The Global Justice Reader, Revised Edition E-Book

Thom Brooks

• Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 2168

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2023

Beschreibung

A unique compendium of foundational and contemporary writings in global justice, newly revised and expanded The Global Justice Reader is the first resource of its kind to focus exclusively on this important topic in moral and political philosophy, providing an expertly curated selection of both classic and contemporary work in one comprehensive volume. Purpose-built for course work, this collection brings together the best in the field to help students appreciate the philosophical dimensions of critical global issues and chart the development of diverse concepts of justice and morality. Newly revised and expanded, the Reader presents key writings of the most influential writers on global justice, including Thomas Hobbes, Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, Martha C. Nussbaum, and Peter Singer. Thirty-nine chapters across eleven thematically organized sections explore sovereignty, rights to self-determination, human rights, nationalism and patriotism, cosmopolitanism, global poverty, women and global justice, climate change, and more. * Features seminal works from the moral and political philosophers of the past as well as important writings from leading contemporary thinkers * Explores critical topics in current discourses surrounding immigration and citizenship, global poverty, just war, terrorism, and international environmental justice * Highlights the need for shared philosophical resources to help address global problems * Includes a brief introduction in each section setting out the issues of concern to global justice theorists * Contains complete references in each chapter and a fully up-to-date, extended bibliography to supplement further readings The revised edition of The Global Justice Reader remains an ideal textbook for undergraduate and graduate courses in global justice and human rights, cosmopolitanism and nationalism, environmental justice, and social justice and citizenship, and an excellent supplement for general courses in political philosophy, political science, social science, and law.

Leseprobe

Table of Contents

Cover

Title Page

Copyright Page

Preface for the First Edition

Preface for the Revised Edition

Acknowledgements

Introduction

I

II

III

IV

V

VI

Notes

PART I: Sovereignty

1

Leviathan

Chapter XIV

Chapter XVII

Chapter XVIII

Note

2 A State of Nature

1 The Skepticism of the Realists

2 The Hobbesian Situation

3 International Relations as a State of Nature

4 The Basis of International Morality

Bibliography

Notes

3 Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty

Institutional Cosmopolitanism Based on Human Rights

The Idea of State Sovereignty

Some Main Reasons for a Vertical Dispersal of Sovereignty

The Shaping and Reshaping of Political Units

Notes

PART II: Rights to Self‐determination

4 National Self‐determination

I Isolating the Issue

II Groups

III The Value of Self‐government

IV A Right to Self‐determination

Notes

5 Theories of Secession

I The Institutional Question

II Two Types of Normative Theories of Secession

III Criteria for Evaluating Proposals for an International Legal Right to Secede

IV Comparing the Two Types of Theories

V Primary Right Theories

VI Political Liberty, the Harm Principle, and the Constraints of Institutional Morality

VII Ideal Versus Nonideal Theory

Notes

III: Human Rights

6 Universal Declaration of Human Rights

Preamble

Note

7 The Nature of Rights

I A Modified Hohfeldian Framework

II The Functions of Rights

III Conclusion

Notes

8 Making Sense of Human Rights

Human Rights as Minimal Standards for Governments

Who Has Human Rights?

Assigning Responsibilities for Human Rights

Scope, Weight, and Trade‐Offs

Are Human Rights Inalienable?

The Existence of Human Rights

How Human Rights Guide Behavior

Overview

References

Note

9 Group Rights and Group Oppression

Group Rights and Individual Rights

Group Rights: The Collective Conception

Group Rights: The Corporate Conception

Group Rights and the Status of Individuals

Groups versus Individuals: The Collective Conception

Groups versus Individuals: The Corporate Conception

Conclusion

Notes

10 What’s Wrong with Torture?

I

II

III

IV

V

VI

VII

Notes

IV: Nationalism and Patriotism

11 Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism

I

II

III

IV

Notes

12 Cosmopolitan Respect and Patriotic Concern

The Bias

Cosmopolitan Respect

Patriotic Priority

Budgetary Bias

Notes

V: Cosmopolitanism

13 Perpetual Peace

Section I

Section II

First Supplement

Second Supplement

Notes

14 Kantian Patriotism

I Three Varieties of Patriotism

II Patriotism as a Duty

III Permissible Patriotisms

Notes

15 Cosmopolitan Justice and Equalising Opportunities

I

II

III

IV

V

References

Notes

16 Philosophy Unbound

Introduction

Traditions as Bounded

Towards a Global Philosophy

Critical Appraisal

Conclusion

References

Notes

VI: Immigration and Citizenship

17 Immigrants, Nations, and Citizenship

I

II

III

IV

Note

18 Immigration, Jurisdiction, and Exclusion

Notes

19 Immigration and the Significance of Culture

Notes

VII: Global Poverty

20 Famine, Affluence, and Morality

Note

21 Distributing Responsibilities

I Principles of Remedial Responsibility

II Taking Stock

III The Connection Theory

Notes

22 Remedial Responsibilities Beyond Nations

1 Introduction

2 Miller’s Theory of Nationalism

3 Beyond Nationalism

4 Remedial Responsibilities Beyond Nations?

5 Conclusion

References

Notes

23 The Problem of Global Justice

I

II

III

IV

V

VI

VII

VIII

IX

X

XI

Notes

24 How Practices Matter

I Relativism

II. Triggering

III Justifying Versus Grounding

IV Practices in the Justification of Mediating Principles

V Cohen v. Rawls

VI Conclusion

Notes

25 Associative Duties, Global Justice, and the Colonies

I Associative Duties Versus Global Justice

II Colonial Rule: The Coercion Account

III Coercion and Indirect Colonial Rule

IV Colonial Rule: The Cooperation Account

V Severing Colonial Ties, Shedding Associative Duties

VI Extending Robust Distributive Justice to All Fellow Associates

Notes

VIII: Just War

26 War, Sedition, and Killing

(a)

