Kut 1916: Courage and Failure in Iraq E-Book

Patrick Crowley

• Herausgeber: The History Press
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 644

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2009

Beschreibung

The siege of Kut is a story of blunders, sacrifice, imprisonment and escape. The allied campaign in Mesopotamia began in 1914 as a relatively simple operation to secure the oilfields in the Shatt-al-Arab delta and Basra area. Initially it was a great success, but as the army pressed towards Baghdad its poor logistic support, training, equipment and command left it isolated and besieged by the Turks. By 1916 the army had not been relieved, and on 29 April 1916, the British Army suffered one of the worst defeats in its military history. Major-General Sir Charles Townshend surrendered his allied force to the Turks in the Mesopotamian (now Iraq) town of Kut-al-Amara. Over 13,000 troops, British and Indian, went into captivity; many would not survive their incarceration. In Kut 1916, Colonel Crowley recounts this dramatic tale and its terrible aftermath.

Leseprobe

This book is dedicated to those British and Indiansoldiers who never made it home

They shall not return to us, the resolute, the young,

The eager and wholehearted whom we gave:

But the men who left them thriftily to die in their own dung,

Shall they come with years and honour to the grave?

Extract from Rudyard Kipling’s ‘Mesopotamia 1917’

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book has taken a long time to construct, as I have worked at it in the margins of a series of busy jobs. I began collecting reference material from the library of the Defence Academy, Shrivenham, in 2003 and took a particular interest in Mesopotamia whilst on operations in Iraq in 2006/07. My prime thanks go to my father-in-law, John Rule, who has been enthusiastically investigating various references for me over a two-year period. Without his ‘reconnaissance’ of archives at Kew, the National Army Museum, the Imperial War Museum and some regimental museums, this book would never have appeared. My second thanks go to the patient staff of the Prince Consort’s Library, Aldershot, and the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst – both institutions hold a fascinating and invaluable collection of books and have been extremely helpful in finding rare references. I am also particularly grateful to two busy and influential individuals, Professor Gary Sheffield and Lieutenant-General Graeme Lamb, for their written contributions. Thanks also to Brigadier Mark Armstrong and Lieutenant-Colonel Bede Strong for their modern pictures from Iraq. Other patient helpers have been the staff at the Royal Hampshire Regiment Museum at Winchester. Aggie Smith provided invaluable practical help in putting the initial drafts together and the Indian Army Liaison Officer at Headquarters Infantry, Colonel Mohit Seth, helped identify Indian Army heritage. Finally, my thanks to my wife, Jane, for being so patient when we might have been doing other things!

Colonel Patrick Crowley, Iraq 2006.

CONTENTS

Title

Dedication

Acknowledgements

List of Maps

Foreword by Professor Gary Sheffield

Preface to the Second Edition

Part One    To the Fall of Kut

Chapter One    – The Scene is Set

The Campaign Summarised

– Oil

– Strategic Importance

– Basra

– Qurna

– Shaiba

– Ahwaz

– Amara

– Nasiriya

– The Move to Kut

– The Turkish Army

– Townshend’s Doubts

– Es Sinn: The Battle of Kut

– More Doubts

– Ctesiphon, Umm-al-Tubal and the Withdrawal to Kut

– The Decision to Stand at Kut

Chapter Two    Kut

The Town

– The Resident Population

– The Defences

– Food Supply

– Ammunition Supply

– Morale and Health

– The Garrison

Chapter Three    December 1915 – Hope and Successful Defence

The Beginning

– Snipers

– Communiqués

– Shelling

– Gallantry

– The Relief Force

– Back in Kut

– The Turks

– The Big Assault

– Christmas

– 1915 Concludes

Chapter Four    January 1916 – False Hopes

The Relief Force Advances

– The Enemy

– Lines of Communication

– Command and Control

– 12th Division

– Kut

– Shaikh Saad

– Medical Support

– The Wadi

– General Sir Percy Lake Takes Overall Command

– The Hanna (or Umm-el-Hannah) Defile

– Back in Kut

– Food

– Rain

– Other Activity

– The End of January

– Communiqué Number One

Chapter Five    February 1916 – Uncertainty and Routine

A ‘Quiet’ Month

– Dispositions

– The New Relief Plan

– Change of Strategic Command

– Life in Kut

– The Relief Force

– Air Support

– On the River Euphrates

– The End of February

– Maintaining Morale

– Sixteenth Anniversary Dinner

Chapter Six    March 1916 – The Second Relief Attempt

Anticipation in Kut

– The Battle at Dujaila Redoubt

– Communiqué Number Two

– An Offer to Surrender

– Consequences

– A New Commander for the Relief Force

– Garrison Routine Continues

Chapter Seven    April 1916 – Prelude to Surrender

13th Division and Major-General Maude

– Attacks at Hanna and Fallahiya

– The Sannaiyat Battle

– Communiqués Number Three and Four

– Back in Kut

– Last Attempts at Breakthrough – Beit Aiessa (Bait Isa) and Sannaiyat

– The

Julnar

Affair

– Negotiations and Lawrence of Arabia

– Communiqués Number Five and Six

Chapter Eight    Capitulation

The Garrison

– The Relief Force

Part Two    Imprisoned

Chapter Nine    – Into Captivity

Shumran

– To Baghdad

– Samara

– The Trek Continues

– Heading West

– Final Destinations

– Parliamentary Report 9208, November 1918

Chapter Ten    Survival

Constantinople

– Broussa (or Brusa)

– Kastamuni

– Changri

– Kedos

– Yozgad

– Afion Kara Hissar

– The Other Ranks

Chapter Eleven    Escape

Attitudes

– The Kastamuni Four

– The Yozgad Break-Out

– Madness

– Reward

Chapter Twelve    Freedom

Differing Experiences

– Major-General Townshend

– More Typical Experiences

– The Reverend Harold Spooner

– Welcome Home to 1/4th Hampshires

– Retribution?

