social policy has been both tardy and frail. They agree with those on the right that growing globalization put increasing constraints on the economic controls and welfare states of the West European nations. As growth and tax revenues declined, unemployment and competition increased, putting a fiscal and political squeeze on national-level social policy. Social democrats had a growing sense that the era of the nationally based Keynesian welfare state had come to an end. As the EU was reinvigorated in the late 1980s and early 1990s, these groups hoped that EU social policy would be capable of protecting Europe’s generally high level of social policy and provision from international competition, blunting the excesses (‘social dumping’) of the free-market-oriented common market strategy, and possibly laying the foundation for some form of new Euro-level welfare state structure as well as the Euro-market.

In this book I argue that neither of the traditional theories adequately explain EU social policy development and the current left–right debate over the impact of EU social policy is misdirected. As is argued in detail in chapters 1 and 2, EU social policy has developed, similar to the EU, due to a variety of factors. Despite its institutional weaknesses and the opposition of the member states, EU social policy has seen significant advances in the 1980s and 1990s. Moreover, due to its increased embeddedness in the EU institutional process, to the growth of EU social policy NGOs and the continued success of the larger integration project, EU social policy is likely to see further development in the foreseeable future. However, as chapters 3–8 demonstrate, this progress has been very uneven both over time and between the various sub-areas of social policy. In essence, no single theory can either fully explain or predict the development of EU social policy. The concluding chapter explores the complex and contingent nature of EU social policy. At present, a number of its key sub-areas appear set for further advances. Further, the larger European and international contexts seem to support further EU social policy developments. However, changes in the larger context and in the dynamic of key sub-areas could easily change. Recognizing this complexity and uncertainty is a key step in moving beyond the traditional debates.

Obviously, this book cannot truly address the second question. The positive or negative nature of EU social policy hinges on the theoretical and moral position one takes towards welfare states and social policy in general. It is beyond the scope of this book to delve into the deep debates and numerous works on the nature and morality of the welfare state. Nevertheless, the left–right debate over EU social policy in the 1980s and early 1990s suffered from two related weaknesses: the debate often lacked detailed knowledge of the policy and its interaction with national social policy regimes; aggravated by this lack, the debate was premised on the assumption of the imminent collapse of national welfare states and the potential development of an EU welfare state. As an increasing number of observers have recognized in the 1990s, national-level welfare states are not collapsing or converging. Moreover, the fears of or hopes for the creation of a European welfare state are both unfounded. Some EU social policy areas, particularly gender policy, have seen significant development and influence. At the same time, others, particularly policy for the elderly, remain inconsequential. The reality of EU social policy is a much more complex mix of success and failure. The aim of this book is to increase the general knowledge of EU social policy and to encourage social policy opponents and proponents to reassess their interpretations of EU social policy and shift away from a rather fruitless debate over the creation of an EU welfare state and towards the complex interaction between EU and member-state social policy regimes. In essence, the new European welfare state is not located at the EU level, but remains predominantly national. However, a new arena of social policy co-operation, co-ordination and struggle has been opened up at the EU level. The more social policy actors are able to take advantage of this level, the more likely symbiotic relationships will develop between the national and EU policy levels. As a proponent of EU social policy, I hope that this shift in debate will allow for the focusing of research and political effort on exploring the potential of this symbiotic relationship.

The strategy of the book

The book’s titular objective of exploring EU social policy poses three questions. How do I define EU social policy? Why focus on EU social policy? What do I mean by ‘exploring’ EU social policy?

