The Isthmus of Suez Question E-Book

Lesseps

• Herausgeber: Science & Technology Publishing
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 230

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2025

Beschreibung

The Isthmus of Suez Question is a comprehensive and insightful exploration of one of the most significant geopolitical and engineering challenges of the nineteenth century: the construction and control of the Suez Canal. Written by Ferdinand de Lesseps, the visionary French diplomat and engineer who spearheaded the canal’s creation, this book delves into the historical, political, and technical aspects surrounding the Suez Isthmus and its transformation into a vital maritime passage connecting the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea. Through detailed narrative and persuasive argument, de Lesseps presents the case for the canal’s necessity, addressing the economic and strategic benefits it would bring to global trade and navigation. He meticulously examines the history of the region, referencing ancient attempts to link the seas, and provides a thorough analysis of the scientific surveys, engineering challenges, and financial considerations involved in the project. The book also discusses the international debates and diplomatic negotiations that shaped the canal’s development, highlighting the competing interests of European powers and the local Egyptian authorities. De Lesseps’s writing is both passionate and methodical, reflecting his deep commitment to the project and his belief in its potential to foster international cooperation and progress. He addresses criticisms and concerns raised by opponents, offering reasoned responses and emphasizing the canal’s role in promoting peace and prosperity. The book is enriched with maps, diagrams, and official documents, providing readers with a clear understanding of the technical and logistical complexities involved. The Isthmus of Suez Question stands as a vital historical document, offering firsthand insight into the vision, ambition, and perseverance that made the Suez Canal a reality. It is an essential read for anyone interested in the history of engineering, international relations, and the transformative power of human ingenuity.

Leseprobe

THE ISTHMUS OF SUEZ QUESTION.

THE ISTHMUS OF SUEZ QUESTION.

BY M. FERDINAND DE LESSEPS,MINISTER PLENIPOTENTIARY.

“APERIRE TERRAM GENTIBUS.”

LONDON:LONGMAN, BROWN, GREEN, AND LONGMANS. PARIS: GALIGNANI AND CO. 1855.

CONTENTS.

Page

The Question Submitted

7

APPENDIX.

No.

I.

M. De Lesseps’ Memorial to the Viceroy

18

II.

Firman of Concession

28

III.

M. De Lesseps’ Instructions to the Engineers

52

IV.

Precursory Scheme

58

V.

Letter from the Grand Vizier to the Viceroy

170

VI.

M. De Lesseps’ Report

174

VII.

Opinion of Mr. Anderson

182

VIII.

Opinion of Captain Vetch

204

IX.

Article from the Moniteur

212

Explanation of the French Monies, Weights, and Measures used in the following pages.

The figures following the denomination are decimal parts; thus: 7 fr. 25, 6 met. 50 represent respectively 7¼ francs, 6½ metres.

THE ISTHMUS OF SUEZ QUESTIONSUBMITTED TO THE PUBLIC OPINION OF ENGLAND.

“Aperire terram gentibus.”

In the month of October, 1854, I left Europe for Egypt, in consequence of an invitation I had received from the new Viceroy, Mohammed Saïd, who for twenty years has honoured me with his friendship. I had no mission from my Government. It was in the course of a journey across the Libyan desert from Alexandria to Cairo which I made in company with the Prince, that the question of cutting through the Isthmus of Suez, was for the first time mooted between us. He requested me to draw up a memorial on the subject, (Appendix, No. 1) and, as my ideas met with his approbation, he issued to the Consuls General of foreign powers a firman (Appendix, No. 2), destined to receive the sanction of the Sultan, granting to a company composed of the capitalists of all nations without distinction, the right to construct a canal between the two Seas. Mr. Bruce, the agent of the British Government, was the first of the Consuls General who was informed of the Viceroy’s project, so that France and England received intimation of it at the same time.

MM. Linant Bey and Mougel Bey, engineers, who have been engaged, the one for the last twenty, the other for the last thirty years, in the construction of important hydraulic works in Egypt, were appointed by the Viceroy to accompany me in an exploring expedition to the Isthmus of Suez, and to complete, by a fresh examination of the ground, the investigations they had already made.

This expedition was made during last December and January; after presenting an account of it to His Highness Mohammed Saïd, I gave instructions (Appendix, No. 3), in his name, to the engineers, calculated to assist them in the preparation of their report.