Chapter Thirteen    An Assessment

Arab and Turk

– The Indian Army

– Command and Control

– Logistics

– The Environment, Tactics and Morale

– Conclusion

Afterword          Lieutenant-General Sir Graeme Lamb

Appendix I         The Force Besieged in Kut

Appendix II       The Relief Force

Appendix III      The Turkish Army In and Around Kut at the Time of Surrender

Appendix IV      Key Personalities

Appendix V        Major-General Townshend

Appendix VI      Chronology

Appendix VII     Battle Honours

Appendix VIII   Comparable Ranks

Appendix IX      Major-General Sir Charles Melliss’s Letter to the Secretary of State for War – Sent from Broussa on 15 August 1917

Bibliography

Copyright

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LISTOF MAPS

  1    Map of the Turkish Empire

  2    Lower Mesopotamia

  3    Early Part of Nasiriya Operations

  4    Nasiriya Operations

  5    Battle of Kut

  6    Battle of Ctesiphon

  7    Kut – General

  8    Kut – Friendly Dispositions

  9    Kut Town – Detail

10    The Fort at Kut

11    Rough Plan of the Defences

12    The Turkish Positions on the Tigris

13    Battle of Shaikh Saad

14    Tigris between Shaikh Saad and Shumran

15    Battle of the Wadi

16    First Attack on Hanna

17    Battle of Umm-El-Hannah

18    Major Nelson’s Map of Kut

19    Captain Mousley’s Map of Kut

20    Actions for the Relief of Kut

21    Attack on Dujaila Redoubt – Detail

22    Operations between 10 March and the end of April 1916

23    Attempts to Relieve Kut

24    Battle of Beit Aieesa

25    Battle of Sannaiyat

26    Map of Asia Minor and Upper Mesopotamia, showing Prison Camps

27    The Baghdad Area

28    Sketch Map of Kastamuni

29    Yozgad to Cyprus

30    The Middle East

FOREWORD BYGARY SHEFFIELD

The Mesopotamian campaign of the First World War remains a neglected facet of that terrible conflict – although events of recent years have given it additional currency. The campaign was a product of two interweaved factors: the deadlock on the Western Front, and British imperialism. Once it became clear that the fighting in France and Flanders was going to be long drawn out, bloody and indecisive, decision-makers began to search for strategic alternatives. The ill-fated Gallipoli campaign of 1915 was the principal product of this thinking, but other secondary theatres were also developed as a consequence.

Mesopotamia, modern-day Iraq, was in 1914 a province of the Ottoman (Turkish) Empire. British and Indian troops were landed at Basra, at the head of the Persian Gulf, at the end of 1914. This was a limited and sensible move to secure oil supplies. Under the pressure of events, the aims of the British forces on the area became increasingly ambitious. Although primarily a struggle to prevent German domination of Europe, the war was also seen as an opportunity to strengthen and expand the Empire. Turkey had been the ‘sick man of Europe’ for decades, and the time seemed to have arrived for the Ottoman Empire to be partitioned. It has been said that the British Empire was acquired in a fit of absent-mindedness. Much the same can be said of the conquest of Mesopotamia. Almost as a reflex, bit by bit, the British forces advanced deeper into the interior. The defeat at Kut, a story well told by Patrick Crowley in this book, was a disaster waiting to happen.

‘Mespot’ lacked the romance and glamour, however spurious, of the campaigns at Gallipoli and in Palestine. Post-war debates raged about whether the opportunity for a major victory had been thrown away at the Dardanelles (the answer, almost certainly, is no). Similarly, the remarkable success of Allenby and the legendary exploits of T.E. Lawrence drew writers to the Palestine campaign. By contrast, little was written about Mesopotamia, which has remained the least known of the major ‘sideshows’ fought against the Turks.

In the short term, the defeat at Kut was a damaging blow to British prestige. It came a few months after the final evacuation of Gallipoli, and around the same time as the naval battle of Jutland (which disappointed a public expecting a new Trafalgar), the Easter Uprising in Dublin, and the death of Lord Kitchener; and a few months before the armies of the Empire began the long-drawn-out agony of the Somme. Kut was thus one of a series of pieces of bad news at that time. In the longer term, Kut was a setback in the Mesopotamian campaign, and little more. The war ended with military victory and the poisoned chalice of Iraq passing to Britain. For those who suffered as a result of Kut, either during the campaign and siege or as a prisoner of war, the consequences were of course serious indeed.

In these centenary years the debate on the First World War is as fierce as ever, and I am pleased that Patrick Crowley has produced a second edition of Kut. Not only is it a fine contribution to the historiography of the First World War, it also serves as important historical context to the momentous events taking place in the Near East today. In 2016 the media and public focus will undoubtedly be on the centenary of the Somme. One can only hope that this book will help remind people of the 100th anniversary of another major battle in which other volunteer British and Indian soldiers served, suffered and died in a largely forgotten campaign.

Gary Sheffield

Professor of War Studies

University of Wolverhampton

August 2015

Map of the Turkish Empire. (Times – The Great War)

PREFACE TO THESECOND EDITION

This second edition of Kut 1916 is published at an interesting period in the history of the fractious land of Mesopotamia/Iraq. The Multi-National Forces have withdrawn from ground-based combat operations, but there are still western troops in Iraq, including the British. Soldiers of my own regiment, the Princess of Wales’s Royal Regiment, successors to the men of Kut, have been providing instruction to Iraqi forces battling Islamic State.

Mesopotamia continues to be a battleground and it is right, 100 years after the Kut disaster, to remember those men who perished in the siege, either within the town and in the Relief Force or in captivity afterwards. This book remains the only detailed modern analysis combining a description of the siege, the attempt to relieve the town and the experiences of the prisoners of war. However, Mesopotamia in the First World War and the disaster at Kut have received much needed additional attention since the first edition was published. The following new books have added great value to this fascinating story. The wider Turkish strategic perspective has been admirably explained in Eugene Rogan’s The Fall of the Ottoman Empire (Penguin, Random House UK, 2015), whilst the campaign as a whole has been expanded upon by Charles Townshend’s When God Made Hell: The British Invasion of Mesopotamia and the Creation of Iraq 1914–1921 (Faber and Faber, 2010) and Paul Knight’s The British Army in Mesopotamia 1914–1918 (McFarland & Company, 2013). In addition, Nikolas Gardner’s The Siege of Kut-al-Amara (Indiana University Press, 2014) provides more detail of the siege itself with excellent analysis of the Indian Army and its commanders, whilst Andrew Syk continues to provide some outstanding analysis of the campaign. Also, a third biography of Townshend by N.S. Nash has further explored the subject’s character; he concludes that the general was professional, egocentric and lacked moral courage –‘a psychologist’s dream’.1 All of this worthy work improves our knowledge about this little known Mesopotamia ‘side-show’.

The first edition of Kut 1916 was received positively; however, for this edition, I highlight two issues: General Nixon and the wider Turkish perspective.

