US Marine Corps Handbook 1941-45 E-Book

Lieutenant Colonel George Forty OBE

• Herausgeber: The History Press
• Kategorie: Fachliteratur
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 392

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2006

Beschreibung

Employing a range of archive black and white photographs, this book examines the US Marine Corps' organisation and command structure, strategy, tactics and amphibious assault doctrine. Providing biographies of its most influential figures, it also surveys insignia, uniforms and equipment to provide a portrait of the US Marine Corps at war.

Leseprobe

USMARINECORPS

Handbook

1941–5

GEORGE FORTY

First published in 2013

The History Press

The Mill, Brimscombe Port

Stroud, Gloucestershire, GL5 2QG

www.thehistorypress.co.uk

This ebook edition first published in 2013

All rights reserved

© George Forty, 2006, 2013

The right of George Forty to be identified as the Author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyrights, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

This ebook is copyright material and must not be copied, reproduced, transferred, distributed, leased, licensed or publicly performed or used in any way except as specifically permitted in writing by the publishers, as allowed under the terms and conditions under which it was purchased or as strictly permitted by applicable copyright law. Any unauthorised distribution or use of this text may be a direct infringement of the author’s and publisher’s rights, and those responsible may be liable in law accordingly.

EPUB ISBN 978 0 7524 9585 9

Original typesetting by The History Press

CONTENTS

Introduction and Acknowledgements

  1       Landing Operations

  2       Marine Corps Static Organisations

  3       Marine Corps Mobile Organisations

  4       The Marine Division

  5       Marine Defense Battalions, Anti-aircraft/Artillery Units and Barrage Balloon Squadrons

  6       The Marine: Insignia, Clothing and Personal Equipment

  7       Weapons, Vehicles and Equipment

  8       Landing Ships, Landing Craft and Amtracs

  9       Marine Raiders, Paratroopers and the Glider Group

10       Marine Aviation

11       USMC Women’s Reserve

12       The Divisions at War

13       Some Famous Marines

Appendix I

Chronology of the War in the Far East and Pacific Theatre

Appendix II

Abbreviations and Acronyms

Appendix III

The Phonetic Alphabet

Appendix IV

Some Examples of Nicknames

Appendix V

Some Examples of Operational Codewords for Assaults on Islands

Bibliography and Sources

INTRODUCTION AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

When the Second World War began, the United States Marine Corps numbered just under 66,000 officers and men (65,881 to be exact). Of these only 19,432 were on active duty, the rest were reservists. However, by the early summer of 1941, this figure had risen steadily with an ever-increasing number of eager new volunteers joining the Corps, while from 1943 onwards conscripts were inducted into a Corps that had previously been composed solely of volunteers. However, such was the ‘gung-ho’ (Chinese for ‘Work together’) spirit of the Marine Corps that some 154,000 of these conscripts rapidly became regular Marines or active Marine reservists. By the end of the war there were over 485,000 men and women in the Corps, the vast majority of whom were serving overseas. This sevenfold increase is of course dwarfed by the massive expansions which took place within the US Army and Navy. However, what makes it so special is the very high proportion of these ‘leathernecks’ (nicknamed after the high, stiff leather collars on their original eighteenth-century uniforms) who actually took part in combat of the bloodiest kind. During the Second World War, the Corps suffered nearly 87,000 casualties, of which just under 20,000 were killed or missing in action, this figure representing a large percentage of the United States’ wartime battle casualty figures and a massive 36 per cent of the total of American soldiers and Marines killed or missing in the Pacific theatre.

The US Marine Corps has always possessed that indefinable aura that invariably surrounds such an elite fighting force, especially one that has taken part in so many battles – namely every conflict in which the USA has been involved since the Marine Corps was first formed in 1775. At the beginning of the twentieth century for example, there were Marines in China during the Boxer Rebellion both as part of the besieged legation garrison in Peking and in the relief force sent to break the siege. They were employed as infantry on the Western Front during the First World War, the Marine Brigade earning glory wherever it fought. After the First World War, they were involved in the Caribbean and in South and Central America – Panama, Cuba, Nicaragua, Haiti and the Dominican Republic – and also in the Philippines; the list is endless. Since the Second World War they have played a major role in Korea, Vietnam, Grenada, the Gulf War and now Iraq. So their fighting prowess is well known; however, much of their wartime organisation, weapons and equipment remains something of a mystery to those outside the Corps, or is assumed to be identical to that of the US Army. They have certainly always intrigued me, which is why, when Sutton Publishing invited me to write a companion volume to the one I completed some years ago for them on the US Army, I jumped at the chance; and this is the result.

