Summa Theologica book I - II
Summa Theologica Book IPROLOGUESUMMA THEOLOGICAQUESTION 1QUESTION 2QUESTION 3QUESTION 4QUESTION 5QUESTION 6QUESTION 7QUESTION 8QUESTION 9QUESTION 10QUESTION 11QUESTION 12QUESTION 13QUESTION 14QUESTION 15QUESTION 16QUESTION 17QUESTION 18QUESTION 19QUESTION 20QUESTION 21QUESTION 22QUESTION 23QUESTION 24QUESTION 25QUESTION 26QUESTION 27QUESTION 28QUESTION 29QUESTION 30QUESTION 31QUESTION 32QUESTION 33QUESTION 34QUESTION 35QUESTION 36QUESTION 37QUESTION 38QUESTION 39QUESTION 40QUESTION 41QUESTION 42QUESTION 43QUESTION 44QUESTION 45QUESTION 46QUESTION 47QUESTION 48QUESTION 49QUESTION 50QUESTION 51QUESTION 52QUESTION 53QUESTION 54QUESTION 55QUESTION 56QUESTION 57QUESTION 58QUESTION 59QUESTION 60QUESTION 61QUESTION 62QUESTION 63QUESTION 64QUESTION 65QUESTION 66QUESTION 67QUESTION 68QUESTION 69QUESTION 70QUESTION 71QUESTION 72QUESTION 73QUESTION 74QUESTION 75QUESTION 76QUESTION 77QUESTION 78QUESTION 79QUESTION 80QUESTION 81QUESTION 82QUESTION 83QUESTION 84QUESTION 85QUESTION 86QUESTION 87QUESTION 88QUESTION 89QUESTION 90QUESTION 91QUESTION 92QUESTION 93QUESTION 94QUESTION 95QUESTION 96QUESTION 97QUESTION 98QUESTION 99QUESTION 100QUESTION 101QUESTION 102QUESTION 103QUESTION 104QUESTION 105QUESTION 106QUESTION 107QUESTION 108QUESTION 109QUESTION 110QUESTION 111QUESTION 112QUESTION 113QUESTION 114QUESTION 115QUESTION 117QUESTION 118QUESTION 119Copyright
Summa Theologica Book I
Saint Aquinas Thomas
PROLOGUE
Because the Master of Catholic Truth ought not only to teach
the proficient, but also to instruct beginners (according to the
Apostle: As Unto Little Ones in Christ, I Gave You Milk to Drink,
Not Meat— 1 Cor. iii. 1, 2)—we purpose in this book to treat of
whatever belongs to the Christian Religion, in such a way as may
tend to the instruction of beginners. We have considered that
students in this Science have not seldom been hampered by what they
have found written by other authors, partly on account of the
multiplication of useless questions, articles, and arguments;
partly also because those things that are needful for them to know
are not taught according to the order of the subject-matter, but
according as the plan of the book might require, or the occasion of
the argument offer; partly, too, because frequent repetition
brought weariness and confusion to the minds of the
readers.Endeavoring to avoid these and other like faults, we shall
try, by God's help, to set forth whatever is included in this
Sacred Science as briefly and clearly as the matter itself may
allow.
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
FIRST PART
["I," "Prima Pars"]
QUESTION 1
THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF SACRED DOCTRINE (in Ten
Articles)To place our purpose within proper limits, we first endeavor
to investigate the nature and extent of this sacred doctrine.
Concerning this there are ten points of inquiry:(1) Whether it is necessary?(2) Whether it is a science?(3) Whether it is one or many?(4) Whether it is speculative or practical?(5) How it is compared with other sciences?(6) Whether it is the same as wisdom?(7) Whether God is its subject-matter?(8) Whether it is a matter of argument?(9) Whether it rightly employs metaphors and
similes?(10) Whether the Sacred Scripture of this doctrine may be
expounded in different senses? _______________________FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 1]Whether, besides Philosophy, any Further Doctrine Is
Required?Objection 1: It seems that, besides philosophical science, we
have no need of any further knowledge. For man should not seek to
know what is above reason: "Seek not the things that are too high
for thee" (Ecclus. 3:22). But whatever is not above reason is fully
treated of in philosophical science. Therefore any other knowledge
besides philosophical science is superfluous.Obj. 2: Further, knowledge can be concerned only with being,
for nothing can be known, save what is true; and all that is, is
true. But everything that is, is treated of in philosophical
science—even God Himself; so that there is a part of philosophy
called theology, or the divine science, as Aristotle has proved
(Metaph. vi). Therefore, besides philosophical science, there is no
need of any further knowledge.On the contrary,It is written (2 Tim.
3:16): "All Scripture inspired of God is profitable to teach, to
reprove, to correct, to instruct in justice." Now Scripture,
inspired of God, is no part of philosophical science, which has
been built up by human reason. Therefore it is useful that besides
philosophical science, there should be other knowledge, i.e.
inspired of God.I answer that,It was necessary for
man's salvation that there should be a knowledge revealed by God
besides philosophical science built up by human reason. Firstly,
indeed, because man is directed to God, as to an end that surpasses
the grasp of his reason: "The eye hath not seen, O God, besides
Thee, what things Thou hast prepared for them that wait for Thee"
(Isa. 66:4). But the end must first be known by men who are to
direct their thoughts and actions to the end. Hence it was
necessary for the salvation of man that certain truths which exceed
human reason should be made known to him by divine revelation. Even
as regards those truths about God which human reason could have
discovered, it was necessary that man should be taught by a divine
revelation; because the truth about God such as reason could
discover, would only be known by a few, and that after a long time,
and with the admixture of many errors. Whereas man's whole
salvation, which is in God, depends upon the knowledge of this
truth. Therefore, in order that the salvation of men might be
brought about more fitly and more surely, it was necessary that
they should be taught divine truths by divine revelation. It was
therefore necessary that besides philosophical science built up by
reason, there should be a sacred science learned through
revelation.Reply Obj. 1: Although those things which are beyond man's
knowledge may not be sought for by man through his reason,
nevertheless, once they are revealed by God, they must be accepted
by faith. Hence the sacred text continues, "For many things are
shown to thee above the understanding of man" (Ecclus. 3:25). And
in this, the sacred science consists.Reply Obj. 2: Sciences are differentiated according to the
various means through which knowledge is obtained. For the
astronomer and the physicist both may prove the same conclusion:
that the earth, for instance, is round: the astronomer by means of
mathematics (i.e. abstracting from matter), but the physicist by
means of matter itself. Hence there is no reason why those things
which may be learned from philosophical science, so far as they can
be known by natural reason, may not also be taught us by another
science so far as they fall within revelation. Hence theology
included in sacred doctrine differs in kind from that theology
which is part of philosophy. _______________________SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 2]Whether Sacred Doctrine Is a Science?Objection 1: It seems that sacred doctrine is not a science.
