Minsky E-Book

Daniel H. Neilson

• Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
• Kategorie: Fachliteratur
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 334

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2019

Beschreibung

No economist has written more incisively and provocatively on financial crisis than Hyman Minsky. Minsky is best known for his claim that "stability is destabilizing" - that the seeds of the bust are sown in the boom. This financial instability hypothesis received renewed attention - and substantial confirmation - in the global financial crisis of 2008. Minsky's insights are not limited to moments of crisis; they grow out of a comprehensive and critical theory of financial capitalism. This book provides a systematic overview of Minsky's thought, covering his entire body of work. It shows how financial crises arise not as exceptions, but out of the normal operation of a financial capitalist system. It explains why Minsky's theories sit uncomfortably with economics and what efforts have been made to integrate them, and shows how Minsky's work can be incorporated into other fields of social thought. This book will be of interest to students and scholars in economics, political economy, finance, politics, and social theory, as well as to anyone with an interest in the financial system and its tendency toward crisis.

Leseprobe

Contents

Key Contemporary Thinkers Series includes:

Title page

Copyright page

Dedication

Acknowledgments

1 Introduction

Theory, history, discipline

Time, uncertainty, capitalism

Minsky as economist

The crisis of 2008

Note

2 Financial capitalism

The institutions

Evolving financial structures

The financial instability hypothesis

Coherence

Before and after the “moment”

3 A payments theory of finance

Capitalism and payment

Survival constraint

Position-making and cash kickers

Economizing on reserves

4 The inadequacy of economics

Iatrogenesis

Cash flow over income

Nominal over real

Liquidity over solvency

5 Making the market

Position-making and liquidity

Dealing and initiative

Supply and demand

Market liquidity, funding liquidity, and monetary liquidity

Interpreting Keynes

6 Last resort

The endpoint of position-making

Centrality and discretion

Validation

Regulation and uncertainty

7 The resilience of economics

Anticipation of crisis

Breaking point

Memory of crisis

8 Minsky for all moments

Financialization

Disciplinarity and study

Minsky’s economics

Bibliography

Index

End User License Agreement

Guide

Cover

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Series Title

Key Contemporary Thinkers Series includes:

Jeremy Ahearne,

Michel de Certeau

Lee Braver,

Heidegger

John Burgess,

Kripke

Claire Colebrook,

Agamben

Jean-Pierre Couture,

Sloterdijk

Colin Davis,

Levinas

Oliver Davis,

Jacques Rancière

Reidar Andreas Due,

Deleuze

Edward Fullbrook and Kate Fullbrook,

Simone de Beauvoir

Nigel Gibson,

Fanon

Graeme Gilloch,

Siegfried Kracauer

Lawrence Hamilton,

Amartya Sen

Christina Howells,

Derrida

Simon Jarvis,

Adorno

Rachel Jones,

Irigaray

Sarah Kay, Žiž

ek

S. K. Keltner,

Kristeva

Matthew H. Kramer,

H.L.A. Hart

Moya Lloyd,

Judith Butler

James McGilvray,

Chomsky, 2nd edn

Lois McNay,

Foucault

Marie-Eve Morin,

Jean-Luc Nancy

Timothy Murphy,

Antonio Negri

Daniel H. Neilson,

Minsky

Ed Pluth,

Badiou

John Preston,

Feyerabend

Severin Schroeder,

Wittgenstein

Susan Sellers,

Hélène Cixous

Anthony Paul Smith,

Laruelle

Dennis Smith,

Zygmunt Bauman

James Smith,

Terry Eagleton

James Williams,

Lyotard

Christopher Zurn,

Axel Honneth

Minsky

Daniel H. Neilson

polity

Copyright page

Copyright © Daniel H. Neilson 2019

The right of Daniel H. Neilson to be identified as Author of this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

