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- Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
- Kategorie: Fachliteratur
- Sprache: Englisch
FIRE RISK MANAGEMENT Practical methodologies to develop holistic and comprehensive fire safety strategies for buildings and industrial assets In Fire Risk Management: Principles and Strategies for Buildings and Industrial Assets, a team of distinguished authors delivers an incisive combination of risk management principles and fire safety assessment methods that offers practical strategies and workflows to prevent and mitigate today's complex fire scenarios. The book summarizes modern, risk-based approaches to fire safety, discussing fire safety objectives in terms of functional statements, performance requirements, and detailed protection measures for buildings and industrial assets towards the development of a fire safety case to timely manage risk with a systematic and structured approach throughout the life cycle of the asset. The authors introduce the fundamentals of fire safety and design principles before moving on to discuss topics like fire risk assessment methods, risk profiles, risk mitigation, safety management and performance, and protective layers and controls. Fire Risk Management presents practical methods, often borrowed from those successfully used in other domains, that can be defined, shared, and communicated with multiple stakeholders from different backgrounds and with different needs and perspectives. Readers will also find: * A code-neutral examination of fire safety principles that is independent of local regulations * Discussions of key principle standards, including NFPA 550 and ISO 45001, and guidelines on fire risk assessment * Practical explorations that connect theory with practice in the real world * In-depth case studies that walk readers through fire risk management strategies for railway stations, warehouse storage facilities, heritage buildings, renewable energy installations, and process industry plants Perfect for fire safety practitioners, engineers, and other stakeholders involved in the design and operation of buildings and industrial assets, Fire Risk Management: Principles and Strategies for Buildings and Industrial Assets will also earn a place in the libraries of facility owners and operators, safety systems managers, occupational health and safety professionals, and code officials.
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Fire Risk Management
Principles and Strategies for Buildings and Industrial Assets
Luca Fiorentini Fabio Dattilo
This edition first published 2023
© 2023 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by law. Advice on how to obtain permission to reuse material from this title is available at http://www.wiley.com/go/permissions.
The right of Luca Fiorentini and Fabio Dattilo to be identified as the authors of this work has been asserted in accordance with law.
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data:
Names: Fiorentini, Luca, 1976- author. | Dattilo, Fabio, author. | John Wiley & Sons, publisher.
Title: Fire risk management : Principles and Strategies for Buildings and Industrial Assets / Luca Fiorentini, Fabio Dattilo.
Description: Hoboken, New Jersey : JW-Wiley, [2023] | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2023021900 (print) | LCCN 2023021901 (ebook) | ISBN 9781119827436 (hardback) | ISBN 9781119827443 (pdf) | ISBN 9781119827450 (epub) | ISBN 9781119827467 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Fire protection engineering. | Fire risk assessment. | Fire prevention. | Risk management.
Classification: LCC TH9145 .F49 2023 (print) | LCC TH9145 (ebook) | DDC 628.9/22--dc23/eng/20230622
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023021900
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023021901
Cover Image(s): © Possawat/Getty Images, Keith Lance/Getty Images, rocketegg/Getty Images
Cover design: Wiley
Set in 9.5/12.5pt STIXTwoText by Integra Software Services Pvt. Ltd., Pondicherry, India
To my father, Carlo Fiorentini.
The memory of his passion for fire safety, his immeasurable expertise and above all his example at work with TECSA and with fire safety professional associations and also in our family accompanies me in my professional life every day, with the hope that I can always do my best and also leave a small contribution of my own to the world of fire-safety engineering and industrial risk assessment, which he made known to me and which I have always been close to, appreciating this whole world and developing a passion to be part of it.
Luca Fiorentini
To Carlo Fiorentini, father of Luca, pioneer and master in risk assessment and fire safety. His passion for his work, in-depth knowledge and love for his family mark our path like milestones.
Fabio Dattilo
Contents
Cover
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication
Foreword
Preface
Acknowledgments
List of Acronyms
About the Companion Website
1 Introduction
2 Recent Fires and Failed Strategies
2.1 Torre dei Moro
2.1.1 How It Happened (Incident Dynamics)
2.2 Norman Atlantic
2.2.1 How It Happened (Incident Dynamics)
2.3 Storage Building on Fire
2.3.1 How It Happened (Incident Dynamics)
2.4 ThyssenKrupp Fire
2.4.1 How It Happened (Incident Dynamics)
2.5 Refinery’s Pipeway Fire
2.5.1 How It Happened (Incident Dynamics)
2.6 Refinery Process Unit Fire
2.6.1 How It Happened (Incident Dynamics)
3 Fundamentals of Risk Management
3.1 Introduction to Risk and Risk Management
3.2 ISO 31000 Standard
3.2.1 The Principles of RM
3.3 ISO 31000 Risk Management Workflow
3.3.1 Leadership and Commitment
3.3.2 Understanding the Organisation and Its Contexts
3.3.3 Implementation of the RM Framework
3.3.4 The Risk Management Process
3.4 The Risk Assessment Phase
3.5 Risk Identification
3.6 Risk Analysis
3.6.1 Analysis of Controls and Barriers
3.6.2 Consequence Analysis
3.6.3 Frequency Analysis and Probability Estimation
3.7 Risk Evaluation
3.7.1 Acceptability and Tolerability Criteria of the Risk
3.8 The ALARP Study
