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- Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
- Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
- Sprache: Englisch
Humans use countless tools and are constantly creating new ones. We are so prone to materiality that the changes we implement in our environment could put our very survival at stake. It has therefore become necessary to question the cognitive origins of this materiality. The Tool Instinct examines this subject by diametrically setting aside the idea that tool use is limited to manual activity. It proposes an original perspective that surpasses a great number of false beliefs regarding the relationship between humans and tools. The author argues that the human tendency to create and use tools relies on our ability (one that may be unique to our species) to generate our own physical problems, thereby resulting in a reasoning that is directed towards our physical world.
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Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2020
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Table of Contents
Cover
Introduction
I.1. The purpose
I.2. The subject
I.3. The route
I.4. The project
1 The Tool With a Capital T
1.1. Defining the Tool: the behavioral reality
1.2. Blinded by tools
1.3. From analogy to specificities
1.4. The select club of animal users
1.5. In-defining the Tool: cognitive reality
1.6. Conclusion
2 Instinct
2.1. Tools not necessary for survival
2.2. Digging your own ditches to cross
2.3. From appetence to instinct
2.4. Conclusion
3 The Myth of Manual Work
3.1. Gestum ago, ergo instrumentis munio
3.2. The myth of motor programs
3.3. Instrumentis munio, ergo gestum ago
3.4. Conclusion
4 A World Without a Technical Solution
4.1. The reason for the Tool
4.2. The technical transfer
4.3. Beyond manipulation
4.4. Mechanical knowledge
4.5. Technical reasoning and dialectics
4.6. Reasoning and dynamism
4.7. Conclusion
5 Reasoning versus Planning
5.1. Executive functions
5.2. Reasoning versus planning
5.3. From routine schemas to recursivity
5.4. Cognitive archaeology: new perspectives
5.5. Using one tool to create another
5.6. Conclusion
6 Tool Disorganization
6.1. Tools in stock
6.2. From use to consumption
6.3. Tool making: toward crafts
6.4. Toolbox and uses
6.5. Conclusion
7 Between Fascination and Shaping
7.1. From instinct to technical stigmergy
7.2. The distance between the maker and the user
7.3. Cumulative technological culture
7.4. Conclusion
Conclusion
References
Index
End User License Agreement
List of Tables
Introduction
Table I.1. Definitions of the main concepts covered in the introduction
Chapter 1
Table 1.1. Major definitions of tool use
Table 1.2. Animal tool use
Table 1.3. Definitions of tool use, tool making and construction according to Sh...
Table 1.4. Human-specific behaviors
Chapter 4
Table 4.1. Familiar and novel tool use in LBD and RBD patients
Chapter 7
Table 7.1. Neurocognitive bases of mental making and different forms of use (ass...
List of Illustrations
Chapter 1
Figure 1.1. Making of stone tools (Oldowayan lithic industry, about 2.5 million ...
Chapter 2
Figure 2.1. Instinct modeling according to Konrad Lorenz. For a color version of...
Figure 2.2. Number of necessary and non-necessary relevant tools and irrelevant ...
Chapter 3
Figure 3.1. Classic dichotomy between procedural and declarative memory (source:...
Figure 3.2. Manipulation-based approach. For a color version of this figure, see...
Figure 3.3. Ecological situation of familiar tool use (source: Osiurak and Heink...
Figure 3.4. Experimental stick transport paradigm developed by Rosenbaum et al. ...
Figure 3.5. Selection of an appropriate posture by the primate prehension system...
Figure 3.6. Interaction between the primate prehension system (recycled mechanis...
Chapter 4
Figure 4.1. Link between familiar and novel tool use in LBD patients (source: Ba...
Figure 4.2. Lesion sites affecting familiar and novel tool use in LBD patients. ...
Figure 4.3. Main results of a recent meta-analysis including neuroimaging studie...
Figure 4.4. Revision of the classic dichotomy “procedural versus declarative mem...
Figure 4.5. The librarian’s problem (source: Osiurak et al. 2010)
Figure 4.6. Ideomotor principle (source: Osiurak and Badets 2016)
Figure 4.7. Strategies used by LBD patients to solve mechanical problems (source...
Chapter 5
Figure 5.1. Behavior of a person who does not have executive functions (source: ...
Figure 5.2. Behavior of a person with executive functions (source: Osiurak 2014)
Figure 5.3. Tower of London. For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co...
Figure 5.4. Phenomenon of recursivity in technical reasoning, language and theor...
Figure 5.5. Production of a simple spear. The sequence of mechanical actions to ...
Figure 5.6. Production of a spear with a split-based bone point. The sequence of...
Chapter 7
Figure 7.1. Cumulative technological culture (source: Osiurak et al. 2016). For ...
