The discovery of a world in the moone E-Book

John Wilkins

• Herausgeber: Science & Technology Publishing
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 169

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2025

Beschreibung

The Discovery of a World in the Moone: A Discourse Tending to Prove That 'Tis Probable There May Be Another Habitable World in That Planet is a groundbreaking work of early scientific speculation and imaginative inquiry, written by John Wilkins and first published in 1638. This influential treatise explores the revolutionary idea that the Moon could be a world much like our own, possibly inhabited and possessing its own landscapes, climates, and even intelligent life. Wilkins, a prominent clergyman, natural philosopher, and founding member of the Royal Society, draws upon the latest astronomical discoveries of his time, including the telescopic observations of Galileo, to challenge the prevailing Aristotelian view of the cosmos. In this book, Wilkins systematically examines the nature of the Moon, its physical characteristics, and the possibility of travel to and habitation upon its surface. He discusses the similarities between the Earth and the Moon, such as their spherical shapes, phases, and apparent seas and mountains, arguing that these features suggest the Moon could support life. Wilkins also addresses theological and philosophical objections to the idea of multiple worlds, offering reasoned arguments that the existence of other habitable planets does not contradict religious doctrine. The Discovery of a World in the Moone is notable for its blend of scientific reasoning, imaginative speculation, and accessible prose. Wilkins invites readers to consider the vastness of the universe and the potential for other worlds beyond our own, laying the groundwork for later developments in astronomy and the eventual acceptance of the plurality of worlds. The book stands as a testament to the curiosity and open-mindedness of the early scientific revolution, encouraging readers to question established beliefs and to explore the possibilities that lie beyond the boundaries of Earth.

Leseprobe

A few typographical errors have been corrected. They have been noted in the text with mouse-hover popups. Invisible letters and punctuation have been marked without further explanation. Words in Greek and Hebrew include mouse-hover transliterations: ὥς. In addition to the ordinary page numbers, the printed text labeled the recto (odd) pages of the first four leaves of each 16-page signature. These will appear in the right margin as A, A2, A3...

THE

DISCOVERY

OF A

WORLD

IN THE

MOONE.

OR,

A DISCOVRSE

Tending

TO PROVE

that ’tis probable there

may be another habitable

World in that Planet.

Quid tibi inquis ista proderunt? Si nihil aliud, hoc certè, sciam omnia angusta esse.Seneca. Præf. ad 1. Lib. N. Q.

LONDON,

Printed by E. G. for Michael Sparl

and Edward Forrest, 1638.

Perlegi hæc παράδοξα & novitatis graciâ typis mandari permitto.

Mart. 29. 1638.Tho. WeekesR.P.Episc. Lond. Cap.Domest.

To the Reader.

FIf amongst thy leisure houres thou canst spare any for the perusall of this discourse, and dost looke to finde somewhat in it which may serve for thy information and benefit: let me then advise thee to come unto it with an equall minde, not swayed by prejudice, but indifferently resolved to assent unto that truth which upon deliberation shall seeme most probable unto thy reason, and then I doubt not, but either thou wilt agree with mee in this assertion, or at least not thinke it to be as farre from truth, as it is from common opinion.

Two cautions there are which I would willingly admonish thee of in the beginning.

1. That thou shouldst not here looke to find any exact, accurate Treatise, since this discourse was but the fruit of some lighter studies, and those too hudled up in a short time, being first thought of and finished in the space of some few weekes, and therefore you cannot in reason expect, that it should be so polished, as perhaps, the subject would require, or the leisure of the Author might have done it.

2. To remember that I promise onely probable arguments for the proofe of this opinion, and therefore you must not looke that every consequence should be of an undeniable dependance, or that the truth of each argument should be measured by its necessity. I grant that some Astronomicall appearances may possibly be solved otherwise then here they are. But the thing I aime at is this, that probably they may so be solved, as I have here set them downe: Which, if it be granted (as I thinke it must) then I doubt not, but the indifferent reader will find some satisfaction in the maine thing that is to be proved.

Many ancient Philosophers of the better note, have formerly defended this assertion, which I have here laid downe, and it were to be wished, that some of us would more apply our endeavours unto the examination of these old opinions, which though they have for a long time lien neglected by others, yet in them may you finde many truths well worthy your paines and observation. Tis a false conceit, for us to thinke, that amongst the ancient variety and search of opinions, the best hath still prevailed. Time (saith the learned Verulam) seemes to be of the nature of a river or streame, which carrieth downe to us that which is light, or blowne up, but sinketh that which is weighty and solid.

