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Beschreibung

Migration dominates contemporary politics across the world, and there has been a corresponding surge in political theorizing about the complex issues that it raises. In a world in which borders seem to be solidifying while the number of displaced people soars, how should we think about the political and ethical implications of human movement across the globe? In this book, Gillian Brock, one of the leading figures in the field, lucidly introduces and explains the important historical, empirical, and normative context necessary to get to grips with the major contemporary debates. She examines issues ranging from the permissibility of controlling borders and the criteria that states can justifiably use to underpin their migration management policies through to questions of integration, inclusion, and resistance to unjust immigration laws. Migration and Political Theory is essential reading for any student, scholar, or general reader who seeks to understand the political theory and ethics of migration and movement in the twenty-first century.

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Contents

Cover

Series Page

Title Page

Copyright

Acknowledgments

1 Introduction

1.1 Some facts about migration today

1.2 International migration: some types, drivers and effects

1.3 Is the contemporary state of affairs unique? Some history

1.4 Overview of subsequent chapters

2 The Right to Exclude and Open Borders

2.1 Arguments for states’ rights to exclude

2.2 Arguments for obligations to allow free movement across borders

2.3 Conclusions

3 Forced Migration and Responsibilities: The Case of Refugees

3.1 Who counts as a refugee?

3.2 Current arrangements for assisting refugees

3.3 Duties to refugees

3.4 Some contemporary issues concerning duties to refugees

3.5 Conclusions

4 Which Criteria May States Permissibly Use in Selection and Citizenship Policies?

4.1 Which criteria may states use in their admissions policies?

4.2 Some critical discussion of Carens’s influential account

4.3 Which criteria may permissibly be used in granting citizenship?

4.4 Should citizenship be for sale?

4.5 Conclusions

5 Legal Immigrants and their Host States: Rights and Responsibilities

5.1 Multicultural citizenship: Will Kymlicka and his critics

5.2 Beyond legal citizenship to inclusion

5.3 David Miller on integration

5.4 Conclusions

6 Undocumented Migrants and their Host States: Rights and Responsibilities

6.1 Do undocumented migrants have any rights? Some basic human rights considered

6.2 Rights to remain: considerations in favor of regularization

6.3 Criticisms of regularization

6.4 Conclusions

7 Fair Treatment for Temporary Migrant Workers

7.1 Walzer’s influential argument on guest workers and justice

7.2 Can any temporary migrant worker program ever be justified?

7.3 Conclusions

8 Justice in Out-Migration

8.1 The Siracusa Principles

8.2 The brain drain: why is there a problem?

8.3 Addressing issues of brain drain: responsibilities and policy options

8.4 Can the case of migrating healthcare professionals generalize to other sectors?

8.5 Conclusions

9 Emerging Issues and Future Directions

9.1 Contemporary issues concerning enforcement

9.2 Resistance

9.3 Cities and immigration

9.4 Methodological challenges to contemporary approaches

9.5 How might considering the Covid-19 situation change debates about migration in the future?

9.6 Concluding reflections

Bibliography

End User License Agreement

Guide

Cover

Table of Contents

Series Page

Title Page

Copyright

Acknowledgments

Begin Reading

Bibliography

End User License Agreement

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And Political Theory series

Mary Hawkesworth, Gender and Political Theory

Brian Orend, War and Political Theory

Elizabeth Frazer & Kimberly Hutchings, Violence and Political Theory

Gillian Brock, Migration and Political Theory

Migration and Political Theory

Gillian Brock

polity

Copyright © Gillian Brock 2021

The right of Gillian Brock to be identified as Author of this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

First published in 2021 by Polity Press

Polity Press65 Bridge StreetCambridge CB2 1UR, UK

Polity Press101 Station LandingSuite 300Medford, MA 02155, USA

All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purpose of criticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.

