Scotland the Growing Divide E-Book

Henry McLeish

• Herausgeber: Luath Press
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Serie: Viewpoints
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 455

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2013

Beschreibung

Scotland: The Growing Divide is the follow-up to Scotland: The Road Divides, which was released in 2007 to significant media interest across the UK. A book ahead of its time, several of the conclusions and predictions in The Road Divides have now become a political reality. Five years on, and now facing a referendum on Scottish independence in autumn 2014, the authors focus on the changing face of politics and what that means for both Scotland and the UK. With a thorough discussion of the arguments reaching several provocative conclusions, this is a must-read for anyone with an interest in the future of this country. REVIEWS: As a response to the 'national conversation' initiated by Salmond this is an important book, and coming from a former Labour heavyweight it is, in its way, remarkable. It virtually concedes that the party that has dominated Scottish politics for the past 30 years, has lost its way, and that the old ideologies no longer count. THE TIMES[McLeish] has emerged as an advocate of a much bolder approach to devolution than many in his party seem ready for. EDINBURGH EVENING NEWS They are particularly scathing of Westminster's response to the debate… The authors note that the initial response was to point out that Westminster could take back powers from Holyrood. THE HERALD

Leseprobe

RT HON HENRY MCLEISH began his political career as an elected member in local government in 1974, and was leader of Fife Regional Council for five years. In 1987 he was elected as a member of the UK Parliament and acted as Minister for Devolution and Home Affairs in the Labour government from 1997 to 1999. In the first Scottish Parliament he was Minister for Enterprise and Lifelong Learning from 1999, and in 2000 he became First Minister of Scotland until 2001. Retiring from politics in 2003, he is now an adviser, consultant, writer, author and broadcaster, and lectures in the USA and elsewhere on a variety of topics.

In 2008, Henry McLeish chaired the Scottish Prisons Commission, which produced a report into sentencing and the criminal justice system entitled ‘Scotland’s Choice’. In 2010 he conducted a major report on the state of football in Scotland, which had been commissioned by the Scottish Football Association.

Luath Press is an independently owned and managed book publishing company based in Scotland, and is not aligned to any political party or grouping. Viewpoints is an occasional series exploring issues of current and future relevance.

Scotland The Growing Divide

Old Nation, New Ideas

HENRY McLEISH

Edited by Tom Brown

LuathPress Limited

EDINBURGH

www.luath.co.uk

First published 2012

eBook 2012

ISBN (print): 978-1-908373-45-8

ISBN (eBook): 978-1-909912-26-7

© Henry McLeish 2012

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements

Introduction

Chapter 1 - Westiminster We Have a Problem

Chapter 2 - The Road to Home Rule

Chapter 3 - Referendum 1997

Chapter 4 - Scotland's Political Parties: The Lessons

Chapter 5 - Making Sense of our Politics, Democracy and Government

Chapter 6 - The State of the Union

Chapter 7 - Date with Destiny, 2014

Chapter 8 - The Battle for Scotland

Chapter 9 - Powers and the People

Chapter 10 - The 'English Question'

Chapter 11 - The Mood of a Nation: Scotland a Split Personality

Chapter 12 - The Soul of the Nation; Inspiring the Debate

Chapter 13 - Old Nation, New Ideas: The Unionist Challenge

Chapter 14 - The Vision, The Alternative and the Second Question

Chapter 15 - The Growing Divide

Chapter 16 - Rethinking the Union, Building a Better Scotland

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author wishes to place on record his thanks to Michael Keating, Professor of Scottish Politics at the University of Aberdeen for his generous cooperation and permission to quote extensively from his bookPlurinational Democracy: Stateless Nations in a Post-Sovereign Era. (Oxford University Press, 2006) and The Independence of Scotland reviews Independence and devolution options (Oxford University Press).

The author would like to acknowledge the Independent and non-party think tank, Reform Scotland, for its excellent work in compiling a glossary of Devolution terms and for their insights into the concept of Devo-Plus.

The author would also like to thank Dr Fiona Davidson, Associate Professor, Director of European Studies at the University of Arkansas for the design and development of the political maps used in Chapter 11, and Mr Tom Brown, one of Scotland’s most respected and experienced political commentators for his advice and editorial input.

INTRODUCTION

2007 WAS A MOMENTOUS political year, with the commemoration of 300 years of the Treaty of Union, the tenth anniversary of the devolution referendum in which Scotland said ‘Yes, Yes’ to its new parliament with tax powers, dramatic political events in Wales and Northern Ireland, and the appointment of Gordon Brown as Prime Minister of the UK. Of greater significance for Scotland was the election of the first ever Scottish National Party government and a First Minister determined to ask the Scottish people to vote on Independence. The SNP with 47 seats, one more than Labour, formed a Minority Government and embarked on governing Scotland for the first time in their history. This extraordinary political event has transformed Scottish politics, ignited the debate about Scotland’s political and constitutional future and left some searching questions to be asked about the Unionist parties and particularly of Labour who had dominated Scottish politics for over half a century.

All of this focused attention on Scotland’s place in the United Kingdom; indeed, on the question of whether Scotland should remain within the Union – and, if so, on what conditions. This should have been the time for an understanding of Scotland’s devolution journey so far and a careful examination of the arguments about where it may take us in the future. Instead, much of the debate at both UK and Scottish levels was poorly-informed and predictable. For the first time in a century of Scottish politics, the Unionist parties were on the defensive. They seemed unable or unwilling to face up to the stark reality of a new politics in the making. Furthermore, they were at a loss to understand the importance of the constitutional question and the reasons why the SNP had moved from a party on the fringe to a party of minority Government under Alex Salmond.

