Statesman
StatesmanINTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS.STATESMANCopyright
Statesman
Plato
INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS.
In the Phaedrus, the Republic, the Philebus, the
Parmenides, and the Sophist, we may observe the tendency of Plato
to combine two or more subjects or different aspects of the same
subject in a single dialogue. In the Sophist and Statesman
especially we note that the discussion is partly regarded as an
illustration of method, and that analogies are brought from afar
which throw light on the main subject. And in his later writings
generally we further remark a decline of style, and of dramatic
power; the characters excite little or no interest, and the
digressions are apt to overlay the main thesis; there is not the
'callida junctura' of an artistic whole. Both the serious
discussions and the jests are sometimes out of place. The
invincible Socrates is withdrawn from view; and new foes begin to
appear under old names. Plato is now chiefly concerned, not with
the original Sophist, but with the sophistry of the schools of
philosophy, which are making reasoning impossible; and is driven by
them out of the regions of transcendental speculation back into the
path of common sense. A logical or psychological phase takes the
place of the doctrine of Ideas in his mind. He is constantly
dwelling on the importance of regular classification, and of not
putting words in the place of things. He has banished the poets,
and is beginning to use a technical language. He is bitter and
satirical, and seems to be sadly conscious of the realities of
human life. Yet the ideal glory of the Platonic philosophy is not
extinguished. He is still looking for a city in which kings are
either philosophers or gods (compare Laws).The Statesman has lost the grace and beauty of the earlier
dialogues. The mind of the writer seems to be so overpowered in the
effort of thought as to impair his style; at least his gift of
expression does not keep up with the increasing difficulty of his
theme. The idea of the king or statesman and the illustration of
method are connected, not like the love and rhetoric of the
Phaedrus, by 'little invisible pegs,' but in a confused and
inartistic manner, which fails to produce any impression of a whole
on the mind of the reader. Plato apologizes for his tediousness,
and acknowledges that the improvement of his audience has been his
only aim in some of his digressions. His own image may be used as a
motto of his style: like an inexpert statuary he has made the
figure or outline too large, and is unable to give the proper
colours or proportions to his work. He makes mistakes only to
correct them—this seems to be his way of drawing attention to
common dialectical errors. The Eleatic stranger, here, as in the
Sophist, has no appropriate character, and appears only as the
expositor of a political ideal, in the delineation of which he is
frequently interrupted by purely logical illustrations. The younger
Socrates resembles his namesake in nothing but a name. The dramatic
character is so completely forgotten, that a special reference is
twice made to discussions in the Sophist; and this, perhaps, is the
strongest ground which can be urged for doubting the genuineness of
the work. But, when we remember that a similar allusion is made in
the Laws to the Republic, we see that the entire disregard of
dramatic propriety is not always a sufficient reason for doubting
the genuineness of a Platonic writing.The search after the Statesman, which is carried on, like
that for the Sophist, by the method of dichotomy, gives an
opportunity for many humorous and satirical remarks. Several of the
jests are mannered and laboured: for example, the turn of words
with which the dialogue opens; or the clumsy joke about man being
an animal, who has a power of two-feet—both which are suggested by
the presence of Theodorus, the geometrician. There is political as
well as logical insight in refusing to admit the division of
mankind into Hellenes and Barbarians: 'if a crane could speak, he
would in like manner oppose men and all other animals to cranes.'