Kut was a disaster for a number of strategic, operational and tactical factors as explained in my assessment in Chapter 13. Command and control confusion and incoherency was one of these key factors involving what Norman Dixon described as ‘the trio’: Townshend, the tactical commander in Kut; Nixon, the operational commander in Mesopotamia; and Beauchamp-Duff, the India-based Commander-in-Chief. I have analysed Townshend’s actions in some depth and the Mesopotamia Commission castigated the other two generals; it is thought that Beauchamp-Duff’s suicide in 1918 was directly related to its findings and they hardly helped Nixon’s poor health and early death in 1921. Busch agrees that no individual was to blame for Kut: ‘The responsibility for the advance, and the failure, cannot be laid upon one individual, or even one department’, and I concur with that view.2

A combination of military and political decisions led to the disaster. All were caught up by Townshend’s initial military successes, Nixon’s misreading of the situation and over-confidence, and the political expectations driven by the senior army officers and politicians in India, who wanted the prestige of capturing Baghdad. However, Nixon’s role needs highlighting; this book comments on his actions as the story unfolds, as he encourages Townshend. Sir Arnold Wilson made his views about Nixon very clear: ‘The weightiest share of responsibility lies with Sir John Nixon, whose confident optimism was the main cause of the decision to advance.’3 He blames him for insufficient transport and equipment, but makes the point that it was not Nixon’s fault for the poor intelligence on the Turks, the lack of clarity emanating from Townshend in Kut or the poor instructions he received from India. These commanders were ‘Victims of the circumstances in which they found themselves’.4 Nixon was not alone in mis-appreciating the Kut situation, as identified by Evans in his analysis of the campaign, ‘The strategic implication was not comprehended by either General Nixon or the authorities in India’.5 Townshend, of course, in his own memoirs, makes a point of blaming Nixon, writing that, ‘The advance was against my judgement’ and ‘I was ordered to plan and perform a difficult and delicate operation, and had utterly inadequate means with which to carry it out’.6 He also, condescendingly, remarks that Nixon was an excellent commander for ‘savage warfare’ against a greatly inferior native enemy, suggesting that he was wanting when it came to fighting the Turks. Yet, Nixon consistently supported and congratulated Townshend’s actions and decisions, including the fateful one to stand at Kut, though this support was described by Evans as the ‘height of rashness’.7 Nevertheless, the ever-confident Townshend was hardly reluctant to pursue the enemy up the River Tigris with or without the support of General Nixon. As I have said elsewhere, Townshend, in 1920, was fighting for his reputation, but he had been fortunate that Nixon took the blame for the Kut disaster when giving evidence to the Mesopotamia Commission, despite the obvious spread of responsibility highlighted throughout this book.

Up to fairly recently, the Turkish perspective of Mesopotamia and elsewhere during the First World War has had limited in-depth analysis translated into English. Erickson’s critical studies of Ottoman effectiveness and Turkish actions in Gallipoli are extremely informative, whilst Rogan’s wider analysis adds enormous value, creating a much better understanding of the Ottoman and Arab roles in the First World War. Whilst the German Kaiser tried to establish himself as a supporter of Muslim Jihad, Rogan comments that Ottoman entry to the war ‘threatened to bring disorder to the Raj’.8 However, in 1914, the Turks had been trounced in the Caucasus by the Russians and, in 1915, embarrassed by the British in a humiliating defeat at the Suez Canal. In the same year, they sought victory at Shaiba, under the impetuous and ambitious Suleyman Askeri Pasha in order to recapture Basra from the British, but that also ended in Turkish failure.

It is no wonder that Nixon and others felt confident of British success. Despite the Ottomans’ poor performance at the beginning of the Mesopotamian campaign, by October 1915 they were a much greater threat, demonstrated by the British decision to abandon Gallipoli in the face of determined Turkish opposition. Whilst the British evacuation of the peninsular in December 1915 and January 1916 was a tactical success, the Turks had achieved a far more significant strategic victory. In addition, Kut was encircled, the British relief force in Mesopotamia was held back and on another front, in Aden, the Turks had succeeded in weakening the British. British prestige was to hit a new low after the Kut surrender of April 1916; there was a genuine fear that Ottoman success could act as a catalyst in other parts of the British Empire for rebellion, particularly amongst Muslims in India.

Patrick Crowley

January 2016

Notes

1  N.S. Nash (2010), Chitral Charlie, Pen & Sword, p.314.

2  Busch (1971), Britain, India and the Arabs, 1914–1921, University of California Press, p.35.

3  Wilson (1930), p.173.

4  Ibid., p.125.

5  Evans (1935), p.59.

6  Townshend (1920), p.10 and 104.

7  Evans (1935), p.63.

8  Rogan (2015), p.70.

Other books by Patrick Crowley

Infantry Regiments of Surrey

Afghanistan: The Three Wars

Regimental Guide to the Princess of Wales’s Royal Regiment

Loyal to Empire: The Life of General Sir Charles Monro, 1860–1929(forthcoming summer 2016)

Lower Mesopotamia. (Candler)

Part One

TOTHE FALLOF KUT

To the Garrison of Kut

Battle and toil survived, is this the end

Of all your high endeavour? Shall the stock

That death and desert braved be made the mock

Of gazing crowds, nor in the crowd a friend?

Shall they who ever to their will did bend –

From Zain to Ctesiphon – the battle-shock

Fall prey to lean starvation’s craven flock

And the dark terrors that her train attend?

You leave the field; but those who, pressing by,

Take up the torch, whene’er your name is named

Shall fight more stoutly, while your company,

Its task performed, shall carry unashamed

Into captivity a courage high:

The body prisoner, but the mind untamed

R.W. Bullard1

Chapter One

THE SCENEIS SET

This modest venture led to a British military disaster so total yet unnecessary, so futile yet expensive, that its like did not occur again until the fall of Singapore in 1942.2

The town of Kut in Mesopotamia, now Iraq, surrendered to the Turkish Army on 29 April 1916. The occupying British-led and mainly Indian Army force had been besieged for four months. 12,000 soldiers were taken into captivity and were to suffer almost as much as their countrymen did in different circumstances under the Japanese nearly thirty years later. There had been 3,776 casualties during the siege, 23,000 men were killed or wounded during the unsuccessful relief attempts and a further 4,000 were to die, subsequently, as prisoners. It was, arguably, Britain’s worse military defeat since the surrender of Cornwallis’s army in 1781 during the American Revolutionary War and came only a few months after the evacuation from Gallipoli.

The campaign in Mesopotamia was India’s main contribution to the First World War. It spawned two major enquiries, the resignation of Austen Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for India, and the offer of resignation from Lord Hardinge, the Viceroy of India. It is now a little-known affair, overshadowed by the scale of the First World War and the attention that is given to the Western Front and Gallipoli. However, it was an expeditionary campaign fought over ground to which the British Army was to deploy again in the 1920s and 1940s and assault through in 1991 and 2003. Many Britons, both military and civilian, have seen service in the area, so the fascinating story of Kut is currently of great pertinence. Foresightedly, in his analysis of the campaign in 1926, Major Evans commented: ‘Unless these difficulties are studied, unless they are met before, and not after, they occur; unless the essentials of the problem are appreciated before the solution is begun, the mistakes in 1914–18 will occur.’3

This chapter provides an overview of the British campaign in Mesopotamia, whilst the subsequent chapters are devoted to the human story of those besieged in Kut; the failed relief attempts, surrender, captivity and freedom.

