The Invisible Hands E-Book

Steven Drobny

• Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
• Kategorie: Fachliteratur
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 700

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2013

Beschreibung

Hedge fund managers who survived and profited through the 2008 financial crisis share their secrets

In light of the colossal losses and amidst the resulting confusion that still lingers, it is time to rethink money management in the broadest of terms. Drastic changes still need to be made, and managers who actually made money during 2008 make for a logical starting place.

This updated and revised edition of The Invisible Hands provides investors and traders with the latest thinking from some of the best and the most successful players in money management, highlighting the specific risk and return objectives of each, and discussing the evolution of certain styles and beliefs in money management.

• Divulges how top financial professionals are looking forward by thinking clearly, managing risk, and seeking a new paradigm of profit making opportunities in the post-crisis world
• Outlines investments and strategies for the rocky road ahead
• Gives guidance on how traditional investors such as pensions, endowments, foundations and family offices should rethink how they approach asset allocation and portfolio construction
• Written by respected industry expert Steven Drobny

Page by page, the professionals found in this book reveal their own approaches to markets, risk, and the broader world in which we live, as well as their advice on how investors should be approaching money management in today's uncertain world.

Leseprobe

Contents

Cover

Title Page

Copyright

Dedication

Epigraph

Foreword to the 2011 Edition

Foreword to the 2010 Edition

Preface

Preface to the 2011 Edition

Preface to the 2010 Edition

Part One: Real Money and the Crash of ‘08

Chapter 1: Rethinking Real Money

I. Why Real Money?

II. The Evolution of Real Money

III. RETHINKING REAL MONEY—MACRO PRINCIPLES

Chapter 2: The Family Office Manager

Part Two: The Invisible Hands

Chapter 3: The House

Chapter 4: The Philosopher

Chapter 5: The Bond Trader

Chapter 6: The Professor

Chapter 7: The Commodity Trader

Chapter 8: The Commodity Investor

Chapter 9: The Commodity Hedger

Chapter 10: The Equity Trader

Chapter 11: The Predator

Chapter 12: The Plasticine Macro Trader

Part Three: Final Word

Chapter 13: The Pensioner

Conclusion

Acknowledgments

Bibliography

About the Author

Index

Cover Design: Wiley

Cover Image: © iStockphoto.com / abzee

Copyright © 2010, 2011, 2014 by Steven Drobny. All rights reserved.

Published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken, New Jersey. Published simultaneously in Canada.

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For the taxpayer.

The whole problem with the world is that fools and fanatics are always so certain of themselves, but wiser people so full of doubts.

—Bertrand Russell

Investors are the big gamblers. They make a bet, stay with it, and if it goes the wrong way, they lose it all.

—Jesse Livermore

Only after disaster can we be resurrected.

—Tyler Durden

Argue for your limitations and they're yours.

—Richard Bach

The truth always happens.

—Peter Tunney

Foreword to the 2011 Edition

I first met Steven Drobny in Milan in 2005, when he invited me to deliver the keynote address at a global macro hedge fund conference he was hosting. I was bearish on the global economy at the time, as I had been looking beneath the speculative frenzy that was driving the booming real estate and asset markets around the world. As is often the case in good times, few people paid heed to my doomsayer views, preferring instead to indulge the environment of easy money and write me off as an out-of-touch academic. I thus became accustomed to being the dark cloud at the party.

Before arriving in Milan, I was expecting more of the same: a group of successful, self-congratulatory hedge fund managers who in truth were only riding the loose credit wave by being long stocks, long credit, and long illiquid assets. To my surprise, this was not at all what I found in the Drobny crowd of predominantly global macro managers. Rather, these managers seemed to be on the same page as me, with the discussions focusing on growing macroeconomic imbalances, building credit concerns, housing bubbles, and other systemic issues with deep and far-reaching consequences for the global economy as a whole.

Although the boom would persist stubbornly for another year, the problems discussed at the conference only increased, becoming exacerbated by the very fact that they continued longer than they should have. Ultimately, it all ended in tears during the 2007--2008 meltdown and ensuing credit crisis, whereby those riding the beta trades dependent upon easy money were cleaned out. I was not at all surprised to see that many of the best-performing hedge funds through the crisis were run by some of the savvy managers whom I had met in Milan.

Fast-forward to today and the crash of 2008 seems a distant memory, as unprecedented government response has showered liquidity on markets in the form of tax cuts, bail-ins, bailouts, interest rate cuts (often to zero), credit extensions, guarantees, and other measures, all of which have been packaged in a panoply of acronyms dreamed up in the halls of Washington, Beijing, and Brussels. Stock markets have rallied, with many indexes doubling from their lows; credit spreads have narrowed to pre-Lehman levels; and extreme volatility has softened considerably. In short, investor complacency has returned. But the global economy is far from recovered, and the underlying systemic issues have not gone away.

The big question that remains is whether the economic recovery is sustainable after the massive government stimulus---monetary and fiscal---is withdrawn, or financial markets will wake up and realize that the big systemic risks still remain. Governments have merely kicked the can down the road, transferring private-sector debt to the public sector and piling public leverage on top of private. And we are already seeing some of the implications of this manifested in the sovereign crises of Iceland and the PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain); higher commodity prices globally; and the threat of inflation coming back in both emerging and developed markets. Although zero interest rates made things look better for a while, at some point policy rates will have to normalize and the fiscal drug will have to be withdrawn. At the same time, geopolitical risks are rising, starting with the domino effect of uprisings in the Middle East, which are causing oil prices to spike and potentially trigger a stagflationary shock. As Ian Bremmer and I discussed in our recent Foreign Affairs piece (March/April 2011), we live in a G-Zero world, not a G-20 world, in which there is no global leadership and there is rather much conflict among great powers about macro, financial, and security issues. Much disagreement surrounds monetary and fiscal policy, exchange rates, trade, global climate change, food and energy security, the reform of supervision and regulation of financial institutions, the redesign of the international monetary system, and global security issues. It is in such a G-Zero world that the great powers see most issues as a zero-sum game, rather than a positive-sum game.