ISBN-13: 978-1-5095-3524-8

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataNames: Brock, Gillian, author.Title: Migration and political theory / Gillian Brock.Description: Cambridge, UK ; Medford, MA : Polity Press, 2021. | Series: And political theory | Includes bibliographical references and index. | Summary: “A comprehensive overview of how political theorists are grappling with the great issue of our times”-- Provided by publisher.Identifiers: LCCN 2020024387 (print) | LCCN 2020024388 (ebook) | ISBN 9781509535224 (hardback) | ISBN 9781509535231 (paperback) | ISBN 9781509535248 (epub)Subjects: LCSH: Emigration and immigration—Political aspects. | Emigration and immigration—Government policy. | Refugees.Classification: LCC JV6255 .B72 2021 (print) | LCC JV6255 (ebook) | DDC 325--dc23LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020024387LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020024388

The publisher has used its best endeavours to ensure that the URLs for external websites referred to in this book are correct and active at the time of going to press. However, the publisher has no responsibility for the websites and can make no guarantee that a site will remain live or that the content is or will remain appropriate.

Every effort has been made to trace all copyright holders, but if any have been overlooked the publisher will be pleased to include any necessary credits in any subsequent reprint or edition.

For further information on Polity, visit our website: politybooks.com

Acknowledgments

This book aims to provide a balanced guide through many complex migration issues. While I have been settled in New Zealand for most of my life, I have also undertaken two major transcontinental migrations at earlier stages. These different experiences have helped me appreciate both migrants’ perspectives as well as those of longer settled community members. In this book, I aim to capture at least these two perspectives on many multilayered debates. Many thanks are owed to the students, colleagues, friends, and fellow migrants who have been discussing issues of migration and political theory with me over the years. Special thanks are also owed to Stephen Davies and the team at Polity, especially Julia Davies and George Owers. For excellent comments on a draft of this manuscript, I am grateful to George Owers and four anonymous reviewers for Polity.

1Introduction

Migration issues dominate contemporary political discourse, and there has been a matching surge in political theorizing about the complex issues that migration raises. President Trump promised to build a wall on the United States’ southern border with Mexico (and to get Mexico to pay for it). He also promised to end the green card lottery, suspend refugee programs, force Dreamers to leave the United States, and deport more of those living illegally in the United States than ever before. The successful campaign for Britain to leave the European Union invoked much fear concerning rising numbers of immigrants. Australia, Italy, and Greece vigilantly guard their coasts, intercepting boats aiming to enter their waters. Violent clashes erupt in South Africa when Zimbabweans seeking work appear to threaten local job opportunities. Protecting the homeland from unwelcome foreign immigrants raises deep questions about the nature of who “we” are and what we fear about others. And it also invites us to think about several other topics, including the nature of political community, the defensible scope of self-determination, rightful authority to exclude from a territory, and the standing of borders.

The range of concerns that migration presents for those interested in matters of justice extends well beyond this cluster of issues centered on the state’s authority to exclude. Much migration is appropriately described as forced, as in the case of refugees. What responsibilities do we have to refugees seeking safe haven? And voluntary migration invokes a host of fairness concerns as well. What kinds of criteria may states permissibly use in formulating selection and citizenship policies? May states permissibly use wealth, health status, language proficiency, religion, sexual orientation, or family connections in such decisions? If so, how and when? Are there normative constraints on how destination countries may treat their “guest workers” from other countries and, if so, what are they? Does justice require regularizing the status of those who have been living in the state in ways deemed to be unlawful, at least under certain conditions? May governments ever defensibly restrict outmigration, preventing its citizens from leaving the territory, as the Soviet Union once did? These are just some of the many issues receiving considerable contemporary attention that are discussed in this work. This book aims to provide an introduction to the core of debates, along with focused attention to current and emerging questions.

This chapter provides some important background to discussing such issues. The chapter also seeks to offer some key facts about migration today in efforts to ensure readers have an accurate understanding of seminal information, which is sometimes appealed to or assumed in current debates. Sometimes politicians and citizens have important misconceptions about the nature, scope, and elements concerning migration. In such cases, arguments rest on shaky foundations. For instance, in contrast to the widely held view that movement is primarily from the so-called Global South to the Global North, in fact just as much, if not more, is South-South migration (IOM 2016). In addition, much migration is not of the kind that aims to be permanent. The phenomenon of migration certainly includes the cases of immigration and settlement, but also temporary and circular migration. This chapter also maps out some of the ethical and justice issues that migration raises and gives an overview of the book, with brief synopses of all the chapters.

