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- Herausgeber: Editions Marie B
- Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
- Sprache: Französisch
A complete book to understand better the affairs of the European Union in 2019, drafted by specialists.
The Schuman Report 2019 on the State of the Union offers a complete panorama of the European Union.
The latest edition of this reference book is an update on the many challenges the European Union will face in 2019.
EXTRAIT
2019 will mark a decisive turning point for the European Union.
The renewal of all of the European institutions, in an extremely specific international context, will provide an opportunity for decisive choices.
American withdrawal and Chinese ambitions are challenging Europe.
Will it assert its place and role amongst the three major centres of power in the world? Will Russia’s excesses, Turkey’s digressions and the instability on its borders convince it that there cannot be strong diplomacy without credible military power?
Will the emergence of Africa lead Europeans to rethink their relations with the continent of youth, based on understanding and fraternity?
These challenges cannot be ignored and will have to be overcome.
They will certainly force the Union to launch major reform.
European integration has succeeded well beyond all expectation, going beyond the hopes and dreams of its founders.
À PROPOS DE L'AUTEUR
Pascale Joannin is managing director of the Schuman Fondation.
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State of the Union 2019, Schuman Report on Europe is a collective work created on the initiative of the Robert Schuman Foundation within the meaning of Article 9 of Law 57-298 of 11 March 1957 and Article L.113-2 paragraph 3 of the Intellectual Property Code.
Layout: North Compo Cover: M Graphic Design Cover image: Baily Lighthouse, Ireland (Getty Images, Roberto Moiola)
Copyright Éditions Marie B / Collection Lignes de repères
ISBN : 979-1-0935-7639-8
This digital document has been produced by Nord Compo.
Contents
Contributors to this book
Texts
Abdelmalek Alaoui
CEO of the Guepard Group, a consulting company on strategic communication and a pan-African investment holding; Abdelmalek Alaoui is notably a shareholder in “La Tribune Afrique” and the “Huffington Post Maghreb”. A graduate of Science Po Paris, holder of an MBA from the HEC and a postgraduate degree from the Economic Warfare School of Paris, he is a renowned specialist in strategies of influence communication. He has served as an advisor to some of the most important market capitalisations in Africa, as well as many governments. He is now working on investments in the media. His most recent work Le Temps du Continent won the 2018 Turgot Francophone economic book prize.
Frank Baasner
After studying literature and psychology at the Universities of Bonn, Tübingen and Paris, Frank Baasner is focused his PhD on the European Enlightenment. Since 1995, he has held a Chair in Romance Literature at the University of Mannheim. He has occupied the position of guest professor in institutions in Austria, Spain and Sweden. In 2003 he was elected member of the Academy of Science and Literature of Mainz. Since 2002 he has headed the Franco-German Institute of Ludwigsburg (dfi), the centre for Franco-German cooperation, research and consultancy, established in 1948.
Arnaud de Basquiat de Mugriet
Entered the Naval School in 1992, a frigate captain Arnaud de Basquiat receives several on-board assignments before volunteering to serve in Africa on a cooperation assignment in Djibouti. In 2011, he joined the Africa cell at the Operations Planning and Command Centre, as a case officer for the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Guinea. From 2015 to 2018 he served at the Africa Department of the Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy (DGRIS), before joining the Chief of Naval Staff as head of the module “Africa-Near and Middle East”.
Véronique Cayla
A graduate of Sciences Po Paris, Véronique Cayla joined the French Ministry for Culture in 1973, then the cabinet of the Secretary of State for Culture in 1974. In 1982, she was appointed Deputy Director of the Paris Film Library then its General Manager. In 1992, she was appointed Director of MK2 and CEO of LMK-Images SA, until her appointment as member of the Audio-visual Council (CSA) in January 1999. At the end of 2000, she became co-General Director of the Festival of Cannes and in 2005 she took over the management of the National Centre for Cinematography and the Moving Picture (CNC). In 2011 she became Chair of the Stewardship Committee of ARTE GEIE. Since 2015 she has been Chair of the ARTE France Board.
Corinne Deloy
Graduate of Sciences Po and holder of a DEA in political sociology from the University of Paris I-Pantheon Sorbonne, Corinne Deloy was a journalist for the Nouvel Observateur and Secretary General for the Foundation for Political Innovation (Fondapol). She is currently the Studies Manager at the Centre de Recherches Internationales of Sciences Po (CERI) and author of the Robert Schuman Foundation’s European Elections Monitor (EEM).
Isabelle Duvaux-Béchon
Head of the Member States Relations and Partnerships Office for the European Space Agency (ESA)., Isabelle Duvaux-Béchon is responsible for relations with ESA’s 22 Member States and for the identification and coordination of ESA transverse initiatives linked to Global Challenges (“Space for Earth”) and of the partnerships with non-space actors, as well as developing the strategy for development cooperation. She joined ESA in 1987. She is a graduate of the Ecole Centrale of Paris and auditor at the Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale (IHEDN). She is an accredited member of the International Academy of Astronautics.