For every science proceeds from self-evident principles. But sacred
doctrine proceeds from articles of faith which are not
self-evident, since their truth is not admitted by all: "For all
men have not faith" (2 Thess. 3:2). Therefore sacred doctrine is
not a science.Obj. 2: Further, no science deals with individual facts. But
this sacred science treats of individual facts, such as the deeds
of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob and such like. Therefore sacred
doctrine is not a science.On the contrary,Augustine says (De
Trin. xiv, 1) "to this science alone belongs that whereby saving
faith is begotten, nourished, protected and strengthened." But this
can be said of no science except sacred doctrine. Therefore sacred
doctrine is a science.I answer that,Sacred doctrine is a
science. We must bear in mind that there are two kinds of sciences.
There are some which proceed from a principle known by the natural
light of intelligence, such as arithmetic and geometry and the
like. There are some which proceed from principles known by the
light of a higher science: thus the science of perspective proceeds
from principles established by geometry, and music from principles
established by arithmetic. So it is that sacred doctrine is a
science because it proceeds from principles established by the
light of a higher science, namely, the science of God and the
blessed. Hence, just as the musician accepts on authority the
principles taught him by the mathematician, so sacred science is
established on principles revealed by God.Reply Obj. 1: The principles of any science are either in
themselves self-evident, or reducible to the conclusions of a
higher science; and such, as we have said, are the principles of
sacred doctrine.Reply Obj. 2: Individual facts are treated of in sacred
doctrine, not because it is concerned with them principally, but
they are introduced rather both as examples to be followed in our
lives (as in moral sciences) and in order to establish the
authority of those men through whom the divine revelation, on which
this sacred scripture or doctrine is based, has come down to us.
_______________________THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 3]Whether Sacred Doctrine Is One Science?Objection 1: It seems that sacred doctrine is not one
science; for according to the Philosopher (Poster. i) "that science
is one which treats only of one class of subjects." But the creator
and the creature, both of whom are treated of in sacred doctrine,
cannot be grouped together under one class of subjects. Therefore
sacred doctrine is not one science.Obj. 2: Further, in sacred doctrine we treat of angels,
corporeal creatures and human morality. But these belong to
separate philosophical sciences. Therefore sacred doctrine cannot
be one science.On the contrary,Holy Scripture speaks
of it as one science: "Wisdom gave him the knowledge [scientiam] of
holy things" (Wis. 10:10).I answer that,Sacred doctrine is one
science. The unity of a faculty or habit is to be gauged by its
object, not indeed, in its material aspect, but as regards the
precise formality under which it is an object. For example, man,
ass, stone agree in the one precise formality of being colored; and
color is the formal object of sight. Therefore, because Sacred
Scripture considers things precisely under the formality of being
divinely revealed, whatever has been divinely revealed possesses
the one precise formality of the object of this science; and
therefore is included under sacred doctrine as under one
science.Reply Obj. 1: Sacred doctrine does not treat of God and
creatures equally, but of God primarily, and of creatures only so
far as they are referable to God as their beginning or end. Hence
the unity of this science is not impaired.Reply Obj. 2: Nothing prevents inferior faculties or habits
from being differentiated by something which falls under a higher
faculty or habit as well; because the higher faculty or habit
regards the object in its more universal formality, as the object
of thecommon senseis whatever
affects the senses, including, therefore, whatever is visible or
audible. Hence thecommon sense,although one faculty, extends to all the objects of the five
senses. Similarly, objects which are the subject-matter of
different philosophical sciences can yet be treated of by this one
single sacred science under one aspect precisely so far as they can
be included in revelation. So that in this way, sacred doctrine
bears, as it were, the stamp of the divine science which is one and
simple, yet extends to everything.
_______________________FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 4]Whether Sacred Doctrine Is a Practical Science?Objection 1: It seems that sacred doctrine is a practical
science; fora practical science is that which ends in action according to
thePhilosopher (Metaph. ii). But sacred doctrine is ordained to
action:"Be ye doers of the word, and not hearers only" (James
1:22).Therefore sacred doctrine is a practical
science.Obj. 2: Further, sacred doctrine is divided into the Old and
theNew Law. But law implies a moral science which is a practical
science.Therefore sacred doctrine is a practical
science.On the contrary,Every practical
science is concerned with human operations; as moral science is
concerned with human acts, and architecture with buildings. But
sacred doctrine is chiefly concerned with God, whose handiwork is
especially man. Therefore it is not a practical but a speculative
science.I answer that,Sacred doctrine, being
one, extends to things which belong to different philosophical
sciences because it considers in each the same formal aspect,
namely, so far as they can be known through divine revelation.
Hence, although among the philosophical sciences one is speculative
and another practical, nevertheless sacred doctrine includes both;
as God, by one and the same science, knows both Himself and His
works. Still, it is speculative rather than practical because it is
more concerned with divine things than with human acts; though it
does treat even of these latter, inasmuch as man is ordained by
them to the perfect knowledge of God in which consists eternal
bliss. This is a sufficient answer to the Objections.
