The Savage Border E-Book

Jules Stewart

• Herausgeber: The History Press
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2007

Beschreibung

For centuries, Pakistan's North West Frontier has been seen as a lawless wilderness, which more recently has given sanctuary to Osama Bin Laden and other fundamentalist Muslim leaders. This, the first significant book on the territory for 40 years, includes first hand accounts of life and soldiering on the Frontier since the Second World War. It also tells how the British and invaders before and after the Raj, attempted to deal with this unpredictable land of the Pathans. The Savage Border provides an in-depth, highly accessible account of life and conflict on the North-West Frontier, covering not only the century of British rule since 1849, but also events since the creation of Pakistan in 1947. The author addresses key questions including 'What makes the Pathan so warlike and belligerent to outsiders, from Darius the Great in the 6th century BC to the US Marines in the 21st century AD?' and 'Can these tribesmen ever be brought into society's fold and persuaded to give up their terrorist comrades? The author is a specialist in North West Frontier affairs, who has travelled extensively in Pakistan.

Leseprobe

THE

SAVAGE BORDER

THE

SAVAGE BORDER

THE HISTORY OF THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER

JULES STEWART

First published in 2013

The History Press The Mill, Brimscombe Port Stroud, Gloucestershire, GL5 2QGwww.thehistorypress.co.uk

This ebook edition first published in 2013

All rights reserved © Jules Stewart, 2007, 2013

The right of Jules Stewart to be identified as the Author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyrights, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

This ebook is copyright material and must not be copied, reproduced, transferred, distributed, leased, licensed or publicly performed or used in any way except as specifically permitted in writing by the publishers, as allowed under the terms and conditions under which it was purchased or as strictly permitted by applicable copyright law. Any unauthorised distribution or use of this text may be a direct infringement of the author’s and publisher’s rights, and those responsible may be liable in law accordingly.

EPUB ISBN 978 0 7524 9607 8

Original typesetting by The History Press

To Helen

Contents

Acknowledgements

Maps

1.

People of a Lost Origin

2.

A Frontier is Born

3.

Poachers Turned Gamekeepers

4.

The Hundred Years War

5.

A Most Superior Person

6.

The Red Shirts are Coming

7.

‘Did we not fight well?’

E

PILOGUE

: Osama, Where Art Thou?

Notes

Bibliography

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the following people for their advice and assistance with this book: Helen Crisp, Mark Baillie, Graham Wontner-Smith, Major John Girling, Rodney Bennett, Duncan McAra, Jonathan Falconer, Julia Fenn, Hilary Walford, Dr Humayun Khan, Douglas Learmond, the Field family and the staff at the Royal Geographical Society archives.

Many of the photographs reproduced in the plate section come from the personal albums of British servicemen who served on the North-West Frontier in the 1930s and 1940s.

Colonel Arthur Field OBE, MC, was a Royal Engineers subaltern officer attached to 12 Field Company, Queen Victoria’s Madras Sappers and Miners, Indian Army. Like many of his contemporaries far from home and in a strange land, he was an avid photographer of life and events on the Frontier. He took his photographs using a Leica camera given to him as an engagement present by his future wife.

Major John Girling OBE joined the South Waziristan Scouts in 1945 at the age of 20. The Frontier was in his blood, his father having served in the 12th Pioneers during the Third Afghan War, while his grandfather soldiered in Afghanistan in the 1880s. After Partition, Girling stayed on as adjutant to the first Commandant. He served the newly created government of Pakistan until 1951.

A Scottish banker by training, Lieutenant Colonel Alexander William Swanson Learmond sailed to India in 1914. He was commissioned in the 51st Sikhs and served in Mesopotamia. The prospect of active service after the Amritsar riots made him reject a return to banking. He transferred to the 37th Dogras, serving in Afghanistan and Waziristan. He joined the Burma Military Police in 1937 and was Commandant in Mandalay, later leading part of the ‘walk out’ of Burma in 1942. He returned to Burma after the War, in the Military and Civil administration of Burma, and retired from the Indian Army in 1946.

Wing Commander William ‘Lofty’ Owen MBE, RAF, was a ground crew sergeant with 28 (AC) Squadron on the airfields and advanced landing grounds at Ambala, Manzai, Miranshah and Tank. Lofty recorded his duty overseas in Iraq and India (1934–9) with a camera he bought as a young aircraft apprentice at RAF Halton in 1923.

Through the lenses of these British servicemen, turned amateur photographers, we are given a unique insight into their lives on the savage border of the Empire at a crucial time in its history.

