The United States and Persian Gulf Security, The E-Book

Steven Wright

• Herausgeber: Ithaca Press
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 438

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2007

Beschreibung

The international relations of the Persian Gulf have long been dominated by power politics. Its unrivalled energy resources have historically made this geopolitical arena a vital national security interest for the United States. Historically, Persian Gulf security became synonymous with the maintenance of the political status quo, but with the onset of the War on Terror, US foreign policy has shifted in priority towards combatting the root causes of Islamic extremism. The age-old policy of maintaining stability to ensure a free and secure flow of energy is now recognized as having fuelled Islamic extremism. The new strategic objective for the United States is to see a complete overhaul of the political systems within the region and to develop a culture of political participation to achieve regional security and ensure US homeland security. It is a new agenda wholly in keeping with the messianic Wilsonian values that have long been part of US foreign policy. The purpose of this book is to offer a detailed analysis of US foreign policy towards Iran and Iraq since the onset of the post-Cold War era and to chart its developments and changes right through to the contemporary period of the War on Terror epitomized by the Presidency of George W. Bush. It also provides a detailed examination of US foreign policy towards political Islam to show why and how US strategic interests have so fundamentally changed since the trauma of the 9/11 attacks. Written in a clear and accessible style, the book is sure to prove invaluable for students, policymakers, and the general reader interested in the politics and security of this highly important but volatile region of the Middle East.

Leseprobe

The UnitedStates and Persian GulfSecurity

The Foundations of the War on Terror

Steven Wright

DURHAM MIDDLE EAST MONOGRAPHS

THE UNITED STATES AND PERSIAN GULF SECURITY

The Foundations of the War on Terror

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Copyright © Steven Wright, 2007

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First Edition

ISBN: 978-0-86372-475-6

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Jacket design by David Rose

Cover photo used with permission of Ali Jasim/Reuters/Corbis

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Contents

1 Introduction

Part 1 Setting the Context of Change in US Foreign Policy

2 The Architecture of US Foreign Policy under Bill Clinton and George W. Bush

3 The Emergence of the War on Terror: Political Islam and Grand Strategy

Part 2 The United States and the Persian Gulf in the Post-Cold War Era

4 The Clinton Years and Iran: Containment and Engagement

5 The Clinton Years and Iraq: Strategic Regime Change

Part 3 The United States and the Persian Gulf in the War on Terror

6 Iraq and the War on Terror: Untangling Tactical and Strategic Policy

7 Iran: Proliferation, Preventative Use of Force and Regime Change

8 Conclusion

Bibliography

Index

1

Introduction

“The Middle East is an area in which the United States has a vital interest. The maintenance of peace in that area, which has so frequently seen disturbances in the past, is of significance to the world as a whole.”

Franklin D. Roosevelt March 1944

The foreign policy response of George W. Bush’s administration in the wake of the trauma of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington D.C. signified a complete redefinition of US grand strategy.1 Whilst the collapse of the Soviet Union marked the end of the Cold War, resulting in the post-Cold War era, the 9/11 attacks marked the onset of the era of the War on Terror. This gave rise to the most fundamental redefinition of US grand strategy since the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt.2 Yet the nature of Bush’s post-9/11 foreign policy agenda has emerged as the most ambitious since Woodrow Wilson articulated his vision for a new international order following the end of the First World War.3 Understanding the origins, strategic direction and application of this change is thus of great importance for the field of international relations and policymakers in general.

The purpose of this book is to provide an examination of US foreign policy and its success in achieving geopolitical security in the Persian Gulf region from the post-Cold War era to the era of the War on Terror. Given the fundamental revision in US grand strategy following the 9/11 attacks, this study will analyse how this new grand strategic era has heralded a redefinition of security for the Persian Gulf. This redefinition will be shown to be a complete break from the long-standing historical position of the United States in this regard. Crucially, it will be demonstrated that this redefinition carries with it the prospect for geopolitical upheaval in the region as a necessary part of achieving the long-term strategic objectives of the War on Terror and the regional needs for security. For scholars of US foreign policy and strategic studies of the Middle East, the manner in which this transition unfolds is likely to dominate the agenda for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, only through a detailed understanding of where we have come from and how the current strategy and tactics differ from the past can a thorough exposition be achieved. In essence therefore, this volume is an examination of Bill Clinton’s and George W. Bush’s foreign and strategic policies vis-à-vis Persian Gulf security in the post-Cold War and War on Terror era.

The Historical Context: American Policy towards Persian Gulf Security

The contemporary national interests of the United States in the Persian Gulf region have their historical origins rooted in the circumstances of the First World War. Although the United States has had long-standing commercial interests in the Maghreb region dating back to 1784,4 it was the inherent requirements of the modern era of mechanised warfare, in addition to the dynamics of Western industrialisation at the time, that led oil to become a key economic and strategic interest of the United States.5 It is important to recognise from the outset that the paramount national security interest of the United States in the region has historically been in “[an] unhindered flow of oil from the Persian Gulf to the world market at a stable price”.6 With upwards of 60% of proven global oil reserves held within Middle Eastern countries surrounding the Persian Gulf, its strategic importance is unrivalled. Moreover, it is also a strategic linchpin as upwards of 90% of oil exported travels through the Strait of Hormuz. Given that Iran has the second highest natural gas reserves and is closely followed by Qatar, the importance of this region for global energy is likely to be long-standing.