Mariya Gabriel
Between 2009 and 2017 Mariya Gabriel was a MEP for the EPP of which she became Deputy Chair as of 2014. Since 2012 she has been Deputy Chair of the EPP Women. Prior to this she was parliamentary secretary of the MEPs from the political party GERB within the EPP from 2008 and 2009. A Bulgarian national, she is European Commissioner for the Digital Economy and Society.
Jean-Dominique Giuliani
Chairman of the Robert Schuman Foundation. Jean-Dominique Giuliani was the director of the cabinet of the President of the Senate, René Monory and director at SOFRES. Former special advisor to the European Commission and a member of ARTE’s Supervisory Board, he coproduced the Permanent Atlas of the European Union, Editions Marie B, (4th edition, 2018). In January 2019, he was appointed Chair of the Institut Libre d’Etude des Relations Internationales (ILERI). He is the author of La Grande bascule – Le XXIème siècle européen “, editions EDG. Paris, 2019.
Francisco Juan Gómez Martos
An economist and political analyst, Francisco Juan Gómez Martos was the Head of Institutional Cooperation with the national parliaments at the European Parliament. Before this he taught public finance for ten years at the Autonomous University of Madrid. Currently he is visiting professor at the University Adam Mickiewicz in Poznan (faculty of Political Science). He is the author of several academic publications in European reviews and of many articles published in the newspaper El País.
Françoise Grossetête
A graduate of the Faculty of Law of Lyons (Masters in Public Law and Political Science) and of the Institut d’Etudes Supérieures de Droit Social et du Travail, Françoise Grossetête started her career as a local councillor and Delegate Town Councillor and Deputy Mayor of Saint-Etienne (1983-2008). She was Chair of the Natural Regional Park of Pilat from 1989 to 2008. MEP since 1994, she has been Deputy Chair of the EPP Group in the European Parliament since 2014, a position that she held previously (1999-2007), and a member of the Environment and Industry Committees, as well as a member of the EU-Russia Parliamentary Delegation. Former Regional Advisor of Rhône-Alpes, she is notably chair of the European Alliance against Alzheimer’s Disease.
Pascale Joannin
General Manager of the Robert Schuman Foundation. Auditor at the Institut des Hautes Etudes de la Défense Nationale (IHEDN), Pascale Joannin co-produced the “Permanent Atlas of the European Union” + editions MarieB, (4th edition, 2018). She is the author of L’Europe, une chance pour la femme, a Robert Schuman Foundation Paper no 22, 2004. She has published a number of studies on European issues.
Alain Lamassoure
A graduate of Sciences Po and of the ENA, Alain Lamassoure was European Affairs Minister (1993-1995), Minister for the Budget; a spokesperson for the French government (1995-1997), and a MP at the National Assembly from 1986 to 1995 and was elected for the first time to the European Parliament in 1989. Member of the high-level group on own resources (HLGOR) and former member of the European Convention, he chaired the Budgets Committee (2009-2014), as well as the special committees on tax rulings (TAX 1 and 2) and was rapporteur on the common consolidated corporate tax base (ACCIS). He is a member of the Constitutional Affairs Committee (AFCO) as well as the Special Committee on financial crime, fraud and tax evasion (TAX 3).
Mathilde Lemoine
PhD in Economic Sciences from Sciences Po, holder of a DEA in economy and international finance and a Masters in applied economics of the University Paris-Dauphine, Mathilde Lemoine is a macro-economist. She has published many books including Les grandes questions d’économie et de finance internationale, editions de Boeck, 3e ed., 2016. She was a macro-economic Advisor in several ministerial cabinets, a member of the Economic Analysis Council (EAC) and the Haut Conseil des Finances Publiques. A professor at Science Po, she is currently Group Chief Economic of the Edmond de Rothschild Group. She is a member of several boards including the École normale supérieure (ENS).
Andi Mustafaj
A graduate in public law from the University Panthéon-Assas Paris 2 in 2011, Andi Mustafaj started his career as a civil servant at the Ministry of Justice in Albania before becoming advisor to the Albanian Minister of Justice. He joined the 2014-2015 “Winston Churchill” year at the École Nationale d’Administration (ENA) in France as a foreign student. He is deputy to the Director of M&A and Strategic Development at Saint-Gobain and is involved in many different European think-tanks like the Belles Feuilles group and the Robert Schuman Foundation, for which he notably was a rapporteur in the BrexLab.
Florence Parly
Since 21st June 2017, Florence Parly has been French Minister for the Armed Forces. After studying at Sciences Po and ENA she joined the civil administrators in the Budget Department. In 1997 she joined Prime Minister Lionel Jospin’s cabinet as budgetary affairs advisor. She was Secretary of State for the Budget from 2000 to 2002. She joined the Air France group where she occupied the post of Director for Strategic Investment (2006 – 2008), the Deputy General Director for Cargo (2008-2012) and finally Deputy General Director for short haul activities in 2013. She joined the SNCF in 2014, firstly as Delegate General Manager, then as of 2016, as General Manager of SNCF Voyageurs.