The Campaign Summarised

The First World War reached Mesopotamia just twenty-four hours after conflict formally began between Britain and Turkey. Mid-morning on 6 November 1914, a landing force disembarked from a British flotilla led by HMS Ocean and the sloop, Odin. The objectives, reached by the Shatt-al Arab waterway at the head of the Persian Gulf, were the fort and telegraph station on the Fao Peninsula. Lead elements of Indian Expeditionary Force ‘D’, consisting of British, Indian and Royal Naval troops, commanded by Brigadier-General Walter Delamain, were immediately successful. His 16th Infantry Brigade of the 6th (Poona) Division conducted a second landing two days later at Sanniya, unopposed. By 24 November, Basra had been secured and two brigades, commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Barrett, were firmly established in the theatre of operations. The British forces had totally surprised and overwhelmed the enemy, seizing all of their objectives – and, particularly, securing the oil.

Field Marshal Sir Arthur Barrett. (Wilson)

Lord Hardinge. (Wilson)

Oil

Mesopotamia was an ancient name used by the British to conveniently describe the three Turkish provinces (vilayets) of Basra in the south, Baghdad in the centre and Mosul in the north. The southern vilayet had recently become increasingly important, because of the local oilfields and pipeline leading to Abadan. Winston Churchill, as First Lord of the Admiralty, had encouraged the development of oil-fired ships for the Royal Navy and in 1913 the Anglo-Persian Oil Convention secured a British controlling stake in this critical asset. Without the intervention of Indian Expeditionary Force ‘D’, the oil would have been controlled by the enemy. As Sir Arthur Hirtzel, Political Secretary to the India Office stated: ‘The political effect in the Persian Gulf and in India of leaving the head of the Gulf derelict will be disastrous, and we cannot afford, politically, to acquiesce in such a thing for an indefinite period while the main issues are being settled elsewhere.’4

General Sir Edmund Barrow, Military Secretary to the India Office, agreed and was concerned about British influence in the region with the Arabs. Turkish presence would mean ‘Our allies the Sheikhs of Mohammera and Kuweit will be threatened and … either attacked or seduced, in which case our prestige and all our labours of years will vanish into air and our position in the Gulf itself will be precarious.’5

Strategic Importance

Mesopotamia’s geographical position was important in 1914, as Iraq’s is now. The British Empire had to protect the Persian Gulf, particularly because of its proximity to India. An overland route from Europe to Asia had been considered by the British and partially constructed by her rival, Germany, who planned a Berlin to Baghdad railway to assist its ‘Drang nach Osten’ (drive to the east).6 German economic activity in the region had been increasing before the war and was seen as a threat to British interests and, by the time of the Fao Peninsula landing, many Turkish regiments were advised or even commanded by German officers. The British Empire, specifically India, could not afford this area to be dominated by her new enemy despite the primacy of the Western Front. The capture of the oilfields was a great success achieved by an Allied army given limited goals within the ‘art of the possible’. It marked the first of the four phases of the Mesopotamia Campaign, the others being the successful advance towards Baghdad; the disaster at Kut coupled with the failure of the Relief Force; and the successful advance to and capture of Baghdad in 1917.

Basra

By the end of November 1914, 6th (Poona) Division was complete in the Basra (or Busrah) area. Basra had been captured at the cost of 489 British dead (170 men from the Dorsetshire Regiment) compared with 1,500 Turks killed. These ratios sound impressive, but the Turks had, mistakenly, recently withdrawn three out of their four divisions based in Mesopotamia and only left the 38th Infantry Division in the country – The Iraq Area Command (Irak ve Havalisi Komutanligi) was no match for the Allied assault or for the subsequent operations.7 Prior to the Fao landings, ‘Mesopotamia was the backwater of the Ottoman Army’ with no supporting aircraft, limited logistics and less than normal establishment levels of artillery.8 However, Expeditionary Force ‘D’, commanded from India, was only equipped to support the initial operation. The campaign was to suffer from changing objectives and purposes, what is now known as ‘mission creep’, and confused command and control arrangements between London, Delhi and commanders in the field; this confusion helped to bring about the disaster at Kut.

Already, the contingent’s political officer, Sir Percy Cox, was recommending an advance to Baghdad to the Viceroy of India, including in his telegram:

Sir Percy Cox. (Graves)

…Turkish troops recently engaged with us were completely panic-stricken and very unlikely to oppose us again … Effect of the recent defeat has been very great, and if advance is made before it wears off and while the cool season lasts Baghdad will in all probability fall into our hands very easily9 … After earnest consideration of the arguments for and against I find it difficult to see how we can well avoid taking over Baghdad.10

Lieutenant-General Barrett approved the telegram, but Force ‘D’ was certainly not equipped for anything like this ambitious aspiration and the Official History stated that the idea ‘was at that time obviously beyond our military capacity and offered no strategical advantage.’11 This suggestion was rejected by the India Office in London, but a move forty miles further up the Tigris, at its junction with the River Euphrates, to Qurna was recommended, despite the objections of Lord Crewe, Secretary of State of India.

Qurna

Qurna (or Kurnah/Kurna) was captured on 9 December 1914 and it was felt that the Shatt-al-Arab waterway was more secure as a result. A small brigade-size force – supported by the fire from two warships and a mix of five armed river steamers and launches – succeeded in capturing over 1,000 men and seven guns. The advance had been vindicated and, once again, it seemed that Turkish weakness had been confirmed.

As debate began as to what should happen next, General Barrett, the Force commander, was superseded by General Sir John Nixon in April 1915, as the occupying force expanded its size to army corps level. The Allied army’s main elements were now based on three formations:

• The 6th Division recently placed under command of Major-General Charles Townshend, who would end up surrendering his besieged force at Kut.

• The newly formed 12th Division under Major-General George Gorringe, who would later attempt to relieve Townshend at Kut.

• The 6th Cavalry Brigade commanded by Major-General Sir Charles Melliss VC, who was also to be in the besieged town.

