Transforming the Skies E-Book

Peter Reese

• Herausgeber: The History Press
• Kategorie: Lebensstil
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 479

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2018

Beschreibung

Following the Armistice of 1918, the British Air Industry and the newly founded RAF held a low place in national priorities. The RAF was rapidly run down, with the infant airlines being given the least possible help, and this neglect continued during the 1920s. The RAF's role was questioned and civilian air travel remained a dream for most and the province of the well-heeled few. But the breakdown of the Geneva Disarmament Talks led to renewed interest in the National Air Force, and the rise of the European dictators brought calls for rapid modernisation and interceptor aircraft, together with the development of further European civilian air routes. Here, Peter Reese charts the dramatic changes that swept aviation across the dynamic interwar period, revealing the transformative last-minute preparations for defence in a world where much depended on the contributions of some outstanding individuals.

Leseprobe

To those men and women who blazedthe aerial trail between the wars.

Cover illustrationsFront: The Supermarine 56 with its Rolls Royce ‘R’ engine; Winston Churchill (author’s collection); Amy Johnson (author’s collection) Back: Mitchell’s Supermarine Spitfire Mark 1 (Digital image by Paul H. Vickers)

First published 2018

The History Press

The Mill, Brimscombe Port

Stroud, Gloucestershire, GL5 2QG

www.thehistorypress.co.uk

© Peter Reese, 2018

The right of Peter Reese to be identified as the Author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without the permission in writing from the Publishers.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

ISBN 978 0 7509 8727 1

Typesetting and origination by The History Press

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CONTENTS

Acknowledgements

Prologue

PART 1 BACKS TO THE WALL 1919–26

       1 Frederick Handley Page and the Great Sell-off

       2 Hugh Trenchard and the Fight for a Separate Air Arm

       3 British Civil Aviation: The Unloved Child

       4 Flying to the Limits

PART 2 NEW PERSPECTIVES 1926–33

       5 Alan Cobham: Bringing Aviation to the People of Britain

       6 British Civil Aviation: Airships, the Doomed Crusade

       7 Britain and the Schneider Trophy

       8 Geneva Talks: Bombers under Threat

PART 3 GATHERING WAR CLOUDS 1933–38

       9 Post-Geneva: The RAF’s Agenda for Growth

     10 The Emergence of Modern Interceptors

     11 British Civil Aviation: Sir Eric Geddes and Imperial Airways

     12 British Civil Aviation: Pioneering Airways within Britain

     13 The Royal Aircraft Establishment: Inspiration and Inspection

PART 4 RACE FOR LOST TIME 1938–40

     14 Post-Munich: Closing the Gap

     15 British Civil Aviation: Sir John Reith – Towards Incorporation

     16 Dowding and the Test of Arms

Assessment

Notes

Select Bibliography

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am extremely grateful to many organisations and people for their immense help.

Above all I required a specialist aviation collection, which I found in the National Aerospace Library at Farnborough with its world-class collection of published and unpublished sources. There I have enjoyed the ready assistance of Chief Librarian Brian Riddle with his noted enthusiasm and encyclopaedic knowledge. I have also received immense help from Christine Woodward and latterly the kind and utterly professional Tony Pilmer, including his work on the index.

As on many other occasions, I have also worked in the Prince Consort’s Library at Aldershot with its fine military collection, including aviation, where the staff are my firm friends of long acquaintance.

Further help has been received from the National Archives, the RAF Museum at Hendon, the Farnborough Air Sciences Trust Museum and the Royal Aeronautical Society (in particular for its original illustrations).

With regard to notable individuals, I am indebted to Mrs Jennifer Prophet for her early reading of the book and editing its text along with technical help from her son, Charles Prophet; Paul Vickers, historian and author, for ideas with titles and much more besides; Linda Mansell for her valued computer skills and great patience with my scrappy longhand; Tim Winter for illustrative sources; Frances Bean for additional typing; Stewart Davis for aerodrome maps; Dave Evans for other written material; and the late Nigel Legge for extensive discussion and valued advice.

As for the invaluable contribution of a publisher, I wish to acknowledge the faith and support of The History Press and in particular its commissioning editor, Amy Rigg and project editor Rebecca Newton.

Finally, my indefatigable wife Barbara, for being what she is, for organising our complex home affairs while I have been absent in libraries and for listening and then giving her acute reactions to my early drafts.

I alone remain responsible for any errors and deficiencies.

Ash Vale, autumn 2017

PROLOGUE

After my recent book1 about the pioneering figures and events that shaped British aviation from the beginning of flight to the movement in 1914 of the Royal Flying Corps detachments to France, I felt I was almost predestined to consider what followed.

Predictably I found that the First World War had its official and unofficial histories, biographies and pilots’ accounts (from both sides) about their aircrafts’ performances and their tactics in attempting to gain command of the air. Following such tales of high adventure, sacrifice and loss, I never expected the period between the wars to have been capable of attracting comparable attention or of being of equal or greater interest to the pioneering years of aviation prior to the war. It was therefore to my considerable surprise that, although it has drawn little literary attention so far, I found it packed with graphic incidents of genuine significance to the development of aviation and the survival of the British state during the Second World War. In short I discovered it was a magnificent story waiting to be told.

At first, I doubted whether anything could equal the advances made by the early aviators from their first flights measured in feet and seconds to the genuine cross-country performances of the aircraft that flew across to France in 1914. Yet, I quickly came to realise the far greater technological achievements of the interwar period. Although in its initial stages the disinterest shown towards British aviation prior to 1914 was repeated, with the role of the air force again questioned and the British aircraft industry shrinking in both size and capability, it could not last. By the mid 1930s the Royal Air Force faced likely attacks from a formidable new opponent and was compelled to enter into a breakneck race in which aeronautical developments went beyond the imaginings of the earlier pioneers. For such reasons I began to understand that this was indeed the time where British aviation came of age.