3.9 Risk Management over Time
3.10 Risk Treatment
3.11 Monitoring and Review
3.12 Audit Activities
3.13 The System Performance Review
3.14 Proactive and Reactive Culture of Organisations Dealing with Risk Management
3.15 Systemic Approach to Fire Risk Management
4 Fire as an Accident
4.1 Industrial Accidents
4.2 Fires
4.2.1 Flash Fire
4.2.2 Pool Fire
4.2.3 Fireball
4.2.4 Jet Fire
4.3 Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE)
4.4 Explosion
4.5 Deflagrations and Detonations
4.5.1 Vapour Cloud Explosion
4.5.2 Threshold Values
4.5.3 Physical Effect Modelling
4.6 Fire in Compartments
5 Integrate Fire Safety into Asset Design
6 Fire Safety Principles
6.1 Fire Safety Concepts Tree
6.2 NFPA Standard 550
6.3 NFPA Standard 551
6.3.1 The Risk Matrix Method Applied to Fire Risk
7 Fire-Safety Design Resources
7.1 International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO)
7.1.1 ISO 16732
7.1.2 ISO 16733
7.1.3 ISO 23932
7.1.3.1 Scope and Principles of the Standard
7.1.4 ISO 17776
7.1.5 ISO 13702
7.2 British Standards (BS) – UK
7.2.1 PAS 911
7.2.1.1 Risk and Hazard Assessment
7.2.2 BS 9999
7.3 Society of Fire Protection Engineers – USA (SFPE-USA)
7.3.1 Engineering Guide to Fire Risk Assessment
7.3.2 Engineering Guide to Performance-Based Fire Protection
7.4 Italian Fire Code
7.4.1 IFC Fire-Safety Design Method
8 Performance-Based Fire Engineering
9 Fire Risk Assessment Methods
9.1 Risk Assessment Method Selection
9.2 Risk Identification
9.2.1 Brainstorming
9.2.2 Checklist
9.2.3 What–If
9.2.4 HAZOP
9.2.5 HAZID
9.2.6 FMEA/FMEDA/FMECA
9.3 Risk Analysis
9.3.1 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
9.3.2 Event Tree Analysis (ETA)
9.3.3 Bow-Tie and LOPA
9.3.3.1 Description of the Method
9.3.3.2 Building a Bow-Tie
9.3.3.3 Barriers
9.3.3.4 LOPA Analysis in Bow-Tie
9.3.4 FERA and Explosion Risk Assessment and Quantitative Risk Assessment
9.3.5 Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)
9.3.6 Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment (FERA)
9.4 Risk Evaluation
9.4.1 FN Curves
9.4.2 Risk Indices
9.4.3 Risk Matrices
9.4.4 Index Methods
9.4.4.1 An Example from a “Seveso” Plant
9.4.5 SWeHI Method
9.4.6 Application
9.5 Simplified Fire Risk Assessment Using a Weighted Checklist
9.5.1 Risk Levels
10 Risk Profiles
10.1 People
10.2 Property
10.3 Business Continuity
10.4 Environment
11 Fire Strategies
11.1 Risk Mitigation
11.2 Fire Reaction
11.3 Fire Resistance
11.4 Fire Compartments
11.5 Evacuation and Escape Routes
11.6 Emergency Management
11.7 Active Fire Protection Measures
11.8 Fire Detection
11.9 Smoke Control
11.10 Firefighting and Rescue Operations
11.11 Technological Systems
12 Fire-Safety Management and Performance
12.1 Preliminary Remarks
12.2 Safety Management in the Design Phase
12.3 Safety Management in the Implementation and Commissioning Phase
12.4 Safety Management in the Operation Phase
13 Learning from Real Fires (Forensic Highlights)
13.1 Torre dei Moro
13.1.1 Why It Happened
13.1.2 Findings
13.1.3 Lessons Learned and Recommendations
13.2 Norman Atlantic
13.2.1 Why It Happened
13.2.2 Findings
13.2.3 Lessons Learned and Recommendations
13.3 Storage Building on Fire
13.3.1 Why It Happened
13.3.2 Findings
13.3.3 Lessons Learned and Recommendations
13.4 ThyssenKrupp Fire
13.4.1 Why It Happened
13.4.2 Findings
13.4.3 Lessons Learned and Recommendations
13.5 Refinery’s Pipeway Fire
13.5.1 Why It Happened
13.5.2 Findings
13.5.3 Lessons Learned and Recommendations
13.6 Refinery Process Unit Fire
13.6.1 Why It Happened
13.6.2 Findings
13.6.3 Lessons Learned and Recommendations
13.7 Fire in Historical Buildings
13.7.1 Introduction
13.7.1.1 Description of the Building and Works
13.7.2 The Fire
13.7.2.1 The Fire Damage
13.7.3 Fire-Safety Lessons Learned
13.8 Fire Safety Concepts Tree Applied to Real Events
14 Case Studies (Risk Assessment Examples)
14.1 Introduction
14.2 Facility Description
14.3 Assessment
14.3.1 Selected Approach and Workflow
14.3.2 Methods
14.3.3 Fire Risk Assessment
14.3.4 Specific Insights
14.4 Results
15 Conclusions
Bibliography
Index
End User License Agreement
List of Tables
CHAPTER 02
Table 2.1 General information about...
Table 2.2 General information about...
Table 2.3 General information about...
Table 2.4 General information about...
Table 2.5 General information about...
Table 2.6 General information about...
CHAPTER 03
Table 3.1 Definitions of...
CHAPTER 04
Table 4.1 Incident typologies and...
Table 4.2 Threshold values for...
Table 4.3 Values of α...
CHAPTER 06
Table 6.1 Probability levels...
CHAPTER 07
Table 7.1 Additional fire-safety...
CHAPTER 08
Table 8.1 Minimum duration of...
Table 8.2 Examples of the...
Table 8.3 Example of performance...
Table 8.4 Example of performance...
CHAPTER 09
Table 9.1 Example of ‘...
Table 9.2 Guidewords for the...
Table 9.3 Extract of an...
Table 9.4 Subdivision of the...
Table 9.5 Hazards and assumed...
Table 9.6 List of typical...
Table 9.7 HAZID worksheet...
Table 9.8 Phases and HAZID...
Table 9.9 HAZID considerations applied...
Table 9.10 ‘Feed’...
Table 9.11 ‘Detailed design...
Table 9.12 Quality scores and...
Table 9.13 Standard performance scores...
Table 9.14 Example of immediate...
Table 9.15 Typical frequency levels...
Table 9.16 Typical consequence levels...
Table 9.17 Qualitative risk matrix...
Table 9.18 Quantitative risk matrix...
Table 9.19 Definition of credits...
Table 9.20 Overview of hazardous...
Table 9.21 R1 level...
Table 9.22 Probability of accident...
Table 9.23 Fire risk governing...
CHAPTER 10
Table 10.1 Prevailing characteristics of...
Table 10.2 Prevailing characteristics of...
Table 10.3 Assignment of R...
Table 10.4 Rlife risk profile...
Table 10.5 Assignment of R
prop
...
CHAPTER 11
Table 11.1 Contents of an...
CHAPTER 13
Table 13.1 Threshold values according...
Table 13.2 Tabular timeline of...
CHAPTER 14
Table 14.1 Prevalent characteristics of...
Table 14.2 Prevailing characteristic rate...
Table 14.3 Rbeni profile determination...
Table 14.4 Typical categorisation for...
Table 14.5 Criteria for minimum...