In the month of March, MM. Linant Bey and Mougel Bey delivered the precursory scheme (Appendix, No. 4), which quite convinced the Viceroy of the possibility of executing this great undertaking in which he has taken the initiative. They establish by calculations and data, which may be verified by any one, that a maritime canal direct from Suez to Pelusium thirty leagues long, one hundred metres wide, and eight metres deep, extending sufficiently far into the two seas by means of jetties, to obtain the depth necessary to enable ships to enter without difficulty, having an inland port in the natural basin of Lake Timsah, and which should be completed in six years, would cost, at the most, 160,000,000 francs, (£6,400,000); or, about half the amount expended on the Great Northern railway from London to York, or on that between Paris and Lyons.

In a journey that I made to Constantinople,[1] I ascertained that the Sultan and his ministers were favourable to the project, and I delivered to the Viceroy a letter from the Grand Vizier, in which he aptly characterized the opening of the Isthmus of Suez by a maritime canal as a work of the most useful and interesting character. (Appendix, No. 5.) His Highness immediately transmitted to the Divan, the documents, maps, and plans necessary for understanding the question of construction, and which were required for obtaining the sanction of the Sovereign.

I was then commissioned to return to Europe for the purpose of calling public attention to the subject and to take measures for organizing the undertaking, on a cosmopolitan basis in accordance with the principles which have from the commencement guided the projectors.

Prince Mohammed Saïd has declared in his instructions (Appendix, No. 6), that the labours of his engineers, who at this moment are engaged in preparing their definitive scheme, shall be submitted to the judgment of engineers, chosen from England, from France, from Holland, from Germany, and from Italy; and that the organization of the Universal Company entrusted with the construction of the Canal shall be based upon the scientific decision of Europe.

Until then no call will be made on the shareholders, and, the administration of the Company being in the hands of capitalists and other persons of all nations, in proportion to the relative commercial importance of their country, they will not support the undertaking unless they are convinced that it will be to their interest to do so.

As England is evidently interested more than any other power in the construction of a canal through the Isthmus of Suez, my first step has been to come to London, both in order to ascertain the state of public opinion in England on this question, and also to give to all who desire it such information as will enable them fully to appreciate the moral and material aspects of the undertaking.

I have already remarked with satisfaction that, in general, men of intelligence with whom I have had the honour of conversing on the subject, do not admit that an event which would advance the interests of the whole world, could possibly do injury to the power or commerce of England. They frankly discard all idea of a prejudice against the project; they assert on the contrary, that if feasible their country cannot but gain by it, and that it would be a source of regret if the idea were entertained in France that what would be beneficial to other countries should not be of equal benefit to England.

Objections, however, which to my mind, I am proud to acknowledge, do honour to the candour of English politicians, have been made, in perfectly good faith, and without any feeling of distrust towards a friendly nation, the alliance with which, cemented by the blood of their brave armies, has been recently sanctioned by the unanimous demonstration of the English people, as it will shortly be by the people of France.

I shall reproduce these objections, and reply to them in very few words.

I begin by setting aside all those which relate to the supposed impossibility of execution, and to the idea that the canal can only be constructed at an expenditure out of proportion to the advantages reasonably to be expected.

If the canal should be found to be physically impossible, of course the scheme will not be entertained, and if European science should not make it clear that the advantages to be derived are commensurate with the expenses to be incurred, capitalists will not come forward.

The report of the engineers replies triumphantly to other objections respecting the sands of the desert, the alluvial deposits at Pelusium and Suez, and the navigation of the Red Sea.

It has been affirmed that the project of a canal might retard the construction of a railway from Alexandria to Suez, which the policy of England has always considered essential to her Indian interests.

Far from being retarded by the canal project, the railway will, on the contrary, be indebted to this very design, for its speedy completion; for it can only obtain sufficient returns from the activity occasioned by a considerable maritime commerce across the Isthmus of Suez. The Egyptian Government, which has already completed, at its own expense, the first two sections of the railway, viz., from Alexandria to the Nile, and from the Nile to Cairo, takes this view of the question, and is at the same time desirous of giving satisfaction to England, whose main object is to secure for her despatches and travellers the most direct and speedy route. The Viceroy, being thus persuaded, that of the two undertakings, the railway and the canal, each forms the complement of the other, has just decided on the completion of the third section, from Cairo to Suez. He has given the order for the rails to an English house, and engineers are at this moment engaged in levelling and in the superintendence of the earth-works.