Summa Theologiae

(b)

Summa Theologiae

(c)

Summa Theologiae

Note

27 A Few Words on Non‐Intervention

Note

28 Charter, Chapter VII

Article 39

Article 40

Article 41

Article 42

Article 43

Article 44

Article 45

Article 46

Article 47

Article 48

Article 49

Article 50

Article 51

Note

29 War and Massacre

I

II

III

IV

V

VI

VII

Notes

30 Just Cause for War

Resort to War, Continuation of War, and Termination of War

The Moral Priority of Just Cause in

Jus ad Bellum

Just Cause and

Jus in Bello

The Connection between Just Cause and Moral Liability to Attack

A Substantive Account of the Requirement of Just Cause

Just and Unjust Causes

Just Cause and Proportionality

Can More Than One Belligerent havea Just Cause?

“Comparative Justice”

The Plurality of Causes and the Moral Status of Combatants

Notes

31 Necessity in Self‐defense and War

I Introduction

II Analyzing Necessity

III Implications for Self‐defense

IV Implications for War

V Necessity and the Laws of War

VI Conclusion

Notes

IX: Terrorism

32 Terrorism Without Intention

I Defining Terrorism

II The Doctrine of Double Effect and the Distinction between Terror Bombing and Tactical Bombing

III Standards of Care in Military Operations

IV Recklessness and Negligence as

Mens Rea

for Terrorism

V Conclusion

Notes

33 Terrorism, Justification, and Illusion

I Preliminaries

II Terrorism and Justification in Practice

III Illusions

Notes

X: Women and Global Justice

34 Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?

Gender and Culture

Group Rights?

Liberal Defense

Part of the Solution?

Notes

35 Poverty, Well‐Being, and Gender

I Poverty and Gender: Basic Facts

II Development and Human Well‐being

III Listening to the Silent Voices

IV Winds of Change in the Development Arena?

Notes

36 On Hearing Women’s Voices

I Justification and Informed Desire

II The Role of Empirical and Narrative Material

Notes

XI: Climate change

37 The Real Tragedy of the Commons

I Hardin’s Analysis

II The Prisoner’s Dilemma

III Coercion and Population

IV Population as a Prisoner’s Dilemma

V Total Environmental Impact

VI The Intergenerational Issue

VII Two Interpretations of the Intragenerational Problem

VIII The Intragenerational Problem in Practice

IX Implications

Notes

38 Just Emissions

I Empirical and Theoretical Background

II The Equal Per Capita View

III Arguing for the Equal Per Capita View

IV A General Challenge to the Equal Per Capita View

V Response 1 – An Appeal to Exceptions

VI Response 2 – From Practicality to Isolation?

VII A Second General Challenge – Putting Emissions in Their Place

VIII A New Start

IX Conclusion

Notes

39 How Not to Save the Planet

1 Introduction

2 Conservation: The Ecological Footprint

3 Conservation: The Polluter Pays Principle

4 Adaptation

5 Climate Change and Catastrophe

6 Conclusion

Notes

Bibliography

Index

End User License Agreement

List of Illustrations

Chapter 7

Figure 7.1 The right to drive as a single privilege

Figure 7.2 A chess player’s right as a paired privilege

Figure 7.3 The right to remain silent as a privilege and a claim

Figure 7.4 A complex molecular right

Figure 7.5 The incidents that are rights according to the four theories of t...

Chapter 38

Figure 1 Note: The lined space indicates the amount of one “resource,” for e...

Guide

Cover Page

Title page

Copyright Page

Preface for the First Edition

Preface for the Revised Edition

Acknowledgements

Table of Contents

Begin Reading

Bibliography

Index

WILEY END USER LICENSE AGREEMENT

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The Global Justice Reader

Revised Edition

Edited by

Thom Brooks

This revised edition first published 2023© 2023 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

Edition HistoryJohn Wiley & Sons Ltd (1e, 2008)

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Library of Congress Cataloging‐in‐Publication DataNames: Brooks, Thom, editor. | Wiley‐Blackwell (Firm), publisher.Title: The global justice reader / edited by Thom Brooks.Description: Revised edition. | Hoboken, NJ : Wiley‐Blackwell, 2023. | Includes bibliographical references and index.Identifiers: LCCN 2022039365 (print) | LCCN 2022039366 (ebook) | ISBN 9781118929315 (paperback) | ISBN 9781119911531 (adobe pdf) | ISBN 9781119911524 (epub)Subjects: LCSH: Social justice. | Globalization. | Human rights.Classification: LCC HM671 .G56 2023 (print) | LCC HM671 (ebook) | DDC 320.01/1–dc23/eng/20220928LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022039365LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022039366

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Preface for the First Edition

I have accumulated many debts in preparing The Global Justice Reader. First, I must thank Fabian Freyenhagen and Peter Jones for first encouraging me to pursue this volume: it would never have been possible without their help from the start. Second, I must thank my friends at Wiley–Blackwell, principally Nick Bellorini and Kelvin Matthews, for their tireless efforts at making this project a reality. In particular, I owe a special debt of gratitude to Nick for his support from the very beginning. I cannot be more thankful.

The work on this Reader took place during a year of research leave. I gratefully acknowledge my thanks to the School of Geography, Politics and Sociology at the University of Newcastle for granting me leave, and the Arts and Humanities Research Council for helping to fund my leave.