First published in 2019 by Polity Press

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Dedication

To my parents

Acknowledgments

I am deeply appreciative of the support of Diana DePardo-Minsky, Alan Minsky, and Esther Minsky in producing this book. My debts to Perry Mehrling, beyond the many citations in the pages that follow, cannot be listed exhaustively. I will mention only two: thank you for showing me Minsky, and thank you for teaching me how to be an economist (though I do it differently than you!). I have been enjoying conversations on all subjects with Tyler Bickford, Çağlar Girit, and Jackson Jones for decades now, and perhaps they will find some of those ideas reflected in these pages. Chris Coggins has been an inspiring co-teacher and friend. I thank Asma Abbas, who among many other lessons pointed me to Rancière (1987), where I found Jacotot (1823), which has been indispensable. An anonymous conversant helped me learn to navigate with map and compass. Whitney Harris was a dedicated research assistant and an indulgent counterparty in conversation and study. I am grateful to my students, and in particular to Jacques Ben-Avie, Mario Campbell, Mackenzie Dwyer, Darcy Pollard, Alice Sinclair, Jeff Tsen, John Zhang, and Chandler Zincke-Byer, each of whom taught me something during this project – thank you, it is what sustains me as a teacher.

I am grateful for and humbled by the work of three anonymous reviewers who read a quite rough version of the manuscript. I responded to many if not most of their suggestions in the text, sometimes by clarification rather than a change in course. I am likewise grateful for the editorial interventions of George Owers and Fiona Sewell at various stages of the process. The book is undoubtedly improved by all of these contributions, though I take responsibility for what remains.

Lena and Augie, I am inspired by how you love your work, and from you I am learning to love my own. Sara, you are present in every word, in every chapter, and in the entire book, but still I feel I have only just begun to speak to you.

1Introduction

Theory, history, discipline

In writing this text, I have sought to reconcile my commitment to two sometimes conflicting aims. On the one hand, it is meant to be a concise outline of Minsky’s work, consistent with the aims of Polity’s Key Contemporary Thinkers series, in which this book appears. Indeed, there is an interesting challenge to the task of somehow representing in a single text the entire work of a scholar; nor will I object if whatever attention might come to the book comes first and foremost in search of an understanding of who Hyman Minsky was.

On the other hand, in celebrating and exploring the work of a single person, it is easy to fall into the trap of hagiography – to make the erroneous leap from “Minsky said it” to “it is true.” Minsky said many things, to many different audiences, that responded to the events and debates of his time, many of which are already fading into history. If one’s only aim is to know what Minsky said, one might therefore simply re-read his many publications, as I have done in the preparation of this book. One finds there a lively and synthetic thinker who has perceived something important and who tries many avenues to get it across.

With this book I have sought, instead, to create something that adds to Minsky’s intellectual bequest. In sorting through that wealth, I have accepted the assessment of my teacher Perry Mehrling that the value of Minsky’s contribution lies not in any particular investigation, but in “his way of looking at the world, his underlying vision” (Mehrling 1999, 139). I have also followed this recommendation of Minsky’s:

The main issue in the controversy about what Keynes really meant is not the discovery of the true meaning of the “Master’s” text. The main issue is how to construct a theory that enables us to understand the behavior of a capitalist economy. (1978d, 6f.; also 1990c)

As Minsky approached Keynes, so I approach Minsky. I share the goal of understanding capitalism, and in particular the role and status of finance in that system. I share with Mehrling and many other observers the belief that Minsky offered us a valuable vision through which to do so. In taking on the events and debates of his time – in academic writing, in commentary, and in engagements with his fellow economists – he put that vision to use, and in the process left us a legacy: the trace of an underlying, never fully spelled out theory. That theory, as I will show, though it is certainly present in Minsky’s published work, does not stand perfectly well on its own in its original form.

This book is not history of thought, nor is it biography. It is a concise outline of Minsky’s thought, but that outline is the consequence of my own synthesis and consolidation. I have tried everywhere to represent Minsky’s intention unambiguously, but at the same time I have avoided supposing that what Minsky said is, by that fact, necessarily true. Rather I have assumed that Minsky’s work may be valuable in the worthwhile but incomplete task of understanding capitalism; I have tried to convey something of that value, and to suggest what use might be made of Minsky’s work by another generation of students of society.