Unlike many books that have appeared in the wake of the crisis, which explain or analyze the events of the past, Steven Drobny's book, The Invisible Hands, takes lessons from the past and then looks to the future to examine how all investors can take a risk-based approach to portfolio management that will allow them to navigate what I see as an increasingly volatile road ahead. Economies from Spain to Japan to the United States eventually have to stand on their own feet without government support, and must face investors who are looking for returns commensurate with the risks they undertake. The lessons from Iceland, Greece, and Ireland may well prove to be a warning shot in the same way that issues in subprime mortgages foreshadowed what was to transpire more broadly.

We in the macro community are often decried for our obsession with doom; macroeconomics is the dismal science, after all. But it is not about doom; it is about observing reality and being aware of the tail risks, the “white swan” crises---as I define them in my recent book, Crisis Economics---which now occur with increasing frequency and virulence. It is this very objectivity that forces me to continually focus on the downside risks, something that enabled me to correctly articulate the events of 2007--2008. It is not easy to be early in identifying potential risks, but it is essential for global investors today to make that the first step in their investment process. Steven Drobny has spent considerable time and attention reexamining portfolio issues in the real money community, with special focus on risk management. All investors would be wiser for reading this book. It could prove valuable in mitigating the pain that is sure to be ahead when the next crisis comes, which could well make 2008 look rather benign, after all.

Nouriel Roubini New York February 2011

Foreword to the 2010 Edition

Question: What is the difference between a Peruvian peasant farmer and a Harvard or Yale endowment manager?

Answer: The peasant is the one who understands risk-sensitive investing and sound investment goals.

That question and answer illustrate why I, as a mere impractical academic historian, find the practical world of investment fascinating.

I got my first peek into the mystery-wrapped world of hedge funds several years ago, when Steven Drobny invited me to give the opening address at his annual conference for hedge fund managers. That initial peek aroused my curiosity. It led me to return to his conference in the following year as an observer, to meet some of Steven's colleagues and invited managers, to read Steven's previous book, Inside the House of Money, and to enjoy brunches with Steven from time to time, where we talk about anything from hedge funds and raising children to fixing the world.

One reason why I became fascinated in the world of investing was the parallels that I saw between investing and history. The issue of risk is acute in both of those spheres. Endowment and hedge fund managers evaluate upside and downside risk to the money they manage for other people, and they make or lose money as a result of those evaluations. The historical and modern peoples whom I study assess upside and downside risk to their own resources that they manage, and they and their families survive or die as a result of those evaluations.

For example, in the Middle Ages, the Norse on the island of Greenland, descended from Viking settlers who colonized Greenland in the year AD 984, made decisions each year about how many of their cows to cull in the fall. They knew the amount of hay that they had harvested during the previous summer, and knew the length of each individual winter (hence the demand for hay to feed the cows over the winter) over many past decades, but did not know the length of the particular winter lying ahead. If they still had hay left in the spring, that meant that they had culled a certain unnecessary quantity of cows, and they could have brought more cows through the winter, then produced more milk, cheese, and meat as a result and been less hungry the following year. If they instead found themselves running out of hay during the winter, that meant they had culled too few cows in the fall, meaning they would have to start sacrificing cows in the winter, ending up with fewer cows in the spring than if they had culled more cows already in the fall.

For about 376 years, the Greenland Norse made those annual decisions about risk-sensitive investment in cow herds sufficiently well that they flourished. But around year AD 1360 there was a particularly cold series of winters for which their hay gamble proved to be a bad miscalculation, with the result that all their cows died during one winter, and all of the thousand or so Norse of Greenland's Western Settlement starved to death in the late winter. Hedge fund managers will undoubtedly empathize with the dilemma that the Norse faced, and with their temptation to be greedy and to invest in many cows in their winter herd. But managers will be grateful, when their own risk calculations prove to be in error, that they themselves lose only their investors' money and don't lose their own lives.

Another reason why I was fascinated with what I learned about the world of investments was the parallels between investment managers and modern farming peoples. For instance, studies of modern Peruvian peasants resolved a mystery that long puzzled medieval historians, and that should have puzzled college investment managers. Each medieval peasant family didn't cultivate one large plot of ground; instead, they cultivated up to several dozen little strips of land scattered in several different directions from their hut, despite the obvious inefficiency of wasting time on traveling and carrying supplies between strips, as well as the waste of land inevitably left uncultivated at boundaries between adjacent strips belonging to different peasants. A possible explanation for the peasants' apparently irrationally stupid behavior was that they were practicing the virtue of diversification praised by modern financial managers: don't put all your eggs in one basket but instead diversify your portfolio. In any given year, all the strips in a single field may fail because of pest infestation, local climate, or thieves. You (the peasant family) are less likely to starve if you plant different scattered strips.

That idea of diversification is plausible, but only recently did economic historians and agronomists discover how sophisticated are the underlying calculations performed unconsciously by peasants. Modern Peruvian peasants scatter their strips of land as did medieval English peasants. Any individual Peruvian peasant owns between 9 and 26 different strips, whose yields of potatoes and other crops vary from year to year independently of each other and partly unpredictably. The peasants can't store significant quantities of potatoes from one year to the next; their food needs have to be satisfied by the current year's harvest. In analogy to the medieval Norse farmers' need for hay, the modern Peruvian peasants must succeed in obtaining a certain minimum potato harvest amounting to about 680,000 calories in every single year, otherwise they and their families end up starving. For 20 different peasants owning a total of 488 strips, the anthropologist Carol Goland measured the potato yields in successive years, then used those measured years to calculate the yield that each peasant would have harvested each year by cultivating only 1, or 2, or 3… etc. strips, with total area held constant but with yield per acre equal to the value for each possible combination of the 1, 2, 3 etc. actual strips. She also measured the calories invested in travel between 1, 2, 3… strips, in order to obtain the net calories remaining to the peasant for each combination.