Jean-Claude Piris
Consultant in European law and International public law, an honorary State Councillor, a former diplomat at the UN, and legal director for the OECD, from 1988 to 2018 Jean-Claude Piris was General Manager for the legal department of the European Council -Council of the European Union and legal consultant of the conferences that negotiated the Maastricht and Lisbon Treaties. He notably published The Lisbon Treaty, Cambridge University Press, 2010 and The Future of Europe: Towards a Two-Speed EU ?, Cambridge University Press, 2012. He contributes regularly to many books and has published a great number of articles on Europe and particularly on Brexit.
Pierre Vimont
A graduate in law, and of Science Po, an alumnus of the ENA, Pierre Vimont is an Ambassador of France. In 1977, he joined the French diplomatic service. In 1999 he was appointed Ambassador, a permanent Representative for France at the European Union. Director of the cabinet of three Foreign Affairs Ministers, he was then appointed Ambassador of France to the USA, from 2007 to 2010, and then became General Executive Secretary in the European Service for External Action (2010-2014). In 2015, he was appointed Personal Envoy for the preparation of the Conference of La Valette on migration. From 2016 to 2018 he was mediator to the French Foreign Affairs Ministry.
Thomas Weissenberg
An economist (PhD in Economics), Thomas Weissenberg joined the European Space Agency in 2016. He works in the External Relations Department at ESA’s HQ in Paris. He has been active in the space sector since 2002. He worked at the German Aerospace Centre (DLR) for 14 years in the sectors of international relations and industrial policy. He was head of International Relations there from 2010 to 2016.
Statistics
Olivier Marty
Alumnus of Sciences Po, the LES and the University Paris-Dauphine, Olivier Marty currently manages a consultancy firm that he created after a few years in finance – banks and capital venture. He teaches economics and European issues at Sciences Po, HEC and at the ESSEC of Ulm. A contributor to the Robert Schuman Foundation where he is a member of the BrexLab and the author of (with Nicolas Dorgeret) Connaitre et comprendre l’Union européenne : 35 fiches sur les institutions européennes (prefaced by Jean-Dominique Giuliani), Ellipses, 2018.
Michaël Yan
Michaël Yan has been studying at Sciences Po since 2013. After passing his degree in 2013 he joined the Europe-Asia campus of Sciences Po in Le Have where he studied for two years. After a year’s university exchange at the University of Hong Kong, he joined the Masters in Public Affairs at Sciences Po.
Maps
Pascal Orcier
An alumnus of the ENS Lyons, agrégé, PhD in geography, a specialist of the Baltic regions, Pascal Orcier is currently a teacher at the Jean-Moulin Lycée in Draguignan (83). Author of La Lettonie en Europe, Zvaigzne ABC, 2005, Régions à la découpe, Atlante, 2015, he contributes to many school and university manuals, atlases and collective works.
Preface
Decisive Choices
2019 will mark a decisive turning point for the European Union.
The renewal of all of the European institutions, in an extremely specific international context, will provide an opportunity for decisive choices.
American withdrawal and Chinese ambitions are challenging Europe.
Will it assert its place and role amongst the three major centres of power in the world? Will Russia’s excesses, Turkey’s digressions and the instability on its borders convince it that there cannot be strong diplomacy without credible military power?
Will the emergence of Africa lead Europeans to rethink their relations with the continent of youth, based on understanding and fraternity?
These challenges cannot be ignored and will have to be overcome.
They will certainly force the Union to launch major reform.
European integration has succeeded well beyond all expectation, going beyond the hopes and dreams of its founders.
The continent’s internal market has opened up, intra-community trade has developed, and European exports boosted. Europe’s economy has transformed in a way unimaginable 70 years ago.
Rising to these new challenges, the Union must open up to this a new era in its integration. It has to achieve its independence and prepare, at some point, to take responsibility for its own security, even if we do not dare to put names on situations, and that in Europe there is still cautious talk of “strategic self-sufficiency”.
Europeans who depend on their allies for their security must change this dependency to achieve their self-sufficiency. They must accept mutual self-reliance so that they no longer have to assume strategic or financial choices that are not always in line with their own interests. They have to learn to protect themselves from political and financial predators, via a clearly updated competition policy.
Will they also have the clarity of mind to establish the notion of “European preference”, which is vital at least for spending financed by their own tax revenues, as is the case everywhere else in the world?
There are as many questions to be debated and which deserve clear response.
They will define Europe’s future profile, possibly even its shape and governance. Since they demand amendments to the treaties, European Member States will have to hold discussions, which finally openly focus on the position and role of Europe in the world.