In doing so, I have developed three main threads over the course of the book. The first thread is financial theory. Minsky offered a theory of how financial capitalism works, which has the virtue of also giving insight into how it fails. He perceived, in my view, enduring patterns of the financial system and of market society, and it has been my goal to organize these – in a way that Minsky never did but with which I think he would agree – into a theory of capitalist finance. This is done in the main text of chapters 2, 3, 5, and 6, and is what I would consider to be the main contribution of the book.

Dealing with Minsky’s theoretical contributions has required, to some extent, a factoring out of financial history, the story of the crises that motivated Minsky and provided him with an ongoing source of inspiration, examples, and evidence. Minsky’s own writing is less accessible, some decades on, for its being tied to circumstances that have changed. One begins to resent ninety-five pages on the crisis of 1975 in Stabilizing an Unstable Economy! The reader who wishes to catch up on the history of the financial crises of the latter half of the last century is directed to Wolfson (1986), for his systematic presentation of each of the relevant episodes; what discussion I have included here of this history is largely confined to brief illustrations that are relatively self-contained and do not presume much in the way of prior knowledge.

At the same time I have felt it important to say a bit about the global financial crisis of 2008. This comes, first, in the form of a narrative in the last section of this chapter. Second, I have made extensive use of the report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC), created by the US legislature to investigate the causes of the crisis. The report is based on extensive interviews, and so in many cases it allows a direct view into the motivations and perceptions of those actually involved in how the events played out. I have taken from that study numerous illustrations of what Minsky understood to be parts of the general pattern of financial crisis. For a more analytical look at the 2008 crisis I recommend the characteristically efficient and insightful analysis of Mehrling (2010).

Minsky offers not only a theory but also a way of being an economist, which is the subject of the second thread of this book. In sections set in differentiated type, this thread proceeds in parallel with the first. Unlike the theoretical development, which is organized to present the theory coherently, this thread is organized chronologically. It considers, in order, Minsky’s major works (his dissertation, two books, a major research study, an edited volume, and an important series of papers), and in doing so illustrates how Minsky came to know what he knew. This second thread ends with a consideration of contemporary interpretations of Minsky.

The third and final thread takes up the relationship between Minsky’s work and the economics literature. Minsky was a stern critic of many of the main currents of economic and financial theory. He objected to the assumptions that underlie the IS–LM model, in Minsky’s time a major framework for economic analysis and still the main teaching model in undergraduate macroeconomics. Minsky felt that IS–LM lacked a role for realistic financial relationships, which were for him the driving force in an understanding of economic activity. Neither was this critique directed only toward IS–LM: at many turns, Minsky’s focus on finance was the basis for divergence from existing theory.

As a consequence of these objections, Minsky worked at the margins of the economics profession, a topic that runs through his writing from the beginning right to the end. He addressed his colleagues with engagement, despite his frustrations with the trends in assumptions and methodologies of economics that came and went during his time. Rather than rejecting economics entirely, he took refuge among others on the margins. He found allies and an audience there, but they were not spared his criticism either. I have tried to make a constructive contribution without rehashing well-known debates about what is wrong with economics. Minsky, I argue, was trying to express something that is very difficult to express in the language of economics, and this is so for interesting reasons. In chapter 4, I try to be precise about the points of divergence, those specific aspects of Minsky’s financial capitalism that are incompatible with economic theory and practice. I come back to this in chapter 7, where I ask what work has come out of this incompatibility.

In the next section, I introduce the themes of the book in a skeletal form. The section that follows illustrates the disciplinary context in which Minsky worked, for those who might be unfamiliar with economics. The final section of this chapter is a brief reading of the global financial crisis of 2008.