Figure 7.2. Tool-use action observation (source: Reynaud et al. 2016). For a col...
Conclusion
Figure C.1. The four constraints theory (4CT) (source: Osiurak 2014)
Figure C.2. PATH theory (source: Osiurak 2017a). For a color version of this fig...
Figure C.3. Theoretical proportion of physical tool use (free use), physical and...
Figure C.4. Link between tool and non-tool conditions in three physical and thre...
Guide
Cover
Table of Contents
Begin Reading
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Series Editor
Jean-Charles Pomerol
The Tool Instinct
François Osiurak
First published 2020 in Great Britain and the United States by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Apart from any fair dealing for the purposes of research or private study, or criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, this publication may only be reproduced, stored or transmitted, in any form or by any means, with the prior permission in writing of the publishers, or in the case of reprographic reproduction in accordance with the terms and licenses issued by the CLA. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside these terms should be sent to the publishers at the undermentioned address:
ISTE Ltd
27-37 St George’s Road
London SW19 4EU
UK
www.iste.co.uk
John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
111 River Street
Hoboken, NJ 07030
USA
www.wiley.com
© ISTE Ltd 2020
The rights of François Osiurak to be identified as the author of this work have been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
Library of Congress Control Number: 2019955365
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library
ISBN 978-1-78630-471-1
Introduction
The Tool Instinct is an essay on the cognitive origins of human materiality. The aim is to jointly address the question of why and how mankind is constantly changing its physical environment, in particular through tool making and tool use. If you are intrigued by this question, be aware that the answer may seem confusing in the sense that the why certainly has its source in the how. “What author did you come across?”, you may think to yourself. In fact, this is a small nod to the readers who, among you, may be familiar with Konrad Lorenz’s work. Perhaps this will be enough for them to already have an idea of the answer proposed in this book. For the others, I am sorry, but I do not have any more clues to give you right now. Please have patience.
This introduction presents the purpose, subject, route and project of this book1. To fully understand my thinking, it seemed essential to me to write these few pages that make it possible to clearly delimit the field of research studied here, namely what I mean by “the cognitive origins of human materiality” (i.e. the purpose). I will also specify my positioning (i.e. the subject) so that you know who is writing, but above all in what context what the “writing” occurs. I will continue by specifying that disciplines are concerned throughout this book and what was their trajectory (i.e. the route). I will conclude by detailing the book’s project, which aims to answer the central question mentioned above by conducting both a critical reflection on what is said in the literature on the subject and a theoretical elaboration to provide new answers. Let us start with the purpose.
I.1. The purpose
I am passionate about humans. This passion is reflected in the smiles that I sketch out daily as I scan my conspecifics. It could be a teenager proudly wearing a hooded jacket, a woman laughing while listening to her smartphone, or a bus driver stuck behind the wheel. How many times a day do I sketch these smiles? Three and maybe four times. The reason behind these smiles? Cynicism? Certainly not. I am not one of those who consider these behaviors to be ridiculous or contemptuous, thinking that I am the only one who realizes that we are nothing more than disguised primates2. I am aware of that. So be it. But what fascinates me is the propensity that humans have to handle clothing, tools, new technologies, etc., as if all this were natural to us.
However, there is nothing natural about wearing a jacket, using a smartphone or driving. There is nothing natural about pushing pedals to move forward. There is nothing natural about talking to a person through a device, when the person is hundreds of kilometers away, if not on the other side of the world. There is nothing natural about wearing clothes to warm up. And what about bridges, buildings, roads, cars, computers, rockets, all these marks left by the human species and which reflect the profound change in the environment brought about by this (these) species? Very often, I observe these marks, without any esthetic judgment – I am sorely lacking in the latter anyway – just because I wonder what cognitive processes specific to our species have allowed us to get there. This question – the cognitive origins of human materiality – accompanies me in my daily life, like a prism that would be fixed on my gaze. Looking for answers to this question is what I am passionate about. And this is precisely the purpose of cognitive3anthropology (see Table I.1) and, a fortiori, of this book.
Anthropology
A discipline aimed at establishing a finite number of characteristics (e.g. morphological, see
physical anthropology
; psychological, see
psychological anthropology
) to define humans.
Physical anthropology
Subdiscipline of
anthropology
aimed at establishing a finite number of morphological, anatomical or biomechanical characteristics characterizing humans.
Social anthropology
Subdiscipline of
anthropology
aimed at establishing a finite number of observable characteristics in social behaviors that would be specific to humans.
Behavioral/psychological anthropology
Subdiscipline of
anthropology
to describe human characteristics and particularities at the
behavioral/psychological
level.
Cognitive anthropology
Subdiscipline of
anthropology
aimed at clarifying the
cognitive
characteristics specific to humans.