The first section covers some central facts about contemporary migration. Section 1.2 explains some frequently used terms in the migration literature that are relevant to political theory. It also outlines some of the key drivers and consequences of migration. Section 1.3 covers a short history of human migration, highlighting some important moments that well illustrate some of the reasons why we have been moving about the planet from our earliest days as human beings. The fourth section provides an overview of core themes that the reader will encounter in subsequent chapters.

1.1 Some facts about migration today

It is important to stress that the vast majority of people, currently about 96.5%, continue to reside in their birth country (IOM 2020). Though still a small fraction of the total world population at 3.5% of the global population, there has been a small increase in the scale of international migration if we track data from the last few decades (IOM 2020).

In 2019, the total number of international migrants globally was 272 million. About two-thirds of those international migrants were labor migrants (IOM 2020: 2): 52% were male while 48% were female; 74% were of working age (that is, between 20 and 64 years old). In 2018, international remittances, the money that migrants send back to family and friends in their countries of origin, increased to US$689 billion.*

International migration continues to be shaped by economic, geographic, and demographic factors (among others) that can result in particular migration patterns developed over many years. Because of population data and trends, some of the largest migration corridors are from developing countries to larger economies, including those of the United States, France, Russia, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. There is more migration between countries in the Global South than between countries in the Global North. For instance, in 2013 38% of all migrants for that year migrated from developing countries to other developing countries (World Bank 2016: 11). By contrast, 23% of migrants had migrated between high-income countries. Popular migration corridors include Mexico-United States, Russia-Ukraine, Bangladesh-India, Afghanistan-Pakistan or Iran, China-Hong Kong, and India-United Arab Emirates or Saudi Arabia.

Some countries have especially high proportions of migrants relative to their local populations. Examples include Qatar (85% of its resident population being comprised of migrants) and the United Arab Emirates (70% of its population are migrants).

There can be considerable migration within a country because of seasonal demands for labor, notably in the agricultural and tourism sectors. However, most political theorizing on migration limits the focus to international migration, where migrants cross a state border.

Counting refugees, those internally displaced (i.e. displaced within their countries of residence but without crossing a border) and asylum seekers, the number of so-called forced migrants or displaced people increased to 70.7 million in 2018. In 2018, Syria had the highest number of internally displaced people (6.1 million), followed by Colombia (5.8 million), and the Democratic Republic of Congo (3.1 million). In 2018, the number of stateless persons globally was 3.9 million.

Displacement is a major feature in some regions. For instance, in the Syria/Turkey region, 6.7 million refugees have fled Syria, with Turkey absorbing 3.7 million of these. By mid-2019, 4 million Venezuelans had left their country of origin, with many traveling to neighboring states such as Colombia. Recent years have seen major migration and displacement events related to conflict (e.g. Syria, Yemen, the Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo), extreme violence (such as experienced by the Rohingya fleeing Rakhine state in Myanmar), economic and political crises (as experienced for instance by Venezuelans), or environmental factors (such as happened in 2018 and 2019 in Mozambique, the Philippines, China, India and the United States). Conflict is a major source of forced migration, the top countries of origin being Syria, South Sudan, Myanmar, Somalia, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, Eritrea, and Burundi, which together account for roughly 82% of the refugee population under the mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (henceforth, UNHCR) (IOM 2020: 39). Turkey hosts more refugees than any other country in the world. Pakistan and Iran are also among the top ten refugee-hosting countries (IOM 2020: 40). The least developed countries (such as Bangladesh, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uganda, and Yemen) host 33% of the global total (IOM 2020: 40).

The number of official resettlement places made available in 2018 was approximately 92,400, a 10% decrease from 2017 (IOM 2020: 41). Many of those who migrate across borders remain in the region, and they flee to countries close by, because of factors such as ease of travel and familiarity (IOM 2020: 53). In 2018, 52% of the global refugee population was under 18 years of age (IOM 2020: 39). Refugees are primarily based in urban environments; at the end of 2018, 61% of refugees were in urban areas (IOM 2020: 39).

As part of current trends, it is notable that politicians, policy makers, and opinion leaders often use international migration as a tool for their own purposes. The politicization of migration is not new, but perhaps the technologies we now readily have at our disposal can disseminate information and discord more swiftly. Some leaders seek to use immigration issues as a way to divide communities. Some also harness social media in attempts to create division and polarization by portraying migrants in a misleading and negative light. Such campaigns have resulted in more polarized and less respectful civic engagement, along with the weakening of many elements of democracy in several cases.

