INTRODUCTION
Is
secret diplomacy the evil spirit of modern politics? Is it the
force
that keeps nations in a state of potential hostility and does not
allow a feeling of confidence and of wholehearted coöperation to
grow up? Or is it only a trade device, a clever method of
surrounding
with an aura of importance the doings of the diplomats, a race of
men
of average wisdom and intelligence who traditionally have valued
the
prestige of dealing with “secret affairs of state”? Or is it
something less romantic than either of these—merely the survival
from a more barbarous age of instincts of secretiveness and chicane
acquired at a time when self-defense was the necessity of every
hour?It
is quite patent that the practice of secret diplomacy is
incompatible
with the democratic theory of state. Even in the Liberal theory of
state it finds little favor, although that is disposed to grant a
great deal of discretion to the representatives who are given the
trusteeship of public affairs. Yet the essential idea of
Liberalism,
government by discussion, includes foreignaffairs
within its scope fully as much as those of purely domestic concern.
In applying to public affairs the experience of private business it
is often argued that as the directorate of a corporation could not
be
expected to transact its business in public, even so diplomatic
conversations are not to be heralded from the house tops. How far
this particular analogy between private business and public affairs
will hold, is a point we shall have to examine later. At first
sight
the planning of private enterprises and the consideration of
benefits
and losses, can hardly furnish completely satisfactory rules for
the
conduct of public affairs, particularly those involving the life
and
death of the persons concerned. Stockholders would be reluctant to
allow such matters to be determined by a board of trustees in
secret
conclave.Divesting
ourselves of all prejudices, even of righteous indignation against
plainly unconscionable practices, we shall try to examine and
analyze
the action of great diplomats and to see to what extent really
important results achieved by them have depended upon the use of
secret methods. In the 18th Century, diplomacy was still looked
upon
as a sharp game in which wits were matched, with a complete license
as to the means pursued;provided,
however, that embarrassing discovery must be avoided, in other
words,
that the exact method of deception must be so closely guarded that
only the results will show. The great diplomats of the beginning of
the 19th century—Metternich, Talleyrand, Pozzo di Borgo—while
they talked much about humanitarian principles, continued to play a
barren game of intrigue. Napoleon III, that master of devious
statecraft, will always be cited by excoriators of secret diplomacy
as an abhorrent example—a man undone by the results of his own
plotting. Bismarck indeed prided himself on looking down upon petty
secret manœuvering and cast a certain amount of contempt on the
whole diplomatic business; he often disconcerted his opponents by
an
unaccustomed frankness. Yet the orientation of his statesmanship
was
based upon the idea of helping history to find a short-cut to her
aims through masterful plotting. He took the reins out of the hands
of Providence.But
let us return to our first question: “Is secret diplomacy the evil
spirit of modern politics?” It is indeed worth inquiring how far
our secretive methods in foreign affairs are to blame for the
pitiful
condition in which the world finds itself to-day. No doubt there is
a
general beliefthat
secret diplomacy and ever-increasing armaments led Europe into the
terrible destruction of the Great War and that the continuance of
such methods is chiefly to blame for the deplorable condition since
the Armistice. There may be deeper causes, but these evidences are
so
obtrusive that they naturally attract most attention and are given
most blame for the evils we endure. It is plain that secret
diplomacy
is a potent cause for continued distrust, fear and hate. There are
few statesmen that would not shrink from deliberately planning and
staging a war. Yet they nearly all participate in methods of
handling
public business from which it is hardly possible that anything but
suspicion, fear and hatred should arise. Distrust is planted
everywhere. There is no assurance of what is the truth; true
reports
are questioned; false reports, believed. All motives are under
suspicion. The public conscience and will are beclouded; nothing
stands out as reliable but stark military force.It
would seem that we have learned very little from the war. The same
dangerous and unhealthy methods continue to be used with inveterate
zeal. The result is that suspicion has now grown up among those who
fought side by side and who shed their blood together.
Realizingthe
fundamental importance of basing international life on sound
opinion
and fair dealing, the framers of the League of Nations tried to
secure the publicity of all international agreements. Yet this
moderate provision of the covenant has not been obeyed by some of
the
strongest contracting powers. Some outsiders, indeed, such as
Russia,
have quite willingly published their treaties and furnished them to
the bureau of the league.That
the first act of peace-making was to shut the door of the council
chamber in the face of the multitudes who had offered their lives
and
shed their blood for the rights of humanity was a tragic mistake.