Psychology
Behavioral science in animals or humans.
Comparative psychology
A subdiscipline of
psychology
that seeks to understand the differences and similarities between humans and other animal species, or between non-human animal species.
Cognitive psychology
Subdiscipline of
psychology
aimed at interpreting our behaviors through a
cognitivist
approach.
Cognition/cognitivism
A current of thought assuming that our thinking is made up of a set of processes such as memory, reasoning and language.
Behaviorism
A current of thought interested only in the formulation of behavioral laws.
Epistemology
A discipline that aims to understand how humans generate knowledge by studying the historical facts and scientific prerequisites that underlie the way a problem is posed.
Metatheory
Influential theory that is considered as a
paradigm
in the sense that it serves as a framework for reflection by being unrecognized for a long time.
Paradigm
A framework of thought that determines how researchers approach a problem (see
metatheory
).
Theory
Answer given to a question, which corresponds to a possible variant of a
metatheory
, without questioning the very foundations of this metatheory.
Empirical evidence
Corresponds to a collection of data to support the predictions of a
theory
.
Science
Methodology that consists of supporting a theory on the basis of a collection of
empirical evidence
.
Philosophy
Reflection on an issue of interest, without necessarily seeking to resolve it with
empirical evidence
.
Continuity
Theory that considers that there is no difference in
nature
between humans and other animal species.
Discontinuity
Thesis that suggests a difference in
degree
between humans and other animal species.
Rupture mechanism
Cognitive mechanism considered as present only in the human species.
Recycled mechanism
Cognitive mechanism pre-existing to the human species, but whose use is modified due to the appearance of a
rupture mechanism
.
Phylogenetics
Corresponds to the evolution of a species over time.
Ontogenetics
Corresponds to the development of an individual over time.
Table I.1.Definitions of the main concepts covered in the introduction
To be clear, I will not discuss how we moved through the history from the first tools shaped by our ancestors to the latest space shuttle designed by NASA. Whether the first representatives of the genus Homo mastered fire by observing the effects of lightning or whether they developed the first silex knives by cutting off their hands will not be discussed here. Unfortunately, dear reader, if it is these answers that you are looking for, namely answers on the historical evolution of human technology, then you are on the wrong track with this book. Rather, I invite you to turn to works such as those written by André Leroi-Gourhan, which describe the historical evolution of techniques in prehistory, for example. However, if what intrigues you is to understand the reasons underlying this historical evolution, and if your interest is primarily directed toward the cognitive evolution of the human species, then this book can provide you with answers, or at least potential explanations, to this great question. To paraphrase Bachelard, the purpose here is not “why are things the way they are?” but rather “why could things have become what they are?” I would add to this “from a cognitive point of view”. After all, it is not only the Homininae4 who have been able to see the damage caused by lightning or who have cut themselves off from body parts when in contact with a sharp stone. Understanding what caused the discoveries is fascinating for a historian. However, for a cognitive anthropologist, the problem is not to describe the historical conditions, whether natural or not, that led to the discovery of a given technique, but rather to understand what cognitive processes are necessary to control and reproduce these accidents in order to constitute what can be called a technique. To paraphrase Emmanuel Kant this time, the purpose of this book is the underlying cognitive structure and not the forms taken by its content5.
I.2. The subject
I am not a “pure scientist”. I concede that. Unlike most of my colleagues, I have difficulty reconsidering certain theoretical positions, and I often have the impression that I am sinking into my positioning, rather than opening up to new horizons. As such, my work is necessarily ideological, and I am not ashamed to say it. In fact, some time ago, I accepted the idea that my career could be about defending a point of view by pushing it to its limits. Too bad if I ever find that this point of view is wrong. At least I tried. In any case, this part of subjectivity permeates my subject, because I am the subject of this book. Therefore, it seems important to me to clarify some of my assumptions, because I am aware that my remarks may be misunderstood, and may lead to a process of intention toward me, because I have not been able to qualify my position accurately and unequivocally. So I would like to remedy this immediately.
On the one hand, although I am fascinated by Man, I do not admire him. My point is neither philanthropic nor misanthropic. I do not attribute exceptional qualities to the human species. Man is nothing extraordinary or rather superior and – even if it means being shocking – it does not matter to me whether our technical bulimia leads us one day to our loss or to leaving the planet. No, what matters to me is to unravel the mystery of how Man is able to get closer to his wildest fantasies. Let us take teleportation. Of course, we are not there yet. But the use of trains, planes, cars, etc., already allows us to move without moving, which is a definite step forward. We are getting closer. And it is the cognitive mechanism that allows this permanent convergence that puzzles me. Why is this happening among our species?