It is my desire that by the occasion of this discourse, I may raise up some more active spirit to a search after other hidden and unknowne truthes. Since it must needes be a great impediment unto the growth of sciences, for men still so to plod on upon beaten principles, as to be afraid of entertaining any thing that may seeme to contradict them. An unwillingnesse to take such things into examination, is one of those errours of learning in these times observed by the judicious Verulam. Questionlesse there are many secret truths, which the ancients have passed over, that are yet left to make some of our age famous for their discovery.

If by this occasion I may provoke any reader to an attempt of this nature, I shall then thinke my selfe happy, and this work successefull.

Farewell.

The First Proposition, by

way of Preface.

That the strangenesse of this opinion is no sufficient reason why it should be rejected, because other certaine truths have beene formerly esteemed ridiculous, and great absurdities entertayned by common consent.

HThere is an earnestnesse and hungering after novelty, which doth still adhere unto all our natures, and it is part of that primative image, that wide extent and infinite capacity at first created in the heart of man, for this since its depravation in Adam perceiving it selfe altogether emptied of any good doth now catch after every new thing, conceiving that possibly it may finde satisfaction among some of its fellow creatures. But our enemy the divell (who strives still to pervert our gifts, and beate us with our owne weapons) hath so contriv’d it, that any truth doth now seeme distastefull for that very reason, for which errour is entertain’d—Novelty, for let but some upstart heresie be set abroach, and presently there are some out of a curious humour; others, as if they watched an occasion of singularity, will take it up for canonicall, and make it part of their creede and profession; whereas solitary truth cannot any where finde so ready entertainement; but the same Novelty which is esteemed the commendation of errour and makes that acceptable, is counted the fault of truth, and causes that to bee rejected. How did the incredulous World gaze at Columbus when hee promised to discover another part of the earth, and he could not for a long time by his confidence, or arguments, induce any of the Christian Princes, either to assent unto his opinion, or goe to the charges of an experiment. Now if he who had such good grounds for his assertion, could finde no better entertainement among the wiser sort, and upper end of the World; ’tis not likely then that this opinion which I now deliver, shall receive any thing from the men of these daies, especially our vulgar wits, but misbeliefe or derision. It hath alwaies beene the unhappinesse of new truths in Philosophy, to be derided by those that are ignorant of the causes of things, and reiected by others whose perversenesse ties them to the contrary opinion, men whose envious pride will not allow any new thing for truth which they themselves were not the first inventors of. So that I may iustly expect to be accused of a pragmaticall ignorance, and bold ostentation, especially since for this opinion Xenophanes, a man whose authority was able to adde some credit to his assertion could not escape the like censure from others. For Natales Comes speaking of that Philosopher, Mytholog. lib. 3. c. 17. and this his opinion, saith thus, Nonnulli ne nihil scisse videantur, aliqua nova monstra in Philosophiã introducunt, ut alicujus rei inventores fuisse appareant.

Some there are who least they might seeme to know nothing, will bring up monstrous absurdities in Philosophy, that so afterward they may bee famed for the invention of somewhat.

The same author doth also in another place accuse AnaxagorasLib. 7. c. 1. of folly for the same opinion, Est enim non ignobilis gradus stultitiæ, vel si nescias quid dicas, tamen velle de rebus propositis hanc vel illam partem stabilire. “’Tis none of the worst kindes of folly, boldly to affirme one side or other, when a man knows not what to say.”

If these men were thus censur’d, I may iustly then expect to be derided by most, and to be believed by few or none; especially since this opinion seemes to carry in it so much strangenesse, so much contradiction to the generall consent of others. But how ever, I am resolved that this shall not be any discouragement, since I know that it is not the common opinion of others that can either adde or detract from the truth. For,

1. Other truths have beene formerly esteemed altogether as ridiculous as this can be.

2. Grosse absurdities have beene entertained by generall opinion.

I shall give an instance of each, that so I may the better prepare the Reader to consider things without a prejudice, when hee shall see that the common opposition against this which I affirme cannot any way derogate from its truth.

1. Other truths have beene formerly accounted as ridiculous as this, I shall specifie that of the Antipodes, which have beene denied and laught at by many wise men and great Schollers, such as were Herodotus, St. Austin, Lactantius, the Venerable Bede, Lucretius the Poet, Procopius, and the voluminous Abulensis with others. Herodotus counted it so horrible an absurdity, that hee could not forbeare laughing to thinke of it. Γελῶ δὲ ὁρῶν γῆς περιόδος γράψαντας, πολλοὺς ἤδη καὶ οὐδένα νόον ἔχοντας ἐξηγησάμενον ὃι Ὠκεανόν τε ῥεόντα γράφουσι, πέριξ τήν τε γὴν ἐοῦσαν κυκλοτερέα ὡς ἀπὸ τόρνου.1

I cannot choose but laugh, (saith he) to see so many men venture to describe the earths compasse, relating those things that are without all sense, as that the Sea flowes about the World, and that the earth it selfe is round as an Orbe.