During the Cold War, the containment of communism was the over-arching, global strategic consideration that characterised US foreign policy, and this was consequently reflected in its policy towards the Persian Gulf. The reasons why the Persian Gulf was a key strategic interest for the United States during the Cold War era are usefully summarised by Michael Hudson:

[T]he entrenchment of Soviet power in that strategic region would [have been] a decisive shift in the world balance, outflanking NATO; Soviet control of Middle Eastern oil could disrupt the economy of the free world; and triumph throughout Asia, Africa, and Europe.7

With Britain having decided to withdraw its presence east of Suez in the 1960s, Richard Nixon was prompted into developing a ‘twin-pillar’ security strategy of promoting Iran, and to a lesser extent Saudi Arabia, as guardians of regional security and as bulwarks against Soviet expansionism.8 This policy involved the provision of military armaments to these two key allies with the aim of achieving regional security.9 With Saudi Arabia leading the Arab oil embargo as a result of US support for Israel in the 1973 Arab–Israeli war, oil prices increased from around $3.00 per barrel to upwards of $12.00. The resulting recession and Saudi Arabia’s involvement did not however cause the unravelling of the twin-pillars strategy. If anything, the strategic value of oil increased the desire of the US to maintain its geopolitical presence in the region and this ironically served to strengthen further the commitment of the US towards Persian Gulf security.

However, this twin-pillar strategy became defunct when Iran, the key pillar of the US security policy, experienced an Islamic revolution in 1979 that resulted in Muhammad Shah Reza Pahlevi being overthrown. The dramatic overthrow of the Shah ushered in a fundamentally new era for regional politics and US strategic policy towards the region. The subsequent seizure of the US embassy in Tehran in November 1979 and the ensuing hostage crisis was crucial in affirming the perception of the Islamic Republic as inimical to US interests. It was as a result of the anti-American position of the successor Islamic regime in Tehran that the revolution necessarily ushered in a reassessment of Iran’s role in US policy towards Persian Gulf security. A further key factor was that Iran became equated with an asymmetric threat to Israel – a key long-term US interest – through its support for Hezbollah and its destabilising influence on the internal affairs of Lebanon. President Carter’s response, known as the Carter Doctrine, was to commit the United States to preventing any hostile power from gaining control over this vital strategic area.

With the onset of the Reagan administration in 1981, US policy towards the Persian Gulf was essentially formulated within the context of the Iran–Iraq War and also through perceived Iranian links to international terrorist attacks against both the United States and Israel. Although the US professed neutrality towards the conflict, Reagan’s policy was essentially characterised by a strategic balancing in which it provided intelligence assistance, ‘dual use’ technologies and export credits to Iraq.10 But compounding this, the Reagan administration adopted Carter’s ambitious plans for a ‘Central Command’ in the region and began to have increased military cooperation with the Arabian Peninsula states. Here it is worthy of note that Saudi Arabia was sold advanced military technology, an example being the sale of Airborne Warning and Control System Aircraft (AWACS) in 1981.

With the end of the Iran–Iraq War and the emergence of a post-Cold War international environment, the dynamics of US foreign policy had entered a new phase. However, this was complicated by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. With Saudi Arabia perceiving a clear threat from Iraq, it welcomed the deployment of US forces on its territory. This was to become the key factor behind a close relationship between several of the Arabian Peninsula states and the United States. Moreover, it was to be a fateful act which fanned the flames of radical Islamism that ultimately promoted a redefinition of US grand strategy in the post-9/11 environment. Whilst prior to the invasion the US presence had been mainly unseen and on the outskirts of the region, the new situation involved an active strategic deployment. America’s Gulf naval force was renamed the Fifth Fleet and was stationed onshore in Bahrain. Military cooperation with Oman increased along with the UAE. Whilst the liberation of Kuwait was achieved, the military footprint of the United States remained. As both Iran and Iraq were considered as potential threats to the United States’ interests in geopolitical security in the Persian Gulf subregion, the administration of George H. W. Bush laid the foundations for a containment of both countries. This was to be later codified into a clear strategy under the Clinton administration and formed the essence of post-Cold War security strategy towards this geopolitical area.

Post-Cold War Persian Gulf Security

Unveiled in May 1993 by Martin Indyk, Special Assistant to the President for Near East and South Asian Affairs, US foreign policy became officially lodged on the premise of containing and deterring both Iran and Iraq from challenging the security of the key oil producing Gulf States, in addition to undermining the peace process and threatening Israel.11 Indyk portrayed the Clinton administration’s approach to the Middle East as a non-compartmentalised strategy which was premised on dual containment. The definitive outline of dual containment was made, however, by national security adviser Anthony Lake in a 1994 article in the journal Foreign Affairs.12Lake clarified the conception of the strategy as entailing a multilateral containment of Iraq as a means of forcing compliance with UN resolutions; and a unilateral containment of Iran until it altered its internal and external policies. The fact that these policies provided for Persian Gulf security was merely seen as a by-product as they were premised on other criteria.13 Indeed, Lake’s argument afforded Iraq under Saddam Hussein the prospect of having sanctions lifted over a period of time, once compliance had been recognised by the UN Security Council and confidence had been restored within the international community.14 Iran received a similar prescription in that the United States sought a moderation of Iran’s policies in order for a rapprochement to occur, but would maintain sanctions as a means of controlling Iran until it moderated policies deemed provocative by the United States. There was thus a degree of analytical conflict between these objectives and the conception of it as a containment strategy which one can equate with maintenance of the status quo.15

Although Lake presented the dual containment strategy as a prudent policy undertaking, debate exists on its origins and nature which contrasts with the official position. It is therefore prudent to examine these varying interpretations. One of the first assessments of dual containment was undertaken by Gregory Gause who interpreted it as a strategy geared towards achieving the wider regional strategic objective of Persian Gulf security.16 He recognised that Iran and, to a lesser extent, Iraq were seen to pose a threat towards Israel and the peace process, but interpreted the overall dual containment strategy as being ultimately geared towards securing US geostrategic interests in the Persian Gulf. Whilst Gause maintained that the Clinton administration’s dual containment policy was premised on geostrategic concerns towards the Persian Gulf, he argued that this was subservient to the long-term objective of making neighbouring states a “sufficient counterweight to both Iran and Iraq”.17 Therefore, containment was designed to weaken both countries to a degree sufficient to usher in a balance of power: through the application of containment, the status quo would be enforced and would thus cater for Persian Gulf security.