It has also been said that if a considerable number of European workmen, or agricultural labourers, were taken to the Isthmus of Suez, there would be some fear of their forming a colony of natives of one single country—of France for instance—which might have a prejudicial effect on the policy of England. In the first place, there is no motive for a universal company to employ, for a special political object, workmen of any one country in preference to those of any other. Again, it is not necessary to demonstrate that a company of capitalists will attend to their own interests, and they will certainly have an incontestable advantage in employing Egyptians only, as workmen and agricultural labourers. The fellah of Egypt has alone constructed, under the direction of skilful and experienced engineers and foremen, all the extensive works undertaken in that country, and no nation can more easily, or on more favourable terms, furnish disciplined armies, of robust, active, and intelligent workmen, equally fit for the construction of canals, for hydraulic and for agricultural operations.[2]

But what is of greater moment, and indeed alone deserves the consideration of a people who have the fortunate custom of interesting themselves in their political affairs, is the apprehension conscientiously entertained by statesmen, whose right and whose duty it is to ask themselves and maturely to consider:—

1. Whether shortening the distance by 3000 leagues for all the countries of Northern Europe, and by 3400 leagues on an average for the ports of the Mediterranean, including Malta, may not in future, in case of war, menace the safety of the British possessions in India.

2. Whether the commercial and maritime relations of Great Britain will not be disadvantageously affected by the opening of a new route, which, while shortening the distance for her own navigation, will at the same time facilitate and increase the navigation of all other nations towards the extreme East.

The following passage from a recent publication replies to these objections:—

“The power in possession of Aden opens and shuts at its will the Red Sea, and if it is true that the influence of nations and governments chiefly depends on the good they can do to their friends and the harm they can do to their enemies, that revolution would be of no slight advantage to England which would lead the principal current of the world’s commerce under the guns of her ships and the batteries of her fortresses. Besides, is it from the naval armaments of the Mediterranean that England has most reason to fear an invasion of India? It requires no more than ordinary foresight to perceive, that if her Indian possessions were ever seriously threatened, it could only be from Russia by land, and from North America by sea. In either case, the safety of her possessions would depend on the shortening of her line of operations.

“India is not the only British possession to which the route will be abridged by the passage viâ Suez. Australia will profit no less by the change; and it will be all the more necessary to facilitate the defence of that country, as it will become, if the cutting through of the Isthmus of Panama be effected, more accessible to the ships of war of the United States.

“We may conclude from these observations, that there would be small risk of the opening of the Isthmus of Suez weakening the military power of Great Britain. Her commercial power could only be compromised by it, if it were possible for the multiplicity of her transactions with the East Indies to be decreased by shortening the intervening distance by 3000 leagues, or if it were possible for the producers and sellers of the commodities of the extreme East to lose by the consumption of them in Europe being doubled.

“If England must gain by the opening of the Isthmus an increase of military and commercial power, the genius of calculation within her will soon triumph over an ill-considered opposition. She will not sacrifice the positive elevation, the basis of which is enlarged by the developement of what surrounds it, to that relative elevation which is satisfied with the degradation of others, and she will not give any one the right to attribute to her, with regard to all the nations bordering on the Mediterranean, the language lately addressed by the Emperor Nicholas to the English Minister on the subject of Greece, and of the East. Such a policy she leaves to its fitting home. She does more, she opposes it by force of arms. Convinced that her strength lies in her power of expansion, and in her commercial capabilities, she endeavours by the prosperity of her neighbours to enlarge the basis of her own, and for this reason it is that she animates with her co-operation so many enterprises which enrich the Continent; no undertaking that she has ever assisted will prove more productive of beneficial results to herself than the operations at the Isthmus of Suez.”

To the preceding quotation, which is conclusive, I add some figures which also have their value.

The Mediterranean ports will profit, it is true, by the opening of the Isthmus of Suez, but England with the 5,000,000 tons employed in her commerce—a tonnage greater than that of all the navies of Europe, including France, united—cannot fail to profit in a much greater degree by the increase of relations which must necessarily result from the shortening of the distance between the points of traffic; to this opening moreover she will be indebted for the inestimable advantage of finding herself in closer connection with her colonies, than another nation whose competition might otherwise be really formidable in the eyes of the upholders of an exclusive system.