Writing inScotland: The Road Divides, Tom Brown and I believed this massive political wake-up call would be heeded by the Unionist parties. It wasn’t.

Five remarkable political years on from 2007, and one year on from the spectacular SNP victory in the 2011 Holyrood elections which propelled them to a majority government, very few lessons have been learned. There seems to be a disconnect at the heart of Scottish politics where the Unionist parties have, at least for now, lost the constitutional plot and cannot seem to recognise or grasp the most basic idea of modern political engagement – Scottishness.

The period between 2007 and 2012 has been eventful, with a string of dramatic political developments north and south of the border, in some cases of seismic proportions. Election results at Holyrood, the defeat of the Labour Government at Westminster, the election of new political leaders in Scotland, major shocks to our politics, our institutions and our democracy, major crises in banking and finance, the worst economic slump for a generation, the Murdoch media and phone hacking crisis, the battle to save the Euro and the arrival of the Conservative-led Coalition at Westminster are changing the politics of Britain and undoubtedly reshaping and reframing the relationship between Scotland and the Union.

Amidst all of this upheaval and transformation there is one factor that screams out loud and clear – the relentless rise of the SNP and their determination to ‘set Scotland free’. More recently, the Coalition budget and tax cuts for the wealthy, the cuts in welfare, the attempts to franchise the NHS, the cash-for-influence exposé of Tory fundraising and the alleged help from Jeremy Hunt for the Murdoch bid for Sky Broadcasting – now part of the ongoing Leveson inquiry into the relationships between the press and the public, police and politicians – have not only exposed the weaknesses of the Conservatives but inevitably reinforced the view of most Scots that Conservatives are pursuing alternative policies and politics which are alien to traditional Scottish views. This can only feed a sense of the Union and the Westminster Parliament being out of touch with a different kind of Scotland. What happens in London is likely to have a direct bearing on the growing sense of Scottishness in the run up to the referendum in 2014. There is little doubt that politics, government and democracy north and south of the border are diverging and this is feeding into a stronger sense of nationality, identity and diversity.

This new and substantially altered edition of the book considers the condition of Scotland’s politics, the Home Rule story so far, the change and challenges of the past five years and their impact on Scotland today. It also updates the narrative on Scotland’s constitutional and political future and assesses the prospects for the Unionist parties and the SNP as they face up to the prospect of a referendum within the next two years. What is remarkable is the fact that the predictions and insights given in the 2007 edition about the fortunes of the Unionist parties, especially Labour, have been largely confirmed by what has actually happened since. The Unionist parties may have wasted five precious years. This raises the question of whether recent political changes in Scotland are merely significant blips in the normal cycle of events, or developments with long term significance for our political parties and our country. Is there a fusion of identity and nationality politics with traditional politics and priorities taking place in Scotland? Is this creating a serious realignment of political thinking and ideas and the possible demise of the old politics of both the UK and Scotland?

Writing in 2007 the authors said,

Devolution is a process, not an event. There can be no going back to entrenched positions of old-style Unionism; yet the Nationalist goal of separation is unacceptable to the clear majority of Scots.

Despite the narrowness of the current debate, the hope is that it can be opened out to include the ‘third way’ of a more flexible modernised Union that is confident enough to embrace the new politics of the 21st century. This requires the ‘Mother of Parliaments’ to understand that transferring more powers is not a sign of weakness but of strength and confidence in the constituent parts of the United Kingdom. Without that, the paradox is that the impetus for the break-up of the Union may be created at the very heart of Unionism itself.

There is also a desire to shift the debate from the preserve of professional politicians and link it more directly to the aspirations and everyday needs of ordinary Scots.

These comments are even more relevant today than they were in 2007.

Scotland: The Road Dividesremains a warning about the need for change, and acknowledges three key issues. First, the danger of the Unionist parties continuing to ignore the realities of change and seeing the constitutional and political future of Scotland as some kind of unwelcome distraction from other political concerns. Secondly, the growing influence of the SNP and their current domination of the politics and governance of Scotland and the impact this is having on the mood of the people. Third, in the context of progressive sub-national politics, illustrated in other European countries, the concepts of identity, nationality, diversity and difference are increasingly important considerations in the vision and values of any aspiring nation and will influence the way Scots are likely to vote.

At the heart of this book we also deal with an extraordinary paradox. In the run-up to the 2014 referendum, the Scottish people will be forced to debate and then vote on a choice of two options, status quo Unionism and Independence, despite the fact that a majority of Scots may support another alternative which will not find its way on to the ballot paper. The reason is simple: the three Unionist parties, who would be the main beneficiaries in the long run, will not, at least at this stage, allow this to happen. Scots will be offered instead the promise of jam tomorrow but only if they defeat Independence in Scotland today!

This new narrative,Scotland the Growing Divide, rejects this dismal idea and argues instead for a new vision, a new alternative and a second question on the referendum ballot paper. This would lead to a positive rethink of the Union and a transformation of Scotland’s role within it. Of the people, by the people, for the people should not be conditional on being told by Westminster what to do first.

CHAPTER 1

WESTMINSTER WE HAVE A PROBLEM

2007 WAS A REMARKABLE year in which the political landscape of the United Kingdom and Scotland was transformed. The 2007 change of power in Scotland, formerly Labour-dominated, to a Scottish Nationalist minority government; the unlikely coalition in Wales between Labour and Nationalists; the remarkable power-sharing by former enemies in Northern Ireland; the appointment of a new Prime Minister, a Scot representing a Scottish constituency; the publication by the UK government of a Green Paper on ‘The Governance of Britain’ and by the Scottish government of a White Paper on an Independence referendum, ‘Choosing Scotland’s Future – A National Conversation – Independence and Responsibility in the Modern World’, have all contributed to constitutional flux. Much of this has now been overtaken by the Westminster elections in 2010 and the Holyrood elections in 2011. What does remain is the threat to the Union.