ONE

People of a Lost Origin

The great phalanx tramped south towards the mountain barrier, churning a sea of dust in its wake as the multitude advanced across the Afghan plain. The grey, barren earth shuddered under the weight of five thousand mounted horse, led by the Faithful Companions, followed by many thousands more of infantrymen shouldering their twenty-foot pikes, wave upon wave of creaking chariots, great siege machines and countless camp followers and pack animals. For miles around, the land resounded with a cacophony of oaths, the braying of mutinous bullocks and the battle songs of the archers and javelineers. The buglers signalled up and down the columns for the foot soldiers to close ranks, quicken the pace, draw the cavalry into line away from the hillsides, where the Pathan tribesmen crouched behind their stone breastworks, poised to loose a deadly fusillade of stones and arrows at the approaching invaders.

In the fourth century BC Alexander of Macedon, the young conqueror of Asia, rode at the head of his host, an army of 120,000 men deployed in two divisions, one under Alexander’s own command, consisting of 30,000 hand-picked, light-armed troops led by the general Craterus, and the other, the main force, some 90,000 foot soldiers and cavalry led by Hephaestin and Perdiceas. The army had spent many months marching across the vast wilderness of Afghanistan, and then over the foothills of the mighty Sofed Koh range, whence the men’s gaze fell rapaciously on the mist rising from the lush Indus valleys beyond the hilltops.

As the columns drew near to the dark mountains, the 25-year-old scholar-warrior reflected on his nightly readings of Herodotus, the Greek ‘Father of History’ who had chronicled these lands a century before Alexander was to set off on his mission of conquest. Herodotus spoke in his Histories of a tribe called the Apey Reti (today known as the Afridis), which dwelt in the Gandhara region west of the Indus, the modern vale of Peshawar. Herodotus warned travellers to this region of the tribesmen’s savagery and hatred of outsiders, and of their fanaticism in battle. Discretion being the better part of valour, Alexander summoned up his genius of tactical instinct and divided his army into two bodies. His trusted generals Hephaestin and Perdiceas would lead the bulk of the force, ninety thousand foot soldiers and cavalry through the Khyber Pass, the homeland of the Afridis, while Alexander took a smaller élite force across the more northerly Kunnar Valley through Swat. Once this territory had been pacified, he would swing his column southward to link up with the main body of the army to begin the crossing of the Indus and the invasion of India proper.

The tribesmen who lay in wait for Alexander and his soldiers were no strangers to invasion. The Pathans, crouched on top of narrow defiles that gave passage into the Indus Valley, or behind stone breastworks with their daggers at the ready, had learnt to defend their homeland over centuries of warfare and internecine strife.

Sometime around 1500 BC the first stirrings were heard from the tribes that dwelt in the pastureland, by then exhausted, along the Caspian Sea. In time, these sedentary agriculturists became restless nomads, gathering force as they swept southward across the lands we now call Iran and Afghanistan.

The Aryans were on the march and there was no resisting this human horde driven by desperation, trampling underfoot all that stood in their path. At last, about a thousand years before the Macedonian king launched his expedition to the Indus, these early settlers began to establish themselves in the land of Gandhara, where they became known as the Men of Roh, the tribal name for the hill dwellers on the Suleiman range of the North-West Frontier.

The Aryans’ martial culture was enshrined in their worship of warring storm-gods, beliefs that were later preserved in the Vedic religion, in which the god Indra was portrayed as a conquering deity, the scourge of the Aryans’ enemies who smashed cities and slaughtered foes. Everything about these colonisers reflected their harsh environment. The fortunate ones made it across the ranges to the rich farmland of the Indus Valley. The lives of those who stayed behind in the parched hills became a daily struggle for survival, and over the years they were forged into one of the world’s most feared warrior castes. This was to stand them in good stead against later waves of invaders, from Alexander to Genghis Khan, Tamerlane, the Mughal emperor Babur and eventually the British.

Then in the seventh century BC came another migratory wave of marauders from Central Asia to occupy a vast tract of land, stretching from the Helmand River that rises in central Afghanistan in the mountains west of Kabul, hundreds of miles east, to the plains of the Punjab in what is today northern Pakistan.

The tribesmen who settled in this inhospitable land built no cities or monuments, and they left no written records of their presence until well into the seventeenth century. Slowly they organised themselves into tribes, which today number about sixty, and numerous clans within each tribe, to defend themselves as much against incursions by rival tribesmen as against the common enemies who descended with regularity from the Asian steppes to plunder the rich lands of the Indus Valley.