However, although the force was increasing its strength to over 20,000 men, the combat service support and, in particular, the medical elements were not increased enough to meet new requirements, despite the appointment of Surgeon-General H. Hathaway, instead of a colonel, to run the medical support. In fact, the Mesopotamia Commission of 1917 reported: ‘We endorse the finding as regards Surgeon-General Hathaway, who in our judgement showed himself unfit for the high administrative office which he held.’12

Shaiba

The Turkish threat had grown in the meantime and during the period 12–14 April 1915, two Turkish divisions from Nasiriya attacked the British at Shaiba. 15,000 men were supposedly involved in the assault, along with twenty-one guns, though more recent Turkish accounts mention about 4,000 assaulting troops.13 Shaiba is ten miles west of Basra and was held by a British force in an isolated fort cut off from Basra by the worst floods in thirty years. It was quickly reinforced by Major-General Melliss and the 30th Brigade to give the defenders about 7,000 in strength. He described his success:

General Sir John Nixon. (The Illustrated War News, 17 November 1915)

Major-General Charles Townshend. (Candler)

Lieutenant-General Sir George Gorringe. (Wilson)

Major-General Sir Charles Melliss. (Wilson)

Next morning, 13 April we drove the enemy back from the vicinity after ten entrenchment sorties. On 14 April, I moved out with my forces to attack the Turkish camp at Borglsiyeh, after a desperate fight lasting from 10.20 am to 5 pm. The Turkish entrenchments were carried as darkness fell, but our force was too exhausted to follow.14

This was a significant battle, which removed the main Turkish threat to Basra and the oil supplies. It was reported that, in this assault, there were 2,435 Turkish casualties, compared with the 1,257 British. The Turks recorded that they had lost 6,000 men killed or wounded over the three days of fighting with 700 taken prisoner.15 Once again, commanders were convinced about the weakness of their enemy. The Turks fled ninety miles to the north-west and the Turkish commander, Suleyman Askeri Pasha, committed suicide, probably because of the setback at Shaiba and the fact that his previous Arab allies had turned against him. However, the British success had not been easily won as troops struggled through the waterlogged landscape and extremely hot conditions. It had depended on some luck, as the Turks had only withdrawn after mistaking the movement of supply carts and mules towards the battle as a major reinforcement. There was also a glimpse of the considerable weakness in the Allied medical support system, which was to plague the early years of the campaign and, particularly, Major-General Townshend’s later advance towards Baghdad. The flooding meant that wheeled ambulances were inoperative and stretcher bearers struggled through waterlogged areas in order to reach a limited number of canoes used for casualty evacuation.

Ahwaz

A second threat to the oil came from an enemy force to the north of Basra consisting of eight Turkish battalions, 10,000 Arabs and eight guns under command of Mohammed Daghestani Pasha in the area of Ahwaz on the River Karun. Major-General Gorringe was dispatched with the 6th Cavalry Brigade and 12th Division to deal with them, and after a difficult advance, again across waterlogged terrain and in hot conditions, the enemy withdrew towards Amara before contact was made. General Nixon was pleased – from his perspective, the enemy were weak, the oil was secure and there was now the opportunity to exploit his generals’ successes.

Amara

The Allied advance continued in late May 1915. General Nixon had informed Major-General Townshend that Amara needed to be captured so that the British position in Mesopotamia could be secured. India did not disagree with the proposal and London supported the advance on 24 May, however, the Secretary of State required General Nixon to guarantee that Amara would be sufficiently garrisoned to avoid a successful attack by the enemy from Baghdad.

The advance began from Qurna, which was surrounded by floods. This town was reputed to be the site of the Garden of Eden, but the hot and oppressive weather conditions made it one of the least popular locations in the country: ‘In the stifling heat the men were continually in a state of dripping perspiration and had no means of keeping cool or clean, for the air was full of dust and thick with flies.’16 The objective was three miles north on the Tigris River – Turkish positions, which were also partially flooded, comprising four islands and some isolated outposts. Surprise in that environment was very difficult and Major-General Townshend, who commanded the assault, realised that any outflanking movement was impossible. The flooding, which was to prove difficult to deal with again at Kut, was described by Captain Wilfred Nunn, Royal Navy, who helped plan the attack with the General:

The Tigris that year rose to an abnormal height. As in the days of Noah, Mesopotamia underwent another flood. Almost the entire countryside and the marshes round Qurna were covered by a great spreading sheet of shallow water, dotted here and there with the blunt tops of sandhills and the spiky heads of high reeds. On some of these sandhills and higher pieces of land the enemy had placed gun-positions. The flood-water was in many places very shallow, it is true, but the area was intersected by deep water cuts, ditches, and canals – which, incidentally, were usually invisible until you fell in. Consequently wading became impossible for troops. In fact, as I have said before there was too little water for the sailors and too much for the soldiers.17

Captain Wilfred Nunn, Royal Navy. (The Times History of the War)

‘Townshend’s Regatta’ was born on this operation. Local canoes, known as bellums, were the main form of transport available, each paddled or punted by an NCO and nine soldiers, eight to fight and two to pole, and the only means by which to assault the enemy. Sixty were allotted to each battalion, 328 for the brigade carrying out the initial assault, and rehearsals were required to allow the troops to gain competency in their handling. Some bellums were armoured and mountain guns were mounted on double bellums. Other guns were placed on barges and river steamers, whilst supplies were on dhows or mahelas. This unusual ‘regatta’ also included four sloops (HMS Espiegle, Clio, Odin and Lawrence), three armed launches (HMS Miner, Shaitan and Sumana) and four 4.7 inch guns mounted in horse-boats. This was an imaginative use of resources and, as an infantry officer wrote later: ‘It was certainly a bold scheme and unexpected, but for these very reasons it was entirely successful.’18 Local Arabs were offered 400 rupees for every mine they discovered in the waterways.

The assault took place on 31 May 1915, led by battalions of the 17th Infantry Brigade, the 1st Battalion the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry on the left of the river and the 22nd Punjabis on the right. The rest of the force included the 16th Infantry Brigade and divisional troops, including 2nd Battalion the Norfolk Regiment and a mix of gunners, sappers and signallers. Major-General Townshend commanded the attack from HMS Espiegle. Captain Nunn commented from the same sloop as the day’s battle progressed:

We lifted our fire as our troops got close, and could see them swarming up the mound. I particularly watched a big soldier who climbed on to their parapet holding his bayonet as if he were just about to select a big fat Turk to stick it into. Next appeared a row of enemy with their hands up and the position was taken.19

However, conditions for the troops were bad, as manoeuvring the bellums was not easy and many of them had to wade through insect ridden water to attack their objectives. Corporal C. Lowman is quoted: ‘These insects and flies in Mesopotamia did not merely tickle and sting, they bit hard. Even sandflies and yet smaller insects, which no mosquito net could keep out, joined the larger beasts in their tormented attacks.’20

The attacks and advance were successful over the next few days, despite the gunboat Espiegle grounding at one point and the command of the expedition transferring to the decks of the Comet. Both General Nixon and Sir Percy Cox, the General’s political adviser, accompanied the ‘regatta’ and the Turks appeared to be withdrawing and avoiding contact with Major-General Townshend’s force. The successful occupation of Amara, with only limited bloodshed, was a major achievement. Through novel tactics, effective use of firepower and what could be described as ‘bluffing gunboat diplomacy’, Major-General Townshend forced the more numerous enemy under the command of Halim Bey to withdraw, and he seized Amara. Before reaching the town he had persuaded both the Turk and local Arabs that he had a force of 15,000 behind him. In fact, his immediate force consisted of the gunboats Comet, Shaitan, Sumana and the Lewis Pelly. On board were four marines, seventeen sailors and twelve soldiers from the Queen’s Own Royal West Kent Regiment and the 1/4th Hampshires!