_______________________FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 5]Whether Sacred Doctrine Is Nobler than Other
Sciences?Objection 1: It seems that sacred doctrine is not nobler than
other sciences; for the nobility of a science depends on the
certitude it establishes. But other sciences, the principles of
which cannot be doubted, seem to be more certain than sacred
doctrine; for its principles—namely, articles of faith—can be
doubted. Therefore other sciences seem to be nobler.Obj. 2: Further, it is the sign of a lower science to depend
upon a higher; as music depends on arithmetic. But sacred doctrine
does in a sense depend upon philosophical sciences; for Jerome
observes, in his Epistle to Magnus, that "the ancient doctors so
enriched their books with the ideas and phrases of the
philosophers, that thou knowest not what more to admire in them,
their profane erudition or their scriptural learning." Therefore
sacred doctrine is inferior to other sciences.On the contrary,Other sciences are
called the handmaidens of this one: "Wisdom sent her maids to
invite to the tower" (Prov. 9:3).I answer that,Since this science is
partly speculative and partly practical, it transcends all others
speculative and practical. Now one speculative science is said to
be nobler than another, either by reason of its greater certitude,
or by reason of the higher worth of its subject-matter. In both
these respects this science surpasses other speculative sciences;
in point of greater certitude, because other sciences derive their
certitude from the natural light of human reason, which can err;
whereas this derives its certitude from the light of divine
knowledge, which cannot be misled: in point of the higher worth of
its subject-matter because this science treats chiefly of those
things which by their sublimity transcend human reason; while other
sciences consider only those things which are within reason's
grasp. Of the practical sciences, that one is nobler which is
ordained to a further purpose, as political science is nobler than
military science; for the good of the army is directed to the good
of the State. But the purpose of this science, in so far as it is
practical, is eternal bliss; to which as to an ultimate end the
purposes of every practical science are directed. Hence it is clear
that from every standpoint, it is nobler than other
sciences.Reply Obj. 1: It may well happen that what is in itself the
more certain may seem to us the less certain on account of the
weakness of our intelligence, "which is dazzled by the clearest
objects of nature; as the owl is dazzled by the light of the sun"
(Metaph. ii, lect. i). Hence the fact that some happen to doubt
about articles of faith is not due to the uncertain nature of the
truths, but to the weakness of human intelligence; yet the
slenderest knowledge that may be obtained of the highest things is
more desirable than the most certain knowledge obtained of lesser
things, as is said inde Animalibusxi.Reply Obj. 2: This science can in a sense depend upon the
philosophical sciences, not as though it stood in need of them, but
only in order to make its teaching clearer. For it accepts its
principles not from other sciences, but immediately from God, by
revelation. Therefore it does not depend upon other sciences as
upon the higher, but makes use of them as of the lesser, and as
handmaidens: even so the master sciences make use of the sciences
that supply their materials, as political of military science. That
it thus uses them is not due to its own defect or insufficiency,
but to the defect of our intelligence, which is more easily led by
what is known through natural reason (from which proceed the other
sciences) to that which is above reason, such as are the teachings
of this science. _______________________SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 6]Whether This Doctrine Is the Same as Wisdom?Objection 1: It seems that this doctrine is not the same as
wisdom. For no doctrine which borrows its principles is worthy of
the name of wisdom; seeing that the wise man directs, and is not
directed (Metaph. i). But this doctrine borrows its principles.
Therefore this science is not wisdom.Obj. 2: Further, it is a part of wisdom to prove the
principles of other sciences. Hence it is called the chief of
sciences, as is clear in Ethic. vi. But this doctrine does not
prove the principles of other sciences. Therefore it is not the
same as wisdom.Obj. 3: Further, this doctrine is acquired by study, whereas
wisdom is acquired by God's inspiration; so that it is numbered
among the gifts of the Holy Spirit (Isa. 11:2). Therefore this
doctrine is not the same as wisdom.On the contrary,It is written (Deut.
4:6): "This is your wisdom and understanding in the sight of
nations."I answer that,This doctrine is wisdom
above all human wisdom; not merely in any one order, but
absolutely. For since it is the part of a wise man to arrange and
to judge, and since lesser matters should be judged in the light of
some higher principle, he is said to be wise in any one order who
considers the highest principle in that order: thus in the order of
building, he who plans the form of the house is called wise and
architect, in opposition to the inferior laborers who trim the wood
and make ready the stones: "As a wise architect, I have laid the
foundation" (1 Cor. 3:10). Again, in the order of all human life,
the prudent man is called wise, inasmuch as he directs his acts to
a fitting end: "Wisdom is prudence to a man" (Prov. 10: 23).
Therefore he who considers absolutely the highest cause of the
whole universe, namely God, is most of all called wise. Hence
wisdom is said to be the knowledge of divine things, as Augustine
says (De Trin. xii, 14). But sacred doctrine essentially treats of
God viewed as the highest cause—not only so far as He can be known
through creatures just as philosophers knew Him—"That which is
known of God is manifest in them" (Rom. 1:19)—but also as far as He
is known to Himself alone and revealed to others. Hence sacred
doctrine is especially called wisdom.Reply Obj. 1: Sacred doctrine derives its principles not from
any human knowledge, but from the divine knowledge, through which,
as through the highest wisdom, all our knowledge is set in
order.Reply Obj. 2: The principles of other sciences either are
evident and cannot be proved, or are proved by natural reason
through some other science. But the knowledge proper to this
science comes through revelation and not through natural reason.
Therefore it has no concern to prove the principles of other
sciences, but only to judge of them. Whatsoever is found in other
sciences contrary to any truth of this science must be condemned as
false: "Destroying counsels and every height that exalteth itself
against the knowledge of God" (2 Cor. 10:4, 5).Reply Obj. 3: Since judgment appertains to wisdom, the
twofold manner of judging produces a twofold wisdom. A man may
judge in one way by inclination, as whoever has the habit of a
virtue judges rightly of what concerns that virtue by his very
inclination towards it. Hence it is the virtuous man, as we read,
who is the measure and rule of human acts. In another way, by
knowledge, just as a man learned in moral science might be able to
judge rightly about virtuous acts, though he had not the virtue.