A number of friends and colleagues gave invaluable advice on the contents for this collection. I must sincerely thank Simon Caney, Fabian Freyenhagen, Lisa Fuller, Carol Gould, Tim Hayward, Matt Lister, Graham Long, Martha C. Nussbaum, James Pattison, Thomas W. Pogge, Leif Wenar, Lenka Žemberová, and anonymous readers for the publisher for their excellent advice – although, of course, I alone assume responsibility for the Reader’s contents.

Finally, I owe a very special and personal debt to my teacher, Leif Wenar. It was under his wing that my interest in global justice first began and continues to grow. His work has long been truly inspirational for me, as well as his example. I gratefully offer him my thanks for the priceless gift of opening my eyes to a new and exciting world.

T.B.

Preface for the Revised Edition

I extend my warmest thanks to Nick Bellorini for believing in this project from the beginning and originally commissioning it. I am enormously grateful to Fabian Freyenhagen and Peter Jones for encouraging me to pursue it in the first place. I am also extremely grateful to Charlie Hamlyn for making this new edition a reality.

My work on this Revised Edition was made possible through a period of leave at Durham University’s Law School partly spent at Yale Law School in my native New Haven, Connecticut. I acknowledge my thanks to colleagues for their continuous support throughout.

Since its original publication a decade ago, I have received invaluable feedback and suggestions for further additions. I am grateful to Michael Blake, Maria Dimova‐Cookson, David Estlund, Fabian Freyenhagen, Carol Gould, Matthew Liao, David Miller, Martha Nussbaum, Bhikhu Parekh, Michael Rosen, and Avital Simhony among many others.

I have been overwhelmed by the positive reception of the original edition and wish to thank you, the readers of this Reader, for making this work a top resource for students new and old exploring global justice. I have updated and expanded the Reader’s contents so that it will continue to stimulate debates and play the leading role it has enjoyed since the first edition appeared in 2008. There is an extended bibliography of top publications in the field at the end reflecting continuing developments in global justice.

Durham, UK 2022

Acknowledgements

The editor and publisher gratefully acknowledge the permission granted to reproduce the copyright material in this book.

Part I Sovereignty

Chapter 1

Thomas Hobbes, Chapters 14, 17–18 (pp. 91–99, 117–129) from Leviathan, edited by Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Reproduced with permission of Cambridge University Press.

Chapter 2

Charles R. Beitz, ‘A State of Nature’, pp. 13–63 from Political Theory and International Relations, 2nd edn (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999). Reproduced with permission of Princeton University Press.

Chapter 3

Thomas W. Pogge, ‘Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty’, pp. 48–75 from Ethics 103:1 (1992). Reproduced with permission of The University of Chicago Press.

Part II Rights to Self‐determination

Chapter 4

Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz, ‘National Self‐determination’, pp. 439–461 from The Journal of Philosophy 87:9 (September 1990). Reproduced with permission of The Journal of Philosophy.

Chapter 5

Allen Buchanan, ‘Theories of Secession’, pp. 31–61 from Philosophy & Public Affairs 26:1 (1997). Reproduced with permission of John Wiley & Sons.

Part III Human Rights

Chapter 6

United Nations, ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’. Reproduced with permission of the United Nations.

Chapter 7

Leif Wenar, ‘The Nature of Rights’, pp. 223–252 from Philosophy & Public Affairs 33:3 (2005). Reproduced with permission of John Wiley & Sons.

Chapter 8

James W. Nickel, ‘Making Sense of Human Rights’, pp. 35–52 (Chapter 3) from Making Sense of Human Rights, 2nd edn (Wiley Blackwell, 2007). Reproduced with permission of John Wiley & Sons.

Chapter 9

Peter Jones, ‘Group Rights and Group Oppression’, pp. 353–377 from The Journal of Political Philosophy 7:4 (1999). Reproduced with permission of John Wiley & Sons.

Chapter 10

David Sussman, ‘What’s Wrong with Torture?’ pp. 1–33 from Philosophy & Public Affairs 33:1 (2005). Reproduced with permission of John Wiley & Sons.

Part IV Nationalism and Patriotism

Chapter 11

Martha C. Nussbaum, ‘Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism’, pp. 2–17, 145 (notes) from For Love of Country? Debating the Limits of Patriotism (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2002). © 1996 Martha C. Nussbaum and Joshua Cohen. Reproduced with permission of Beacon Press, Boston.

Chapter 12

Richard W. Miller, ‘Cosmopolitan Respect and Patriotic Concern’, pp. 202–224 from Philosophy and Public Affairs 27:3 (1998). Reproduced with permission of John Wiley & Sons.

Part V Cosmopolitanism

Chapter 13

Immanuel Kant, extracts from Sections I and II, pp. 3–21, 23–34 from Perpetual Peace, edited by Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs‐Merrill, 1957).

Chapter 14

Pauline Kleingeld, ‘Kantian Patriotism’, pp. 313–341 from Philosophy and Public Affairs 29:4 (2000). Reproduced with permission of John Wiley & Sons.

Chapter 15

Simon Caney, ‘Cosmopolitan Justice and Equalizing Opportunities’, pp. 113–134 from Metaphilosophy 32:1–2 (2001). Reproduced with permission of John Wiley & Sons.

Chapter 16

Thom Brooks, ‘Philosophy Unbound: The Idea of Global Philosophy’, pp. 254–266 from Metaphilosophy 44:3 (2013). Reproduced with permission of John Wiley & Sons.

Part VI Immigration and Citizenship

Chapter 17

David Miller, ‘Immigrants, Nations, and Citizenship’, pp. 371–390 from The Journal of Political Philosophy 16:4 (2008). Reproduced with permission of John Wiley & Sons.