One symptom of the uncertainty about ‘the state of the Union’ was that the 300th anniversary of the Treaty of Union in 2007 was not marked by a celebration. Instead, there was a low-key ‘commemoration’ of the survival of the institution which has held Britain together for three centuries.

After four Scottish Parliament elections, we seem to be at the end of the beginning of devolution. Scotland and the UK have reached a constitutional and political crossroads and to all but the most rigidly unbending Unionists, it is obvious that the Union must adapt to survive. Again, it currently shows no sign of bending to the inevitability of change

On 11 September 1997, Scots – despite their long history of dissension, a remarkable degree of party political tribalism and their modern political divisions – came together as never before. By an overwhelming majority they voted across party lines and social boundaries with a decisive double-affirmative ‘Yes, Yes’ for the restoration of the Scottish Parliament with tax-raising powers.

Their votes in that devolution referendum paved the way for a bold new constitutional settlement, realigning the 300-year-old Union, creating unknown and unforeseen risks, but at the same time opening up promising possibilities for Scotland and the United Kingdom.

Written at the time of the 10th anniversary of that referendum, Scotland: The Road Divides was not a history of those ten years. It was an attempt to take a close-up and politically honest look at where the devolution journey has taken Scotland and the United Kingdom. It asked searching questions about the future: is it the status quo, is it a further development of devolution, or is the Scottish Nationalist dream of Independence a possibility?

Nor was this an anti-Union treatise, since the authors were both Unionists at heart and our hope was to show alternative ways in which the bonds and structures of the United Kingdom can be preserved and strengthened. Questions about ‘Britishness’ and ‘Scottishness’ were not merely the preoccupation of a Prime Minister of the United Kingdom who happened to be a Scot; they are of concern to us all. We, too, are proud of our Scottish nationality and heritage and prefer, along with the majority of Scots, to have the best of both worlds.

Meanwhile, traditional loyalties to party and class are less strong – as was decisively shown in the May 2007 and 2011 Scottish Parliament elections. The advent of a Scottish Nationalist government – and, perhaps even more, its display of confidence and competence – along with Labour’s loss of control of all but two of the 32 local authorities, created a radical realignment in the political control of Scottish institutions.

Only time will tell whether this – and the change in the Scottish mindset – is permanent. There is a distinct possibility that, as Scots become more sophisticated in the practice of devolution and the use of proportional voting, they will continue to develop a political ‘split personality’. The clearest demonstration of this is the election of two SNP governments with their platform of separation from the UK, when the overwhelming majority of Scottish voters have declared they are anti-Independence.

Depending on the nature of the UK government, Scots seem prepared to wield their votes to gain the best advantage for their country. Thus, Scots set aside traditional ties and even ideologies to vote differently in UK and Scottish elections, returning an SNP-led coalition in the first instance and then a majority Government at Holyrood. In sharp contrast Labour had a resounding victory in Scotland at the 2010 General election. The danger is that, after a period of seemingly-effective Nationalist government, sufficient voters will be prepared to support full Independence in a future referendum – in line with First Minister Alex Salmond’s all-too-obvious ‘softly softly’ strategy for achieving separation. We should not underestimate the virtues of ‘soft politics’ in the hands of Scotland’s SNP First Minister.

The only safeguards against this would be more subtlety in the approach of the UK government to constitutional change (certainly more sensitivity than has been shown by certain UK government ministers and a surprising number of MPs) and a bolder response to the dangers by those Scottish political parties that support the Union. None of this is obvious from a Westminster whose embrace of sovereignty and indifference to the devolution idea is deep and unwavering. Britain remains one of the most highly centralised nation states in Europe, despite the devolution of some power to Scotland, N. Ireland and Wales over the last 13 years.

The ousting of Gordon Brown and the Labour Government in 2010 changed considerably the Westminster-Holyrood dynamic. The Conservative victory and the arrival of David Cameron as Prime Minister installed, as far as Scots are concerned, a traditional enemy at Westminster and, for the SNP, held out the prospect of more alienation of the Scottish people as a right wing Government – propped up by the Lib-Dems – continued to see Scotland on the edges of their radar.

This split personality voting and the return of the ‘auld enemy’ at Westminster presents a real danger of further polarisation of two extreme views: this is not stable-state politics. It does, however, reflect the tribalism in politics, which is a tried and tested way of unifying the party faithful, and in this case the populations of two nations.

An increasingly potent factor over the last few years has been the growing English resentment at the Scots getting self-government while Scottish MPs and Scottish ministers of the United Kingdom government rule and decide on purely English concerns. ‘English votes for English laws’ has become an effective slogan but the paradox is that, although it has become the chant of the arch-Unionist Conservative Party, it is potentially damaging to the Union.

It was said at the time that devolution was not an end in itself, but a continuing process. It is clear that many wish that process to continue and gather speed; yet it is also clear that others fear it will take Scotland and the UK on the wrong path.

The late Labour leader John Smith famously described devolution as ‘unfinished business’ and, 13 years on from delivery, it remains unfinished. There are those who will strenuously dispute this, fearing that any further tinkering or more drastic alteration to the delicate balance of the Union will damage it beyond repair. However, any realistic assessment shows that maintaining the status quo without further adaptation, evolution and modernisation is not an option. The politics of common sense suggest that the constitutional question will continue to evolve and deepen its impact on the way Scots think of their future. This is particularly relevant to the current debate about the second question on the referendum ballot paper.