The first manner of judging divine things belongs to that wisdom
which is set down among the gifts of the Holy Ghost: "The spiritual
man judgeth all things" (1 Cor. 2:15). And Dionysius says (Div.
Nom. ii): "Hierotheus is taught not by mere learning, but by
experience of divine things." The second manner of judging belongs
to this doctrine which is acquired by study, though its principles
are obtained by revelation. _______________________SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 7]Whether God Is the Object of This Science?Objection 1: It seems that God is not the object of this
science. For in every science, the nature of its object is
presupposed. But this science cannot presuppose the essence of God,
for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, iv): "It is impossible to
define the essence of God." Therefore God is not the object of this
science.Obj. 2: Further, whatever conclusions are reached in any
science must be comprehended under the object of the science. But
in Holy Writ we reach conclusions not only concerning God, but
concerning many other things, such as creatures and human morality.
Therefore God is not the object of this science.On the contrary,The object of the
science is that of which it principally treats. But in this
science, the treatment is mainly about God; for it is called
theology, as treating of God. Therefore God is the object of this
science.I answer that,God is the object of
this science. The relation between a science and its object is the
same as that between a habit or faculty and its object. Now
properly speaking, the object of a faculty or habit is the thing
under the aspect of which all things are referred to that faculty
or habit, as man and stone are referred to the faculty of sight in
that they are colored. Hence colored things are the proper objects
of sight. But in sacred science, all things are treated of under
the aspect of God: either because they are God Himself or because
they refer to God as their beginning and end. Hence it follows that
God is in very truth the object of this science. This is clear also
from the principles of this science, namely, the articles of faith,
for faith is about God. The object of the principles and of the
whole science must be the same, since the whole science is
contained virtually in its principles. Some, however, looking to
what is treated of in this science, and not to the aspect under
which it is treated, have asserted the object of this science to be
something other than God—that is, either things and signs; or the
works of salvation; or the whole Christ, as the head and members.
Of all these things, in truth, we treat in this science, but so far
as they have reference to God.Reply Obj. 1: Although we cannot know in what consists the
essence of God, nevertheless in this science we make use of His
effects, either of nature or of grace, in place of a definition, in
regard to whatever is treated of in this science concerning God;
even as in some philosophical sciences we demonstrate something
about a cause from its effect, by taking the effect in place of a
definition of the cause.Reply Obj. 2: Whatever other conclusions are reached in this
sacred science are comprehended under God, not as parts or species
or accidents but as in some way related to Him.
_______________________EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 8]Whether Sacred Doctrine is a Matter of Argument?Objection 1: It seems this doctrine is not a matter of
argument. For Ambrose says (De Fide 1): "Put arguments aside where
faith is sought." But in this doctrine, faith especially is sought:
"But these things are written that you may believe" (John 20:31).
Therefore sacred doctrine is not a matter of argument.Obj. 2: Further, if it is a matter of argument, the argument
is either from authority or from reason. If it is from authority,
it seems unbefitting its dignity, for the proof from authority is
the weakest form of proof. But if it is from reason, this is
unbefitting its end, because, according to Gregory (Hom. 26),
"faith has no merit in those things of which human reason brings
its own experience." Therefore sacred doctrine is not a matter of
argument.On the contrary,The Scripture says
that a bishop should "embrace that faithful word which is according
to doctrine, that he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to
convince the gainsayers" (Titus 1:9).I answer that,As other sciences do not
argue in proof of their principles, but argue from their principles
to demonstrate other truths in these sciences: so this doctrine
does not argue in proof of its principles, which are the articles
of faith, but from them it goes on to prove something else; as the
Apostle from the resurrection of Christ argues in proof of the
general resurrection (1 Cor. 15). However, it is to be borne in
mind, in regard to the philosophical sciences, that the inferior
sciences neither prove their principles nor dispute with those who
deny them, but leave this to a higher science; whereas the highest
of them, viz. metaphysics, can dispute with one who denies its
principles, if only the opponent will make some concession; but if
he concede nothing, it can have no dispute with him, though it can
answer his objections. Hence Sacred Scripture, since it has no
science above itself, can dispute with one who denies its
principles only if the opponent admits some at least of the truths
obtained through divine revelation; thus we can argue with heretics
from texts in Holy Writ, and against those who deny one article of
faith, we can argue from another. If our opponent believes nothing
of divine revelation, there is no longer any means of proving the
articles of faith by reasoning, but only of answering his
objections—if he has any—against faith. Since faith rests upon
infallible truth, and since the contrary of a truth can never be
demonstrated, it is clear that the arguments brought against faith
cannot be demonstrations, but are difficulties that can be
answered.Reply Obj. 1: Although arguments from human reason cannot
avail to prove what must be received on faith, nevertheless, this
doctrine argues from articles of faith to other
truths.Reply Obj. 2: This doctrine is especially based upon
arguments from authority, inasmuch as its principles are obtained
by revelation: thus we ought to believe on the authority of those
to whom the revelation has been made. Nor does this take away from
the dignity of this doctrine, for although the argument from
authority based on human reason is the weakest, yet the argument
from authority based on divine revelation is the strongest. But
sacred doctrine makes use even of human reason, not, indeed, to
prove faith (for thereby the merit of faith would come to an end),
but to make clear other things that are put forward in this
doctrine. Since therefore grace does not destroy nature but
perfects it, natural reason should minister to faith as the natural
bent of the will ministers to charity. Hence the Apostle says:
"Bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of
Christ" (2 Cor. 10:5). Hence sacred doctrine makes use also of the
authority of philosophers in those questions in which they were
able to know the truth by natural reason, as Paul quotes a saying
of Aratus: "As some also of your own poets said: For we are also
His offspring" (Acts 17:28). Nevertheless, sacred doctrine makes
use of these authorities as extrinsic and probable arguments; but
properly uses the authority of the canonical Scriptures as an
incontrovertible proof, and the authority of the doctors of the
Church as one that may properly be used, yet merely as probable.