Chapter 18

Michael Blake, ‘Immigration, Jurisdiction, and Exclusion’, pp. 103–130 from Philosophy & Public Affairs 41:2 (2013). Reproduced with permission of John Wiley & Sons.

Chapter 19

Samuel Scheffler, ‘Immigration and the Significance of Culture’, pp. 93–125 from Philosophy & Public Affairs 35 (2007). Reproduced with permission of John Wiley & Sons.

Part VII Global Poverty

Chapter 20

Peter Singer, ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality’, pp. 229–243 from Philosophy & Public Affairs 1:3 (1972). Reproduced with permission of John Wiley & Sons.

Chapter 21

David Miller, ‘Distributing Responsibilities’, pp. 453–471 from The Journal of Political Philosophy 9:4 (2001). Reproduced with permission of John Wiley & Sons.

Chapter 22

Thom Brooks, ‘Remedial Responsibilities Beyond Nations’, pp. 156–166 from Journal of Global Ethics 10:2 (2014). Reproduced with permission of Taylor & Francis Group.

Chapter 23

Thomas Nagel, ‘The Problem of Global Justice’, pp. 113–147 from Philosophy & Public Affairs 33:2 (2005). Reproduced with permission of John Wiley & Sons.

Chapter 24

Andrea Sangiovanni, ‘How Practices Matter’, pp. 3–23 from The Journal of Political Philosophy 24:1 (2016). Reproduced with permission of John Wiley & Sons.

Chapter 25

Lea Ypi, Robert E. Goodin and Christian Barry, ‘Associative Duties, Global Justice and the Colonies’, pp. 103–135 from Philosophy and Public Affairs 37:2 (2009). Reproduced with permission of John Wiley & Sons.

Part VIII Just War

Chapter 26

St Thomas Aquinas, ‘War, Sedition, and Killing’, pp. 239–242, 247–248, 251–256, 261–266 from Political Writings, edited by R.W. Dyson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). English translation © 2002 Cambridge University Press. Reproduced with permission of Cambridge University Press.

Chapter 27

John Stuart Mill, ‘A Few Words on Non‐intervention’, pp. 118–124 from Essays on Equality, Law, and Education (Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, vol. XXI), edited by John M. Robson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984). Reproduced with permission of University of Toronto Press.

Chapter 28

United Nations, Chapter VII from the UN Charter, https://www.un.org/en/about‐us/un‐charter/chapter‐7. Reproduced with permission of United Nations.

Chapter 29

Thomas Nagel, ‘War and Massacre’, pp. 123–144 from Philosophy & Public Affairs 1:2 (1972). Reproduced with permission of John Wiley & Sons.

Chapter 30

Jeff McMahan, ‘Just Cause for War’, pp. 55–75 from Ethics & International Affairs 19:3 (2005). Reproduced with permission of John Wiley & Sons.

Chapter 31

Seth Lazar, ‘Necessity in Self‐defense and War’, pp. 3–44 from Philosophy and Public Affairs 40:1 (2012). Reproduced with permission of John Wiley & Sons.

Part IX Terrorism

Chapter 32

David Rodin, ‘Terrorism Without Intention’, pp. 752–771 from Ethics 114 (July 2004). Reproduced with permission of The University of Chicago Press.

Chapter 33

Saul Smilansky, ‘Terrorism, Justification, and Illusion’, pp. 790–805 from Ethics 114 (July 2004). Reproduced with permission of The University of Chicago Press.

Part X Women and Global Justice

Chapter 34

Susan Moller Okin, ‘Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?’ pp. 9–24, 133–135 (notes) from Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard and Martha C. Nussbaum (eds.), Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999). Reproduced with permission of Princeton University Press.

Chapter 35

Susan Moller Okin, ‘Poverty, Well‐being, and Gender: What Counts, Who's Heard?’ pp. 280–316 from Philosophy and Public Affairs 31:3 (2003). Reproduced with permission of John Wiley & Sons.

Chapter 36

Martha C. Nussbaum, ‘On Hearing Women's Voices: A Reply to Susan Okin’, pp. 193–205 from Philosophy and Public Affairs 32:2 (2004). Reproduced with permission of John Wiley & Sons.

Part XI Climate Change

Chapter 37

Stephen M. Gardiner, ‘The Real Tragedy of the Commons’, pp. 387–418 from Philosophy and Public Affairs 30:4 (2001). Reproduced with permission of John Wiley & Sons.

Chapter 38

Simon Caney, ‘Just Emissions’, pp. 255–300 from Philosophy and Public Affairs 40:4 (2012). Reproduced with permission of John Wiley & Sons.

Chapter 39

Thom Brooks, ‘How Not to Save the Planet’, pp. 119–135 from Ethics, Policy & Environment 19:2 (2016). Reproduced with permission of Taylor & Francis Group.

Introduction

I

The Global Justice Reader brings together the best work in the area of contemporary political philosophy and its history. This newly revised and expanded Revised Edition is divided into 39 chapters across 11 parts. These parts are (1) sovereignty, (2) rights to self‐determination, (3) human rights, (4) nationalism and patriotism, (5) cosmopolitanism, (6) immigration and citizenship, (7) global poverty, (8) just war, (9) terrorism, (10) women and global justice, and (11) climate change. The authors surveyed here include the most influential writers on global justice. In this introduction, I will offer a brief overview of important themes covered in this Reader’s Revised Edition.1

II

The history of political philosophy has been marked by an interest in domestic justice within the state. Indeed, the vast majority of what philosophers had to say about justice did not extend to considerations of global justice outside the state. Coincidentally, the vast literature on justice and rights that developed over the years had focused on questions of distributive justice within a single society, rather than across several societies or states.