I also learned that the events of the interwar years went far beyond jostling for military advantage, including as they did such issues as the birth and expansion of British civil aviation, the building of huge airships before their final rejection, and the familiarisation of aeroplanes to ordinary men and women in Britain. Even so, it was the country’s involvement in the Schneider Trophy competitions, bringing major advances in both airframe and engine technology, that enabled Britain’s Royal Air Force to develop from a threatened and backward service to one whose balanced forces could meet assaults from a country that viewed air power as a major weapon of war.

Such was the speed and extent of the technological advances during this time that eminent scientist Sir Harry Garner called them discontinuities rather than the result of gradual improvements.2

While he acknowledged that much of the progress was due to a steadily growing knowledge of materials, structures, aerodynamics and engine design, he identified other inventions bringing radical alterations (discontinuities) to the design of the aeroplane, such as unbraced monoplane construction that replaced the heavily braced biplane, and the gas turbine (rather than the piston engine) invented in Britain by Frank Whittle and tested in 1937 – although this would not play a substantial role until late in the Second World War.

The piston engine shouldered the lion’s share of wartime missions and among the regular advances that Garner saw as transforming its performance and reliability were improved air-cooled radiators, superchargers and constant speed propellers, together with improved fuel that gave its bombers an increase of up to 70 per cent in the ratio of power to weight compared with those in the First World War.3

Such advances became ever more significant when the weight of airframes was reduced by using improved materials, e.g. alloys with stressproof qualities (compared with the previous wood and canvas) leading to dramatic increases in wing loading. Speaking after the war as an expert on aircraft engines, Roy Fedden maintained that aviation ‘had and will continue to have a more far-seeing effect in other fields of material endeavour than any other previous single development’.4

While Fedden’s supreme confidence was by no means shared by everyone, during the interwar years there were service leaders who, too, understood and exploited such fast-moving technological developments to bring RAF strategy more into line with what was possible. One was Air Marshal Wilfrid Freeman with his widespread responsibilities for aircraft design and production. In the British democratic system, however, there were bound to be others of high rank who were far less astute and whose actions would have malign consequences. Among them was Freeman’s chief of staff, Edward Ellington, who floundered due to his unease with and misunderstanding of such technological advances.

The same applied to civil aviation that in Alan Cobham had someone who, before its establishment in Britain, envisaged airports for every major British town and airlines that would fly regular services to the ends of the earth. In contrast, Sir Eric Geddes, chairman of Imperial Airways, the nation’s favoured airline, sought fiscal soundness above all else and thereby missed a host of opportunities for his formidable company.

The widespread advances in British aviation during the interwar years were bound to bring contrasting assessments. Guy Halford-MacLeod, writing about British civil aviation, emphasised its contrasts and complexity, leading to ‘an ordered incoherence, an endearing story of muddle; heroic pioneering, lost opportunities, determined entrepreneurs, extravagant waste, commercial reality’.5

In contrast, test pilot and aviation author, Harald Penrose, viewing it from a pilot’s point of view, emphasised the pioneering elements ‘whether trail-blazing air routes that did not become established until years later, extending the boundaries of power and speed, conquering greater heights or making aeroplanes and even airships, their engines and equipment more efficient and reasonably reliable’.6

Political commentator Montgomery Hyde approached it with Britain’s strategic requirements in view, although he too emphasised its contrasts, writing that ‘British Air Policy in the years between the two World Wars is marked by inconsistencies and changes which were dictated by the recurrent need for economy in national expenditure and also in the second decade by the growing menace of Germany’s rearmament’.7

All, however, acknowledged how the rollercoaster pattern of such years was exacerbated by the contrasting attitudes between the 1920s and ’30s. In Britain during the earlier period, for instance, memories of the recent loss of life were still raw and many looked to the ideals of pacifism and universal peacekeeping through international bodies rather than the use of standing armies or air forces. This was to change with the rise of the dictators, when British politicians were soon compelled to acknowledge a world of sovereign states pursuing their own self-interest and protected by national armed forces. Parallels can, in fact, be found with the time of the English Civil War with its repeated questioning of such issues as individual and state morality, the structure and use of armed forces and the legitimacy of making war.

However one considers the interwar period, during it British military aviation gained equal status with the other two armed services, and civil aviation rose from nothing to become a means of faster communications between both near and far-flung countries that offered almost unimaginable potential.

As such, it appears as a time of intriguing contrast and change manifesting a unique stage in the story of British aviation.

1

FREDERICK HANDLEY PAGE AND THE GREAT SELL-OFF

In his summary of the first year after the war, Charles Grey, editor of The Aeroplane and self-appointed voice of the British aircraft industry, observed that:

1919 has been one of extremes in aeronautics. It has seen the Aircraft Industry reduced from one of the greatest and most important in the country to one of the smallest as regards output and one of the least important as regards the present existence of the Empire. It has seen firms which made hundreds of thousands of pounds out of building aeroplanes during the war shut down their aircraft departments and dismiss their skilled staff and it has seen other firms which struggled gamely through the bad times before the war spending their hard-earned and over-taxed war profits in perfecting aircraft for peaceful purposes.1

Turning to the nation’s air force, he wryly observed that due to the scale of the rundown it did not seem that many more people remained to be eliminated.

He ended his editorial with the heartfelt comment that we have finished with 1919, for which the Lord be thanked.