In the current circumstances, in 2012, it is not overstating the case to say that the maintenance of Scotland within the Union can only be achieved if politicians across the Unionist spectrum are prepared to be open-minded, face up to uncomfortable truths, shed out-dated prejudices, realise the need for new political ideas and accept pragmatic solutions.

And, despite their understandable euphoria of their accession to power, Scottish Nationalists must recognise the cold reality that though they are in government they have not won the hearts and minds of Scots for their core belief in Separatism. The results of the 2007 and 2011 Scottish elections cannot be interpreted as an endorsement of ‘capital-n’ Nationalism; to a large degree it was Scotland’s expression of disillusion with New Labour, and the way in which the SNP Government has become populist in its approach and competent in its delivery of policy. Scots have also become more aware of their Scottishness and the powerful attraction of the saltire wrapped around issues of pride, passion and patriotism; identity and nationality are coming to the fore as election issues. These issues and symbols of a modern country are not complex or the monopoly of one party so it is all the more remarkable that the SNP has cornered every aspect of the idea of Scottishness without a struggle! The SNP have demonstrated their potential as a competent, credible and popular party of government – with or without their ultimate aim of Independence. This is the factor that the Unionist parties should fear most.

However, in the case of Scottish Labour, it takes more than the shellshock of their loss of power to explain their muted performance in their first months of the ‘new politics of the SNP’. It was even more remarkable that, between the defeats of 2007 and 2011, Labour failed to recover, or to gain any political traction and seemed stranded in a political no man’s land of denial and an inability to assess the enormity of what had happened to them.

After 2007, the Scottish Labour Party had a new leader in the energetic and accomplished Wendy Alexander and she conducted a post-mortem on the demise of its domination of national and local politics, which had lasted for half a century. It seems the party that delivered devolution had not come to terms with its consequences. Writing back then we said,

In addition to producing a strategy for electoral recovery and overhauling the party machine, Labour should be redefining its mission in post-devolution Scotland, re-thinking the party’s identity and whether it should or can be more ‘Scottish’.

By the time of Labour’s defeat in 2011 none of this had happened. It is worth pausing to ask, why not?

The only thing of consequence to emerge between the two Holyrood elections was the Calman Commission which was set up to look at the devolution powers. This was a solid piece of work, created to give some purpose to the collectivist Unionist effort at a time when the SNP were movingly swiftly and confidently forward. The contents of Calman are now part of the new Scotland Act 2012. Once again, this seems to be too little too late, as they have been overtaken by events and history.

Labour’s problems have not eased with the passage of time between 2007 and today. Does it want to create a distinctive political culture and identity for Scottish politics – or does it want to continue to look over its shoulder to Westminster? Does it really understand devolution? Is it prepared to lead the debate on an evolving constitution? In effect, can Scottish Labour win back Scotland, not only in its once-traditional and narrowly-based heartlands but on a wider national basis? Put simply, what does Labour in Scotland stand for at the start of the 21st century? Can it produce a progressive left of centre platform which contributes both to the wider ambitions of Labour in Britain and to creating a winning appeal in Scotland by embracing Scottishness, nationality and identity?

It should go without saying that the challenge is every bit as serious for the other Unionist parties; in fact their survival depends on how they face up to the post-2011 situation. The Tories are still seeking their way out of the Scottish wilderness into which they condemned themselves in the 1980s and 1990s. Like the Labour leadership, David Cameron has to decide whether he will allow his colleagues north of the border to be ‘Scottish’ or whether, for political expedience, he will pander to the Little Englanders and the anti-Scottish sentiment which has always blighted Toryism.

The Scottish Liberal Democrats now find themselves in a political no-man’s-land. Their electoral prospects in Scotland in 2007 were not helped by being too close to Labour. The 2010 election left them providing cover for the hugely unpopular Conservative dominated Coalition government. The drubbing they received at the Holyrood elections of 2011 simply confirmed, in dramatic style, how unpopular they were with the electors. It is not a question of ‘Whither the Liberal Democrats?’ but ‘What is the point of the Liberal Democrats in Scotland?’

Underlying all of this is the basic question: What is the future of Scotland within the Union? After 305 years of the Union, 12 years of Devolution, five years of SNP Government and with the prospect of a referendum on Independence in 2014, there is a real opportunity (so far ignored) to take stock and initiate a more inspired debate acknowledging the new realities facing Scotland. For far too long the debate has been dominated by the SNP, now the Government of Scotland. But this debate is not about the future of the SNP, it is about the future of Scotland and the kind of country we want to live in. The debate is not just about Independence; it is about the powers, ideas, ambitions and other alternative visions. If the SNP did not exist, the nation and the political parties would still be talking about Scotland’s future and our role in the UK.

Above all, we have to free ourselves from the highly polarised and narrow debate on the future of our country which still sees constitutional politics as an inevitable choice between the status quo (no more devolution!) and the Separatism of the SNP (no more Union!). There is much more to the future of Scotland and the United Kingdom, for the future is not one Union but many unions. Despite the blinkered view that sees only two options, we have much wider choices, for which we only have to look at the diversity of constitutional alternatives in Europe. Britain didn’t invent sub-national government, federalism or devolution!

What about our future in the European Union?:Scotland could play a more significant role alongside sub-national governments, small nations and regions.

What about our future in the United Kingdom?:Relationships with England and the other devolved areas will change, with the possibility of a federalist pattern of governance emerging as Westminster revisits the whole question of devolution. England remains one of the most highly centralised countries in the Western world, with no law-making outside London.

What about our future in the global union?:The revolution in communications technology and the breaking down of boundaries and barriers all offer a different world, in which Scotland can have a greater role in climate change, trade, immigration, energy and development aid.

And what about our future in terms of our own domestic agenda?Economic, institutional, social, environmental, educational and political challenges in Scotland demand distinctive solutions. New powers and responsibilities from Westminster will be part of this.