The pride of the Hellene is further humbled, by being compared to a
Phrygian or Lydian. Plato glories in this impartiality of the
dialectical method, which places birds in juxtaposition with men,
and the king side by side with the bird-catcher; king or
vermin-destroyer are objects of equal interest to science (compare
Parmen.). There are other passages which show that the irony of
Socrates was a lesson which Plato was not slow in learning—as, for
example, the passing remark, that 'the kings and statesmen of our
day are in their breeding and education very like their subjects;'
or the anticipation that the rivals of the king will be found in
the class of servants; or the imposing attitude of the priests, who
are the established interpreters of the will of heaven, authorized
by law. Nothing is more bitter in all his writings than his
comparison of the contemporary politicians to lions, centaurs,
satyrs, and other animals of a feebler sort, who are ever changing
their forms and natures. But, as in the later dialogues generally,
the play of humour and the charm of poetry have departed, never to
return.Still the Politicus contains a higher and more ideal
conception of politics than any other of Plato's writings. The city
of which there is a pattern in heaven (Republic), is here described
as a Paradisiacal state of human society. In the truest sense of
all, the ruler is not man but God; and such a government existed in
a former cycle of human history, and may again exist when the gods
resume their care of mankind. In a secondary sense, the true form
of government is that which has scientific rulers, who are
irresponsible to their subjects. Not power but knowledge is the
characteristic of a king or royal person. And the rule of a man is
better and higher than law, because he is more able to deal with
the infinite complexity of human affairs. But mankind, in despair
of finding a true ruler, are willing to acquiesce in any law or
custom which will save them from the caprice of individuals. They
are ready to accept any of the six forms of government which
prevail in the world. To the Greek, nomos was a sacred word, but
the political idealism of Plato soars into a region beyond; for the
laws he would substitute the intelligent will of the legislator.
Education is originally to implant in men's minds a sense of truth
and justice, which is the divine bond of states, and the legislator
is to contrive human bonds, by which dissimilar natures may be
united in marriage and supply the deficiencies of one another. As
in the Republic, the government of philosophers, the causes of the
perversion of states, the regulation of marriages, are still the
political problems with which Plato's mind is occupied. He treats
them more slightly, partly because the dialogue is shorter, and
also because the discussion of them is perpetually crossed by the
other interest of dialectic, which has begun to absorb
him.The plan of the Politicus or Statesman may be briefly
sketched as follows: (1) By a process of division and subdivision
we discover the true herdsman or king of men. But before we can
rightly distinguish him from his rivals, we must view him, (2) as
he is presented to us in a famous ancient tale: the tale will also
enable us to distinguish the divine from the human herdsman or
shepherd: (3) and besides our fable, we must have an example; for
our example we will select the art of weaving, which will have to
be distinguished from the kindred arts; and then, following this
pattern, we will separate the king from his subordinates or
competitors. (4) But are we not exceeding all due limits; and is
there not a measure of all arts and sciences, to which the art of
discourse must conform? There is; but before we can apply this
measure, we must know what is the aim of discourse: and our
discourse only aims at the dialectical improvement of ourselves and
others.—Having made our apology, we return once more to the king or
statesman, and proceed to contrast him with pretenders in the same
line with him, under their various forms of government. (5) His
characteristic is, that he alone has science, which is superior to
law and written enactments; these do but spring out of the
necessities of mankind, when they are in despair of finding the
true king. (6) The sciences which are most akin to the royal are
the sciences of the general, the judge, the orator, which minister
to him, but even these are subordinate to him. (7) Fixed principles
are implanted by education, and the king or statesman completes the
political web by marrying together dissimilar natures, the
courageous and the temperate, the bold and the gentle, who are the
warp and the woof of society.The outline may be filled up as follows:—SOCRATES: I have reason to thank you, Theodorus, for the
acquaintance of Theaetetus and the Stranger.THEODORUS: And you will have three times as much reason to
thank me when they have delineated the Statesman and Philosopher,
as well as the Sophist.SOCRATES: Does the great geometrician apply the same measure
to all three? Are they not divided by an interval which no
geometrical ratio can express?THEODORUS: By the god Ammon, Socrates, you are right; and I
am glad to see that you have not forgotten your geometry. But
before I retaliate on you, I must request the Stranger to finish
the argument...The Stranger suggests that Theaetetus shall be allowed to
rest, and that Socrates the younger shall respond in his place;
Theodorus agrees to the suggestion, and Socrates remarks that the
name of the one and the face of the other give him a right to claim
relationship with both of them. They propose to take the Statesman
after the Sophist; his path they must determine, and part off all
other ways, stamping upon them a single negative form (compare
Soph.).The Stranger begins the enquiry by making a division of the
arts and sciences into theoretical and practical—the one kind
concerned with knowledge exclusively, and the other with action;
arithmetic and the mathematical sciences are examples of the
former, and carpentering and handicraft arts of the latter (compare
Philebus). Under which of the two shall we place the Statesman? Or
rather, shall we not first ask, whether the king, statesman,
master, householder, practise one art or many? As the adviser of a
physician may be said to have medical science and to be a
physician, so the adviser of a king has royal science and is a
king. And the master of a large household may be compared to the
ruler of a small state. Hence we conclude that the science of the
king, statesman, and householder is one and the same. And this
science is akin to knowledge rather than to action. For a king
rules with his mind, and not with his hands.But theoretical science may be a science either of judging,
like arithmetic, or of ruling and superintending, like that of the
architect or master-builder. And the science of the king is of the
latter nature; but the power which he exercises is underived and
uncontrolled,—a characteristic which distinguishes him from
heralds, prophets, and other inferior officers. He is the wholesale
dealer in command, and the herald, or other officer, retails his
commands to others. Again, a ruler is concerned with the production
of some object, and objects may be divided into living and
lifeless, and rulers into the rulers of living and lifeless
objects. And the king is not like the master-builder, concerned
with lifeless matter, but has the task of managing living animals.