Whatever Charles Grey’s opinions, aviation at this time was no place for the faint-hearted, with John Seely, the former Under-Secretary for Air, concluding that ‘the air industry in this country is dying, it is withering away, and it is most sad it should be so, and it is also very dangerous. Of the great firms which were producing aircraft and which had large design staffs – and it is on them that our future in the air depends – nearly all have gone out of business.’2

On the other hand, Winston Churchill, as the serving Secretary for War and Air and future Chancellor of the Exchequer, was sure that some robust figures remained, and the best solution lay in ending subsidies and for Government to get out of the way and let the aeronautical industry and nascent civil aviation fly by themselves.3

However contrary these standpoints, the challenges of post-war conditions were immense for a young industry that had started in the early twentieth century on a semi-amateur basis led by gentlemen enthusiasts working in competition with the Royal Aircraft Factory, and progressed to one that had met demands for more advanced aircraft in unheard of numbers, where in spite of many of its trained men enlisting into the services, design departments of real strength were created.4

Some idea of such vastly increased production can be seen by comparing the period between August 1914–May 1915 with that from January 1918–October 1918. In 1914–1915 530 aircraft were built (fifty-three per month) compared with 26,685 aircraft (2,669 a month) in 1918.5

During the war, Winston Churchill, speaking as Minister of Munitions, emphasised the amazing progress: ‘We are now making in a single week more aeroplanes than were made in the whole of 1914, in a single month more than were made in the whole of 1915 and in a single quarter more than were made in the whole of 1916.’6

The companies involved in such precipitate advances were fully aware that such conditions were unlikely to last, and in 1916, under the leadership of Holt Thomas from Airco, they banded together to form ‘The Society of British Aircraft Constructors’ in an attempt to support their common concerns both in and out of Government.

Its forty founding members were joined later by Armstrong Whitworth, British and Colonial, Gloster Aircraft Co. Ltd and Fairey. Although it represented all the major firms, at the end of the war the society found itself powerless to prevent a major collapse in its members’ fortunes, when contracts for 25,000 aircraft were cancelled. With RAF manpower falling by 90 per cent in fifteen months, it simply did not need new aircraft, and the numbers of civil aircraft built would drop from a by-no-means impressive 240 in 1920 to a minuscule ninety-seven in 1922. As a result, the aircraft firms attempted to diversify into whatever products they thought might sell: Westland made pianos and milk churns, A.V. Roe produced a small monocar, Gloster turned some of its hangars over to pig rearing and mushroom growing7, while Vickers commercialised its Vimy bombers for the Chinese Government.

A four-engined Handley Page V/1500, the civilian version of which carried passengers. (Author’s collection)

To make matters worse, the companies faced instant demands for an excess tax on profits ‘in excess of a stipulated peacetime standard’, which by 1917 were levied at a punitive 80 per cent. ‘This hit the aircraft industry especially hard for during the war the firms had regularly put the majority of their profits into their expanding undertakings, before at its end, when tax demands (requiring immediate payment) were still coming in, the requirement for aircraft abruptly ceased.’8

Finally, a huge quantity of spare aircraft and equipment was about to flood the market whose sales, after early haphazard arrangements, were coordinated through the so-called Aircraft Disposal Co. Ltd, where leading constructor Frederick Handley Page acted as managing agent. The firm succeeded in acquiring this role after Handley Page raised the very large sum of £1,080,000 through debenture shares charged to his company’s property, with which he purchased the entire stock of aircraft assembled by the Government Disposals Board for £1 million plus 50 per cent of all profits on the future sale of the stock.

After producing an impressive brochure, the Disposal Company held its initial launch on 23 April 1920 at the Savoy Hotel, where the Under-Secretary of State for Air, the Marquess of Londonderry, voiced his official support: ‘The Government as the dispenser of property is always in a difficult position. In my official capacity, therefore, I welcome the advent of an organisation which is prepared to carry on the best interests of private enterprise, the undertaking we are recommending today.’9

He was followed by Handley Page himself who, after listing the stunning amount of stock that he estimated was worth upwards of £100 million, including 100,000 different aeroplanes, 350,000 aero engines and vast quantities of other spares of all descriptions, told his listeners it could all be purchased at ‘a cost which is only a small proportion of the original cost to the British Government.’10 The aircraft came with the necessary adjuncts of spare parts for both engines and machines but ‘after these stocks are exhausted it will be impossible to replenish them or obtain material except at three or four times the cost’.11

Handley Page shrewdly pointed out the benefit of such low-cost machines for civilian air transport, which he said made great development possible that under rigid Government control of sales would have been out of the question.

Whatever use was made of such machines, the sales proved so successful that Handley Page was soon able to remit £500,000 to the Government as its share of the profits (while earning the same himself) although so much stock remained that the Disposal Company still had plenty for sale ten years later.

The success of the Disposal Company was less advantageous for other constructors because it further reduced the requirement for new planes and led them to face three stark choices: the need to slim right down, restructure – in order to avoid the full force of the excess profits tax – or close down altogether.

RAF Wapiti fighter patrol planes. (Author’s collection)

In the event Airco, the largest of all, was forcibly amalgamated with Birmingham Small Arms (BSA). Sopwith Aviation disappeared to re-emerge as Hawker Engineering Co.; Bristol and Colonial Aeroplane Co. was wound up to reappear as Bristol while Grahame-White Aviation Co. lost its independence altogether.

In the process, the number of aircraft constructors fell to sixteen and the few military orders that came through during the early 1920s were in the main for modifying and improving existing models. The RAF for instance found that its operations in the Middle East against insurgent tribesmen could be fulfilled by continuing with semi-obsolescent aircraft such as the Westland Wapiti, itself designed to use many components from the earlier DH.9a.

This plane would continue in production from 1927 until 193212 and its successor, the Wallace, came from a Wapiti conversion for which orders continued until 1936 with eighty-three Wallaces still on RAF strength at the beginning of the Second World War.13

So desperate were the constructors for new business that when an RAF requirement promised to lead to a significant production order, it would attract a clutch of venture prototypes. An example was W21/26 – the last two figures related to the year in which it was issued – for a single-seater fighter to replace the 6/22 Fairey Flycatcher. This attracted no fewer than ten competing designs for a single contract, all of which had to be built, flown and tested.

In such a climate, aircraft constructors needed special qualities. Along with technical know-how and immense self-belief, they required nerve and determination, if not ruthlessness; qualities that were invariably united with a hearty dislike of the civil servants who doled out the few contracts available. Such attributes were undoubtedly possessed by the swashbuckling and formidable Frederick Handley Page, the constructor involved in the Aircraft Disposal Company but still in the market for new contracts.

Handley Page’s lower middle class origins were not that unusual in the aircraft industry of the time. He was the second son of a master upholsterer and proprietor of a small furniture business, and an ardent member of the Plymouth Brethren. Frederick was given the opportunity to attend Cheltenham Grammar School, following which – in 1902 – against his family’s wishes – he enrolled at Finsbury Technical College for a three-year course in electrical engineering under Professor Sylvanus Thompson. Ever ambitious, he chose this course because he was convinced that the electrical industry had good prospects for expansion.

Frederick proved himself a clever pupil and after graduating at 21, the London firm of Johnson and Phillips appointed him as their chief electrical designer. Even so, he soon developed what would become a lifelong interest in aviation. After joining the Aeronautical Society he consulted the aviation press and made contact with French landscape painter and aeronautical enthusiast José Weiss, uniting with him in developing an advanced glider and crescent-winged monoplanes in his spare time.

In 1908 Handley Page went over to France to see the Wrights flying at Le Mans and on his return was so anxious to press ahead with constructing a machine of his own that he took the risk of doing some experimental work at his employers’ factory ‘without their authority’.14 When they found out they straightaway accused him of embezzlement and he was dismissed.

Frederick Handley Page in 1914. (Royal Aeronautical Society/National Aerospace Library)

Undaunted, Handley Page set up a business of his own near Woolwich Free Ferry, where he obtained a commission to build a tandem biplane for the inventor Deverall Saul, after receiving permission from Weiss to incorporate some of his aircraft patents.

The plane never flew, even when towed by a motor car, but on 17 June 1909 Handley Page turned his aviation business into a limited liability company, reputedly the first of its type, although from an authorised total of £10,000 capital only £500 was subscribed. Rumour had it that Handley Page raised his initial sums from his winnings at poker on the commuter trains in and out of Fenchurch Street Station but the truth was probably more prosaic since he lived very frugally and earned money from manufacturing components, including propellers, for the Willows No. 2 airship of 1910.

Calling upon his boundless energy, in the evenings he taught at Finsbury Technical College, and by 1911 he had progressed to the Northampton Polytechnic Institute at Clerkenwell (the forerunner of the City University), where he lectured on aerodynamics. He installed a wind tunnel there and set his students practical coursework to investigate design problems connected with his own airframes.

By now his aerodynamic skills were advancing quickly and from Weiss he developed a belief in building larger planes. In July 1911 one of his crescent-wing monoplanes (nicknamed the Yellow Peril because of the extreme colour of its dope) was piloted across London by Edward Petre to Brooklands, a distance of 55 miles,15 and in the following year another two-seater plane (whose construction had been made possible by a loan of £500 from his uncle) took part in the military trials held on Salisbury Plain, where it flew satisfactorily before crashing. In 1913 he moved his work premises to a larger 11-acre site at Cricklewood where he built his first biplane, which featured in the Hendon air show of that year.

Ever the opportunist, when the brilliant George Volkert became one of his students he made him the company’s chief designer for a salary set at an undemanding 15s a week.

By now Handley Page was becoming well known among constructors not just for his academic and practical skills but as a good salesman and an effective public speaker, where his knowledge of the Bible acquired from his father proved valuable. While not averse to using others’ ideas, he kept abreast of current aeronautical research and design and became recognised as a legendary hard worker, with a natural self-confidence and a determination not to become downcast from adversity.

Gustav Lachmann worked closely with Handley Page during the interwar years and believed his personality contained three heady archetypes: ‘the circus director representing the ebullient entrepreneur, the scientist, and in his personal encounters that of the Indian goddess Durga, multi-armed with ambivalent qualities of destruction and benevolence’.16

Whatever his personality, before the war Handley Page’s company had designed small aeroplanes, including ones offering notable stability, and his breakthrough came in late 1914 when he was summoned by Captain (later Rear Admiral) Murray Sueter to consider making planes that could both bomb the German High Seas Fleet in its base at Kiel and the Zeppelin sheds along the Friesian coast. Handley Page produced drawings for a two-engined aircraft with a 100ft wingspan that delighted Sueter, who drew from his desk a signal from Commander Samson in France saying ‘what we want here is a bloody paralyzer to stop the Hun in his track’. ‘That,’ Sueter repeated (pointing to the drawings) ‘is what we want.’ Handley Page’s design was to become the 0/400, which flew about eighteen months later and was the forerunner of large bombers in Britain.

The experiments conducted in the Northampton Institute’s wind tunnel moved Handley Page far ahead of most other designers, although Geoffrey de Havilland took advantage of his association with the Royal Aircraft Factory with its own wind tunnels. In 1915 Charles Grey affectionately described Handley Page’s august relations with his small design team as ‘that benevolent autocracy which is known as Handley Page’.

By the end of 1916 Handley Page had delivered forty-six of his 0/400 bombers before being asked to build a new four-engined derivative, the V/1500 with a wingspan of 126ft and a range of 1,200 miles capable of bombing Berlin. Because his factory at Cricklewood was fully committed to building the 0/400, he decided the new bomber should be constructed at the Harland and Wolff factory in Belfast. There George Volkert, assisted by weekend visits from Handley Page himself, set the shipwrights to work twelve hours a day, six and a half days a week, but although the plane first flew in May 1918 this was too late for it to enter operational service before the war ended.17

With his affinity for large aircraft that were capable of carrying passengers, it was fully understandable that Handley Page should be one of the first constructors to turn his attention to their commercial possibilities. As early as 1919 he formed Handley Page Transport Ltd to promote civil aviation in Europe and such was his enthusiasm that he sent 0/400 rebuilds – with fitted interiors including seats and tables for passengers – to potential customers in South Africa, Argentina, China, Greece, India, Peru, Poland, Scandinavia, Spain and the USA.

The pattern of British civil aviation during its early years is considered more fully in Chapter 3, but Handley Page’s bold initiatives in this field soon resulted in him suffering massive losses amounting to £130,000 in 1920 alone.18 This was particularly serious because of his other heavy financial commitments. The year before, he had attempted to raise extra capital by turning his manufacturing complex into a public company by issuing 500,000 £1 cumulative shares, most of which he was forced to take up himself. He also incorporated his airline company, Handley Page Transport Ltd, with £200,000 capital and bought his Cricklewood premises from the Ministry of Munitions with further money borrowed from Barclays Bank.19

In a praiseworthy attempt to retain his full workforce he entered into a further agreement with the motor car firm Eric Campbell and Co. to build car bodies. Within a short time Campbell and Co. went bankrupt and this cost Handley Page a further £150,000. If this were not enough, his trade missions to sell converted bombers still did not bring the orders expected and by the end of 1920 they had accumulated a further £286,492 of debts.

Such liabilities gave him ample grounds for going into receivership but this was not Handley Page’s way, and by using the proceeds from his Aircraft Disposal Company he succeeded in wiping off both his debts and his overdraft. The company proved itself as a cash cow and by 1939 it was estimated to have earned him an amazing profit of £3 million, but this also brought its problems. During its early years it threatened his managing directorship of the parent company where, due to a lack of orders, the value of its ordinary £1 shares had slumped to 1s. His solution was to channel some of the Disposal Company’s funds into his own company – as a likely temporary measure – with the predictable result that he found himself accused by its shareholders of spending £400,000 of their money in promoting new transport services across the globe.20 The seriousness of this can well be imagined when at the time he owed the Bank of Scotland a similar amount.

In the end the bank agreed that Handley Page could remain on as managing director providing the Disposal Company and the bank nominated new directors to the Handley Page board, including Lieutenant Colonel J. Barrett-Leonard to act as chairman for no fewer than six years. This agreement cost Handley Page royalties of £179,000 – although characteristically he considered it far more important to remain as managing director. While in Handley Page’s case his laudable if overambitious plans to sell airliners were responsible for many of his debts, the root of his problems, like those of other constructors, came from a chronic lack of orders. This was especially the case following the world financial crisis of 1921, when for a time the RAF ordered no new aeroplanes and Handley Page’s works foreman, William MacRustie, was left to supervise just eight apprentices and five workmen. It forced Handley Page into even more drastic reductions to his workforce, including the release of George Volkert, his chief designer, who went to Japan to help set up an aeronautical industry there.

However deep their cuts, without income from orders, neither Handley Page nor his fellow constructors could hope to solve their financial problems. In 1924 Barrett-Leonard, who by this time had also joined the board of the Disposal Company, demanded that Handley Page settle debts totalling £242,477. In a Herculean effort including using his profits from the Disposal Company, selling off land at Cricklewood and negotiating a fresh loan with Barclays Bank, he managed to do so.

It had been the closest thing for, although in July 1924 Handley Page was finally awarded a contract to build fifteen Hyderabad bombers based on his 0/400s, such had been the rundown of his company that he had to borrow more money to buy the necessary materials. The Air Ministry made things even more difficult by never ordering more than fifteen planes at a time and although he built seventy-nine in all, he had to sack his workmen after each order for fifteen was completed.21

Remarkably by 1926, the indefatigable Handley Page had not only paid off all his debts but was able to carry out a further capital reconstruction of his firm due to fresh expectations from an important technological breakthrough arising from his earlier work with George Volkert at Cricklewood in developing automatic slots on planes’ upper and lower wings, for which he had lodged patents in October 1919.22

When such slots were fitted to the leading edge of wings they increased an aircraft’s range of speed, enabling it to be controlled at lower speeds and to be free from spinning. On being informed that another patent had been registered by a German designer, Gustav Lachmann, Handley Page went straight to Germany and recruited him into the company to make further wind tunnel experiments at Gottingen University (and safeguard his own patent). Far from Lachmann being aggrieved, this started a lifetime association between them.

During the 1920s the slot system was fitted to aircraft in forty-three countries and the Air Ministry specified that slots should be fitted to all RAF models, thus earning the Handley Page Company some £750,000 from the invention. He personally received £100,000 from the British Government and £200,000 from the US23 for his technical breakthrough.

By the late 1920s Handley Page had come through the worst of his troubles and before the start of the Second World War his company built a number of aeroplanes, both airliners and bombers, although the extent of the problems experienced by one of the industry’s most innovative and indomitable figures illustrates the immensely difficult conditions for the British aeronautical industry during the first decade after the war.

Aviation commentator Peter King believed that only two constructors, Tommy Sopwith and Geoffrey de Havilland, came through with their aims untarnished24 and that this was because both found special and idiosyncratic ways of survival.

Sopwith was not only a brilliant leader but also possessed rare business acumen. Although at the war’s end he believed as strongly as others in the growth of civil aviation, he directed his company into manufacturing motorcycles and car bodies despite realising it could not survive for long that way. When in 1920 the Treasury duly lodged an enormous claim for excess war profits and refused to place it against the firm’s heavy losses during 1919, he decided he could go on no longer. After effecting stringent economies, including mortgaging the company premises, Sopwith placed his firm in voluntary liquidation25, thus enabling him to meet the Treasury’s claim in full and pay all his creditors at 20s in the pound.

This accomplished, he started again in a small way with three of his ‘originals’, Harry Hawker, Fred Sigrist and Bill Eyre, who joined him in investing £5,000 each for a firm dedicated to building relatively small aeroplanes. Although Harry Hawker died tragically in 1921, the knowledge and enthusiasm of the remaining three meant Hawker Aircraft was very likely to succeed, especially when after 1926 it began to produce fighter aircraft designed by a young Sydney Camm.

Geoffrey de Havilland took another route towards survival; after demonstrating advanced design skills at the Royal Aircraft Factory and at Airco (before that company closed down on 25 September 1920) he founded his own company, de Havilland Aircraft Co. Ltd, helped by capital supplied by Airco’s Holt Thomas. Like Hawker Aviation, it started on a small scale but its particular strategy was to tender for non-governmental work both in Britain and overseas in the form of airliners and smaller passenger carriers – until in 1927 it brought out the outstanding Tiger Moth light aircraft. Although some work was subsequently undertaken for the Air Ministry, this was generally confined to reconditioning de Havilland aircraft and by the end of 1925 de Havilland was so confident in his design ability that he did not ‘submit a competitive military prototype until the late 1930s.’26

Another company that survived because of its owner’s outstanding business acumen was Fairey Aviation. It was formed in 1915 by Richard Fairey, who like Sopwith swiftly took it into voluntary liquidation before re-forming it in 1921. A man of almost unassailable self-belief, Fairey steered his company through the stormy passages of the early 1920s helped by the Navy’s loyalty to his designs and by producing biplanes that were capable of going through a succession of models over a comparatively long period. He also showed a capacity to act quickly, as shown in 1930 when his Fox bomber lost out for RAF orders to the Hawker Hart. He went over to Belgium and sold satisfactory quantities to the Belgian air force, including one contract totalling £300,000.27

Geoffrey de Havilland. (Royal Aeronautical Society/National Aerospace Library)

Whatever such achievements, the 1920s were extremely difficult years for the British aircraft industry. The previous war’s insistent demands for greater numbers of planes for both the Army and Navy resulted in massive expansion and the creation of a first-class airframe and engine industry. However, such rapid growth caused many firms to be undercapitalised and dependent on Government orders. The total cessation of these brought immediate losses and gross uncertainty, and while some companies attempted to switch over to new products, demands for Wartime Excess Profits Tax, allowing no latitude nor concession for the losses made during 1919, brought on a massive crisis. Things were made worse still when the belief that opportunities for exports and an expanding civil market would carry the industry through also quickly evaporated.28

With the likelihood of another war ruled out for a full decade at least and by 1918 the RAF reduced to just ten per cent of its peak size, the Air Ministry expected it to be able to make do with wartime planes, of which it held a three-year supply. In any case, Hugh Trenchard, Chief of the Air Staff, was far more concerned with building up the RAF’s infrastructure than spending his small budget on new planes. Any remaining prospects for new aircraft orders were hit by the vast quantities of existing planes, engines and the other spares available at knockdown prices from the Aircraft Disposal Board.

Although from 1922 there was a measure of official assistance through the granting of subsidies to civil aviation and with the Air Ministry’s decision to no longer purchase front-line aircraft made from wood, in the absence of a clear strategic doctrine (demonstrated by the number of multi-purpose aircraft favoured at this time) and the strictly limited numbers of contracts that had to conform to both rigid and uninspired Air Ministry specifications, the industry was prevented from achieving the massive technological leaps that were already beckoning.

In the circumstances it was lucky the industry had the leaders it did, many of them self-made men whose extra qualifications had been acquired through part-time study. Most of them were not natural businessmen – although they could hardly have avoided making money during the war – nor were they the best employers – as self-made men they were not only heavily demanding but often martinets to their staff. Yet as a group they possessed two common beliefs that helped them through, namely their continuing mission to conquer the skies and their deep-held scorn of the Air Ministry’s civil servants. When speaking in his accustomed biblical fashion in 1959 at the memorial address to his friend Richard Fairey, Frederick Handley Page recalled the struggles during the 1920s with the condemnatory words of St Paul that: ‘We wrestle not with flesh and blood but with the spread of wickedness in high places.’29

‘Brab’ Moore-Brabazon, who knew the pacesetters so well, emphasised their vulnerability during the dire struggles of the early 1920s following the years of plenty. ‘They were my friends, I lived with them, I knew them as brothers … but it was not their fault, believe me, it was not their fault that it has all gone a little mad, we were all suffering from dreams of such a wonderful future. No one really thought of money in connection with it.’30

Tommy Sopwith (right) talking to P.W.S Bulman, chief test pilot at Hawker Aviation. (Royal Aeronautical Society/National Aerospace Library)

For many of the construction pioneers, even more than their opposite numbers in the more traditional industries, the early 1920s were years when the highly exciting and seemingly unending progression since 1908 ended, when a heavy cull of their numbers took place and when survivors such as the Shorts, although deprived of their brilliant eldest brother, Horace, continued in business but would never recover their former ascendancy.

Fortunately the indomitables such as de Havilland, Handley Page and Fairey were still there and, in a more detached role, so was Tommy Sopwith. While these and brilliant new constructors were still prepared to meet different but no less important challenges, some of the early blithe spirit had been lost forever.

2

HUGH TRENCHARD AND THE FIGHT FOR A SEPARATE AIR ARM

The creation of the Royal Air Force from the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) and the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) just seven months before the end of the First World War was undoubtedly one of the most important events in the history of British arms. It therefore seems all the more surprising that by the beginning of 1919 the British Prime Minister, Lloyd George, should have decided to dismantle the Air Ministry and with it a separate Royal Air Force.

Against such a powerful Prime Minister any defence was bound to be difficult and it was made even more so by the exceptional circumstances that had brought about the creation of the Royal Air Force, namely the degree of national anger at the then current bombing attacks on the British capital that appeared to signal that henceforth they would become a new means of waging war.

To avoid possible party rivalries, Lloyd George appointed former Boer general Jan Christian Smuts to join him on a two-man committee to consider the air defence of Britain and the higher direction of air operations. The Prime Minister left the practical work to Smuts and the resulting reports that went to the War Cabinet were in his name, the first appearing on 8 July 1917. It was relatively straightforward and involved the setting up of a unified command to defend London, comprising observers, anti-aircraft guns, a balloon barrage and fighter squadrons. This was accepted by the Cabinet without delay.

David Lloyd George in 1916 shortly before he became Prime Minister. (Author’s collection)

Smuts’s second report of 17 August was far more sweeping. This proposed the creation of a separate Air Ministry to control and administer all matters in connection with air warfare and plan arrangements for the amalgamation of the existing two air services (the Royal Flying Corps and the Royal Naval Air Service) into a single organisation.

Smuts (supported by Sir David Henderson, Head of the Royal Flying Corps at the War Office) sketched out a grandiose role for future British air power:

The Air service … can be used as an independent means of war operations. Nobody who witnessed the attacks on London on 11 July could have any doubt on that point … As far as at present can be foreseen there is absolutely no limit to the scale of its future independent war use. And the day may not be far off when aerial operations with their devastation of industrial and populous centres on a vast scale may become the principal operations of war, to which the older forms of military and naval operations may become subordinate.1

This hyperbolic – and unproven – forecast of future capability came at a time when the German raids were about to become much reduced and transferred to night-time, and when the future Allied Independent Bombing Force (formed in June 1918 under General Trenchard) would prove capable of mounting little more than nuisance attacks on German border targets such as Metz and Cologne. Smuts’s expectations were fuelled in part by inflated forecasts of future aircraft production – far in excess of the current Army and Navy requirements – and during the remainder of the war (which had been expected to last for some further years) the RAF had little chance of achieving even part of Smuts’s overarching hopes. Even so, by the war’s end it was the largest air force in the world with more than 27,000 officers and almost 300,000 airmen and airwomen.2

These strength levels were soon to be massively reduced: by 3 January 1920 no fewer than 26,087 officers, 21,259 cadets and 227,229 other non-commissioned ranks had been discharged from RAF service.3 With the Air Force yet to prove itself a war-winning instrument and with the Air Estimates just a quarter of the Navy’s and less than 20 per cent of the Army’s, it was near inevitable that the two older services should start pressing for it to revert to its two original portions and be returned to their control. With Lloyd George’s negative attitude, powerful opposition from the other two services and without a strong political champion of its own, the chances of the RAF keeping its separate identity seemed hopeless.

That their attacks failed were largely due to an exceptional defence put up by Hugh Trenchard (1873–1956), arguably the greatest figure in RAF history, who after being re-appointed Chief of the Air Staff on 11 January 1919, held the post for almost the whole of the 1920s. Such an achievement did not seem likely from his early service record and even after joining the Royal Flying Corps in 1912 he seemed a most unlikely figure to reach high rank, let alone successfully champion a separate air force. Born into a family of six children whose solicitor father went bankrupt, Trenchard showed little ability for the armed forces’ entrance examinations. He eventually succeeded – at his third attempt – in passing the less demanding tests for the Army militia, coming eighth from the bottom of the 169 successful candidates. Commissioned into the Royal Scots Fusiliers, he was far from an immediate success, with an aggressive attitude that made him unpopular while acquiring the reputation as something of a loner – although he quickly distinguished himself as a good organiser.

At the outbreak of the Anglo–Boer War, Trenchard took the opportunity to raise a company of irregular cavalry and quickly shone as their gifted, if headstrong, leader before he was seriously wounded conducting a rash attack. Following his recovery he became an acting lieutenant colonel with the colonial South Nigeria Regiment, but when the war ended and he returned to his parent regiment in Londonderry he reverted to the substantive rank of major. There he unwisely locked horns with his commanding officer, who told him the town was too small for both of them.

By 1912 Trenchard was still a major and on entering his 40th year he was understandably discontent with his lack of progress. Upon the advice of a friend he decided to attempt a flying career, for which he had to pass a flying course before his 40th birthday. He was granted three months’ leave and after paying £75 (returnable on passing) for lessons at the Tommy Sopwith School of Flying at Brooklands he succeeded in gaining his pilot’s certificate just in time, although his flying skills did not over-impress his instructor.

The Royal Flying Corps was formed during the same year and as one of its older officers he was sent to its Central Flying School at Upavon in Wiltshire. At Upavon, Arthur Longmore (later Air Chief Marshal Longmore) found Trenchard’s flying suspect, judging that he was overconfident and lacked finesse – but this did not appear to hamper Trenchard unduly for he was soon appointed adjutant and then assistant commandant of the school due to his undoubted administrative ability. At Upavon he became known for requiring instant obedience but despite a booming voice and an imposing presence, it was soon apparent that he experienced difficulties in conveying his messages clearly, either on paper or directly. However, he came to exert a strong hold over those under him, not least because of his genuine conviction in the aeroplane’s vast potential.

Viscount Hugh Trenchard, defender of the RAF. (National Portrait Gallery)

As a senior figure among a small pool of regular officers, the war brought Trenchard rapid advancement. In 1915 he was promoted to major general to replace Sir David Henderson as head of the Royal Flying Corps in France, where he served under Douglas Haig in command of the British forces there. On his appointment Trenchard was particularly lucky to inherit the brilliant Maurice Baring as his private secretary, who became invaluable to him and to whom he reputedly said during their first meeting: ‘I can’t write what I mean … I can’t say what I mean, but I expect you to know what I mean.’4

During Trenchard’s time in France he tirelessly pressed for better aircraft, although his chief concern was to develop an aggressive spirit among his fliers that he believed would enable them to gain air supremacy over the battlefield and go on to attack enemy lines of communication, and even industrial centres beyond the defence lines. It was a costly stance for, although after 1916 British aeroplanes increasingly outnumbered their German opponents and came to match them in performance capability, they suffered up to four times their casualties.

Lord Rothermere, short-lived Secretary of State for Air. (Flight, 29 November 1917)

The creation of the RAF brought Trenchard to the pinnacle of power when he was offered the post of Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) despite still being less than enthusiastic about it becoming a separate service. Predictably, before the RAF’s official birthday on 1 April 1918 serious dissension had broken out among its leaders, with Trenchard directly involved. The dispute originated with Prime Minister Lloyd George’s wish to favour the Harmsworth brothers, who as press barons had much influence over public opinion and shared his antipathy to Douglas Haig, the Commander-in-Chief in France. The elder, Alfred, Lord Northcliffe, publicly refused the Prime Minister’s offer to appoint him Secretary of State for Air in the columns of his Times newspaper, before his younger brother Harold, Lord Rothermere, accepted. It is highly debatable whether he was well served by his Chief of the Air Staff, for on his appointment Trenchard proved very reluctant to leave Haig when the climactic land battles of the war were about to start. In any case, he utterly disagreed with the political attacks being mounted against his former chief and it was only after the strongest pressure from both Harmsworth brothers that he accepted the post as Chief of Air Staff – but it quickly became apparent that Trenchard and Rothermere were fundamentally incompatible. In fact, Trenchard quickly lost all faith in someone he believed was an intriguer by nature (although Trenchard himself never hesitated to make use of his own powerful supporters). More importantly, he believed Rothermere was patently out of his depth when it came to the necessary discussions regarding the new service. Whatever his shortcomings, Rothermere undoubtedly had major problems of his own, not only with his health but also from the devastating loss in action of his second son that quickly followed the death of his first. This counted for little with Trenchard, who felt compelled to ask to be relieved of his duties and be allowed to tender his resignation (serving officers had no right to resign).

Trenchard’s decision triggered the departure of Sir David Henderson as vice president of the Air Council, with Major Baird, the department’s Parliamentary Under-Secretary, likely to follow. Such losses among his senior staff triggered Rothermere’s resignation just four months after assuming office and caused the arrival of Lord Weir (former Minister of Munitions and as Secretary of State for Air a strong champion of air power and strategic bombing), with the post of Chief of the Air Staff going to Trenchard’s long-term rival, Major General Frederick Sykes. Weir confirmed Sykes in the appointment but, as an admirer of Trenchard, gave him command of the Independent Bombing Force that Trenchard had formed earlier in France. Trenchard attempted to build this into a force of formidable proportions, but during its early raids it suffered greater casualties at the hands of defending aeroplanes than he had anticipated.

As the intensity of the air war over the western battlefront increased, Trenchard criticised the duplication of staff required by his bombing force, and on Armistice Day declared with typical forthrightness, that ‘a more gigantic waste of effort and personnel there has never been in any war’.5 Even so, it was while he was directing the Independent Force, that Trenchard came to believe in the utility of heavy bombing and its particular effects on civilian morale (a conviction expressed earlier by Smuts and wholeheartedly supported by Weir). In justification of the tactics used by the Independent Force Trenchard wrote:

By attacking so many centres as could be reached, the moral effect was first of all very much greater as no town felt safe and it necessitated continual and thorough defensive measures on the part of the enemy to protect the many different localities over which my force was operating. At present the moral effect of bombing stands undoubtedly to the material effect in a proportion of 20 to 1 and therefore it was necessary to create the greatest moral effect possible.6

How Trenchard reached this proportion of 20:1 was never explained, and not everyone was as convinced as Trenchard, Smuts and Weir about the effects on morale. In a memorandum sent at the time of Weir’s appointment as Air Minister, Winston Churchill had written that:

It is not reasonable to speak of an air offensive as if it were going to finish the war by itself – it is improbable that any terrorism of the civil population which could be achieved by air attack would compel the Government of a great nation to surrender. Familiarity with bombardment, a good system of dug-outs, or shelters, a strong control by police and the military authorities should be sufficient to preserve the national fighting powers unimpaired … therefore our air offensive should consistently be directed at striking at the bases and communications upon whose structure the fighting power of his armies and his fleets of the sea and of the air depends.7

Weir was unlikely to have been convinced by Churchill’s arguments against air attack, and in any case he had planned to resign by the end of the war. When in January 1919 he handed over his keys of office to the more sceptical Churchill, his ambitions for air remained at the highest, and in his farewell speech to the Air Staff at the Hotel Cecil he reminded them that the Air Ministry’s responsibilities were twofold, namely ‘the administration of the young Air Force with its great traditions, and the development of civil aviation with all its vast possibilities’.8

At this point Churchill not only had reservations about the effects of bombing, but neither did he take civil aviation all that seriously. Weir took pains to impress on him (as he was due to become Secretary of State for both War and Air) that if the RAF was not to disappear, its Chief of the Air Staff had to be a man ‘with a mind and will of his own’. Weir believed the truculent Trenchard rather than Sykes possessed the required force of character not only to meet opposition from the other two services but also create a new service from the wreckage of wholesale demobilisation and the sale of all surplus aircraft. ‘Trenchard,’ he said, ‘can make do with little and won’t want to be carried.’

Churchill, who had had a genuine belief in the need for a separate air arm since before the First World War, sent for Trenchard and offered him the post of CAS (despite the fact it was presently held by Sykes), while at the same time asking him to submit brief plans concerning the reorganisation of the Air Ministry and, more crucially, the RAF. Churchill already had in his possession the ambitious plans that Sykes had submitted to Weir for a post-war air programme, including proposals for the formation of a multi-national Air Force (with standardised equipment) operating from permanent air bases across the Empire, supported by a standing striking force that Churchill knew the Cabinet had rejected on grounds of expense.

Trenchard’s proposals to Churchill covered just two sheets of foolscap paper, on which he suggested that a future Air Ministry should be as small as possible with an Air Council of just three branches and no more than a dozen senior officers.

In anticipation of the expected attacks from the other two services, he also made proposals for a small Air Force, with only a limited number of its officers holding permanent commissions. Others would be offered short service commissions and a further group of officers would be seconded from the other two services for a period of four years. (Whatever their type of commission, Trenchard was adamant that all officers had to learn to fly.)

Trenchard’s second main proposal was that the RAF should have specialist and thoroughgoing training units quite separate from its operational ones. By these means he hoped to establish foundations with nothing much else on show – but ones that would be hard to destroy.9 Trenchard also made clear that the infant RAF needed a demonstrable part to play in the nation’s security.

Churchill approved Trenchard’s proposals and brought him back as CAS after gaining Sykes’s agreement to head civil aviation, which that officer naively and wrongly hoped the Government would immediately support financially.