About 1,000 enemy troops on both banks were seen retreating north out of the town. Captain Singleton, the captain of the Comet, earned the Distinguished Service Order for his handling of his ship, the encouragement of the 2,000 Turks to head north and the capture of over 250 enemy soldiers. Lieutenant Palmer, another naval officer on the Comet, then went on with two other members of his ship and an interpreter to take the surrender of a complete Turkish battalion. At one point, over 1,000 prisoners were being held captive by the small Allied force amongst a potentially hostile population of 10,000. There was a sense of relief on the morning of 4 June when a river transport arrived with the 2nd Battalion of the Norfolk Regiment on board. As an aside, the soldiers of the West Kents and Hampshires clearly enjoyed their time onboard ship, as Captain Nunn stated that they asked to see him and ‘mustered on the quarterdeck their senior put forward the request that they might be permitted to change over from the Army to the Navy.’ He suspected ‘that they preferred yachting on the river to foot-slogging in the desert!’21

A mountain gun on a raft. (Birch Reynardson)

Medical bellum. (Birch Reynardson)

In all, about 2,000 prisoners, twelve field guns and five naval guns had been taken, whilst the advancing force only lost four killed and twenty-four injured throughout the advance from Qurna to Amara. In addition, two enemy boats were sunk and six boats and ten barges captured. Major-General Townshend had displayed audacity and initiative in this operation and had been lucky. He had outwitted the enemy and boosted the confidence of his subordinates both in their capability and his. It is easy to forget these successes in the light of the later surrender of Kut and the criticism heaped on Major-General Townshend. Soldiers can put up with a commander’s eccentricities if they know that he is a winner and he had proved his credentials during this engagement. Even the critical Mesopotamia Commission Report recorded: ‘As a military operation this action was audaciously planned and well timed, and it deserves high praise, as it achieved great objects with comparatively small loss of life.’22 At this point Major-General Townshend leaves the scene for sick leave in India, suffering from fever.

Nasiriya

The next objective, Nasiriya (or Nasiriyeh) was twenty-eight miles west from Qurna, up the River Euphrates. Major-General Gorringe was to lead the 12th Division in this advance, the aim being again to secure approaches to Basra, as this was seen as an exposed left flank. The objectives included the town of Suk es Sheyukh en route to Nasiriya, and the suppression of strong local tribes.

General Nixon was keen to secure Nasiriya on the Euphrates and had also suggested to India the seizing of Kut on the Tigris, otherwise a British garrison based at Nasiriya could be threatened by Turks based at Kut. Sir Percy Cox also supported a move to Nasiriya in order to secure the heartland of the Arab Muntafiq group of tribes. Sir Harry Beauchamp-Duff, Commander-in-Chief India, Lord Hardinge, the Viceroy, and Austen Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for India, were against the taking of Kut at this stage, as the proposed seizure of the town was seen as a commitment too far. However, India approved this advance on 22 June, without receiving the Secretary of State’s approval. This was evidence of potential ‘mission creep’, as each new objective was suggested by General Nixon in order to secure the previous captured objective. His argument for the seizing of Nasiriya was flawed; it was not possible for the Turks to proceed south from Kut by boat, as the waters were so low on the connecting river, the Shatt al Hai, for most of the year. The argument against further advances was expressed by an accompanying political officer of the time, Captain Arnold Wilson, who was on Major-General Gorringe’s staff: ‘Basra was easily defendable, and once we held Amara and Qurna the narrow strip of land along the Tigris was unlikely to be the scene of serious fighting.’23

Armoured Protection for Bellums. (Birch Reynardson)

Major-General Gorringe’s force was based on 30th Indian Brigade under command of Major-General Melliss, two batteries of guns, various divisional troops and, similar to Major-General Townshend’s advance, a ‘regatta’ of boats. The water was lower than it had been on the Tigris. Smaller river-steamers were employed: the Shushan, with Captain Nunn on board, and the Massoudieh and Muzaffri armed with re-distributed guns. Three other river-steamers carried the troops and each carried two 18-pounder guns on their decks and there were two more tugs, some towing mahelas carrying stores. The mounted guns were on bellums.

At this stage of the campaign, the 12th Division had already taken about fifty per cent casualties, fought at Ahwaz and marched great distances in pursuit of the enemy for an unpopular commander nicknamed ‘Blood Orange’. Major-General Gorringe proved his leadership as he personally took charge of mining operations on the waterways and, later, the author Russell Braddon wrote that:

Gorringe was the ideal man for a relentless slog. A big man, highly coloured, deeply tanned, officious and utterly without tact, he reminded those less insensitive than himself of an enormous he-goat, and allowed nothing – not Turks, Nurretin, counter attacks, casualties, swamps, Marsh Arabs or deeply entrenched redoubts – to stop him.24

These characteristics did not mean success, however, when he was attempting to relieve the besieged force at Kut a few months later. The same author described Major-General Melliss, who had the nickname of ‘Old Blood and Thunder’ as ‘given to roaring like a bull when enraged; and when in doubt he attacked.’25 Many of the British commanders in Mesopotamia appear to have been lively characters.

The Shushan and Massoudieh led the flotilla to the west of Lake Hammar on 27 June. The force would have to contend with six weeks of shallow waters, deep mud, oppressive heat of between 115 and 120 degrees Fahrenheit and aggressive local Arabs as well as the Turks. The troops were suffering from the conditions and medical facilities were inadequate, as one officer described: ‘Sickness of all kinds became rife, sun-stroke and heat-stroke were common, fever and dysentery and para-typhoid – ample warning was given to those responsible of the difficulties to be expected if they should ever have to deal with the rush of a casualty list.’26

Suk es Sheyukh was captured on 6 July, but the main Turkish position was located about six miles south-east from Nasiriya on both sides of the River Euphrates. Approaches to the positions were marshy and any manoeuvring with the various boats was extremely difficult. The initial frontal attack on 14 July faltered with heavy casualties amongst the 24th Punjabi Infantry and there was some concern about the security of the British position. The same officer wrote that ‘Probably seldom before have British, or, for that matter native, troops been required to fight under such terrible conditions of weather and climate, in a difficult country, against a resolute enemy.’27