Among these wild tribes, according to Herodotus, there was one that bore the name Pactyes, giving rise to speculation among ethnologists that these people were the forebears of the Pathans. ‘Is the name that has come down to us in this ancient Greek version identical with the present-day Pathans?’ asks one scholar. ‘If it is, we have here a clue to the date at which the ancestors of the Pathans first established themselves in the Helmand basin.’1

Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and indeed even to our own day, the ethnic origin of the Pathans has been a subject of much heated debate. Our knowledge of the tribes comes largely from relatively modern research, given the lack of written historical records and, above all, the hostile reception that awaits the interloper who dares venture into tribal territory along the North-West Frontier. Even the Afridi tribe, the first to be identified in historical records among the Pathans, whose homeland is the relatively accessible Khyber and Tirah region of Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province, is still an enigma to scholars in search of their ethnic roots. The Afridis, like their brother Pathan tribes, are a Pashtu (or Pakhtu in this case, the harder northern variant) speaking people. But no one can say with any certainty if this was always so.

Observations . . . support the belief that the Afridi tribes, though at present speaking Pashtu, contain a large, if not predominant racial element, which was established in Tirah long before the advent of those Afghan invaders who during Mohammedan times gradually pushed their way into the belt of hills and alluvial plains west of the Indus, and who have spread their Pashtu speech in places even across the great river.2

Sir Aurel Stein, the author of these comments and one of the most eminent archaeologists and orientalists of the early twentieth century, maintains that the Afridi tribesmen probably migrated from the Afghan highlands to the hill country along the North-West Frontier. Stein suggests that, with their often fair hair and frequently blue or light grey eyes, the Afridis bear a closer resemblance to the Dardic-speaking hill dwellers found south of the Hindu Kush mountains of Afghanistan than to the much darker and ‘curiously Semitic-looking’ type prevalent among Afghans proper living west and south-west of the Afridis’ tribal homeland around the Khyber Pass. The Dardic speakers were those tribes that had fled the onslaught of the Aryans and established their fastness in Afghanistan’s great range, where until relatively recent days they kept their ancient pagan faith and evaded conversion to Islam. Stein concludes that the Afridis were one of the Pathan tribes described by Herodotus, which inhabited the easternmost Persian satrapy, or province, of the Archaemenidian Empire that flourished between the sixth and fifth centuries BC. Stein’s thesis is supported by the discovery of Archaemenid inscriptions mentioning Gandhara as one of the provinces of this early Persian Empire. We are therefore on relatively safe ground in assuming that the Afridis were in possession of their native land from very remote times, certainly before the sword-wielding Afghan horsemen of the seventh century AD galloped in to convert the tribes to Islam.

At some point, the Pathans began to weave a nexus of tales to explain their genealogy. About four hundred years ago we find the first references that planted the seeds of the Pathan genesis, not in the migrations of the pagan warriors who emerged from Central Asia, but in the venerable Hebrew patriarchs of the bible. The Pathans offer an elaborate biblical folklore linking their origins to the Ten Lost Tribes of Israel, from which they claim direct descent. The version that is told around the hearth, from mud dwellings of the barren hills of South Waziristan to the story-tellers’ bazaar of Peshawar, goes like this: Saul, the first king of the Israelites, had a son named Irmia (Jeremiah), and he in turn had a son who was called Afghana. Saul was killed in battle with the Philistines and Jeremiah died at roughly the same time as his father. Afghana was brought up by King David and eventually rose to take command of the armies of Israel. Somewhere between the seventh and sixth centuries BC, about four hundred years after Afghana’s death, which would be at the time of the captivity of the tribes of Israel, ten of the twelve tribes (the sons of Afghana) escaped, and several of them found refuge in the mountains of Ghor, in what is now Hazarat in central Afghanistan. These people, the tribesmen will tell you, were the progenitors of what was to become the Pathan nation. Moreover, the Pathans up and down the Frontier, who are overwhelmingly Sunni Muslims, refer to themselves in the most matter-of-fact way as Ben-i-Israel, or ‘sons of Israel’. They acknowledge the founder of their race to be Qais, allegedly the thirty-seventh lineal descendant of Saul, who lived in Ghor at the time of the rise of Islam. Saul himself, according to Pathan lore, was the forty-fifth in descent from Abraham, a claim that is at total variance with biblical genealogy, while the former allows only thirty-seven generations for a period of 1,600 years. Nevertheless, the Pathans ignore this inconsistency, and according to their tradition, Qais himself was converted to Islam by Muhammad’s emissary Khaled Ibn Waleed, whose daughter he married, and subsequently visited Mecca to receive a blessing from the Prophet. In the tenth century, the last of the Pathan tribes had embraced Islam. By tradition, Qais had four sons, Sarbanr, Bitan, Ghurghusht and Karlanri, and all the Pathan tribes trace their line of descent from one of these offspring. Thus the Sarbanri, or western Afghans, engendered the Saddozai and Muhammadzai families that ruled Afghanistan in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries respectively. Another section of the Sarbanr dynasty, the eastern Afghans, gave rise to important tribes such as the Shinwaris and Mohmands, as well as the Yusufzais of Dir, Swat and Buner, and the Mandanr Yusufzais of the plains of Swabi and Mardan, the town that was to acquire fame in the days of the Raj as the spiritual home of the Corps of Guides, raised to keep the peace on the Frontier. The family tree of Bitan, Qais’s second son, produced the Bhittanni tribe of Waziristan, and later the powerful Lodhi dynasty that ruled in Delhi in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Ghurghusht was the patriarch of several tribes that migrated to the southernmost reaches of the Frontier, and also to the Peshawar district. Karlanri, the last of Qais’s children, who was reputedly discovered in the forest as a newborn babe, was the forefather of the greatest hill tribes of the Frontier. The Afridis, Utman Khel, Orakzais, Daurs, Mahsuds, Utmanzais and Wazirs, and others, all look to Karlanri as their founding father.