On the more positive side, there has been substantial change in the global governance of migration over recent years as evidenced by the formation of the United Nations Network on Migration and the two well-supported global compacts, one on refugees and another that governs migration more generally. The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration and the Global Compact on Refugees are two important international treaties which are the products of decades-long efforts by states, international organizations, civil society organizations, and other actors committed to improving how migration is governed at the international level. These global agreements enjoy near-universal consensus on central issues requiring sustained international cooperation and commitment (IOM 2020: 6). At the end of chapter 9, we will be in a position to understand better why the compacts represent historic commitment to changing key defects with our current migration arrangements.

1.2 International migration: some types, drivers and effects

In this section, I cover key terms used in the migration literature, along with some commonly reported drivers and effects of migration.

1.2.1 Key terms

People can be described as migrants even when they have not actually themselves migrated. For instance, children of citizens born in other lands may be categorized as migrants, commonly second- or third-generation migrants (or citizens of migrant origin). People migrate for many reasons, but the overwhelming majority migrates because of factors related to work, family, or study. There is also a huge category of forced migrations in which people migrate because of conflict, violence, persecution, natural disasters, or environmental degradation. Let us look at some commonly used terms related to migration next.

International migrants are those who cross a state border as opposed to those who migrate within a state. The terms destination,recipient, or host state refer to the country to which a migrant goes. The country she has left is commonly referred to as a state of origin, sending country, or home state.

International migration can be characterized as either intending to be permanent or for a more temporary duration. Not all migrants enter the destination state on a permanent basis, but rather some aim to reside in the country for a short period and then return home. Work and study are dominant reasons motivating people to migrate temporarily. A vast number of these temporary migrants enter for work and are called “temporary labor migrants.”

Many migrants seek to live in a state more permanently and in ways that are lawful. This usually involves at least two phases. In the first phase, the migrant, if successful, is legally admitted to reside in the territory on a permanent basis. In order to become a citizen, the migrant usually has to reside in the territory for a period of time, such as five years. During the first phase, the migrant would typically be described as a permanent resident. In the second phase, once citizenship has been conferred, the migrant might be referred to as a naturalized citizen.

Some migrants repeat patterns of migration between two destinations, such as the home and host states, often because the demands of work are seasonal. Such migration might be referred to as circular.

Next, let’s cover cases of involuntary migration. Those who cross a border fleeing war, persecution, or other significant disturbance to public order are often classed more loosely as refugees. Those displaced by such activities but who do not cross a border are classified as internally displaced people. A person crossing a border seeking refuge in another state may apply for protection in the territory, and such applicants are called asylum seekers. If the application is successful, the person’s legal status changes and they are recognized as an official refugee. Achieving formal legal status can come with certain rights and entitlements that are not afforded to asylum seekers, such as a right to work in the country of refuge.

In practice, the distinction between voluntary and involuntary migration can be rather arbitrary. Levels of coercion, in reality, fall along a continuum as migrants experience different forms of pressures that they perceive as forcing them to leave. One such huge category of pressure relates to economic conditions and opportunities in countries of origin. Many people who seek to leave their home countries are not successful in doing so lawfully. Often desperate people might feel compelled to take matters into their own hands, and they might seek to enter their desired destination state in ways that are characterized as “illegal,” “unauthorized,” “undocumented,” “irregular,” or “illegalized.” While many people have strong preferences as to which of these terms to use, I will refer to those who enter in such ways as undocumented migrants to adopt what I believe to be one of the most widely used and neutral ways of referring to members of the group.

Human trafficking involves the trade in people for purposes such as forced labor or commercial sexual exploitation. People smuggling differs from such practices in that the person being smuggled has consented to the transaction. While many cases of human smuggling may start off as consensual, the nature of the transaction may change considerably through coercive or exploitative elements, such as having to take out significant loans to repay the smugglers or others who facilitate international movement. Trafficked people are often held against their will and forced to work for the trafficker or their associates. In these situations, those trafficked can experience modern-day slavery.