In the absence of consensus, divisions and splits will ensue. An agreement of principle, on the other hand, would provide greater guarantee for the revival of European integration. Finally, we cannot neglect the hypothesis of the agreement on the part of some to show the example towards enhanced European cooperation and to ensure the efficacy of new common public policies in vital areas such as migration, security, justice and defence.
The future legislature of the new institutions cannot afford not to innovate!
Jean-Dominique Giuliani
1
European issues at stake in 2019
Pascale JOANNIN
As every five years the European Union will find itself in a particularly important year in 2019, because its main institutions are to be renewed.
Firstly, Europeans, according to their Member States, are being invited to elect the 705 MEPs of the European Parliament from 23rd to 26th May. The number of MEPs will be reduced in comparison with 2014 (when there were 751) due to the planned departure on 29th March next of the UK from the European Union.
Then, depending on the results of this election and the coalition necessary to form a majority, MEPs will meet as of the beginning of July (date of the start of a new legislature) to elect the President of the Parliament and officials to the various bodies (office, quaestors, committees, etc.) and on the other hand, in mid-July to confirm – after a hearing – the appointment of the President of the European Commission, who will be appointed by the heads of State and government.
The latter will then have to put his team together based on appointment proposals made by the States. The candidate commissioners will in turn be convened for hearings in September by the MEPs to be invested, collectively if they are selected, at the end of October, since the new Commission is to enter office on 1st November.
Finally, at the same time, the heads of State and government will appoint the future president of the European Council for a two-and-a-half-year mandate, which is renewable once, to start on 1st December.
In 2019 the 8-year mandate of the President of the European Central Bank (ECB), appointed by the European Council, will also come to an end in November.
Jean-Claude Juncker, the outgoing President of the Commission, has said that he will not be standing for a second mandate, and Donald Tusk, President of the European Council is coming to the end of his second and last mandate. Therefore, the leaders of the main European institutions will change. The interest of this is as important for the electorate, as it is for candidates and observers.
Elections under high tension
Since 1979 the European elections have been held by direct universal suffrage after a proportional vote in all Member States. Each State holds a number of seats depending on its population, ranging from 6 for the smallest States (Cyprus, Malta and Luxembourg) to 96 for the most populous (Germany). Due to the departure of the UK, the number of seats granted to some States (14) has increased slight, taking into account their demographic development. France and Spain will have five more seats, Italy and the Netherlands 3, Ireland 2, Austria, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Sweden 1 more each, i.e. 27 seats. This aims to respect the principle of “degressive proportionality” to a greater degree.
The only European institution elected directly by the citizens, the Parliament should be the focus of real interest. Unfortunately, the turnout rate has decreased constantly since 1979, falling to only 42% in 2014. What will happen this year?
Low turnout
Some might think that this is a result of a certain fatigue on the part of those who have been voting since 1979, but the new Member States do not turn out to vote either; the lowest turnout levels are even, and rather in many of these latter States, as for example the Czech Republic (18.2%) or Slovakia (13%).
The European election is still largely misunderstood, with few citizens knowing the exact role and powers of the European Parliament, and very few know who their MEPs are. Yet, the competences of the European Parliament have increased over time (budget, structural fund, 1st pillar of the Common Agricultural Policy, etc.) which make it a true co-legislator. Some MEPs have however had a front-stage national career: either before they have had seats in Parliament, as is the case of France, which sends many former ministers and national MPs to Strasbourg. Some former ministers, even former Prime Ministers, also come from other States like Belgium for example; or after having sat in Parliament: Croatian Prime Minister Andrzej Plenkovic and Latvian Prime Minister Krišjānis Karins.
Europe’s citizens do not seem very motivated by the vote in this election, whose stakes they gauge badly. There is not just one election, but as many in the individual Member States. The national result does not reflect the final sum of all those individual results, and therefore, the European results. The latter is all the more difficult to understand, because no party wins a majority alone and a coalition is necessary. Moreover, this brings parties together, which would otherwise be opposites in the Member States.
The most recent polls show1 that 68% of Europeans deem that their country benefits from EU membership. It is the highest score seen since 1983. 49% say they are happy with the democratic functioning of the Union, 48% deem that their vote counts in the Union and 48% want the European Parliament to play a greater role. But one of the explanations for this disaffection possibly lies in the fact that 68% say they do not trust political parties in general.
To palliate this, many initiatives like for example “this time I’m voting”, have emerged to encourage voters to fulfil their civic duty and to encourage greater citizen participation in the next European elections. Let us hope they will indeed be followed with interest and not just by those who want to challenge the European project.
A rise in the “populists”
Many observers deem that the European elections of 2019 are going to be very dangerous and that a tsunami of populist forces could hit Parliament, with some going as far as imagining that they will hold the majority.