Four interesting conclusions emerged from Goland's study. First, the long-term time-averaged potato harvest decreased with subdivision of the peasant's land, in agreement with the expectations of horrified western agronomists who urged the peasants to consolidate their strips, and for several reasons including wasted travel time. Second, the year-to-year variance in potato harvest decreased with increasing subdivision of the peasant's land, as expected from the principle ``don't put all your eggs in one basket.'' But, because of that variance, the third conclusion was that the frequency of the years with a harvest so low as to cause starvation was highest for a single strip and decreased with subdivision to reach zero at a certain number of strips varying between 4 and 13, depending on the particular peasant's land. Finally, each individual peasant planted 2 or 3 strips more than the number required to reduce the risk of starvation to zero.

In short, the peasants do not aim at maximizing long-term time-averaged yield, even though that is an appropriate goal for investors not spending their earnings and just investing to pay for luxuries on a rainy day in the distant future. Instead, the peasants only maximize long-term yield insofar as that is consistent with their overriding goal of eliminating their risk of starving in any given year, and throwing in a small safety margin for that calculation. It seems to me that the Harvard and Yale endowment managers are in a position analogous to that of the peasants, and would have done better to set a goal of maximizing yield only above a certain minimal level. As a Harvard graduate myself, I receive my college's periodic mailings, the tone of which has recently changed from pride in Harvard's wisdom to tales of woe. Harvard, like Peruvian peasants, uses endowment income for current needs; in fact, as it turns out, a considerable fraction of college expenses is paid from the endowment each year. As a result, Harvard has had to impose a hiring freeze, and recently it had to cancel its plan for a new science campus.

Naturally, Peruvian peasants did not perform the sophisticated statistical analysis that Carol Goland performed retrospectively. Instead, they arrived at their solution of optimizing strip numbers to avoid starvation on the basis of long experience. They had observed some greedy but lazy peasants with overconsolidated holdings who glutted themselves for many years, only to starve to death in a bad year. Likewise, they observed other peasants with overspread holdings who never starved but also never glutted, while still others discovered a happy medium of strip numbers that permitted frequent modest gluts and never any starvation. Should you suspect that the peasants really did use a pocket calculator and a friendly visiting mathematical modeler, birds such as sparrows, which certainly don't have pocket calculators, also make similar risk-sensitive decisions such that they are never starving.

Steven Drobny's latest book is about the Peruvian peasants of the hedge-fund world: that minority of managers who made money or at least preserved capital during the Annus horribilis of 2008, while greedier managers who had accumulated major gluts and perhaps even achieved higher long-term time-averaged returns in previous happy years lost disastrously or went bankrupt. Hence, anyone interested in the world of finance and making money will pour over this book to extract some powerful lessons: What can I do to emulate those successful guys and gals in order to make money or preserve capital, even under the worst conditions, and become rich and famous?

But this book will also fascinate anyone interested in people. My other interest in the hedge fund world is for that reason. When Steven Drobny introduced me to his world of colleagues and clients, I found myself comparing them with the many creative scientists, architects, composers, artists, and business people whom I have interviewed. I wondered: What makes these people tick? How did their childhood experiences shape their adult professional success? Because a person's abilities change with age, do most hedge fund managers become washed up by age 40, or does a 60-year-old manager still have ways of succeeding in a world of cutthroat young managers who need less sleep and who received a more recent technological education? Are they managing money in order to become rich, to stoke their ego, to acquire flashy cars and supermodel dates, or to satisfy some other motivation?

With Steven Drobny's kind help, I interviewed some hedge fund managers (including a couple that Steven interviewed for this book) just for my own curiosity. I was struck by the fact that, although all the managers were quite different from each other, each had a broader life philosophy that he or she applied to the world of hedge funds in particular. Each had childhood experiences, things that their parents did or didn't do for them, that shaped them as future managers, although their parents could have hardly anticipated that outcome. All of them became managers partly for fun and curiosity. They want to understand how the world works, and they want to keep testing their evolving hypotheses about the world's workings against reality. All are still active in their 40s, 50s, and 60s. Yes, the 28-year-old whiz kids can get by with less sleep, while saddled with less knowledge about dated technologies, and have been schooled in the latest technologies. But ``older'' managers whom I interviewed enjoyed the advantage of having used their years to try out more things, and having seen more ups and downs. They are in the position of the peasant who remembers that dry summer 17 years ago, and who isn't deceived by the recent runs of wet summers into assuming that summer will always be wet. Some of the managers whom I met expect still to be managing money when they are 80 years old. They fulfilled their own lifetime financial needs long ago, but they may never fulfill their curiosity about how the world works, nor the fun they derive from testing their ideas.

My own interviews were casual ones, by an interviewer (i.e., me) ignorant of the subject matter. Steven Drobny's book consists of 12 long interviews with global macro hedge fund managers. No one is better qualified than Steven to probe the subject matter, and to place his interviewed managers in a broad context, both as investors and as human beings. Whether you are curious about money or people, you are certain to love this book.

Jared Diamond Professor of Geography and Environment Health Sciences, UCLA Author of numerous books including Guns, Germs and Steel; Collapse; The Third Chimpanzee; and Why Is Sex Fun?

Preface

This book was written in 2009, largely inspired as a response to widespread losses the prior year suffered by all types of investors, but especially real money portfolios (pensions, university endowments, sovereign wealth funds, foundations, family offices, and other asset managers). Risk management had been grossly neglected in the run-up to the crisis by almost everyone, and 2008 sent most investors scrambling to stem losses.

Fast-forward to 2013 and the U.S. economy appears to be the healthiest in the world, the S&P is at all-time highs, and quantitative easing seems to have helped avert most worst-case scenarios. Conventional wisdom is that everything is happening in due course: the world was overlevered, a crash ensued, we’re making our way through the adjustment process, and everything will ultimately be fine. Very few investors have used 2008 to do necessary introspection on their investment processes and risk management procedures. In the course of my research for this book, I asked the chief investment officer (CIO) of a triple-digit billion-dollar pension fund what he would have done differently in 2007 with perfect hindsight, and he didn't have an answer. Four years later, I suspect he still doesn't have an answer.