1.2.2 Important drivers of migration

The factors that drive migration are sometimes categorized in terms of push and pull factors. Push factors repel migrants away from their countries of residence or origin, while pull factors attract them to a new destination. They can often be combined; for instance, a lack of economic opportunities in one area and better prospects for economic flourishing elsewhere provide a combination of push and pull factors that can motivate movement. Let us look at four large categories of reasons next, which can often be connected as well as distinct.

First, global inequality and uneven development drive much migration. Many popular migration corridors are from less developed to more developed countries, in which prospects for work and higher incomes are more abundant.

Second, demographic changes can underlie much movement. Some countries have high birth rates and young populations. Others have low birth rates and aging populations. One challenge for countries with high birth rates is to provide employment opportunities for all its citizens. Migration for work provides a good fit for both those countries with surplus labor and those with higher demands for labor. For instance, an aging population creates high needs in service and care sectors in some countries, as is the case in Japan and many European states. And youthful unemployed workers in other countries might value the opportunities to work abroad rather than remain unemployed or underemployed at home.

A third set of reasons relates to challenges presented by conflict or political instability. Much migration in this category is undertaken to avoid war, violence, conflict, human rights violations, and other public crises that challenge the state’s capacities to its limits.

And finally, social, cultural, and political factors can drive much migration. Examples include a desire for more freedom to pursue religious goals or to seek lifestyle, social, or cultural opportunities that are restricted or not available in the home country.

1.2.3 Some central general economic impacts

Economists commonly cite the tremendous benefits of human migration today, such as migrants having increased the size of the world economy and contributed very positively to global GDP, higher incomes, and productivity. Remittances – the money sent back by migrants to family and friends in the country of origin – are another huge source of revenue. This flow of revenue can be of great value both to those who receive remittances and to the local economies of recipients.

International migration can also prove to be a potent catalyst for significant social, economic, demographic, and political changes in sending and receiving countries. Migrants can make significant sociocultural, political, and economic contributions both in the countries they join and those they leave, especially when they act as agents of change. One widely noted feature is that immigrants tend to engage in much higher levels of entrepreneurial activity compared to their native counterparts, perhaps because they have become used to taking greater risks. In some countries, such as the United States, migrants have made huge contributions to innovation (IOM 2020: 6).

While it should be acknowledged that there can be these significant general benefits, it is also important to appreciate that the effects of migration differ enormously among countries. Specific effects for particular countries can vary a great deal depending on who is migrating, where they are going, where they have been, and particular contextual factors such as government policies in home and host states. In various situations, migrants can affect labor markets, wages, prices of goods and services, economic growth, tax revenues, capital investments, health and educational outcomes, among many other factors. For instance, high levels of skilled migrants can lead to a brain drain from their country of origin but they can also raise the return on investment in education, thus leading to a higher education level among the remaining population. This phenomenon is called brain gain, though to what extent the phenomenon exists in certain countries and particular sectors also varies considerably. Skilled emigrant diaspora populations can also contribute positively through remittances and political and economic channels. In addition, returning migrants can bring with them capital and progressive ideas that can help reform the local economy and advance more democratic regimes through changes in political climate and public opinion. Whether or not these effects have measurable impacts and whether they outweigh several categories of disadvantages of migration, such as reduced health outcomes, declining wages, weakened institutions, or increased political instability, is another important issue. Such topics are discussed in more detail elsewhere in the book, such as in chapter 8.

1.3 Is the contemporary state of affairs unique? Some history

The history of human migration is vast, complex, and fascinating. Here there is space to highlight only a few seminal migration moments from that history.

Humans have been moving about our planet since the origin of our species, as people began occupying all the regions of our world (Scarre 2013a). Homo erectus began moving out of Africa across Eurasia about 1.75 million years ago (Mithen 1996). Homo sapiens occupied Africa about 150,000 years ago and had spread to all habitable parts of Australia, Asia, and Europe by 40,000 years ago (Dunbar 2004; Scarre 2013a). Many factors motivated early humans to migrate, including climate change and the search for more adequate food supplies.