For our faith rests upon the revelation made to the apostles and
prophets who wrote the canonical books, and not on the revelations
(if any such there are) made to other doctors. Hence Augustine says
(Epis. ad Hieron. xix, 1): "Only those books of Scripture which are
called canonical have I learned to hold in such honor as to believe
their authors have not erred in any way in writing them. But other
authors I so read as not to deem everything in their works to be
true, merely on account of their having so thought and written,
whatever may have been their holiness and learning."
_______________________NINTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 9]Whether Holy Scripture Should Use Metaphors?Objection 1: It seems that Holy Scripture should not use
metaphors. For that which is proper to the lowest science seems not
to befit this science, which holds the highest place of all. But to
proceed by the aid of various similitudes and figures is proper to
poetry, the least of all the sciences. Therefore it is not fitting
that this science should make use of such similitudes.Obj. 2: Further, this doctrine seems to be intended to make
truth clear. Hence a reward is held out to those who manifest it:
"They that explain me shall have life everlasting" (Ecclus. 24:31).
But by such similitudes truth is obscured. Therefore, to put
forward divine truths by likening them to corporeal things does not
befit this science.Obj. 3: Further, the higher creatures are, the nearer they
approach to the divine likeness. If therefore any creature be taken
to represent God, this representation ought chiefly to be taken
from the higher creatures, and not from the lower; yet this is
often found in Scriptures.On the contrary,It is written (Osee
12:10): "I have multiplied visions, and I have used similitudes by
the ministry of the prophets." But to put forward anything by means
of similitudes is to use metaphors. Therefore this sacred science
may use metaphors.I answer that,It is befitting Holy
Writ to put forward divine and spiritual truths by means of
comparisons with material things. For God provides for everything
according to the capacity of its nature. Now it is natural to man
to attain to intellectual truths through sensible objects, because
all our knowledge originates from sense. Hence in Holy Writ,
spiritual truths are fittingly taught under the likeness of
material things. This is what Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i): "We
cannot be enlightened by the divine rays except they be hidden
within the covering of many sacred veils." It is also befitting
Holy Writ, which is proposed to all without distinction of
persons—"To the wise and to the unwise I am a debtor" (Rom.
1:14)—that spiritual truths be expounded by means of figures taken
from corporeal things, in order that thereby even the simple who
are unable by themselves to grasp intellectual things may be able
to understand it.Reply Obj. 1: Poetry makes use of metaphors to produce a
representation, for it is natural to man to be pleased with
representations. But sacred doctrine makes use of metaphors as both
necessary and useful.Reply Obj. 2: The ray of divine revelation is not
extinguished by the sensible imagery wherewith it is veiled, as
Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i); and its truth so far remains that
it does not allow the minds of those to whom the revelation has
been made, to rest in the metaphors, but raises them to the
knowledge of truths; and through those to whom the revelation has
been made others also may receive instruction in these matters.
Hence those things that are taught metaphorically in one part of
Scripture, in other parts are taught more openly. The very hiding
of truth in figures is useful for the exercise of thoughtful minds
and as a defense against the ridicule of the impious, according to
the words "Give not that which is holy to dogs" (Matt.
7:6).Reply Obj. 3: As Dionysius says, (Coel. Hier. i) it is more
fitting that divine truths should be expounded under the figure of
less noble than of nobler bodies, and this for three reasons.
Firstly, because thereby men's minds are the better preserved from
error. For then it is clear that these things are not literal
descriptions of divine truths, which might have been open to doubt
had they been expressed under the figure of nobler bodies,
especially for those who could think of nothing nobler than bodies.
Secondly, because this is more befitting the knowledge of God that
we have in this life. For what He is not is clearer to us than what
He is. Therefore similitudes drawn from things farthest away from
God form within us a truer estimate that God is above whatsoever we
may say or think of Him. Thirdly, because thereby divine truths are
the better hidden from the unworthy.
_______________________TENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 10]Whether in Holy Scripture a Word may have Several
Senses?Objection 1: It seems that in Holy Writ a word cannot have
several senses, historical or literal, allegorical, tropological or
moral, and anagogical. For many different senses in one text
produce confusion and deception and destroy all force of argument.
Hence no argument, but only fallacies, can be deduced from a
multiplicity of propositions. But Holy Writ ought to be able to
state the truth without any fallacy. Therefore in it there cannot
be several senses to a word.Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De util. cred. iii) that
"the Old Testament has a fourfold division as to history, etiology,
analogy and allegory." Now these four seem altogether different
from the four divisions mentioned in the first objection. Therefore
it does not seem fitting to explain the same word of Holy Writ
according to the four different senses mentioned
above.Obj. 3: Further, besides these senses, there is the
parabolical, which is not one of these four.On the contrary,Gregory says (Moral.
xx, 1): "Holy Writ by the manner of its speech transcends every
science, because in one and the same sentence, while it describes a
fact, it reveals a mystery."I answer that,The author of Holy Writ
is God, in whose power it is to signify His meaning, not by words
only (as man also can do), but also by things themselves. So,
whereas in every other science things are signified by words, this
science has the property, that the things signified by the words
have themselves also a signification. Therefore that first
signification whereby words signify things belongs to the first
sense, the historical or literal. That signification whereby things
signified by words have themselves also a signification is called
the spiritual sense, which is based on the literal, and presupposes
it. Now this spiritual sense has a threefold division. For as the
Apostle says (Heb. 10:1) the Old Law is a figure of the New Law,
and Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) "the New Law itself is a figure
of future glory." Again, in the New Law, whatever our Head has done
is a type of what we ought to do. Therefore, so far as the things
of the Old Law signify the things of the New Law, there is the
allegorical sense; so far as the things done in Christ, or so far
as the things which signify Christ, are types of what we ought to
do, there is the moral sense. But so far as they signify what
relates to eternal glory, there is the anagogical sense. Since the
literal sense is that which the author intends, and since the
author of Holy Writ is God, Who by one act comprehends all things
by His intellect, it is not unfitting, as Augustine says (Confess.