What evidence do we have to substantiate this seductive theory of Jewish origin, which, it should be remembered, came to the attention of the western world at a time when the legend of the Lost Tribes and the biblical prophecies was very much in British minds? And, if archaeological shreds and fragments are to be found to support the claim to Israelite origin, is this a sufficiently sound foundation on which to construct a scientific thesis? The debate, which first came to the western public’s notice in the early nineteenth century, split open a hornets’ nest in the ethnologist community.

It was in 1808 that the intrepid traveller the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone assembled an embassy to Afghanistan, an entourage of great magnificence in the classic style of his day. Seated bolt upright on his mount, the gaunt, hawk-like Elphinstone rode out of the gates of Delhi at the head of what resembled a small army, made up of a secretary, two East India Company assistants, a surgeon and an infantry captain and seven officers commanding an escort of 450 mounted cavalry and infantrymen. The mission’s objective was to gather intelligence about the unknown territories that lay beyond the borders of the Raj and to make such inquiries ‘as were likely to be of use to the British Government’. This meant exploring the opening of trade routes with Central Asia as well as assessing the mood of the local potentates towards the Raj. On his journey, Elphinstone accumulated a vast store of knowledge on the Afghans and their cousins of the Frontier, which at that time lay hundreds of miles beyond British India’s territorial limits. At the court of the Amir of Kabul, Elphinstone was regaled with stories of the Pathan bloodline, which he interpreted as plausible, but only up to a point, beyond which the tales became riddled with historical inconsistencies. He brought back accounts of warrior tribes whose version of Hebrew ancestry does not, according to the traveller, essentially differ from Scripture. ‘It is known that ten of the twelve tribes remained in the east after the return of their brethren to Judea,’ he writes.

The supposition that the Afghans are their descendants explains easily and naturally both the disappearance of the one people, and the origin of the other. The rest of the story is confirmed by the fact that the Jews were very numerous in Arabia at the time of Mohammed, and that the principal division of them bore the appellation of Khyber, which is still the name of a district in Afghanistan, if not of an Afghan tribe.3

It is obvious from Elphinstone’s description of the Khyber that the North-West Frontier, which four decades later was annexed to British India, was deemed in the early years of the nineteenth century to be part of the terra incognita that made up Afghanistan.

The debate between proponents of the Israelite origin theory and those who dismissed it as fanciful raged well into the twentieth century. As late as the 1950s, prominent individuals such as Itzhak Ben-Zvi, the second president of Israel, were outspoken in their acceptance of the Pathans’ Jewish roots. Prior to that, the nineteenth-century explorer William Moorcroft mysteriously came across an ancient copy of the Old Testament in Hebrew on his travels in Afghanistan. Moorcroft’s contemporary, the distinguished orientalist Sir William Jones, put forth his arguments in favour of the Pathan version of their descent on the basis of shared names with the ancient Hebrews, certain religious traditions and similarities between the Pashtu and Aramaic languages. The Central Asian explorer Joseph Wolff, a converted Jew and the son of a German rabbi, was, on the other hand, an emphatic disbeliever of the Ten Lost Tribes story. A hundred years after Elphinstone’s expedition to Kabul, archaeological digs near Herat, in western Afghanistan, unearthed some remarkable gravestones bearing Hebrew as well as Persian names. Furthermore, the Kabul Museum, before it was savagely demolished by the Taliban, contained a black stone discovered in Kandahar with Hebrew inscriptions inexplicably carved on it. The Honourable Elphinstone himself must be cast alongside the sceptics. This is his word on the subject: ‘I fear we must class the descent of the Afghans [Pathans] from the Jews with that of the Romans and the British from the Trojans, and that of the Irish from the Milesians or the Brahmins.’4 It is perhaps a happy circumstance that the compelling mystery of the Pathans’ ethnic origin is destined to be left unsolved for the foreseeable future. Given the tribesmen’s historical hostility to outsiders, no comprehensive anthropological study of these people has ever been carried out.