Most real money investors today are patting themselves on the back because they've “recovered” and are at or near their asset highs. Yet this comes after six years spent in a drawdown. Meanwhile, liabilities continue to grow. An 8 percent assumed rate of return compounded over 6 years is almost +60 percent. If net asset value peaked in 2007, then they are less than halfway from where they need to be from an actuarial perspective. And they are not at all prepared for another 2008.

Led by their consultants, lay boards, and committees, real money investors remain stuck in their antiquated ways. They still view their investments from a notional allocation standpoint, and diversify their holdings by asset class names, not by underlying risk characteristics. Most have their assets in U.S. equities, global equities, private equity, venture equity, real assets, credit, and equity long/short funds, yet think that they're diversified because each of these categories has a different color on their pie charts. Unsurprisingly, they have an extremely high correlation to public equities. One large pension fund, for example, has had a 0.96 correlation with the S&P over the past 30 years.

The choice for real money investors going forward is: look in the mirror and accept the fact that they are essentially running one principal bet, or roll up their sleeves and effectuate change. If the status quo is accepted, then all external managers, in-house staff including the CIO, fancy offices, and consultants should be immediately cut loose, as their input is no longer required and their fees and costs are a tremendous drag on returns. A simple exchange-traded fund or cheap swap would do the trick. Alternatively, taking action requires a fundamental rethink of their entire approach.

The Invisible Hands sought to address such structural issues in the U.S. pension system and real money investing community, trying to learn from global macro hedge fund managers who, by and large, were the better-performing funds during 2008.

After years of researching this topic, talking with investors, watching behavior, and reviewing annual letters and other performance material, the path to success is now quite clear to me. Mind you, this is not a solution but, rather, a road map or process. There is no magic bullet. Success in real money management requires:

A strong, decisive investment board (ideally with a single, risk-loving patriarch).A skilled, well-compensated, and properly incentivized investment team.A risk management process that focuses on true risk exposures.A heavy reliance on inexpensive beta to attain various risk exposures.A low reliance on external managers who charge high fees.When external managers are used, there should be a requirement that value is derived from leveraging information and opportunities across the policy portfolio.A strong understanding for the value of liquidity.A relevant cash position at all times.And, finally, extreme scenario testing.

That said, as I write, however, complacency reigns. As equity markets grind higher, why worry about another 2008? The authorities have proven that they will do whatever it takes to avoid dealing with the true structural problems. Thus, investors must embrace moral hazard in order to navigate the environment.

While it is far easier to forget the painful lessons of 2008 and relegate a macro risk framework to the dustbin, a macro approach to money management is arguably more relevant now than ever. Quantitative easing is coming to an end, and tremendous uncertainty exists everywhere. No one is prepared for another crisis. We are in uncharted waters, making these interviews with managers who navigated 2008 more relevant than ever.

Steven Drobny Malibu, California August 2013

Preface to the 2011 Edition

This book was originally conceived in the dark days of spring 2009, when the Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500 index hit a low of 666. The idea was born of two conversations: one with Joseph Dear, chief investment officer of the California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS), and another with the former manager of a major U.S. university endowment. Both managers conceded that the model of real money management, as it was being implemented at the time, was broken. Yet they bemoaned the fact that no new model had emerged.

From those two conversations, I naively thought that I had the new model, although my model was less an asset allocation formula than a framework, a thought process. I figured, in a globalized, interconnected world where massive amounts of capital flow anywhere with the push of a button, and where risks spring up suddenly and abruptly, that the static, backward-looking approach to asset allocation employed by so many real money players made little sense. A global macro-style approach seemed the only sensible way to manage real money pools, regardless of the size of the capital base. Starting from this basic premise, I sought out people much smarter than me for further clarity and confirmation, the results of which comprise the conversations in this book.

Since the release of the original edition of The Invisible Hands, reactions to the book and to the crisis of 2008 have been bifurcated. On the one hand, many investors have made no changes to their approach and are carrying on as if nothing ever happened. They chalk up the crisis as a once-in-a-hundred-years event and forget about it. On the other hand, a few investors are thinking more deeply about portfolio construction with a sharp eye on risk management, liquidity, and the opportunity set going forward. The striking difference can be seen in real time by comparing the two largest university endowments: Yale and Harvard. These two endowments were managed in a similar style prior to the 2008 crisis, and suffered similar fates: losses in the 30 percent range, drastic cuts to university spending, and other changes at the institutional level (such as lowering the thermostats or cutting hot breakfasts to save money). Both universities also issued debt to cover cash shortfalls, in effect further levering the institutions and arguably limiting the losses on the endowment portfolios, since further forced sales of assets at distressed prices were avoided. Postcrisis, however, their approaches have diverged dramatically. Yale Endowment, according to the 2009 annual report, has stuck to its guns, maintaining that over the long term, illiquid equity and equity-like instruments are the best way to generate returns. Meanwhile, Harvard Management Company, according to its 2010 annual report, began to rethink the road ahead, bringing more money management duties in-house, tightening up risk management, reducing leverage, and increasing liquidity and cash.

The jury is still out on who will be proven right, as many positions entered into before 2008 remain on the books with uncertain valuations, and no clear set of best practices for real money management have emerged. But after spending a year of my life researching what I had previously considered to be the most boring aspect of finance, it is now very clear to me that understanding the implications of real money management is of the utmost importance. One only needs to open a newspaper to read about underfunded pensions, municipal finance deficits, and a myriad of other fiscal problems to understand how important these issues have become. Indeed, the recently issued report from the Little Hoover Commission on public pensions concludes that “pension costs will crush government” and “barring a miraculous market advance, few government entities---especially at the local level---will be able to absorb the blow without severe cuts to services.”