Anthony Cordesman also argued that the adoption of dual containment was a necessity given the inability of the Gulf countries to offer a credible defence against their aggressive neighbours. Cordesman comments that “[it] is not solely a function of what Iran can do or Iraq can do, it is a function of what the nations in the region can do, and it is basically a function of American ability to contain Iranian and Iraqi military power.”18 He recognised that such an approach was required in order to safeguard vital US political and economic interests. Nevertheless, he conceded that, in the case of Iraq, containment would ultimately not be able to prevent an Iraqi production of unconventional weapons as it merely slows their development.19 Gause, however, went even further by arguing that sanctions neither weakened Saddam’s hold on power nor stopped his development of unconventional weapons.20 Nevertheless, both shared the premise that dual containment was based on geostrategic interests in the Persian Gulf. Kissinger lends weight to this prescription by echoing the argument that dual containment was a thoroughly geostrategic response to the threat both countries posed to US interests in the Persian Gulf.21

In contrast, Gary Sick contended that the adoption of a containment policy towards Iran was primarily based on serving the strategic priority of the Arab–Israeli peace process.22 He highlighted the fact that it was a policy undertaking that virtually mirrored a policy paper authored by Martin Indyk in 1993, prior to his taking office in the National Security Council, which called for a containment of the threats Iran and Iraq posed to Israel and the peace process itself. Therefore, US bilateral foreign policy towards Iran and Iraq was arguably subordinate to US interests in the peace process. Sick conversely saw US policy towards Iraq under the dual containment rubric as being premised on a compliance with UN resolutions: increased Persian Gulf security was thus seen by him as a by-product rather than an objective.23 Indeed, Sick suggested that this resulted in the United States emerging as a regional player rather than an external actor, and was thus able to ensure these objectives were achieved.24

In what several scholars recognise as a seminal article on this subject, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft and Richard Murphy refined these interpretations. They suggested that the Clinton administration’s bilateral policies towards Iran and Iraq were part of the mutually reinforcing strategic objectives of supporting the peace process and providing for Persian Gulf security.25 Thus a mutually compatible dual track US geostrategic policy towards the Middle East was applied, and the ‘dual containment strategy’ was a mere slogan with little conceptual worth.

Even with the onset of the administration of George W. Bush, there is little dispute that foreign policy towards the Middle East actually retained consistency from the Clinton administration up until the watershed of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. Indeed, Robert Kagan and William Kristol critically remarked that prior to the 9/11 attacks, Bush’s policy seemed “content to continue walking down dangerous paths in foreign and defense policy laid out over the past eight years by Bill Clinton”.26 The views of other scholars, such as Kenneth Pollack, were more moderate but still identified US foreign policy towards Iran and Iraq as showing continuity from the preceding Clinton administration until the War on Terror actually began.27

As a result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Islamic terrorism emerged as the accepted primary strategic threat faced by the United States. However, understanding the intellectual context in which the Bush administration interpreted this threat is key to understanding its strategic response. The new grand strategy on how to counter the causes of Islamic terrorism in the long term will be shown to be completely linked to the redefinition of Persian Gulf security. Suffice it to say at this stage that the new intellectual context of the War on Terror subordinated long-standing US geostrategic interests in the Persian Gulf to the maxims of grand strategy in the War on Terror. Therefore, as with the Cold War era where Persian Gulf security was defined under the strategy geared towards countering the communist threat, so too in the War on Terror has Persian Gulf security been redefined. However, the redefinition will be shown to be far more sweeping – the achievement of security for this region is now conceived as premised not on a military enforcement through geopolitical power relationships, but rather as hinging on the domestic political form of the states within this subregion. In essence, the new definition of Persian Gulf security rests on the belief that insecurity is simply a product of the nature of the internal power structure within the region’s states. Therefore, only through civil society having power to control the political elite, as in Western liberal democracies, can states’ action be steered away from hostility and insecurity.

This book will aim to provide a detailed examination of this change by conducting an analysis of US foreign policy within the context of Persian Gulf security. The following two chapters will provide the reader with an analysis of the intellectual context of US foreign policy, firstly, by showing its relationship with political Islam and terrorism, and secondly, by framing US foreign policy within a historical context to underscore the forces at play in shaping it. The chapter on political Islam is particularly important as it will show what the intellectual understanding of the root causes of Islamic radicalism are and thus will explain the essence of what US grand strategy is in the War on Terror. This is crucial to understanding the strategic change in Persian Gulf security post-9/11. The other sections of the book will analyse US foreign policy towards Iran and Iraq but will separate the analysis on US policy towards these countries before and after 9/11 in order to underline the redefinition that Persian Gulf security underwent.

NOTES

1 Grand strategy is defined as the over-arching strategic purpose or direction which takes precedence over regional geostrategic foreign policy calculations and bilateral foreign policies. It typically involves the application of all areas of national power to achieve a long-term national objective geared towards combating an over-arching strategic threat. For example, during the Cold War era the grand strategic purpose was commonly defined as the containment and deterrence of the ideological spread of Communism.

2 John L. Gaddis, “Grand Strategy in the Second Term”, Foreign Affairs 84.1 (2005): 2.

3 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Touchstone, 1995) 218–45.