Defining social policy is never easy. Richard Titmuss, one of the founders of the study of modern social policy, lamented, ‘this tiresome business of defining social policy’ (Titmuss, 1974: 28). A brief glance at any basic work on this topic would show the variety of theoretical interpretations and distinctive developments of differing national social policy regimes (Lavalette and Pratt, 1997). Moreover, the EU social policy regime’s very distinctive structure and dynamics further complicate the creation of a clear and concise definition. For example, if one were to use T.H. Marshall’s classic definition of social policy as the use of ‘political power to supersede, supplement or modify operations of the economic system in order to achieve results which the economic system would not achieve on its own’ (Marshall, 1975: 15), then one could certainly argue that the most important and substantial European social policy is EU agricultural policy. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is a massive policy area, controlling nearly two-thirds of the EU budget and with its strategies of income support, market direction, education and training could easily be seen as using political power to shape economic outcomes. Lacking a clear theoretical model, I have chosen to use the EU’s practical definition of social policy, the activities of the Commission’s Directorate-General V (DGV) responsible for employment, industrial relations and social affairs, as my definition of the boundaries of EU social policy. Consequently, all the main areas of DGV activity are reflected in my chapter topics. There are obvious weaknesses in this strategy, one of which is that DGV’s activities have varied over time. For example, as this book goes to press it has just been announced that the responsibility for public health policy has been moved from DGV to DGXXIV. Nevertheless, DGV’s activities do provide a reasonable and traceable outline of EU social policy.

Regarding the second question, one should ask how one can study EU social policy in isolation from the social policy of the various welfare states of the member states. Clearly, EU social policy is related to the development of these welfare states. EU social policy has generally been built around the institutional structures of existing welfare states as a minimalist floor underneath existing social policy regulations and rules. Throughout most of the history of the EU, member states have maintained strict control over EU social policy though the unanimous voting (UV) procedures in the Council. Moreover, one of the most interesting elements of EU social policy is its relationship and impact on differing welfare state structures. While these are valid points, EU social policy has become so important that it not only deserves specific attention as a policy area in its own right, but it has also become sufficiently substantial as a policy area to fully occupy a book-length manuscript. Further, EU social policy, with the expansion of qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council, its expanding base in the treaties and the growing activity and influence of social policy NGOs, has increasingly escaped from direct control by member states. As such, it is essential to trace the emergence of this transition not from the perspective of the member states, but from that of the European level. This is not to say that national-level dynamics are unimportant or can be completely ignored. In this book, I often refer to national-level demands and dynamics. However, in order to trace the map of EU social policy, I could mention the national-level influences only briefly. As mentioned in the preface, this book is intended to ‘map’ the policy contours of EU social policy; my second work will rectify some of the national deficiencies that are inherent in this text.

Third, what do I mean by ‘exploring’ social policy? There are two parts to my definition of exploration, my desire to explore beyond the limitations of existing works and my methodological approach. Despite its growing importance, academic understanding and debate on EU social policy remain surprisingly limited. The secondary position of EU social policy, the recent focus on economic and monetary integration and EU institutional blockages have combined to constrain the development of and interest in EU social policy. There are a few books that examine EU social policy. These include collections of essays that explore particular elements of EU social policy or bring together excellent published articles on different aspects or implications of that policy2 and other works which provide some degree of overview to the development and scope of social policy.3 Unfortunately, none of these works provides a comprehensive and up-to-date examination of the development, scope and theoretical impact of EU social policy. This book is meant to fill that gap.

Exploration is also a good metaphor for my methodological approach. The study of EU social policy lies at the intersection of international relations, regional integration theory and comparative policy studies.4 What marks this intersection is the reliance on ‘historical institutionalism’ and the ‘comparative approach’. Historical institutionalism, an established theoretical perspective which significantly revived in the 1980s and 1990s,5 argues that the key nexus for policy development is in the embedded historical policy legacies of central policy institutions. By focusing on the actors and developments within intermediate-level institutions, institutionalism provides the theoretical ‘bridge between “men who make history” and the “circumstances” under which they are able to do so’ (Rothstein, 1992: 35). Closely linked to historical institutionalism is the comparative approach.6 As opposed to a more behaviouralist and statistically oriented comparative method, the comparative approach is less scientifically rigorous in that it tries to capture the complexity and interrelatedness of comparative politics and policy studies. As Jean Blondel wrote, the comparative approach is ‘a multi-pronged effort designed to come as close as possible to the many facets of the reality of the institutions, people, and countries which constitute the context within which government acts and develops’ (Blondel, 1981: 168).

Essentially, this methodology assumes that the primary goal of research is to explore, rather than to prove. Mapping the development of EU social policy requires a knowledge and synthesis of earlier works, extensive analysis of primary documents and a detailed knowledge of the primary actors. Over the past two years, I am confident that I have reviewed all major English language texts on EU social policy, obtained most of the major primary documents (an increasingly easy task due to the internet) and acquired first-hand knowledge through my interviews with EU social policy actors.