And the tending of living animals may be either a tending of
individuals, or a managing of herds. And the Statesman is not a
groom, but a herdsman, and his art may be called either the art of
managing a herd, or the art of collective management:—Which do you
prefer? 'No matter.' Very good, Socrates, and if you are not too
particular about words you will be all the richer some day in true
wisdom. But how would you subdivide the herdsman's art? 'I should
say, that there is one management of men, and another of beasts.'
Very good, but you are in too great a hurry to get to man. All
divisions which are rightly made should cut through the middle; if
you attend to this rule, you will be more likely to arrive at
classes. 'I do not understand the nature of my mistake.' Your
division was like a division of the human race into Hellenes and
Barbarians, or into Lydians or Phrygians and all other nations,
instead of into male and female; or like a division of number into
ten thousand and all other numbers, instead of into odd and even.
And I should like you to observe further, that though I maintain a
class to be a part, there is no similar necessity for a part to be
a class. But to return to your division, you spoke of men and other
animals as two classes—the second of which you comprehended under
the general name of beasts. This is the sort of division which an
intelligent crane would make: he would put cranes into a class by
themselves for their special glory, and jumble together all others,
including man, in the class of beasts. An error of this kind can
only be avoided by a more regular subdivision. Just now we divided
the whole class of animals into gregarious and non-gregarious,
omitting the previous division into tame and wild. We forgot this
in our hurry to arrive at man, and found by experience, as the
proverb says, that 'the more haste the worse speed.'And now let us begin again at the art of managing herds. You
have probably heard of the fish-preserves in the Nile and in the
ponds of the Great King, and of the nurseries of geese and cranes
in Thessaly. These suggest a new division into the rearing or
management of land-herds and of water-herds:—I need not say with
which the king is concerned. And land-herds may be divided into
walking and flying; and every idiot knows that the political animal
is a pedestrian. At this point we may take a longer or a shorter
road, and as we are already near the end, I see no harm in taking
the longer, which is the way of mesotomy, and accords with the
principle which we were laying down. The tame, walking, herding
animal, may be divided into two classes—the horned and the
hornless, and the king is concerned with the hornless; and these
again may be subdivided into animals having or not having cloven
feet, or mixing or not mixing the breed; and the king or statesman
has the care of animals which have not cloven feet, and which do
not mix the breed. And now, if we omit dogs, who can hardly be said
to herd, I think that we have only two species left which remain
undivided: and how are we to distinguish them? To geometricians,
like you and Theaetetus, I can have no difficulty in explaining
that man is a diameter, having a power of two feet; and the power
of four-legged creatures, being the double of two feet, is the
diameter of our diameter. There is another excellent jest which I
spy in the two remaining species. Men and birds are both bipeds,
and human beings are running a race with the airiest and freest of
creation, in which they are far behind their competitors;—this is a
great joke, and there is a still better in the juxtaposition of the
bird-taker and the king, who may be seen scampering after them.
