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The asian continent is quivering, China is going through happenings that can have relevant consequences on the whole world. Our two authors, Albert Forchielli and Romeo Orlandi, who have been experts on asian and chinese matters for a long time, offer us once again a privileged outlook on that society, providing a detailed and updated picture of what shakes the chaotic oriental continent. The second volume of "Notebooks of China" talks about this political and geographic area's ability of being contemporary and, at the same time, allows us to understand the geopolitical and economic scenarios that are building up in Asia and in the rest of the world. The Notebooks are a useful tool to comprehend that part of the world that we are still struggling to see, but that we absolutely can not ignore any longer.
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Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2014
Notebooks from China
(and much more)
2 – 2014
Osservatorio Asia
KKIEN Publ. Int. is a trademark of KKIEN Enterprise srl
www.kkienpublishing.it
ISBN 978-88-98473-984
First digital edition: 2014
Cover: Shangai’s skyline
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Osservatorio Asia has traditional origins, an evolution hinging on modernity, and a fittingly undefined approach. It is a think tank born from a relationship based on collaboration between leaders in the business and academic worlds, with the objective of analyzing economic rapports between Italy and East Asia with continuity. Its only objective is to encourage business professionals and institutions to acquire a better understanding of Asian countries. OA promotes various activities (conferences, seminars, research, training courses, and publishing projects) in order to provide concrete support for internationalization and a structured understanding of globalization. OA ambitiously fosters its motto, “knowledge is a factor of success,” and operates under the guidance of a Scientific Committee.
It is, therefore, an intellectual organization hailing from a different culture than the digital age. Yet, it owes its growth to these very means of communication—digital publications, information, and networks. Osservatorio Asia is based on a software culture that allows it to reduce costs, timelines, and infrastructure. For more than 10 years, Osservatorio Asia has been thriving on sponsorships, which have been repaid with quality and visibility. The decision to publish a series of eBooks containing contributions from OA fits perfectly into our portfolio of activities.
www.osservatorioasia.com
The ring of tensions between Washington and Beijing has just earned another diamond, one of the most precious gems. After years of investigations, the Department of Justice has accused five Chinese military officials of illegal activities aimed as industrial espionage and information security. Essentially, they accused the Chinese military of training its agents to fraudulently steal industrial property, presumably of high sophistication. The FBI published photos of the five researchers. China’s reaction was very hard, not only because the soldiers “lost face” symbolically, but also because their pictures were preceded by the words “wanted,” like outlaws in the Old West or gangsters in Chicago. China has refuted the accusations and has accused the US of managing the biggest espionage information network in the world, citing recent examples in the media. As a first response, but probably not the last, it interrupted the China-US Cyber Working Group. The US was therefore not reticent in taking strong measures, knowing that incriminating the military officials would have pointed the finger at political leaders. Evidently, the bilateral climate is tending strongly toward anti-Chinese positions, where even supporters of a pragmatic relationship with China are in the minority for the paucity of results reached. It’s only the latest source of tension that’s fueling a dangerous decline in rapport between the two superpowers: from the containment of China in the Pacific to the worries over the reinvigorated relationship between Beijing and Moscow, from the arms sales to Taiwan to the nondisclosure of facts regarding Pyongyang’s regime. Even if resounding, Washington’s decision is not unexpected. For a long time, Germany and Austria have been working to contain the dangers of Chinese industrial espionage (after being involved in political spying with the US). Intelligence agencies are worried about two aspects of cyber spying: the military-political implications (given the country’s central role in the west’s chessboard), and industrial implications that could lead to economic successes or cyclical declines. Competent authorities recommend caution to businesses: avoid the diffusion of sensitive materials, business emails, speaking about patents, and discussing discoveries over the phone. They seem like trivial worries, but they are strengthened during trips to China or when receiving business delegations. The fear is shared by businesses that gave uncontainable instructions over the phone to employees, especially to top management. This worry stems from a phase of declining investments in Germany; it’s simultaneously cause and effect. In principle, all of the pretexts for an advantageous exchange exist. German Mittelstands (which is to say, the biggest in terms of PMI, production capacity, innovation, and export) are the most desirable targets for Chinese investors that need quality and have the financial resources to buy them. Chinese manufacturing capabilities and the promise of a limitless market are the dreams of every European business—both nightmare and fantasy. In any case, Chinese acquisitions in Germany are declining. According to the German Trade and Invest Institute, there were 593 acquisitions of German companies in 2013, of which 99 ended up in US hands, 63 in the UK’s, 53 in Swiss, 30 in French, and only 7 in Chinese hands (non of which were large). Expectations of currency inflows from China have been disregarded, involving an army of consultants and analysts that predicted an easy marriage of interests. There’s no doubt Chinese inexperience is among the causes. Managing complex situations, respecting rules and customs, and dialoguing with social groups to guarantee welfare have not been among their best qualities that characterize Beijing’s explorations overseas. Larger doses of humility and respect for international laws would have been needed. It was probably this very fear of sacrificing these aspects of dear, old Europe that discouraged German companies from having complete faith in their Chinese counterparts even though they had all the requisites to become credible business partners on paper. For now, German technology seems to be a postponed interest for the Chinese, because attempts to buy it are based on a different prerogative. You can buy a company, but the socio-economic model is not yet for sale.