Since my initial conversations in spring 2009, equity and credit markets have largely recovered. Nevertheless, many pensions remain drastically underfunded and most real money funds are still well below their peak asset levels prior to the crisis. Still, what would you do if you could go back to 2007 and reposition your portfolio? Given current market levels, thanks to government (i.e., taxpayer) generosity, we essentially do have this opportunity. The interviews contained in this book offer a multitude of ideas on how certain key concepts in macro investing can be incorporated in all real money investment portfolios. Given the myriad of risks in the world, from sovereign default to commodity price inflation to unrest in the Middle East to other looming, potential issues, it seems that a forward-looking, risk-based, global macro approach to real money management is the only viable option left.

Steven Drobny Manhattan Beach, California February 2011

Preface to the 2010 Edition

2008 was an unmitigated disaster for most investors, including unlevered “real money” investors---the focus of this book. Markets around the world, from real estate to equities to commodities to credit, posted huge declines, taking down with them some of the world's most venerable financial institutions, a wide variety of alternative asset managers (hedge funds, private equity, venture capital, and real asset managers), and a host of real money accounts (pension funds, insurance companies, endowments, foundations, family offices, and sovereign wealth funds). Almost everyone lost money in 2008, and in many cases more than anyone imagined possible.

Anger and confusion linger in the aftermath of the crisis, but are by no means limited to market players. Main Street is reeling as homes and jobs have been lost, savings have evaporated, and many assumptions governing the stability of modern society have been challenged. Governments around the world have responded with all sorts of innovative monetary and fiscal stimulus, generating even more uncertainty about the future. At the same time, the social contracts between governments and their citizens are being called into question as Social Security, health care, and pensions loom as potential financial crises for the taxpayer.

Meanwhile, a full year after the crash of `08, nearly everyone in the markets---from savvy hedge fund managers to small private investors with retirement accounts to policy makers---still struggle to understand what went wrong. While the debate over who or what deserves blame will likely rage for decades, the world has not ended and investors must now adapt and adjust to the new reality. The crisis of 2008 has called many investment mantras into question---notably the Endowment Model (diversifying into illiquid equity and equity-like investments) and others including stocks for the long term, buy the dip, buy and hold, and dollar cost averaging---yet no new model has taken root. The crisis of 2008 did, however, supply the financial community with an abundance of new information with regards to portfolio construction, in particular around risk, liquidity, and time horizons.

After such an extreme year in the markets, reactions in the real money world have been polarized: some have learned valuable lessons and are incorporating them in their approach, whereas others are operating as if it is business as usual, completely dismissing 2008 as a one-in-a-hundred-year storm that has passed. Although this latter camp may well prove correct in the near-term, history has taught us that extreme events happen more frequently than predicted, both on the downside and the upside. What if 2010 or 2011 offers an environment similar to or worse than 2008? Ignoring or discounting the lessons of 2008 is quite simply poor risk management.

One of the more significant questions facing all investors is whether a three-decade tail wind for risk assets---due to falling inflation and declining interest rates---could be over, now that the main economic blocks (United States, Europe, Japan) have no inflation and near-zero interest rates. Fiscal deficits, increasing public sector debts, private sector deleveraging, and populist and protectionist politics around the globe all point to increased volatility and a move away from “price stability.” Still, real money accounts have an overwhelming proportion of their portfolio in equity and equity-like investments.

The status quo for real money management is no longer tenable. It is not acceptable to obscure losses and volatility behind benchmarks, long-term time horizons, or relative performance numbers. Losing less than peers or benchmarks does not provide the annual cash flow needs of pensioners, universities, and charities. Poor portfolio construction by these funds creates a potential cost to society and the taxpayer that is too great to ignore.

“The most powerful force in the world is compound interest,” Albert Einstein is said to have declared. However, he neglected to mention that avoiding large drawdowns---which can wipe out years of performance---is an important implicit part of this phenomenon. Building better portfolios and properly managing risk are the first lines of defense against large drawdowns, which should be the primary concern of anyone managing capital against annual cash needs.

It is time to rethink real money management, and a good place to start is with portfolio managers who fared well in 2008, either by posting strong performance or by preserving capital. Risk management was the key differentiator and global macro hedge fund managers were, in aggregate, one of the few investment categories that managed risk effectively through the crisis. Although there is always a wide disparity in performance among global macro managers due to its broad mandate, there was a clear delineation in 2008: funds that focused on risk made money or at least preserved capital, whereas most funds that remained entrenched in long-held views suffered debilitating losses. Because my professional network includes many of the world's leading global macro hedge fund managers, I decided to reach out to those who performed in 2008 to see if any lessons were transferable to real money and other investors.

My last book, Inside the House of Money: Top Hedge Fund Traders on Profiting in the Global Markets (John Wiley & Sons), published in 2006, captured the process behind global macro investing through a series of interviews with some of the top global macro hedge fund traders at the time. Many of these managers foresaw the coming credit crunch, and elements of this foresight were captured through the animated discussions in the book. This book seeks to ignite a discussion about portfolio management in light of the lessons learned in 2008. Through another series of interviews, this time with top global hedge fund traders who managed risk well through 2008 and into 2009, the book highlights certain valuable elements of the global macro approach that could be applied to other mandates within money management.

The Invisible Hands begins by defining and discussing the importance of real money management. It then discusses the evolution of real money management and raises some important questions about how real money portfolios are constructed. Next, the experts speak for themselves. First, “The Family Office Manager,” Jim Leitner, addresses the lessons he learned in 2008 and offers his own thoughts on rethinking real money. Next, the “Invisible Hands”---10 anonymous global macro hedge fund managers, the Philosopher, the House, the Professor, et al---discuss how they approach money management, how they managed to make money or avoid large losses in the crisis, and how they would address some of the challenges faced by real money managers. Finally, “The Pensioner” gives a view from the inside of the real money world and offers prescriptions for his peers.

I chose the anonymous route to increase candor as well as keep the focus on the ideas as opposed to the personalities. Many of the managers featured in this book actively shun publicity and have little to gain from revealing their money-making process. Few are seeking new investors and most have seen their assets under management grow dramatically as a result of strong 2008 performance. Nevertheless, they agreed to take part in this project because they recognize the important societal implications of real money performance.