Although it is highly likely that most of these parties will witness a better result than the one won in 2014, their gains should be relative. And this is for several reasons:
Firstly, their main gains are due to come from States which send the most MEPs to the European Parliament. This will certainly be the case in Italy: the Lega, which only won 5 seats 2014 (6.19% of the vote) is now credited with nearly 30%. In German, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), which won 7 seats with 7.1% of the vote in 2014, is credited with 12% at present; finally, in Spain, the new party, Vox, won 12% of the vote in Andalusia in 2018.
Some parties already recorded a good score in 2014 like the Rassemblement national (formerly the Front National) in France (24.9% and 23 MEPs), Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice, PiS) in Poland (31.7% and 19 MEPs) the Movimento 5 Stelle (5 Stars Movement, M5S) in Italy (21.1% and 17 seats). Their gains should be marginal in comparison with 2014.
In the States with fewer MEPs, the gains should also be as limited. For example, the Partij voor de Vrijheidle (Freedom Party, PVV) in the Netherlands won 4 seats with 13.3% of the vote in 2014, it achieved the same score (13%° in the general elections in 2017) and is not due to win any further seats; the Dansk Folkeparti (the Danish People’s Party, DF) won 4 seats with 26.6% (it won 21% in the general elections a year later); finally Sverigedemokraterna (Sweden Democrats, SD) won 2 seats with 9.7% of the vote. With 17% their score in the general elections in September 2018, they might win one or two more seats.
Moreover, gains by some parties should be compensated by the poor performance by others, and automatically in two political groups due to the British departure. The UK Independence Party (UKIP) won 26.7% and 24 seats and the Conservative Party, 23.9% and 19 seats.
Hence the group “Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy” (EFDD) in the European Parliament, which to date has 41 seats and in which 17 UKIP representatives sit, would only have 24 seats, i.e. below the necessary threshold to comprise a group.
The future of the EFDD is in question, even though the M5S which is its second component, should be able to take over if it manages to rally 25 MEPs from 7 States.
Likewise, the number of seats (75) held by the “European Conservatives and Reformists” (ECR) is due to drop to 56 after the departure of the British Conservatives and would therefore no longer be the 3rd political force in Parliament.
In addition to this we should note that these populist parties do not sit in the same group. They are divided into four groups, which range from (ECR, 75 seats) to the far left (GUE/NGL, 52 seats), not forgetting the Eurosceptics (EFDD, 41 seats) and the far-right (ENF, 37 MEPs).
Amongst the Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) there are 18 Poles from Law and Justice (PiS), 6 representatives in 2014 standing under the colours of the AfD, but who no longer sit there, 4 Belgians of the N-VA (Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie), 3 MEPs of the Danish People’s Party (DF), 2 True Finns (Perussuomalaise, PS) and 2 from Sweden Democrats (SD).
In the radical left group (GUE/NGL) there are 10 Spaniards (of who 5 are from Podemos), 8 Germans (Die Linke), 6 Greeks (of whom 3 are from Syriza), 5 French (of whom 3 representatives from Front de Gauche) and 4 Portuguese (of whom 3 Communists).
In the EFDD group (41 representatives), there are 14 Italians from the M5S and 6 French (of whom 2 Patriotes and 1 from Debout la France).
Finally, in the Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF, 37 MEPs) there are 15 from the Rassemblement national, 6 from the Lega, 4 Dutchmen from the PVV and 4 Austrians from the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ.
This spread amongst the group, which are the smallest in number, does not give them a very high profile in terms of debate and work. This reduces their scope and strength. We might be surprised however by the dichotomy in their discourse in the capitals and the vote or rejection of the texts in Strasbourg.
In all the populist forces are low in number with a total – all together – of 200 seats, 230 if we add to these the 22 non-attached Members, which no group deems “respectable” (former French FN, or from Hungarian Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom (Jobbik) and Greek party (Χρυσή Αυγή, Golden Dawn) for example). Undoubtedly there will be a few more of them, but they will not upset the European political arena - since they will have to compensate for the British losses and overcome their profound divisions, on the one hand between the far right and the far left and on the other, within the same camp. Hence, for example, the two parties in the Italian government coalition have not planned to sit together in the European Parliament!
New political balances
The functioning of the European Parliament is quite atypical in that the idea of majority and opposition is not as clear as in the Member States. To form a majority there, rival national political forces are obliged to join forces: the right (EPP) and the Left (S&D) form a kind of “grand coalition”, which is well understood in some rare Member States which practice it, like Germany for example, or where it has been implemented more recently, like in Austria. But this remains a concept that is hard for most capitals to apprehend.
Hence, the two main political groups in Parliament, the Christian Democrats (EPP) and the Social Democrats (S&D), have shared power almost uninterrupted since 1979, sharing the Presidency of the Parliament for two and a half years each, except in 1999 and 2004, when the EPP shared office with the Liberals (ELDR at the time). Undoubtedly this will no longer be the case in 2019.