However, it is certainly true that many philosophers in the past had an interest in matters of international justice, too. For example, both St Augustine (in his The City of God) and St Thomas Aquinas (in his Summa Theologiae) offer revealing and influential theories on what constitutes a ‘just war’ (see Chapter 26).2 Thus, Aquinas argues that a just war requires several elements: the legitimacy of government, a just cause, and a right intention. A government cannot wage a just war if it is illegitimate. Legitimate governments, in turn, can only wage just war with both a just cause and just intent. That is, the offending state must have performed some act of wrongdoing, a wrong that is in need of being put right by others. Moreover, a state must not only be legitimate and wage war for a just cause, but it must also have a just intent. Our intention must be to spread good or help avert evil. We cannot wage just war if we lack righteous intentions even if the state that we want to attack deserves punishment for its actions. Thus, we have two justificatory grounds for a just war: jus ad bellum (the justifiability of the war) and jus in bello (the justifiability of the way war is waged).

This body of work on just war and international affairs by Augustine and Aquinas was extended by others, including Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf, and continues in recent contributions to the debate over just war by Jeff McMahan, Thomas Nagel, and Seth Lazar (see Part VIII).3 These philosophers defend very different views of what can amount to just war. For example, Nagel opts for strict ‘absolutist’ limits on what might serve as a justification for war and its justified conduct, such as an absolute prohibition on the killing of innocent non‐combatants (Chapter 29). McMahan makes an argument for the view that a war which lacks a just cause cannot be fought justly (Chapter 30). In other words, just war theorists separate the distinctions of (a) jus ad bellum and (b) jus in bello. For McMahan, these distinctions are not equal partners. If jus ad bellum is not satisfied, then it does not matter how virtuous we conduct the battle because it cannot be considered a just war. Contemporary commentators move in different directions and alert us to the importance of various distinctions contributing to our understanding of just war. However, the link with the past work of Aquinas remains strong. Our work today benefits clearly from earlier work by canonical figures. The issue of just war theory is not unique in this respect.

Of course, just war theorists offer us various accounts of how war might be justified. This position takes for granted the possibility of war being justifiable.4 Some philosophers have argued against the justifiability of war. Thus, for example, John Stuart Mill presents us with a distinctly unique perspective in his essay ‘A Few Words on Non‐Intervention’ (Chapter 27). We might often think that we sometimes do a favour to countries when we conquer them. After all, perhaps these states are authoritarian or worse. Perhaps they lack the know‐how or political will to transform their economy and political institutions to bring benefit to their citizens and the world community. If going to war brought with it good consequences like these, then we might think these good reasons to go to war.

Mill disagrees. He argues that battles may be won, but a people’s freedom is to be won only by their own toil: ‘No people ever was and remained free, but because it was determined to be so … for, unless the spirit of liberty is strong in a people, those who have the executive in their hands easily work any institutions to the purposes of despotism’. Thus, freedom is something a people earn and not something they can simply be given by others.

It is true that part of Mill’s argument rests on more than a moral claim about legitimate justifications to invade others and, instead, on an empirical matter of fact: the political stability of a country will be undermined if its freedoms and constitution are imposed from outside and not fought for and developed by a country’s own citizens. Of course, Mill is far from alone in believing history helps to prove his point. In fact, G.W.F. Hegel argues that:

For a constitution is not simply made: it is the work of centuries, the Idea and consciousness of the [nation] … What Napoleon gave to the Spanish was more rational than what they had before, and yet they rejected it as something alien … The constitution of a nation must embody the nation’s feeling for its rights and [present] condition; otherwise it will have no meaning or value.5

If history does prove this view of Hegel’s and Mill’s, then this poses a threat to just war theorists who claim war might be justified in the effort of nation‐building.6 Thus far, the tragic experiences of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria do not yet appear to correct this view even if it is unclear why history has acted with such ‘cunning’.

There is a further powerful argument often made by those who oppose war in general. This argument is made by Albert Camus in his often‐overlooked essay ‘Neither Victims Nor Executioners’.7 Camus also grounds his argument on an empirical claim. He begins by claiming that every war entails a loss of innocent life. That is, every military conflict will involve the deaths of both combatants and innocent non‐combatants without exception, no matter how careful we are to avoid harm to innocents. This, in turn, raises an important consideration that we tend to overlook when deciding whether or not a war is a just war. That is, if it follows that whenever we lend support behind a decision to go to war that will inevitably lead to innocent non‐combatants as a casualty of the conflict, then whenever we support the decision to go to war I am deciding that innocent people elsewhere can be killed. Of course, I would not be choosing which innocent persons were killed during the course of any conflict: these persons would be selected randomly.

Therefore, for Camus, we condemn to death innocent people elsewhere selected at random whenever we support the decision to go to war. These innocent people will become victims of any support of a ‘justified’ war and we become their executioner: these innocent people might live if only we had not supported military conflict. Camus then makes a startling argument. If I am to ever support a decision to go to war, then I must likewise be willing to become an innocent non‐combatant death during this war.8 For Camus, I am inconsistent at best (and immoral at worst) to support a war that will have the consequence of the innocent deaths of randomly selected civilians if I were unwilling to die similarly from such an attack. Camus importantly reminds us that the decision to go to war is more than an intellectual exercise. Innocent people die in every conflict. In supporting a conflict, we must be willing not only to support the deaths of these innocent victims, but be willing to die ourselves – taking personal responsibility for our choice – as an innocent victim of their military if all innocent people share equal moral worth. Camus concludes that pacificism is the only path where all human beings are ‘neither victims nor executioners’ and we escape this moral problem. Whether or not we are persuaded by this argument, Camus does well to highlight an important consideration that is too often overlooked. Indeed, the main casualties of every conflict seem always to be the innocent.