On the other hand, I also know that my position can be criticized as reflecting a contemporary analysis of the problem, neglecting that the human species is not characterized only by recent technological advances, since for a long time there was talk of the use of stone tools and certainly also wooden ones6. My answer to this criticism is as follows. Yes, I am fascinated by current human productions. It often happens that when my plane is stopped on the tarmac, I look out the window at the planes in front of me. And then I am amazed by this ability that has allowed us to produce a flying object of several tens or even hundreds of tons, thus realizing a real thumbnail to gravity. So, yes, I often let myself be subjugated by contemporary visions of human technology. But these visions are highly instructive, because they reflect what Man – nowadays at the origin of our species – is able to produce. In short, whether it is a question of producing a six-knife or an aircraft; in both cases, the same reasoning could well be at work. The question remains to understand what form this reasoning can take, whether by focusing on what Man is capable of building, either now or a long time ago7.
I.3. The route
The key discipline addressed in this book is cognitive anthropology. However, I am aware that this discipline – and in particular its boundaries – may seem somewhat obsolete to a novice. In this section, I will focus on this notion by explaining the trajectory – the route – followed by it within the social sciences and humanities. This will lead me to discuss the notions of anthropology, psychology and cognition.
I.3.1. Physical anthropology and social anthropology
At a time when we plan to send the first settlers to Mars and the number of exoplanets discovered is flourishing, it is becoming more and more reasonable to consider that the long-awaited encounter with extra-terrestrial life is imminent. No, you might say? Maybe I am a sweet dreamer, that is true. Nevertheless, one day we will have to prepare for the eventuality of this meeting by being able to answer the important question, which justifies the very existence of the sciences that we call human, and that our kind aliens could ask us very quickly, as soon as they have put a “foot” on Earth: what is a human? How to recognize one? Imagine that you are the lucky one, the very first one to whom this question was addressed. What would you say? Take a few seconds, one or two minutes if necessary. But try to answer correctly, because the future of humanity may well depend on it!
If you have done this exercise, you should have some snippets of answers to this question, which, behind its apparent simplicity, masks a disconcerting complexity. How can we ensure that an extra-terrestrial observer does not confuse us with another species? What criteria can we set? This question, that of the threshold of the human being, is the hallmark of anthropology. Inventorying the criteria is the ultimate challenge, until we can characterize humans by differentiating them from other species.
Let us start by looking at the type of answers you were able to provide. It is very likely that some of you started your inventory by focusing on the physical aspects that could be specific to humans. In this case, you have practiced, perhaps unknowingly, physical anthropology, which aims to produce a catalogue of human morphological, anatomical and biomechanical characteristics. You may have noticed the bipedalism, which is a mode of locomotion consisting of moving on its two hind legs. It is indeed a defining feature of our species, Homo sapiens, even if we are not the only ones to practice this mode of locomotion, since it is also the preserve of birds, for example. The opposable thumb is another physical characteristic of humans, allowing a fine grip, using the thumb and index finger – as when you handle a pencil. Without an opposable thumb, the only possible grip is called a power grip, and consists of gathering all the fingers toward the palm, as when handling a hammer. Like bipedalism, this trait characterizes us, although it is not specific to humans, as other primate species also have this ability.
The referencing of these physical characteristics is not the only concern of anthropology, which may reassure some readers who had opted for another direction in order to carry out the proposed exercise, with a greater emphasis on behavioral aspects. For example, only humans perform funeral rites, which consist of commemorating the death of an individual through a set of actions and words. Another example reported by the eminent French anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss is the prohibition of incest, which is found in all human civilizations. The repertoire of these traits could have been the objective of behavioral anthropology, since it is indeed a question of listing the supposedly species-specific behaviors. However, historically, the term social anthropology has been used, for the simple reason that the first anthropologists who officiated at the end of the 19th Century and the beginning of the 20th Century sought above all to understand the invariants present both in Western societies and in societies considered primitive at the time, such as the Indigenous peoples of the Amazon. In other words, they sought to understand the social traits shared by all human societies.
I.3.2. Social anthropology and behavioral anthropology
An epistemological limitation – I will come back to this notion later – inherent in social anthropology is to naturally focus on social characteristics, as if human beings defined themselves and distinguished themselves mainly from other species by their social behaviors. You will tell me that this remark is relatively tautological and not very informative, since this form of anthropology would not be called “social” if it were not so. However, such a presupposition presents significant risks to the understanding we can have of our species at a psychological level.