Since the Neolithic period (roughly 12,000 years ago), most migrations involved aggression, such as conquest and colonization (Scarre 2013a). Colonialism, which began intensifying about 500 years ago, involved the expansion of settled populations, largely from Europe. European colonialism accelerated the pace of migration. New settlers sometimes overwhelmed and virtually eradicated local populations.

There has been much human migration related to colonial and postcolonial events, war, slavery, religious pursuits, persecution, and economic goals (Fisher 2014). I obviously cannot cover all these cases in any detail, though I certainly will make reference to relevant features of this history in the chapters to come. For instance, several theorists draw on aspects of colonial history in arguing for reparative duties or other justice obligations towards those peoples who were previously colonized or significantly disadvantaged by historical processes.

Here I pick out only a few examples to give a flavor of some of the large-scale migrations that have taken place. Often migration has been driven by tensions and has in turn been the source of further tensions. Migration can also be a way to connect diverse communities across the world and to promote mutually beneficial goals. I have chosen a few instances to illustrate how there have been several common reasons for movement across the centuries. Dominant among these reasons are two: first, attempting to escape conflict, persecution, or violence; and, second, seeking better economic, social, or political opportunities for oneself and one’s family.

During the world wars and their aftermath, there was considerable movement, with millions motivated to avoid genocide, conflict, and hostilities. The Potsdam Agreement, signed in 1945, gave rise to the largest migration in the twentieth century in which approximately 20 million people were resettled; 16.5 million Germans were expelled from Eastern Europe, but so were hundreds of thousands of Poles, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and Belarusians. Many Jews from Eastern Europe also migrated to countries such as Israel and the United States.

The aftermath of World War II also heralded a move for colonized states to seek separation from their former colonists. A wave of new independent states gave rise to much tension which necessitated large-scale movement. The partition of India offers one of the most dramatic examples. In 1947, huge populations of Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims moved either away from or into the newly created state of Pakistan. The partition displaced approximately 17 million people.

The term “the Great Migration” is often used with reference to the movement of African Americans from the rural Southern United States to the Northeast, Midwest and West between 1910 and 1929. At that time, African Americans faced extensive political and social barriers to advancement, especially economically. The regions to which they migrated offered vastly different economic, social, and political prospects. A second wave of migration, called “the Second Great Migration,” took place from 1929 to 1970, when opportunities began to change in the South. About seven million African Americans migrated in these so-called Great Migrations.

As this very brief historical synopsis illustrates, our species, Homo sapiens, has always migrated; indeed, the history of human beings centrally involves migration. However, the issues concerning human movement that we face today are more complex and multifaceted than ever before. Like our forebears, central reasons for migration involve the quest for new opportunities, scarcity of resources, environmental challenges, religious persecution, ethnic tensions, wars, or unstable post-conflict societies. At various periods in our history, technological change facilitated and multiplied movement opportunities, and this is clearly evident in our current stage of globalization, in which vast numbers of people are able to travel as never before. The higher density and efficiency of transportation, along with superior technological and communication linkages, make global travel and migration much easier today than it was centuries ago. That swiftness and efficiency of transportation can be an advantage when it moves people rapidly to the opportunities they seek. But it can also prove to be a massive disadvantage, notably when it allows disease to spread at a record pace. In chapter 9, I discuss just how the current tragedy of Covid-19 is affecting migration and is likely to influence migration debates in the future.

1.4 Overview of subsequent chapters

Chapter 2 discusses issues related to states’ rights to exclude others and whether borders should be more open than they currently are. The surge in attention to migration in mainstream political theorizing began with two especially important works, which present the seminal arguments of two seemingly opposed positions. These two works have shaped contemporary theorizing about migration like no other and they therefore deserve extended treatment. Michael Walzer (1983) defends the right of states to limit migration and, in response, Joseph Carens (1987) argues for generally open borders. These two works in particular mark the beginning of an explosion in theorizing about migration problems. The right to control admissions raises issues about the nature of political communities and national identity, which can connect closely to people’s sense of personal identity and values. It also invites us to think about whether national identity has a role to play in sustaining democracies, the legitimate scope for self-determination, rightful authority to exclude from a territory, just and unjust occupation, settlement, and land use. These topics are introduced in this chapter and weave through several others as well. Many prominent theorists have weighed in on these issues and some of the most influential positions are covered in this chapter.