It is definitely not a detailed history of the USMC in the Second World War, although I have included a short account of the Marine divisions’ individual wartime combat records in the Pacific theatre in one of the chapters. Neither is it a complete history of the USMC since its formation. Rather, it is offered as a ‘nuts and bolts’ pamphlet, hopefully describing in some detail what made the USMC ‘tick’ during the Second World War, so it includes such mundane, but important, details as organisation tables, descriptions of weapons, vehicles and equipment, etc., and of course, most importantly, the ships of all kinds that took them to war. I sincerely hope that readers will find it both interesting and of value, and above all, that I haven’t made too many errors. Of course I would have been completely unable to attempt such a task without the continuing expert help I have received from the USMC Chief Historian, Maj Charles D. Melson, to whom I owe an enormous debt of gratitude. The same applies to the renowned American historian Gordon L. Rottman, whose US Marine Corps World War II Order of Battle must be the most comprehensive treatise on the USMC ever written. His kindness in allowing me to quote from it is very much appreciated. The breadth and depth of his knowledge of the USMC is apparent from the range of his other relevant publications, such as those in the various Osprey series – Elite, Warrior, Battle Orders and Campaigns.

Of course, there are other British writers who have also kindly assisted me, who have written excellent books on specific aspects of the US Marine Corps, for example Jim Moran, who is an undoubted expert as far as USMC uniform and equipment are concerned, and Derrick Wright, who has written countless books on the battles that the Marine Corps fought during their ‘island hopping’ campaigns, such as his latest, Pacific Victory. I must thank both of them for their kindness, help and support, and also for the loan of numerous photographs. The Bibliography lists the books I have studied, but in particular, I must mention the series of pamphlets entitled ‘World War II Commemorative Series’ produced by the History and Museums Division at the Marine Corps Historical Center, in Washington, DC, which covers most aspects of their wartime service. Some of the photographs in this book come from their pages and I am most grateful for their permission to use them, as I am for the other USMC, USN and National Archive photographs that I have used. Sources are listed, but include Real War Photos of Indiana, Do You Graphics, USA, and Compendium Publishing of London. I have made every effort to contact the owners of images included here, and apologise if I have overlooked anybody.

The main US Marine Corps role in the Second World War was in the Pacific theatre. True, they still maintained such peacetime tasks as providing legation guards in important places like London; they also provided (for a while anyway) part of the garrison in Iceland, and found a token landing force for D-Day in northwest Europe. However, they were mainly to be found in the Pacific theatre, which stretched from Pearl Harbor to Okinawa, from the Solomons to Iwo Jima, a vast area into which, as one historian succinctly put it, ‘you could drop the entire African–European theatre and hardly notice it’. They were in many ways isolated from the rest of the war, suffering, as did the British Fourteenth Army in Burma, from being forgotten by the general public at home for long periods of time. While Eisenhower’s armies were receiving rapturous welcomes all over Europe, all that greeted the Marines were Japanese ‘banzai’ charges, cowed natives, jungles full of poisonous insects and the most awful tropical diseases from malaria upwards. And the fighting went on for longer too – ‘All in all . . . a grim, lonely war . . . a war that seemed to have no end.’

Because their main role was in the Pacific, I have chosen to start the book with a brief description of ‘Landing Operations’, beginning with a short amount of pre-war history, a period that produced the ‘Tentative Manual for Landing Operations’ that was the basis of the tactics employed in their endless beach landings. This opening chapter also includes an example of an amphibious landing (on Iwo Jima) during which the various elements of the landing force can be seen to play their essential roles.

As an ex-professional soldier, one can only bow in admiration at the continued bravery and courage that the individual Marines from general down to ‘grunt’ displayed throughout the long and difficult days that must never have seemed to have any end in sight. Theirs was a hard and bloody war, fought in the most difficult conditions and against a suicidally brave and implacable enemy. Gen George S. Patton once remarked that ‘in Landing Operations retreat is impossible’, so there was only one direction for the Marines to go and that was forwards against the enemy, whatever the cost.