For, as we remarked in discussing the Sophist, the dialectical
method is no respecter of persons. But we might have proceeded, as
I was saying, by another and a shorter road. In that case we should
have begun by dividing land animals into bipeds and quadrupeds, and
bipeds into winged and wingless; we should than have taken the
Statesman and set him over the 'bipes implume,' and put the reins
of government into his hands.Here let us sum up:—The science of pure knowledge had a part
which was the science of command, and this had a part which was a
science of wholesale command; and this was divided into the
management of animals, and was again parted off into the management
of herds of animals, and again of land animals, and these into
hornless, and these into bipeds; and so at last we arrived at man,
and found the political and royal science. And yet we have not
clearly distinguished the political shepherd from his rivals. No
one would think of usurping the prerogatives of the ordinary
shepherd, who on all hands is admitted to be the trainer,
matchmaker, doctor, musician of his flock. But the royal shepherd
has numberless competitors, from whom he must be distinguished;
there are merchants, husbandmen, physicians, who will all dispute
his right to manage the flock. I think that we can best distinguish
him by having recourse to a famous old tradition, which may amuse
as well as instruct us; the narrative is perfectly true, although
the scepticism of mankind is prone to doubt the tales of old. You
have heard what happened in the quarrel of Atreus and Thyestes?
'You mean about the golden lamb?' No, not that; but another part of
the story, which tells how the sun and stars once arose in the west
and set in the east, and that the god reversed their motion, as a
witness to the right of Atreus. 'There is such a story.' And no
doubt you have heard of the empire of Cronos, and of the earthborn
men? The origin of these and the like stories is to be found in the
tale which I am about to narrate.There was a time when God directed the revolutions of the
world, but at the completion of a certain cycle he let go; and the
world, by a necessity of its nature, turned back, and went round
the other way. For divine things alone are unchangeable; but the
earth and heavens, although endowed with many glories, have a body,
and are therefore liable to perturbation. In the case of the world,
the perturbation is very slight, and amounts only to a reversal of
motion. For the lord of moving things is alone self-moved; neither
can piety allow that he goes at one time in one direction and at
another time in another; or that God has given the universe
opposite motions; or that there are two gods, one turning it in one
direction, another in another. But the truth is, that there are two
cycles of the world, and in one of them it is governed by an
immediate Providence, and receives life and immortality, and in the
other is let go again, and has a reverse action during infinite
ages. This new action is spontaneous, and is due to exquisite
perfection of balance, to the vast size of the universe, and to the
smallness of the pivot upon which it turns. All changes in the
heaven affect the animal world, and this being the greatest of
them, is most destructive to men and animals. At the beginning of
the cycle before our own very few of them had survived; and on
these a mighty change passed. For their life was reversed like the
motion of the world, and first of all coming to a stand then
quickly returned to youth and beauty. The white locks of the aged
became black; the cheeks of the bearded man were restored to their
youth and fineness; the young men grew softer and smaller, and,
being reduced to the condition of children in mind as well as body,
began to vanish away; and the bodies of those who had died by
violence, in a few moments underwent a parallel change and
disappeared. In that cycle of existence there was no such thing as
the procreation of animals from one another, but they were born of
the earth, and of this our ancestors, who came into being
immediately after the end of the last cycle and at the beginning of
this, have preserved the recollection. Such traditions are often
now unduly discredited, and yet they may be proved by internal
evidence. For observe how consistent the narrative is; as the old
returned to youth, so the dead returned to life; the wheel of their
existence having been reversed, they rose again from the earth: a
few only were reserved by God for another destiny. Such was the
origin of the earthborn men.'And is this cycle, of which you are speaking, the reign of
Cronos, or our present state of existence?' No, Socrates, that
blessed and spontaneous life belongs not to this, but to the
previous state, in which God was the governor of the whole world,
and other gods subject to him ruled over parts of the world, as is
still the case in certain places. They were shepherds of men and
animals, each of them sufficing for those of whom he had the care.
And there was no violence among them, or war, or devouring of one
another. Their life was spontaneous, because in those days God
ruled over man; and he was to man what man is now to the animals.
Under his government there were no estates, or private possessions,
or families; but the earth produced a sufficiency of all things,
and men were born out of the earth, having no traditions of the
past; and as the temperature of the seasons was mild, they took no
thought for raiment, and had no beds, but lived and dwelt in the
open air.