In
the defense of secret procedure, published on January 17, 1919, it
was said “To discuss differences in the press would inflame public
opinion and render impossible a compromise.” So all connection
between the great public that was paying the price of the game and
the benevolent elder statesmen who thought they would shoulder the
burden of responsibility alone, was cut off. The men in the council
chamber were not strengthened in this great crisis by a feeling of
intimate touch with a strong and enlightened public opinion. The
public itself was disillusioned; suspicion and contempt were the
natural result. The bald statements given to the press
concerningthe
negotiations did not satisfy any one. Most of what was going on
became known to outsiders. But its authenticity was so uncertain
and
it was so commingled with mere rumor that the public soon gave up
in
despair. It will be important to inquire as to what is the proper
perspective between confidential deliberation and publicity of
results, in conferences, which are becoming the usual agency for
discussing and settling international affairs.When
secrecy is confined merely to the methods of carrying on
negotiations, its importance for good and evil is certainly not so
great as when the secrecy of methods includes concealment of aims
and
of the agreements arrived at. We could imagine that even a
statesman
who seeks the closest relationship with public opinion, even a
Lincoln, could not at all times eliminate all use of confidential
communications. But the temper of the whole system of foreign
affairs
is a different matter; and any broad effort to conceal the tendency
of action or its results is certainly productive of evil, no matter
how salutary or beneficial it may seem to the men employing it at
the
time.But,
it is said, we must trust to experts. International relations are
so
intricate and have somany
delicate shadings that they elude the grasp of the ordinary man,
and
can be held together and seen in their proper relations only by the
comprehensive and experienced mind of the seasoned statesman. There
is, however, a distinction which ought to be noted. The public
relies
in most cases unreservedly upon expertship in matters of
engineering,
science, accounting, business management, and even in medicine,
though in the latter with a feeling of less complete security. In
all
these cases we know that the processes applied and the methods
pursued are demonstrable, and mathematically certain to produce the
results anticipated. But in the affairs of international politics
into which the human equation and other inexactly calculable
factors
enter, there is no such mathematical certainty which can be tested
and ascertained by any group of experts. It is all a matter of
wisdom
in choosing alternatives, and we may well doubt whether any man or
small group of men, under modern conditions of life and public
state
action, can be wiser in such matters by themselves than they would
be
if they constantly kept in direct touch with public opinion.
Society,
when properly organized, will have at its disposal on every
question
of importance, groups of men who have expert knowledge.
Expertshipin
foreign affairs is not confined to the foreign offices or the
chanceries; many thoughtful men observing and thinking intensely,
traveling widely, seeing foreign affairs from an independent angle,
have opinions and judgments to contribute that the officials cannot
safely ignore. In an inquiry of this kind we shall have to consider
the broader setting of diplomacy as a part of public life within
the
nation and throughout the world. The element of secrecy is
appropriate only when we consider diplomacy as a clever game played
by a small inner privileged circle; it appears out of place in a
society organized on a broader basis. As a matter of fact the
defense
of secrecy, from the point of view of the inner politics of the
state, resolves itself almost entirely into an opinion that the
ignorance and inexperience of the people does not fit them to judge
of foreign relations. That, it must be confessed, does not seem to
be
a very sound or convincing basis for the choice of methods of
public
action in a modern state.But
the real strength of the argument for secrecy comes when the
external
aspects of state action are considered. Then there is, on the
surface
at least, an apparent justification for secretiveness, in the
interest of a closely knit society engaged in competitive struggle
with similarsocieties
and obliged to defend itself and to safeguard its interest by all
available means.Regarded
in its broader aspects there are two conceptions of diplomacy which
are quite antagonistic and which have divided thinkers since the
time
of Machiavelli and Grotius. These two great minds may indeed be
considered as typifying the two tendencies and expressing them in
themselves and through the sentiments which their thought and
writings have engendered in their successors.We
have the conception of diplomacy as working out a complex system of
state action, balancing and counterbalancing forces and material
resources and giving direction to the innermost purposes of the
state. It is probable that all professional diplomats are more or
less enchanted by this ideal. Up to the great war, Bismarck was
generally considered the ablest master of diplomacy, and his action
seemed to supply short-cuts for historical forces to work out their
natural aims. Nationalism was the word of the day and the creation
of
the German national state, foreordained as it seemed by the laws of
history, was accelerated by the masterful action of the great
diplomat. But we are now able to see wherein lay the limitations of
this method as applied byBismarck.