4 Thomas A. Bryson, American Diplomatic Relations with the Middle East, 1784–1975 : A Survey (Metuchen: Scarecrow Press, 1977) 1–57.

5 John A. DeNovo, American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 1900–1939 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1963) 167–69.

6 United States, “United States Security Strategy for the Middle East”, ed. Department of Defence (GPO, 1995).

7 Michael C. Hudson, “To Play the Hegemon: Fifty Years of US Policy Towards the Middle East”, Middle East Journal 50.3 (1996): 334.

8 Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1979) 1262–65.

9 F. Gregory Gause III, “British and American Policies in the Persian Gulf 1968–1973”, Journal of International Affairs 45.2 (1985).

10 Anthony H. Cordesman, The Iran–Iraq War and Western Security 1984–87: Strategic Implications and Policy Options (London: Jane’s Publishing, 1987) 157–63.

11 Martin Indyk, “The Clinton Administration’s Approach to the Middle East”, Address to the Soref Symposium (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1993).

12 Anthony Lake, “Confronting Backlash States”, Foreign Affairs 73.2 (1994).

13 Indyk, “The Clinton Administration’s Approach to the Middle East”.

14 Lake, “Confronting Backlash States” 45–50.

15 F. Gregory Gause III, US Policy toward Iraq, Emirates Lecture Series, vol. 39 (Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2002) 12.

16 F. Gregory Gause III, “The Illogic of Dual Containment”, Foreign Affairs 73.2 (1994): 56–58.

17 Gause III, US Policy toward Iraq 12.

18 Martin Indyk, Graham Fuller, Anthony H. Cordesman and Phebe Marr, “Symposium on Dual Containment: US Policy toward Iran and Iraq”, Middle East Policy 3.1 (1994): 13.

19 Indyk, Fuller, Cordesman and Marr, “Symposium on Dual Containment: US Policy toward Iran and Iraq” 13.

20 F. Gregory Gause III, “Getting It Back on Iraq”, Foreign Affairs 78.3 (1999): 62.

21 Henry Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy?: Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century, rev. ed. (London: Free Press, 2002) 191.

22 Gary Sick, “The United States and Iran: Truth and Consequences”, Contention 5.2 (1996): 59–78.

23 Gary Sick, “Rethinking Dual Containment”, Survival 40.1 (1998): 5–32.

24 Gary Sick, “US Policy in the Gulf: Objectives and Purpose”, Managing New Developments in the Gulf, ed. Rosemary Hollis (London: Royal Institute for International Affairs, 2000) 14.

25 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft and Richard Murphy, “Differentiated Containment”, Foreign Affairs 76.3 (1997): 20–30.

26 Robert Kagan and William Kristol, “Clinton’s Foreign Policy Cont.”, Weekly Standard 12 Mar. 2001: 11.

27 Kenneth Pollack, “Next Stop Baghdad?”, Foreign Affairs Editors’ Choice: The Middle East Crisis, ed. Gideon Rose (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2002) 116–32.

PART 1

SETTING THE CONTEXT OF CHANGE IN US FOREIGN POLICY

2

The Architecture of US Foreign Policy under Bill Clinton and George W. Bush

“The presidency has many problems, but boredom is the least of them.”

Richard M. Nixon January 1973

The most distinguishing feature of US foreign policy is the varying level of continuity and change that stems from each successive administration. Each President brings a new outlook, interpretation and agenda for US policy. The President’s choice of staff disseminates change on a bureaucratic level which in turn has an impact on policy. The importance of recognising such factors is necessary for a comprehensive foreign policy analysis and interpretation to be achieved.

Here, comparative observations of Bill Clinton’s and George W. Bush’s administrations allow for a clearer understanding of the factors which contributed towards foreign policy formation. Such foreign policy analysis1 will consider the drivers of policy within the administrations and will act as a useful precursor to the subsequent chapter which will analyse the intellectual context of US policy and political Islam in order to show the essence of strategy in the War on Terror and thus the motives behind the post-9/11 redefinition of Persian Gulf security.

The following analysis will provide an examination of the idiosyncratic differences between Clinton and Bush in order to highlight how their background, outlook, and character would have had an impact on foreign policy. A second area which will be examined is that of the ideological influences on the elite decision makers. This will highlight the idiosyncratic differences of key staff members from both presidencies whose background and beliefs are important factors that allow for a deeper understanding of the origins of foreign policy. The final section will examine how this foreign policy manifested itself and contrasted under each presidency with particular attention paid to the nature of President Bush’s post-9/11 strategy. In the first instance however, the historical context of change in US foreign policy needs to be appreciated in order to show the relationship between pragmatic realpolitik calculations and moralism. This is important in order for the reader to fully conceptualise the nature of change that the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 effected in US foreign policy.

The Historical Competition in US Foreign Policy: Moralism vs. Realpolitik

To be sure, the United States has, since the early days of the republic, been heralded as a nation that is motivated by the dictates of enlightened rationalism, its very destiny tied to serving as a beacon of freedom, hope and advancement. In its isolationist years of the nineteenth century, two central themes came to dominate US diplomacy: the values on which the republic was founded were viewed to be universal moral maxims, and their global adoption was seen to become yet more certain once the United States had refined them at home and properly conceived a ‘shining city on the hill’ for others to emulate – symbolic of the views articulated by Thomas Jefferson. Such moral maxims did, however, have to operate under observance of the accepted Westphalian doctrines of sovereignty and non-intervention and so did not successfully emerge as integral parts of US foreign policy. With Secretary of State John Quincy Adams famously stating in 1821 that the United States’ role was “the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all” but not a nation that “goes in search of monsters to destroy”, the promotion of such moral virtues was largely to be a missionary affair with foreign policy confining itself with realpolitik statecraft. However, a fundamental break from this occurred under the fateful Presidency of Woodrow Wilson, the legacy of which has had a defining resonance within contemporary US foreign policy.