Philosophers in the past have made important contributions to how we think about issues in the present and most especially on the justifiability of war. At present, politicians have argued for just war as a response to terrorism. This has offered many problems of its own. The first problem is perhaps definitional, namely, what precisely is terrorism? For one thing, terrorism appears to be rather similar to sedition and treason. In other words, terrorism seems to be a distinctly political activity aimed at political change. The traitor is interested in betraying his country, contributing to its demise. Those engaged in sedition aspire to undermine their political leaders.

And, yet, terrorism seems much more. For one thing, ‘terror’ seems essential to ‘terrorism’. Indeed, an act that did not attempt to instil fear might be best categorised rather differently. If a person was involved in a random murder spree, then we would understand that person to be a murderer, not a terrorist. However, we might then think that what makes a terrorist is not simply causing terror but intending to cause terror. In other words, we might think that a person or group of persons must intend to cause terror for their act to be a terrorist act. However, David Rodin persuasively argues that what such persons intend is immaterial: we can be terrorists without intending to cause terror (Chapter 32). Just as we might be found guilty of murder if we killed someone through reckless or negligent behaviour, Rodin believes that terrorism is terrorism even if performed out of recklessness or negligence.

The next question concerns whether or not such activities might ever be justified. If innocent non‐combatants can become legitimate military targets, then we might wonder if it follows that they can become legitimate terrorist targets. Terrorism does not aim exclusively at spreading terror, but its victims are often innocent non‐combatants. If their deaths can be justified at all, then perhaps they can become legitimate targets for terrorists. Saul Smilansky examines the major cases of terrorism in the world today, such as the activities of the Irish Republican Army, Palestinian liberation fighters, and al‐Qaeda (chapter 33). In all cases, Smilansky argues that these groups lack justification for their terror. This is not to say that he then believes terrorism is never justified; instead, he argues it is only justified in response to a clear and present danger. That said, a strong reason to argue against ever legitimising terrorism is that the vast majority of what passes for terrorism is unjustified.

III

In his Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes makes several fundamental contributions to how we conceive international affairs (Chapter 1). Hobbes introduces the idea of ‘a state of nature’: a world without a common source of authoritative power where individuals compete against each other to further their advantage. Hobbes argues that there is no justice in international affairs because there is no world body that can judge whether a state acts rightly or wrongly. Whether or not states should abide by any treaties with other states is a judgement left to individual states. Thus, the international sphere is characterised by anarchy where states compete against one another in pursuit of self‐interest. This classical ‘realist’ understanding of international politics continues to be highly influential to this day.

Moreover, Hobbes offers an important contribution to how we understand sovereignty as well. He argues that a state has legitimate authority over its members if, and only if, it has the consent of all members. This consent takes the form of a social contract where all members consent to the authority of a monarch or assembly. It is now commonplace (and perhaps modern common sense) that any legitimate government remains a sovereign power over its members only if it has the consent of its members. This fact speaks clearly to the great contribution that Hobbes’s work on consent and sovereignty offers us today, raising new questions about justified political authority and rights, if any, to secession and self‐determination (see Part II).

In the late eighteenth century, Immanuel Kant published his Perpetual Peace and this remains a defining moment in the development of work on global justice (Chapter 13). Perpetual Peace marks a distinct departure from Hobbes’s Leviathan. While both agree on the importance of consent, Kant denies that the lack of a world government must lead to international anarchy and the absence of international justice. Instead, Kant argues that a state needs the consent of its people in order for it to justify going to war. However, citizens will only rarely agree to engaging in war given the many costs involved. There will therefore be great pressure to avoid war and create ‘a league of nations’, a body where states engage in diplomacy. A ‘perpetual peace’ amongst states is possible and without a world‐state.

This Kantian view that we can have international justice in the absence of a world‐state is also developed by later writers, such as Charles Beitz (Chapter 2) and Thomas Pogge (Chapter 3), and remains an endearing legacy of Kant’s work. Beitz agrees with Kant against Hobbes: the international sphere may lack a political body with authority over all member states, but it is not a realm of anarchy. In fact, there are a variety of international norms that continue to govern our activities, not least with respect to the rules of war. The fact that we lack a world‐state does not discredit the fact about the absence of anarchy in the international sphere: we are bound by rules that member states should recognise and uphold.

Pogge agrees with this perspective and argues that one important implication is that some states have a negative duty to assist those in severe poverty. Our world is not governed by anarchy nor a world‐state, but a world order that is supported and maintained by wealthy states. This world order contributes to severe poverty in poor states. Wealthy states harm poor states in maintaining a coercive global order that contributes to severe poverty. Wealthy states have a negative duty to refrain from contributing to harm and rectifying the damage caused, eradicating severe poverty. Economic justice is not something that exists alone within a particular state, but something we can extend across borders.

The Hobbesian and Kantian perspectives on international justice present us with two different vantage points with which to consider the international realm. The Hobbesian is largely nationalist, claiming no duties to distant others beyond a state’s borders. My duties are only to my countrymen with whom I share an important relation, namely, our shared identity as citizens of our state. The Kantian is more cosmopolitan. This person argues that the individual person is the highest unity of concern, not the realm of the state. Justice for all exists beyond state borders given that people live in other states and, as people, they are entitled to equal concern and respect. Thus, we should extend equal status to all.

Martha C. Nussbaum argues for a modified cosmopolitanism (Chapter 11).9 She does not deny that we have special connections with those in relation to us, whether family or friends or fellow citizens. What she denies is that we lack any relation to humanity as a whole. Our task, for Nussbaum, is to bring these different layers of connection together so that all share equal status.