xii), if, even according to the literal sense, one word in Holy
Writ should have several senses.Reply Obj. 1: The multiplicity of these senses does not
produce equivocation or any other kind of multiplicity, seeing that
these senses are not multiplied because one word signifies several
things, but because the things signified by the words can be
themselves types of other things. Thus in Holy Writ no confusion
results, for all the senses are founded on one—the literal—from
which alone can any argument be drawn, and not from those intended
in allegory, as Augustine says (Epis. 48). Nevertheless, nothing of
Holy Scripture perishes on account of this, since nothing necessary
to faith is contained under the spiritual sense which is not
elsewhere put forward by the Scripture in its literal
sense.Reply Obj. 2: These three—history, etiology, analogy—are
grouped under the literal sense. For it is called history, as
Augustine expounds (Epis. 48), whenever anything is simply related;
it is called etiology when its cause is assigned, as when Our Lord
gave the reason why Moses allowed the putting away of wives—namely,
on account of the hardness of men's hearts; it is called analogy
whenever the truth of one text of Scripture is shown not to
contradict the truth of another. Of these four, allegory alone
stands for the three spiritual senses. Thus Hugh of St. Victor
(Sacram. iv, 4 Prolog.) includes the anagogical under the
allegorical sense, laying down three senses only—the historical,
the allegorical, and the tropological.Reply Obj. 3: The parabolical sense is contained in the
literal, for by words things are signified properly and
figuratively. Nor is the figure itself, but that which is figured,
the literal sense. When Scripture speaks of God's arm, the literal
sense is not that God has such a member, but only what is signified
by this member, namely operative power. Hence it is plain that
nothing false can ever underlie the literal sense of Holy Writ.
_______________________
QUESTION 2
THE EXISTENCE OF GOD(In Three Articles)
Because the chief aim of sacred doctrine is to teach the
knowledge of God, not only as He is in Himself, but also as He is
the beginning of things and their last end, and especially of
rational creatures, as is clear from what has been already said,
therefore, in our endeavor to expound this science, we shall
treat:
(1) Of God;
(2) Of the rational creature's advance towards God;
(3) Of Christ, Who as man, is our way to God.
In treating of God there will be a threefold division, for we
shall consider:
(1) Whatever concerns the Divine Essence;
(2) Whatever concerns the distinctions of Persons;
(3) Whatever concerns the procession of creatures from
Him.
Concerning the Divine Essence, we must consider:
(1) Whether God exists?
(2) The manner of His existence, or, rather, what isnotthe manner of His existence;
(3) Whatever concerns His operations—namely, His knowledge,
will, power.
Concerning the first, there are three points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether the proposition "God exists" is
self-evident?
(2) Whether it is demonstrable?
(3) Whether God exists? _______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 2, Art. 1]
Whether the Existence of God Is Self-Evident?
Objection 1: It seems that the existence of God is
self-evident. Now those things are said to be self-evident to us
the knowledge of which is naturally implanted in us, as we can see
in regard to first principles. But as Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
i, 1,3), "the knowledge of God is naturally implanted in all."
Therefore the existence of God is self-evident.
Obj. 2: Further, those things are said to be self-evident
which are known as soon as the terms are known, which the
Philosopher (1 Poster. iii) says is true of the first principles of
demonstration. Thus, when the nature of a whole and of a part is
known, it is at once recognized that every whole is greater than
its part. But as soon as the signification of the word "God" is
understood, it is at once seen that God exists. For by this word is
signified that thing than which nothing greater can be conceived.
But that which exists actually and mentally is greater than that
which exists only mentally. Therefore, since as soon as the word
"God" is understood it exists mentally, it also follows that it
exists actually. Therefore the proposition "God exists" is
self-evident.
Obj. 3: Further, the existence of truth is self-evident. For
whoever denies the existence of truth grants that truth does not
exist: and, if truth does not exist, then the proposition "Truth
does not exist" is true: and if there is anything true, there must
be truth. But God is truth itself: "I am the way, the truth, and
the life" (John 14:6) Therefore "God exists" is
self-evident.
On the contrary,No one can mentally admit the
opposite of what is self-evident; as the Philosopher (Metaph. iv,
lect. vi) states concerning the first principles of demonstration.
But the opposite of the proposition "God is" can be mentally
admitted: "The fool said in his heart, There is no God" (Ps. 52:1).
Therefore, that God exists is not self-evident.
I answer that,A thing can be self-evident in
either of two ways: on the one hand, self-evident in itself, though
not to us; on the other, self-evident in itself, and to us. A
proposition is self-evident because the predicate is included in
the essence of the subject, as "Man is an animal," for animal is
contained in the essence of man. If, therefore the essence of the
predicate and subject be known to all, the proposition will be
self-evident to all; as is clear with regard to the first
principles of demonstration, the terms of which are common things
that no one is ignorant of, such as being and non-being, whole and
part, and such like. If, however, there are some to whom the
essence of the predicate and subject is unknown, the proposition
will be self-evident in itself, but not to those who do not know
the meaning of the predicate and subject of the proposition.
Therefore, it happens, as Boethius says (Hebdom., the title of
which is: "Whether all that is, is good"), "that there are some
mental concepts self-evident only to the learned, as that
incorporeal substances are not in space." Therefore I say that this
proposition, "God exists," of itself is self-evident, for the
predicate is the same as the subject, because God is His own
existence as will be hereafter shown (Q. 3, Art. 4). Now because we
do not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident
to us; but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known
to us, though less known in their nature—namely, by effects.
Reply Obj. 1: To know that God exists in a general and
confused way is implanted in us by nature, inasmuch as God is man's
beatitude. For man naturally desires happiness, and what is
naturally desired by man must be naturally known to him. This,
however, is not to know absolutely that God exists; just as to know
that someone is approaching is not the same as to know that Peter
is approaching, even though it is Peter who is approaching; for
many there are who imagine that man's perfect good which is
happiness, consists in riches, and others in pleasures, and others
in something else.
Reply Obj. 2: Perhaps not everyone who hears this word "God"
understands it to signify something than which nothing greater can
be thought, seeing that some have believed God to be a body. Yet,
granted that everyone understands that by this word "God" is
signified something than which nothing greater can be thought,
nevertheless, it does not therefore follow that he understands that
what the word signifies exists actually, but only that it exists
mentally. Nor can it be argued that it actually exists, unless it
be admitted that there actually exists something than which nothing
greater can be thought; and this precisely is not admitted by those
who hold that God does not exist.
Reply Obj. 3: The existence of truth in general is
self-evident but the existence of a Primal Truth is not
self-evident to us. _______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 2, Art. 2]
Whether It Can Be Demonstrated That God Exists?
Objection 1: It seems that the existence of God cannot be
demonstrated. For it is an article of faith that God exists. But
what is of faith cannot be demonstrated, because a demonstration
produces scientific knowledge; whereas faith is of the unseen (Heb.
11:1). Therefore it cannot be demonstrated that God exists.
Obj. 2: Further, the essence is the middle term of
demonstration. But we cannot know in what God's essence consists,
but solely in what it does not consist; as Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. i, 4). Therefore we cannot demonstrate that God
exists.
Obj. 3: Further, if the existence of God were demonstrated,
this could only be from His effects. But His effects are not
proportionate to Him, since He is infinite and His effects are
finite; and between the finite and infinite there is no proportion.
Therefore, since a cause cannot be demonstrated by an effect not
proportionate to it, it seems that the existence of God cannot be
demonstrated.
On the contrary,The Apostle says: "The
invisible things of Him are clearly seen, being understood by the
things that are made" (Rom. 1:20). But this would not be unless the
existence of God could be demonstrated through the things that are
made; for the first thing we must know of anything is whether it
exists.
I answer that,Demonstration can be made in two
ways: One is through the cause, and is calleda
priori,and this is to argue from what is prior
absolutely. The other is through the effect, and is called a
demonstrationa posteriori; this is to
argue from what is prior relatively only to us. When an effect is
better known to us than its cause, from the effect we proceed to
the knowledge of the cause. And from every effect the existence of
its proper cause can be demonstrated, so long as its effects are
better known to us; because since every effect depends upon its
cause, if the effect exists, the cause must pre-exist. Hence the
existence of God, in so far as it is not self-evident to us, can be
demonstrated from those of His effects which are known to
us.
Reply Obj. 1: The existence of God and other like truths
about God, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles
of faith, but are preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes
natural knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection
supposes something that can be perfected. Nevertheless, there is
nothing to prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting, as a
matter of faith, something which in itself is capable of being
scientifically known and demonstrated.
Reply Obj. 2: When the existence of a cause is demonstrated
from an effect, this effect takes the place of the definition of
the cause in proof of the cause's existence. This is especially the
case in regard to God, because, in order to prove the existence of
anything, it is necessary to accept as a middle term the meaning of
the word, and not its essence, for the question of its essence
follows on the question of its existence. Now the names given to
God are derived from His effects; consequently, in demonstrating
the existence of God from His effects, we may take for the middle
term the meaning of the word "God".
Reply Obj. 3: From effects not proportionate to the cause no
perfect knowledge of that cause can be obtained. Yet from every
effect the existence of the cause can be clearly demonstrated, and
so we can demonstrate the existence of God from His effects; though
from them we cannot perfectly know God as He is in His essence.
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 2, Art. 3]
Whether God Exists?
Objection 1: It seems that God does not exist; because if one
of two contraries be infinite, the other would be altogether
destroyed. But the word "God" means that He is infinite goodness.
If, therefore, God existed, there would be no evil discoverable;
but there is evil in the world. Therefore God does not
exist.
Obj. 2: Further, it is superfluous to suppose that what can
be accounted for by a few principles has been produced by many. But
it seems that everything we see in the world can be accounted for
by other principles, supposing God did not exist. For all natural
things can be reduced to one principle which is nature; and all
voluntary things can be reduced to one principle which is human
reason, or will. Therefore there is no need to suppose God's
existence.
On the contrary,It is said in the person of
God: "I am Who am." (Ex. 3:14)
I answer that,The existence of God can be
proved in five ways.
The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion.
It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some
things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by
another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality
to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves
inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the
reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing
can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something
in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire,
makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and
thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same
thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same
respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot
cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously
potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same
respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved,
i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion
must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in
motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in
motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on
to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and,
consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move
only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the
staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore
it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no
other; and this everyone understands to be God.
The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In
the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes.
There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a
thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would
be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it
is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient
causes following in order, the first is the cause of the
intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the
ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only
one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect.
Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there
will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in
efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be
no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect,
nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly
false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause,
to which everyone gives the name of God.
The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and
runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not
to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and
consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is
impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible
not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible
not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in
existence. Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing
in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to
exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time
nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for
anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be
in existence—which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely
possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is
necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity
caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to
infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by
another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes.
Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being
having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from
another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men
speak of as God.
The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in
things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true,
noble and the like. Butmoreandlessare predicated of different things,
according as they resemble in their different ways something which
is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it
more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is
something which is truest, something best, something noblest and,
consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things
that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written
inMetaph.ii. Now the maximum in any
genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the
maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there must
also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being,
goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.
The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We
see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies,
act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or
nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result.
Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they
achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move
towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with
knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the
archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural
things are directed to their end; and this being we call
God.
Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (Enchiridion xi): "Since God
is the highest good, He would not allow any evil to exist in His
works, unless His omnipotence and goodness were such as to bring
good even out of evil." This is part of the infinite goodness of
God, that He should allow evil to exist, and out of it produce
good.
Reply Obj. 2: Since nature works for a determinate end under
the direction of a higher agent, whatever is done by nature must
needs be traced back to God, as to its first cause. So also
whatever is done voluntarily must also be traced back to some
higher cause other than human reason or will, since these can
change or fail; for all things that are changeable and capable of
defect must be traced back to an immovable and self-necessary first
principle, as was shown in the body of the Article.
