The Byzantine Wars E-Book

John Haldon

• Herausgeber: The History Press
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2008

Beschreibung

By the middle of the sixth century the Byzantine emperor ruled a mighty empire that straddled Europe, Asia and North Africa. Within 100 years, this powerful empire had been cut in half. Two centuries later the Byzantine empire was once again a power to be reckoned with, and soon recovered its position as the paramount East Mediterranean and Balkan power, whose fabulous wealth attracted Viking mercenaries and central Asian nomad warriors to its armies, whose very appearance on the field of battle was sometimes enough to bring enemies to terms. No book has ever attempted a survey of Byzantine wars, and few accounts of Byzantine battles have ever been translated into a modern language. This book will provide essential support for those interested in Byzantine history in general as well as a useful corrective to the more usual highly romanticised views of Byzantine civilisation.

Leseprobe

THE

BYZANTINE

About the Author

John Haldon is Professor of History at Princeton University. He studied in the UK, Greece and Germany, and is a Senior Fellow at the Dumbarton Oaks Center for Byzantine Studies in Washington D.C. One area of his research focuses on the history of the early and middle Byzantine empire, in particular in the period from the seventh to the eleventh centuries. His publications include Byzantium in the Seventh Century, Three Treatises on Byzantine Imperial Military Expeditions, The State and the Tributary Mode of Production, Warfare, State and Society in Byzantium, Byzantium: A History and The Palgrave Atlas of Byzantine History.

THE

BYZANTINE WARS

JOHN HALDON

This edition first published 2008

Reprinted 2009, 2012

The History Press

The Mill, Brimscombe Port

Stroud, Gloucestershire, GL5 2QG

www.thehistorypress.co.uk

This ebook edition first published in 2013

All rights reserved

© John Haldon, 2001, 2008, 2013

The right of John Haldon to be identified as the Author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyrights, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

This ebook is copyright material and must not be copied, reproduced, transferred, distributed, leased, licensed or publicly performed or used in any way except as specifically permitted in writing by the publishers, as allowed under the terms and conditions under which it was purchased or as strictly permitted by applicable copyright law. Any unauthorised distribution or use of this text may be a direct infringement of the author’s and publisher’s rights, and those responsible may be liable in law accordingly.

EPUB ISBN 978 0 7524 9652 8

Original typesetting by The History Press

Contents

A Note on Transliteration

Introduction

1

The Geography of Byzantine Warfare

2

Justinian’s WarsStrategic arrangements – Tactics – Tactical structures – The battle of Dara – The reconquest of Italy – The battle of Tadinae (Busta Gallorum) 551/2 – The battle of the Casilinus (Volturnus) river 554

3

After Justinian: The Later Sixth and SeventhCenturies and the Rise of Islam Tactical and strategic developments – Siege warfare in the Byzantine period – The wars in the East – The battle of Solachon 586 – The Islamic conquests – The battles of Jabiya-Gabitha and the Yarmuk river 636 – Consequences: the transformation of strategy

4

Bulgars and Arabs: The Eighth and Ninth CenturiesStrategy – Tactics and tactical organization – Security on the march – The battle of Pliska 811 – The battle of Versinikia 813 – The battle of Anzen (near Dazimon) 838 – Battles of the later ninth century: the battles of ‘Bishop’s Meadow’ 863 and Bathys Ryax 878 – The battle of Acheloos 917

5

Warfare in the Age of ReconquestRaids and razzias – Sa’if ad-Daulah’s raid of 956 – Offensive strategy and tactical change – A feigned retreat in 970 – The battles of Dorostolon 971 – The wars of Basil II

6

Collapse and Recovery: The Eleventh and Twelfth CenturiesStrategy – Tactics and tactical organization – Manzikert 1071 – The battle of Kalavryai 1078 – Dyrrachion 1081 – The Komnenian recovery – The battle of Semlin/Sirmium 1167 – The battle of Myriokephalon 1176

Conclusion

Sources and Discussion

List of Illustrations

Glossary

Acknowledgements

A Note on Transliteration

Books dealing with the Byzantine world generally open with a note on the transliteration of Greek or Latin words and technical terms, for the simple reason that there are several different systems in use. I have decided to use the simplest: Greek terms will be transliterated as literally as possible, but without employing macrons on long vowels (thus no ê or ô for the letters eta and omega) or the phonetic rendering of certain letters (b will be kept as ‘b’ rather than ‘v’, for example, which is the way it would have been pronounced in most contexts). There are a few concessions towards standard Modern Greek phonetic transliterations – thus Thessaloniki, rather than Thessalonike – because these are now the common form, but not many.