After a century of feeling inhibited by the Westphalian order, the First World War presented an opportunity for Wilson to remake the international order based on the underlying political moral maxims that captured the essence of enlightened American rationalism. Indeed, Wilson explicitly justified America’s involvement as premised on the objective of reordering the international system in its own image. This was a clear departure from the long-standing US foreign policy practice of conducting its diplomacy based on practical rather than ethical considerations. The pursuit of a national interest was thus rejected as selfishness and substituted with the broader doctrine of seeking the advancement of values which could benefit all of mankind; such an objective was thus in clear tension with long-standing Westphalian notions on a nation’s sovereignty over its internal polity.

Wilson left a defining impression on all subsequent US foreign policy through three interrelated themes. Firstly, he held the progressive view that the natural state of the international system was harmonious cooperation – the Hobbsian world view was largely rejected. Secondly, the use of force to achieve change was similarly abandoned in favour of international law and arbitration. Moreover, such normative values were extended to the sub-state level which upheld that people had an innate right to determine their own future; the principles of self-determination and democracy were therefore seen as the pillars on which a nation should be based.

Finally, and most importantly, Wilson upheld the view that nations that are built on such criteria would not only be stable internally – therefore ending the risk of carnage through civil war – but also that such nations would never opt for external war. Achieving a global adoption of such values was therefore upheld as not only a moral imperative but also a practical means of reducing the risk of war which could embroil the United States. Nevertheless, the driver was firmly seen as for the benefit of all mankind. Wilsonian doctrine therefore challenged the purely amoral realpolitik conception of statecraft by taking the founding values of the republic and applying them within a cogent foreign policy package.

The legacy of the Wilsonian world view on US foreign policy cannot be underestimated; it has served to challenge the very essence of an enlightened pragmatic or realpolitik conception of foreign policy. Although this thought has been an integral part of US diplomatic thinking since Wilson, the failure of the League of Nations showed that in the absence of a clear external threat to US national security, the political stomach for such crusading morally grounded diplomacy was limited. It was only with the onset of the Second World War that such Wilsonian values came to be merged with a clear conception of threat to US security. Indeed, America’s appetite for entry into the Second World War was largely wanting until Pearl Harbour. This teaches us that in circumstances where US national security is challenged, a common cause emerges between those who seek to pragmatically safeguard the US and those who shape its objectives on a moral plateau. This affords wider support but also errs towards John Quincy Adams’s2 caution to the US should it be seeking a crusading foreign policy.

The onset of the Cold War allowed the continuance of this alliance between Wilsonian values and what Walter Russell Mead3 describes as “Jacksonians” who are primarily concerned with defending the US from an external enemy. The Soviet Union was an ideal enemy that posed not only a military threat but also an ideological one which allowed this synergy of streams of thought to mutually reinforce each other. Nevertheless, the danger posed to US foreign policy from the Wilsonian school is that within contexts where national security is challenged, a crusading messianic globalism is a genuine risk. Vietnam was a prime example of where, within the Cold War strategic context, Wilsonian values, most notably under Johnson, ultimately triumphed over a realpolitik assessment of the geopolitical situation and thus propelled the United States into a misguided conflict that was hugely wasteful of life, and of financial resources, and detrimental to the standing of the US in the international system. The unfolding failure of the Wilsonian mission in South East Asia ultimately heralded a short-lived return to a sophisticated realpolitik diplomacy under Nixon and Kissinger which not only saw them manage the US withdrawal from the conflict, but also achieve other notable successes through a revolutionary triangular diplomacy. Whilst this episode was a golden era for US diplomacy, the ensuing Watergate scandal and ending of the Vietnam conflict once again brought about a revival in Wilsonian forces on foreign policy with realpolitik strategy merely dismissed as amoral and too power-centric. Given this, the key lesson of the tragedy of US involvement in Vietnam had not been learned: a rejection of the pursuit of national interest in favour of an unselfish and universalistic Wilsonian mission, driven by American exceptionalism, may ultimately lead to costly adventurism – increased suffering, death and a rejection of US values as being alien rather than universalistic.

Under Ford and Carter, the Wilsonian vigour that had brought about Vietnam began to resurface – this occurred most significantly within Congress and amongst disillusioned left-wing intellectuals. For Congress, a watershed occurred in 1974 when, for the first time, legislation was passed that directly concerned the domestic policy of another state. Here, Congress’s concern was the immigration of Jews from the

Soviet Union. Within the framework of the universal human rights agenda which coincided with this, the concept of a Westphalian system was clearly on the wane as the formerly sacred cow of a nation’s internal affairs was increasingly seen as fair game. Moreover, this struck a chord with several of the key principles on which the republic was founded and thus provided a second coming for Wilsonians.

Compounding this, a new intellectual movement, neoconservatism, emerged from the controversy of the Vietnam antiwar context and struck a chord with the human rights activism that gained momentum initially under President Ford. As an intellectual movement, neoconservatism provided a synthesis between the universalistic Wilsonian morals and the Jacksonian need to safeguard US national security. In essence, neoconservatism advocated the pursuit of Wilsonian values as being in the national interest in the long term as only through their global adoption could the United States achieve the security it so yearned for. During the Cold War, it bridged the divide between both those who wanted to combat the Soviet military threats and those who wanted to free its people enslaved by a hostile ideology. Neoconservatism advocated the objective of achieving freedom and human rights, as the adoption of such values would not only free an enslaved people, but would also nullify the risks posed to US national security. Democratic states were, at the end of the day, more likely to resolve their disputes through international law and arbitration rather than war so the global adoption of such values thus provided for US national security. In essence, neoconservatism had given Wilsonianism the new character of being a crusading messianic globalism whilst also serving the selfish national interests of US security.