But this great ignorance is not so much to be admired in him, as in those learneder men of later times, when all sciences began to flourish in the World. Such was Saint Austin who censures that relation of the Antipodes to be an incredible fable, De civit. Dei. lib. 16. cap. 9.Institut. l. 3. c. 24. and with him agrees the eloquent Lactantius, quid illi qui esse contrarios vestigiis nostris Antipodes putant? num aliquid loquuntur? aut est quispiam tam ineptus, qui credat esse homines, quorum vestigia sunt superiora quàm capita? aut ibi quæ apud nos jacent inversa pendere? fruges & arbores deorsum versus crescere, pluvias & nives, & grandinem sursum versus cadere in terram? & miratur aliquis hortor pensiles inter septem mira narrari, quum Philosophi, & agros & maria, & urbes & montes pensiles faciunt? &c.

What (saith he) are they that thinke there are Antipodes, such as walke with their feet against ours? doe they speake any likelyhood? or is there any one so foolish as to believe that there are men whose heeles are higher than their heads? that things which with us doe lie on the ground doe hang there? that the Plants and Trees grow downewards, that the haile, and raine, and snow fall upwards to the earth? and doe wee admire the hanging Orchards amongst the seven wonders, whereas here the Philosophers have made the Field and Seas, the Cities and Mountaines hanging.

What shall wee thinke (saith hee in Plutarch) that men doe clyng to that place like wormes, or hang by their clawes as Cats, or if wee suppose a man a little beyond the Center, to bee digging with a spade? is it likely (as it must bee according to this opinion) that the earth which hee loosened, should of it selfe ascend upwards? or else suppose two men with their middles about the center, the feete of the one being placed where the head of the other is, and so two other men crosse them, yet all these men thus situated according to this opinion should stand upright, and many other such grosse consequences would follow (saith hee) which a false imagination is not able to fancy as possible. Upon which considerations, BedeDe ratione temporum, Cap. 32. also denies the being of any Antipodes, Neque enim Antipodarum ullatenus est Fabulis accommodandus assensus, “Nor should wee any longer assent to the Fable of Antipodes.” So also Lucretius the Poet speaking of the same subject, sayes: De nat. rerum, lib. 1.

Sed vanus stolidis hæc omnia finxerit error.

That some idle fancy faigned these for fooles to believe. Of this opinion was Procopius Gazæus, Comment. in 1. Cap. Gen.Psal. 24. 2. but he was perswaded to it by another kinde of reason; for he thought that all the earth under us was sunke in the water, according to the saying of the Psalmist, Hee hath founded the Earth upon the Seas, and therefore hee accounted it not inhabited by any. Nay Tostatus a man of later yeeres and generall learning doth also confidently deny that there are any such Antipodes, though the reason which hee urges for it bee not so absurde as the former, for the Apostles, saith hee, Comment. in 1. Genes. travelled through the whole habitable world, but they never passed the Equinoctiall; and if you answer that they are said to goe through all the earth, because they went through all the knowne world, hee replies, that this is not sufficient, since Christ would have all men to be saved, and come to the knowledge of his truth, 1 Tim. 2. 4. and therefore ’tis requisite that they should have travelled thither also, if there had been any inhabitants, especially since he did expressely command them to goe and teach all nations, and preach the Gospell through the whole world, Mat. 28. 19 and therefore he thinkes that as there are no men, so neither are there seas, or rivers, or any other conveniency for habitation: ’tis commonly related of one Virgilius, that he was excommunicated and condemned for a Heretique by Zachary Bishop of Rome, because hee was not of the same opinion. But Baronius saies, Annal. Eccles. A.D. 748. it was because hee thought there was another habitable world within ours. How ever, you may well enough discerne in these examples how confident many of these great Schollars were in so grosse an errour, how unlikely, what an incredible thing it seemed to them, that there should be any Antipodes, and yet now this truth is as certaine and plaine, as sense or demonstration can make it. This then which I now deliver is not to be rejected; though it may seeme to contradict the common opinion.

2. Grosse absurdities have beene entertained by generall consent. I might instance in many remarkeable examples, but I will onely speake of the supposed labour of the Moone in her eclipses, because this is neerest to the chiefe matter in hand, and was received as a common opinion amongst many of the ancients, and therefore Plutarch speaking of a Lunary eclipse, relates, that at such times ’twas a custome amongst the Romanes (the most civill and learned people in the world) to sound brasse Instruments, and hold great torches toward the heaven. Τῶν δὲ Ρωμαίων (ὥσπερ ἐστω ἐνομισμένον) χαλκοῦ τε πατάγοις ἀνακαλουμένωντὸ φῶς αὐτὸς καὶ πυρὰ πολλὰ δαλοῖς καὶ δασσὶν ἀνεχόντων πρὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν, In vita Paul. Æmil. for by this meanes they supposed the Moone was much eased in her labours, and therfore Ovid calls such loud Instruments the auxiliaries or helpes of the Moone. Metam. l. 4.