Table 14.6 Risk level categorisation...
Table 14.7 Summary of relevant...
Table 14.8 Summary of technologies...
Table 14.9 External areas in...
Table 14.10 External areas in...
Table 14.11 External areas in...
List of Illustrations
CHAPTER 02
Figure 2.1 Layout of the...
Figure 2.2 Building during the...
Figure 2.3 Longitudinal section of...
Figure 2.4 Photo of the...
Figure 2.5 Area involved in...
Figure 2.6 The flattener and...
Figure 2.7 Details of the...
Figure 2.8 Map of the...
Figure 2.9 Footprint of the...
Figure 2.10 Damages of the...
Figure 2.11 Some damaged pipes...
Figure 2.12 Transversal section of...
Figure 2.13 Photos of the...
Figure 2.14 A helicopter view...
Figure 2.15 Photos of the...
CHAPTER 03
Figure 3.1 Swiss cheese model...
Figure 3.2 Different perspectives on...
Figure 3.3 The principles of...
Figure 3.4 The RM framework...
Figure 3.5 Components of a...
Figure 3.6 Risk management framework...
Figure 3.7 Leadership and commitment...
Figure 3.8 Internal and external...
Figure 3.9 Identify the requirements...
Figure 3.10 Implementing the risk...
Figure 3.11 Scheme of the...
Figure 3.12 The risk assessment...
Figure 3.13 Level of risk...
Figure 3.14 Frequency analysis and...
Figure 3.15 Risk acceptability and...
Figure 3.16 Example of a...
Figure 3.17 Prioritisation of risk...
Figure 3.18 Risk prioritisation and...
Figure 3.19 Matrix example for...
Figure 3.20 Achieving balance in...
Figure 3.21 Risk treatment activities...
Figure 3.22 Residual risk...
Figure 3.24 Documenting the risk...
Figure 3.25 Skills and knowledge...
Figure 3.26 Resources to be...
Figure 3.27 Understand the mission...
Figure 3.28 Risk control hierarchy...
Figure 3.29 Culture maturity level...
Figure 3.30 Safety culture levels...
Figure 3.31 Quality of risk...
Figure 3.32 The pathological condition...
Figure 3.33 The reactive condition...
Figure 3.34 The bureaucratic condition...
Figure 3.35 The proactive condition...
Figure 3.36 The generative condition...
Figure 3.37 The Deming cycle...
Figure 3.38 Enterprise risks affected...
CHAPTER 04
Figure 4.1 Causes of industrial...
Figure 4.2 Components related to...
Figure 4.3 Identification of some...
Figure 4.4 Identification of some...
Figure 4.5 Major threats from...
Figure 4.6 Flammable dispersion cloud...
Figure 4.7 Flammable dispersion cloud...
Figure 4.8 Flammable dispersion cloud...
Figure 4.9 Radiation versus distance...
Figure 4.10 Schematic representation of...
Figure 4.11 LPG fireball...
Figure 4.12 LPG fireball...
Figure 4.13 LPG fireball...
Figure 4.14 Radiation versus distance...
Figure 4.15 Sequence of events...
Figure 4.16 Overpressure...
Figure 4.18 Impulse...
Figure 4.20 Explosion peak overpressure...
Figure 4.21 PEM activities at...
Figure 4.22 Conditions affecting the...
Figure 4.23 Possible evolution of...
Figure 4.24 Phases of a...
Figure 4.25 Fire growth rate...
Figure 4.26 Thermal release rate...
Figure 4.27 HRR growth curves...
CHAPTER 05
Figure 5.1 Phase design process...
Figure 5.2 Building life cycle...
Figure 5.3 Building fire safety...
Figure 5.4 Building fire safety...
Figure 5.5 Example fire safety...
Figure 5.6 Industrial asset design...
CHAPTER 06
Figure 6.1 Typical scheme of...
Figure 6.2 Typical scheme of...
Figure 6.3 Higher levels of...
Figure 6.4 Overview of the...
Figure 6.5 The Risk Matrix...
CHAPTER 07
Figure 7.1 Interaction between HAZOP...
Figure 7.2 Risk management over...
Figure 7.3 Elements constituting a...
Figure 7.4 Matrix of the...
Figure 7.5 Strategy evaluation grid...
Figure 7.6 Flow chart about...
Figure 7.7 General overview of...
Figure 7.8 IFC fire-safety...
CHAPTER 08
Figure 8.1 Phases of the...
Figure 8.2 ASET > RSET criterion...
CHAPTER 09
Figure 9.1 General overview of...
Figure 9.2 Iterative selection of...
Figure 9.3 Feed line propane...
Figure 9.4 Basic structure of...
Figure 9.5 Basic structure of...
Figure 9.6 Basic events...
Figure 9.8 Fire triangle using...
Figure 9.9 Flammable liquid storage...
Figure 9.10 Example of FTA...
Figure 9.11 Fault tree example...
Figure 9.12 Representative fault tree...
Figure 9.13 The structure of...
Figure 9.14 Event tree analysis...
Figure 9.15 Pipe connected to...
Figure 9.16 Example of event...
Figure 9.17 Representative event tree...
Figure 9.18 Bow-Tie diagram...
Figure 9.19 A typical Bow...
Figure 9.20 Bow-Tie as...
Figure 9.21 The ‘Swiss...
Figure 9.22 Basic elements of...
Figure 9.23 Barriers prescribed by...
Figure 9.24 Equivalent measures to...
Figure 9.25 Suggested additional risk...
Figure 9.26 Bow-Tie guiding...
Figure 9.27 Bow-Tie guiding...
Figure 9.28 Barrier functions...
Figure 9.30 Barrier classification promoted...
Figure 9.31 The energy model...
Figure 9.32 Generic safety functions...
Figure 9.33 Actions of a...
Figure 9.34 Defining ‘activities...
Figure 9.35 Scale of the...
Figure 9.36 Relationship between effectiveness...
Figure 9.37 A comparison between...
Figure 9.38 General workflow for...
Figure 9.39 QRA is the...
Figure 9.40 Summary of the...
Figure 9.41 Spectacle blinds and...
Figure 9.42 Instruments and small...
Figure 9.43 Event tree for...
Figure 9.44 Example of risk...
Figure 9.45 FN curves for...
Figure 9.46 Comparison between LSIR...
Figure 9.47 Emergency systems criticality...
Figure 9.48 Impairment frequency maps...