The world is changing. Sometimes we seem more bewildered than understanding of what is happening. Scotland and the UK cannot simply watch and wonder. The Union is in danger of losing a great opportunity to reconnect with the Scottish people and renew the relationship. In turn it makes little sense for the Union to frustrate Scotland as it builds on devolution and demands a greater say in its own future.

None of this requires us to leave the Union, nor to accept the current constitutional settlement. But it does require us to create a distinctive Scottish political culture and an identity for our parliament and Government that commands broad support. This will provide the confidence and the tangible results that will help the electorate see the benefits of further constitutional change: but we have made little progress on this front. Scotland needs a world view not just seen through the prism of London and Westminster. Scotland needs nation-building. Scotland needs to build capacity to deal with change and help transform its future. Scotland needs a political and constitutional consensus, which it currently doesn’t have. This is absolutely vital. Both the status quo and Independence are divisive scenarios, Scotland and the Scots are capable of building a better vision for the challenging times ahead. BUT currently there is nothing new on the table as the Unionist parties seek solace in trying to kill off Independence without worrying a great deal about what happens the day after the referendum.

New thinking is required which sees the world in different ways, with new solutions to old and enduring problems. It is inevitable that Scotland’s role in the UK will change significantly in the first half of the 21st century; the first decade has only served to illustrate what a remarkable journey the country is on, with little indication that the momentum is slowing. There is a great deal we can learn from social and constitutional changes in Europe but only if we can break free from the debate of extremes and the constraints imposed by the Unionist parties.

What now for Scotland? Thirteen years on, we are surely at the end of the beginning of devolution. Again writing in 2007 we said,

As the clash between an apparently inflexible Union and a seductively harmless-seeming form of Independence takes shape, it needs to be pointed out that constitutional and political roads need not lead to such a stark choice between two extremes. It should not be too much to expect that the futures of Scotland and the Union can be built on enlightenment and hope, not misunderstanding and political prejudice.

There are signs that for the first time in post devolution politics, Scotland’s role in the Union is now higher up the Westminster agenda. In the first few days of 2012, the media – including the English press – was full of comment on the back of David Cameron’s intervention into the referendum issue and for all intents and purposes looking like a ‘Westminster, we have a problem’ moment. Mirroring the Tom Hanks crisis in the filmApollo 13, David Cameron had lost patience with the failure of the Unionist parties to stop the SNP juggernaut and he was clearly worried by the fact that Westminster had lost control of the constitutional debate. The future of the Union went viral and, for the first time in a decade, devolution and Scotland’s role within the United Kingdom was centre-stage.

This was probably not the intention of the PM, whose intervention was probably more opportunistic than considered and more about Westminster exercising its legislative muscle, but it certainly focused the minds of the Unionist parties north and south of the border, generating some real debate about the forthcoming referendum, the nature of the question and the issue of whether the Scottish Parliament could lawfully hold such a vote.

Consultation papers on the referendum from both governments quickly followed and although the intense and frenetic debate that followed has subsided, we are now at the start of what is likely to be the most momentous period in the political and constitutional history of Scotland since the Act of Union in 1707. The result of the referendum in 2014, regardless of the outcome, will change the future of Scotland and its relationship with England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Scotland is now preparing for its date with destiny. This book discusses the political and constitutional future of Scotland as the journey continues. The report from the House of Commons Scottish Affairs Committee, published in early August 2012, confirms the Westminster obsession with Referendum legalities. Most Scots will be content and relieved to accept that Scotland’s ultimate future will be decided by themselves in the court of public opinion, and not in the law courts by advocates and QCs. These are exciting times for our nation. It remains to be seen whether the author is being too optimistic about the future of a country he passionately believes in.

CHAPTER 2

THE ROAD TO HOME RULE

AN UNDERSTANDING OF the emerging ‘new politics’ requires an understanding of how the politics of devolution and Independence have evolved, and the modern political parties have reached their present positions.

Labour’s involvement with the constitutional question, leading ultimately to the embrace of devolution, started in the early part of the 20th century when a number of speeches by key people such as Keir Hardie floated the idea of ‘home rule’. Keir Hardie first pledged the Labour Party’s support for Scottish home rule in an election address in 1888 and the Labour Party went into the general election of 1918 with Scottish home rule as the third priority in its manifesto, ahead of housing, pensions and education.

Gordon Brown wrote in 1993:

There’s a joke in the Scottish Party about our 1918 manifesto. Then we promised home rule, proportional representation and the prohibition of alcohol. And in more than seventy years we have managed to secure none of them.

It can now be said that two out of three is not bad, but the third is still highly unlikely…

Over the years, Labour’s commitment waxed and waned. By 1929, home rule had fallen to the bottom of the 63 priorities in Labour’s manifesto. It formed no part of their manifesto in 1945 and in 1958 Labour formally dropped any commitment to devolution.

Interestingly, in Labour’s early days, there was a socialism and nationalism debate within the party and in Scotland, also involving the movement that led to the SNP and the Liberals. A number of home rule bills were submitted to Westminster but, although they affected Scotland, their primary aim was to deal with the Irish question. A number of backbench bills on home rule for Scotland were submitted, but these never had any chance of success.

These formative years also saw the genesis of Labour’s continuing difficulties with constitutional questions. Because of socialism’s tenet of centralisation and command of the economy, there was hardly any further discussion for much of the first half of the 20th century. Many Labour Party stalwarts believed that any form of nationalism or home rule cut across Labour’s wider political aspirations and was a distraction from the main political battle, which focused on dealing with class and the excesses of capitalism. Surprisingly, much of this argument remains today.