To clarify my point, let us take an example that is at the heart of this book, namely tool use. As I will discuss later, tool use is not unique to humans, other species are also able to show this behavior, such as chimpanzees or crows from New Caledonia. However, human tool use differs in several respects from that reported in animals. Let us consider one of these specificities, namely the cumulative technological culture, which consists of transmitting and improving a technique employed over generations, leading us, among other things, to switch from the flint, to the knife, then to the electric knife. If the assumption is that any difference between our species and other species necessarily results from the emergence of unique social skills – as implied by social anthropology – then the only way to explain this cumulative cultural phenomenon is to suggest that it appears because humans have developed specific social skills. This thesis is the one defended by Michaël Tomasello, a renowned contemporary psychologist, who is not considered to be developing work in social anthropology. However, the same assumption exists in his research. For him, this cumulative cultural phenomenon illustrates what distinguishes us from other animal species, namely the ability to develop an effective pedagogy based on active teaching that reveals the teacher’s ability to understand the teacher’s intentions during learning. If I was convinced that all human behavioral characteristics can be summed up in this thesis, then this book should have been called “The Social Instinct”. However, as you will have understood, I am not convinced that this thesis should be accepted in its entirety, since a significant number of studies indicate that the human threshold cannot be limited to unique social skills. The objective of this book is precisely to develop an alternative thesis on the question of tool use.
Where does this critique of social anthropology lead us? First of all, it is possible that when you read the idea that every human civilization practices funeral rites or prohibits incest, the following question may not have escaped your attention: why are we doing this? A number of theories have been formulated in this regard by illustrious authors, such as Sigmund Freud, who saw in these behavioral invariants the hallmark of psychological functioning that was preoccupied, even tortured, by existential anxieties about death and the prohibited. I will not develop here these theories that I have relatively poor knowledge of, I must admit. Simply, I will insist on the psychological dimension that Freud gave to these phenomena, by reminding everyone that all behavior, social or not, necessarily rests on a psychological functioning specific to each of the individuals of the species. In other words, for him, social anthropology is above all a psychological anthropology. This point of view is also the one I share.
In other words, if we remove the assumption that our species is only socially singular, we gradually move toward the idea that Man could possess a set of specific psychological characteristics, reflected in a number of specific behaviors as well, which may or may not be social. Social anthropology would then only be a special case of a behavioral anthropology, which encompasses all the behaviors, social or not, that characterize the human species. We carry out behaviors, some of which characterize us as a species. The purpose of behavioral anthropology is to understand them. In this respect, behavioral anthropology is at the crossroads of two disciplines: anthropology (the human threshold) and psychology (the behavioral dimension). This may require a little more detail on the term psychology, which although it has become common, often refers to mistaken beliefs, including that psychology is not a scientific discipline.
I.3.3. Psychology
The term psychology comes etymologically from psyche (soul) and logos (discourse), literally meaning the discourse on the soul. This definition is now obsolete since it corresponds to a leap made at the time by the ancient Greeks, who had invented this notion. Why am I talking about leaps? The reason is simple. At that time, the Greeks, under the influence of Platonic thought, considered that our behavior was guided by the soul, an immaterial substance, the fruit of divine creation. This anthropocentric perspective – since Man was considered to be the only species to possess this privilege, thus placing him at the center of creation – was for a long time the dominant, classical approach to the philosophy of the mind, supported by illustrious thinkers such as René Descartes. In fact, this Platonic approach is at the very origin of creationist religions, such as Christianity, and is still largely espoused by many of us. I will come back in a few paragraphs to the scientific revolution that led to the formulation of an alternative thesis, evolutionism. In short, according to this anthropocentric perspective, all behavior is guided by the soul. In other words, studying our way of behaving or even thinking is like studying the soul. In this sense, the term psychology etymologically corresponds to a confusion between the subject of study and the theoretical approach useful for its interpretation.
This bias is also very common among psychology students and their university teachers. For example, if you ask a student about a possible definition of psychology, he or she will most likely raise the idea that psychology is the study of psychic processes. It is at this precise moment that it is necessary to be intractable so that the student does not reproduce the confusion inherent in the term. Psychology is the study of behavior. Behavior is the only tangible data we need to study, whether it is an act or a word produced by others. We do not access the thoughts of others. Of course, you will tell me that we are accessing our own thoughts and that in this case, introspection can be useful to understand them. This method was precisely the one advocated by Plato to access the soul. However, these thoughts cannot be studied as such. They can be a source of scientific inspiration and I do not deny that we all experience them. But they do not correspond to the subject of psychological study, namely behavior.