But on the contrary, England, adopting the policy of commercial freedom, has been seen to favour the attempts which have been made to cut through the American Isthmus, although, if successful, it would bring the United States nearer the British possessions in India and still nearer to Australia. She is not, however, ignorant of the fact that the maritime commerce of the United States, which twenty years ago employed only 1,000,000 tons, now, in 1854, requires no less than 5,400,000, and that this vast tonnage, already larger than her own, is constantly increasing. But England on her part does not remain at a stand-still, and she has done well in showing no fear of the contest. The law of progress has been justified by official statistical documents. The burthen of the English ships built in 1842 was 130,000 tons; in 1843, shipping to the amount of 203,000 tons was built. It is especially since the relations of the United States with the Indian Seas have been extended, that the commerce of Great Britain has in those very regions experienced a still farther developement. Thus, the imports from the Indian Peninsula, which in 1849 amounted to £9,238,000, had in 1853 increased to £13,610,000. Those from China, which in 1849 were £6,200,000, rose in 1853, to £8,300,000. Again, the tonnage employed in the trade between Great Britain and her Eastern possessions, including the other countries in the Indian Seas, to and fro, amounted in 1849 to 967,076, and in 1853 to 1,595,138 tons.

It may perhaps not be superfluous to reply to those persons who still believe in the supposed monopoly which they think it advisable for England to retain in her commerce with the East; we have just seen that there is in fact no such monopoly as far as the United States are concerned, and that England does not suffer from the want of it. It is the same with respect to Europe. This state of things has a tendency to increase every day, even with the existing means of communication by the Cape of Good Hope and the imperfect transit through Egypt. Marseilles, Bordeaux, Havre, Genoa, Trieste, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and Hamburg, all despatch vessels direct to the Indies. Marseilles and Trieste now receive, viâ Egypt, cases of indigo from India and bales of silk goods from China. Powerful companies, in anticipation of peace, are at this moment engaged in building ships expressly for trading to the East, or else in devoting to that purpose the steamers and sailing vessels now used as transports in the Black Sea.

Other objections have been made, and as they have been seriously brought forward, I cannot allow them to pass without remark. Some very modest Englishmen have compared their country to Venice, and have contended, that if Venice lost her power by the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope, England would see hers decline by a return to the shortest route. In the first place, the shortest route is a geographical fact which no one can get rid of, and, from the moment that it is ascertained that no material obstacle prevents the opening of this direct line, it will not be for any Government, much less for the one which has inaugurated the era of commercial freedom, to oppose the realization of a work which will satisfy the interests of all. Then, Great Britain in the nineteenth century cannot be compared to Venice in the fifteenth: the latter, in consequence of her defeats in 1291 and 1298, had been obliged to cede the supremacy to Genoa, and, after having still shone in the first rank when she put herself at the head of the league against Charles VIII. (1495), finally lost her preponderance when the Portuguese destroyed her fleets in the Red Sea, and the Emperor, the Pope and the kings of France and Aragon formed the league of Cambray against her (1508). It would be useless to prove by historical evidence that the decline of the Queen of the Adriatic was due to other causes than the discovery of the Cape (1497), by which she might have profited as well as the Portuguese, if she had had the same elements of strength and vitality. Trieste, which has succeeded to her commercial prosperity, and even surpassed it, has had no need of the re-establishment of the ancient route to India. If Trieste participates largely, as is to be hoped, in the advantages of the Isthmus Company, if her neighbour of the Adriatic finds therein a new life, Great Britain will lose nothing thereby. Has it ever been seen that a capital city, brought into communication with a great market by a railroad, has had to regret the shortening of the distance and the amelioration of its own relations, because some secondary towns on the line were nearer to the market and participated in the common benefit?

Marseilles, Trieste, Greece, the ports of Italy, of Spain and of Turkey, are nearer to Egypt than London and Liverpool. Well; in the present state of the relations of Europe with Alexandria, England absorbs to herself alone half the value of the commerce between all other countries and Egypt, and her tonnage comprises two-thirds of the navigation to and fro under all flags.

I wrote the following from Cairo, December 3rd, 1854, to a friend of mine, a member of the British Parliament.