Basically, throughout the last 100 years, there has not been a body of fundamental and coherent philosophy or strategic thinking about territory, sub-national government, federalism, nationality or identity within the Labour Party. Instead, policy on this subject has evolved incrementally, often hesitatingly and sometimes acrimoniously, over the century, with understandable highs and lows in the party’s interest. Labour, for much of its history, has viewed the devolution of power as a distraction from the main UK struggles and as a sop to the Nationalists. This suspicion of constitutional change remains deeply embedded in the psychology of the party and remains today a major obstacle to modern and progressive thinking on the matter.

As a result, Labour’s engagement with devolution has ebbed and flowed, reflecting Scotland’s national mood, the varying political fortunes of the Nationalist party, the campaigning zeal of devolutionists within Labour by groups like Scottish Labour Action, and the impact of the economy and unemployment in Scotland on leadership thinking in London.

It was not until October 1974, after the strong showing of the SNP in the February 1974 election, that the first full manifesto commitment at UK level was given: ‘The next Labour government will create elected assemblies in Scotland and Wales.’

From 1974 through the five general elections to 1997, there were reaffirmations of the commitment to devolution in the UK. Prior to 1974, the economic, industrial and employment problems of sectors of the UK were the focus and at that time Scotland was still classified as a ‘region’. Significantly, in a section of the 1955 UK manifesto entitled ‘Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland’, the concern was identified which heralded a great programme of decentralisation of industry and subsidies for the ‘economically deprived regions’.

The manifesto said:

Under the Tories, there had been hunger and misery, idle pits and shipyards and bankrupt farms. Labour in power brought new life to Scotland and Wales. Thriving industry justified triumphantly Labour’s systems of controls and priority. But unemployment in some parts of these countries remains high. Labour will ensure full employment in Scotland and Wales and will begin to overtake Tory neglect by bringing new industries to Northern Ireland.

But, of more interest and for the first time in a UK Labour manifesto, there was a comment: ‘We respect and will safeguard the distinctive national cultures of these countries.’ Until then these countries had been termed only as ‘regions’ and the use of the words ‘distinctive national cultures’ and ‘countries’ was telling.

In the 1970s, the SNP did so well that in February 1974, Labour quickly got to work on a response and produced the commitment to Scottish and Welsh Assemblies in their October 1974 manifesto.

On 22 June 1974, Labour’s Scottish executive met to ratify the Downing Street proposals on devolution. Unfortunately, this was also the day of the Scotland–Yugoslavia World Cup football match and only 11 members of the executive turned up. Most of those who stayed away to watch the football were pro-devolutionists and this allowed the anti-devolutionists to throw out the proposals. Labour leader Harold Wilson was enraged and at the Dalintober Street meetings in August, Scottish Labour put devolution back on the agenda, even though many members were against it. In October 1974, the SNP won 11 seats, the highest number they ever achieved at Westminster.

The matter remained reasonably high on the agenda until the 1979 referendum debacle. At that time, Labour was split between devolutionists and Unionists, while the SNP was split between devolutionists and those who favoured complete Independence.

In the referendum, 1.23 million Scots voted ‘For’ and 1.15 million voted ‘Against’ the Scottish Assembly, with a turn-out of 58.8 per cent, but with the Cunningham Amendment (stating that a ‘yes’ vote would only be valid if 40 per cent of the total electorate voted for it) creating another obstacle, the vote represented only 32.9 per cent of Scotland’s electorate and, as a result, devolution for Scotland fell. This was a tipping point for constitutional change within the Labour party.

The referendum defeat foreshadowed the downfall of the Callaghan government and the election of the Conservatives, leading on to the Thatcher years. As a result, in the immediate aftermath of the 1979 Labour defeat, the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly was launched by home rule politicians, academics and activists. The early 1980s were lean years for devolution and it was only in 1989 that the Scottish Constitutional Convention held its inaugural meeting to reactivate the fight for devolution. Despite the election defeat of Labour in 1992, a firm commitment to a Scottish Parliament was reinforced and the election of a Labour government in 1997 ensured that, after nearly 100 years, Scotland would have its own parliament. Scots are now living the legacy of those early struggles.

The Scottish National Party, in sharp contrast, has had the idea of radical constitutional change for Scotland at its heart since its formation in 1934 – through an amalgamation of the National Party of Scotland, founded in 1928, and The Scottish Party (a 1932 breakaway from the Cathcart Conservative Association). It has to be said that the growth in nationalism, or the fear of it, often resulted in a flurry of political activity from Labour and the Conservatives.

Always a fractious party, it has ironically (but not inaccurately) been said that the SNP’s first split occurred when it enlisted its second member. There were initial disagreements over whether to concentrate on electoral politics or wider cultural aims, followed by arguments over relations with other political parties, especially the Labour Party. Despite little success in the polls, the SNP’s very existence sustained the concept of a separate Scottish state in the public mind.

Over the years, supporters of Scottish Independence have continued to hold mixed views on the home rule movement, with three strands of thinking: those who wanted devolution within the framework of the UK, those who saw it as a stepping-stone to Independence and those who wanted to go all-out for Independence.

From opposition to European integration – because it was perceived as an assault on sovereignty – the SNP moved to a positive policy of ‘Independence in Europe’ and cited the prosperous Scandinavian countries and Ireland (the ‘Celtic tiger’) as models.