A new majority
According to the most recent forecasts it would appear that these two groups will lose seats in 2019, more on the side of the Social Democrats, who will be affected by the departure of the British Labour, which is not the case of the Christian Democrats, which the British Conservatives left in 2009.
Amongst these forecasts, one estimates the EPPs losses at around 35 seats, and that of the S&D at around 50. Hence the math does not play in favour of a renewal of the EPP-S&D duopoly. With 217 seats and 187 at present, they are now only credited with 181 and 135 seats approximately i.e. 316 seats. But a majority requires at least 352 seats. Hence the novelty in 2019 will be the end of the two-party system in force since 1979. It will be necessary to open up to other groups to form a new majority. What might the new configuration be?
As in the past it is plausible to include the Liberals (ALDE, 75 seats) which might win nearly 100 seats if certain parties, which already sit with them better their results significantly, which might be the case with Ciudadanos (Citizens-Citizenship Party) in Spain or if some recently formed parties join it like the République En Marche (LREM) in France. This would then become the 3rd group in Parliament.
We might also imagine an opening towards the Greens (52 seats at present) but they are not due to be in a position to win seats in 2019, according to the polls available to us.
Finally, nothing is preventing an alliance rallying the four most European parties. But this might lead to a response on the part of the Europhobes of all political allegiances, who might then join forces, which the leader of the Lega is presently trying to do.
A new redistribution
This new three-party majority would involve a different distribution of the main positions of responsibility.
Hence it is difficult to see how the Presidency of the European Parliament will be able to continue split in two, as is the case at present between the EPP and the S&D, if three parties now join in coalition. It will be difficult to change President every 20 months. It is more likely that the position will be distributed more generally between the three institutions (Parliament, Commission, Council) and that the future President of Parliament, this time will be appointed for the entire legislature.
Likewise, to date the two main parties have shared the posts. The EPP chairs the European Commission at present because in 2014 it was and still is the main group in Parliament and the European Council. At the Commission the S&D achieved – out of concern for political balance – the two following positions, i.e. that of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and the Security Policy and that of First Vice-President. It is due to be completely different after the elections in May.
Which governance for the institutions of Europe?
If the coalition requires three parties, it is tempting to suppose that each will want one of his own to occupy the presidency of one of the three European institutions that are up for renewal in 2019. And this will be the focus of long, deft political arbitration.
The main political parties, except for the Liberals renewed the so-called “Spitzenkandidat” procedure, thereby appointing their “lead candidate” who would stand to preside over the European Commission if the group, of which he or she is a member, comes out ahead in the elections. We should say clearly: this procedure was not fully satisfactory in 2014. Of course, the EPP candidate, Jean-Claude Juncker, was appointed as President of the European Commission, but his S&D challenger, Martin Schulz, was appointed President of the European Parliament! A strange idea of democracy when the loser gets a place nevertheless. This time things will not occur in the same way. On the one hand, because the final decision lies with the European Council, as Angela Merkel and Emmanuel Macron pointed out. On the other hand, because the political situation will be different with a group of three, not two.
An equation with several unknowns
An unwritten rule provided to date that the positions would be distributed according to a subtle mix of both political balance of the contending parties and geographical States according to their size (big/small), their history (old/new) and their position (north-south, east-west). This distribution was the object of long discussions to reach the greatest consensus. With two it was relatively easy. With three, it is going to be more complicated.
The three presidencies will be bitterly negotiated by each of the parties. The party which wins the presidency of the Commission will not necessarily be the one that comes out ahead on 26th May. The post will be fought over and balanced with those of President of the Parliament and the European Council. In the European Council, the 9 heads of State and government are affiliated to the EPP, 8 are from the ALDE, 5 are socialists (PES), 2 are conservatives (ECR), one is from the radical left GUE/NGL, 2 are independents (France and Lithuania) and one is difficult to qualify (Italy). The battle for the position of president may be even livelier than in 2014. In the Commission a fair balance will have to be found in terms of distributing the main positions. If the scheme set up by Jean-Claude Juncker is not modified, no fewer than six posts are available (High Representative, 1st Vice-President, and four Vice-Presidents), a perfect multiple of 3. The combinations are many and negotiations will be tense.
A male/female ticket
They will be even livelier since another, far too often forgotten aspect, will have to be added in this exercise: parity. But what are the parties doing with their Spitzenkandidat in 2018? Apart from the Greens and the far left (GUE/NGL), who have a mixed-tandem in 2014, they all exclusively appointed… men!
A further reason which confirms that this process in not (or no longer) adapted. Might Europe also be governed by women? More than at present. Has the world not changed in this area over the last few years for this equation not just to be addressed at the end of the appointment process, as is often the case, but rather at the beginning? Isn’t Europe the continent of women and has it not made parity one of its guiding principles (article 2 TEU)?
It would be a mistake not to take them into account, especially since in 2009, as well as in 2014 the States had to be reminded that they had to appoint women. A suggestion would be that heads of State and government be forced to present two names for a post of commissioner, - one man – one woman. It is up to the President of the Commission designate to then decide to achieve an equal College (at least 13 women), three of whom (out of 6) for the highest positions.
