The Tribalization of Europe E-Book

Marlene Wind

• Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 164

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2020

Beschreibung

Tribalization is a global megatrend in today's world. The election of Donald Trump, the Brexit vote, populist movements like Catalan separatism - together with democratic backsliding in Central and Eastern Europe - are all examples of tribalization. Fuelled by anti-globalism and identity politics, tribalization is drawing up the drawbridge to the world. It is putting cultural differences before dialogue, collaboration and universal liberal values. But tribalism is a dangerous road to go down. With it, argues Marlene Wind, we have put democracy itself in danger. Tribalism is not just about being pro-nation, anti-EU and anti-global. It is in many instances a bigger and more fundamental movement that casts aside the liberal democratic principles we once held in common. At a time when former defenders of liberal values are increasingly silent or have even joined the growing chorus of tribalists, this book is a wakeup call. Drawing on a wide range of examples from the UK and the US to Spain, Hungary and Poland, Wind highlights the dangers of identity politics and calls on people to stand up for democracy and the rule of law.

Leseprobe

Contents

Title page

Copyright page

Preface

Introduction

Imagined Communities and Identity Politics

Tribal Thinking and Dreams of Detachment

Why Brexit is Just Another Kind of Tribalism

The Tribal Shift in Central and Eastern Europe

Who Cares About Democracy?

Who Are The People?

The Purpose of a Constitution

Democracy Without Limits?

Are Illiberal Democracies Democracies?

Why Liberals Are Increasingly on the Defensive , but Shouldn't Be

Concluding Remarks

End User License Agreement

Guide

Cover

Contents

Introduction

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The Tribalization of Europe

A Defense of Our Liberal Values

Marlene Wind

polity

Copyright page

Copyright © Marlene Wind 2020

The right of Marlene Wind to be identified as Author of this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

First published in 2020 by Polity Press

Polity Press

65 Bridge Street

Cambridge CB2 1UR, UK

Polity Press

101 Station Landing

Suite 300

Medford, MA 02155, USA

All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purpose of criticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.

ISBN-13: 978-1-5095-4167-6

ISBN-13: 978-1-5095-4168-3(pb)

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Wind, Marlene, 1963- author.

Title: The tribalization of Europe : a defence of our liberal values / Marlene Wind.

Description: Cambridge, UK ; Medford, MA : Polity, 2020. | Includes bibliographical references. | Summary: “An urgent wakeup call on the dangers of the new tribalism in global politics”-- Provided by publisher.

Identifiers: LCCN 2019053013 (print) | LCCN 2019053014 (ebook) | ISBN 9781509541676 (hardback) | ISBN 9781509541683 (paperback) | ISBN 9781509541690 (epub)

Subjects: LCSH: Group identity--Political aspects--Europe. | Identity politics--Europe. | Political culture--Europe. | Liberalism--Europe. | Democracy--Europe. | Europe--Politics and government--21st century.

Classification: LCC JN40 .W56 2020 (print) | LCC JN40 (ebook) | DDC 306.2094--dc23

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019053013

LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019053014

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Preface

Politics today … is defined less by economic or ideological concerns than by questions of identity.

Francis Fukuyama, Identity

The tribalization of politics is a global megatrend in today’s world. The election of Donald Trump, the Brexit vote, populist movements like Catalan separatism – together with democratic backsliding in Central and Eastern Europe – are all clear examples of the mechanisms and effects of tribalization. The key tendencies here are anti-globalism and identity politics: putting cultural differences before dialogue, collaboration, and universal liberal values.

This book argues that tribalism is pulling up the drawbridge to the world – and to Europe. And it’s not just “the people” who have chosen this avenue. Trump and Brexit have silenced many former defenders of globalism and liberal values because they feel guilty. Guilty that they didn’t see what was coming, and guilty that they ignored the desires of those who now want to put up walls. Along with this a new narrative has come to characterize the debate and the media in numerous parts of the Western world: as we did not predict the rebellion and the identity issues, we now have to embrace the anti-globalists by way of apology and reconciliation.

Tribalism is, however, a dangerous road to go down. With it, and with the retreat of liberal voices, we have put democracy itself in danger. In several places – even in Europe – democracy has already surrendered to illiberalism, by eliminating free elections, an independent judiciary, a free and critical press, and closing down those universities that didn’t parrot the leaders of the countries which hosted them. In this sense democracy has already died, just without us noticing it. Tribalism is not just about being pro-nation, anti-EU, and an opponent of supranational institutions and conventions. It is in many instances a bigger and more fundamental movement casting aside all insistence on the liberal democratic principles we once cherished and insisted were defining for our time.

By succumbing to the identity politics that we see in many places and by reducing democracy to “the will of the people” without discussing who the people really are (or should be), we are abandoning the rights, ideas, and principles we have fought for since the end of the Second World War. Rights, ideas, and principles that millions of Europeans, Americans, and Canadians as well as people of several other nationalities died for on our behalf.