Chapter outlines

The choice of chapter topics and overall structure of the book reflect my desire to correct the limitations of the previous literature on EU social policy and lay a foundation for further research into the relationship between EU and national-level social policy regimes. Chapters 1 and 2 provide the fundamental historical and theoretical background for the later policy chapters. Chapter 1 begins with a brief definition and history of social policy and the limited international aspects of its development. It then briefly reviews the three major theories of European integration associated with the period after the Second World War: the federalist ‘vision’, functionalist ‘plan’, and neo-functionalist ‘spillover’, paying special attention to the role of social policy in each. Following this, the chapter explores the foundation of EU social policy in the Treaties of Paris (1951) and Rome (1957), and then turns to the limited developments in social policy during the late 1950s and 1960s and the theory of realism. The role of social policy in realist thinking was of minimal significance and was dependent on the national interests of the various member states. The theory, sceptical of the development of the EU, fit well with the stagnation of the EU in the 1960s.

Chapter 2 begins with a brief examination of the revival of social policy in the early 1970s under the 1974 Social Action Programme and follows the uneven development of social policy throughout the 1970s and early 1980s. During this time, theoretical understanding of European integration and policy development shifted from the starkly pessimistic views of realism to the more cautiously optimistic opinions of confederalism. The chapter then examines the revival of the EU and EU social policy in the late 1980s and early 1990s under the Single European Act and 1992 Project, and explores the development of the Social Dimension, Social Charter, 1989 Social Action Programme and the impact of the EU Commission led by Jacques Delors. During this period, debates focused on the nature of and need for EU social policy. Generally, free-market conservatives argued against it, and social democrats for it. The final section of chapter 2 discusses the most recent EU social policy developments, the growth of a more pluralist form of EU social policy formation7 and the theoretical transition from macro- to meso-level theorizing.

Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the crucial areas of EU labour policy. Of the various areas of EU social policy, labour policy is probably the most contentious. It reflects deep philosophical divisions within European politics and society, attracts powerful, committed and determined interest groups (capital and labour) and is obviously extremely important to the functioning of the advanced industrial economies of Western Europe. Chapter 3 explores the less controversial ‘core’ policies of freedom of movement of labour and health and safety policy. These were built into the earliest EU treaties, both as a strategy for creating a true European market and as a way of reassuring wary workers that their economic and social position would not be eroded by labour market integration. Of primary interest is the way in which these areas were used as ‘Trojan horses’ to bring in other areas of EU labour and social policy.

Chapter 4 explores the main extensions to EU labour policy that emerged after the 1970s. These included the development of policies in the areas of employment rights and working conditions, worker participation and the social dialogue. These areas emerged in the aftermath of the 1974 Social Action Programme and were justified through direct and indirect reference to the core areas of labour policy. Promoted by DGV in the EU Commission, the Parliament, socialist parties (at the national and European level) and European trade unions, these areas saw some degree of success, particularly during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Although all of them have now become firmly established within the field of EU social policy, their current strength and potential for continued expansion vary substantially.

Chapter 5 concerns the fascinating development of EU gender policy. From its beginning in Article 119 in the Treaty of Rome, ratified on 1 January 1958, through the remarkable European Court of Justice (ECJ) cases of the 1980s to the present ‘mainstreaming’ of gender issues, EU gender policy has been one of the most impressive areas of social policy development. Spurred on by the growth of ‘second wave’ feminism in Western Europe, an increasingly effective women’s group lobbying organization, as well as the breakdown of the traditional family structure and male-dominated occupational structure, gender policy has made enormous strides since the 1970s. By the 1980s, gender policy had become a well-funded policy area with a significant and growing legal base. In the 1990s it proved to be one of the most important social policy areas and was increasingly ‘mainstreamed’ into other policy areas.