Adm Chester Nimitz probably encapsulated the feelings of all in the last sentence of the victory communiqué that he issued on 17 March 1945 when Iwo Jima had fallen, in which he said, ‘Among the Americans who served on Iwo Jima, uncommon valor was a common virtue.’ Undoubtedly this is what had been displayed by the USMC from the very first bullet of the very first battle of the war they fought so bravely and so well in the Pacific theatre during the Second World War.

George Forty

Bryantspuddle, Dorset

April 2006

THE MARINES’ HYMN

From the Halls of Montezuma,

To the shores of Tripoli;

We fight our country’s battles

In the air, on land, and sea;

First to fight for right and freedom

And to keep our honor clean;

We are proud to claim the title of

United States Marine.

Our flag’s unfurled to every breeze

From dawn to setting sun;

We have fought in every clime and place

Where we could take a gun;

In the snows of far off northern lands

And in sunny tropic scenes;

You will find us always on the job –

The United States Marines.

Here’s a health to you and to our Corps

Which we are proud to serve;

In many a strife we’ve fought for life

And never lost our nerve;

If the Army and the Navy

Ever look on Heaven’s scenes;

They will find the streets are guarded by

United States Marines.

CHAPTER ONE

LANDING OPERATIONS

A SMALL BEGINNING

According to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, the United States Marine Corps (USMC) is a separate military service within the US Department of the Navy, and is charged with the provision of Marine troops for the seizure and defense of advanced bases and with the conducting of operations on land and in the air, coincident with naval campaigns. The Corps is also responsible for the provision of detachments for service aboard certain types of naval vessels and for the provision of security forces to protect US Navy shore installations and US diplo-matic missions in foreign countries. They also specialise in amphibious operations, such as those they undertook against Japanese-held islands in the Pacific during the Second World War.

It was on 10 November 1775 that the Marine Committee of the Continental Congress held a meeting in the Tun Tavern, on King Street, Philadelphia, at which they passed a resolution that a force of Marines was to be formed for duties as landing forces for the American fleet: ‘that two Battalions of Marines be raised consisting of one Colonel, two Lieutenant Colonels, two Majors & Officers as usual in other regiments, that they consist of an equal number of privates with other battalions . . . and are good seamen, or so acquainted with maritime affairs to be able to serve to advantage by sea, when required’.

From this small beginning evolved the present-day multi-functional organisation that combines skilled ground, sea and air combat units which have fought all over the world, as their famous ‘Hymn’ explains. This is not the place to go into detail about the early years of Marine history, when the Corps was developing, nor the period up to and including the First World War, when the Corps was evolving into an expeditionary force and winning glory, not only against the sophisticated German army in Europe, but also in the many ‘brush fire/banana republic’ wars that followed the end of the ‘war to end all wars’. However, we do need to look at the interwar period, between 1919 and 1941, during which the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) came into being, as did the new, innovative tactics for amphibious landing operations that were evolved at the same time and that would, during the Second World War, become the primary reason for their very existence. In doing so they moved away from the traditional functions that they had espoused in the past, such as ship guards and landing parties. As Chester G. Hearn rightly says in his Illustrated Directory of the United States Marine Corps, ‘Without this action, there would have been no Marine Corps in 1942 to lead the fighting in the South and Central Pacific and no amphibian vehicles to breach the enemy defenses.’ Having laid the foundations during this run-up to the ‘Day of Infamy’, they went on to prove themselves masters of their craft in the Pacific theatre against a ferocious and implacable enemy, their other roles – and there were still quite a few of those – assuming a lesser importance as they proved their courage and ability time and time again, ‘island hopping’ across the Pacific ever closer to the heartland of Japan.

PLAN ORANGE

Before the First World War, American operational military plans for dealing with their potential enemies were known by a series of colours. The one involving the most likely enemy in the Pacific area was entitled ‘Orange’; hence codeword ‘Orange’ became synonymous with Japan, as did the plan to deal with war with that country. The ‘Orange Plan’ had to be constantly revised in order to keep pace with the ever-changing international situation, at no time more relevant than when, after the First World War, Japan was given control of the former German possessions in the Carolines, Marshalls and Marianas under a League of Nations mandate. This made the Philippines ever more vulnerable to attack by the Japanese.