Time, uncertainty, capitalism

Hyman P. Minsky (September 23, 1919–October 24, 1996) began his career as an economist with the completion of his doctoral dissertation at Harvard University in 1954. The experience of the stock market crash of 1929 and the subsequent Great Depression led Minsky, like many of his profession, to the question of whether another large financial disturbance could occur – whether “it” could happen again. Unlike most of his colleagues, he felt compelled to study at first hand the detailed workings of the financial system, the infrastructure of capitalism. This took the form of a study early in his career of the Federal Funds market from a seat in a New York money-market broker, and from 1967 as a consultant to Mark Twain Bank (1957a; Mehrling 1999).1 Minsky concluded that not only could instability recur, but in fact it would necessarily do so, and that such instability was indeed to be expected as a normal part of the functioning of US capitalism.

The crises of the 1960s and 1970s seemed to be powerful evidence in favor of this hypothesis. Much of Minsky’s work on the financial system is written in response to the financial disturbances he observed. His narrative evolves in response to these, but to a significant degree it is the same story each time. The crises that attracted Minsky’s notice were these: the Kennedy Slide of 1962 (1962; 1963a); the 1966 Credit Crunch (1965c; 1968b; 1968c; 1969a; 1969b); the Penn Central liquidity squeeze of 1969–70 (1970a; 1971; 1974a; 1974e); the international monetary crisis of August 1971 (1972a; 1973a); the Franklin National crisis of 1974–5 (1974d; 1976; 1978a; 1978e; 1986e); the 1978 intervention in the exchange value of the dollar (1978f); the silver crisis of 1980 (1980a; 1981b; 1982a; 1983a); the Continental Illinois crisis of 1984 (1984d); and the 1987 financial crisis (1988a; 1988c; 1988d; 1989b; 1992a; 1993a; 1995b). Crisis did, indeed, seem to be normal.

Minsky drew a stark conclusion from these crises, one that was to define his thinking, his career, and his legacy: “[I]n the early 1960s the mode of behavior of the financial system underwent significant changes and … these changes tended to accelerate the trend toward fragile finance” (1975b, 10; also 1995a). Following a stable period between the end of the Depression and the mid-1960s, crisis had become, if not predictable, at least unsurprising. These crises were costly, in terms of unemployment and bankruptcies, and instability seemed to be getting worse, so an investigation was warranted; Minsky’s first-hand observations in financial institutions suggested that that investigation should begin from the financial mechanics.

The acute nature of crisis – headline-making defaults and institutional failures – points to the importance of time in understanding them. Each crisis has a before, in which financial patterns are established and elaborated; a during, when those patterns seem to unravel chaotically and damagingly; and an after, characterized by retrenchment and stability. The cyclicality of crisis, however, seemed also to demonstrate that each post-crisis period becomes, imperceptibly, a pre-crisis period. Minsky saw this temporality embedded in the financial system. “As a result of their debt structure, firms operate today with cash-payment commitments inherited from the past. Furthermore, current investment and ownership of capital assets require financing, which sets up payment commitments for the future” (1982d, 19). Instability, that is, emerges in the present, as promises made in the past are reconciled against an ever-unfolding future.

The unstable present stands between a past that can no longer be changed and a future that cannot yet be fully known. Business ventures into this uncertain future, with entrepreneurs making promises now, to be fulfilled with the eventual proceeds that follow from today’s efforts. It is in the financial system that the success of these ventures will ultimately be tested, when debts made today come due in the future. Time and uncertainty create the possibility for innovation, for the setting in motion of business activity on which capitalism is based. They also, Minsky saw, create the possibility for failure; not just for the failure of a single firm, but for widespread failure due to systemic phenomena. Because the financial system is where past and present meet, it is the locus for crisis.

Minsky thus took as his object of study the capitalist system, with the financial system at its center (1967a). Pervasive uncertainty meant that finance, and thus capitalism, would be constantly subjected to the possibility of crisis. The series of crises over the course of Minsky’s career seemed to provide clear evidence that the US financial system was indeed unstable, and that that instability even arose out of the normal operation of the system. He went so far as to call financial capitalism “inherently flawed” (1969a, 224): “The flaw in American capitalism centers around the financial system, and the financial system is an essential attribute of the economy” (1968a, 578).