“Some persons assert that the Viceroy of Egypt’s project will meet with opposition in England. I cannot believe it: your statesmen are too enlightened for me to entertain such a supposition under present circumstances. What! England herself transacts more than half the general commerce with India and China; she has an immense empire in Asia; she may reduce by one-third the charges on her commerce, and bring that Eastern Empire nearer by one-half; and she would not allow it to be done. Wherefore? To prevent the Mediterranean nations from taking advantage of their situation to increase their commerce in the Eastern Seas,—she would deprive herself of the immense advantages which must accrue to her, in material respects, and in a political point of view, from this new communication, solely because others are more favourably situated than herself, as if geographical position was all-in-all, and as if, everything considered, England had not more to gain by this work than all the nations together. Finally, England, it is said, must dread the reduction in the number of vessels employed in Indian commerce which would result from the diminution of more than one-third in the duration of the voyage. And has not England proved in her experience of railways, by results which have surpassed the boldest anticipations, that the necessary consequence of shortening the distance and diminishing the duration of a journey, is the infinite augmentation of intercourse and circulation. One cannot understand why those who entertain this fear do not advise the English Government to direct, that the voyage to India now shall be viâ Cape Horn, for that would employ still more ships than the way by the Cape of Good Hope and furnish better sailors.

“If, as is not unlikely, the difficulties with which I am threatened should be brought forward, public opinion, so powerful in England, will soon do justice to interested opposition and superannuated objections.”

Her Majesty’s Government concluded with the United States, on the 19th of April, 1850, a treaty of neutrality for the projected canal through the American Isthmus. The cabinets of London and Paris are now on such intimate terms as to make it a matter of no difficulty for them to agree upon a convention, if it suited their political interests to do so, relative to the passage of the Isthmus of Suez, assimilating it to that of the Dardanelles. The other powers would not fail to give in their adhesion to the convention, which would be open to them.

In this manner commercial navigation would be guaranteed against the chances of war, and military armaments could neither remain in nor pass through the Isthmus without the permission of the Sovereign of the country.

The question of the importance to the commercial interests of Great Britain of cutting through the Isthmus of Suez, has been considered in the most favourable light by the principal men of science, engineers, economists, and public writers of England. I shall quote hereafter the opinions of Mr. Anderson, the present director of the Peninsular and Oriental Company, and of Captain James Vetch, R. E., from their respective works. (Appendix, Nos. 8 and 9.) The fact of the question having been frequently treated with favour by the press, seems to show that it has already been accepted by the feeling of the country; the remarkable extract from the “Papers for the People” in the memorial of the engineers (Appendix, No. 4) will be read with interest. The celebrated novelist, Charles Dickens himself, has not disdained to devote several eloquent pages to a very practical consideration of the project for constructing a canal through the Isthmus of Suez.

It is to be remarked that the English authors who have written upon this question, have, without exception, advocated the direct line from Suez to Pelusium. This view is taken by all the inhabitants of Egypt, and I doubt if the indirect line, complicated as it is by traversing the Nile, would have been adopted by two of my compatriots so distinguished as M. Baude and M. Paulin Talabot, if they had themselves been on the spot before they gave their opinions.

The Moniteur Universel of France, in the Number for the 6th of July, has proved the advantage of the direct track over the indirect one. I refer my readers to that article (Appendix, No. 9).

It is incumbent on me to add, that, although the two tracks may be entertained, theoretically speaking, practically only one is now to be thought of; for the Viceroy of Egypt, who consents to the cutting of the Isthmus, has a perfect right to refuse to allow the whole of Egypt to be cut through. He has, in his written instructions, specially charged me to make known his declaration, which is in the following terms:—

“After having passed in review the numerous projects submitted to various Governments or to the public for more than fifty years, I grant perfect liberty for the application of those means that science shall recognise to be best to bring the Red Sea and the Mediterranean into communication at any point of the Isthmus, eastward of the course of the Nile; but I declare that I will not authorize the Grand Maritime Suez Canal Company to adopt any track which shall have its point of departure on the Mediterranean coast, to the west of the Damietta branch, and which shall traverse the course of the Nile.”

If it were necessary, reference might be made to the East India Company, the merchants of Australia, of Singapore, of Madras, of Calcutta and of Bombay, the commercial houses of the City, the shipowners of London and Liverpool, the manufacturers of Manchester, the proprietors of iron mines, the manufacturers of machines, the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, the directors of banks and of extensive industrial undertakings, the Chambers of Commerce, the proprietors of coal-fields, who in 1854 exported 1,309,251 tons of coal, of the value of £2,127,156, an amount which, immense as it already is, will be still farther increased, and to a considerable extent, by the opening of the Isthmus of Suez.