The interwar years were a period in which many new ideas about how future wars would be conducted were endlessly discussed. The Germans, for example, enthusiastically supported the revolutionary tactics of armoured warfare that were being expounded by British military ‘gurus’ such as J.F.C. Fuller and Basil Liddell Hart. However, they did more than just discuss them, but rather fully embraced such teachings, with their own armoured expert, Gen Heinz Guderian, using them as the basis of his new form of warfare, which he called ‘Blitzkrieg’. In the USA, the Office of Naval Intelligence was studying what would happen if ‘Orange’ became a reality. Clearly US forces would have to fight their way across the Pacific before they could relieve the Philippines, and the USMC, among others, was directed to help in the study. MajGen John A. Lejeune, the then Marine Commandant, assigned Maj (later Lt Col) Earl H. Ellis, the brilliant former adjutant of 4th Brigade, which had fought so well in France, to study the problems of the current Plan Orange. The result was a paper entitled ‘Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia’ that he wrote in 1921, which, having been given Lejeune’s blessing, became the basis of ‘Operational Plan 712D’ that was the USMC contribution to the Orange Plan. Ellis had concentrated upon just one segment of possible war against Orange, namely the seizure of an advanced base for use by the Navy as a coaling and repair station. The place he had in mind was in the Marshall Islands and he even outlined the tactics to be used against such islands in the group as Eniwetok (on which the Marines would land in February 1944). His proposals were of course limited by the equipment then available, but he still made a number of sensible recommendations – for example, the need for troops fighting on shore to have naval gunfire available ‘on call’.

In his dissertation, Ellis had argued that the success of an opposed landing depended upon speedy ship-to-shore movement by waves of assault craft that would be pro-tected by overwhelming gunfire and aerial attacks: ‘The landing will entirely succeed or fail practically on the beach,’ wrote Ellis. Preceded by a naval version of the First World War ‘box barrage’, the assaulting troops would require not only infantry but also machine-gun units, artillery, engineers and light tanks to help them to penetrate beach obstacles and overcome beach defenses. These units would all require special landing craft and armoured vehicles armed with machine guns and light cannon. Unlike other contemporary planners, Ellis stressed that the landings should occur in daylight, so as to avoid confusion among landing craft and assault forces. Close-in naval gunfire would help to neutralise the defenders. Ellis also averred most strongly that, because an amphibious assault depended on detailed planning, continual peacetime training was necessary, together with careful tactical and logistical organisation ‘along Marine lines. It is not enough that the troops be skilled infantrymen or artillerymen of high morale; they must be skilled watermen and skilled junglemen who know it can be done – Marines with Marine training.’ Ellis subsequently went on a clandestine recce of the islands; with Gen Lejeune’s approval, he took extended leave in May 1921 to visit the Marshall Islands and the Caroline Islands, posing as an American businessman. He died somewhere in the Palau island group in May 1923 in mysterious circumstances. To quote Millett: ‘His disappearance made him a martyr in the eyes of Second World War Marines and gave his studies the heroic glow of prophecy.’ Later, Operational Plan 712D was accepted in its entirety and would be used thereafter, to guide war planning, field exercises, equipment development and officer education.

Part of the Marine Corps plan was to provide two expeditionary forces – one located on the west coast and one on the east, both of some 6,000–8,000 men, ready at forty-eight hours’ notice to embark, the former for a campaign in the Pacific, for example against the Marshalls and Carolines, the latter for any Atlantic or Caribbean emergencies. These forces would be independent of other commitments.

Unfortunately, although there was general interest expressed in planning and preparing for future amphibious operations, most of the ‘powers that be’ and even some influential officers within the Corps itself, resisted these new proposals, while stressing that the provision of security detachments both at home and abroad, and of providing ships’ guards and occupation forces as and when necessary, still took a higher priority than preparing for a war that might never come. As Alan Millett comments, ‘War Plan Orange might represent a new concept for the Marine Corps, but it remained to be seen whether the Corps would respond to the amphibious assault role.’

Nevertheless, by the mid-1920s, a certain amount of instruction on amphibious operations, both theoretical and practical, was included in the curriculum at the Marine Corps Schools (MCS) and it was soon clear that there was much to learn. Initial exercises, held in 1924, proved to be a fiasco; for example, landing boats did not reach the beach at the correct time, the unloading of supplies was chaotic and naval bombardment was totally inadequate. Further exercises were held the following year and while there was considerable improvement, there was still a lot to be done; for example, the need for better boats, better communications and more training in debarking were seen as paramount. Then, before further training could take place, the Marine Corps had to deploy men, firstly to guard the US Mail, then to go on operations in China and Nicaragua, stripping the fleet of amphibious exercise units. However, some progress was made, and in 1927, the Joint Army–Navy Board gave the Marine Corps its new mission: to conduct land operations in support of the fleet for the initial seizure and defense of advanced bases, and such limited auxiliary land operations as are essential to the prosecution of the naval campaign.