Figure 9.49 F–N...
Figure 9.50 Example of a...
Figure 9.51 Approach to screen...
Figure 9.52 Effect of type...
Figure 9.53 Hazardous units in...
Figure 9.54 Effect of additional...
Figure 9.55 Graphical representation of...
Figure 9.56 Proposed risk-based...
CHAPTER 11
Figure 11.1 Risk preventive and...
Figure 11.2 Role of the...
Figure 11.3 Fire in waste...
Figure 11.4 Area improperly used...
Figure 11.5 Non-combustible ceiling...
Figure 11.6 Protective treatment (fire...
Figure 11.7 Analytical calculation of...
Figure 11.8 Calcium silicate protection...
Figure 11.9 Investigations to assess...
Figure 11.10 Smoke-proof filter...
Figure 11.11 Pressurisation system of...
Figure 11.12 Restoration of plant...
Figure 11.13 Emergency exit of...
Figure 11.14 Doors with push...
Figure 11.15 Backlit escape sign...
Figure 11.16 Choice of exit...
Figure 11.17 Modelling escape routes...
Figure 11.18 Orderly exodus down...
Figure 11.19 Large-scale simulation...
Figure 11.20 Coordination of emergency...
Figure 11.21 Portable fire extinguisher...
Figure 11.22 Wheeled fire extinguisher...
Figure 11.23 Hydrant UNI45...
Figure 11.25 Fire pump room...
Figure 11.26 Incorrectly positioned sprinkler...
Figure 11.27 Water blade...
Figure 11.29 Testing a smoke...
Figure 11.30 Linear sensor...
Figure 11.32 Manual push-button...
Figure 11.33 Microphone station EVAC...
Figure 11.34 Magnet for automatic...
Figure 11.35 Natural smoke evacuator...
Figure 11.36 Multi-compartment smoke...
Figure 11.37 Mechanical smoke extraction...
Figure 11.38 Emergency vehicle approach...
Figure 11.39 Isolation devices of...
Figure 11.40 Electric release buttons...
Figure 11.41 Sign prohibiting lift...
Figure 11.42 Channel detector...
CHAPTER 13
Figure 13.1 Torre dei Moro...
Figure 13.2 Torre dei Moro...
Figure 13.3 Left: Open fire...
Figure 13.4 Closed intercept valve...
Figure 13.5 The valves opened...
Figure 13.6 Left: The drencher...
Figure 13.7 Recognition and collection...
Figure 13.8 Localised bending of...
Figure 13.9 Lateral openings on...
Figure 13.10 CFD simulation about...
Figure 13.11 Detailed RCA logic...
Figure 13.12 Part of the...
Figure 13.13 Photos taken inside...
Figure 13.14 Curve of the...
Figure 13.15 The PV thin...
Figure 13.16 The burned layers...
Figure 13.17 The domain used...
Figure 13.18 Jet fire simulation...
Figure 13.19 Jet fire simulation...
Figure 13.20 Event tree of...
Figure 13.21 Frames from the...
Figure 13.22 Graphical visualisation of...
Figure 13.23 Graphical visualisation of...
Figure 13.24 Steel structure damaged...
Figure 13.25 Forensic engineering highlighting...
Figure 13.26 Simulations carried out...
Figure 13.27 View of the...
Figure 13.28 Section of the...
Figure 13.29 Section of the...
Figure 13.30 View of the...
Figure 13.31 Effectiveness in risk...
CHAPTER 14
Figure 14.1 Bow-Ties developed...
Figure 14.2 Fire load...
Figure 14.4 Barriers/protection layer...
Figure 14.5 Weakest barriers and...
Figure 14.6 Ground floor plan...
Figure 14.7 Qualitative classification of...
Figure 14.8 Classification of activities...
Figure 14.9 Sample table compliance...
Figure 14.10 Quantitative analysis of...
Figure 14.12 Plant floor plan...
Figure 14.11 An illustrative example...
Figure 14.13 Graphic representation of...
Figure 14.14 Graphic representation of...
Figure 14.15 Floor plan of...
Figure 14.16 Interpretation of FDA...
Figure 14.17 External areas in...
Figure 14.18 External areas in...
Figure 14.19 External areas in...
Figure 14.20 Bow-Tie model...
Figure 14.21 Map of lightning...
Figure 14.22 Annual average temperature...
Guide
Cover
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication
Table of Contents
Foreword
Preface
Acknowledgments
List of Acronyms
About the Companion Website
Begin Reading
Bibliography
Index
End User License Agreement
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Foreword
“Fire safety between prescription and performance”.
Fire safety, in deliberately general terms, is a discipline of extreme complex application. This is primarily because, although it presents itself as a specialised sector, it affects almost the entirety of the profiles in which the design of an activity is declined; if we think that the fire-safety strategy developed for a given commercial activity conditions the choice of furnishings and fittings, we immediately realise the breadth of the profiles and perspectives impacted by the discipline. Second, because fire safety runs through and affects all phases of the development of an activity, starting from design and ending with daily management, once implemented, the fire-safety strategy must be applied in the operation of the activity and cyclically measured in expected performances.
Considering therefore the breadth of the regulated profiles and the immanence of fire safety in management processes, it is easy to understand how the discipline cannot be relegated among the recurring fulfilments to be carried out once and for all, but must find an integrated place in the production cycle and constitute an opportunity to improve the overall management process of the activity.
A little further elaboration is needed on this point.
In fact, fire safety – particularly in its prevention portion – was perceived as a separate process that had to accompany, through fire-safety design, the technical development of a given project, and that ended with obtaining a favourable opinion from the competent authorities and obtaining certification once the project was implemented (where applicable).
Such an approach was undoubtedly favoured by a prescriptive regulatory approach that, by providing for predetermined standards, allowed for the certainty of compliance once they had been integrated.
In fact, this approach can certainly not be considered the most efficient; the inherent limitation of the prescriptive approach precisely lies in the general and abstract nature of the standardisation and thus in the rigid application of standards:
on the one hand, they condition the possibility of developing innovative solutions in the case of new works;
on the other hand, they do not allow the utilisation in the fire strategy of strengths that may be available in existing works and activities through compensation with other requirements that are not fully sufficient.
Granted, with all its limitations, but the prescriptive approach is somewhat reminiscent of the Platonic view of reality in which the project constitutes the ideality and its application represents its imperfect mirror.