What is curious about this debate is how close the two positions might appear. Most nationalists do not deny that we have obligations beyond our borders. Instead, nationalism often amounts to the position that we have obligations to all and special duties to a few, namely, our fellow citizens. Most cosmopolitans, similarly, do not deny that we have special duties to people with whom we share a special connection (see Chapter 14).

For example, suppose our child was drowning in one lake and someone else’s child was drowning in a second lake. We stand equidistant between each drowning child and are only able to rescue one of them. We may believe that each child has an equal moral right to life, while we also believe that, if we must choose to save but one of these lives, we ought to choose to save the life of our own child. In fact, many of us would be uneasy with someone who thought this fact made no difference and used a coin toss to decide whom to save.10 Cosmopolitans might both choose to save their own child and claim all people have an equal right to life. Given these general characterisations, it can be difficult to discriminate sharply between these two views as both most nationalists and most cosmopolitans agree that duties exist beyond our borders and that we have a special connection with those nearest and dearest to us. The difference then only lies with how highly we prize our obligations to compatriots and how strong our commitments to non‐citizens are.

This naturally raises questions about citizenship and immigration. What barriers, if any, should be established for migrants wanting to become full members of a new political community? We do not live in a borderless world. Each polity has developed a view on what is required from migrants to become citizens, as well as the requirements for admission. One issue is to consider the legitimate grounds for excluding individuals from becoming citizens of a new country (see Chapter 18). A second issue is to consider what obligations fall on newcomers – and on the state – when individuals are admitted (see Chapter 17). A third issue considers whether we should have concerns about any clash of culture and identity (see Chapter 19). These issues do not exist in a vacuum and are relevant to wider considerations of justice.

IV

If most commentators on global justice – whether nationalist or cosmopolitan – accept duties to persons elsewhere, then this raises the question of international distributive justice and our obligations to the global poor. The plight of the global poor is perhaps the leading moral problem of our times. Peter Singer argues that we have a duty to extend assistance to the global poor (Chapter 20). If preventing something bad from happening to other people involves relatively minor costs, then we are obliged to act and prevent harm. Thus, wealthy nations that can alleviate global poverty are under an obligation to the poor as the costs are relatively minor. Singer’s work was revolutionary at the time and heralded a new attention to issues of global justice.

Of course, we may have a moral obligation to the global poor that requires us to contribute help whether or not it is a positive duty as conceived by Singer. For example, David Miller argues that states have ‘remedial’ responsibilities to provide support to those in severe poverty based on several factors, such as their causal or moral responsibility for the poverty, the ability to provide remedy, shared culture or history, and geographical proximity (Chapter 21). We weigh these factors together and assign responsibilities to rescue based on these connections.

But we might go further. Thom Brooks notes that these different connections are not of the same weight as an inability to provide remedy would rule out any state from providing support whatever the relative strength of other connections.11 Moreover, Brooks highlights that not only states can provide rescue and, in some specific circumstances, we might prefer non‐states to act. Therefore, Miller’s connection theory of remedial responsibilities extends beyond nations and states providing a greater reach. Our practices matter and can help shape how we support and implement global justice (see Chapter 24).

Some argue, following Thomas Nagel, that whatever the institutions we will need in order to bring about greater global equality we must recognise that these institutions will be first unjust and serve the interests of affluent states before contributing to the cause of good (chapter 23). The path to justice must lead through injustice. Once these institutions are in place (even if most likely for less justified reasons) then and only then can a global institutional order be constructed that can address global inequalities, such as global poverty.

Nevertheless, even if we have international institutions that might help facilitate our effectively providing resources to the poor, a question still remains as to how we should best choose these resources. For example, Amartya Sen argues that we should not look at development solely in terms of resources. He reminds us that a lack of resources does not explain, say, long life expectancy, literacy, and other features that we expect to find only in affluent, not poor, communities. Instead, we can locate communities that are financially prosperous who score low on these counts and communities who are not financially prosperous who score well.

For example, the United States is wealthier and possesses more resources than either Kerala, India, or China and, yet, the survival rates of African American men fare worse than men in Kerala, China, and white men in the United States. Instead of focusing only on resources, we should adopt a view of ‘poverty as a deprivation of basic capabilities, rather than merely as low income’.12 Thus, the best measure of a people’s development is their ability to pursue basic capabilities: development is freedom, not merely resources. Sen’s well‐known and powerful example is that no democracy has ever suffered a famine.13

Most importantly, the use of the capabilities approach is not meant only to provide us with a better understanding of development, but of universal freedom: the capabilities of someone living in the United States are no different for those of us living in the United Kingdom, China, India, or Brazil. Thus, the capability approach is universalistic in its application to all cultures and men equally as women. Governments are under a duty to permit its citizens the opportunities to exercise their capabilities, leaving this choice to the individuals’ discretion.

Thus, one view is that our assistance to others should be aimed at expanding the possibilities that others have to exercise their full range of capabilities. A second view is less ambitious and more traditional: our assistance should be targeted at the protection of human rights or capabilities. Human rights are universal: they are rights that all possess in virtue of being a human being. It makes no difference whether we are rich or poor, tall or short, nor male or female. Our rights are shared in equal measure.