Notwithstanding his grasp of historic principles of development, he
did not, after all, work in unison with broad natural forces, but
relied on his power to dominate other men through forceful mastery,
with dynastic associations. He was a superman rather than a great
representative of a people’s aspirations. So while he proclaimed
the truthfulness of his diplomacy, it was nevertheless kept
essentially as his own and his master’s affair and business, rather
than the people’s. The base of his policy was narrow. He understood
nationalism from a Prussian point of view. He severed Austria from
Germany, and then antagonized France by taking Lorraine; far more
important still, he failed to strengthen German relations with
Central Europe and thus made it later seem necessary for Germany to
go on to the sea and thus to arouse the apprehensions and enmity of
England. Thus while he himself would probably have in the end
avoided
confronting the entire world as enemies, the foundations he had
laid
did not provide a safe footing for the more ordinary men who
followed
him. His diplomacy, once considered so great, had contained no
adequate and sound foundation for permanent national life. Such
have
been the results of the most distinguished and successful work of
manipulativediplomacy
during the Nineteenth Century.What
then shall we say of the justification of wars brought about as a
part of such a system; under which statesmen consider it quite
natural to contemplate “preventive war” and to assume
responsibility for wholesale slaughter because their plan of action
seems to reveal a necessity for it. The idea of conscious planning,
or striving to subject national and economic facts and all historic
development to the conscious political will,—that conception of
diplomacy is synonymous with the essence of
politics and will
stand and fall with the continuance of the purely political state.
Manipulative, and hence secret, diplomacy is in fact the most
complete expression of the purely political factor in human
affairs.
To many, it will seem only a survival of a hyper-political era, as
human society now tends to outgrow and transcend politics for more
comprehensive, pervasive and essential principles of action. We
need
not here rehearse the fundamental character of
politics as a
struggle for recognized authority to determine the action of
individuals, with the use of external compulsion. Politics is a
part
of the idea of the national state seen from the point of view of a
struggle for existence among different political organizations, in
whichone
class originally superimposed its authority upon a subject
population
and in which, after authority is firmly established within,
political
power is then used to gain advantages from, or over, outside
societies. It is Machiavelli as opposed to Grotius who gives us the
philosophy of this struggle. The narrowness of this basis for human
action and the direful effect of conscious and forceful
interference
with social and economic laws, is now beginning to be
recognized.But
there is also a broader conception of diplomacy which is
influencing
the minds of men although it is not yet fully embodied in our daily
practice. This conception looks upon humanity, not as a mosaic of
little mutually exclusive areas, but as a complex body of
interlocking interests and cultural groups. As this conception
gains
in strength, the center of effort in diplomacy will not be to
conceal
separatist aims and special plots, but to bring out into the clear
light of day the common interests of men. The common work for them
to
do in making the world habitable, in dignifying the life of men and
protecting them against mutual terror and massacre,—that ideal of
coöperation and forbearance, is as yet only partially embodied in
our international practices, although it arouses the fervid hopes
of
menthroughout
the world. Whether a system of local autonomy combined with full
coöperation and free interchange of influences can be brought about
without the exercise of an overpowering influence on the part of a
group of allied nations, is still doubtful. But if it should be
achieved, then plainly the old special functions of diplomacy will
fall away and administrative conferences will take the place of
diplomatic conversations. When Portugal became a republic, the
proposal was made to abolish all diplomatic posts and have the
international business of Portugal administered by consuls. That
would eliminate politics from foreign relations.Diplomacy
in the spirit of Grotius has always had its votaries even in
periods
of the darkest intrigue, but there has only recently come into
general use a method of transacting international business which
favors open and full discussion of diplomatic affairs. Such
business
will be dealt with less and less in separate negotiation between
two
powers; there will generally be more nations involved, and
conferences and standing committees or commissions will be at work,
rather than isolated diplomats. Indeed, international conferences
are
still largely influenced by the old spirit of secretive diplomacy.
Yet the practiceof
meeting together in larger groups is itself inimical to the strict
maintenance of the older methods and we may expect a natural growth
of more simple and direct dealings. It will be interesting to watch
the use of the older methods of diplomacy under these new
conditions
and to see how far and how fast they will have to be modified in
order to bear out the underlying principle in human development to
which action by conference responds.The
Washington Conference of 1921 afforded the first notable occasion
for
bringing into use open methods in diplomatic discussion. Secretary
Hughes in his introductory speech struck a keynote hitherto not
heard
in negotiations on international matters. A new era seemed to have
dawned in which great issues and all-important interests could be
discussed openly and decided on their merits. A great wave of
enthusiasm passed over the public. But it cannot be said that the
temper of this auspicious opening was sustained throughout. As the
conference descended from general declarations to important
questions
of detail there was an unmistakable reversion to old methods, which
obstructed the straightforward aims of Secretary Hughes. Even the
generous initial proposal of the American government wasmade
by one of the powers a trading subject. The result was that some of
the attendant evils of secret diplomacy invaded even this
conference,
and that the public soon became somewhat confused as to its object
and purposes, through an abundance of guesses which put a premium
on
the sensational imagination. It must be said that the temper of the
press, encouraged by the manner in which the Conference had been
inaugurated, was one of restraint and responsibility. Viewing the
questions which were before this Conference, there can be no doubt
that the very problems about which there was hesitation and
exaggerated secretiveness, were exactly those which could have been
best judged of by the well-informed public opinion. One could not
avoid the conclusion that the fear of publicity is in all cases
inspired by motives which cannot stand the test of a world-wide
public opinion.At
the present day, as yet, the fatal circle has not been broken:
secret
diplomacy, suspicion, armaments, war. We had thought that we should
escape from it quite easily, after the terrible sacrifices laid on
mankind and the light which had been flashed on us in that
darkness.