That being said, psychologists, like all scientists, have theories, that is, models that aim to explain groups of data and predict others. It is known that these theories are formulated on the basis of analogies. For example, Sigmund Freud drew inspiration from the thermodynamic models of his time to develop his theories on the interactions between the different psychological processes. For some, this may be perceived as a discovery, like Freud himself, who considered that his formulation of the unconscious corresponded to the third greatest scientific revolution in history, after the Copernian revolution – the transition from geocentrism to heliocentrism – and the Darwinian revolution – the transition from anthropocentrism to evolutionism. Unfortunately, the unconscious remains a theoretical concept, not tangible, unlike the two revolutions mentioned above. Also, when a student says that she/he studies psychic processes, this is not true. This is not the subject of study, but a possible interpretation of the subject of study, i.e. behavior. After all, no teacher will ever come with a jar in his hand, asking the students to get closer to the desk, so that in a few moments she/he can observe this famous Freudian unconscious locked in the jar. I would like to inform the reader that I am not challenging Freudian theory here, far from it. The same criticism can be leveled at colleagues who may believe that psychology is the study of cognitive mechanisms. I say this because my research laboratory is called that, like many others. However, again, at no time do we study cognitive mechanisms. We study behaviors, which we interpret through theories rooted in the cognitivist approach also called cognitivism. In short, psychology is a neutral discipline, theoretically, even if any researcher in psychology necessarily has a theoretical framework that helps him/her to interpret the observed behaviors.
I.3.4. Psychologies
Just as there are many forms of anthropology, there are also many forms of psychology. Here, I will not go into the details of what can be social psychology, clinical psychology, health psychology, developmental psychology, or many others. I will simply focus on a distinction that is useful for me, namely the distinction between human and animal psychology (also called ethology); these two forms can be studied together and then give rise to comparative psychology.
For many, psychology is necessarily human, which in a sense reinforces its academic position within the human sciences. It is true that the majority of university teaching focuses on the study of human behavior. However, there is nothing redundant in qualifying psychology as human, since as a behavioral science, its object can be either human or animal. At the origin of scientific psychology, at the end of the 19th Century, this frontier was even inoperative. The supporters of behaviorism had been keen to go beyond the methodology used by philosophers to understand our mind, namely the introspection introduced by Plato and the ancient Greeks perpetuated since then by classical philosophy. The objective of the behaviorists was precisely to break with this methodological tradition to develop an experimental approach consisting of observing behavioral responses to environmental stimuli. The focus was definitely on behavior, opening the door to the real definition of psychology, the science of behavior.
However, historically, this development has been supported by Charles Darwin’s evolutionary theory, leading to the erasing of any “mental” difference between humans and animals. Since every individual produces behaviors, the same psychological laws can be stated to understand the origin of these behaviors. In this context, behaviorists have naturally turned to animals – rats and pigeons being the most studied species – to model human behavior as animals, the difference being only a matter of degree, not nature. The first memory models were tested in rats and then mechanically transferred to humans. Moreover, the main argument for the animal behavioral study was that it is entirely possible to know the experiences encountered by animals since birth, thus making it possible to fully control past acquisitions, where such control appears ethically impossible in humans. For example, some studies involved depriving rats of any solid element from birth to their first year of life, in order to understand whether their construction “instinct” operated from birth, or whether it was subject to some form of learning, resulting from their interactions with the environment from birth. Such a study obviously seems unthinkable in humans. In short, the behaviorists practiced a psychology, which was intended to be both animal and human.
However, this conception has evolved with the emergence of the cognitivist approach, which, although based on the experimental method of behavioral study initiated by behaviorists, has broken with this trend by focusing on “mental” processes, called cognitive. These processes are purely theoretical, like theories on psychological functioning. At no time will a teacher be able to show these processes to her/his students. They are another way of interpreting behavior based on an analogy, which is based on the functioning of the computer. An individual receives stimuli that are a source of information, then processes them using several cognitive processes, and finally emits a behavioral response. Understanding these different processes is the objective of the cognitivist approach. When the interpretation is limited to behavioral observation, it is referred to as cognitive psychology. When it concerns the collection of data from the brain, it is called cognitive – or behavioral – neuroscience, if a link is established with the behavior without underlying cognitive interpretation.
I.3.5. Cognitive anthropology
In short, psychology is the study of behavior, whether human or animal. To interpret it, several theoretical currents are possible, such as cognitivism. If we are then interested in cognitive processes that are specific to humans, it is possible to talk about cognitive anthropology. As indicated, this discipline can draw its sources from several fields. This may involve comparing animal and human behavior to identify fundamental differences. In this case, comparative psychology provides some answers for cognitive anthropology. It is also possible to search for invariants between different cultures or societies, without necessarily focusing on social aspects, as social anthropology does. In this case, we are talking about ethnology. It may also involve studying humans through experimental procedures, such as in cognitive psychology, for example. In any case, the project of cognitive anthropology is to list all the cognitive processes – and therefore theoretical processes – that can characterize the human species. Therefore, the purpose of this book will be to focus on the use of tools and technology, detailing human cognitive particularities in this regard.