To give some context amidst the anonymity, the hedge funds represented by the 10 anonymous managers herein manage over $100 billion of capital. The interviewees represent half a dozen different nationalities, and are based in various financial centers around the world. All have strong historical track records and all but two of the managers made money in 2008, with the exceptions still having preserved capital, finishing the year roughly flat (i.e., percentage losses in the single digits). None of the managers had a good year in 2008 that stood out against their historical performance due to either one significant bet or a longstanding bearish bias. This is a collection of discussions with outstanding risk managers.

This book is meant to serve as a catalyst for a deeper discussion on the future of real money management. It does not presume to possess a silver bullet, as no such thing exists. The goal is to provide an understanding of how successful global macro hedge fund managers navigated the most significant financial crisis of our lifetimes and to offer suggestions for how real money managers and all investors can incorporate certain elements of the macro approach into their own investment process. For all of our benefit, I hope this book makes progress toward that end.

Steven Drobny Manhattan Beach, California December 2009

Part One

REAL MONEY AND THE CRASH OF ‘08

Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.

—George Santayana

Chapter 1

Rethinking Real Money

I. Why Real Money?

Real money is a commonly used term in the financial markets to denote a fully funded, long-only traditional asset manager. Real money managers are often referred to as institutional investors. The term real money means the money is managed on an unlevered basis. This contrasts with hedge funds, which often manage money using borrowed funds or leverage. Real money funds can and often do employ leverage, but they normally attain leverage on a nonrecourse basis (e.g., investing as a limited partner in a fund that is levered). Examples of real money managers are public and private pension funds, university endowments, insurance company portfolios, foundations, family offices, sovereign wealth funds, and mutual funds.

This book focuses on the mistakes made and lessons learned in 2008 and attempts to incite a dialogue about how to construct better portfolios in the real money world. For this reason, mutual funds will be excluded from the discussion, since they are usually managed under strict mandates and asset class restrictions, rather than as broad portfolios where asset allocation decisions dominate the investment process.

Real money funds are important and worth analyzing because: (1) they are some of the largest pools of capital in the world; (2) they have a direct impact on the functioning of society; (3) they lost staggering amounts of money in 2008; and (4) in many cases, these funds are ultimately backstopped by the taxpayer if they fail to deliver their promises. Real money funds are in crisis and are “too big to fail.”

Size

Real money funds comprise a majority of world's managed assets, which totaled $62 trillion at the end of 2008. Within this grouping, pensions are by far the largest category, at $24 trillion, with U.S. pensions at $15 trillion, or almost one-quarter of total managed assets (see Figure 1.1).

Figure 1.1 Global Fund Management Industry, End of 2008

SOURCE: IFSL estimates.

Impact on Society

Much of real money exists to deliver the promise of future retirement benefits, to support education, to guarantee the payouts from insurance agreements, to support charitable activities, and even to back national interests. In short, real money is the foundation for many important aspects of modern society. Pensions form an important part of the fundamental social contract between workers and employers, both in the public and private sectors. Public pensions in particular help ensure that basic societal functions are populated by competent people. Some of these functions include: police officers, firemen, judges, sanitation workers, teachers, health workers, politicians, and soldiers, amongst many others. To give an example of how real money affects society, after the crash of 2008, Philadelphia city officials threatened to lay off workers and cut sanitation and public safety services unless they could delay pension contributions. Stories such as these will likely become much more prevalent over the next few years.

2008 Losses

During the financial crisis, real money accounts suffered immense drawdowns. Pension funds globally saw their assets fall by almost 20 percent, while university endowments in the United States lost 26 percent on average. More surprisingly, because of the severity of investment losses, many institutions were forced to modify their operations to reflect a new reality: universities laid off staff, froze or cut salaries, issued debt, reduced financial aid, and suspended building projects; pensions increased employee and employer contributions, raised retirement ages, and cut benefits; charitable foundations canceled grants and delayed new programs; families curtailed spending and in many cases have been forced to sell assets.

The severe losses in 2008 also exposed some fundamental flaws in how real money portfolios are managed. Portfolio construction methodologies failed to account for both worst-case scenarios and potential illiquidity. A primary lesson of this experience is that the pain of investment losses is not linear; there is a kink, after which point losses begin to force changes in behavior. As a result, short-term investment performance has consequences even for “long-term” investors.

Taxpayer

Although all real money accounts are important to society in one way or another, pensions are the largest and arguably the most important. Well before the crisis of 2008, demographic challenges had been steadily putting pressure on pension systems in the developed world. Nevertheless, at the end of 2007, after an extended bull run for assets, many plans were fully funded, whereas at the end of 2008 most had become significantly underfunded.

Although a university going bust or a charitable foundation closing down is tragic for those directly involved, the effect would be relatively isolated. On the other hand, a pension fund going bust has implications for taxpayers. In the United States, the taxpayer is the explicit backstop for public pension funds and the implicit backstop for corporate pension funds, the latter of which are guaranteed by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. (PBGC), a federal agency. The PBGC is currently facing its own crisis, with a reported deficit of $33.5 billion at midyear 2009, a more than tripling of the $11 billion deficit reported at midyear 2008. The deficit is the largest in the agency's 35-year history. More importantly, without confidence by workers that their benefits are intact, society breaks down.

In Ohio, for instance, the teachers pension system reported that it could take 41 years for its investments to meet its liabilities to retirees based on actuarial assessments—and this was before 2008. During the 2008–2009 fiscal year, the pension fund lost 31 percent, prompting officials to claim that they would never be able to meet liabilities. Because of the inherent complexity and subjectivity associated with calculating the funding levels for pension funds, the true costs are often disguised in the near-term (see box on page 7).

The shortfall associated with underfunded pensions can be made up by either investment performance or pension reform (i.e., changing the structure of the pension in some way). Yet pension reform amounts to fiscal tightening at a time when the global economy is weak and personal budgets are stretched. At the same time, these decisions are made by politicians, whose tenure in office does not compel them to make difficult, long-term decisions. Because voters do not opt for more tax or less benefits, the problems are often ignored, growing bigger by the day. Pensions loom as the next big financial crisis.