But the passions which had been stirred up and the fear and terror
which had been aroused in that direexperience
may for some time yet serve to strengthen the reactionary forces in
human affairs, and retard those which tend to liberate humanity
from
terror and suffering. But it is lack of leadership toward better
things, that is most to blame.To
America, to the government and the people, the elimination of
secret
dealings in international affairs is nothing short of a primary
interest. The entire character of our foreign policy is inspired
with, and based upon, the belief in open dealings and fair play. We
have a broad continental position which makes secret plotting and
devious transactions unnatural, inappropriate and unnecessary. Our
national experience of one hundred and fifty years has expressed
itself quite spontaneously in proposals for the peaceful settlement
of international disputes by discussion, for the improvement of
international relations through conferences, and in the great
policies of the Open Door, which means commercial fair play, and
the
Monroe Doctrine, which means political fair play to the American
sister republics. A policy such as this has nothing to seek with
secret methods and concealed aims.To
tolerate secrecy in international affairs would mean to acquiesce
in
a great national danger.For
good or ill we can no longer conceive ourselves as isolated. Our
every-day happiness and permanent welfare are directly affected by
what other nations do and plan. Continued secrecy would mean that
we
should feel ourselves surrounded by unknown dangers. We should have
to live in an atmosphere of dread and suspicion. We could find
peace
of mind only in the security of vast armaments. In international
affairs we would be walking by the edge of precipices and over
volcanoes; our best intentioned proposals for the betterment of
human
affairs would be secretly burked, as in the case of Secretary Knox’
plan of railway neutralization in Manchuria. Our rights would be
secretly invaded and our security threatened, as at the time when
England and France agreed with Japan that she should have the North
Pacific islands, behind our backs, though our vital interests were
involved. In all such matters secrecy will work to the disadvantage
of that power which has the most straightforward aims and policies.
America cannot willingly submit to such a condition. It is
unthinkable that with our traditions of public life and with our
Constitutional arrangements, we should ourselves play the old game
of
secret intrigue; it is for us to see, and to the best of our
powerand
ability to assure, that it will not be played in the future by
others.Nations
will respond to the call for absolutely open dealings in
international affairs, with a varying degree of readiness and
enthusiasm. We are perhaps justified in saying that wherever the
people can make their desires felt they will be unanimously for a
policy of openness. The English tradition of public life would also
be favorable to such a principle of action, were it not that such
special imperial interests as the British raj in India frequently
inspires British diplomacy with narrower motives and with a
readiness
to depart from open dealings from a conviction that imperial
interests so require. The Russian Soviet government in giving to
the
public a full knowledge of international affairs, was at first
inspired primarily by a desire to discredit the old régime. But it
is also undoubtedly true that the hold which this government has on
the party which supports it, is in a measure due to the fact that
all
foreign policies and relationships are freely reported to, and
discussed in, the party meetings and the soviets. No matter what
the
aims of this government may be, it cannot be denied that it has
strengthened itself by the openness of its foreign policy. The
Chinese peoplehave
manifested a deep faith in public opinion and their chief desire in
international affairs is that there shall be open, straightforward
dealings so that all the world may know and judge. Through all
their
difficulties of the last decade they have been sustained by this
faith in the strength of a good cause in the forum of world-wide
public opinion.The
peoples of the Continent of Europe undoubtedly would welcome a
reign
of openness and truth, for they have suffered most from secret
dealings in diplomacy. But those who govern them find it difficult
to
extricate themselves from the tangle of intrigue. As President
Wilson
expressed it:
“
European
diplomacy works always in the dense thicket of ancient feuds,
rooted,
entangled and entwined. It is difficult to see the path; it is not
always possible to see the light of day. I did not realize it all
until the peace conference; I did not realize how deep the roots
are.”