Given the lack of unity among the Frontier tribes, it comes as no surprise that the theory of Israelite origin is only one of a pot-pourri of less widespread tales of Pathan origin. Several tribes adhere to the concept of Aryan genealogy, and still others are happy to consider themselves as descendants of the Arabs, Persians or Greeks. The Mohmands, for instance, firmly believe they can trace their ancestry directly back to followers of the Prophet Muhammad, while many of the tribes bear names with clear links to great Old Testament figures. Shinwari, for instance, comes from Simeon; Yusufzai translates as ‘sons of Joseph’, the suffix zai being a corruption of the Pathan word zoe, meaning ‘son’; and Afridi is itself a derivative of ‘Ephraim’. It is the Afridis, however, who stand out as the principal proponents of the Jewish origin theory. Their case has been taken up by genuine as well as amateur authorities from the early nineteenth century onward. Thomas Pennell was a physician and missionary who spent sixteen years in charge of a medical station at Bannu, in North Waziristan. Pennell had a fascination for what he perceived to be unmistakable ethnic links between his Pathan patients and the Jews. ‘Often in looking round the visitors to our out-patient department one sees some old greybeard of pure Afghan descent, and involuntarily exclaims: “The man might for all the world be one of the old Jewish patriarchs returned to us from Bible history!”’5 Pennell was struck by the many commonly shared customs and observances of the Pathans and Hebrews. In particular, he cites two that in the Islamic world are unique to the Pathans. The first is the sacrifice of an animal, usually a goat or a sheep, in case of illness, after which the blood of the animal is sprinkled over the door posts of the house of the sick person, to ward off the angel of death. The other is to take a heifer and ceremoniously place upon it the sins of the people, after which it is driven out into the wilderness.

Much later, in the 1950s, the American diplomat James W. Spain found himself seduced by the Pathans’ exotic genealogical tree. After a posting with the US Embassy in Karachi, the original capital of Pakistan, Spain devoted nearly a decade of his life to researching the history and customs of the Frontier tribes. He never accepted the Pathans’ literal version of their biblical lineage, but he was impressed by the remarkable consistency of their tales, which he surmised had been composed almost entirely from the same origin about four centuries previously. ‘Every true Pathan can fit himself and his ancestors into this great family tree,’ he says. ‘Nonetheless, it is valuable since it provides a framework which reflects the real divisions of groups at that time and has preserved the actual lines of descent since.’6

The sceptic should be wary of rejecting out of hand this ‘fable’ of the Ten Lost Tribes. Attention must be drawn to the work of Sir Olaf Caroe, the doyen of Pathan historians, who served as the last British governor of the North-West Frontier Province before the transfer of sovereignty to Pakistan in 1947. As a native of the Scottish Highlands, albeit of Norwegian ancestry (his full Christian name was Olaf Kirkpatrick), Caroe found himself in familiar surroundings on the North-West Frontier. On his first journey to the Frontier, when he crossed the bridge at Attok, the gorge where the Kabul River meets the Indus at the site of the fort built in the sixteenth century under the reign of the emperor Babur, Caroe exclaimed that ‘to cross the bridge at Attok is to come home’. Caroe was far more than a civil servant. His meticulous, scholarly research provides us with an authoritative point of reference to the Frontier tribes, embodied in The Pathans, a seminal work that traces this people’s history from 550 BC to the second half of the twentieth century.

‘Lest already the serious reader dismiss it as pure fable, I must here put some weight in the other scale,’ writes Caroe about the Israelite origin theory.

It is to be remembered, first, that with the exception of some modern Kabul writers, who at one time inclined to ‘Nordic’ theories under Hitlerian influence, the greater number of Afghan and Pathan commentators believe these traditions, the more so in relation to the tribal genealogies which grow out of the ‘myth’ when it reaches the Islamic era.7

The Pathans call their homeland Yaghistan, the ‘Land of the Untamed’. The handful of surviving British soldiers who served on the North-West Frontier will tell you that the name is fully justified. No doubt the conquerors of past centuries whose armies clashed with these hill tribes would also endorse this view. The story goes in Pathan folklore that when God created the world there were many stones and rocks left over, and that these were all dumped down on the Frontier. The tribesmen’s stoical acceptance of their existence in a largely desolate, hostile landscape belies a character as hard and enduring as the rocks that Allah caused to be scattered on their homeland.