Redistributed competences
For a long time, the positions available were from equal. The competences granted by the States to the Union are still too restricted to justify such a big Commission. Some commissioners take care of portfolios for which Europe has no real competence, therefore means and powers; others struggle to exist. Things cannot go on like this.
Either the number of commissioners should be reduced, or the portfolio must be re-organised by attributing new competences to the Union. In both situations this supposes real political will on the part of the heads of State and government. Will they have the courage to do this?
In all events they might do well to watch the polls, like the Eurobarometer which show Europeans’ expectations, and moreover the concern they express about the future of Europe.
The Eurosceptic parties have understood this – since they no longer want to leave the EU or the euro area as they demanded until recently, but rather change it from the inside. If the pro-European forces do not take initiatives on the renewal of the institutions, will it not be too late in five years’ time?
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Europe, which will soon be 70, has risen to many challenges in the past and during its history it has become a prosperous continent with certain powerful attributes and notably true soft power. But the world has changed. It must rise to new challenges, both internal and external, adapt and strengthen if it is to have any influence in the world of tomorrow. This is undoubtedly one of the main issues at stake in the period that is now starting. It is up to the leaders to seize this opportunity and renewal to imagine and build a Europe worthy of the 21st century.
1. Parlemeter 2018 “ Rising to the challenge: (Silent) support to the real vote“ survey undertaken between 8th and 26th September 2018 amongst 27,474 Europeans (aged 16 and over) in the 28 Member States.
“Put that budget away! Out of my sight!”
Alain LAMASSOURE
This is the silent cry uttered by national leaders about the community budget. It is as if taking decisions is already so irksome, that financing them is well beyond their strength. With each new treaty, jealous of their power, they make sure that they have the monopoly of decision over revenues and absolute control over spending: by locking the annual budget within the multi-annual framework, over which only the system has control, it facilitates everyone’s quest to maximise the “returns” from their national contribution. After paying their dues, they all then hold out their begging bowl to the other 27.
The present framework 2014-2020 was cause to leave a bitter taste. Drafted in December 2013, just as David Cameron was suffering an attack of Eurosceptic mysticism, it witnessed Paris and Berlin shelter pitifully behind London as they justified a reduction in volume of the European budget, at a time when new requirements were expanding rapidly. Then, ten months later as Jean-Claude Juncker took over as head of the European Commission he discovered that he did not have a single euro to revive long-term investment, to finance climate commitments of COP21 or to master migratory flows: he was condemned for his entire mandate - and half of that of his successor! – to spend less than 1% of the GDP, whilst guaranteeing each Member State the “cheque” that had been promised in virtue of the Cohesion Fund (countries in the East and South), of the Common Agricultural Policy (France, Italy, Ireland) or the “British rebate” (UK, but also Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Austria). In the meantime, David Cameron gave up on political life, the UK left us, but no one thought to review the budgetary cuts that it had demanded.
The negotiation of the next financial framework 2021-2026 started in December 2018. We might hope that this “soft disdain” for figures on the part of their Excellencies at the European Council might start to wane? The electoral campaign season, noisy populist one-upmanship on the part of certain leaders, the unprecedented fiscal overdose in France expressed by the “gilets jaunes” are hardly cause for optimism. But behind the bullying stances and ranting on the social networks, the facts are obstinate, it is the revenge of reality over post-reality.
And there is good old popular common sense. All the polls confirm it. We know the cause: to rise to the challenges of the 21st century, a united Europe is better equipped than each of the Member States enclosed in its splendid isolation. No party is demanding to leave the Union since the transformation of Brexit into a pitiful shipwreck of the royal Titanic, engulfing with it the entire British political class. When it comes to countering terrorism, to guaranteeing Europe’s internal and external security, taxing multinationals where their profits are generated, countering climate change and to remaining in the race towards scientific and technical progress, public opinion approves of the Union’s intervention, and even some of the most Eurosceptic MEPs do not dare go against it. Of course, the word “migration” causes cerebral paralysis amongst those in power in the East and of the opposition in the West, but their electorates are not fooled by the impotence of the national police forces as they face a phenomenon of mass that is due to be there for the duration.
Leaders are more aware than they care to admit. Although the increase in the community budget is still taboo, over the last few years we have witnessed the development of some satellite budgets, devoted to new actions needed because of emergencies. The table herewith drawn up by the European Parliament’s Budgets Committee illustrates its cosmography. Alongside the old moon of the European Development Fund, we have witnessed the emergence of the Financial Stability Fund, the European Stability Fund, two specific funds for Greece, the Fund for Strategic Investments, the so-called Juncker plan, the trust fund for refugees from Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, another trust fund for the prevention of migration decided at La Valette, the climate fund, the lending facility for non-euro countries, the funds for research and funds for the defence industry … Throw no more away!