At a time when (former) defenders of liberal values are increasingly silent, or have even joined the growing chorus of tribalists, this book is a wake-up call. By using clear, empirical examples pointing out the dangers of identity politics and the insidious logic behind it, the book encourages people to stand up for true democracy and rule of law in Europe. Democracy is not just “the will of the people” in simple numerical terms but is also about respecting fundamental values, minorities, a free and critical press, and independent courts.

There are several people I need to thank for helping me write this book. First of all, however, I have to thank Ana Rosa and Dolores Cruz Arroyo from Espasa.es for convincing me that this book just had to be written, after a thorough discussion of democracy, separatism, and Balkanization with Carles Puigdemont and my colleague Professor Christian Rostbøll at Copenhagen University in January 2018. I would also like to thank Professors Carlos Closa and Juan Mayoral for comments, corrections, and constructive criticism, as well as those many colleagues at iCourts and the Department of Political Science at the University of Copenhagen who patiently listened to my many thoughts on the subject of this book. I am also highly indebted to my research assistants Regitze Frederiksen, Louise Solgård Hvass, Amalie Lund Michaelsen, and Caroline Emilie Björkenheim Rebien for tireless work on copy-editing, commenting, and source-searching, and not least to Adrian Nathan West for magnificent language editing. Finally, yet importantly, I want to thank my family for their patience with me on this project. My husband Kristian patiently listened to my arguments and my two sons Carl and Jakob never failed to debate with me and test my arguments. I remain indebted to them for their continuous encouragement and interest.

Introduction

Not so long ago, most Europeans believed that our common destiny was to exist as a Union with no internal borders. Nationalist sentiments, a destructive cold war, and restrictive ideologies had been eradicated and replaced by a united Europe, inclusive rights, values, and dreams held in common.

As the Soviet Union crumbled and the Berlin Wall fell, the large majority envisioned the world becoming a better place, with fewer hindrances to travel, trade, and communication, not more. The protection of basic rights, the rule of law, democracy, and economic prosperity would now flourish in the East just as they had in the West since the Second World War. The vision of Europeans living, working, and marrying across borders, of the unity in diversity that EU treaties speak so warmly about, was finally something that most people actually believed could be accomplished. It encapsulated the idea of a Europe that could and should consist of many different regional identities, with Scots, Catalans, Bavarians, Lombardians, and Sami living side by side with (and in) established nation-states.

Unity in diversity also suggested that Europeans – despite their ethnic and cultural differences – had acknowledged that only common aspirations for peaceful co-existence and cooperation could heal the wounds caused by forty-four years of division. In such a world, state borders would have become irrelevant. Separatists and secessionists would serve no purpose, and their raison d’être would have vanished. Why would anyone want to leave their mother nation to create small new city-states if borders had become obsolete? With the important – and extremely bloody – exception of the breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, no one imagined that borders and bombastic territorial symbols would reenter the European mind, let alone enjoy a renaissance. When liberal democracy had finally triumphed over repressive competing ideologies, including nationalisms new and old, new attempts to mark boundaries would look old-fashioned, even ridiculous.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, scholars, too, were optimistic, speaking of “A New World order”1 and the “end of history,”2 with belief in liberal democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and freedom of speech replacing divisiveness and creating a (global) community without partitions.

In Europe 2004 – only fifteen years after East German border guards opened the Berlin Wall by accident – eight new democracies from the former Soviet bloc embraced these ideals and joined the EU. For many Central and Eastern Europeans, the European Community represented hope for the future and for a better life without repression. They had escaped the tutelage of the Soviet Union and the Iron Curtain, which had cut them off from the free world for so long. For more than forty years, becoming part of a borderless, open, liberal Europe had been an unobtainable dream. Now it was a reality.

***

All this now feels like ancient history. What we have witnessed in Europe over the past five, ten, or fifteen years is an entirely different development from the one described above. Many Europeans seem to have given up on their universalist aspirations and are pulling up the drawbridges – returning to the tribe. The rhetoric of “us” and “them” has returned and identity politics is a winning argument in elections and referenda.

According to a prestigious global research project3 measuring the state of democracy in the world, Europe is the place where liberal democracy has declined most precipitously in recent years. Probably because democracy here had come to be regarded as a given and because we have become incredibly bad at recognizing when important democratic institutions are being gradually undermined. According to the study, as many as six European countries can no longer be classified as liberal democracies but should instead be referred to as hybrid regimes or semi-autocracies. These countries may hold elections, but no longer heed those basic principles that have defined us as European democratic polities since the Second World War.

The main question addressed in this book is: are we witnessing a general tribalization of Europe? Or is it sporadic declines that can be reversed? I will try to argue that the answer depends not only on where we look, but also on the extent to which we are willing to face our own demons. What is undoubtable is that the most original, successful, and innovative supra-statist project that the world has known, the European Union, is in trouble. It – and not least the values it represents – needs new defenders. This book is such a defense.

So, what is tribalization? As I understand it, tribalism is a phenomenon in which cultural, ethnic, and nationalist groupings of various sizes and organization emphasize themselves as the “true” tribe, nation, or culture while verbally or in practice excluding named “others” from being a part of the community. At the same time, they strive increasingly to regress from internationalist structures, if not formally then in practice, by no longer recognizing previously adopted laws, conventions, and common ground rules. If tribalization is a long-lasting trend, as much evidence suggests, it could eventually splinter the continent into hundreds of more or less homogeneous enclaves, undermining the Europe we know today. A Voltairean nightmare, as some would call it, recollecting the Holy Roman Empire’s resolution and the patchwork of small entities in constant infighting.