Under Reagan, this neoconservatism began to define a presidency as Reagan adopted the Wilsonian rhetoric of a crusading moralism against an ‘evil empire’ intent on challenging the very existence of the United States. Traditional realpolitik statecraft was thus deemed to be an unworkable concept unless guided by this crusading moralism. Amoral realpolitik statecraft was thus relegated from defining the national interest to helping achieve the neoconservative strategic objectives by providing the basis of a sophisticated tactical foreign policy towards this end. But with the ending of the Cold War, the loss of a clear external threat to the United States resulted in the demise of neoconservatism as a guiding ideology that fused a clear moralism with a security-based conception of Cold War grand strategy.

Victory over the Soviet threat saw the post-Cold War strategic environment characterised by a ‘New World Order’ without a clear threat to US national security. For neoconservatism, this translated into the loss of an essential pillar which made it largely redundant in the post-Cold War strategic context. With this onset of American hegemony and the lack of a clear external competitor, a clear-sighted political strategy did not emerge. The Clinton era maintained the Wilsonian theme by engaging in several humanitarian causes, but given the lack of a political strategy, its diplomacy was ad hoc and not geared towards a clear conception of the national interest along realpolitik lines. The foreign policy of the United States thus retained its Wilsonianism but lost its crusading zest that characterised previous eras. With the absence of a clear political strategy, foreign policy during the Clinton era largely gave way to a promotion of global economic integration as the cornerstone of day-to-day US diplomacy. This largely accounts for the unparalleled economic success that the 1990s bore for America. Nevertheless, the promotion of economic globalism is not a satisfactory substitute for a coherent political strategy as it lends itself to an ad hoc and, crucially, a reactive foreign policy that is absent of any recognition of the national interest and the statecraft involved in preventing geopolitical threats from emerging.

The trauma caused by the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks fundamentally changed this post-Cold War conception of the ‘New World Order’. The devastation and shock caused by a small number of Islamic fundamentalists to the US homeland was reminiscent of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour. The threat posed by Islamic extremism was viewed as akin to communism during the Cold War and thus the new grand strategic era of the War on Terror had begun.

With the Bush administration including a number of key decision makers who had clear neoconservative idiosyncrasies, the establishment of a comparable foreign policy was understandable; however, extremist political Islam constituted a threat unlike communism and thus produced a more nuanced Reaganite political strategy. Unlike the Cold War where the Soviet Union posed a clear ideological and military threat, radical political Islam was recognised to be an unintended offshoot of the social and political structure within autocratic Middle Eastern nations. Specifically, the lack of fundamental freedoms were seen as resulting in Islam serving as the sole political mobilising agent which, although Muslim politics had many faces, resulted in extremism directed internationally against the United States and the West in general. So unlike the Communist threat which was clearly state-centric, radical political Islam was simply viewed as an unintended by-product of the state structure having failed to adopt the universalistic pillars that captured the essence of the American republic: freedom of speech, equity and self-determination. Moreover, the failure of Middle Eastern countries to adopt such values was recognised as being initially a product of colonialism and later a result of the United States seeking maintenance of the status quo in order to ensure a secure flow of hydrocarbon resources from the region.

With the threat being an unintended by-product of the state structure, the manner in which neoconservatism approached this quagmire differed in important ways to the Cold War Reaganite strategy. Specifically, it meant that whilst at a state level the United States could have friendly relations with a given Middle East regime, the problem at hand was their political structure and practices rather than the rulers themselves – the strategic objective for the neoconservatives was therefore to elicit political change through the regimes’ adoption of some of the universalistic standards on which the American republic was based. Whilst a risk of this was that a hostile power could gain control over the given friendly regime, it would, nonetheless, serve US strategic interests providing it upheld the key values that were deemed to be an antidote to political extremism.

In a historical context, with the George W. Bush administration adopting a nuanced Reaganite approach, or indeed neo-Reaganite strategy, the purpose of military force was relegated in importance: only in circumstances where a state was an overt supporter of terrorism would a military, or Jacksonian, state-centric approach apply, otherwise the strategic focus was on achieving Wilsonian ends at a sub-state level. That is not to say that Bush’s approach discounted realpolitik statecraft; as with Reagan, Bush saw such calculations as a tactical means of fulfilling the crusading Wilsonian strategic objective. So therefore the character of the threat had resulted in the adoption of a more nuanced approach when compared with Reagan’s Cold War strategy: in essence the strategy took on a much greater Wilsonian character. Crucially, with the diagnosis of the Islamic terrorist threat being a result of Muslim nations having largely failed to adopt universalistic values on which the American republic was seen to be based, the scope for variance in US foreign policy, whilst geared towards this strategic endgame, was limited to how the US should effect change within Muslim nations. Nonetheless, the US conception of threat and its strategy towards countering it became firmly premised on an abandonment of the Westphalian concept of sovereignty.

With the approach of the Bush administration in the War on Terror being firmly grounded in a global messianic Wilsonianism, historical observations can be made on the risks pertaining thereto. As the tragedy of Vietnam had shown, a preponderance of Wilsonian values, as a determinist force in foreign policy, risked adventurism and miscalculation in the application of military power. The dilemma facing US foreign policy was whether a sophisticated realpolitik strategy, which could convincingly deal with the threats posed by Islamic extremism, could be developed which would determine the national interest over a currently preponderant and vigorous Wilsonianism.