‘THE TENTATIVE MANUAL FOR LANDING OPERATIONS’

Between 1919 and 1933, the Joint Army–Navy Board had produced several manuals that attempted to explain how the two services would cooperate in joint overseas expeditions. However, a manual of landing instructions was still lacking. Such events as having to mobilise 7th Marine Regiment for duty in Cuba in 1933 drained away personnel. Eventually, though, it was agreed that all classes should be discontinued at the Marine Corps Schools, so that students and staff could devote all their time and effort towards producing a landing operations manual. Work began in January 1934 and a first version (deliberately called ‘The Tentative Manual’) came into being some six months later, and was used at MCS during the 1934–5 school year. It would be revised and reissued on numerous occasions in subsequent years; for example, it was revised, then adopted by the USN in 1938 as ‘Fleet Training Publication 167’ (also known as ‘The Landing Operations Doctrine, US Navy 1938’). Wartime amendments followed, the first being based on developments up to 1941 (it was the guide for the Guadalcanal landings in August 1941). A second followed on 1 August 1942, just six days before Guadalcanal. Change No. 3 was issued in August 1943, based upon further experiences in the Solomons and in North Africa. It was subsequently used during the rest of the Second World War.

Command relationships were described in the manual, dealing with the organisation of the landing force as well as the command procedures. Overall command would rest with a naval officer of flag rank, while the task force would have two main components:

•The landing force, consisting of FMF units

•The naval support groups, consisting of the Fire Support Group, the Air Group, the Covering Group and the Transport Group

The specific responsibilities of the various commanders during all phases of the operations were clearly enumerated, and the principle of parallelism of command, subject to the overall authority of the amphibious force commander, was defined, thus ensuring that the naval forces would be organised so as to be responsive to the needs of the landing forces.

The ‘Tentative Manual’ recognised that an assaulting landing force followed a similar pattern to conventional offensive action, but appreciated that the ‘over-the-water’ movement of the attacking troops complicated the problems of providing fire support. Naval gunfire missions had to take the place of conventional field artillery, with the inherent problems, such as fire direction, nature of projectiles, magazine capacity, muzzle velocities and trajectories, all having to be considered, and a sound doctrine for the effective delivery of naval gunfire, developed.

Additionally the manual explored the possibility of using aircraft to provide close air support and an initial doctrine was evolved, which included visual and photographic reconnaissance, air defense and airborne fire support, especially during the final run-in of landing craft to the beach.

ORGANISED FOR COMBAT

We shall be covering the detailed organisation of the wartime Marine division in a later chapter, including the various changes that were made during the war years as a result of operational experience. Here, however, we need to look at how a Marine amphibious force would be ‘task-organised’ for combat. Typical attachments to a Marine division from the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) for an assault landing would include:

•   a signal intelligence platoon (radio direction finding)

•   a detachment of 4.5in barrage rockets

•   a war dog platoon

•   a joint assault signal company (Navy, Army and Marine personnel to coordinate naval gunfire, artillery and air support)

•   an amphibious truck company (equipped with DUKWs)

•   amphibian tractor battalions (both LVTs and LVT(A)s to provide both transport and close fire support)

In his book US Marine Corps 1941–45, Gordon Rottman explains how the task-organised and reinforced regiments were initially called ‘combat groups’ and their battalions ‘combat teams’. However, in late 1943, these were redesignated as ‘regimental landing teams’ and ‘battalion landing teams’ respectively. He quotes two examples of how such groups/teams were organised:

1st Marine Division for the August 1942 landing on Guadalcanal

Combat Group A (5th Marine Regiment) and Combat Group B (1st Marine Regiment). Each comprised an infantry regiment, an artillery battalion, a tank company, an engineer company, a pioneer company, an amphibian tractor company and a medical company, plus scout, special weapons and transport platoons. Within combat groups, the infantry battalions were designated Combat Teams A1, A2, A3, B4, B5 and B6. As well as the infantry battalion, each had a 75mm pack howitzer battery, plus an engineer platoon, a pioneer platoon and an amphibian tractor platoon, together with small service elements. Additionally a divisional support group was formed, which had four subgroups of artillery, and engineer, pioneer, amphibian tractor, headquarters, communications, medical and special weapons elements, plus 1st Parachute Battalion. The division was not only organised to land and fight under this structure but also embarked on to its transport as groups and teams.

2nd Marine Division for the November 1943 landing on Tarawa (Betio)

The first two regiments were organised as Regimental Landing Teams 2 and 8 (bearing the designation of their parent regiment), and reinforced by a 105mm artillery battalion and various combat support units. Battalion landing teams were designated Red, White and Blue for 1st, 2nd and 3rd Battalions. Each was reinforced by a 75mm pack howitzer battalion, a tank company and an engineer platoon.

Battalions and companies also task-organised their assets for greater effect. For example, for the Roi-Namur landing in 1944, 4th Marine Division formed their landing companies into assault and demolition teams. Each company formed six such teams, each led by an officer and comprising a four-man LMG group, a five-man demolition group, a three-man bazooka group and a four-man support group (with two Browning automatic rifles). A team was carried in an LVT(2). Follow-on reserve companies also formed ‘boat teams’ but were lacking the LMG group. They would be carried in an LVCP.

A TYPICAL ASSAULT LANDING

Perhaps the best way of illustrating how all these elements worked together is to examine a typical amphibious assault landing in which Marine Divisions were heavily involved. I have chosen the assault on ‘Sulphur Island’ (Iwo Jima) on 19 February 1945. First we shall consider command relationships. Adm Nimitz had given the mission to the same team that had succeeded in the earlier amphibious assaults in the Gilberts, Marshalls and Marianas, so the overall commander for Iwo Jima was Adm Raymond A. Spruance (commanding Fifth US Fleet). Vice Adm Richmond Kelly Turner commanded the Expeditionary Forces, while Rear Adm Harry W. Hill headed the Attack Force. In addition, the highly regarded Rear Adm William H.P. Blandy was in command of the Amphibious Support Forces, who were responsible for minesweeping, underwater demolition and the preliminary naval air and gun bombardment. Gen Holland M. Smith himself was designated Commander of Expeditionary Troops. (Smith was CG of the newly created Fleet Marine Force Pacific Command). The Marine forces immediately available for the operation were 3rd, 4th and 5th Marine Divisions, which were assigned to V Amphibious Corps, commanded by Gen Harry Schmidt, Smith’s immediate subordinate in the chain of command and commander of the landing forces. The actual strength of the assault force was some 70,600, augmented by Army garrison troops and naval personnel assigned to shore duty (construction and beach logistics), bringing the expeditionary force strength up to just over 111,300.

To assist with the landing, the force was allocated:

•  2nd Armored Amtrac Battalion – sixty-eight LVT(A)4s for armoured support

•  Four battalions of cargo-carrying amtracs (3rd, 5th, 10th and 11th) to provide the troop-carrying amtracs for the landing and subsequent logistics support; these were LVT(2)s and LVT(4)s

They would spearhead the operation, the first five waves of the landing using 400 LVTs to carry eight battalions of 4th and 5th Marine Divisions on to the south-eastern beaches of the island. The cargo tractors would be preceded by 2nd Armored Amtrac Battalion, who in turn would be preceded by LCI gunboats firing rockets and machine guns. Heavy firepower in the first wave was the order of the day, the LVT(A)4s being in line formation so that all had maximum freedom to fire their 75mm howitzers and machine guns. They would also land and proceed a short distance inland, so as to provide continued close support to the assault troops.

Troop tractors were to land and discharge their troops on the beach, then return to sea for logistic duties. The line of departure for the landing was some 4,000yd offshore and from there a thirty-minute run-in was expected. The interval between waves of LVTs was to be 250–300yd. The combined width of the landing beaches for the two assault divisions was 3,500yd, which meant that there would be an armoured amtrac every 50yd as the first wave approached the beach.

Once the forces were ashore, the plan was simple: 4th and 5th Marine Divisions would land abreast (5th on the left), with 3rd Marine Division in reserve. The extreme left-hand regiment of 5th Marine Division (27th Marine Regiment under Col Harry ‘The Horse’ Liversedge) was to attack straight across the neck of land, then turn south-west and take Mount Suribachi. Other regiments of the division were to attack forwards, then turn right and attack north-east up the long axis of the island. On D+3, 3rd Marine Division was to land over the same beaches and move into the centre between the other two divisions.

Landing ‘on call’ over their parent division beaches would be 4th and 5th Tank Battalions and it was anticipated that their firepower would be needed to help get the Marines off the beach quickly. It was on the beach that the intelligence analysts expected the toughest battle as that had been the experience of past Japanese tactics. However, this would not be the case at Iwo Jima, the enemy remaining virtually silent during the early phase of the battle, then opening devastating fire after the landing had moved inland. When 3rd Marine Division came ashore, they brought their 3rd Tank Battalion. Thus there were some 150 Sherman M4A2 medium tanks on the island and their high-velocity 75mm had almost twice the hitting power of the 75mm howitzer on the LVT(A)4 – of considerable value in dealing with the numerous heavy enemy fortifications that abounded on Iwo Jima.

‘LAND THE LANDING FORCE!’

At Annexe A to this chapter are, by way of example, details of the Task Organisation of 4th Marine Division for the Iwo Jima landing. Weather conditions around Iwo Jima on the morning of 19 February 1945 (D-Day) were almost ideal and at 0645 hr Adm Turner signalled: ‘Land the landing force.’

Space does not permit a complete ‘blow by blow’ account of the entire landing and battle for Iwo Jima. However, here is an extract from 4th Marine Division’s history, which graphically tells of the first moments of the assault:

Early on the morning of February 19, the Division arrived off Iwo. It was D-Day! Lying off the island was the now familiar spectacle of the vast armada of an invasion force. From every side the guns of the warships were laying down their bombardment, and overhead wave after wave of planes hit the island: torpedo bombers firing rockets, fighters strafing and dive bombers coming straight down to drop their load.

The assault BLTs (Beach Landing Teams) were boated at an early hour in their LVTs. The reserve battalions and the reserve regiment (RCT 24) were to use LCVPs. The Division landing plan provided for RCT 23 to land on the left (Yellow) beaches, while RCT 25 would use the right (Blue) beaches. From left to right, the assault BLTs were: 1/23, 2/23, 1/25, and 3/25. Because of the damage to the LCI(G)s caused by Japanese fire on D-1, close-in fire support for the assault waves was to be furnished by LCS(L)s. In addition, the leading LVTs were preceded by LVT(A)s. H hour was set for 0900.

By 0815, the first three waves of assault troops were formed and waiting behind the Line of Departure. At 0830, they were on their way in. The weather was good and the surf moderate. The naval gunfire, air strikes and rocket and mortar barrages from the gunboats were saturating the beaches now, and only moderate enemy fire fell on the leading waves. As they neared the shore, the support fire moved inland in a ‘rolling barrage’ [a ‘navalised’ form of the traditional army rolling barrage, this was aimed against beach-front targets just before H-Hour, then advanced progressively inland as the troops landed, always remaining 400yd in front of them, and controlled by air spotters]. At 0902 they hit the beach. A Japanese observer who was watching from a cave on Mount Suribachi said: ‘At nine o’clock in the morning several hundred landing craft rushed ashore like an enormous tidal wave.’

And then came trouble – in large quantities. As the naval gunfire lifted, the Japanese ‘opened up’ with every weapon they had, and soon a solid sheet of fire was pouring down on the beaches and the incoming waves. It was (according to the Division report on Iwo) the ‘heaviest enemy mortar and artillery fire yet seen in any operation’.

Boats were hit; they broached and clogged the beaches. Personnel casualties mounted rapidly. Vehicles ashore found the sandy volcanic ash and the first terrace (with its 40% grade) nearly impassable. Even tanks bogged down. Every move was under direct observation of the Japanese on top of the cliff line on the right flank and on Mt Suribachi on the left.

Nevertheless, supporting arms and personnel kept coming ashore as rapidly as conditions on the beaches would permit. Tanks were on Yellow Beach by 0940. The reserve BLTs of the assault regiments were coming ashore by 1233. The Shore and Beach Parties began landing. Around 1500, two battalions of artillery were going ashore to furnish direct support for the assault troops and 1/14 was firing missions by 1740. BLTs 1/24 and 2/24 of the Division Reserve were sent in at 1615 to be attached to the assault regiments. The command posts of RCT 23 and RCT 25 were set up by 1700. RCT 24 (minus detached elements) was completely ashore at 1945 and then it moved to its assembly area.