But crises often bring about change. We now have new information, which raises many important questions about what to do going forward. In order to understand more clearly what happened in 2008 and be able to formulate a plan for where we go from here, it is worthwhile to examine a brief history of real money, focusing on the U.S. pension world because it is the largest pool of funds and the biggest risk to the taxpayers of the world's largest economy.

Pension Funding Levels

Pension plans have two primary elements: (1) the future benefit obligations earned through employee service; and (2) the plan assets available to meet the liabilities owed to the beneficiaries. The challenge in assessing the health of pension plans is that both future liabilities and returns are estimates.

Since the payments to beneficiaries will be made far into the future, actuarial assumptions are required to estimate mortality rates, medical costs, and future salary increases. The future stream of assumed payments is discounted into a single present value estimate, whereby the discount rate is determined by reference to a benchmark yield. The higher the discount rate, the lower the benefit obligations. Very small changes in the discount rate have enormous real dollar implications for estimated funding levels.

Likewise, the value of plan assets available in the future to meet the pension obligations is also an estimate. The future value calculation is a function of expected returns on plan assets. Expected long-term returns are often developed using historical or “assumed” rates of return. In sum, it's a big guessing game.

II. The Evolution of Real Money

In the Beginning, There Were Bonds

Although pensions have existed for hundreds of years, the current structure took shape after 1948. In that year, the U.S. National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) ruled that corporate pensions must be included in contract negotiations between employers and employees. Before the ruling, the amount of capital allocated to an employee pension scheme, if such a plan even existed, was at the employers’ discretion. This ruling defined how much a corporation must contribute to the employee pension plan annually, regardless of company performance and profits. As a result, money began to consistently move into pension funds, creating significant growth in assets and eventually leading to the large, powerful, professionally managed institutions that exist today (see Figure 1.2).

Figure 1.2 Growth of US Public and Private Pension Fund Assets, 1950–2008

SOURCE: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds.

At the time, pension assets were managed very conservatively; fixed interest on bonds was matched to meet fixed commitments to pensioners—simple asset/liability matching. Bonds were selected from preapproved “legal lists” of securities, and it was common to have a limit for equities. In 1949, public and private pension assets in the United States were $15.7 billion. The asset mix was roughly half in government bonds, and half in other fixed income and insurance company fixed annuity investment products. There was minimal exposure to equities.

Along Came Inflation

By 1970, public and corporate pension fund assets in the United States reached $211.7 billion, the majority of which was concentrated in fixed income. Beginning with the 1973–1974 oil embargo, wave after wave of commodity price-induced inflation roiled fixed interest portfolios through the remainder of the decade. Nevertheless, assets continued to pour into pension funds because of strict commitments mandated on employers.

At the end of the decade, U.S. pension funds had $649 billion in total assets, and the outperformance of equities versus bonds during the previous ten years did not go unnoticed by pension fund managers. While bond portfolios got destroyed, equities at least managed to preserve capital in real terms (see Figure 1.3). Panicked and weary pension fund managers began rethinking their portfolios, and the shift out of bonds into stocks began in earnest. By 1980, corporate pensions had 45 percent of their assets in equities, while public pensions had 16 percent. In many cases, public plans were still capped as to how much equities they could own. The largest U.S. pension fund, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), for example, had a maximum allocation to equities of 25 percent, which was eventually lifted in 1984.

Figure 1.3 U.S. Stocks and Bonds, 1970s

SOURCE: Bloomberg; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,http://www.bls.gov/CPI/; and Damodaran Online,http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/∼adamodar/.

The 60–40 Model and the Great Moderation

Through the 1980s and 1990s, pensions continued to shift their assets out of bonds and into stocks, ultimately moving toward the now ubiquitous 60–40 policy portfolio (60 percent in stocks and 40 percent in bonds, often domestic only). The 60–40 model which became the standard benchmark by which to judge portfolio performance. The shift into stocks, and corresponding increase in risk, occurred in lock step with Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker's famous battle with inflation, which saw the fed funds rate peak at 20 percent in 1981. In 1980, the so-called “misery index”—unemployment plus inflation—peaked at 20 percent.

As the excess pessimism of the 1970s gave way to excess optimism during the Reagan 1980s and euphoria during the technology revolution of the late 1990s, 60–40 pension portfolios performed well. The big decisions that investors faced at this time were whether to tweak the 60–40 allocation to, say, 65–35 or 55–45. In actuality, the market environment throughout the 1980s and 1990s rendered these decisions inconsequential as both stocks and bonds benefited greatly from falling inflation and declining interest rates. The environment later became known as the Great Moderation, and was summed up well in a 2004 speech by then–Federal Reserve Governor Ben Bernanke (see box).

Bernanke on the Great Moderation

The Great Moderation, the substantial decline in macroeconomic volatility over the past twenty years, is a striking economic development. Whether the dominant cause of the Great Moderation is structural change, improved monetary policy, or simply good luck is an important question about which no consensus has yet formed. I have argued today that improved monetary policy has likely made an important contribution not only to the reduced volatility of inflation (which is not particularly controversial) but to the reduced volatility of output as well. Moreover, because a change in the monetary policy regime has pervasive effects, I have suggested that some of the effects of improved monetary policies may have been misidentified as exogenous changes in economic structure or in the distribution of economic shocks. This conclusion on my part makes me optimistic for the future, because I am confident that monetary policymakers will not forget the lessons of the 1970s.

SOURCE: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, www.federalreserve.gov; February 20, 2004.

By 1998, U.S. pension assets totaled more than $6.9 trillion, 438 times the 1949 figure. Pensions were larger than the national debt and growing faster. Because of their immense buying power, pensions became powerful market players in terms of shareholder activism, governance, and reform (see Figure 1.4).

Figure 1.4 Equity Assets Owned by US Public and Private Pensions, 1950–2008

SOURCE: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds.