When the SNP declared itself for outright Independence 50 years ago, a moderate element would still have joined in any all-party action to achieve a substantial degree of home rule. Interestingly, this half-way position is where the SNP found itself in 2007 – in power under devolution but, because it was a minority government, it was unable to push for Independence. Four years later in 2011 – as a Majority Government of Scotland – the SNP made a firm commitment to pass a Bill and put the issue of Independence to the Scottish people in the first officially-sanctioned vote on the matter. In a curious way and capturing the essence of democracy, only the Scottish people now stand between Scotland being independent and the Treaty of Union being rewritten. Beneath the surface, the divisions between ‘softly, softly’ gradualists and ‘big bang’ Separatist radicals still exist, making full Independence a less certain outcome for many in the SNP. This stopping short of Independence may provide a natural bridging point to link the gradualists with those in the Unionist parties who wish to move on from the status quo and the first phase of devolution. This area of common ground remains to be explored in the ongoing debate. Once again there is no progress on such an agenda, especially within and between the leaderships of the Unionist parties in Scotland. There are, however stirrings of new thinking outwith traditional party politics.

There is no great corpus of Conservative Party thinking on constitutional change or the politics of devolved power. The party formerly known as the Conservative and Unionist Party, now simply ‘Conservatives’ or ‘Scottish Conservatives’, has in the past been robustly opposed to devolution – never more so than under Margaret Thatcher’s leadership. It was conveniently forgotten that in 1968 Edward Heath promised, in his ‘Declaration of Perth’, a Scottish Assembly indirectly elected from members of Scottish local authorities, and when Mrs Thatcher reversed this policy in 1976, the Shadow Scottish Secretary, Alick Buchanan-Smith, and Shadow Minister of State, Malcolm Rifkind, resigned.

However, having been saved from electoral extinction by the Holyrood Parliament and proportional representation, the Tories are now grateful, but reluctant, devolutionists. The 2007 Scottish leader Annabel Goldie paid tribute to the Union as ‘a 300-year success story’ but the May 2007 manifesto promised the Scottish Conservatives would ‘make the Scottish Parliament work better for Scotland’. Ms Goldie followed this up by meeting First Minister Salmond to discuss drugs policy, one of a number of issues on which consensus might be achieved, explaining: ‘It reflects a new political will and a desire to take forward a new agenda in Scotland.’ This was very much the pattern between 2007 and 2011 where the SNP, lacking an overall majority, were happy to get Tory support and in turn secure some tangible political benefits, especially at budget times.

Goldie’s party also participated in a meeting with Scottish Labour and the Scottish Liberal Democrats, to issue a joint statement rejecting the SNP government’s proposal for a referendum on Independence. The Unionist parties also came together in the agreement to set up the Calman Commission to inquire into further powers for the Scottish Parliament. This was possibly the only time in the five wasted years that the three Unionist parties came together in common cause; occasioned by the total domination of the SNP, the need to remain connected to the constitutional issue and to start to look like a credible alternative to an SNP Government that was digging in and looking more competent and confident by the day. After the 2011 Holyrood election, the SNP’s overall majority negated the need for them to cultivate allies, build any consensus on issues and make budget concessions to the Tories or indeed any other party. There is no doubt that an overall majority in a Parliament, where the voting system was deliberately designed to ensure that never happened, is not good for consensus or cross-party agreement or bipartisanship. Tribalism rules and the opposition’s task is made much more difficult.

Any prospect of a change in Scottish Conservative Party thinking on devolution disappeared during the Tory leadership contest after Annabel Goldie stepped down. The fight that followed had Ruth Davidson taking on Murdo Fraser for the Conservative crown in Scotland. The views of the candidates could not have been more different. Murdo Fraser wanted to scrap the party name and all the post-war baggage that went with it. A new start for Scottish Tories was advocated and to the impartial observer this made a great deal of sense for a party that seemed to be in terminal decline and had not stopped falling in the polls since 1955. With no MPs at Westminster after the 1997 General Election, only proportional representation (PR) at Holyrood saved the party from total oblivion. There was no doubting the fact that Scots were embarrassed by the Tories and their perceived anti-Scottishness which was at its most virulent during the Thatcher era. Not surprisingly Tory party members did not share his radical vision for the renewal of Scottish conservatism and Ruth Davidson was elected leader. In sharp contrast, she embraced the Union flag and seems determined to resist further calls for radical constitutional change, instead working to defeat Independence and keep Scotland within an unchanging Union. Few people see this as a step towards renewal or reform. Most people see this as a lost opportunity to halt a decline covering nearly half a century.

The Liberal Democrats are committed to a federal United Kingdom, with elected regional assemblies throughout the country. In ‘Here We Stand’ (1993) they proposed that a federal framework be put in place ‘that regions may or may not take advantage of immediately’, and in their 1997 election manifesto they remained committed to regional assemblies.

In the joint Labour–Lib-Dem statement of March 1997, the Lib- Dems indicated that, despite their disagreement with Labour’s intention to hold pre-legislative referendums in both Scotland and Wales, they would not seek to frustrate or delay the referendum legislation and would campaign for a ‘double yes’ in the referendum.

Their 2007 Scottish election manifesto said: ‘A growing number of people support more powers for the Scottish Parliament – many more than support Independence.’

This followed the report ‘Moving to Federalism – a New Settlement for Scotland’ by the Steel Commission, set up by the party and chaired by former Scottish Parliament Presiding Officer and former leader David Steel. Its terms of reference included:

To examine the powers, responsibilities and financial powers of the Scottish Parliament and its relationship to the United Kingdom Parliament and government and to the European Union.

To consider how to move forward to a fully federal structure for the United Kingdom (including consideration of the relationship between the Scottish Executive and local government in Scotland).

To identify what changes to the powers and legislative competences of the Scottish Parliament are desirable.

To identify the potential advantages of greater fiscal and economic powers for the Scottish Parliament.

In his introduction, Lord Steel wrote:

It has long been accepted that the Scotland Act should be reviewed a decade or so after it came into force in 1999.