I.4. The project
In this book, I will give considerable importance to epistemological reflection, which will often be reflected in the titles of the different chapters. In the following, I will detail what this notion refers to and how it relates to theory and empirical evidence. Then, I will present the key concepts of rupture mechanisms and recycled mechanisms, concepts that will form the basis of the cognitive anthropological approach at the heart of the project of this book.
I.4.1. Epistemology, theory and empirical evidence
No scientific theory is neutral. It always depends on a point of view and on a way of posing the problem (i.e. the subject). The greatest challenge for a researcher is to grasp the point of view developed by other researchers, which inevitably leads to major scientific advances. This reflection on the very origins of the reasons that drive researchers to move toward certain theoretical models is the objective of epistemology, i.e. a discipline that is globally interested in the way knowledge is generated, whether in an isolated individual or a group of individuals, like scientists.
Let us take the case of the individual. Jean Piaget, an illustrious Swiss psychologist, had, in his time, founded a genetic epistemology – in fact ontogenetic – consisting of detailing how children, during their development, acquire new knowledge about their physical and social environment, through a dialectic of structure–destructuring–restructuring8. The genetic aspect of his theory assumes that this dialectic takes place at different stages of a child’s development, allowing the child to move from one stage to another, the stages being understood here as periods of stability in the structure. In other words, the evolution of knowledge in children is undergoing revolutions, in the sense that it is not a progressive and cumulative acquisition, but rather marked by significant breaks.
Like the isolated individual, the evolution of knowledge at the species level also follows a nonlinear trajectory punctuated by significant breaks. For example, as I mentioned earlier, the two greatest ruptures in the history of science correspond to the Copernican and Darwinian revolutions. These revolutions correspond to what epistemologists interested in the history of science – such as Gaston Bachelard or Thomas Kuhn – call paradigm shifts, understood as a change in thinking framework, in order to pose the problem. Interestingly, it seems that these two revolutions consisted of challenging the default paradigm that is: “We are the center of the universe”. This paradigm is in itself intuitive, given the egocentric nature of our thinking. After all, the only world perspective I have access to is my own phenomenological experience. So when I sail from one place to another, this perspective moves with me all the time, giving me the illusion of being at the center of everything. This egocentrism is obviously very marked in children, as education often consists of nothing more than teaching them to get out of their own point of view. However, it is a daily struggle, because we obviously remain self-centered by default. In this context, to conceive that it is not the place where we live that is the center of the universe – that is, geocentrism – or our species that is at the heart of everything – that is, anthropocentrism – requires a considerable challenge to the default paradigm built on egocentrism. The two major revolutions mentioned above therefore consisted of challenging this paradigm, considerably changing the way we think and raising the problem of our origins. Note that this paradigm shift can only exist if another point of view exists. This other point of view remains the greatest challenge for a scientist.
I hope you will understand the major interest of epistemological reflection. If we want to move forward on a scientific issue, we must be able to understand how the problem usually arises, what are the default assumptions that authors accept, sometimes without even knowing it, simply because they are rooted in a framework of thought, a paradigm. For this reason, this book will present as soon as possible – it will in fact depend on my thinking skills – an epistemological critique of current models in order to understand their ins and outs. This will lead me to discuss what I call metatheories, theories so powerful that they have shaped the way students and researchers have thought for decades. An example that I will discuss at length is the distinction between procedural and declarative memory. The first form refers to skills that are often referred to as motor skills, useful for implicitly learning how to ride a bike or type. The second form contains our knowledge of the world and the support of language. This distinction is taught in a massive way among psychology students, which is quite legitimate given its heuristic power, making it possible to understand our behavior quite simply. So when I ask students – or even colleagues – which memory allows us to use tools, the answer given is systematically the same: procedural memory. And, this answer is produced by reasoning in this context, in the sense that it may arise even though at no time did a teacher explain to students that this was the case. In other words, this distinction is an important paradigm in psychology, guiding students and researchers on how to conceive human cognition and the use of tools. As you will see in this book, one of my reflections will be to overcome this epistemological obstacle by submitting the idea that this distinction is far from sufficient to understand the cognitive bases of human tool use.