For two decades, the trend in equity markets was almost straight up, producing an entire generation of real money investors conditioned to buy any dip and remain invested in equities for the long term. Academics such as Jeremy Siegel of the University of Pennsylvania and bank strategists such as Abbey Joseph Cohen of Goldman Sachs became cheerleaders for the idea of owning equities for the long term, while banks and consultants peddled the story. Pensions, other real money investors, and retail investors all made money in this environment. It was a wonderful time to be invested (see Figure 1.5).

Figure 1.5 Interest Rates, Inflation and Equity Multiples, 1980–2000

SOURCE: Bloomberg; Federal Reserve System, http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/; and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/bls/.

The Dot-Com Crash

As real money was becoming increasingly loaded up on equity risk in their 60–40 portfolios (stocks can be anywhere from 2 to 10 times riskier than bonds depending on what proxies are used), two decades of declining inflation and interest rates culminated in a technology-led stock market bubble that finally popped in March 2000. After the peak, global equity markets declined relentlessly year after year, finally bottoming in early 2003. Stocks generally lost half their value while in-vogue technology stocks dropped 75 percent from peak to trough (see Figure 1.6). Just as they had in the 1970s with bonds, real money managers became painfully aware of the equity concentration risk in their portfolios and began to look for a better, less risky approach. Pensions were facing serious underfunding issues and all investors were looking for new answers. Amidst the carnage, the two largest university endowments—Harvard and Yale—rode through the dot-com bust unscathed, causing many investors to explore what these large, sophisticated real money investors were up to (see Table 1.1).

Figure 1.6 MSCI Global and NASDAQ, 1995–2003

SOURCE: Bloomberg.

Table 1.1 Equity Returns versus Harvard and Yale Endowments

We Are All Endowments Now

Just as the real money world's attention shifted to the Harvard and Yale Endowments, David Swensen, Chief Investment Officer of the Yale Endowment, published a seminal work in May 2000, entitled Pioneering Portfolio Management: An Unconventional Approach to Institutional Investment, in which he outlined his investment process. The book became the bible of the real money world, and dog-eared copies can be found on the desks or bookshelves of most real money managers. Soon after its publication, investors from family offices to pensions and foundations began trying to emulate Yale by creating their own endowment-style portfolios.

The “Yale Model” soon came to be known as the “Endowment Model” as the portfolio management style became pervasive among university endowment portfolios. The Endowment Model, as it was popularly interpreted, is a broadly diversified portfolio, though with a heavy equity orientation, which seeks to earn a premium for taking on illiquidity risk. The argument behind the equity and “equity-like” orientation is that stocks produce the highest returns over time. This fundamental concept has roots in the very foundations of capitalism: risky equity capital should earn more than less risky bonds. The argument for seeking out illiquidity risk comes from financial theory, which states that investors are paid a premium for assuming the risk of illiquid assets (you should be compensated for not being able to sell something when you want). Illiquid investments include publicly traded illiquid securities and a host of “alternatives,” including private equity, real estate, venture capital, infrastructure, physical commodities and real assets such as timber, mines, etc. The focus on illiquid assets made the Endowment Model particularly attractive to funds that—at least in theory—had extremely long time horizons, such as endowments and pensions.

David Swensen took over the Yale Endowment in 1985, when total assets stood at $1.3 billion, and started to shift the portfolio towards illiquid alternative assets aggressively after 1990 (see Table 1.2). He grew assets to a reported peak of $22.87 billion by June 30, 2008, a truly remarkable achievement. During his tenure, he shifted Yale's endowment from a classic policy portfolio (80–20 in this case) focused primarily on listed equities to an illiquid, equity-oriented portfolio invested in a broad array of alternative assets, primarily managed by external managers. His extraordinary performance included only one negative year (–0.2 percent in fiscal 1988), so it is hardly surprising that other investors with similar mandates sought to emulate him.

Table 1.2 Yale Endowment Portfolio Composition

In the years following the dot-com bust in 2000, and accelerating after 2003, slow-moving investment committees across the real money spectrum shifted their portfolios from the 60–40 model to versions of the Endowment Model, again spurred on by consultants and banks selling both expertise and products. Aggressive real money managers at pension funds and university endowments such as Stanford, Duke, Notre Dame, MIT, and Princeton pushed their portfolios towards high percentages of illiquid assets and alternatives, in turn becoming the industry stars that others sought to emulate. David Swensen followed up his first book with a retail investor version in 2005, entitled Unconventional Success: A Fundamental Approach to Personal Investment, in which he addressed how individual investors can mimic the Yale portfolio using low-cost instruments available to retail investors such as Exchange-Traded Funds. Meanwhile, new money management firms headed by former endowment chiefs created endowment-style funds that were sold to retail investors through mass distribution channels.

With so many real money and retail investors piling into the Endowment Model, the assets of partially liquid and illiquid alternative asset managers exploded. Central banks, fighting the last battle—the dot-com bust—kept interest rates low, adding fuel to the fire.

Assets of hedge funds grew from $237 billion in 2000 to over $2 trillion in 2007. Private equity grew from $511 billion with another $450 billion committed in 2003, to $1.5 trillion with another $1 trillion committed in 2008. Investment in commodity indexes grew from $70 billion in 2005 to $180 billion in 2007 and real estate became a worldwide bubble. Yet, as real money investors sought diversification through the same methodology, their portfolios were in fact becoming more correlated to each other while portfolio risks were becoming more concentrated and increasingly dependent upon illiquid equity-like investments. Crowding was becoming an issue, yet the primary concern of real money investors at the time was getting capacity in the “best” managers. This stampede led investors to accept worsening terms, such as longer lockups, less transparency, higher fees, and others that served to increase the overall risk profile of their funds. Indeed, crowding is not a surprise since real money managers often share the same consultants and occasionally the same board members.

In a May 31, 2007 interview in Fortune, Harvard's endowment chief at the time, Mohamed El-Erian, was asked about the major investment challenges facing Harvard Management Corporation. He had this to say: