TSR2 E-Book

Damien Burke

• Herausgeber: The Crowood Press
• Kategorie: Lebensstil
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 919

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2014

Beschreibung

More than forty years after its cancellation, the BAC TSR2 is still a controversial aircraft. Years ahead of its time, it was abruptly cancelled by a new government when flight testing had ony just begun. Built to a demanding RAF requirement , the BAC TSR2 was a revolutionary low-level strike aircraft able to deliver a tactical nuclear weapon at supersonic speed and low altitude to evade enemy radar. This fascinating new book describes in detail the aircraft, its history and the events of its cancellation. Many hitherto unseen photographs and diagrams support the detailed text, which benefits from extensive research in the BAC archives and access to newly rediscovered material.

Leseprobe

Damien Burke

The Crowood Press

First published in 2010 byThe Crowood Press Ltd Ramsbury, MarlboroughWiltshire SN8 2HR

www.crowood.com

This impression 2011

This e-book first published in 2014

© Damien Burke 2010

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication DataA catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

ISBN 978 1 84797 791 5

Acknowledgements

I have been repeatedly impressed by the time and effort that so many people have spared to assist with my research for this book. My grateful thanks are therefore extended to: BAE Systems’ Warton Heritage Group for unprecedented access to its TSR2 archives, including much material that was previously classified, in particular to Dave Ward, Tony Wilson, the late Keith Emslie, Keith Spong, Peter Hardman, Dave Hutton and the late Bob Fairclough; the Brooklands Museum at Weybridge for similar access to its own TSR2 and Hawker archives, in particular to John Pulford, Julian Temple, Jack Fuller, Albert Kitchenside, Chris Farara, Geoff Burchett and Michael Goodall; Barry Guess and Trevor Friend at BAE Systems Farnborough; Guy Revell and Peter Devitt at the Department of Research and Information Services at the RAF Museum, Hendon; the RAF Museum, Cosford for access to XR220, particularly Clare Carr and Keith Woodcock; the Imperial War Museum at Duxford for access to XR222; Barry and Dianne James at the Midland Air Museum; the staff of the National Archives at Kew; and the staff of the Coventry City Council History Centre. Thanks also to Ivan Yates, the late Wing Commander Jimmy Dell OBE, Don Knight, Air Commodore Dennis Reader, Glenn Surtees, Matin Hale, Alan Mansell at Solent Sky and, finally, to Ronnie Olsthoorn for his stunning, and chilling, cover artwork. Any errors are mine; sadly the uneven nature of much surviving TSR2 documentation does not lend itself to firm statements in some areas, but with the valuable assistance of several people who worked on the designing, building and testing of TSR2 I hope I have at least addressed many of the misunderstandings and errors that can be found in other publications on the subject, without introducing too many of my own. Any errors found after publication will be addressed on a dedicated website to be found at www.tsr2.info.

DAMIEN BURKEMarch 2010

Websites of organizations that assisted with research for this book:

BAE Systems Heritage – www.baesystems.com/heritage

Brooklands Museum – www.brooklandsmuseum.com

Coventry History Centre – www.theherbert.org/index.php/home/history-centre

Imperial War Museum Duxford – www.duxford.iwm.org.uk

Midland Air Museum – www.midlandairmuseum.co.uk

National Archives – www.nationalarchives.gov.uk

RAF Museum Department of Research and Information Services – www.rafmuseum.org.uk/research

RAF Museum Cosford – www.rafmuseum.org.uk/cosford

Contents

Abbreviations

Introduction

  1 BEGINNINGS

  2 SUBMISSIONS TO GOR.339

  3 DESIGNING TSR2

  4 BUILDING TSR2

  5 FLIGHT TEST DEVELOPMENT

  6 THE AIRCRAFT

  7 THE ENGINE

  8 ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS

  9 WEAPONS

10 RAF SERVICE

11 CANCELLATION

12 UNBUILT VERSIONS

Appendix    I  General Operational Requirement

Appendix   II  Operational Requirement

Appendix  III  Flight Reference Cards

Colour Profiles

Index

Abbreviations

A&AEE

Aeroplane and Armament Experimental Establishment

AAPP

airborne auxiliary powerplant

AFCS

automatic flight-control system

AFVG

Anglo-French Variable-Geometry (project)

AGC

automatic gain control

AGM

air-to-ground missile

AHB

Air Historical Branch

AI

airborne interception (radar)

APU

auxiliary power unit

ASM

air-to-surface missile

ASP

aircraft servicing platform

ASR

Air Staff Requirement

AST

Air Staff Target

ATE

automatic test equipment

AUW

all-up weight

BAC

British Aircraft Corporation

BEA

British European Airways

BLC

boundary layer control

BSEL

Bristol Siddeley Engines Ltd

CA

Controller Aircraft

CAL

Cornell Aeronautical Laboratories

CAP

combat air patrol

CEP

circular error probable

c.g.

centre of gravity

CCS

central computing system

CPU

central processing unit

CRT

cathode ray tube

CSD

constant-speed drive

CSDS

constant-speed drive starter

CSDE

Central Servicing Development Establishment

CSEU

Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions

CWAS

Conventional Weapons Aiming System

CWP

central warning panel

DDOR

Deputy Director of Operational Requirements

DOR

Directorate of Operational Requirements

DRPC

Defence Research Policy Committee

ECM

electronic countermeasures

ECU

engine-change unit

EIT

Electronic Introduction Team

EPR

engine pressure ratio

ETPS

Empire Test Pilots’ School

FLR

forward-looking radar

FTB

flying test bed

GOR

General Operational Requirement

GPI

Ground Position Indicator

GTS

Ground Training School

HDU

hose-and-drogue unit

HE

high explosive

HOTAS

hands on throttle and stick

HP

high-pressure

HUD

head-up display

IFF

identification friend or foe

ILS

instrument landing system

INS

inertial navigation system

IR

infra-red

IRD

infra-red decoy

IRBM

intermediate-range ballistic missile

LABS

Low Altitude Bombing System

LCNs

(airfield) load classification numbers

lox

liquid oxygen

LP

low-pressure

MoA

Ministry of Aviation

MoD

Ministry of Defence

MoS

Ministry of Supply

MTI

moving-target indication

MTBF

mean time between failures

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGTE

National Gas Turbine Establishment

OCU

Operational Conversion Unit

ODS

Operational Development Squadron

OR

Operational Requirement(s)

PEP

Project Execution Plan

PERT

Programme Evaluation and Review Technique

PRF

pulse-repetition frequency

psi

pounds per square inch

PSP

pierced steel planking

QRA

Quick Reaction Alert

RAAF

Royal Australian Air Force

RAE

Royal Aircraft Establishment

RAF

Royal Air Force

RAM

radar-absorbing material

R&D

research and development

RBW

rapid-blooming Window

RCAF

Royal Canadian Air Force

RCS

radar cross-section

RN

Royal Navy

RPDU

rapid processing and development unit

RPU

rapid processing unit

RRE

Royal Radar Establishment

RWR

radar warning receiver

SAM

surface-to-air missile

SFC

specific fuel consumption

SHAPE

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

SLR

sideways-looking radar

SRV

servicing and readiness vehicle

STOL

short take-off and landing

TFR

terrain-following radar

TISC

Tactical Intelligence Steering Committee

TRRV

turn-round and readiness vehicle

TSE

Tactical Strike Establishment

TSR

Tactical Strike Reconnaissance

USAF

United States Air Force

VTOL

vertical take-off and landing

Introduction

In the German city of Hamburg on the night of 27/28 July 1943 over 40,000 people were killed, mostly incinerated or suffocated in their shelters, by a bombing raid that produced a ‘firestorm’, a conflagration of immense scale, consisting of numerous smaller fires combining to create a hurricane of high winds feeding into the fire. This raid had consisted of 787 aircraft from Royal Air Force (RAF) Bomber Command; forty-one turned back with various problems, and losses en route reduced them further so that a total of 731 bomb loads fell on the city, around 600 of them falling within the space of half an hour over a 2-square-mile (5.2sq km) area on an unusually dry and warm night. In total, 1,127 tons of high explosive and 1,199 tons of incendiaries fell on the city. Bomber Command lost twenty-one aircraft; four over the target itself and the remainder at various points on the journey to and from Hamburg, including four crashed or written off on return to their bases. These losses, over 100 young men dead or missing, were considered ‘light’. The raid was one of four of similar scale conducted over the course of a week, but, of the four, only this single raid produced such an immense level of death and destruction.

Around two years later, at 8.15am on the morning of 6 August 1945, a single bomb released from an American Boeing B-29 bomber took slightly less than a minute to fall 30,000ft (9,000m) before detonating around 2,000ft (600m) above central Hiroshima, an industrial city in southern Japan. In the blink of an eye a fireball expanded to a diameter of 1,200ft (370m). Everything flammable within a mile (1.5km) of the centre of the explosion (the hypocentre) burst into flame. Nearest the hypocentre, humans were reduced to shadows burnt into stone and concrete. The blast pulverized buildings, vehicles, people and anything else up to 11,000ft (3,350m) away. Only the strongest buildings, mostly constructed of reinforced concrete to resist earthquakes, survived the initial blast. Fires spread rapidly, consuming shattered buildings, fed by broken gas pipes and any number of flame sources dislocated by the blast; toppled stoves, lanterns, and so on. The fires merged into a firestorm, and within hours of the release of this single weapon 66,000 people were dead. Nearly 5 square miles (13sq km) of the city and 70 per cent of its buildings had been totally destroyed. The world had entered the age of atomic warfare. That single bomb was a primitive fission weapon, producing an explosive yield equivalent to somewhere between 13,000 and 15,000 tons (13,200 and 15,250 tonnes) of high explosive. Three days later a second atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki, and the Japanese surrendered within a week in the face of threats of further atomic bombings.

Over the next few years Great Britain struggled to recover not only from the direct destruction visited upon the nation by the Luftwaffe during World War Two, but also from the crippling economic costs incurred by fighting the war. Government spending on the armed forces was drastically cut back, the RAF in particular suffering from a lack of investment in new aircraft. There was one notable exception in 1945, when the English Electric company was awarded a contract to design and develop a jet bomber to replace the de Havilland Mosquito. During the war English Electric had impressed the government with its production of Handley Page Hampden and Halifax bombers, and had expanded its aviation activities by buying up the Napier & Son aero-engine company and by producing Vampire jet fighters for de Havilland. It was therefore not quite so surprising, perhaps, that English Electric, rather than one of the more established aircraft manufacturers, was given the job of producing the RAF’s first jet bomber, the Canberra.

The RAF’s strategic bomber force suffered badly, soldiering on with obsolete Avro Lancasters, and Lincolns that were little better. Only in 1947 did work begin on jet-powered replacements, a requirement that would result in the V-bomber trio of Vickers Valiant, Handley Page Victor and Avro Vulcan. Meanwhile, the Communist threat became ever greater, and, by the time the Canberra had flown, the Iron Curtain was firmly in place. Just months after the Canberra’s first flight, in August 1949, an atomic explosion bloomed over the Semipalatinsk test site in what is now northern Kazakhstan. The Russians now had The Bomb too.

Instead of being able to concentrate on recovery, the British nation was forced to prepare for a new war, one that would be fought not with bullets and high explosive but with atomic fire. The run-down of the country’s anti-aircraft gun sites that had begun with the end of World War Two was halted, and hundreds of new gun sites were built to protect the major cities and industrial areas. Across the country spread a sophisticated network of radars, antiaircraft guns and hardened bunkers. Stores of the supplies that would be needed after an atomic attack – food, clothing, and so on – were secreted in various locations. Large numbers of fire fighting vehicles were dispersed in depots located at safe distances from expected targets. The government put in place plans for running a country torn apart by an atomic attack, devolving responsibility to individual regions in the event of central government being obliterated.

The 1950s began with the shock of the Korean War, which kick-started the British aviation industry back into wartime production, albeit at a much slower rate than during World War Two. More complex aircraft and engines inevitably took longer to produce, and cost much more than their ancestors. An atomic war was a horrifying prospect but it was not unthinkable, and, more importantly, the government did not believe it was unwinnable. This all changed on 1 November 1952, when the USA detonated its first full-scale hydrogen bomb. A basic fusion weapon, it was nonetheless around 450 times as powerful as the bomb used against Hiroshima, and when the Russians began tests of similar weapons in 1955 it was horrifyingly clear that the nightmare of an atomic attack upon Great Britain was as nothing compared with an attack with the new ‘H-bomb’, and the existing defences were laughably inadequate.

A massive construction programme began that would end with nearly 2,000 underground bunkers scattered across Great Britain, most of them being fall-out plotting and monitoring bunkers manned by Royal Observer Corps personnel. They afforded little but basic fall-out protection for the volunteers staffing them; facilities within were primitive, but at the end of the day it was the national will demonstrated by having such a network that was the most important thing. Part of that national will was also the demonstration that Great Britain had the means to support the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in a European conflict. The RAF and Army were far too small to be a viable threat to the Soviets, and the whole of NATO would still be hopelessly outnumbered. NATO doctrine recognized that only tactical nuclear weapons could restore the balance. Thus Great Britain had been placed into a situation where it was operating mostly outmoded aircraft, fielding outmoded weapons, as part of an alliance facing a numerically superior enemy armed with the ability to turn much of Great Britain into a firestorm during just a few hours of unrestricted warfare.

For the RAF’s part it was clear that the Canberra, although it was an excellent aircraft, was living on borrowed time. Soviet defences were improving all the time, and improvements in radar and missile technology would soon make the Canberra obsolete. The RAF desperately needed a modern bomber that could survive in the increasingly sophisticated defence environment of a European battlefield and pack a big enough nuclear punch to redress the numerical imbalance that NATO troops faced.

This was the world into which the TSR2 was to be born.

CHAPTER ONE

Beginnings

In September 1951, with the Canberra shortly due to reach RAF squadrons in quantity, the RAF’s Directorate of Operational Requirements (DOR) began looking at the prospects for a new light bomber to replace the Canberra in due course. It has traditionally been the case that the RAF has always looked ahead for a replacement type as soon as possible after the existing type has begun to enter service (sometimes even before that milestone was reached). Air Commodore H.V. Satterly at DOR started the ball rolling with a Minute to his staff at the Directorate, asking them start thinking about policy for the Canberra replacement. In it he pointed out that the RAF’s Aircraft Research Committee had already begun a study on the pros and cons of a low-altitude bomber, though current policy was that bombers had to be able to evade or fight their way through defences, and the low-altitude bomber concept was designed to evade only.

A paper entitled ‘An Appreciation on the Requirement for a Future Light Bomber’ was produced in July 1952. It laid out the need for a light bomber with a primary role of the delivery of atomic weapons; with the highest performance possible, particularly at low altitude; and the capability to be adapted to secondary roles without compromising its primary role. This was the first real hint of what was to become the TSR2. The paper specifically referred to replacing the Canberra, ‘now in Service and already to some extent technically obsolete’, with the new aircraft expected to be in service by 1958 and having a useful front-line life of about four years, until 1962. The RAF mindset at the time was still stuck in the 1940s, when an aircraft type’s useful life was sometimes measured in months rather than years; certainly never in decades.

The English Electric Canberra. The RAF expected the type to be obsolete by 1965 and completely worn out by 1970. This is B.2 WK163, which set a world altitude record in August 1957 with the aid of a Napier Double Scorpion rocket engine. This aircraft had a varied trials career, including linescan development work, before being finally retired, still not worn out, in the 1990s. It began a civilian career as G-BVWC in 1994 with Classic Aviation Projects, and is seen here being displayed at Duxford in 2008 just before being grounded by lack of suitable replacement Avon 109 engines.Damien Burke

Some of the more interesting aspects of the paper included an appreciation that, when it came to carrying small atomic bombs, the ‘best bomber for any task is broadly the smallest and cheapest that is capable of the required range and accuracy’, and that surface-to-surface guided weapons, or ‘expendable bombers’, could well fulfil the primary role, though accuracy and the attack of fleeting targets would be a challenge. Attacking moving targets and targets of opportunity would not be possible for an unmanned system of any kind, and even the best blind bombing system would also be unsuitable for this kind of task, which would demand visual bombing. Visual bombing accuracy depended greatly on going in at low altitude, and as high-altitude operation was also no longer a means of protection from fighter attack, it was clear which way the wind was blowing. As for weapons carriage, guided bombs would demand control surfaces and economy would demand a small fuselage, so external carriage rather than an internal bomb bay was expected to be the result.

By March 1953 a draft Operational Requirement (OR) had begun to be worked on, based on the Future Light Bomber paper, which blithely (and, as it transpired, inaccurately) declared that the Canberra ‘is rapidly becoming outdated and has no potentialities for further important development’. Clearly the writer of that requirement did not expect the Canberra to be in RAF service more than fifty years later (albeit purely in the reconnaissance role). The draft requirement called for a new aircraft capable of striking up to 500nm (575 miles; 925km) behind the enemy front line, in all weathers, day or night, with priority given to low-level performance, and relying on speed, routeing and manoeuvrability to protect it from enemy defences, as no defensive armament was to be carried (by this point, evade or fight had become simply evade). A cruising speed of 600kt/690mph/ Mach 0.9 was needed, with supersonic bursts of Mach 1.4, and runways of 2,000yd (1,850m) length should be adequate, including pierced steel planking (PSP) or similar improvized surfaces. For 1953 this was all pretty advanced stuff, but the RAF’s dated mindset still showed in other aspects of the draft requirement. These included references to the navigator being provided with a crash station should his normal position be unsuitable; the provision of Gee Mark 3 in the radio fit for the marshalling of bomber streams; and armour to protect against cannon attack from below (as per the Schräge Musik upward firing night-fighter cannon used by the Luftwaffe in World War Two). Weapons were to include four 30mm cannon and various items fit for particular roles, e.g. Blue Jay (Firestreak) missiles for the intruder role, rockets and bombs for interdiction or Pentane torpedoes for anti-shipping strike. Production was to begin in 1958, and the aircraft needing to be in squadron service by 1959 at the latest, when the Canberra was expected to be on its last legs.

Coincidentally, in January 1953, as part of development work for an improved Gloster Javelin fighter (the ‘Developed Javelin’) which was being designed to satisfy Specification F.153D, Glosters had submitted a proposal to use a variant of this new ‘thin-wing’ Javelin as a light strike aircraft, and this attracted a great deal of Air Staff interest. By July 1955 OR.328 had been drafted around Gloster’s bomber-Javelin proposals, the broad intention of which was to provide a bomber capable of delivering a tactical nuclear weapon (to OR.1127, the requirement that would result in the atomic bomb later known as Red Beard) in the face of modern air defences, at long range (the target was to be up to 1,000nm (1,150 miles, 1850km) away from base, twice as far as the early drafts of the Canberra replacement requirement), in adverse weather by day or by night. Deletion of fighter equipment such as the huge radar and wing guns would enable the carriage of an extra 2,600gal (11,820L) of fuel (for a total of 4,000gal (18,185L) and the fitting of Bristol Siddeley Olympus 6 engines. A single tactical nuclear bomb would be carried externally, slung under one of the wings, with a drop tank balancing it on the other side and further drop tanks under the fuselage. The in-service date was still required to be 1959.

Simultaneously, work was under way to see what, if anything, could be done to upgrade the Canberra, concentrating on the addition of a blind-bombing system so that the type would have much improved tactical capability at night and in bad weather. However, as the RAF fully expected the type to be out of service in less than a decade, it looked like any serious effort to upgrade it would be wasted, as any sufficiently advanced blind-bombing system would take so long to develop that the aircraft would be nearing retirement by the time it was available. Development of the Bomber/Interdictor versions of the Canberra was rushed through as a stopgap measure, the definitive B(I).8 version entering service in RAF Germany with American ‘Project E’ atomic weapons during 1957.

Unfortunately for Gloster it also soon became clear that the company could not get its thin-wing Javelin bomber into service until 1961. Moreover, a variety of problems, such as dealing with low-level flying and its effect on fatigue life, crew comfort and equipment reliability, had not been fully addressed in Gloster’s proposal. The firm considered that an aircraft with an all-up-weight of 70,000lb (31,750kg) and carrying 4,000gal (18,185L) of fuel would only be able to manage a radius of action of 1,000nm (1,150 miles, 1850km) if most of the flight was to be at high level, and any improvement would entail a complete redesign. As OR.328 required a combat radius of at least 1,000 miles, mostly flown at low level, the bomber version of the thin-wing Javelin did not get far. The Defence Research Policy Committee recommended cancellation of the requirement in late 1955, and when the Chiefs of the Air Staff met in March 1956 they accepted the recommendation. On 11 April 1956 OR.328 was formally cancelled.

The procurement process

The usual process of procuring a military aircraft for the RAF began in the Air Ministry, where the Air Staff (RAF officers) would begin formulating a rough requirement. The result would be an Air Staff Target (AST), which gave a broad outline of what they were after and formed the basis for feasibility studies at industry level, usually submitted in the form of detailed brochures. Assuming these found that the target was a practical and viable proposition, the next step would be to formulate a more detailed Air Staff Requirement (ASR, also often referred to as an Operational Requirement or OR) and award a project study contract to a single firm. The aim of this study was to make an extremely thorough and detailed investigation of the scientific and technical problems involved, and produce a detailed development plan including estimates of cost, timescale and manpower requirements. Assuming this study was approved by all concerned in the Air Ministry (the Air Staff, Operational Requirements department and so on) and Ministry of Supply (MoS, the ministry responsible for the procurement of military aircraft, replaced by the Ministry of Aviation (MoA) from 1960), it would be recommended to the Secretary of State for Defence, who would then ask for Treasury approval to proceed.

The Treasury’s job, of course, was to resist spending money, and this would prompt further investigation into the requirement and whether the new project was really needed, including political input. Assuming Treasury authority was finally granted, the next step would be the awarding of a Development Contract to the firm, covering work on a number of prototypes or a development batch of aircraft. While the company was working on these it would be negotiating a Production Contract, approval for this also having to go through the Treasury and thus requiring further investigation and justification from the Air Ministry. At any point in the process continued Treasury co-operation could never be taken for granted, and political decisions could overrule any requirements at any point. Thus it was not uncommon for projects to get as far as the Development Contract stage, with prototypes under construction, and then be cancelled without further ado, sometimes even before the prototype had flown.

All of this took time, and the replacement of the Canberra was becoming an ever more urgent requirement. Within just a handful of years the Canberra would be obsolete and only the V-bomber force would be able to deliver, in ad hoc fashion, tactical nuclear weapons. Both the Air Staff and the MoS needed to find some way of shortening the process.

General Operational Requirement No. 339

The DOR now began work on a report defining its future tactical bombardment requirements, and whether they could be fulfilled by an all-new aircraft, a guided weapon or an off-the-shelf aircraft. The Assistant Chief of the Air Staff within the Operational Requirements department was H.V. Satterly (by then promoted Air Vice-Marshal), who had already looked at a new design from Blackburn Aircraft, the NA.39/B.103 low-level strike aircraft being designed to satisfy a naval requirement. Satterly and the Air Staff were unimpressed with the NA.39, considering it ‘not much of advance on the Canberra’ with high-altitude performance ‘handicapped by either lack of span or too early drag rise’. Blackburn had suggested an improved version with redesigned wings and tail, but would not be able to get it into the air until after 1960, again too late. Thoughts turned towards acquiring a suitable aircraft from the USA, preferably as a ‘free gift’. The Convair B-58 Hustler was just about to make its first flight and was considered by Satterly to be the only viable contender, and some quiet efforts were made to find out what sort of performance it was likely to have. However, the B-58’s flight-testing turned into a protracted affair, and it had not been designed for conventional strike, nor low-level operation. It was also a big and expensive aircraft, and the RAF soon lost interest. The B-58’s impressive high-altitude speed and range was drastically reduced when it was later operated at low level, validating the RAF’s loss of interest at the time.

Blackburn’s brochure model of its B.103 design to NA.39. While obviously a Buccaneer, the B.103 differed in many ways from the prototype airframes that Blackburn actually built, and the production marks S.1 and S.2 differed further from those.BAE Systems

In October 1956 English Electric began discussions of its own with Mr Handel Davies at the MoS about their ideas for a Canberra successor. The talks centred on an aircraft capable of up to Mach 1.3 with a radius of action of more than 350nm (400 miles; 64km) at sea level, carrying conventional or atomic weapons, or reconnaissance equipment (cameras or electronic sensors). Rolls-Royce Conway engines, then in development, were suggested as a powerplant. The target in-service date of the first version would be 1964, a much more realistic prediction than any of the RAF’s ideas up to this point, and various versions covering different roles were envisaged. English Electric’s initial sketches were of an aircraft with straight, shoulder-mounted wings, podded engines slung under each wing and a high tailplane, though it was also asked to consider a development of its P.1B to do the job.

Within the Air Ministry’s Operational Requirements department the discussions prompted the generation of a new ‘General’ OR, GOR.339, a file on this being first recorded on 28 November 1956, covering the need for a tactical strike and reconnaissance aircraft. A GOR was more of an American concept than the traditional Air Staff Target, but was similarly intended to be the basis upon which various firms would tender designs, and would be the solution to short-cutting the more usual lengthy procurement process. The most interesting aspects of the firms’ submissions would be used to create a more detailed OR to then proceed with. Another bonus would be that, if any of the requirements in the GOR were felt by all the firms to be technically too difficult or expensive, those requirements could be amended or dropped to make sure the project as a whole was feasible.

Feelers were also put out to the various tactical air forces and commands within the RAF, and also to the Army, to gain a better idea of just what type of aircraft was going to be needed. English Electric had another meeting in January 1957 with Gp Capt Wheeler of the Air Staff (Deputy Director of Operational Requirements; DDOR) and Handel Davies, which further firmed up the requirement to cover a two-seat strike aircraft, carrying a single ‘Target Marker Bomb’. This was the hilarious euphemism then in use for the atomic weapon to OR.1127 that came to be known as Red Beard. (Admittedly, any target hit with such a weapon would certainly be marked in fine style.) A conventional bomb load was also called for, of four or preferably six 1,000lb high-explosive (HE) bombs. Combat radius was to be 600nm (690 miles; 110km) at low level with a speed of Mach 0.9 (with a Mach 1.3 burst) or 1,000nm (1,150 miles; 1,850km) combat radius at higher altitudes and Mach 1.5. Short takeoff, or even vertical, would be needed, to operate from strips just 1,000yd (900m) long (for the shorter sortie), and the first mention was made of possibly catering to Royal Navy (RN) needs at the same time.

English Electric had a further meeting with OR and the MoS on 30 January, after a conference on P.1 development. The importance of the low-level requirement was restated, and English Electric realized that a developed P.1B (the P.18 that it had been working on) would not be up to the job in terms of combat radius or short takeoff and landing (STOL) performance. Work on it was discontinued so that the company could concentrate on a far more elaborate design, Project 17. English Electric also pointed out that vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) and any formal preparation of a requirement followed by a prolonged design competition would both rule out any possibility of getting a new aircraft into service by 1964.

English Electric P.1B XA847 in flight near Warton. Compared with the earlier P.1, the P.1B had gained the familiar circular intake with radar bullet centrebody, and is seen here flying ‘clean’ before the addition of the belly fuel tank.via Warton Heritage Group

By February 1957 the requirement was solidifying into a primarily low-altitude-penetration concept, though Bomber Command wanted to retain high-altitude capability. The Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE) had been brought in to rough-out a baseline design that could be used to evaluate any submissions from industry. A number of studies had also been carried out of aircraft of interest, such as the Saunders-Roe F.177D (rocket fighter) and Fairey ER103 (the Fairey Delta 3 fighter), both submissions to OR.329 (an all-weather interceptor requirement), to see if they had any possibility of being used in the ground-attack role, and also of a Short Brothers design for a VTOL low-level strike aircraft.

English Electric also completed project report P/103, entitled ‘Possibilities for a multi-purpose Canberra Replacement – Aircraft Project P.17’. This summarized the impressive success of the Canberra, touched briefly on the fact that, despite its many versions, the interceptor version had never been fully developed, addressed the question of whether manned aircraft were still required in the ballistic-missile era and answered that with a firm ‘yes’. Missiles were inflexible, and just one part of a deterrent strategy. Being able to reconnoitre and strike accurately at enemy headquarters, missile bases, aerodromes, etc., was all part of the deterrent, and there seemed still to be a requirement for a manned aircraft ‘in the tradition of the Canberra’. Keeping development costs reasonable by using Canberra and P.1 experience, and producing an aircraft of maximum flexibility would be the key, ensuring foreign sales and a reduction in the cost to the RAF. The P.17 was then described. At this point the P.17 had obvious P.1/ Lightning inheritance, with a similar tailplane and fin and a delta mainplane that was effectively the Lightning mainplane with the area between the trailing edge of the wingtip and the fuselage filled in. The fuselage, however, bore no such similarities, being much longer, with side-by-side engines and quarter-cone intakes hidden under the wings. Unsurprisingly, given the aircraft’s P.1 ancestor, English Electric mentioned the possibilities that it would have as a fighter with long endurance (30min at Mach 1.6 instead of 5min for the P.1). In what would become a common theme, the company also pointed out that keeping a multi-role strike aircraft affordable would require the use of much off-the-shelf equipment, rather than specifying masses of exotic new kit, such as terrain clearance radar. The various strike, interdiction and reconnaissance missions could be carried out by differing equipment packs fitted in a large bomb bay; cameras, cannon, etc.

Interim submissions

In March 1957 the first draft of the GOR was also passed to de Havilland, Vickers, the Hawker-Siddeley Group and Blackburn, though Handel-Davies at the MoS was already concerned that the mix of low-level and high-altitude use, plus huge combat radius, was going to lead to a very large aircraft. Each firm duly submitted proposals to upgrade some of its existing aircraft to provide interim types to satisfy at least some aspects of the GOR. De Havilland offered a developed DH110 (Sea Vixen) and Vickers offered a developed N.113 (Scimitar). Hawker followed up with a proposal of its own based not upon an existing type, but upon one then in early development, the P.1121. The Admiralty had also raised the question of the RN’s upcoming new strike aircraft. When this submission arrived in April 1957 it turned out to be, to the RAF’s displeasure, Blackburn’s B.103 again, though this time Blackburn submitted a brochure containing not only the standard B.103 but also a slightly developed variation of it. English Electric’s P.18 was also briefly looked at, but not seriously considered. It is worth describing these four early submissions (plus English Electric’s P.18), even if they were only regarded as interim solutions to GOR.339, as they exposed attitudes that would have long-term consequences.

A general-arrangement drawing of the Blackburn B.103A of April 1957.Damien Burke

Blackburn and General Aircraft B.103 / B.103A

Blackburn, for the second time in two years, submitted its polished and detailed B.103 brochure, putting forward the standard B.103 as before plus the B.103A, a developed version. The B.103 was destined to satisfy Naval Air Staff Target No. 39, abbreviated as NA.39, which was also the designation the aircraft was widely known by. The NA.39 was a carrier-borne naval strike aircraft primarily designed to deliver a nuclear weapon against a Soviet warship at sea or in inshore waters, or perhaps against a well-defined shore target. It had to be tough and it had to be capable of penetrating the formidable defences of a Soviet warship group. It was no wonder Blackburn thought it a good fit for the RAF’s requirement for a tactical bomber.

For the standard B.103 the normal takeoff weight would be 40,000lb (18,000kg), though an overload condition with two externally carried 300gal (1,365L) fuel tanks, full internal fuel and a Target Marker Bomb would bring it up to 45,000lb (20,000kg). The NA.39 had originally been intended to carry a pair of underwing missiles fitted with the Red Beard warhead, missiles named Green Cheese. Never let it be said that nuclear war is an entirely humourless business!

Leading Particulars: Blackburn B.103

Length

61.5ft (18.75m) (51ft (15.5m) folded)

Height

16ft (4.87m) (17ft (5.18m) with wings folded)

Wing span

42.5ft (12.95m) (20ft (6.09m) folded)

Wing area

500sq ft (46.45sq m)

Wing aspect ratio

3.58

Tailplane span

14.2ft (4.33m)

Tailplane area

75sq ft (6.97sq m)

Tailplane aspect ratio

2.7

Engines

2 × 7,000lb (32,000kg) s.t. Gyron Junior PS43

Max speed

640kt (740mph; 1,185km/h) at sea level, Mach 0.98 at 30,000ft (9,000m)

Empty weight

22,290lb (10,115kg)

Max AUW

46,000lb (20,865kg)

Blackburn B.103 production components. The design was broken down into components small enough to be readily transportable by road between the company’s Brough and Dumbarton works or those of subcontractors. Most of the aircraft was to be of conventional construction, just the wings and tail surfaces being milled from solid alloy billets with integral stiffeners.BAE Systems

With a full load of fuel and the means to mark a target to bits, the NA.39’s combat radius would be 650 miles (1,050km) (or 725 miles (1,170km) if 400gal (1,820L) external tanks were fitted). The aircraft was basically subsonic, able to cruise at Mach 0.85 with bursts at Mach 0.94, and to just nudge past Mach 1.05 in a dive. Take-off performance on a normal runway rather than an aircraft carrier would be in the order of 1,650yd (1,500m) under standard atmospheric conditions, boundary layer control by blowing forming an essential part of the aircraft’s take-off and landing performance. It is noteworthy that this performance, apart from the inability to carry out a supersonic fighter evasion sprint or tool along at high altitude, waiting to be blown apart by a missile, pretty much met all of the needs of the first OR drawn up for a Canberra successor.

A crew of two operated the aircraft, which had a Blue Parrot search and ranging radar capable of picking up discrete targets such as ships at sea or large buildings on the shore and a Yellow Lemon Doppler navigation system. The accuracy of this system was not good enough on its own, and visual references and map reading would be an essential adjunct to the Doppler. Thus attacking a target at night or in poor weather would be a difficult, if not impossible, task. An internal bomb bay with a rotating door could accommodate the Target Marker Bomb or four 1,000lb HE bombs, with additional capacity under the wings for further bombs or rockets (though the latter would result in considerable reductions in range). The aircraft would be capable of a reconnaissance role by carrying a battery of five F.95 cameras facing in various directions and having various focal lengths, or a single FX.100 night camera with 200 flash cartridges. Blackburn was predicting a Controller (Aircraft) (CA) release date of 1960 for the NA.39, and expected to be able to begin deliveries to the RAF in 1961. The cost per aircraft would be £0.5 million, and no additional research and development would be necessary as it was already well under way for the RN.

The B.103A was to be a de-navalized version more suited to RAF needs. Wing folding would be deleted, providing an unbroken wing with more room for internal fuel. An extension to the fuselage behind the cockpit would accommodate extra fuel, and the existing rear-fuselage tanks would be enlarged to balance things out (this extension was later incorporated into the standard NA.39). An improved Gyron Junior engine with 10 per cent more static thrust would be fitted. All of these changes gave the aircraft a 300gal (1,365L) increase in internal fuel, bringing take-off weight up to 48,000lb (20,000kg) and combat radius to 850 miles (1,370km), with the ability to carry all the weapons and reconnaissance kit that the standard B.103 could do, with the addition of a pair of F.96 cameras and eight 8in photo flashes. The all-important take-off run would unfortunately be extended by 50yd (46m) to 1,700yd (1,550m). The additional research and development (R&D) necessary for this version was expected to cost in the order of £5.5 million (including five development batch aircraft at £0.75 million each) and require an additional two years of design effort (to be run in parallel with existing B.103 work, hopefully putting deliveries no later than 1961/1962).

Needless to say, a minor variation to an aircraft the RAF had not wanted two years previously did not go down too well, of which more shortly.

De Havilland Aircraft Company Developed Sea Vixen

De Havilland’s existing Sea Vixen was entirely unsuitable, with a ridiculously inadequate 175-mile (280km) combat radius at low level and an expected short fatigue life in these conditions. It was, after all, designed to be a medium- to high-level interceptor, and had relatively low wing loading. However, de Havilland submitted a proposal for a development of the Sea Vixen, termed a ‘Tactical Bomber and Photographic Reconnaissance Aircraft’, suitable for both carrier- and land-based operations. Compared with the Sea Vixen this version would have a 6.75ft (2.05m) nose extension (making room for an additional 850gal (3860L) of fuel), a repositioned nose fold (so it could still fit within existing carrier deck lifts), permanent wingtip tanks (with slightly shorter wings so that the overall span remained identical), additional fuel tanks within the wing near the tips, and increased capacity for the existing outboard wing tanks. Measures to improve take-off and landing performance consisted of extra droop on the wing leading edge inboard of the existing wing fence, flap blowing, a larger elevator, a Spectre rocket for take-off assistance and a braking parachute for landing. To deal with the low-level role the structure would be beefed up, using different materials and thicknesses where appropriate (and entailing a complete redesign of the centre fuselage), the navigator/observer would be given a larger window to aid visual navigation, and sprung supports would be introduced for crew seats and instruments. The existing Rolls-Royce RA24 Avon engines could be replaced by the RB133, then under development for the Canberra PR.9, but equally could be left alone. Take-off weight would be 60,000lb (27,000kg) (compared with 40,000lb (18,000kg) for the standard Sea Vixen), with a combat radius of the full 1,000 miles (1,600km) required by GOR.339 if a pair of 250gal (1,140L) drop tanks were carried. Like the B.103, the aircraft would be subsonic at low level, cruising at Mach 0.85 with dashes at Mach 0.95. Above 14,000ft (4,250m), however, it could manage Mach 1.2. The take-off distance would be 1,050yd (960m) with rocket assistance or 1,400yd (1,280m) without, increasing to 1,700yd (1,550m) if the existing RA24 engines were retained. De Havilland expected a fatigue life of up to 1,000 operational hours, more than that of Blackburn’s B.103 or B.103A.

A general-arrangement drawing of the de Havilland DH110 Sea Vixen development of March 1957.Damien Burke

As with the B.103, the two-man crew would be retained, but navigation equipment was improved with Decca, a Ground Position Indicator (GPI, a basic moving map) and Doppler. Beyond Decca ground station range, accuracy would be as limited as that of the B.103. Limited fuselage space allowed only a shallow bomb bay, so a Target Marker Bomb would be only semi-recessed in the belly with around half of the weapon exposed to the airstream, introducing possible thermal issues at high speed and safety issues during take-off and landing (the Vickers-Supermarine Scimitar would be subject to a ban on carrier landing with a Red Beard under the wing because of similarly restricted ground clearance). The small bay could, however, fully accommodate a pair of 1,000lb HE bombs, and two more could be carried on the wing pylons (though with reduced full fuel load). Alternatives included up to ninety-six 2in rockets underwing or twenty-four OR.1099 rockets. In the reconnaissance role the aircraft was to be fitted with a permanent forward-facing F.95 camera in the nose (the airborne interception (AI) radar would not be fitted), with an optional fit of a pair of either F.95 oblique cameras, F.96 day cameras with 24in lenses or F.97 night cameras with 400 photo-flash cartridges.

Leading Particulars: Developed Sea Vixen

Length

59.5ft (18.14m)

Height

11.5ft (3.5m)

Wing span

50ft (15.24m) (including tanks)

Wing area

611sq ft (56.76sq m)

Wing aspect ratio

4.1

Engines

2 × 13,880lb (6,300kg) RB.133

Max speed

Mach 1.2 @ 25,000ft (7,600m)

Empty weight

Not stated

Max AUW

62,080lb (28,180kg)

This photo of a Sea Vixen FAW.1 carrying a Red Beard ‘shape’ gives some idea of the challenges of carrying a bomb of this size on a relatively small strike aircraft.BAE Systems

Work on the existing Sea Vixen was well under way and aiming at CA release by the end of 1958. De Havilland had already started work on a mock-up of the developed version, and claimed it would be able to get it into service by 1960 at a cost of £0.5 million per aircraft, with R&D costs of around £5.5 million (including five development batch aircraft). This was a particularly attractive concept, as the RN could also operate the uprated version, though it would need to keep maximum weights down by launching aircraft with a restricted fuel load, flight-refuelling them once airborne. However de Havilland’s estimates were so optimistic that they raised eyebrows even among a normally sceptical RAF, something no doubt not helped by the RAF knowing of the protracted development period the Sea Vixen had already suffered, albeit due in part to the RAF’s own indecision when choosing between the Javelin and DH110 for their own interceptor needs.

English Electric P.18

English Electric’s P.18 was a minimal modification of its existing P.1B (and internally was described as ‘P.1 LABS version’), given extra fuel capacity (in tip tanks, roughly pencilled in on the only relevant drawing found to date) and carrying a single Target Marker Bomb semi-recessed in the ventral tank. Each tip tank held 100gal (450L) of fuel, extending the basic aircraft’s pitiful combat radius. To try and eke out the aircraft’s endurance, operation of the P.18 would be rather different from its fighter brethren, and take-off and climb would both be performed without the use of reheat and speed limited to Mach 0.9 with the tip tanks still attached. Once these were empty and jettisoned, speed could rise, but only to Mach 1.3. With the aircraft at an all-up weight (AUW) of 37,500lb (17,000kg) its take-off roll would be a whopping 2,000yd (18,290m). Assuming an entirely low-level and subsonic sortie at Mach 0.9, this would result in a combat radius of a mere 190nm (220 miles; 350km), so it was no wonder that English Electric wasted no further time on this idea. It was not seriously considered by the Air Staff either.

Vickers-Armstrongs Aircraft Developed Scimitar

The RAF must have felt under siege, with the third design submitted being a development of yet another naval type, the N.113 Scimitar. In terms of GOR.339 the standard Scimitar would have been pretty useless owing to a miserly 200nm (230-mile; 370km) combat radius when loaded up with full internal fuel, two 150gal (680L) and one 200gal (910L) wing drop tanks and a single Target Marker Bomb under the port wing.

Vickers, however, had been working on an improved version of the Scimitar for the RN even before the type entered service, and had put together a brochure entitled N.113 Developments, covering three major variations. The first was the Type 562, much like the existing Scimitar F.1 but with a new pointed nose radome containing an AI.23 search radar and huge 500gal (2,270L) slipper tanks under the outer wings. The second was the Type 564, similar to the 562 in most ways, but with Blue Parrot radar and Gyron Junior engines instead of RA.24s. The third was the Type 567, a two-seat version of the 564 with side-by-side seating (to keep the length the same and stay within carrier deck lift limits), with optional extra weapons pylons under the wings near the fuselage (thus retaining four pylons for stores use when the slipper tanks were fitted).

Leading Particulars: Vickers Type 565

Length

62.2ft (18.96m)

Height

15.75ft (4.8m)

Wing span

37.2ft (11.34m)

Wing area

485sq ft (45.06sq m)

Wing aspect ratio

2.84

Engines

2 × RA24 Avon

Max speed

Mach 0.98

Empty weight

Not stated

Max AUW

49,600lb (22,500kg)

A general-arrangement drawing of the Vickers-Armstrongs N.113 Scimitar development of March 1957.Damien Burke

While these had all been aimed at the RN, Vickers could see the possibilities in offering such an aircraft to the RAF, so in parallel it had produced another brochure, entitled N.113 Development, Tactical Bomber for the Royal Air Force. This described a subtly different development, the Type 565, another two-seat aircraft powered by RA.24 Avons and with the large 500gal (2,270L) slipper tanks and extra pylons. The Scimitar’s four cannon would be deleted to make room for extra internal fuel. The canopy was initially sketched as being smoothly curved, unlike the ‘double bubble’ of the slightly later Type 567, but later drawings of the 565 incorporated the 567’s canopy. For navigation, target identification and attack there would be a moving-map addition to the existing Doppler, a search radar based on the AI.23 being used on the English Electric P.1 and, perhaps most radically, a partly automatic flight control system that could fly the aircraft through an atomic attack release manoeuvre (the Low Altitude Bombing System – LABS). Adding a navigator/ observer greatly relieved the pilot’s workload, and was considered essential by the RAF in any case. As with the B.103 and DH110, however, final attack was going to be primarily based on a visual search within the vicinity of the target.

Up to 2,000lb (900kg) of weight was saved compared with the 567 by deleting the naval equipment such as folding wings and arrester hook, which gave improved performance all round. Take-off weight would be 48,500lb (22,000kg), with a combat radius of up to 740nm (850 miles; 1,370km) (high-altitude sortie, descending only to attack). Combat radius for a low-level sortie would be between 430 and 560nm (495 miles/795km and 645 miles/ 1,040km), depending on speed (the higher figure being for a sortie with much of the cruise carried out at 300kt (345mph; 555km/h) with one engine shut down to save on fuel). Cruising speed would be Mach 0.83, with dashes at Mach 0.93. The take-off distance would be within 1,500yd (1,370m) with rocket assistance, or 1,940yd (1,775m) without.

No specifics on fatigue life were mentioned, as tests were still under way on the existing Scimitar. However, it was built to be a tough beast, and the developed version would no doubt have held up well too. Weapons carriage was basically similar to that of the existing Scimitar, which suffered from the handicap of not having room for a weapons bay of any kind. Thus the wing pylons were the only possible place to put weapons, bringing associated heating and drag problems.

Vickers believed it could get the Type 565 into the air in 1959 and into service by mid-1961, at which time production of the Scimitar F.1 would be ending. Alternatively, the naval features could be retained, cutting back on development time and getting the aircraft into service nine months sooner at a cost of higher weight and reduced performance (8 per cent reduction in combat radius, 50yd (45m) added to take-off distance). Total R&D costs were expected to be £4 million (including £2 million for five development batch aircraft).

Take-off performance fully loaded was a concern, so Vickers took another look at the design. De-navalization and the new nose had moved the centre of gravity (c.g.) forward, and large external stores also tended to lower the c.g. Raising the nose for take-off would therefore take longer, and various means were looked at to improve the situation. These included redistributing weight within the airframe, moving the main undercarriage forward, increasing tailplane size, adding a tailplane flap or even adding an auxiliary system to raise the nose during the take-off roll. Reducing the aircraft’s unstick speed was also necessary, and to this end more options were considered, such as tilting the jet pipes downward a further 10 degrees, high-lift devices on the wing, and drooped ailerons with blowing. However, the only serious improvement would be achieved using rocket assistance, so provision was made for a ventrally slung rocket for assisted take-off (initially two Super Sprites but later a single Spectre), the rocket pack being jettisoned and recovered by parachute after use.

A second set of figures was produced for an improved Type 567. This would use integral fuel tanks instead of bag tanks (giving an extra 200gal (910L) of fuel) plus improved RA.24 Avons with 6 per cent better fuel economy and lighter weight. Take-off weight would now be 48,570lb (22,045kg) with a combat radius of up to 950nm (1,090 miles; 1,760km) for the high-altitude sortie and up to 670nm (770 miles; 1,240km) at low level. The take-off distance was much the same, but the actual ground roll was now reduced to as little as 1,070yd (980m) with rocket assistance.

Perhaps the most interesting of the whole slew of developed N.113 proposals was specification No. 566, for an integrated flight control system. Supermarine’s work on future aircraft had led it to the firm belief that rising complexity and speeds meant there was a need for a fully integrated flying control system encompassing autopilot, autostabilizer and power controls, with electrical signalling holding it all together. Sperry had created a system that handled much of this requirement, and which would be ideal for installation in an N.113 airframe as it allowed existing mechanical control runs to coexist with the integrated system. Unlike existing simple altitude/heading holding autopilots, this system would effectively have been able to fly complete manoeuvres had it been developed further. In ‘Direct’ mode it would act as an orthodox powered control system using existing mechanical linkages; in ‘Autostablizer’ mode it would use electrical signalling, and control surface movements would be subject to small adjustments superimposed on the pilot’s demands. Finally, in ‘Little Stick’ mode, the aircraft would be controlled by a small side-stick (rather like the General Dynamics F-16, only some years in advance), which would translate pilot demands into co-ordinated use of the control surfaces, the pilot never needing to move the rudder bar unless he wanted to introduce slip deliberately into a manoeuvre. Fully automatic instrument landing system (ILS) approaches could be flown on the system, and the intention was to develop it so that it could fly complex manoeuvres such as programmed climbs, steady turns to a preselected radius, automatic attacks coupled to the radar and a complete LABS attack.

Hawker P.1121

Hawker’s proposal was contained in a brochure entitled P.1121 Air Superiority Strike Aircraft, and referred to an aircraft already unsuccessfully submitted for OR.329. Hawker believed strongly enough in this aircraft to have continued its development using the company’s own money, even when it failed to win the tender for OR.329, and claimed that it could easily become a multi-role strike aircraft. As both the Saunders-Roe and Fairey designs to OR.329 had been briefly considered for the light strike role, Hawker certainly deserved to give it a go as well.

The P.1121 was an attractive swept-wing, single-seat multi-role aircraft, and a prototype was under construction, powered by a single reheated de Havilland Gyron engine fed through a chin-mounted intake. Either the Rolls-Royce Conway or Bristol Olympus would have been more suited to the strike role. Hawker was confident that the airframe could be developed into a variety of versions, one of which was a two-seat tactical bomber carrying Doppler, sideways-looking radar (SLR) in underwing pods and forward-looking radar. Relocation of the existing fuselage-mounted tricycle undercarriage to wing nacelles to allow space in the fuselage for extra fuel or bombs was possible. The brochure, however, concentrated on the single-seat P.1121 already under development. Navigation capabilities would be as limited as those of the single-seat Scimitar, with equal pilot workload problems.

Leading Particulars: P.1121

Length

66.5ft (20.27m)

Height

15.33ft (4.67m)

Wing span

37ft (11.28m)

Wing area

474sq ft (44.03sq m)

Wing aspect ratio

2.89

Wing anhedral

2 degrees

Tailplane span

19.25ft (5.87m)

Tailplane area

115sq ft (10.68sq m)

Tailplane aspect ratio

3.23

Tailplane dihedral

10 degrees

Engines

2 × 15,800lb R-R Conway 11R (25,700lb (11,665kg) in reheat)

Max speed

Mach 1.15 at sea level, Mach 2.3 at 36,000ft(11,000m)

Empty weight

27,365lb (12,420kg)

Max all up weight

49,690lb (22,550kg)

Carrying 1,500gal (6,800L) of internal fuel, a 2,000lb ‘Tactical Strike Weapon’ on a pylon under the port wing (balanced, as on the Scimitar, by a drop tank under the starboard wing), up to 600gal (2,700L) of fuel in underwing drop tanks, two nose-mounted cameras, and a pair of retractable rocket packs either side of the fuselage behind the cockpit housing twenty-five 2in rockets each (alternatively, four 30mm cannon in a pack), the Conway-powered P.1121 would have a normal AUW of 43,700lb (19,800kg), rising to 48,200lb (21,900kg) with full weapon load and extra drop tanks. Cruising speed would be Mach 0.85 at altitude and Mach 0.72 at low level with a burst of up to Mach 0.9, all in dry power. With reheat, low-level speed could be Mach 1.05, with an impressive Mach 2.1 at 36,000ft (11,000m). Take-off distance was not so impressive, at 1,950yd (1,780m), and hi-lo combat radius in strike configuration was up to 675nm (775 miles; 1,250km). In reconnaissance fit at high level and high speed, combat radius was reduced to 430nm (500 miles; 800km). With two 300gal (1,360L) and two 150gal (680L) drop tanks, one-way ferry range would be 2,170nm (2,500 miles; 4,000km).

With the Olympus 21R instead of the Conway the aircraft would be 140lb (65kg) lighter overall, capable of up to Mach 2.65 at 36,000ft (11,000m). The maximum combat radius would increase to 800nm (920 miles; 1,480km) and take-off distance would be reduced to 1,790yd (1,640m).

A general-arrangement drawing of the Hawker P.1121 of March 1957.Damien Burke

Hawker predicted production beginning in 1960, with an in-service date of mid-1961 and an R&D cost of £9 million, which included eight development batch aircraft.

Arguments against the early proposals

The RAF was altogether less than impressed with all of these aircraft, believing they had been foisted upon it under the guise of ‘making do’ in the grand British tradition of muddling through with whatever was on hand. Contrary to the various companies’ promises that these developed types could all be brought into service far faster than a new aircraft, and for much less money, enabling development of a more capable aircraft at a more leisurely pace, the RAF believed it would be stuck with these interim types if it accepted any of them, and never get what it really wanted. The RAF’s own updated predictions for a completely new aircraft that did everything it wanted was for an R&D cost of £15 million and an in-service date of 1964. To save perhaps two or three years off that target and a half to two-thirds of the cost (if the manufacturers’ estimates were at all believable), while ending up with an aircraft that simply did not do the job, was not an attractive option. What the RAF did not consider for even one moment was that it could be as woefully optimistic in its estimates as it believed the manufacturers were with theirs.

The major arguments against all four interim aircraft developments comprised a simple numbers game. Only the developed Sea Vixen met the GOR.339 requirement of a 1,000-mile (1,600km) radius of action, a figure the RAF claimed was based on various regional pacts and treaty obligations rather than being ‘plucked from thin air’, as some would later have it. Fixed targets could not be moved closer to existing bases just because your bombers were unable to go that far (the RN, of course, could often move a carrier closer to a target to begin with). Take-off and landing distances were generally unsatisfactory except with rocket assistance for take-off, but the two biggest problems were being able to find the target, and to survive while doing so. Finding a target to a high degree of accuracy was the key to attacking it successfully, and none of the naval proposals gave the RAF any confidence that the respective aircraft could reliably manage this. The RN had the luxury of mostly dealing with well-defined targets that showed up well on radar: ships at sea, or coastal installations. The RAF had no such luck, and ground clutter reduced the existing radars of these aircraft to little more than ranging radars. A new and much more sophisticated radar would be necessary at the very least. However, even if that problem was ignored, the fact that most of the aircraft were subsonic doomed them all.