Greek was the language of culture and government from the later sixth and seventh centuries, but both Greek and Latin were employed before that time. Indeed, the empire included at various times considerable areas where Latin was the main or only language – parts of Italy, parts of the northern Balkan region and central and western North Africa. To Latinize Greek names of the medieval period looks odd, just as Hellenizing earlier Latin names and terms appears unreasonable or confusing. I have, inevitably, had to compromise. Technical terms and names will, therefore, be presented usually in their Latin form for the period before the year A.D. 600, and in their Greek form thereafter. This leaves many contradictions, but is the best that can be done. Where standard English versions of technical terms, personal names or placenames exist, I have used them (thus Constantine rather than Konstantinos).

Introduction

In its thousand years of existence – from the reign of Justinian I (527-565) until that of the last emperor, Constantine XI (1445-1453) – the Byzantine (or medieval eastern Roman) empire was almost constantly at war with one or another of its neighbours. This reflected its geography and strategic situation, centred as it was on the southern Balkans and Asia Minor. It had constantly to fend off challenges to its territorial integrity from, on the one hand, the Persian and then Arab or Turkish Islamic powers to the east and, on the other, its Balkan neighbours to the north – various barbarians groups, in particular Slavs and the Turkic Avars, in the sixth and seventh centuries and then, until the thirteenth century, the Bulgars. To complicate matters, relations with the western medieval states which grew up amid the ruins of the western Roman empire from the fifth and sixth centuries on were rarely easy, and there was an ongoing political tension between the patriarchate at Constantinople and the papacy, the two major sees in the Christian world (the others being Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem). As the western and central European powers grew and matured – first in the form of the Carolingian empire, then the German empire and the kingdom of Hungary – so Byzantine political pre-eminence began to be challenged, until by the end of the twelfth century the empire had become a second-rate state, subject to the power politics of powerful western kingdoms and the commercial strength of Italian merchant republics such as Venice, Genoa and Pisa.

Throughout its history military matters were of prime importance to the empire, and it is therefore no surprise that a very considerable part of the annual revenue of the state was spent on soldiers or related issues. But while the army and the physical defence of its lands were of first-order importance, the empire’s political situation meant that diplomacy and politics played an equally important role. Indeed, given its limited territory and population, they were absolutely crucial to its survival, for shortage of manpower alone meant that the casual expenditure of such a valuable resource was, wherever possible, to be avoided. Hence the Byzantines’ reputation for clever diplomacy and, in the post-Crusader western tradition, cunning and deceitfulness – hardly deserved in reality, especially in view of the record of the western powers in their dealings with the Byzantines, but an unfortunate result of western cultural prejudice. Byzantium was a society in which the virtues of peace were extolled and war was usually condemned, certainly when taken for its own sake. Fighting was to be avoided at all costs. Yet the empire nevertheless inherited the military administrative structures and, in many ways, the militaristic ideology of the expanding pre-Christian Roman empire in its heyday. These tensions were overcome through the blending of Christian ideals with the political will to survive and the justification of war as a necessary evil, waged primarily in defence of the Roman world (as understood by the Byzantines, who described themselves as ‘Romans’) and the Orthodox faith. Late Roman and medieval Christian society in the eastern Mediterranean/south Balkan region thus generated a unique culture which was able to cling without reservation to a pacifistic ideal while at the same time legitimating and justifying the maintenance of an immensely efficient and, for the most part remarkably effective, military apparatus.