In chapter 6 I move from the most successful area of EU social policy to the wealthiest, the EU Structural Funds, in particular the European Social Fund (ESF). In the current funding period (1994–9), the structural funds have planned to allocate a total of 138 billion ECU, of which the ESF intend to allocate around 42 billion ECU.8 In many ways, this is the heart of the European social project. From its very inception in the 1957 Treaty of Rome, the ESF was intended to ‘improve employment opportunities for workers’, primarily through encouraging mobility, vocational training and unemployment aid. As the EU progressed, the Structural Funds and the ESF expanded and moved into wider policy areas, created a more European orientation and profile, and developed a multitude of distinctive projects and programmes. A key focus of this chapter is the difference between past and present policy roles of the Structural Funds and the ESF. Are they regional or social policies, or are they just bribes for the weaker member states and social groups to keep them committed to the larger integration project?

Chapter 7 looks at three of the most recent areas of EU social policy expansion: those on anti-poverty/social inclusion, anti-race discrimination against racism and on public health. Though anti-poverty policy has its roots in the 1970s, it was not until the late 1980s that these three policy areas begin to develop at the EU level. In the 1990s these policy areas have experienced different levels of success. Anti-poverty policy development looked extremely promising in 1993 with the expanding budget of the Fourth Poverty Programme and the burgeoning concepts of social inclusion/exclusion. However, following the Council’s rejection of the programme in 1994, the policy area has stagnated. Anti-discrimination policy against racism has always had a delicate position in the EU system. The EU has been reluctant to accept responsibility for a difficult policy area, while the member states have been unwilling to cede authority over it. Nevertheless, responding to the rise of far right parties in the 1980s and racist crimes in the early 1990s (particularly in Germany and France), the EU began to develop more anti-discrimination legislation against racism and has recently inserted an anti-discrimination Article into the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty. Finally, public health policy emerged out of particular health issues of the 1980s and 1990s: drug dependence; cancer (particularly where linked to smoking); AIDS; health promotion; and information. Emphasizing the importance of member-state co-operation and the information and research orientation of this policy area, the EU has pushed into the field of public health with relative ease. With the continued importance of these health issues and the commitments made by the Amsterdam Treaty to further European public health, this is one EU social policy area which will probably expand.

Chapter 8 examines the emergence of three policy areas linked to specific social groups, the elderly, the disabled and the young. Of these three, the policy for the elderly has been the least successful within the EU policy process. Ignored in the founding treaties, not recognized until the 1974 Social Action Programme and only occasionally referred to in related policy areas of social inclusion and social protection during the 1970s and 1980s, elderly policy did not establish itself until the 1988 Social Charter, the 1989 Social Action Programme and subsequent action programmes. Its failure to gain a firm base in the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties demonstrates its continued weakness. Similarly, disability policy made no significant appearance in EU social policy until the early 1970s. Following the 1974 Social Action Programme, a series of action programmes were created to improve the condition of the disabled in Europe. By the late 1980s, disability policy had firmly established itself in the programmatic side of EU social policy, but had yet to make significant legislative developments. Though the disabled were ignored by the Maastricht Treaty, the Amsterdam Treaty and subsequent Employment Guidelines did recognize their needs. Finally, some aspects of youth policy have been deeply rooted and very successful in the EU social policy process. Areas such as vocational training, student mobility, and employment promotion for the young have been core elements of EU policy since the Treaty of Rome. These areas of youth policy have substantial roots in the treaties, particularly the Maastricht Treaty, and are supported by substantial funding from the Structural Funds. However, outside these traditional areas, youth policy has seen little or no development.

The final chapter opens with a brief summary of the current ‘map’ of EU social policy. I then explore how EU social policy is not like national-level social policy, how it has become primarily regulatory, exhibiting a variety of policy dynamics, not significantly replacing or undermining national social policy regimes. I conclude with a discussion of the next wave of EU social policy research and the uncertain future of EU social policy.

1

European Social Policy 1950–1969

[The Commission] cannot conceive that the Community has not got a social purpose.

EEC, Second General Report, 19581

This then is the sum total of social policy measures in the Treaty of Rome: a whiff of society-creating measures in Articles 2, 117 and 118; a gesture towards harmonisation in Articles 119 and 120; and a strong element of functional social policy to encourage the mobility of labour, and the retraining of workers through the ESF.