This rugged landscape stretches from the mountains of Chitral in the north, where many of the inhabitants claim to be descendants of the remnants of Alexander’s army that stayed behind and settled here. Indeed, one of the most common male names in this region is Iskander, the local translation of Alexander. What is today the North-West Frontier then descends some 400 miles south through a tangle of inhospitable hill and mountain country to untamed South Waziristan, the land of the much-feared Mahsud tribe. Here the hills are mostly devoid of cultivation, from the Kurram Valley to the north to the point at which the hills merge with the Suleiman Range near the towering landmark of Takht-i-Sulaiman, the ‘Throne of Solomon’. At its widest point the Frontier runs from Kurram Agency on the Afghan border about 250 miles eastward to Abbottabad, so named for General Sir James Abbott, one of the great paladins of the Punjab.

The North-West Frontier lies in the epicentre of conflict zones. On its northern border, it touches the Wakhan Corridor, the elongated mountainous valley between the Hindu Kush and the Pamirs that was ceded to Afghanistan in 1893. This finger of land was demarcated to act as a buffer to prevent Britain and Russia’s colonial empires meeting head on. Yet the two superpowers of their day were separated by less than half a dozen miles by the Corridor, which today serves as a wedge between Pakistan and Tajikistan, one of Central Asia’s most politically unstable countries, and also as the gateway to China. To the south, the Frontier is bounded by the desolate tribal land of Baluchistan, where the Pakistani government is battling pockets of tribal revolt, and the Dera Ghazi Khan district of the Punjab. To the east lies Kashmir, one of the loveliest spots in South Asia, where the Pakistani and Indian armies confront one another on the world’s highest battleground, the 20,700ft Siachen Glacier. The Frontier’s western border straddles Afghanistan, a country that has not known peace for almost three decades.

Geographically, the Frontier is split into three regions. The Hazara district is the only portion of the Frontier found to the east of the Indus. Only about a quarter of the people in this district are Pashtu speakers, while the remainder speak Hindko, an ancient language of northern Pakistan. There is a narrow strip of land between the west bank of the Indus and the tribal hill country, whose main city is Peshawar, the administrative as well as the historic capital of the Frontier. The tribal area itself, to the north and west, lies along the Durand Line, which for more than a century has stood as the official border between British India, now Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

Outside the cultivated farmland and bustling towns of the ‘settled districts’ – that is, the Frontier enclave in which the British colonialists established their presence – there is little of natural beauty in tribal territory proper. ‘First, miles of cliff and stony slopes,’ recalls one veteran Frontiersman in his memoirs of tribal warfare. ‘Then open plains flanked by low, bare hills, and scored by deep ravines, after which you come to the great bare hills and cliffs of the Khyber . . . ’8 There are exceptions to this bleakness – for instance, the Tirah, the lush valleys and woodlands south of the Khyber Pass that are the jealously guarded preserve of the Afridi tribe. But for the most part, a visitor to the Frontier would be hard pressed to understand how anyone could survive, much less provide for a family, in this barren country that is home to several millions of Pathans. The answer is that the Pathans struggle desperately hard to eke out a living from traditional farming and trade and by long-standing tradition regularly engage in less savoury activities, such as smuggling, extortion and the drug trade, to make ends meet.

Yet the Frontier has always held a compelling allure for those who have given years of their lives to this harsh environment. Caroe, for one, found that the secret of the Frontier’s fascination was in what he described as the tremendous scenic canvas brought into sharp relief by sharp, cruel changes of climate. ‘Sometimes the assault on the spirit is that of stark ugliness and discomfort – appalling heat, a dust-storm across the Peshawar plain, the eroded foothills of Khyber or Waziristan,’ he writes. ‘More often it is an impression of beauty indescribable in its clarity and contrast with the barren emptiness that went before. The weft and warp of this tapestry is woven into the souls and bodies of the men who move before it. Much is harsh, but all is drawn in strong tones that catch the breath, and at times bring tears, almost of pain.’9 There is no doubt that the Frontier, in the very bleakness that inspired Caroe’s elegant tribute, possesses the power to rouse deeper emotions than might, for instance, a familiar and pleasant alpine meadow. ‘The last free place on Earth’ was how a British journalist in the 1950s described his first exposure to the North-West Frontier.