In the following chapters we will look at the development of this military organization and illustrate its performance through a series of examples of actual battles. The history of the armies and their successes is not simply a military matter – the ups and downs of imperial military history parallel those of the state, both in its political as well as its social and economic aspect. There were notable peaks and troughs. In the sixth century, with the resources of a still dominant empire at its disposal, the armies were able to effect a series of remarkable reconquests in many regions conquered in the previous century by Germanic peoples such as the Goths (in Italy) and Vandals (in North Africa), as well as holding off barbarian inroads into the Balkans and defeating the other major player in the western Eurasian world, the Sassanid Persian empire. In contrast, the seventh and much of the eighth century saw the massive loss of territories following the Islamic conquests of the Middle East, Egypt and eventually North Africa, with a consequent restructuring of military organisation within the empire. By the tenth century the empire had taken up the offensive once more, and by the 1030s was once again the dominant power in the eastern Mediterranean basin, its armies well led and disciplined, to the extent that the mere rumour that an imperial army was on the way was sufficient to bring most recalcitrant former allies or neighbours to heel. Yet by the time of the Fourth Crusade in 1204 the empire had been reduced to a shadow of its former self, with armies consisting mostly of foreign mercenaries and ineffective local militias. Thereafter, although it was able to make a slight recovery in the second half of the thirteenth century, the Byzantine state was an empire in name only, its armies constantly on the defensive, reduced in numbers, largely modelled and armed along western lines and barely affordable. Given this picture, the present volume will concentrate on the period up to the middle of the twelfth century, focusing in equal measure on victories as well as defeats, and the reasons for both.

In presenting the historical framework within which the various battles and encounters took place, I have drawn on the most recent modern studies of Byzantine and medieval warfare and military organisation. But the sources for the descriptions of the battles themselves are often very partial and frequently lacking in the sort of detail needed to make sense of the tactics employed, the movements of troops before and during the battles, the numbers of men and the types of unit involved, as well as physical details of the terrain and contours of the localities at which the clash occurred. Those battles which are treated by the sources in some detail have received frequent attention, although interpretations of what actually happened vary. Thus the battles of Adrianople (378), at which the emperor Valens was defeated and killed by the Goths, Chalons (451) when the Romans defeated the Huns, the battles described by Procopius and Agathias for the reign of Justinian, as well as Manzikert in 1071 are relatively well studied. Yet there is enough information on many other encounters to justify a little more than a brief mention of the outcome, and I have attempted in this volume to extract as much information as possible about such battles.

In some cases, details can be supplied in whole or in part by visiting the sites (or attempting to locate) the sites in question. I have myself been to most of the relevant sites, where they can be identified, or to the areas in which the battles in question took place, and this has guided me in my interpretation of the written sources. In other cases, one can supply depth and colour by drawing on other accounts of similar battles at the same period and in the same area, sometimes by the same medieval writer or writers. In this respect, therefore, I must confess to using some informed guesswork and a little imagination, but always grounded in what the medieval sources tell us, in order to flesh out some of the details of some encounters. Where this is the case I have noted the fact in the section on sources and literature at the end of the book.

1

The Geography of Byzantine Warfare

Before beginning our survey of warfare and military organization, it is worth glancing briefly at the physical context in which these are to be situated, since it is obvious that neither can really be understood without some appreciation of the landscape and other related factors which affected them. Resources, communications, population size and settlement patterns are all relevant here, and just as modern strategists must take these features into account, so Roman and Byzantine generals and politicians had to pay serious attention to such matters in planning and executing any military strategy.

The Byzantine world in the sixth century was dominated by three major regions: the Balkans, sometimes stretching northward as far as the Danube; Asia Minor (Anatolia, approximately the area occupied by the modern state of Turkey); and the Middle Eastern regions of Syria, western Iraq and Jordan, with Egypt, North Africa, Italy, and the seas which linked these lands. Different climatic patterns determined patterns of agricultural and pastoral activity in each area and thus what the government at Constantinople could hope for in the way of human and material resources.