Hoskyns, Integrating Gender

How is it that such divergent views could be held over the role of social policy in the early years of the EU? Was social policy at the heart of the early treaties of Paris and Rome that laid the foundation for the ECSC and the EEC? Or was social policy an afterthought used to placate the threatened in the integration process? Moreover, what role did social policy play in early integration theory? This chapter attempts to explore these questions. It starts with a review of the key social policy developments at the international level and within the ECSC and EEC member states in the years immediately after the Second World War. I then examine three early integration theories, federalism, functionalism and neo-functionalism as well as their interpretation of EU social policy, succeeded by an analysis of the role of social policy in the treaties of Paris and Rome, and a brief overview of major social policy developments. In conclusion I argue that EU social policy has been an uncertain and controversial policy since its creation. It has generally had a secondary role in relation to the larger goal of economic integration, but was expected to become increasingly important as integration progressed.

West European social policy in the early postwar years

The foundations of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and European Economic Community (EEC) were based on fundamental military and economic bargains between the major member states. These bargains revolved around the answers to such questions as how to rebuild the broken economies of Western Europe, how to deal with the growing threat from the USSR, and what should be done with Germany. Social policy, or concerns over its development, played only a limited role in early integration strategies. The early unimportance of European-level social policy (in marked contrast to national developments) greatly limited its scope, but did not completely eliminate it from the European agenda.

West European social policy has a long and detailed history (Ashford, 1986; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Flora, 1986; Gough, 1979; Marshall, 1975; Pierson, 1991; Titmuss, 1974). Its modern roots easily reach back into the second half of the nineteenth century, when demands for state provisioning of education, health care, unemployment insurance, pensions, labour rights and family support all began to be heard. The variety of these demands was staggering and their various institutional manifestations often reflected the general orientation of early national welfare state structures. For example, early German ‘conservative’ social policies aimed at co-opting and integrating the working class into a conservative Bismarckian social order. Early French social policies were used to promote a Catholic family structure. Meanwhile, early British social policies, such as the reforming of the Poor Laws in the mid-nineteenth century, reflected the more liberal, market-oriented approach of the British system.

Social policies grew throughout the twentieth century, and expanded rapidly after the Second World War. This postwar expansion was triggered by a number of demands from soldiers who had made tremendous sacrifices during the war, families who had suffered because of the war, and the general population that felt that the state had a growing responsibility to do something about the basic condition of society. In some cases, these policies were undertaken by left-wing governments, particularly in Britain and Scandinavia. In others, they developed under conservative or Christian-democratic regimes such as in Germany and France. Moreover, as the economies of Western Europe began to revive in the late 1940s, the expanding economic capacity and fiscal resources allowed the state to expand social policies and social rights. Despite a great deal of variation between the European social policy regimes, European welfare states and social policy seemed to be following a similar developmental path.

As T.H. Marshall argued in his seminal work, Citizenship and Social Class (1950), West European societies seemed to be going through a similar developmental process in regard to the nature of citizenship and individual and social rights. Marshall saw this as a three-step process involving the creation, expansion and universalization of fundamental civil rights (eighteenth century), the formation of universal political rights (nineteenth century) and the foundation of fundamental social rights (twentieth century). Social rights were the zenith of citizenship rights and had become increasingly universalized, within the various nation-states, in the early postwar period. In the early 1950s social expenditure by West European nation-states varied between 10–20 per cent of GNP. By the mid-1970s it had grown to 25–33 per cent of GNP (Flora, 1986: xxii). Marshall’s book was a clear reflection of the public expectations for the development of social rights and policies in the early postwar period. The particular type and level of social policy varied from country to country, but for Marshall (and many others) the trend was towards expansion and universalization of these rights and policies.