Cum frustra resonant æra auxiliaria Lunæ.

and therefore the Satyrist too describing a loud scold, saies, she was able to make noise enough to deliver the labouring Moone. Iuven. Sat. 6

Vna laboranti poterit succurrere Lunæ.

Now the reason of all this their ceremonie, was, because they feared the world would fall asleepe, when one of its eyes began to winke, and therefore they would doe what they could by loud sounds to rouse it from its drowsinesse, and keepe it awake by bright torches, to bestow that light upon it which it began to lose. Some of them thought hereby to keepe the Moone in her orbe, whereas otherwise she would have fallen downe upon the earth, and the world would have lost one of its lights, for the credulous people believed, that Inchanters, and Witches could bring the Moone downe, which made Virgil say,

Cantus & è cœlo possunt deducere Lunam.

And those Wizards knowing the times of her eclipses, would then threaten to shew their skill, by pulling her out of her orbe. So that when the silly multitude saw that she began to looke red, they presently feared they should lose the benefit of her light, and therefore made a great noise that she might not heare the sound of those Charmes, which would otherwise bring her downe, and this is rendered for a reason of this custome by Pliny and Propertius:

Cantus & è curru lunam deducere tentant, Et facerent, si non æra repulsa sonent. Nat. hist. lib. 2. c. 12.

Plutarch gives another reason of it, and he sayes, ’tis because they would hasten the Moone out of the darke shade wherein shee was involv’d, that so she might bring away the soules of those Saints that inhabit within her, which cry out by reason they are then deprived of their wonted happinesse, and cannot heare the musicke of the Spheares, but are forced to behold the torments, and wailing of those damned soules which are represented to them as they are tortured in the region of the aire, but whether this or what ever else was the meaning of this superstition, yet certainly ’twas a very ridiculous custome, and bewrayed a great ignorance of those ancient times, especially since it was not onely received by the vulgar, such as were men of lesse note and learning, but believed also, by the more famous and wiser sort, such as were those great Poets, Stesichorus and Pindar. And not onely amongst the more sottish heathens, who might account that Planet to be one of their Gods, but the primitive Christians also were in this kinde guilty; which made S. Ambrose so tartly to rebuke those of his time, when he said, Tum turbatur carminibus Globus Lunæ, quando calicibus turbantur & oculi. “When your heads are troubled with cups, then you thinke the Moone to be troubled with charmes.”

And for this reason also did Maximus a Bishop, Turinens. Episc. write a Homily against it, wherein hee shewed the absurditie of that foolish superstition. I remember, that Ludovicus Uives relates a more ridiculous story of a people that imprisoned an Asse for drinking up the Moone, whose image appearing in the water was covered with a cloud, as the Asse was drinking, for which the poore beast was afterward brought to the barre to receive a sentence according to his deserts, where the grave Senate being set to examine the matter, one of the Counsell (perhaps wiser than the rest) rises up, and out of his deepe judgement, thinkes it not fit that their Towne should lose its Moone, but that rather the Asse should be cut up, and that taken out of him, which sentence being approved by the rest of those Politicians, as the subtillest way for the conclusion of the matter was accordingly performed. But whether this tale were true or no I will not question, however there is absurdity enough in that former custome of the ancients, that may confirme the truth to be proved, and plainly declare the insufficiency of common opinion to adde true worth or estimation unto any thing. So that from that which I have said may be gathered thus much.

1. That a new truth may seeme absurd and impossible not onely to the vulgar, but to those also who are otherwise wise men, and excellent schollers; and hence it will follow, that every new thing which seemes to oppose common Principles is not presently to be rejected, but rather to be pry’d into with a diligent enquiry, since there are many things which are yet hid from us, and reserv’d for future discovery.

2. That it is not the commonnesse of an opinion that can priviledge it for a truth, the wrong way is sometime a well beaten path, whereas the right way (especially to hidden truths) may bee lesse trodden and more obscure.

True indeed, the strangeness of this opinion will detract much from its credit; but yet we should know that nothing is in its selfe strange, since every naturall effect has an equall dependance upon its cause, and with the like necessity doth follow from it, so that ’tis our ignorance which makes things appeare so, and hence it comes to passe that many more evident truths seeme incredible to such who know not the causes of things: you may as soone perswade some Country peasants that the Moone is made of greene Cheese (as wee say) as that ’tis bigger than his Cart-wheele, since both seeme equally to contradict his sight, and hee has not reason enough to leade him farther than his senses. Nay, suppose (saith Plutarch