I appeal to their interests, and leave the decision to their judgment.

Lastly, the objection has been made, that the canal project would not be received with favour by the Turkish Government; but, like every question in which the principle is just, the consequences are infallible; and from whatever point of view we regard this question of the Isthmus of Suez, we see nothing but universal benefit arise from it.

As I have already remarked, I met with no opposition at Constantinople on the part of the Porte. Turkey is aware that the Canal of the two Seas is destined to add to her power and prosperity, by bringing Constantinople nearer by 4300 leagues to the Indian Ocean, and by facilitating the communication with the Holy Places of Arabia, the source of the authority the Sultan possesses over his Mussulman population.

Turkey can rise from her present languor only by borrowing capital and intelligence from Europe. The prosperity of the East is intimately connected at the present day with the interests of civilization in general, and the most effectual means of working its welfare, in connection with that of humanity, is to break down the barriers that still separate individuals, races, and nations.

War and commerce have civilized the world. War will have played out its part with that last effort which is being made under our eyes. The victories hereafter to be gained will be those of commerce only. Let us exert ourselves to open up for her a new route. This object may be pursued and attained—in the words of a great writer—“A travers les orages et les ténèbres de la guerre.” (Guizot.)

Let us bring the populations of Polynesia, of Australia and China, of the Indies and of Africa, nearer to Europe; let us make them participators in the blessings of civilization.

To accomplish this great undertaking, we appeal to all religious and intelligent men, for it is worthy of their sympathy and co-operation.

We invoke the support of all statesmen, because in the establishment of new and easy means of communication between the two hemispheres all nations are interested. Lastly, we will address ourselves to the capitalists, when they have satisfied themselves of the pecuniary advantages to be derived from the undertaking.

Ferd. de Lesseps.

London, July, 1855.

APPENDIX.No. I. MEMORIAL ADDRESSED TO HIS HIGHNESS MOHAMMED SAID.

MEMORIAL ADDRESSED TO HIS HIGHNESS MOHAMMED SAID, VICEROY OF EGYPT.

The Camp, Marea, In the Lybian Desert, 15th November, 1854.

The junction of the Mediterranean and the Red Seas, by a navigable canal, is an undertaking the utility of which has attracted the attention of all the great men who have reigned in, or conquered, Egypt: Sesostris, Alexander the Great, Julius Cæsar, the Arab Conqueror Amrou, Napoleon I. and Mehemet Ali.

A canal, communicating with the Nile, was in existence in ancient times; first, for a period of 100 years, down to about the middle of the ninth century before the Hegira; secondly, for a period of 445 years, from the reign of the first successors of Alexander the Great, down to about the fourth century before the Hegira; thirdly and lastly, for a period of 130 years after the Arabian conquest.

Napoleon, upon his arrival in Egypt, immediately organized a commission of engineers to ascertain whether it would be possible to re-establish that ancient channel of navigation: the question was resolved in the affirmative, and when the learned M. Lepère delivered to him the report of the commission, on the eve of his return to France, he said: “It is an important affair, it is not now in my power to accomplish it, but the Turkish Government will perhaps one day owe its preservation and its glory to the execution of this project.”

The moment has now arrived to realize Napoleon’s prediction. The work of cutting through the Isthmus of Suez is certainly destined, more than any other, to contribute to the preservation of the Ottoman Empire, and to demonstrate to those who have been wont to proclaim its decay and ruin, that it still has a productive existence, and that it is capable of adding a brilliant page to the history of the world’s civilization.

Why have the governments and the peoples of the West combined to uphold the Sultan in the possession of Constantinople, and why has he who has thought fit to menace that position met with the armed opposition of Europe? Because the passage from the Mediterranean into the Black Sea is of so much importance, that whatever European Power might become master of it would domineer over all the rest, and destroy that balance which the whole world is interested in preserving.

Do but establish at another point of the Ottoman Empire a similar, and a yet more important position; do but make Egypt the highway of the commercial world by cutting through the Isthmus of Suez; and thereby you will create in the East another immoveable seat of power; for, as far as the new passage is concerned, the great powers of Europe, from fear of seeing it one day seized upon by one amongst them, will regard the necessity of guaranteeing its neutrality, as a question of vital importance.