Given the poverty of the land and the extremes of climate (temperatures can soar to more than 115°F in summer and plunge to well below freezing in the winter months), it is no wonder that the Pathans have been moulded into what more than one officer serving on the Frontier has acknowledged to be the world’s toughest fighting men. Their ability to stalk an enemy with the stealth and cunning of a panther is legendary. ‘Their power of moving concealed is astounding, not only in moving from cover to cover, but in slipping from light to shadow, and background to background,’ recalls one British solider. ‘It has to be seen to be believed. And their stillness in cover is equally striking.’10 This predatory nature is graphically reflected in the Pathans’ raiding tactics. Reliable British Army issue rifles, since the arrival of the Raj, have always been their most cherished booty, and camp sentries their chosen prey. When launching a raid on an arms depot under the cover of darkness, a party of Pathan warriors would often strip naked to avoid the tribesmen’s baggy trousers rustling against the underbrush and thus giving away their presence. Apart from their daggers, they carried short twigs to use as a funnel should anyone have to relieve his bladder during the long waiting hours before the attack. The slightest noise that might cause a sentry to prick up his ears would send the raiders slithering silently back to their nullahs, the dry riverbeds that criss-cross the valleys and serve as escape routes. If the opportunity is missed on any given night, it is bound to come the next or the one after that, at any rate often enough to make it worth their while to watch for it. ‘They have no work to do, no camp to get to, they have range upon range of hill to screen them for as long as they choose, and night has no terrors for them. They will return to the job day after day without anyone having an inkling of their presence, and when the real chance comes they seize it like lightning.’11

It should not be assumed that the Pathan tribes make up a homogenous race in respect of character and a belligerent nature. Historically, much depends on environment – that is, to what extreme a tribe is forced to prey on its neighbours to obtain its daily bread. As we have seen, not all the tribal land is made up of parched hills and barren scrub. There exist pockets of rich farmland, as well as grazing pasture up and down the Frontier, in Bajaur, the Khyber and elsewhere. The less warlike tribes tend to be found in these comparatively prosperous regions. In more recent times it became a matter of a tribe’s proximity to the settled districts, in particular the major towns like Peshawar. Education and social services come into the picture as well. This author was told by a Mullagori tribesman, whose family hails from north of the Khyber Pass, that in his village in the past, any man who ventured out of his home without a firearm did so at the peril of his life. Over a period of a couple of decades, the village had been provided with schools, sanitation facilities and proper medical services. Today, he said, these who walked the streets with assault rifles slung over their shoulders would be laughed at.

Sir William Barton, who served as Commandant of the Khyber Rifles at the time of the Third Afghan War in 1919 and later held high rank in the North-West Frontier civil service, was one of the most experienced of British administrators in dealing with the mosaic of Pathan tribes. Barton held to the view that it would hardly be possible to produce a sketch of Pathan character to fit all the tribes, from the Indus to the Persian border and the Hindu Kush to Baluchistan. He explains:

There is, for example, a vast difference between the mental and moral outlook of a rich young Khan from Peshawar, educated in England, who, on a visit to London, might give you an elaborate lunch at the Savoy, and an odoriferous Wazir lazily making his way from Birmal in the Amir’s country [Afghanistan], to the Kurram valley with his sheep and camels.

Barton nurtures no romantic notions of these rough hill people, who in his view, and in that of the soldiers who crossed swords with the fierce Wazir tribesmen, would cut an infidel’s throat with a blunt knife as soon as look at him. This mistrust and animosity towards outsiders are not confined to foreign intruders. As far as the tribesmen of the hills are concerned, any stranger is to be regarded as an adversary until the contrary is proven, a doctrine embodied in the Pathan language, whose word for ‘cousin’ (tarbur) is synonymous with ‘enemy’. ‘The Khan might not like his English guest politically,’ says Barton, ‘he might criticise the social exclusiveness of the Englishman, but the murderous instincts of his race have been atrophied by education and contact with civilised life.’12

This ‘odoriferous Wazir’, to which Barton referred, according to the earliest written records has for centuries past inhabited the wild tangle of hills of Waziristan that stretch for about 100 miles south of Kurram Agency, with Afghanistan as the western border and the tribal agencies of Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan to the east. The two agencies of South and North Waziristan, which together comprise the homeland of the Wazir tribe, cover an area of some 5,000 square miles, most of it wilderness, with the towns of Miranshah, Tank and Wana as the only outposts of civilisation in the entire territory. Given their remoteness and the fierce independent spirit of the inhabitants, North and South Waziristan have always been the most troublesome of the tribal territories, from a military and administrative perspective, starting in early British colonial days, right up to the present. Many mujahidin guerrillas who fought the Russian army during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s, as well as Taliban remnants and Al Qaeda militants fleeing the US forces after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, found a safe haven amongst the fanatical Wazirs. The Pakistani army has deployed a massive contingent of some eighty thousand troops in and around the borders of Waziristan, where they are battling to root out foreign terrorists and seal off the region to infiltrators from Afghanistan. Army operations in the territory have carried a high cost. Since 2004, hundreds of Pakistani troops have been killed in fierce engagements with the tribesmen. The Wazirs are not in the least intimidated by modern weaponry, which they can easily match with their own panoply of captured Soviet equipment and smuggled arms. The Pakistan Government is showing signs of impatience with their frustrated efforts to stem the influx of Al Qaeda terrorists across the Afghan border into Waziristan. Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz stated on a visit to Britain in 2006 that ‘terrorists should not have to be intercepted in tribal territory’ and that ‘more action needed to be taken on the Afghan side’. For Kabul, turning a blind eye to guerrilla infiltration across the border from Afghanistan’s radical heartland is a convenient way to keep up the pressure on Pakistan in the historical stand-off between the two nations.