In chapter 3, I discuss our responsibilities in relation to forced migration. Much migration is forced, as in the case of refugees. What responsibilities do we have to refugees seeking safe haven? Granting asylum, offering resettlement, and facilitating repatriation are just some options to consider. What grounds any obligations we have to refugees? And what would it mean for a state to do its fair share, given that more than 70 million people are currently displaced by conflict at home? In this chapter, some prominent answers to these questions are considered, including those of Michael Walzer, Joseph Carens, David Miller, David Owen, Mathew Gibney, Alexander Betts, and Paul Collier, analyzing their strengths and weaknesses. We also cover some contemporary developments concerning how to assist refugees effectively that address many needs, along with the unique solutions that consideration of climate change refugees might require.

In chapter 4, I discuss which criteria states may permissibly use in selection and citizenship policies. Not all potential migrants are perceived as equal. High-income states are typically welcoming to the wealthy, skilled, and talented, even when they aim to keep out those they judge to bring insufficient benefits. High net-worth individuals and those with special skills are frequently offered a fast track to citizenship. Are such actions defensible? Which criteria may states permissibly use in selection and citizenship policies? May states permissibly use wealth, health status, education, language ability, religion, sexual orientation, cultural factors, or family connections in such decisions? When might their use be perfectly legitimate and when might they constitute unjust discrimination? In this chapter, I explore such questions in their contemporary context, discussing some prominent analyses of permissible and impermissible criteria for selection, exclusion, and naturalization.

Chapter 5 covers responsibilities concerning legal immigrants and their host states. What responsibilities do legal immigrants have to their new home states? What responsibilities do states have to these new members? States have responsibilities to maintain an ethos of inclusion, so working out how and when to accommodate difference is therefore important. The chapter begins by noting that there are several models of membership, including those aimed at assimilation, integration, and inclusion, that have influenced state policies over the last one hundred years. We see how contemporary trends have moved away from assimilation towards models of integration. The chapter covers several key concerns about how to promote integration. We start with the debate between Will Kymlicka and his critics concerning migrants’ rights and responsibilities in multicultural environments. While states should aim to offer an inclusive and welcoming environment to new members, there seem to be multiple ways of enacting these goals, with some presenting as better ways to achieve the desired objectives. The chapter draws on many contemporary examples to illustrate salient issues, from prohibiting certain practices (such as banning the wearing of hijabs or headscarves) to practices that actively encourage new migrants to celebrate the cultures of their home countries.

While Kymlicka’s model emphasizes group-differentiated rights, other models, such as those of Joseph Carens, stress many of the informal behaviors, norms, and practices that are central to integration. Mutual adaptation is frequently required between host and immigrant citizens. This chapter also considers the underlying question of how to promote a flourishing democracy in multicultural environments, the role that national identity might play in such projects, and the mechanisms that governments may permissibly use in promoting democratic values.

Chapter 6 discusses the rights and responsibilities concerning undocumented migrants and their host states. Do so-called illegal migrants deserve fair treatment and, if so, what does this consist in? Should their children be entitled to free education in a state, even when parents have no legal residence permission? Should undocumented residents have access to certain services or opportunities, such as being permitted to obtain a driving license? And for those who have resided in a country illegally for a reasonably long period, such as a decade or more, should they eventually have access to legal residency or citizenship processes? Critics of regularization policies argue that such actions would reward illegal behavior and are unfair to those law-abiding applicants who have been patiently waiting for admission while remaining in their countries of origin. By contrast, those who defend such policies often maintain that such actions are most consistent with justice as they recognize the role of social belonging: such long-term residents are members of the communities they have joined and are, after sufficient time has passed, entitled to full rights as members of those communities. The case is particularly poignant for those who arrived illegally as very young children and who know no other place as home, such as many of the Dreamers in the United States. Denying access to regularization for such residents seems to punish the innocent harshly for features of their existence beyond their control. While the strengths and weaknesses of such arguments are reviewed, this chapter also highlights why the most compelling of these arguments point in favor of some important rights for long-settled undocumented migrants. Objections to programs of regularizing the status for such long-settled migrants can often be addressed through a restorative approach in which the undocumented can reasonably be said to have earned citizenship or made amends for past transgressions.