With this historical character in mind, the following section will provide a foreign policy analysis of the Clinton and Bush presidencies in order to show the internal forces at play in their administrations. This will allow for a greater conceptualisation of US foreign policy towards Iran and Iraq in subsequent chapters.

The Clinton and Bush Presidencies: Idiosyncrasies

One of the key elements in foreign policy formation is that of the individual level which can lend itself to more psychological prescriptions.4 How political decision makers construct a view of the world in their minds is an essential component in understanding foreign policy.5 Such ontological factors have an impact on how foreign policy issues are perceived, interpreted and acted upon.6

The idiosyncratic differences between Bill Clinton and George W. Bush were significant in that their style of leadership, political ethos and vision differed markedly. In terms of their background, the differences are stark. Whilst Bush followed in the path of John Quincy Adams who also succeeded his father as President in 1825, Clinton grew up in a modest household at the hands of a drunken and physically abusive stepfather.

Clinton enrolled for his bachelor’s degree in Foreign Service from Georgetown University. He subsequently attended Oxford University as a

Rhodes Scholar for two years. Bush went to Yale where he graduated with a bachelor’s degree in History. Whilst Clinton subsequently went to Yale Law School, Bush opted for Harvard Business School. This academic and professional background had an impact on decision-making style: whilst Clinton approached issues in a lawyerly, systematic manner, Bush’s style was characterised by the demonstration of leadership through decisive action.

The most important difference about their activities at university level, however, was that they took different positions during the anti-Vietnam War movement. Clinton was actively and vocally supportive of the movement during his undergraduate studies at Georgetown, and his subsequent move as a Rhodes Scholar to University College, Oxford was something that his political opponents would later seize on as evidence of his avoidance of the draft. In comparison, Bush’s reputation at university was more apolitical and hedonistic. In contrast to Clinton, Bush enrolled with the Texas Air National Guard. The importance of their differing political outlooks at the time of the anti-Vietnam War movement is significant: the Clintonian administration was, according to Henry Kissinger, “the first staffed by many individuals who came out of the Vietnam protest”.7 Bush’s senior staff by comparison consisted of more politically seasoned individuals: many had served in previous Republican administrations dating back to Richard Nixon.8 Indeed, Kissinger is correct to highlight that generational forces are significant factors in how policy issues are perceived and acted upon.

Their route to the White House was also different. Clinton’s first attempt at a political career began in the wake of Nixon’s resignation in 1974, when he ran unsuccessfully for a Congressional seat in Arkansas. Clinton subsequently ran for the State Attorney General which he then used as a platform for the Governorship in 1978. Elected as the youngest Governor in the United States, he held the position until 1982, but was then re-elected in 1984 and ultimately used this as a platform for the presidency. Bush also unsuccessfully contested a Congressional seat, but his political career really began in 1994 when he won the Texas governorship by capitalising on the political dissatisfaction with Clinton’s “political ineptitude by pressing for and failing to achieve major health care reform”.9 Bush also capitalised on the breaking Lewinski scandal in 1998 to discredit his Democrat opponent and achieve re-election.

Whilst Clinton clearly had more political experience in office before winning the presidency, Bush had a wealth of experience from an inside exposure to his father’s and the Reagan presidency. But even more importantly, their differential political backgrounds had an impact on their political ethos in general: Clinton’s political ability was fostered through domestic politics, whilst Bush had a more rounded exposure but clearly lacked the level of experience in office that Clinton had accumulated. Either way, neither could be described as foreign policy-orientated before taking office in the way that George H. W. Bush had been.

In terms of their religious outlook, Clinton was a Baptist whilst Bush was a born-again evangelical Christian.10 Whilst there is no question that Clinton was a devout Baptist, there is little indication that this had a bearing on his policy during office. Indeed, Clinton frequently spoke of the need to maintain a clear separation between the church and state.11 But for George W. Bush religion was much more significant in that he regarded it as having shaped his world view, outlook and purpose in life.12 Bush’s religious outlook was significant in that, although several Presidents have been noted Christians – Ronald Reagan, Jimmy Carter and Richard Nixon – the Bush presidency appeared to be the most ‘faith-based’ to hold the White House.13 But crucially, Bush appeared more than any of his predecessors to draw a policy guide from his spiritualism,14 and it seems reasonable to conclude that his beliefs have complemented the outlook of key members of his administration on the basis of their similarity.

The differences were significant even with their election to the presidency. Clinton’s November 1992 election victory saw him inaugurated on 20 January 1993, as the forty-second President of the United States and also as the first Democrat President since Jimmy Carter. Clinton won by a comfortable majority over the incumbent George H. W. Bush by wisely recognising that the key issue for the electorate was the economy. An often quoted phrase, “it’s the economy, stupid,” typified Clinton’s highly successful 1992 presidential electoral campaign. He also entered office with the 103rd Congress (1992–1994) being Democrat controlled. Although the US economy was experiencing recession and required immediate attention, Clinton undoubtedly took office in a secure domestic, political position. Nevertheless, the Democrats’ control of Congress was short-lived as control was lost in 1994 and was not regained during his two terms of office.15

In comparison, Bush became the first President since Benjamin Harrison in 1888, and only the fourth since independence, to win the Electoral College vote but lose the popular vote. The controversy surrounding the vote count in Florida, where the Supreme Court had to rule on the outcome, tainted Bush’s first term on the grounds of legitimacy. Nevertheless, Bush entered office with a firm Republican majority in Congress and a strong economic environment which was only beginning to show signs of slowdown.