Despite the stunning success of European integration over the past six decades, there seems to be an increasing temptation – even among those who consider themselves progressive – to rally around new exclusionary identities rooted in a more or less fundamentalist version of the nation-state or in regional separatist movements. What do these projects have in common? They all represent – despite their differences – a tireless yearning to stand in opposition to neighboring identities. Chasing enemies and creating opponents is clearly far from a new phenomenon, but the regression we are experiencing in Europe in these years is something new. And now the enemies are apparently not just those who do not share your culture, religion, or identity, but also liberal elites, the EU and the liberal values we have jointly cherished since the Second World War.

Tribalization, in the form I address in this book, also has something in common with the term “ethnocentrism.” Ethnocentrism is often characterized as the attempt to reinforce one’s own identity by disparaging others. William Graham Sumner defines ethnocentrism as “a view of things in which one’s own group is the center of everything and all others … scaled and rated with reference to it.”4 However, tribalization has an extra, almost activist dimension, which is directed outward. It can be said to be a reappearance of a form of cultural fundamentalism, which sustains its momentum through active demonization and distancing from others. It is an ugly mix of generic populism combined with rage against those who do not share a particular cultural, linguistic, religious, historical, national, or even ethnic origin. I have chosen to describe it as tribalism insofar as it often draws on exclusionary language and the building of walls and borders (sometimes merely symbolically) to keep the others out. However, the purpose is not to be mistaken. First and foremost, it serves to stiffen up the “tribe” itself while underlining who does and who doesn’t belong.

Where Europe was built on the ethos of common values and inclusiveness, the continent is now split into what the British weekly The Economist describes as “the new political divide” between “wall-builders and globalists.”5 Unfortunately, the wall-builders have the upper hand at present, and the globalists are increasingly keeping mum. I will refer here to tribalization and tribalist tendencies as a kind of Balkanization, by which I mean the breaking up of the continent into several distinct (ethnic) enclaves – either literally or as a metaphorical solution to Europe’s problems as currently perceived. Leaving historical circumstances aside, the breakup of Yugoslavia and the Dayton Accords were in many ways a defeat of a European ideal: that ethnicity should never take center stage and define who we are. Although sometimes assuming more civilized forms and simulating something quite different, such as with the separatists in Catalonia or among the many extreme Brexiteers, the rhetoric that was so central to the escalation of the conflicts in the Balkans has now come back to haunt us.

The tribal way of being in the world is spreading and regaining popularity in old Europe as well as new. Not only among more or less ignorant voters who get carried away by populist leaders who cynically exploit primitive language (and social media) to create a feeling of exclusive unity. More frighteningly, perhaps, the rhetoric is spreading among established politicians and opinion makers. Tribalism has become the new political megatrend and also the go-to argument for demonizing the so-called liberal elites who still believe in the merits of a liberal international order, the dissolution of borders, and joint solutions to common challenges.

The ideal and cultivation of a common past are absolutely central to the current tribal discourse. To the extreme Brexiteers as well as the Catalan separatists and ethnic-nationalists like Hungarian leader Vikor Orbán, the reference to prior historical greatness is crucial. Research has shown that referencing an often threatened or lost common past both polarizes societies and constitutes the recipe for modern tribalism. The narrative of an identity under threat is thus the very foundation of most autocratic regimes centered on a “strong leader” with a cynical personal interest in stoking hatred and antagonism to maintain his power base. As the American scholars Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt have addressed in their book How Democracies Die, the modern death of democracies rarely materializes at a coup or a tyrannical seizure of power. Rather, the strategy often involves a polling station to at least make the exercise look like “real” democracy.

What are the flashpoints for tribalism today? Tribalism, or neo-nationalism, is apparent from one end of Europe to the other. In Catalonia, for instance, where secessionists claim to urgently need a separate Catalan state, despite having one of the highest degrees of regional autonomy in Europe. Or in Britain, where tribalism for more than three years has resonated in Brexiteers’ call to defy Europe in the name of a long-expired glorious past. Similar developments are evident in Central and Eastern Europe – and more recently Italy, where Matteo Salvini’s Lega party employs identity politics, inventing new enemies, while at the same time blaming Europe for everything that is deplorable. Today, however, tribalization is reappearing everywhere and identity politics is used offensively to create a sense of community that “others” can never become a part of.

Precisely because these identity-political projects need attention to flourish, well-orchestrated drama and divisiveness are frequently staged as media stunts, with a conflict-obsessed press happy to serve as backup chorus. On many occasions, hype and tribal aggression are a mere cover-up, a distraction from underlying corruption and power grabbing among populistic leaders. This is plain to see among the political elite and establishment in Hungary and the Cezch Republic, for instance, where aunts, uncles, sons-in-law, and old friends of Viktor Orbán and Andrej Babiš have become wealthy by greedy scams with EU funds.6