_______________________
QUESTION 3
OF THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD(In Eight Articles)
When the existence of a thing has been ascertained there
remains the further question of the manner of its existence, in
order that we may know its essence. Now, because we cannot know
what God is, but rather what He is not, we have no means for
considering how God is, but rather how He is not.
Therefore, we must consider:
(1) How He is not;
(2) How He is known by us;
(3) How He is named.
Now it can be shown how God is not, by denying Him whatever
is opposed to the idea of Him, viz. composition, motion, and the
like. Therefore
(1) we must discuss His simplicity, whereby we deny
composition in Him; and because whatever is simple in material
things is imperfect and a part of something else, we shall discuss
(2) His perfection; (3) His infinity; (4) His immutability; (5) His
unity.
Concerning His simplicity, there are eight points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether God is a body?
(2) Whether He is composed of matter and form?
(3) Whether in Him there is composition of quiddity, essence
or nature, and subject?
(4) Whether He is composed of essence and existence?
(5) Whether He is composed of genus and difference?
(6) Whether He is composed of subject and accident?
(7) Whether He is in any way composite, or wholly
simple?
(8) Whether He enters into composition with other things?
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 3, Art. 1]
Whether God Is a Body?
Objection 1: It seems that God is a body. For a body is that
which has the three dimensions. But Holy Scripture attributes the
three dimensions to God, for it is written: "He is higher than
Heaven, and what wilt thou do? He is deeper than Hell, and how wilt
thou know? The measure of Him is longer than the earth and broader
than the sea" (Job 11:8, 9). Therefore God is a body.
Obj. 2: Further, everything that has figure is a body, since
figure is a quality of quantity. But God seems to have figure, for
it is written: "Let us make man to our image and likeness" (Gen.
1:26). Now a figure is called an image, according to the text: "Who
being the brightness of His glory and the figure," i.e. the image,
"of His substance" (Heb. 1:3). Therefore God is a body.
Obj. 3: Further, whatever has corporeal parts is a body. Now
Scripture attributes corporeal parts to God. "Hast thou an arm like
God?" (Job 40:4); and "The eyes of the Lord are upon the just" (Ps.
33:16); and "The right hand of the Lord hath wrought strength" (Ps.
117:16). Therefore God is a body.
Obj. 4: Further, posture belongs only to bodies. But
somethingwhich supposes posture is said of God in the Scriptures: "I
saw theLord sitting" (Isa. 6:1), and "He standeth up to judge" (Isa.
3:13).Therefore God is a body.
Obj. 5: Further, only bodies or things corporeal can be a
local termwherefromorwhereto.But in the Scriptures God is spoken of
as a local termwhereto,according to the
words, "Come ye to Him and be enlightened" (Ps. 33:6), and as a
termwherefrom: "All they that depart
from Thee shall be written in the earth" (Jer. 17:13). Therefore
God is a body.
On the contrary,It is written in the Gospel of
St. John (John 4:24): "God is a spirit."
I answer that,It is absolutely true that God is
not a body; and this can be shown in three ways. First, because no
body is in motion unless it be put in motion, as is evident from
induction. Now it has been already proved (Q. 2, A. 3), that God is
the First Mover, and is Himself unmoved. Therefore it is clear that
God is not a body. Secondly, because the first being must of
necessity be in act, and in no way in potentiality. For although in
any single thing that passes from potentiality to actuality, the
potentiality is prior in time to the actuality; nevertheless,
absolutely speaking, actuality is prior to potentiality; for
whatever is in potentiality can be reduced into actuality only by
some being in actuality. Now it has been already proved that God is
the First Being. It is therefore impossible that in God there
should be any potentiality. But every body is in potentiality
because the continuous, as such, is divisible to infinity; it is
therefore impossible that God should be a body. Thirdly, because
God is the most noble of beings. Now it is impossible for a body to
be the most noble of beings; for a body must be either animate or
inanimate; and an animate body is manifestly nobler than any
inanimate body. But an animate body is not animate precisely as
body; otherwise all bodies would be animate. Therefore its
animation depends upon some other thing, as our body depends for
its animation on the soul. Hence that by which a body becomes
animated must be nobler than the body. Therefore it is impossible
that God should be a body.
Reply Obj. 1: As we have said above (Q. 1, A. 9), Holy Writ
puts before us spiritual and divine things under the comparison of
corporeal things. Hence, when it attributes to God the three
dimensions under the comparison of corporeal quantity, it implies
His virtual quantity; thus, by depth, it signifies His power of
knowing hidden things; by height, the transcendence of His
excelling power; by length, the duration of His existence; by
breadth, His act of love for all. Or, as says Dionysius (Div. Nom.
ix), by the depth of God is meant the incomprehensibility of His
essence; by length, the procession of His all-pervading power; by
breadth, His overspreading all things, inasmuch as all things lie
under His protection.
Reply Obj. 2: Man is said to be after the image of God, not
as regards his body, but as regards that whereby he excels other
animals. Hence, when it is said, "Let us make man to our image and
likeness", it is added, "And let him have dominion over the fishes
of the sea" (Gen. 1:26). Now man excels all animals by his reason
and intelligence; hence it is according to his intelligence and
reason, which are incorporeal, that man is said to be according to
the image of God.
Reply Obj. 3: Corporeal parts are attributed to God in
Scripture on account of His actions, and this is owing to a certain
parallel. For instance the act of the eye is to see; hence the eye
attributed to God signifies His power of seeing intellectually, not
sensibly; and so on with the other parts.
Reply Obj. 4: Whatever pertains to posture, also, is only
attributed to God by some sort of parallel. He is spoken of as
sitting, on account of His unchangeableness and dominion; and as
standing, on account of His power of overcoming whatever withstands
Him.
Reply Obj. 5: We draw near to God by no corporeal steps,
since He is everywhere, but by the affections of our soul, and by
the actions of that same soul do we withdraw from Him; thus, to
draw near to or to withdraw signifies merely spiritual actions
based on the metaphor of local motion.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 3, Art. 2]
Whether God Is Composed of Matter and Form?