The question is then how to determine what are our human rights. One attempt to set out what are our human rights is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (Chapter 6). The UDHR enshrines a number of rights as the rights of all human beings everywhere as agreed by virtually all countries in the world irrespective of wealth, ethnicity, religion, or continent. These rights include rights, such as less controversial rights to life and employment and more controversial rights to choosing one’s marriage partner. The specification of rights is, of course, itself of tremendous importance given that most of us argue that states possess legitimacy when they respect the rights of their citizens (see Chapters 7 and 8). Similarly, we believe states are damaged when they use torture as torture is a serious abuse of human rights (see Chapter 10)

Leif Wenar examines the nature of rights clarifying our understanding of rights (Chapter 7). He offers us a ‘several functions theory of rights’ where not all ‘Hohfeldian’ incidents are rights, but all rights are incidents.14 Hohfeldian incidents support one or more particular functions, such as the exemption, discretion, authorisation, protection, provision, and performance. Wenar’s several functions theory of rights is meant to overcome ‘single‐function’ theories of rights, such as the will theory (e.g., rights are incidents that offer the rights holder specific varieties of choices) and the interest theory (e.g., rights are incidents that further the well‐being of the rights holder). A several functions theory can acknowledge that all rights must serve at least one function without claiming that all rights must serve at least a particular function.

Of course, a several functions theory (or, indeed, a theory of capabilities) does not reject the possibility of non‐individualistic rights. One importance of rights is that they capture something of significance to human beings (see Chapter 8). Part of what is of significance to us is our identity in particular groups. According to Peter Jones, if this view is correct, then rights can belong both to individuals and the groups to which they belong (Chapter 9). That is, we have individual rights – and group rights.

But although these various contributions support our making great strides of progress in better understanding global justice, there might be some areas that appear overlooked. The first is the curiosity of how non‐global our theories of global justice are. Too often we work out from within our own approaches as part of a particular philosophical tradition various norms to be applied globally. It raises questions of why only the approaches or resources found in one tradition should help determine our views on justice for all individuals no matter their traditions. Thom Brooks has these concerns and claims we should offer a more ‘global’ view of global justice (Chapter 16). Traditions should engage with one another and share philosophical resources where relevant to help address global problems. In this way, a more global philosophy might emerge which is better suited to these issues.

We might believe something is missing in what has been said thus far. Global justice may demand that we have duties to those in dire need. It may demand that protect the rights and capabilities of all. However, we must not only give special concern to the plight of the global poor who so often visibly command our attention, but also to the status of women who seem almost invisible in far too many discussions of global justice. Indeed, women make up half the world’s population and yet they possess secondary status everywhere. For nearly every state, no woman has held top positions of power and many of the few occasions where women have so risen it is as a widow or daughter of an important previous male politician.

We might suppose that a greater respect for women would entail a greater respect for group rights and multiculturalism. Full respect of groups, such as women and multicultural groups, may help correct the problem of a male‐dominated society that has harmed the status of women and these groups. Susan Moller Okin alerts us to an important reservation that a respect for multiculturalism may be harmful to women (Chapter 34). Her argument is that many groups perpetuate violations of the rights of women, taking the form of practices such as female genital mutilation, polygamy, forced marriages, and much worse.15 The fact that these practices are part of a culture is an insufficient reason to respect the right of a culture to continue such practices. We harm the rights of women if we permit these group rights. Instead, we should only respect group rights insofar as they do not violate individual rights, not least the rights of women.

Gender inequalities take shape on the global stage as well. Okin points out that our theories about development do not account for the gendered practices and discriminatory division of labour that we find globally (Chapter 35). Gender is central to our understanding of severe poverty and must be recognised as such. In direct reply, Nussbaum advocates her capabilities approach as sufficiently responsive to cultural differences and the specificity of women living in developing countries (Chapter 36). If we seek to better allow the voices of the poor and disadvantaged to be heard in promoting global justice, then Nussbaum claims we should endorse her capabilities approach as the best way forward.

V

The final section of this Reader focuses on climate change. There is an increasingly rich and diverse literature erupting in this area worthy of concern and interest. Indeed, issues of environmental justice are certain to gain an increasing priority in our discussions of justice as the signs of environmental degradation become ever clearer.

But what to do? This requires a firmer handle on the kind of problem that climate change poses for us. Stephen Gardiner argues that it is a perfect moral storm of epic proportions. He refers to the tragedy of the commons, whereby our increasing consumption of resources through population growth undermines sustainability (Chapter 37). Gardiner rightly notes the issue is not so much the population number, but its total environmental impact.

Part of this impact is intergenerational. This is because a key source of impact on the environment comes from carbon emissions. The problem is that these emissions can remain in the atmosphere for several decades. This raises the issue of how we might assign ‘just emissions’ considered by Simon Caney in Chapter 38. How should we distribute the right to emit greenhouse gases against the backdrop of the responsibility to reduce these emissions? Caney considers various critiques and argues against any equal per capita basis. However, any such distribution must not be determined separately, in his view, from other issues of justice.

One criticism of all of these views is that they tend to see environmental degradation as an exclusively anthropocentric problem where the only harms we consider are to human beings, not nature itself. Indeed, this may strike us as a curious position to take as surely part of the damage caused by environmental degradation is the harm caused to the earth’s creatures and landscape. Moreover, it may strike us that if human activities contribute to global climate change and if this change has resulted in harm to human beings, then it does not necessarily follow that we should then pollute the planet less than we do. If the problem is the harm caused to fellow human beings through rising sea levels, higher rates of cholera, and withering crops, then one solution is to resolve these harms: we might relocate threatened coastal communities, provide free inoculations to all, and create new genetically modified crops that can survive in greater heat in more arid climates. If harm to human beings is the problem, then one solution is to stop generating harms by addressing the problem of climate change. Or perhaps a second solution is to make the planet more adaptable to climate change.

Thom Brooks makes a wide‐ranging critique developing these problems in rejecting proposed policy ideas by political theorists for combatting climate change (Chapter 39