Allied reinforcements arrived, including one brigade, a battery of guns and, for the first time, two Caudron/BE2C aircraft primarily available for reconnaissance. Another assault was made on 24 July. 2nd Battalion the Queen’s Own Royal West Kent Regiment, leading the attack for 12th Brigade on the left bank, takes up the story:

The bombardment opened punctually at 5 a.m. on 24 July. About 5.20 our scouts crept over our parapet and went forward to the margin of the wood, about 200 yards to the front. At 5.30 a.m. Nos 1 and 3 Companies commenced their advance, and reached the edge of the wood referred to. There they were held up, and, as the enemy’s fire seemed stronger than our own, the remaining two companies were called up. The reinforcing companies gave fresh impetus to the leading line and carried them forward. In the open they could not make much ground, but on the extreme left Major Kitson led portions of Nos 3 and 4 right into the enemy’s flank trench and carried it. A few moments afterwards the whole line surged forward and reached the trenches. One company of the 90th Punjab Infantry was close behind Nos 1 and 2, and took part in the close fighting in the trenches. The bayonet was brought into play in a few cases, but as a rule the enemy were either shot down at a few yards’ distance or, throwing down their arms, were taken prisoners.28

The battalion began the attack with seventeen officers and 470 other ranks. They suffered thirty-three per cent casualties, similar statistics to the 1/4th Hampshires and the 17th Sapper Company. Both sides, British and Turk, had begun with about 4,500 men each, but the British had over twenty more guns and made effective use of them from their boats. 1,000 Turks had been captured with 2,000 killed and wounded. Total British casualties were 104 killed and 429 wounded.29

The 30th Brigade had assaulted on the right bank of the river, once the parallel initial assault had begun. The 1/4th Hampshires and the 2/7th Gurkhas succeeded in driving the Turks out of those trenches, supported by the 67th Punjabis and fire from the Shushan, Massoudieh and the Muzaffri. The fighting all took place with temperatures at 110 degrees Fahrenheit in the extremely humid shade. The Turks eventually withdrew north in the afternoon and Nasiriya was occupied on 25 July 1915. However, British medical treatment and evacuation procedures were seen, again, to be wanting, as Captain Wilson’s account explained:

Early part of Nasiriya Operations. (Nunn)

2nd Battalion the Queen’s Own Royal West Kent Regiment at Nasiriya, 24 July. (Queen’s Own Gazette)

Nasiriya Operations, 6–24 July 1915. (Nunn)

After the battle, as after the preceding engagement, I spent some hours assisting in the evacuation of the wounded. I was horrified at what I saw, for at every point it was clear that the shamefully bad arrangements arose from bad staff work on the part of the medical authorities, rather than from inherent difficulties. The wounded were crowded on board to lie on iron decks that had not been cleaned since horses and mules had stood on them for a week. There were few mattresses.30

The poor state of medical support was not to be rectified by the time of the siege of Kut.

The Move to Kut

General Nixon was keen to push on to Kut and make the most of the Turkish defeats. He was supported by Sir Percy Cox. Consequently, on 27 July, a telegram was sent from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State saying that ‘Now that Nasiriya has been occupied the occupation of Kut-el-Amara is considered by us to be a strategic necessity.’31 London was not convinced, because of the long fragile lines of communication and the administrative challenges, combined with the weather conditions and the health and lack of troops. Lord Hardinge, the Viceroy, supported General Nixon and the Secretary of State was persuaded to support the advance. Approval was given on 23 August and Baghdad appeared to be in their sights. A weak Turkish division was reported to be at Kut (the 35th Division) with one withdrawing to the town from Nasiriya (the 38th Division); another enemy division was in Baghdad (the 45th Division). Success would offset the increasingly depressing messages coming from the Dardanelles. Nasiriya, which was situated in a useful position to defend the Basra vilayet, would be protected whilst the advance would separate the Turks from their allies, the Arab Beni Lam tribe. The British position in Mesopotamia would be consolidated.

The Turkish Army

The Anglo-Indian force had achieved great successes so far in the campaign, though the enemy had been limited in strength. A number of measures were being put in place by the Turkish Army to rectify this situation, though their effect would only begin to be felt at Ctesiphon in November 1915. A new Mesopotamia-based Turkish Army, the 6th, was formed in April, based on the existing XII and XVIII Corps and a new commander was appointed – Nurretin Pasha (or Nur ud Din Pasah). Nurretin was not staff-trained, but had an impressive intellect and a great deal of practical operational experience. He had fought in the Ottoman-Greek War of 1897, dealt with guerrillas in Macedonia in 1902 and served in a counter-insurgency campaign in the Yemen in 1911–13. Following divisional command, he had: ‘arrived in mid-June to take over a badly battered army.’32 Initially, Nurretin had to rely on what remained of the 35th and 38th Turkish Divisions, about 7,000 men. However, the 45th Division would be available at Ctesiphon and two more experienced war-fighting divisions from the Caucasus, the 51st and 52nd Divisions, would arrive in due course.

Townshend’s Doubts

On sick leave in India, Major-General Townshend discovered that the Foreign Department and Sir Beauchamp-Duff, the Commander-in-Chief, were against another advance unless more forces were available. On 8 August 1915 he wrote to a friend, General Sir James Wolfe Murray in England, expressing a number of concerns about an advance to Kut.

I believe I am to advance from Amarah on Kut-al-Amara directly I get back to my division … The question is where we are going to stop in Mesopotamia? I stayed with the Viceroy last month, but could not get anything out of him as regards our policy in Mesopotamia … We have certainly not got enough troops to make certain of taking Baghdad … We can take no risks of a defeat in the East. Imagine a retreat from Baghdad and the consequent instant rising of the Arabs of the whole country behind us, to say nothing of the certain rise in that case of the Persians and probably of the Afghans in consequence … I consider that we ought to hold what we have got and not advance any more-as long as we are held up, as we undoubtedly are, in the Dardanelles. All these offensive operations in secondary theatres are dreadful errors in strategy: the Dardanelles, Egypt, Mesopotamia, East Africa!33

Nurretin. (Braddon)

The following day he received a letter from a friend in the Foreign and Political Department at Simla, India. This included the comments:

There is no doubt that there are many good military reasons for seizing Kut, and politically I think there are no objections. But I entirely agree that we should be very careful before we go any further. I do not think there is an idea at present of an advance to Baghdad, and unless the forces at our disposal were more than adequate for the purpose, this Department would very strongly deprecate such a move.34

Major-General Townshend lunched with Sir Beauchamp Duff on 10 August. He was told that he would probably advance to Kut on his return to Mesopotamia, though London had not yet sanctioned the proposal suggested by General Nixon and supported by Sir Percy Cox. Major-General Townshend said that he could take Kut, but:

It was not for me, I said, to point out to him the grave risks of continuing the strategic offensive with inadequate forces and with no troops on the lines of communication behind me. He fully agreed with me, and said with emphasis: ‘Not one inch, Townshend, shall you go beyond Kut-el-Amara unless I make you up to adequate strength’. I mentioned that I ought to have fully an army corps to take Baghdad and hold it.35

These three quotations reveal a great deal about Major-General Townshend, who later was blamed for the situation at Kut. He had identified the limitations of the army in Mesopotamia and was not happy to be over-stretched; reinforcements were required for victory. However, he was the victim of his previous successes along the Tigris – the advance was to continue.