The fact is that, probably also due to instances of severe and continuous innovation in architectural, engineering and supporting technological development, a more performance-oriented approach to fire-safety management has progressively established itself, the development of which has gone hand in hand with the affirmation of the centrality of risk assessment and the empowerment of the activity owner in this regard.
In short, the fire protection designer has been allowed to play a central role in constructing the fire protection strategy – as if he or she were the ‘demiurge’ that connects reality to bring it closer to its ideality – with the owner’s guarantee and commitment to ensure that the assumptions underlying the design and expected performance are maintained over time.
Having said this, in such a largely established context, it would make no sense – in addition to being inconsistent with the obligations assumed by the owner with respect to the service – to manage fire prevention ‘fulfilments’ in a minimal and fractional manner in the context of the entire business cycle.
On the contrary, also thanks to the technological development of support tools, the integration of fire safety into the broader system of business process management constitutes an opportunity for overall improvement, both to strengthen safety and performance monitoring and to extend a participative and conscious approach of all actors involved.
This book, applicable to civil buildings as well as to industrial assets, enforces a holistic view of fire strategy design to be coupled with a conscious management of assets overtime to ensure the maintenance of the performances identified to achieve an acceptable level of fire risk from the earliest design stages and from the risk-based identification of fire scenarios by the competent application of sound approaches and methods.
Damiano Tranquilli
Head of Safety, Environment and Quality of Rete Ferroviaria Italiana, Direzione operativa stazioni. Head of Safety, GS Rail, Operations. Italian Ferrovie dello Stato Group
Foreword
According to its current technical definition, risk is the potential for realisation of unwanted, adverse consequences to human life, health, property or to the environment. Estimation of risk (for an event) is usually based on the expected value of the conditional probability of the event occurring times the consequence of the event, given that it has occurred. In this context, fire risk management can be considered as the process of firstly understanding and characterising fire hazard in a building, unwanted outcomes that may result from a fire, and secondly developing optimal and robust fire strategies to reduce risk or, at least, control its occurrence.
Recent tragic fire events such as the fire of the Grenfell Tower in London (2017) and of the Torre dei Moro in Milano (2021) have shown the importance of integrating the fire risk analysis from the beginning of the building design process, in order to identify the best fire strategy to be implemented in the construction. In both cases, the composite facades heated up rapidly and allowed the fire to spread faster, pass through windows and advance from floor to floor up and down the building’s facade.
In this book, the authors, thanks to their personal experience in fire-safety design and accident analysis, provide a comprehensive treatise of fire risk management. First, they describe recent fires, failed strategies and lessons learned. As a second step, they define the appropriate measures for fire risk assessment and the acceptable fire risk levels (according to national and international rules and performance-based codes) representing the first step in fire risk management. Then, the authors explain the state-of-the-art fire risk assessment and the fire-safety design leading to risk mitigation.
All the aspects of fire risk management are considered, including, for example, fault tree analysis, barrier performance, fire growth, fire spread and smoke movement, compartments, occupant response and evacuation models. Critical aspects of risk, such as the correct analysis of event consequences on people, environment, property and business continuity, are included. Finally, a note on explosions and appendices dedicated to railway stations, process industries and warehouse storage buildings are included.
The wide experience of the authors, both on civil buildings and industrial assets, along with their clarity and scientific rigor, make the book a unique and comprehensive essay on fire risk management.
Prof. Dr. Eng. Bernardino Chiaia
Head of the Center SISCON ‘Safety of Infrastructures and Constructions’, Politecnico di Torino (Italy)
Foreword
Fire risk management in contexts where the magnitude of damage is potentially very high is a particularly complex business. The history of major accidents teaches that they are typically determined by a variety of logically connected and antecedent causes to the facts, revealing that prevention is a multidisciplinary and multi-level theme, which is constituted on a stratification of decisions and controls, to be planned and supervised with the highest time priority.
Largest industrial organisations have long time ago understood that serious risks like this – which shake the foundations of entrepreneurial certainties linked to human, industrial, economic and reputational heritage – need to be matched, even before an adequately articulated architecture of measures, an iterative and very robust assessment system in order to properly understand accident phenomena in their possibilities, create organisational awareness and management competence among the professional figures involved, and reach a risk management plan capable of providing adequate strategies and responses.
Process control measures, as well as prevention and protection measures, while qualifying the organisation in terms of performance, activate investment procedures that are sometimes very demanding; therefore, the decisions connected to this must be carefully weighed, making use of all the available technologies and specific competencies to define the best actions to protect safety.
In this perspective, this editorial work is precious because, starting from a very broad and usable explication of the fundamental notions, it allows us to understand the importance of conducting weighted and customer-specific analyses and decisions. In fact, there are different methodologies and approaches for risk assessment, and it is now clear that the same performance result – in the design phase – can be achieved with a different dosage of technical-plant engineering solutions, organisational-managerial solutions and/or behavioural solutions, which turns into different costs and sustainability of the results for the operators or users of the assets. What are the most appropriate choices? What implications and charges do these choices entail on the operational management of processes? Since safety is the ultimate and common goal of all the involved actors, fire risk management is obviously not a theme that is affirmed only when the analysis is carried out, nor it is resolved in the effective completion of an authorisation process: the assessment process must accompany a project from its birth and continue throughout its life, consolidating its being as plural process in terms of ownership, temporal development and a variety of analytical and methodological focuses.
Risk assessment becomes a mindset to be used regularly. Appropriately fast and accurate methodologies must correspond to this; the use of resources must in fact be modular so that the efforts of calculation, representation, discussion and investment are diversified and concentrate where needed. Conversely, adopting inadequate methodologies necessarily involves a high risk on detriment of the asset under consideration, for the simple fact that some risk scenarios may be unknown and therefore not well controlled.
Finally, a good risk assessment provides clear and accurate outputs. Based on this, an effective competence network can be established for the benefit of all components of the organisation concerned. It is no longer just a matter of fostering the ability to react at zero time; rather, the foundations are laid for a widespread governance culture causal elements as well as elements not directly conducive to, obtainable only through an adequate study that moves the centre of the time axis away from the moment of the accident.
Vito Carbonara
Sabo S.p.A. (Italy) –Technical Procurement and Logistics Director
Preface
Heraclitus, an ancient Greek philosopher, asserted that everything in the world flows (‘Panta Rei’) and that fire represents universal becoming better than anything else because fire itself is the ‘arché’, the principle from which all things are generated.
For the philosopher, this is becoming not random and chaotic but is regular and orderly, provided one knows the rules.
In this volume, we have tried to explain the complex rules governing fire in a simple way, using methods, from the simplest to the most refined, such as the engineering approach.
Studying the development of smoke and heat in fires, knowing the effects they have on people and buildings, helps a great deal in adopting the right strategies for preventing and containing fires.
But the approach taken in the book is deliberately holistic in the sense that each individual strategy can have a great influence on the others, and therefore fire prevention must be seen as a whole.
And as a whole, the success (or failure) of the strategies implemented also depends on the behaviour of the people involved, behaviour that must be framed within a safety management perspective.
A volume that purports to present the historical discipline of fire prevention but with a new methodological approach based on the performance to be achieved rather than on strongly prescriptive but often uncritical methods and requirements.
Happy reading.
Luca Fiorentini and Fabio Dattilo
Acknowledgments
First of all, we would like to express our sincere thanks to Riccardo Di Camillo (P.Eng.).
Riccardo Di Camillo is Head of Fire Safety and Emergency Planning at Grandi Stazioni Rail S.p.A. – Operations, where he deals with all safety issues including permitting activities for the major Italian railway stations. Given his expertise in dealing with very large and complex railway infrastructures as well as with their renovation and modification plans, Riccardo gave us an important and fundamental support in developing all the fire strategy elements in the chapter with the title ‘fire strategies’. Fire risk mitigation should be based on a fire strategy conceived to be reliable over time, focused, auditable, and Riccardo, being a professional engineer specialised in fire-safety engineering, also offered us the practical experience in managing fire strategy elements on a daily basis in complex railway stations and infrastructure. This allowed us to highlight how the link between risk analysis, the basis of a performance approach, must necessarily find fulfilment in the implementation of an effective strategy over time as a commitment by organisations to ensure that an acceptable level of fire risk is maintained over time. Riccardo showed how the effective maintenance of the basic elements of the strategy must take into account the complications associated with the normal day-to-day management of the infrastructure for which he works, posed by the constant transformations during the necessary operational continuity, the presence of the public, the intersection with other infrastructure, and nonetheless the architectural complexity, the extension and the use of historical assets. By masterfully managing these aspects within the scope of his work, relating to all stakeholders, he enabled us to describe in a simple, clear and effective manner the problems and methods to seek their solution in the combination of actions aimed on the one hand at identifying and measuring the fire risk and on the other hand at managing the risk over time.
A heartfelt thank you people at TECSA S.r.l. (www.tecsasrl.it) who deal every day in fire risk assessment and industrial risk assessment consulting activities, overcoming the challenges posed by complexity and sharing the professional growth of the entire organisation that complexity itself poses to all those who are called upon to ensure safety over time. Through TECSA activities it is possible every day to measure oneself against important and unique experiences that impose the need to disseminate and share the lessons learnt so that we can increasingly not only speak a common language but also acquire a common understanding. TECSA gave us the material to prepare the case studies in this book summarising some experiences.
Finally, considering the fact that fire safety is an achievement of the organisations for themselves to protect their people, their contractors and third parties working there, the environment, their assets and their business continuity, it is most important to thank Dr. Germano Peverelli, President and CEO of Sabo S.p.A. (www.sabo.com), a fine chemical company operating for more than 80 years and under the requirements of the Seveso major accident EU Directive. We appreciated the proactive attitude of the company in dealing with fire and industrial risks as issues to be conjugated with the business. We should thank those guys firstly not only for having allowed high-level risk identification and management activities to be carried out using modern methodologies, but also for having established a relationship over the years characterised by seriousness and a common will to assess and manage fire and industrial risks in the best way and without compromise as a fundamental value for the organisation and all the involved stakeholders including the authorities having jurisdiction. Some of their continuous investments for safety and their commitment widely transpire from several summarised case studies presented in this book for which we thank them.
List of Acronyms
AHJ
Authority Having Jurisdiction
AIChE
American Institute of Chemical Engineers
AIIA
Associazione Italiana di Ingegneria Antincendio (SFPE Italy)
ALARP
As Low as Reasonably Practicable
ANSI
American National Standards Institute
API
American Petroleum Institute
ASET
Available Safe Egress Time
ATEX
Explosive Atmosphere
BFA
Barrier Failure Analysis
BIA
Business Impact Analysis
BLEVE
Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion
BS
British Standard
BSI
British Standard Institute
CEI
Comitato Elettrotecnico Italiano
CEN
European Committee for Standardisation
CENELEC
European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation
CFD
Computational Fluid Dynamics
CLP
Classification, Labelling and Packaging (EU Regulation)
COMAH
Control of Major Accident Hazards (Regulation)
DCS
Distributed Control System
DNV
Det Norske Veritas (now DNV-GL)
DOWF&EI
Dow Fire and Explosion Index
EIV
Emergency Isolation Valve
ETA
Event Tree Analysis
EVAC
Evacuation
EWS
Early Warning System
F&EI
Fire and Explosion Index
F&G
Fire and Gas
FARSI
Functionality, Availability, Reliability, Survivability and Interaction
FDS
Fire Dynamics Simulator
FEM
Finite-Element Method
FERA
Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment
FMEA
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
FMECA
Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis
FMEDA
Failure Modes and Effects Diagnostics Analysis
F–N
Frequency–Number (of fatalities)
FPSO
Floating Production and Offloading
FRA
Fire Risk Assessment
FRM
Fire Risk Management
FSE
Fire-Safety Engineering
FSM
Fire-Safety Management
FSMS
Fire-Safety Management System
FTA
Fault Tree Analysis
GSA
Gestione Sicurezza Antincendio (Fire-Safety Management)
HAC
Hazardous Area Classification
HAZAN
Hazards Analysis
HAZID
Hazards Identification
HAZOP
Hazard and Operability
HEP
Human Error Probability
HMI
Human–Machine Interface
HRA
Human Reliability Analysis
HRR
Heat Release Rate
HS
Health and Safety
HSMS
Health and Safety Management System
HSE
Health, Safety, Environment
HVAC
Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning
ICI
Imperial Chemical Industries
IEC
International Electrotechnical Commission
IMO
International Maritime Organisation
IPL
Independent Protection Layer
ISO
International Standard Organisation
ISO-TR
ISO-Technical Report
ISO-TS
ISO-Technical Specification
LFL
Low Flammability Level
LGN
Liquid Natural Gas
LOC
Loss of Containment
LOPA
Layer of Protection Analysis
LPG
Liquified Petroleum Gas
MARS
Major Accidents Reporting System
MIL-STD
Military Standard (US)
MOC
Management of Change
NFPA
National Fire Protection Association (USA)
NIST
National Institute for Standards and Technology (USA)
OHSAS
Occupational Health and Safety Assessment Series
P&IDs
Process and Instrumentation Diagrams
PDCA
Plan Do Check Act
PED
Pressure Equipment Directive (EU)
PFD
Probability of Failure on Demand
PHA
Preliminary (Process) Hazards Analysis
PSV
Pressure Safety Valve
QRA
Quantitative Risk Assessment
RAGAGEPs
Recognised and General Accepted Good Engineering Practices
RAM
Reliability Availability Maintainability
RAMS
Reliability Availability Maintainability Safety
RBD
Reliability Block Diagram
RHR
Heat Release Rate
R
env
Risk for Environment
R
life
Risk for Occupants
R
pro
Risk for Assets and Business Continuity
RM
Risk Management
RSET
Required Safe Egress Time
SFPE
Society of Fire Protection Engineers
SIF
Safety Instrumented Function
SIL
Safety Integrity Level
SIS
Safety Instrumented System
SMS
Safety Management System
TNO
Nederlandse Organisatie voor Toegepast Natuurwetenschappelijk Onderzo
TOR
Terms of Reference
UNI-VVF
Italian Specific Technical Regulation
UVCE
Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion
VCE
Vapour Cloud Explosion
About the Companion Website
This book is accompanied by a companion website:
www.wiley.com/go/Fiorentini/FireRiskManagement
This website includes a presentation of the main principles expressed in the book along with a number of pictures and diagrams that can be used during training sessions, as well as a number of fully developed case studies from several domains to illustrate different fire risk assessment and management methods from real experiences:
Fire risk assessment of a production plant for a Fire & Explosion Risk Assessment (FERA)
Fire risk assessment of a production plant for a Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)
Fire risk assessment of listed historical building
Fire risk assessment of listed Industrial production and warehouse site
Semi quantitative fire and explosion risk assessment of major accidents with LOPA and physical and effects modelling
1 Introduction
Building and industrial asset complexity is increasing, and new fire threats are emerging. Risk-based approach, instead of prescriptive rules, can give a better perspective to various stakeholders (not only in the design phase but also in the operation phase), but an effective fire risk assessment should be based on sound foundations around fire characteristics, building/industrial asset characteristics and people characteristics as well as the interactions among these elements. Fire-safety level should be managed and maintained during the life cycle of the asset and, in particular, during design and operation phases, including any emergency situation that may arise. Fire strategy should be defined, shared and communicated among stakeholders that often have different knowledge and feeling about fire protection measures, assessment methods, codes and standards. This book allows the readers achieving a common and intuitive overview of the process to select, design and operate a fire strategy in a risk-based framework, in which the strategy, as a pool of different measures, is not unique.
Given a fire scenario, the proper fire strategy should be defined given the risk (magnitude and probability of occurrence), the risk-reduction factor, the cost to implement and to maintain the measures, the vulnerabilities, etc. Resilience is achieved when fire risk assessment allows the consideration of the relevant fire scenarios, and their mitigation in frequency and magnitude to an acceptable level, given a defined risk criterion, is put in place and maintained over the time with a sound fire-safety strategy, known and shared among the stakeholders.
Stakeholders should be aware of considering the fire strategy as a common and shared holistic approach that goes beyond the differences among the parties (in primis the ‘famous’ gap among architects or civil engineers and fire protection engineers) to a specific additional and inalienable objective for the building performance: fire safety.
This approach would benefit from the increasingly common collaborative and working environments (even digital) that could solicit a common discussion around fire-safety issues.
According to the complexity of the building/asset under consideration, the readers will gain an overview of the general approach to achieve a structured fire-safety strategy in the design phase to be maintained over time, based on fire risk assessment results and eventually coupled with performance-based approaches for alternative solutions.
This workflow, based on fire-safety principles and from the examples gained, in terms of lessons learnt from real and severe fire events, is regulation-free and codes-neutral. This framework may become the basis of a common fire-safety culture among professionals with different expertise and from different environments, including the people who should manage fire safety during the operation phase under the use cases defined during earlier design.
These use cases, built around fire-safety objectives, should nowadays face complexity of socio-technical organisations using basic fire-safety principles. For professional engineers who want to adopt performance-based approaches (often built around the use of sophisticated tools), this book serves as a reminder of the objectives to be achieved considering the fire-safety fundamentals. For all the involved stakeholders, the content discusses the fire-risk-based workflow to be followed to verify and document the achievement of the performance as well as the requirements for the building/asset owners to maintain over time the required performance levels for each preventive/mitigative safety measure in the selected fire strategy as defined by a consistent fire risk assessment activity that becomes, together with the fire engineer, the main element of the entire process, while increasing the responsibilities of the expert himself:
“The fire engineer needs a certain toughness – and I am referring to intellectual toughness. The engineer must be able to be tested, challenged and deal with matters in a rigorous, analytical and, above all, honest way”.
Margaret Law, OBE, 1990
2 Recent Fires and Failed Strategies
Over the past few decades, fire safety has taken some significant steps forward which have made it possible to achieve high safety standards today in a variety of application areas, from civil to industrial to maritime. The merit of this advance in different sectors can be found in the overlapping of multiple factors that, layering one on top of the other, have considerably thickened the level of fire safety potentially achievable today. A fundamental role is undoubtedly played by the progress made in the field of materials technology, fire protection systems and local regulatory requirements, which, in each country, has imposed increasingly restrictive measures that are primarily oriented towards expected performance rather than the prescription of already ‘pre-packaged’ design parameters that showed great limitations in applicability given the current complexity in each sector and daily emerging threats.