China’s expansion numbers are ambivalent, but the poor diffusion of its model is unequivocal. By now, breaking records is one of Beijing’s specialties; an impressive sequence of results has undeniably projected it into a leading role in the global theater. In any case, there are signals of slowing growth, like the greatly reduced acquisitions of German Mittelstand businesses, the high quality small-medium enterprises that would be valuable for China’s technological improvement (we wrote about this in last week’s post). Even Chinese investments in the US are languishing, entangled in politics and national security issues, despite ideal economic conditions. Not surprising are the obstacles hindering China’s approach to Japan, the third region—after Europe and North America—where China could find the innovation it needs. The numbers reveal that Chinese capital has been deferred, and negotiations to sign bilateral accords are still in the deep water. On the contrary, investments in countries that produce raw materials continue; they are generally weaker politically and economically underdeveloped. London is one exception, but it involves the real estate market where selling assets to Chinese investors is less challenging.
The recession is palpable in the real economy, more in terms of lost opportunities than what statistics reveal. There’s a mixed attitude of rejection, suspicion, disinterest, and disillusionment toward business partnerships with China. People that work between Europe and China have an undeniable perception of this. Business, law offices, and communication firms are closing their China desks. Setting up business meetings required more time and effort, as if you were forcing the involved parties into an undesired interaction. Even curiosity concerning the Middle Kingdom is waning, as if economic transactions had exhausted other spheres of knowledge. Sociologists teach us that expatriated Chinese communities don’t integrate, and that students studying in the best universities don’t bring the cross-cultural knowledge expect by such high-level programs. Ironically, in a globalized world, China continues to assert its differences. But, this inspires continually less sympathy. The economy is running the risk of souring relationships, but in turn it’s risking losing sight of its objectives, which are profit opportunities. Essentially, China is missing two central aspects needed to affirm itself in the business world: an endearing soft power, and a network of services to accompany its economic might. It’s not enough to have production capacity or reserves to spend. It is necessary to confirm the trust of your partners, maintain business etiquette, and instill hope rather than fear. The great Chinese culture should be a springboard for the future, not a mantra for justifying any kind of behavior. Furthermore, a framework of services would support the economy: legal offices that recognize international laws, respected consulting agencies, business ethics that marry power relationships, and assuming international responsibilities that go beyond the country’s interests. All of this is still insufficient, and in any case, not in line with China’s dimensions and the expectations that its success generated. There are no ideological foreclosures toward China because its entrance into the globalized world is beyond refuted. China should not dissipate the respect that in acquired though hard work, perseverance, and dedication. The last two generations in China experience hardship, the challenges of reconstruction, and the deprivations of underdevelopment. The results achieved have attracted huge and deserved admiration. Instead, attitudes prevail today that are frequently contrary to modesty and frugality. The road to complete redemption is still long, and those that have the country’s reigns in their hands know that international collaboration is indispensable and that it needs to be cultivated with humility and dedication, not only with the adoration of power, even if they tend in China’s favor now.
A tremor of pride swept through Hong Kong, an attempt to resist absorption into Mainland China. International rankings continue to give Hong Kong first place in terms of transparency, easy of conducting business, collective prosperity, and the number of millionaires. Despite pressure from Beijing, the ex-colony has managed to maintain its relative independence at the heart of the events that framed China’s return to power: one country, two systems. Trials against corruption—notable due to their insufficiency—cover the front pages of newspapers despite the accused’s coat of arms. The judiciary still remains impartial, and even public opinion doesn’t seem resigned to the silent assimilation into China. Just like 1989, even this year thousands of people, many of who were not born at the time, reunited in Victoria Park to remember the repression caused by tanks and the armed soldiers at Tiananmen Square, and celebrate the memory of compatriots that became their victims. The even was analyzed to understand Hong Kong’s political climate, divided between its evident diversity from Beijing and the fateful date in 2047 when its reentry into China will be complete and there will no longer be any official differences between the two. This year, participation was the highest on record. Dressed in black with candles in their hands, young students, representatives of the middle class, refugees from Beijing, intellectuals, and professors walked with courage and dignity.
For the first time the protest took on a worrisome shape for China. Many protestors hoped for an unprecedented movement to lighten the pressure from Beijing. Its communication formula has been tested and fortunate: Occupy Central, named after Hong Kong’s financial district, and analogous to what happened on Wall Street. In any case, the protest was not against international finance as much as poised to steal a balanced electoral reform which could lead to the first democratic elections and universal suffrage in 2017. Until now, voting in Hong Kong has been biased and Beijing has essentially imposed the chief executive using articulated institutional moves. The expiration date in three years could bestow an official chosen by the citizens on the Hong Kong government, possibly a representative of the democratic movement. Obviously, China would not be happy about this contradiction to its political system, and it’s giving off anxious signs to prevent the movement from acquiring favorable public opinion even though it has only just been announced. Bellicose declarations can be heard from Zhou Nan, a politician from Beijing who marked Hong Kong’s history: he was vice foreign minister, ambassador to the United Nations, and chief negotiator for the United Kingdom while director of the Hong Kong news agency, Xinhua, a symbolic function that d [...]