Before travelling to Amara, Major-General Townshend told General Nixon that ‘If I routed the Turks in the battle and stampeded them, as at Qurna, I might follow them into Baghdad. That is, if they were well on the run.’ General Nixon offered to enter the city with him and Sir Percy Cox mentioned that: ‘If I went into Baghdad it would have almost the same political significance and importance as if I were to enter Constantinople. The news would go through all Asia.’36 There was quite an incentive for Major-General Townshend to succeed after his form so far and his superiors were expecting more of the same.

Es Sinn: The Battle of Kut

6th Division concentrated at Ali-al-Gharbi in early September 1915, whilst Major-General Gorringe’s 12th Division became responsible for lines of communication between Amara and Kut. By 25 September, Major-General Townshend’s 6th Division was at Sunnaiyat and had been reinforced by two more battalions. He now had at his disposal about ‘11,000 rifles, 28 guns and 40 machine-guns. The Turks were estimated at approximately 6,000 with 38 guns.’37 These were the 35th Division with six infantry battalions on the right southern bank of the Tigris and the 38th Division with six battalions on the left northern bank. They had four battalions and some cavalry in reserve. However, according to Erickson’s research: ‘most of these soldiers were local Arabs, who had been drafted into the Turkish Army, and their morale was not high.’38

On the morning of 27 September, the assault began at ‘Horse Shoe Marsh’. The advance and fight were difficult; navigation proved tricky, whilst the ground was marshier than expected and the Turks were dug in with excellent fields of fire between the Suwaikiya (or Suwacha/Suwachi) and Suwada Marshes and had built a boom across the Tigris. Also, the attacking forces were always going to have difficulty engaging their targets accurately: ‘Such mistakes were constantly occurring owing to the difficulties of observation, for, in addition to mirages, there was nearly always a sand-storm blowing which made it almost impossible to see any distance.’39

This was a problem throughout the campaign and would hamper the progress of the later Kut Relief Force. Of note, in this battle, was a brave bayonet charge by the 104th Indian Rifles; 111 Turks and one of their officers were captured, and the attempt by Lieutenant-Commander Edgar Cookson, Royal Navy, to destroy the boom – he was awarded the Victoria Cross posthumously for this action. The three main Turkish redoubts had to be taken by similar assaults. The enemy had been driven from their positions by the end of the following day and the 18th Infantry Brigade was ordered to pursue. It reached Aziziya (or Aziziyeh), over sixty miles beyond Kut, on 5 October. By that time, the Turks had lost 4,000 men compared with the 1,230 British troops, but they were regrouping and had not been routed.

The pursuit was not successful, mainly due to a two-day delay at Kut caused by ships becoming stuck in the mud of an extremely shallow Tigris. Also, Major-General Townshend was not impressed by the lack of initiative displayed by two Indian cavalry regiments, who were unable to make contact with the retreating Turks because the Sikh and Hindu cavalrymen were delayed. They had not been fed and would not use Arab cooking pots; he did not dispute their valour, but was frustrated by the fact that their culture had limited their effectiveness in that situation. Even today, when multi-national operations are the norm, commanders have to take into consideration national and cultural idiosyncrasies before allocating tasks. On this occasion, a British cavalry regiment may have been more effective in this pursuit role, but none was available.

There is no doubt that this battle, known as the ‘Battle of Kut’, was a significant victory for Major-General Townshend’s division. The initial feint had deceived the enemy, who thought that the attack was taking place on a different flank and the British columns’ movement at night and the ‘turning manoeuvre’ had contributed to the enemy’s surprise. Major-General Townshend, never an immodest commander, later stated:

Lieutenant-Commander Edgar Cookson, Royal Navy. (Wilson)

The Battle of Kut-el-Amara can be said to have been one of the most important in the history of the British Army in India. There had been nothing of its magnitude either in the Afghan War or the Indian Mutiny, for it was fought against troops equally well armed and of equal numbers to ourselves. In addition, we ejected them from a very strong and up-to-date position commanding ground as flat and as open as a billiard-table with nothing to check their fire-sweep.40

Battle of Kut, 28 September 1915. (Mesopotamia Study)

Captain Wilson, the political officer, expressed with his informed hindsight:

Had General Townshend’s plans been successfully developed on the lines laid down by him, the main portion, if not the whole, of the Turkish force then in Mesopotamia would have been captured or destroyed and Baghdad might have been entered without further resistance.

The failure or inability of the British forces to pursue the enemy was interpreted by him as ‘a turning point, perhaps decisive, in the whole of the campaign.’41

However, General Nixon’s army was spread thinly in garrisons throughout the occupied country and he was short of modern equipment, ammunition, transport and combat service support troops. At Kut, he now had 6th Division with its three infantry brigades, mixture of artillery, signals and engineers, eight cavalry squadrons and one battery of horse artillery. This force amounted to about 10,000 personnel, which was less than the Turks in the Kut and Baghdad area, yet the campaign’s successes so far encouraged General Nixon to advance further.

More Doubts

Baghdad was still another 213 miles by water from Kut, and there were doubts in both Delhi and London that a British force in Baghdad would be able to rebuff a Turkish counter-attack. The British troops were tired, suffering from the intense heat and inadequate logistic support, Turkish reinforcements were reported to be moving towards the area and the long lines of communication were fragile. Interestingly, the German General Colmar Von Der Goltz, who was a Field Marshal in the Turkish Army, becoming the overall commander besieging Kut a few months later, had written in 1899:

The lines of communication should be made secure before everything. The longer they are, the more difficult they are to guard, and the more vulnerable do they become. It is easier for the enemy to intercept them, and more difficult also for us to forward supplies to our army by them. Advances along very extended lines of operations, which render similar lines of communications necessary, are therefore always productive of trouble.42

He goes on to refer to Napoleon’s march on Moscow – an historic event well known by Major-General Townshend, who was a much-publicised student of Napoleon. Even back in England, Field Marshal Horatio Kitchener, Secretary of State for War, believed that a march on Baghdad ‘could be made with less risk, less cost and equal value later on.’43

The Dorsets at the Battle of Kut-al-Amara, 28 September 1915. (The Times History of the War)