It has also been accepted that the so-called ‘Barnett formula’ under which Scotland has, since the 1970s, received its share of public expenditure is due for re-examination. In my Donald Dewar Memorial Lecture three years ago, I said that no self-respecting parliament could exist permanently on a grant from another parliament.

The Commission called for a second Constitutional Convention to consider the best ways to devolve new powers, including taxation powers, to the Scottish Parliament, as well as the creation of a joint committee of the Scottish and UK Parliaments, and a new category of powers in which the two parliaments should work in partnership. The new convention would consider the case for applying this approach in areas including regulatory powers, misuse and control of drugs, control of firearms, asylum and immigration, strategic planning of welfare services and aspects of employment law. The Commission also believed the Scottish Parliament should have exclusive competence over the electoral system, the operation of the Scottish Parliament itself, the civil service, energy policy, transport powers and marine policy. Other extended powers might include betting and gaming, public and bank holidays, human rights and equalities, and an increased role in governance of broadcasting.

As expected, the Commission rejected full fiscal autonomy, and preferred ‘fiscal federalism’, believing that:

The time is right to move the debate on fiscal powers forward and fiscal federalism offers the opportunity to Scotland to bridge the gap in accountability seen in the current system but within the framework of a renewed and refreshed set of relations for the UK.

It is instructive that full fiscal autonomy (where Scotland raises and retains all tax revenue and remits an agreed sum to Westminster for shared services) does not operate in any industrialised country. In contrast, fiscal federalism can be seen to work well in countries across the world. There is no doubting the constitutional credentials of the Lib-Dems. They have consistently advocated a form of federalism and have been highly critical of a situation where Devolution and the Holyrood Parliament could continue with a hand-out from Westminster. This was in their eyes a Parliament that could not win trust and confidence without the respect and responsibility of fiscal federalism. Of all the Unionist parties, the Lib-Dems are the radical party. But in recent times that radicalism has been rather subdued as they battle the twin problems of their so-called allies in the Coalition Government at Westminster and their electoral unpopularity caused by signing up to Austerity Britain. But being seen as providing a cloak of respectability, for the right wing ideology of a Conservative led Government, has not been helpful to the Lib-Dems.

From a tentative start, or even outright opposition, the parties have all made a political journey that has ended in recognition of the inevitability of the new constitutional settlement that is devolution. The next stage in that journey is equally inevitable. For the SNP, the journey is to Independence, whatever that means in a world of growing interdependence. For the Conservatives, Labour and the Lib-Dems there is much less certainty and a great deal of confusion. Listening to Radio 2 the words of a song captured my concerns, ‘They’re talking, but they’re not saying anything. They’re listening but don’t hear anything. They’re moving but not going anywhere’ The Lib-Dems and Labour should be in the forefront of constitutional change and a positive force for a federal Britain.

CHAPTER 3

REFERENDUM 1997

IT IS USEFUL TO LOOK back at the 1997 referendum, both to understand why things happened as they did and to see what lessons can be learned for the future. The debate surrounding the referendum in 1996 and 1997 still has importance for a number of reasons, mainly because they have not been properly addressed by the UK parties.

In the pre-referendum tensions of that time lie the roots of the disputes and suspicions that plague politics in the post devolution era. Labour’s fraught relationship with the constitutional question continues to cast a shadow over the party’s ability to win success in the new era of Scottish politics. Little has been done to create working relationships and trust between UK politicians and devolved parliaments. Instead, there has been resentment and some MPs have been openly scornful of their MSP colleagues, as was shown by the infamous ‘White Heather Club’ jibe which originated among Scottish Labour MPs at Westminster.

Furthermore, the parties themselves have not come to terms with the new politics or created true devolution in their internal structures. The doggedly centralist attitude at Westminster has not only created unnecessary strains, it has been self-damaging for the parties. For Labour in particular, there are unresolved questions to be answered before the UK Party can be comfortable with devolution. Despite having delivered it, large sections of the Party still appear uneasy about the consequences of devolution. For some members, the arrival of the Scottish Parliament was a grudging response to a ‘Nat’ led threat and never part of a longer journey.

The debate of a decade ago reveals the doubts and misgivings about devolution within the Labour Party then and now. The prevailing psychology of that period may help explain the defensive and negative attitudes within the Westminster parliament; why some members of the party are uncomfortable with devolution; why today’s Labour Party in Scotland can seem ambivalent and uneasy about where devolution goes from here; and why UK Labour has been slow to allow the Scottish Party to respond to the new realities of devolution 13 years on. After nearly 100 years of discussing some form of home rule, the Labour Party in Scotland remains uneasy about any real debate about the constitutional future of Scotland.

The referendum itself was a symptom of that uneasiness. Devolution was a huge issue in Scottish politics and Labour accepted that it was what John Smith had described as ‘the settled will of the Scottish people’ and ‘unfinished business’. In England and at Westminster, however, there was a feeling of indifference and certainly ambivalence. Devolution had never been part of the DNA or the soul of an institution which had ruled without disruption for centuries.

The majority of the Blair shadow cabinet accepted that devolution was ‘unfinished business’, but no more than that. It was largely regarded as a Scottish affair, for some a distraction from mainstream politics, and key Unionists such as Derry Irvine, Jack Straw and David Blunkett did not disguise their misgivings.

At Westminster, there was little awareness that each minor turn in the winding road towards devolution could attract outsized headlines in the Scottish media. Devolution was not recognised as something that would change the face of British politics and was not taken seriously enough, and there is ample evidence to suggest the Unionist parties continue to pay a heavy price for this. Nor was it recognised as having repercussions for England, despite the consideration of assemblies for the English regions, which collapsed after a disastrous referendum in the north east of England.