The British always regarded the Frontier as a territory of maximum strategic significance for the defence of the Indian Empire. As late as 1927, a mere twenty years before Britain relinquished sovereignty of the subcontinent, the Simon Commission, which was set up to make recommendations on the future Indian Constitution, reinforced this concept. ‘The North-West Frontier is not only the frontier of India,’ the report stated. ‘It is an international frontier of the first importance from the military point of view for the whole Empire.’13 A prophetic statement in the light of how history has unfolded in the eighty years since the Commission submitted its report, and nowhere is this more pertinent than in the turbulent land of Waziristan. The region’s strategic value also lies in its geographical location as a major crossroads between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Tochi Pass connects Ghazni in Afghanistan with Bannu, while the Gomal Pass provides a trade route from Afghanistan to Dera Ismail Khan. Both these roads cut straight through the heart of Waziristan.

The historian Arnold J. Toynbee, who travelled extensively in this region in the early 1960s, attributes the fierceness of the Wazirs to a piece of historical bad luck, in his opinion a consequence of the tribe having stumbled on the badlands at the time of the migrations across the watershed of the hills dividing the parched Afghan flatlands from the fertile Indus Valley. Toynbee held that a tribe’s character is a product of that tribe’s lands. ‘On these lands they [the Wazirs] have not been able to make a living by peaceful labour,’ he writes. ‘In order to live, they have had to rob either each other or, more profitably, their less indigent neighbours. There has been nothing but fighting to occupy their minds and employ their energies. So the nakedness of their land would explain the Ishmaelitish [desert Arab] way of life that they lead today.’14

On his journey to Kabul in 1808, Elphinstone came across these wild hill men and found them a peaceful and cordial lot. Four decades later, when the British Government came up against the Wazirs, the tribe swiftly gained a reputation for being one of the most singularly hostile on the North-West Frontier. Even in 1937, after many years of military campaigns against the Wazirs, several British Indian Army divisions found themselves involved in operations in Waziristan in what amounted to almost full-scale war. The most plausible explanation for this reversal of attitude is that Elphinstone would have been accepted as a transient visitor, an object of curiosity to a tribe that had never before come into contact with Europeans. Less than a generation after the Elphinstone expedition, the tribesmen got word of the annihilation of an entire British army on the retreat from Kabul, in the wake of the First Afghan War, at the hands of their kinsmen on the other side of the hills. From that moment the Pathans would have certainly looked upon the feringhee (European) as the enemy. From that episode came into common usage the Pathan proverb that was to serve as the tribesmen’s watchword for the next hundred years of British presence on the Frontier: ‘First comes one Englishman for shikar [hunting], then come two Englishman to draw a map, and then comes an army to take your land. So it is best to kill the first Englishman.’

The Wazirs are frequently referred to as the Darwesh Khel, Khel being the Pashtu word for clan. The tribe is divided into two great branches, the Utmanzai and Ahmadzai. Both branches take pains to distinguish themselves from their cousins, the Mahsuds of South Waziristan, who are regarded as the most extreme fanatics of all the Frontier tribes. The Mahsuds’ cruelty, especially on the battlefield, became the stuff of barrack-room lore among the troops who crossed swords with this ferocious tribe. ‘They are an extremely barbarous and warlike tribe, of the same origin as the Darwesh Khel Wazirs,’ declares an official report issued in 1910.15 This document is in itself an elaborate testimony to the Government’s determination to catalogue every bit of data it had accumulated on the Pathan hill tribes. It contains almost five thousand entries classifying the Pathans first by tribe, then by clan of the tribe, division of the clan, sub-division of the division, section of the sub-division, down to other minor factions of the section, along with the number of fighting men of each faction, the locality of the tribe, the clan and so on.

The directory was compiled very much in the spirit of ‘know thy enemy’, for government records, particularly in the early days of British rule, showed nothing but a deep-rooted contempt for the Frontier tribes. Less than a decade after the Raj arrived on the scene in 1849, the official reports filed by government agents on the Frontier spoke with breathtaking arrogance of the Pathans as ‘savages’ and ‘absolute barbarians’.