At the supranational level, were social policies being discussed and implemented? The answer is: yes, they were discussed; and no, they were not implemented. By 1948 three major international institutions had a substantial social policy component to their work. The oldest was the International Labour Organization (ILO). The ILO was founded in 1919 in the aftermath of the First World War and was oriented towards improving the living standards and rights of working persons. After the Second World War the reputation and influence of the ILO was greatly boosted by a supportive US government and its linkage to the United Nations. Its job was to provide information on labour and working conditions, and promote the creation of full employment, increasing living standards, and basic social and economic rights within the member countries. The ILO did produce a number of documents on basic working, labour and social rights; its power to inform, encourage or embarrass gave it some influence, particularly among smaller nations, but it never had the ability to directly intervene in or substantially influence a national situation (Galenson, 1981). Likewise the UN, founded in 1944, did create a substantial body of basic economic and social rights in its original charter which member states were supposed to fulfil. However, most Western European nations far exceeded the level of these basic rights and the UN lacked the political will and policy capabilities to rigorously implement them. Finally, the Council of Europe, founded in 1948, created a European Charter of Human Rights in 1953 that included some social rights. Moreover, in 1961 the Council presented its European Social Charter (Gomien et al., 1996). Similar to the principles of the UN and the ILO, this charter was a list of basic social rights which most of the West European countries easily surpassed. Council of Europe members who signed the charter were expected to maintain and improve upon these basic provisions. However, policing and implementing these policies was left up to the member states. The Council of Europe had no money or powers to implement the rights, leaving the charter with little impact on particular social rights other than through its moral force.

Early European integration theory

Before turning to the earliest elements of EU social policy, it is necessary to step back and examine the role of social policy in early European integration theory. During the 1940s and 1950s there were three main theories which attempted to explain and direct the development of European integration: federalism, functionalism and neo-functionalism (Harrison, 1974; Pentland, 1973; Heater, 1992).

Federalism

The theory of federalism has a long and distinguished history both as a type of government and as a theory of governing (Riker, 1964; Wheare, 1953; Heater, 1992). The ancient Greeks established early federalist leagues. Other examples include the Hanseatic League (gradually formed in various north German cities, c. 1250–1350), the Swiss federation (founded in the fifteenth to sixteenth century), Dutch federal republic (sixteenth century), United States (eighteenth century) and Germany (nineteenth century). As a theory of uniting different regions/states into a diverse yet unified unit, federalism received a substantial boost in Western Europe following the two world wars. These left a desperate desire within many people for the creation of a more unified society that would contain or eliminate such conflicts, at least within Western Europe (Heater, 1992: chapters 6–7). In 1946 the European Union of Federalists (EUF) was established, building on earlier federalist organizations and including a number of former resistance fighters and leading intellectuals (mostly prominently Altiero Spinelli, the future EEC Commissioner).

At its most basic level, postwar European federalism relied upon three main assumptions (Harrison, 1974: chapter 3). First, human society was complex and heterogeneous. Such issues as language, race and culture could not be reduced to one clear and homogeneous social model. Second, society was pluralistic. Different interests had their legitimate place within various cultures and groups and the right to autonomy, protection and influence within general society. Third, since society was diverse and pluralistic (and would continue to be so for the foreseeable future), institutions must be devised to grant not only autonomy and protection, but a voice to these various elements of society while unifying them within a larger framework. The envisioned framework generally included a state structure divided both vertically, between central, regional and local institutions, and horizontally, between distinct central institutions and resting upon a constitutional edifice that balanced the rights and responsibilities of both the central and regional bodies and interests. In theory, the benefits of the federal system included: a barrier against central despotism; the protection of minority interests; the peaceful integration of conflicting interests; and the ability to solve societal problems at the level of government (local, regional, national, supranational) that was most suited to the particular problem.

For the postwar Euro-federalists, their system could resolve the previously irreconcilable differences that had twice torn Western Europe apart. With its combination of local, regional, national and federal governmental structures allowing for a maximum amount of diversity and protection of minority and regional rights within a unifying framework, European federalism would provide the necessary freedom and autonomy for the different European societies at the same time as it would provide for and encourage co-operation and conflict resolution. Pluralistic autonomy would be wedded to a co-operative and integrated federal structure to produce a productive and peaceful West European society that would be a model not only for the rest of Europe, but for the world as well.

The key problem for the federalists was how to go from the existing European structure of antagonistic and competitive nation-states to the formation of a European federation. For moderate federalists, such as Spinelli, the federalist goal could be obtained only through slow moderate reforms that increasingly integrated the differing nation-states into a growing federal structure. For radical federalists, the late 1940s represented a revolutionary moment in West European history. The legacy of two world wars had weakened the traditional hold of nationalism. West European society was sick of war and desperate for a new peaceful political system. Radical federalists hoped to channel this discontent into a political force that would demand the immediate creation of a European federal system.

The role of social policy in both the moderate and radical federal visions was secondary and obscure. The ideas and plans of the federalists were much more grandiose than the petty concerns of social policy. The federalists were trying to establish a new, prosperous and peaceful European order. Their expectation was that if European federalism could be created, then peace would be assured, the economy and society would prosper, and social problems would be alleviated by these broader developments. The creation of European level social rights and social policies would obviously play a role in this development.

What happened to federalist thinking in the 1950s? The radical federalists were doomed to disappointment. In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, there was a brief upsurge in public opinion against the nation-state and towards some vision of Euro-federalism. However, as war memories faded, the economies of Western Europe revived, and the Cold War heated up, public support for the various nation-states returned and the hopes of creating a political force for federalism turned out to be a mirage. Without the European democratic force, radical federalists were little more than ‘voices crying in the wilderness’ (Harrison, 1974: 44). Moreover, with the failure of the Council of Europe, the ECSC and EEC to adopt a federal structure and the collapse of the proposed European Defence Community and European Political Community in 1954 (Willis, 1968; Grosser, 1982), the movement lost its internal organization and drive and ceased to play a major role in EU affairs.

On the other hand, the moderate or evolutionary federalists saw the limited successes of the Council of Europe, the ECSC and EEC as laying the basis for some form of future federal structure. As already noted, several of the moderate federalists (Spinelli) moved into prominent positions within the new Euro-institutions. Despite disagreements about the pace of federal transformation, the moderate federalist vision has played a role in the strategies and plans of the EU from its earliest days to the present.

Functionalism

It is rather ironic that the second main theory of early European integration, functionalism, was originally opposed to the creation of regional or continental supranational federations. As David Mitrany argued in the seminal work of the functionalists, A Working Peace System: ‘There is little promise of peace in the mere change from the rivalry of Powers and alliances to the rivalry of whole continents.… Continental unions would have a more real chance than individual states to practise the autarky that makes for division’ (Mitrany, 1966: 45). Like early realists in international relations theory, Mitrany and the early functionalists saw the largest threat to peace in Western Europe and elsewhere as the anarchical international system and the self-interested actions of individual states within that anarchical order. Building regional blocs or super-states within that basic order would not change the prospects for peace. For Mitrany, individuals were generally rational, economistic, utilitarian, self-interested and welfare-oriented. Society, mirroring the thinking of classical economics, was little more than a collection of these individuals. In many ways, states were reflections of individuals. They were generally rational and self-interested. However, nation-states, caught in an anarchical world order, continually had to justify their existence to their constituent societies and at the same time defend themselves against attacks from other states. This aggressive-defensive relationship was fundamentally opposed to the basic utilitarian and welfare-oriented nature of individuals. As long as nation-states existed within an anarchical international system, this contradiction would continue, and the basically co-operative and economistic tendencies of society would be suppressed under the potentially violent struggles caused by nation-state competition.

To escape from this trap and to create real peace and prosperity, society had to subvert and eventually eliminate the nation-state. As opposed to international-relations realists, functionalists thought this could be done through a slow, steady process of functional transformation. Individuals and interest groups needed to shift their national orientation and strategies towards the opportunities and benefits of international co-operation. This would not be done at the state level, but on the relatively low level of basic social and economic interactions. Economic groups demanding greater market opportunities, academic groups desiring increased exchange of knowledge, tourist groups yearning to explore different areas, could maximize their own distinctive interests much more effectively outside the constraints of the nation-state. These groups were predominantly ‘non-political’ for Mitrany in that they were merely pursuing their self-interest rather than the particularist political demands of a given nation-state. Moreover, as these interactions or transactions2 increased two major transformations would occur. One, individuals and groups would begin to demand the creation of international authorities that would maintain and support these functional links. Sovereignty would begin to transfer away from competing nation-states to non-political co-operative international institutions that would fulfil the functional needs of society. Two, as nation-states became increasingly caught within the growing mesh of functional social relations they would become increasingly constrained and incapable of pursuing their former violent and destructive activities.

The functionalist strategy was relatively straightforward. Ignore the activities of state actors, since state level promises of peace and friendship will come and go. Instead, spend time promoting the low level functional linkages between different societies. As these linkages grow and develop, these individuals and groups will increasingly demand that international institutions ‘non-politically’ support and enhance these activities. As Mitrany stated, international peace is ‘more likely to grow through doing things together in the workshop and market place than by signing pacts in chancelleries’ (Mitrany, 1966: 25). Over time, national sovereignty and control would erode in a sea of functionally oriented international institutions.

Following this logic, social policy played an important role for the functionalist. Social policy, like economic policy, was the realm of low politics (as opposed to the high politics of defence and foreign relations). Dealing with unemployment, promoting workers’ rights, encouraging labour mobility, taking advantage of larger economies of scale, co-ordinating family, education and health policy and combating poverty were all issues and policy areas that were seen as primarily ‘non-political’ and best addressed through technically efficient bureaucratic organizations that could promote the fundamental commonality of these issues. Economic factors were clearly at the heart of functionalist thinking, but social factors and policies were important as well.

What happened to functionalist thinking in the 1950s? As mentioned earlier, Mitrany opposed the formation of regional European organizations such as the ECSC and EEC since they would merely form larger units of the same national problem. He and other functionalists strongly supported the creation of the UN and the ILO. For these organizations to be created and to have some impact was a major achievement. However, by no stretch of the imagination could it be argued that they were fulfilling the functionalist dreams of enmeshing nation-states into peaceful co-operation. Ironically, functionalist thinking was central to the creation of the ECSC and EEC. It did not take much of an intellectual leap to take the grandiose global plans of the functionalists and apply them in a constrained yet successful manner at the European level. The ECSC and EEC were designed to promote functional linkages between the various member states. Authority and sovereignty were transferred to an international, functionally oriented, bureaucratic institution that was supposed to maintain and develop these functional linkages. Moreover, the hope was that these growing functional linkages would increase the interdependence and co-operation between the member states; if not end, they would at least reduce the likelihood of violent conflict between them. Unlike federalism, which provided the EU with a proposed goal or vision, functionalism helped to give the ECSC and EEC their actual strategies, concomitantly providing the basis for neo-functionalism.

Neo-functionalism

Ernst Haas’s history of the ECSC, The Uniting of Europe, published in 1958, remains one of the pre-eminent works of neo-functionalism. It examined in detail the policies of the ECSC and, more importantly, the ECSC-related policies of the major political parties and interest group actors in all six of the member states. For Haas, a marvellous thing had occurred in the early 1950s. Contrary to the expectations of many, after its birth in 1951 the ECSC had not collapsed or stagnated. Not only had the ECSC survived, but the European integration process was about to be greatly expanded with the creation of the Treaty of Rome in 1957. Supranational integration had gone beyond one particular sector (coal and steel) and was embracing the entire economies of the six member states. Haas asked why these countries, which little over ten years earlier had been fighting each other, were now willing to integrate their economies into a common market.

He found the answer in the basic functional needs of individuals and groups and the impact of ‘spillover’. Haas’s fundamental thinking was quite similar to functionalism. In the past, nation-states had existed in a competitive international system that promoted violent competition and weakened the possibility for economic prosperity. However, as functionalists pointed out, these nation-states were not unified actors, but rather composed of a multitude of individuals and interest groups who were not only rational and self-interested, but could continually evaluate their actions and allegiances in relation to their rational self-interest. As a consequence, national allegiances were not fixed. Interest groups and individuals could reorient their interests and allegiances to an international organization or federal state. The creation of such an organization/state would lead to greater peace and prosperity. Unlike Mitrany, Haas never assumed that the nation-state could, should or would be completely eliminated. A Euro-federalist vision was much closer to what Haas had in mind. Local problems would be dealt with at a local level, regional problems at a regional level, national problems at the national level and European problems at the European level.