If all our Scrooges increase the number of coffers like this, it is the start of a cure to their chronic constipation. The following stage should be to add it all together, and to pour the content into one coffer - the good old community budget. By opposing this, they are just delaying matters and are doomed to failure: if the necessary money is to be mobilised, the clarity of management, the savings and the need for democratic control via parliament, evidently plead for the principle of budgetary unity. Clearly and, dare I say, irresistibly – even in European history – the resilience of government obstinacy has often been counted more in decades than in lunar cycles.
Other signs lead us to think that things are moving.
France’s insistence on demanding a specific budget for the euro zone was finally crowned with success at the European Council in December 2018, despite Berlin’s lack of enthusiasm and strong reserve on the part of the brand new “Hanseatic Club” that rallies our Nordic partners. The interest is not so much in the instrument itself – since the departure of the UK, all the Member States are committed to joining the euro. It lies in the justification given by France and accepted by its partners: a monetary zone cannot do without a sizeable common budgetary tool. On several occasions Emmanuel Macron has mentioned an amount of around “several GDP points”, whilst the community budget in which the line “euro zone” will be included, has been stuck at 1% for the last quarter of a century. Parliament’s long repeated obsession, i.e. the size of the European budget, is now posed at the highest level of the Council.
Likewise, another problem raised by Parliament – the need to create new own resources is no longer challenged by Europe’s governments. Again, we shall have to be patient. The proposals put on the table by the European Commission – tax on plastic, harmonised corporate tax – are just at the stage of the debate of principle and their outcome would require the equivalent of a new treaty (unanimous Council decision, with national ratifications). But the prospect of seeing national contributions, a present predominant resource, increased mathematically by the departure of the rich British contributor is stimulating the imagination of major financiers in the quest for alternative solutions.
It remains that opening in-depth debate over the European budget will require leaders with courage close to heroism. Two recommendations can encourage them in this.
Firstly, it means challenging the blind straight-jacket that the multi-annual framework has become. Why have important politicians approve spending ceilings for a period of seven years, which no longer matches the political calendar, and which goes beyond the forecast of the best experts? Setting European priorities now for the entire decade of the 2020’s would simply be stupid. In our local budgets, as in our national budgets, we know how to ensure sustainable long-term policy financing without damaging responsiveness, which is all the more necessary in a time of high uncertainty.
Second recommendation: setting the principle of budgetary regularity. And showing it through figures. Europe has to be built on constant costs, all things being equal. If the principle of subsidiarity is well implemented, 1 euro more spent in “Brussels” should save more than one euro at national or local level in exchange for greater efficacy. A recent study by the European Parliament’s research department focusing on six main European agencies created to supervise the internal market estimated the savings made by this transfer of competence from the States to the Union at several hundred million euro. The European Court of Auditors is prepared to work in a network with its national counterparts to make impact studies like this systematic. The first should focus on the European border guard: the pooling of means and the deployment, for example, of police forces from the west and the north to countries in the south and south-west should significantly improve the cost-effectiveness ratio in terms of border protection. Europe will start to be popular again when we can say that the Union means more security and less taxes.
Europe and Disinformation
Mariya GABRIEL
Over the last few months the European Commission has been looking carefully at the phenomenon of on-line disinformation, notably in view of the upcoming European elections, in which we have to decide the future of Europe together. Since disinformation has always existed, we must say now that it is its on-line nature that is novel here. This novelty is typified by low cost creation, swift dispatch and an omnipresence in our environment. Disinformation, an invisible scourge, is infiltrating the lives of our citizens and is influencing opinion and the decisions we make. Whilst social network platforms play an increasingly important role in our media landscape, the disinformation circulating there is polarising debate and can create or worsen tension in society, but it can also undermine our electoral systems.
Disinformation, the European approach to a global phenomenon
Disinformation is an attack on the freedom of opinion and expression, a fundamental right that is part of the European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights. The freedom of expression covers the respect of the freedom and pluralism of the media, as well as the citizens’ right to give their opinion and receive or communicate information or ideas “without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.” Based on this, it is the duty of public authorities to raise citizens’ awareness regarding the dangers of actions that aim deliberately to manipulate their opinion, and similarly they are obliged to protect them from this.
The progression of disinformation and the seriousness of the threat it represents have been the cause of concern and of increasing awareness within civil society, as well as in the Member States and at international level. In a June 2017 resolution the European Parliament asked the Commission to analyse in depth the current situation and legal framework with regard to fake news, and to verify the possibility of legislative intervention to limit the dissemination and spreading of fake content.”
The rise of platforms has gone together with a crisis in the traditional media. These offer a free, pluralist point of view of society but are suffering the effects of digitisation, which has impacted their model of financing profoundly and also the way their content is distributed.
On-line disinformation is a phenomenon that is worrying all Europe. A wide public consultation organised at the beginning of 20181