The ramifications of time and uncertainty are written into the financial system; the resulting instability of capitalism constitutes its inherent flaw (1996). The investigation of this problem set Minsky in motion, and sustained his entire career. There seemed to be plenty to talk about, and one might suppose that Minsky’s contributions would have found an attentive audience among his fellow economists.

* * *

To know Minsky’s economics, we must also know Minsky as economist. Viewed in its entirety, Minsky’s published work follows the contexts, events, and debates of his time; he draws on texts, conversations, and experience and incorporates each into a worldview, a theory that is constantly refined, updated to add what is new and subtract what is no longer true or no longer needed. In each of Minsky’s publications we can see not only knowledge but also a way of knowing. In learning from Minsky we must study both: not only what he knew but how he knew it. For the events and debates of our time are not those of Minsky’s time; his ideas cannot be taken up unaltered. They must be interpreted, given meaning in our own context. Minsky’s way of knowing will lead us to our own. Thinking back to his days as a student, the septuagenarian Minsky wrote:

[T]here is never a true reading of a text. The reader is not a mere passive recipient, but an active creator of interpretation. The reader brings priors to the text, priors that can be more or less restricting or binding. In economics, there is another difficulty: history unfolds and institutions evolve. As the world moves through time, each reader has to interpret (extract meaning from) events and institutional changes and integrate the reading of what happened and what is into an interpretation, into a maintained theory. This means that, to a serious scholar, the lessons learned from a text are subject to change. (1992b, 365)

Minsky’s scholarship began with the completion of his doctoral dissertation at Harvard in 1954. His subject was business cycles, a problem of unquestionable importance, in light of the experience of 1929 and the Great Depression that had been the economic context for his formative studies. It seemed also to be a promising line of research: economic theory did not yet offer satisfying answers. Minsky found a disconnected body of thought, with each author emphasizing a particular phenomenon, attached to a different policy approach; what was lacking was an integrated work that transcended these compartments. The Great Depression had demonstrated that a severe crisis was a phenomenon that cut across the fields of economic experience, that needed to be understood from a synthetic point of view. For a PhD student, such an approach would be ambitious, but Minsky had learned to put vision before technique (1992b; Mehrling 1999). If the result would be received as “eclectic,” so much the better: the problem had enough texture to warrant it. He begins:

Paraphrasing Voltaire, we can assert that if business cycles did not exist, the economic theorist would have invented them. For if we look at the problem of business cycles, without any doctrinaire bias, it seems obvious that in this branch of economics a natural connection occurs between the often too separate compartments of economic analysis: between the “monetary” and the so-called real phenomena. Therefore, a theory of business cycles, to be consistent with the observable material and the inherited doctrines, should be a blend of the analytical material which deals with the interrelations among a few broad aggregates – which traditionally has been the approach of monetary theory – and the analytical material which deals with the behavior of individual economic units and of particular markets – which has been the sphere of price and distribution theory. This thesis can be interpreted as an attempt to construct such an eclectic business cycle theory. ([1954] 2000, 1)

Minsky had lost his dissertation supervisor, the great Joseph Schumpeter, with his death in 1950. Though Minsky completed his project under the supervision of Wassily Leontief, he remained Schumpeter’s student, and the dissertation was the beginning of an effort to build on his professor’s work. Schumpeter had placed finance at the center of his understanding of economic change. Credit extended in support of business activity is the mechanism by which entrepreneurs are given control over the means of production, even before those efforts bear fruit:

By credit, entrepreneurs are given access to the social stream of goods before they have acquired a normal claim to it. It temporarily substitutes, as it were, a fiction of this claim for the claim itself. Granting credit in this sense operates as an order upon the economic system to accommodate itself to the purposes of the entrepreneur, as an order on the goods which he needs: it means entrusting him with productive forces. (Schumpeter 1934, 107)