Chapter 7 looks at fair treatment in relation to temporary migrants. Much migration is temporary and involves mutually beneficial economic arrangements for sending and destination countries. The scale of such movement is vast and some regions of the world are highly dependent on large temporary workforces. The migrants themselves frequently welcome such opportunities as much-valued employment, especially in home countries with large unemployment problems. Many of these migrants have no desire to settle away from home countries and view these rather as good opportunities to save and remit funds to family.

Are there normative constraints on how destination countries may treat their “guest workers” and, if so, what are they? For instance, may employers treat them in much worse ways than employees who are citizens? Are destination countries obliged to offer citizenship to those who have been working legally within a state for a long period of time, as Michael Walzer (1983) argued? This chapter considers how temporary migrants may and may not permissibly be treated in host states, consistent with the demands of justice. We also examine the arguments of those who believe all temporary work programs are morally objectionable and should be abandoned. Here a key factor is whether there are ways to strengthen the protections that temporary workers receive so that they are not exploitative in the ways critics fear.

Chapter 8 looks at justice in out-migration. Are there ever circumstances in which governments may regulate or restrict citizens in leaving a country? The issue of restricting exit has risen to prominence through several recent developments. During the early stages of the coronavirus pandemic of 2020, China prohibited the out-migration of millions of its own citizens, along with many other travelers. In 2015, governments of several western democracies sought to prevent the departure of some of their citizens hoping to travel abroad to join the struggle for an Islamic State and other terrorist organizations. States have obligations to prevent harm to citizens so, on these grounds, there appears to be support for such actions. However, what weight should be placed on the human right we apparently all have to emigrate? The chapter reviews the international framework for navigating such issues so we can appreciate that considerable guidance is available. The chapter focuses on one dominant contemporary example in which the issues have recently been explored by many leading political theorists, namely the issues arising over “brain drain.” Where brain drain is an issue, migration can result in significant harms for those who are left behind in countries of origin when high levels of skilled migrants leave a country, increasing deprivation for the worst off. How, if at all, should this issue of brain drain affect migration policy in destination or sending countries? For instance, some argue that policies that mitigate losses that migrants would otherwise create can be justified in such circumstances. Examples might include conditioning departure on completion of short compulsory service terms or commitments to pay taxes to countries of origin for a limited time. Such policies suggest that justice requires regulating exit under certain conditions. I cover these issues in chapter 8.

Chapter 9 considers where debates in this field are going, identifying some emerging issues and future directions for continuing migration discussions. In addition, this chapter considers important challenges to debates as they have unfolded so far. Core issues tackled include just enforcement methods, permissible forms of resistance to unjust immigration policies, and the role cities should play in immigration matters. I also look at some arguments from the field of critical border studies that challenge dominant assumptions about how to approach migration matters and I discuss the implications of the Covid-19 pandemic on migration and political theorizing. Next, I briefly explain some of these topics further.

Even if immigration policies or laws are normatively justified, there are further questions about what means a government may use to enforce its immigration laws. For instance, may states separate children from their parents at the border if this is an effective way to get migrants to leave or not come in the first place? What criteria should we use in deciding what are the permissible and impermissible ways to enforce immigration policies?

A second core set of questions involves our responses to unjust immigration policies or laws. We center the analysis around questions such as: Are sanctuary cities to be commended? Is it permissible to resist unjust immigration law? What forms of resistance, if any, might be justified in cases of unjust migration policy? Can people smuggling ever be permissible in response to unjust immigration policies?

I then move on to discuss three further important contemporary challenges. It is widely assumed that immigration policy is a matter for nation-states to decide rather than smaller political sub-units. Should cities be permitted to make their own immigration policies? If so, what sorts of decisions might they rightfully make for themselves? Next, we look at some of the important critiques emerging from critical border studies theorists. For instance, such theorists argue that once we connect processes that drive movement within the state with drivers across state borders, we see a number of common elements that should be studied and tackled together. Powerful multinational corporations have shaped migration through foreign investment, activities, and structural processes, that drive both intrastate movements (such as from rural to urban environments) and movements from low-income to high-income countries. If we wish to tackle some of the most important drivers of movement around the planet that force vulnerable people from their homes, we must appreciate the role that structural processes and powerful actors play.