Although both experienced very different electoral victories, the most important factor was their contrasting style of leadership. It is generally accepted that Clinton treated issues in a highly systematic and unstructured manner in order to explore them to their full potential.16 His propensity for lengthy meetings may have been a good means of fully exploring policy issues, but it also highlighted Clinton’s lack of focus and decisiveness as a leader. The important point is that Clinton’s approach favoured decision making on an ad hoc level, whilst trying to accommodate as many different positions as possible. In other words, Clinton sought wide-ranging consent and approval rather than being driven by an objective or ideology. Whilst such a style has the merit of allowing for informed decisions which are more utilitarian, it is also an inherently weak style in that clarity of purpose and direction can be lacking. Either way, it appears reasonable to conclude from the available evidence that Clinton had an aversion to foreign policy risk taking. Stephen Graubard appropriately asks:

Why, then, was [Clinton] unable to address the problems that surfaced abroad, that recommended a major reconsideration of policies pursued by his two Republican predecessors? The short answer is that Clinton, like Bush and Reagan, feared any engagement that carried substantial risk, defined as the return of American body bags.17

By comparison, Bush saw his position as the Commander in Chief who did not get immersed in finer details in the way that Clinton had so typically done.18 The focus was, therefore, on taking decisions once recommendations had been formulated, whilst giving general direction for policy.19 The limitation of such an approach was that the President became more dependent on the advice of senior staff, but it does have its own merit in that there is clarity of purpose through decisiveness.

Indeed, this allows for a style of leadership epitomised by Ronald Reagan. But in comparison to Reagan and Clinton, George W. Bush appears to have been more comfortable in using American power in general. This was especially the case following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.

In terms of a world view, both candidates did premise themselves on a platform that the United States should play an active role in world affairs: this is hardly surprising as this is a common trait that every major presidential candidate has positioned themselves on since the end of the Second World War.20 For Bush, the promotion of American values was clearly commensurate with US interests. Indeed, he notably held in high esteem Natan Sharansky’s arguments that democracy and freedom were the universal remedies to tyranny and extremism.21But as early as 1999, Bush commented that:

[T]he basic principles of human freedom and dignity are universal … Some have tried to pose a choice between American ideals and American interests – between who we are and how we act. But the choice is false. America, by decision and destiny, promotes political freedom – and gains the most when democracy advances. America believes in free markets and free trade – and benefits most when markets are opened. America is a peaceful power – and gains the greatest dividend from democratic stability.22

Bush saw his position as being directly comparable to Clinton, whose foreign policy he alluded to as being “action without vision, activity without priority, and missions without end”.23 As for Bush’s vision, Robert Kagan characterised it as having “no hint of a pseudo-realist notion that American principles have to be set aside in favor of exclusive concentration on America’s vital national interests”.24 Interestingly this is a world view which is notably similar to Ronald Reagan’s outlook.25 Nevertheless, Bush’s perception of American values as being universal and their promotion being in US national interests, underscores the point that he had a neo-Reaganite vision of international affairs.26

When Clinton is compared to Bush, there are surprising similarities in that Clinton also saw the promotion of democracy and freedom as being in US national interests. According to Clinton, “[t]he defense of freedom and the promotion of democracy around the world aren’t merely a reflection of our deepest values; they are vital to our national interests. Global democracy means nations at peace with one another, open to one another’s ideas and one another’s commerce”.27 This vision, articulated by Clinton prior to taking office, was maintained throughout his two terms of office; however, he also saw geoeconomics as a key additional component. Clinton remarked “[o]ur economic strength must become a central defining element of our national security policy”.28 Indeed, this was commensurate with his domestic platform of defining the economy as his primary policy concern. Clinton’s vision was, therefore, premised on dual strategic objectives. The importance of this for foreign policy analysis is, however, that in certain circumstances such objectives could be contradictory: the promotion of democratic reform could unbalance the status quo and thus be detrimental to geoeconomics. Therefore, the key issue is the extent to which such strategies were applied in practice and served as a strategic guide for foreign policy.

Overall, there are noticeable differences in the background, outlook and leadership style of Bush and Clinton. But more importantly, such factors highlight a differential approach to how America’s role in the world was perceived, and the difference in leadership styles was bound to have a bearing on policy formation. Nevertheless, it is also important to recognise the general bureaucratic differences which played a key role, so the following section will draw attention to the idiosyncratic differences of senior staff.

Ideological Influences on Elite Decision Makers

Whilst Clinton and Bush did have clear idiosyncratic differences, it is also of significance that this extended to the very essence of their administrations. Clinton’s choice of staff was telling as they closely mirrored his own style and outlook. The important characteristic of Clinton’s choice of staff for foreign policy was that they shared his general lack of vision and caution in American foreign policy. This contributed to the administration’s lack of strategic clarity and purpose in foreign policy matters.

In the first Clinton administration, the appointment of Warren Christopher as Secretary of State was viewed by many as a safe bet. Christopher was a distinguished lawyer who had been the Deputy Secretary of State in the Carter administration, However, although he was widely regarded as an efficient and capable bureaucrat, he was also seen as “lacking originality and beliefs of his own”.29 Given Clinton’s lawyerly and at times indecisive character, the reluctance of Christopher to press for his own beliefs would have resulted in a relatively low-key input from the State department in foreign policy formation. Moreover, this contributed towards a reactive foreign policy rather than one that was striving for clearly defined objectives.

A similar appointment was made in the form of Anthony Lake as National Security Advisor. Unlike Christopher, Lake was far from afraid to voice his own opinions: he was notably critical of the Vietnam policy whilst he was on Kissinger’s national security staff during the Nixon administration and resigned over the covert bombing of Cambodia. But in Lake, Clinton had an individual who shared his sentiments over Vietnam and took an equally cautious approach to the application of US military power. “Lake was a Wilsonian figure in an era that was less and less Wilsonian”,30