The financial system is not just a way of allocating command of production. As the very organizing principle of capitalism, finance is itself the most important of the evolving institutions to which economists must attend; in the financial record is written the unfolding history of the entrepreneurial successes and failures of capitalism: “Schumpeter brought to the analysis of a monetary production economy the sense of the economy as an evolving institutional structure. Nowhere is market-driven institutional evolution (innovation) more apparent than in the financial sphere” (1993c, 113). But Schumpeter’s work on business cycles did not, Minsky thought, fully incorporate the lessons of the Depression. The contradiction was surprising, to a mature Minsky looking back, for Schumpeter had many of the necessary ingredients at his disposal:

[Schumpeter] noted that “The money market is always, as it were, the headquarters of the capitalist system” (Schumpeter, 1934: 126). This seemingly implies that the sequence of events that can be said to have been triggered by the break in stock market prices in October 1929 – that led to the complete closure of the banking system in March of 1933 – was not peripheral but rather were central to the functioning of a capitalist economy. … Schumpeter may write of financial catastrophe, but he nowhere explains catastrophe. The significance of liability structures and the importance to banks as holders of business liabilities of business profits are only peripheral concerns in Schumpeter’s analysis in The Theory of Economic Development and Business Cycles. (1986c, 114)

Minsky already had a sense of his vision, his maintained theory; here was a set of historical circumstances in need of interpretation: to explain catastrophe. If the money market, the banking system, is the center of capitalism, why should the financial structures that unraveled in the Depression be relegated to the margins of analysis? It would become the effort that was to form the intellectual basis of his career. “To Schumpeter’s original view of the monetary process we have to add a specific consideration of the liquidity phenomenon” ([1954] 2000, 225). To interpret catastrophe would require that liability structures, and the sudden intervention of crisis in the normal functioning of capitalism, be placed at the center.

* * *

Minsky as economist

Minsky’s training – Chicago BS in mathematics (1941), Harvard PhD in economics (1954) – started him off with the makings of a disciplinary insider. After teaching at Brown while still a graduate student, he accepted a faculty position at Berkeley in 1958. His education and early publications in academic journals of high prestige among economists (1957a; 1957b; 1959a; 1961) might have set him on the path to prominence. But he left Berkeley for Washington University in St Louis, and his subsequent publications are in more marginal academic journals and in the non-academic press. Minsky never withdrew his claim on economics, however; instead he resolutely and repeatedly sited himself at its margins.

This must be in part because Minsky’s treatment of themes central to his work is in conflict with those of the discipline. The issues of time and uncertainty created serious problems for economists, he thought, and the mechanisms of finance suggested a way to study them. “Economics is a strange discipline in which present, past, and future coexist in time. A cash-flow approach to economic theory helps unravel some of the problems associated with time” (1982d, 19; also 1993b). Minsky’s objection echoes that of G. L. S. Shackle: “To look down the complete vista of all relevant history-to-come is to see a still picture where nothing happens. In such a world … there would be no need for postponement of choice, no need for liquidity” (Shackle 1972, 165). For Shackle as for Minsky, economics offers no adequate understanding of time, and therefore no adequate understanding of instability.

Minsky did try to persuade. His dissertation (1954) can be understood as a way to add financial mechanics to standard economic models. His first book (1975c) adds very much the same financial mechanics to the analysis of Keynes’s The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936). Minsky’s second book (1986e) studies them in the context of the experience of the 1970s. Indeed, what is most striking about Minsky’s relationship to the economics profession is the consistency of his stance despite the changing fashions of academic economics.

In this it seems helpful to regard the economics profession as a community united by a language. Economics has its lexicon of technical terms – or everyday terms with technical meanings – but also a vocabulary of mathematical models and statistical approaches. Together, these comprise the language of instruction in most economics undergraduate and especially PhD programs. Minsky certainly mastered the language to the satisfaction of the Harvard economics department, but later reflection, without regret, suggests that he still felt a language barrier, having “never really [become] strongly bound to [his] contemporaries in economics” (1985b, 213).

The resulting communication difficulties were clearly frustrating. Reviews of work by more mainstream authors open with complaints: “The combination of a critical attitude towards Arrow–Debreu and a positive view of Keynes led this reader to expect that an effort to develop an ‘alternative construction’ would follow… Alas, my high hopes were not validated” (1984c, 450; also 1981c). The reviews that follow are embedded in what are clearly rehearsals of Minsky’s own views; it is not hard to see how these jabs could be ignored by their targets.