Despite this, the more or less recent news headlines continue to be populated by incidents involving fires and/or explosions that attract media attention due to their severe consequences in terms of fatalities, injuries, damage to the artistic-historical heritage, environmental pollution and so on. Excluding wildfires and fires on aircraft from the list, a simple search reveals the following fires to be identified among the major news stories of recent years:
Oil depot explosion in Cuba – 7 August 2022 – 1 fatality, 121 injured and 16 missing;
‘Moro’ Tower fire in Milan (IT) – 29 August 2021 – no fatalities;
Beirut port explosion – 4 August 2020 – 218 fatalities;
ICS plant fire in Avellino (IT) – 13 September 2019 – complete destruction of the plant;
Notre Dame fire in Paris – 15 April 2019 – damage to historical and artistic heritage;
Grenfell Tower fire in London (UK) – 14 June 2017 – 72 fatalities;
Norman Atlantic ferry fire – 28 December 2014 – 9 fatalities and 20 missing;
ThyssenKrupp fire in Turin (IT) – 6 December 2007 – 7 fatalities;
Deep Water Horizon drilling offshore platform explosion and fire in Gulf of Mexico – 22 April 2010 – 11 fatalities and complete loss and severe environmental damage;
Lac – Mégantic crude oil train rail disaster in Quebec (CA) – 6 July 2013 – 47 fatalities (42 confirmed and 5 presumed victims).
It is striking to observe how, despite the long period of time that separates us from the event chronologically most distant to us, incidents of these kinds are still terribly topical and equally nefarious because of the high degree of exposure that characterises them.
In order to understand the reasons that led the authors to write this book, a number of incidents are illustrated in the following sections, with the aim of discussing, at this stage albeit briefly, the reasons that led to the failure of the planned fire-safety strategies.
All the incidents are simple examples, among the most well known at international level, of failed fire strategies where the severities have been determined and/or escalated by a number of multiple failures, often occurred in different stages, including the design phase and the operation phase.
2.1 Torre dei Moro
2.1.1 How It Happened (Incident Dynamics)
High-rise building known as ‘Torre dei Moro’ is composed of
an approximately 60 m high tower consisting of 18 above-ground floors for exclusively residential use;
2 underground floors;
some lower bodies for commercial and residential use, for a total of 77 residential building units, out of a total of 84 building portions.
It follows that the building has a mixed-type configuration and is consisted of (i) 3100 m2 of production area, (ii) 2300 m2 of commercial area, (iii) 420 m2 of tertiary area, and (iv) 3700 m2 of residential area.
The tower is composed of a reinforced concrete frame: the first five horizons of the complex are composed of prefabricated trussed slabs, lightened with polystyrene blocks and cast-in-place completion castings, while the remaining levels are composed of prefabricated latero-concrete panels with cast-in-place completion castings. The staircase ramp is made of a reinforced concrete mix with solid slabs, the roofing of the units above the business premises is flat, while that of the tower is made of prefabricated joists with brick-lightening blocks.
Visually, the tower appears as a parallelepiped with balconies jutting out on the largest sides with a curved profile, while on the two largest sides of the parallelepiped there are two curved sails that cover the balcony parapets and continue beyond the building outline (Figure 2.1).
Figure 2.1 Layout of the building.
Fire started on the balcony of flat C, exposed on one of the two side sails, located on the fifteenth floor of the building. Initial fire has been recorded as very severe and fully developed since the beginning.
Fire first started visibly with the presence of abundant smoke, which was followed by the rapid spread of flames over the building via the mast external façade and also involving the insulation panels applied as an external cladding to the main structure of the building. It then rapidly spread to the panels located on the side end of the balcony, further feeding and, above all, favouring the downward spread of the flames, made possible by the phenomenon of the dripping of the polymer constituting the panels and the fall of the same (Table 2.1).
Table 2.1 General information about ‘Torre dei Moro’ fire.
Who
High-rise residential building
What
Façade fire
When
29 August 2021
Where
Milan (Italy)
Consequences
Severe damages to the building and adjacent residential premises; no fatalities
Credits
Luca Fiorentini (TECSA S.r.l.)
The spread of the fire was rapid and followed a totally atypical evolution, extending not only towards the upper floors favoured by the upwards development of the flames, but also laterally and, above all, towards the lower floors, involving the entire building, up to the shops on the ground floor, including the car park.
Not only were the sail panels unable to contain and/or at least contain the combustion phenomenon, but, on the contrary, they also caused the fire to develop rapidly, creating new hotspots (located in the lower part of the building) completely disconnected from the first one (located on the fifteenth floor of the tower), thus affecting parts of the building that would not normally have been involved in the fire in any way.
Although the flames spread outside the building, they then penetrated inside the flats through the windows and doors.
The flames that spread on the west façade of the tower passed through the outer structure known as the ‘sail’, affecting the materials on the balconies. These acted as vectors for the introduction of the flames inside the flats at some locations contributing to the resulting damages.
The evidence found on site highlights the differentiated damage suffered by the flats. By virtue of the materials on the balconies, these were attacked by the flames, carrying the fire from the outside to the inside. The wind, which was almost always present, especially on the upper floors, helped channel hot smoke and flames into the houses, first affecting the window frames and then penetrating into the flats.
On one and the same landing, for example, there are houses where only one is affected by partial smoke damage, while the one next door suffered a heat stroke that destroyed the rooms. The dwellings face opposite façades.
An analysis of the angle of the flames shows that the material from which the fire originated was located in the niche in the end section inside the balcony, close to the closing part of the sail.
The action of the flames therefore caused the metal end wall of the balcony to collapse, effectively creating a direct communication with the cavity where the PVC rainwater drainage pipes are located.
This service cavity is a single duct extending from the ceiling down to the ground, and in fact creates a high ‘chimney’-type effect, in which the flames also develop quickly thanks to the turbulence created inside.
Photographic evidence shows the presence of flames at the top of the façade, in correspondence with the cavity, an indication that they are fully spread inside this duct (cavity) where they gain speed precisely because of the aforementioned ‘chimney effect’.
The vigorous dripping of the incandescent insulation triggers a fire at the base of the cavity, causing the rapid extension of the flames that enveloped the entire building.
The fire was somehow brought under control after many hours of extinguishing activities by the fire brigade department, who used ladder trucks to reach (even if only partially) the upper floors of the building, and highly qualified personnel.
It is quite evident that (i) the speed of flame propagation, (ii) its continuous feeding, (iii) its spreading not only upwards but also downwards and sideways, and (iv) its ability to involve even a completely detached façade oriented in the opposite direction show that the initial ignition found its source of combustion in the materials that are used to compose and clad the building.
Significant damage to the attics of many floors above ground level was immediately reported, without the involvement of people.
After the critical phase of the fire (Figure 2.2), in constant liaison with the fire brigade department continuously present at the site of the damaging event, work was started to save the unsafe parts still present on the façades.
Figure 2.2 Building during the fire.