In this approach, the notion of theory is at a lower level than the paradigm or metatheory, in the sense that it refers to the solutions provided within the pre-established framework. For example, if the paradigm is the distinction between procedural and declarative memory, then a theory that tool use is based on motor memories is a possible solution based on this distinction, since the latter ultimately allows little freedom. Three types of criticism can therefore be made against a theory. The first type consists of questioning the epistemological validity of the underlying paradigm. In this case, the theory proposed in response necessarily goes beyond the paradigm and then diverges diametrically from the theory being criticized. In reality, this level refers more to epistemological reflection by asking whether the problem was correctly posed in the beginning. Criticisms may be directed not only against this theory, but also against the parent theories. The second type is not to question the paradigm that serves as a framework, but rather the answers provided by this theory within it (i.e. theoretical validity). For example, it could be worth considering that tool use does not only come out of procedural memory, but also from declarative memory – this is an example and not my point, as you will see later. In this book, I will sometimes situate myself at this level, but the criticisms will often be of an epistemological nature, so that it will rarely be a single theory that I will question, but rather a group of theories because they belong to the same paradigm. The third type consists of reflecting on the empirical validity of the theory in question by examining the arguments used. In the end, many researchers are only interested in this aspect, considering that data collection is the very foundation of research. However, if a theory is not conceptually valid, it may be that the collection of data to support it is of little value, given the inability to accurately examine the predictions of that theory9. In other words, although I will obviously discuss this form of validity to discuss current theories on tool use, I remain convinced that this aspect remains relatively minor, particularly with regard to epistemological validity.
This last aspect leads me to introduce the notion of empirical evidence, which corresponds to the collection of data – in this case behavioral data – since this is indeed a book of psychology, although I will also discuss neuroanatomical data and neuroimaging, which will sometimes divert this book into the field of neuroscience. This evidence may or may not be based on statistical analysis. I would like you to know that I do not consider, in any case, that evidence is necessarily based on statistics. After all, the two great scientific revolutions did not need that. However, in psychology, it is true that the contribution of statistics is important to be able to conclude on the generalization of the results obtained. Again, it is possible to criticize the methodologies used to acquire the data. I will also discuss this experimental aspect, although I consider it essential not to drown in these considerations, at the risk of wasting time that would be much more useful for epistemological reflection. Finally, I will address here the question of the distinction between science and philosophy, which is essentially distinguished in this respect. If philosophy consists of conducting epistemological and theoretical reflection on concepts, science adds to this the need to support conclusions on the basis of empirical evidence. A good balance between these two aspects seems to me essential to the success of any research objective. Too much philosophy, and the theories formulated may lack evidence. Too much science, and the theories formulated may lack validity.
I.4.2. Continuity versus discontinuity
The Darwinian revolution had an unparalleled impact in the history of the humanities. Before this one, the question of the criteria necessary to define what a human is did not arise, the answers being in any case all found in the sacred texts. As a result of this revolution, scientists began to grasp the question of what distinguishes us from other species, seeing the emergence of anthropology whose objective is precisely articulated around this question.
The first answer was formulated by Darwin himself, who in his impetus suggested that there is no qualitative or natural difference between humans and other species, the differences being only quantitative or degree. This argument followed a logic similar to what he demonstrated in terms of morphological aspects, the wing of the birds being nothing more than a progressive modification of the fin of the fish. He had the same reasoning at the behavioral level, postulating that morals, attention, reasoning, etc., already existed in non-human animals, the difference being simply once again that humans have more. This thesis can be characterized as continuous due to the assumed continuum between humans and other species.
This proposal was accepted at the time by the dominant current in psychology, namely behaviorism, a paradigm according to which all behavior is guided by learning that connects a stimulus and a response, consolidated by reinforcing loops. In this context, the same process can be applied to humans and non-human animals, the difference in complexity being not a qualitative difference, but a quantitative one. For Watson, one of the main proponents of behaviorism, the description of these relationships between stimulus and response was simply easier to achieve in animals than in humans. At present, this approach is still widely used, particularly in the field of animal cognition, where many authors refuse to address the idea that qualitative cognitive differences exist between humans and certain animal species – except perhaps with regard to symbolic language.
During the 20th Century, and particularly with the emergence of cognitivism, several authors questioned the thesis of continuity, suggesting that at least some cognitive traits could be specifically human. This is the thesis of a discontinuity. This was the case, for example, of Noam Chomsky, who argued that only humans are capable of generative grammar, and Michael Tomasello, who (as mentioned above) advocated the idea that only humans are capable of understanding the intentions of their fellow human beings, or of Daniel Povinelli, according to whom humans have the particularity to understand their world through analogical reasoning. In a way, this perspective finally joins traditional philosophy such as the Cartesian approach, according to which humans possess mental skills distinct from animals.
Importantly, the authors supporting the discontinuity thesis do not reject the idea that, in humans, more archaic cognitive processes can be reused in favor of more recent processes. For example, for Daniel Povinelli, human analogical reasoning would partly recycle the natural capacity – and shared with the animal – to carry out associative learning on concrete objects. Simply put, this reasoning would correspond to a form of recycling of this associative learning, thus making it possible to extract what is analogous in different situations to obtain a relationship between abstract elements. Other authors such as Michael Anderson have suggested that a large part of our cortex, useful for more archaic cognitive processes, is being redeployed to support certain more recent brain regions and destined for new functions from a phylogenetic point of view.