Fellow dissidents received much the same treatment: Minsky’s review of Davidson’s Money and the Real World suggests that the author “should go back to the drawing board and produce a more succinct and a better focused presentation of the important things he has to say” (1974b, 17), and the review makes clear that the ideal model for such a presentation would be Minsky’s own. Writing of Leijonhufvud’s Information and Coordination, similarly, Minsky says that it “works to the literature, not to institutions and their evolution. This was valuable when criticising established doctrine was the task; it is a serious flaw when the task is the building of viable theory” (1982e, 977).

Minsky’s objections extend to the methodologies that sustain the language of economists. He dismissed as irrelevant to practical concerns highly mathematical theoretical and statistical models: “Economic policy is not made for a mathematical or statistical abstraction” (1977g, 3; also 1969c; 1980d). Statistical analyses were “printouts”: “As the doubters of permanent prosperity did not have printouts to prove the validity of their views, it was quite proper to ignore the arguments drawn from theory, history, and institutional analysis” (1977b, 146). Such modeling efforts were not just idle; the standards of mainstream economics meant that other valuable perspectives – principally, again, Minsky’s own – were ignored. Evidently the failure to communicate was a sore point; evidently Minsky’s tone did little to win converts to his perspective among his colleagues.

This book seeks to understand Minsky’s work; the opinions of the mainstream of the economics profession are well documented elsewhere, as are those of its heterodox critics. I have therefore limited myself, in what follows, to the critical aspect of the relationship between Minsky and the economics profession: what are the points on which communication failed, and why? Minsky returned time and again to the same set of ideas about finance and capitalism, trying to articulate them to other economists, but economics did not really have the vocabulary to accommodate those ideas. As Shackle observed, “Money, as something which can introduce a time-interval between selling one thing and deciding what to have in exchange for it, can evidently have no place in a system whose logic requires all its choices to be comprehensively simultaneous in order that they may be pre-reconciled and thus fully informed” (Shackle 1972, 164).

The real barrier to communication, I propose, was that the themes Minsky dealt with – uncertainty, liquidity, money – find no easy expression in the language of economics as it currently is; the very words had different meanings to his colleagues. The more one is socialized into the discipline, the harder it becomes to talk about these ideas. I return to these translation difficulties later, especially in chapters 4 and 7.

* * *

Minsky’s intellectual vision and appetite for the grand challenges of the theory of business cycles made Schumpeter a natural mentor. The author of a thousand-page book on business cycles illustrated by example a way of knowing, a way of being a scholar and an economist, that Minsky admired and sought to emulate. But Schumpeter’s approach was out of sync with the priorities of the post-World War II generation of graduate students. The ambition that Minsky shared with Schumpeter was the exception among his cohort of PhD students:

[I]n the Harvard of 1946–49, the graduate students, largely but not exclusively veterans of either the service or of Washington, did not take Schumpeter seriously. This was not because the students were in the forefront of the emerging mathematical economics and therefore had surpassed Schumpeter. It was because the main thrust in economics at Harvard was applied: the simplified Keynesian economics of Prof. Alvin Hansen and the quite mechanical application of monopolistic competition theory to problems of industrial organization as set out by Prof. Edward Mason ruled the roost. The representative student was not intellectually engaged with the big issues of the scope and nature of economics and the lessons for a vision of society that were to be extracted from the dismal history of the previous two decades. The prevailing ethos was careerist. The working postulate among the graduate students was not only that big thinking was in the past, but, in truth, it was not worth doing. Their task was to get the Ph.D. and go forth to teach or to serve a government bureau. In the prevailing view, economics was now a normal science, not a grand adventure, and therefore Schumpeter was irrelevant. (1992b, 363 n. 2)

Minsky had no interest in the mechanical application of theory; he wanted the grand adventure. This meant that he was immediately confronted with the contradictions of economic theory. This led to, for example, challenging the distinction made by economics between monetary phenomena, reckoned in quantities of money, and “real” phenomena, reckoned in quantities of goods, from the first paragraph of his dissertation (the substance of which distinction we will take up again in chapter 4). Schumpeter had also rejected the distinction:

Economic action cannot, at least in capitalist society, be explained without taking account of money, and practically all economic propositions are relative to the modus operandi of a given monetary system. In this sense any theory of, say, wages or unemployment or foreign trade or monopoly must be a “monetary” theory, even if the phenomena under study can be defined in non-monetary terms. (Schumpeter 1939, 548)

It was not only in studying money that Minsky felt the need to reject the methodological assumptions of the economics discipline:

Much of present day price theory tends to identify price theory with marginal analysis. Marginal analysis is far from being a primitive concept; it is derived in the analysis of perfect competition. Marginal analysis is derived from profit maximization … the carrying over of profit maximization behavior to non-competitive markets has been the typical approach as far as price theory is concerned. Economists can be accused of being parrots who say that marginal x equals marginal y, and the position so determined is where the firm will operate.

Observed behavior of firms, any casual observation of the behavior of certain non-competitive firms during an inflationary period, can be interpreted to indicate that firms either lack the knowledge or the desire to behave as the marginal analysis indicates a firm should behave. The use of unmodified profit maximization as the sole basis for the analysis of firm behavior is a carry-over by the economist from the analysis of competitive markets. ([1954] 2000, 90f.)

Minsky did not hesitate to object to these two weaknesses of economic theory – leaving no room for money, and adherence to marginalism against the evidence: “The usual economic theory ignores financing problems and assumes a unique behavior principle for all firms (profit maximization, leaving only the trivial problem of the choice of the product to be produced to the firm” ([1954] 2000, 89). By relegating finance to the margins, by supposing that money is to be distinguished from what is “real,” by assuming a single mode of economic action, economists had assumed away the possibility for crisis. Without an understanding of finance, what could they say about the crash of 1929, or the closure of the banking system in 1933?

* * *

The crisis of 2008

In writing about financial crisis, a perennial topic and the one that oriented Minsky’s career, two points in time inevitably loom large: the next crisis and the last. Knowing that they come about, if not cyclically, at least repeatedly, it is hard to resist the temptation to imagine what will be the next crisis. Minsky’s work, as we shall see in some detail, helps us see how financial traumas grow from the quiescent periods that precede them; but having recognized this fact, one can quickly spot the seeds of crisis all around. This is not the same, however, as being able to offer a precise prediction. For these reasons I have tried, in what follows, to avoid predicting the next crisis; we shall have to wait and see.

The last crisis stands out in memory; indeed, a decade on, the debates and headlines that occupy the world’s attention today can still be traced along quite short paths back to the events of 2008. The subprime crisis, or the global financial crisis of 2008, was a major disruption: from a tipping point in the market for US real estate, it exposed the fragile arrangements in a global market-based credit system, bringing about the failures of major financial institutions, sparking a crisis in sovereign debt, and requiring coordinated intervention by central banks around the world. The consequences for employment, public finances, investment, not to mention politics and even, arguably, the course of history, have been and continue to be great. At the same time there is a risk of driving in the rear-view mirror, of preparing for the last war. Financial crises have a strong family resemblance, and at the same time each is unique; Minsky’s work, I argue, is more about the family resemblance than about any particular crisis, 2008 included.

I have aimed, therefore, to keep 2008 as an important example, but not the focus, for most of the book. Chapter 7 takes up the subprime crisis as a context for understanding the resurgent interest in Minsky’s work. Examples from the FCIC of the US Congress are included throughout the book as illustrations, in many cases quite precise ones, of Minsky’s insights. This section anticipates the discussion to follow with a short look at the events of the 2008 crisis. (I have tried to make this narrative both complete and efficient; as a consequence I fear it is slightly technical for an introductory section. To the interested reader for whom some of the financial vocabulary may be daunting, I suggest that you feel free to skip or skim this section. Its value might lie mostly in that it