By the night of D Day, the Division had all three of its rifle regiments (less some Support Group elements), two battalions of artillery and some heavy Shore Party equipment ashore. Despite the withering enemy fire and extremely heavy casualties, the assault units had driven ahead and established a line that included the eastern edge of Airfield No. 1 and was (as reported in the Division Report on Iwo): ‘of sufficient depth inland from Blue Beaches to guarantee the successful holding of the beachhead’. Full contact with the Fifth Division had been established and adequate supplies were ashore for a continuation of the attack the next day.

I hope this short, but detailed, account of a typical assault landing will help to explain how the Marines operated in their Pacific campaigns. To close this first chapter, this quotation from the Corps history, Semper Fi, should equally help to explain the major change that had thus occurred to the raison d’être of the Corps:

The Corps had made a major contribution (perhaps the major contribution) to create an essential Allied military speciality, the amphibious assault against a hostile shore. At the same time the Corps’ ability to grow and adapt to the Pacific war remains impressive. When Pearl Harbor came Navy and Marine planners envisioned a Corps balanced between FMF assault divisions and base defense forces, made up of infantry, coastal and AAA, and aviation. By VJ Day the ground element of the FMF was an amphibious assault force without peer and the Marine divisions had gone through four basic organisational changes to find the right mix of men and weapons for each succeeding campaign.

The FMF also had created corps troops of heavy artillery, tanks, amtracs, recce units, and varied service units where none had existed in 1942. These changes represented rapid organisational responses not only to the tactical and logistical challenges of ship to shore movement, but also to the shifting character of the fighting ashore. Essentially the Corps fought four different ground wars against the Japanese: the jungle warfare in the South Pacific; the atoll warfare of the Gilberts & Marshalls; the mobile warfare of the Marianas; the cave warfare of Peleliu, Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Each war made its special demands and the Corps met them. It did so by adjusting its infantry training, increasing the firepower of its infantry and artillery regiments, using tanks, and armoured amphibians not only as mobile artillery but also as flamethrowers and stressing the coordination of supporting fires. By 1945, the Corps had made important conceptual and practical advances in using artillery, naval gunfire, and close air support against ground targets, but it was also aware that it needed further experience in fire support coordination.

Annexe A

TASK ORGANISATION OF THE FOURTH MARINE DIVISION ON IWO JIMA

Regimental Combat Team 23

23rd Marine Regiment

3rd Band Section

Company C, 4th Tank Battalion

Company C, 4th Engineer Battalion

Company C, 4th Medical Battalion

Company C, 4th Motor Transport Battalion

133rd Naval Construction Battalion (less Company D, plus Company A, 4th Pioneer Battalion)

3rd Platoon, 4th Military Police Company

3rd Platoon, Service and Supply Company, 4th Service Battalion

Detachment, 1st Joint Assault Signal Company

10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion

Company B, 2nd Armoured Amphibian Battalion

3rd Sec., 7th Marine War Dog Platoon

Detachment, 8th Field Depot Shore Party

3rd Platoon, 442nd Port Company

2nd Sec., 1st Provisional Rocket Detachment

Liaison and Forward Observation Parties, 2/14

Regimental Combat Team 25

25th Marine Regiment

1st Band Section

Company A, 4th Tank Battalion

Company A, 4th Engineer Battalion Company

A, 4th Medical Battalion

Company A, 4th Motor Transport Battalion

4th Pioneer Battalion (less Company A, plus Company D, 133rd Naval Construction Battalion and Headquarters Detachment, 8th Field Depot)

1st Platoon, 4th Military Police Company

1st Platoon, Service & Supply Company, 4th Service Battalion

Detachment, 1st Joint Assault Signal Company

5th Amphibian Tractor Battalion

Company A, 2nd Armored Amphibian Battalion

7th War Dog Platoon (less 2nd and 3rd Secs)

Detachment, 8th Field Depot

30th Replacement Draft (less detachment) (Self-Propelled)

1st Platoon, 442nd Port Company

1st Sec., 1st Provisional Rocket Detachment

Liaison and Forward Observation Parties, 1/14

Regimental Combat Team 24 (Divisional Reserve)

24th Marine Regiment

2nd Band Section

Company B, 4th Tank Battalion

Company B, 4th Engineer Battalion

Company B, 4th Medical Battalion

Company B, 4th Motor Transport Battalion

2nd Platoon, 4th Military Police Company

2nd Platoon, Service & Supply Company, 4th Service Battalion

Detachment, 1st Joint Assault Signals Company

2nd Sec., 7th War Dog Platoon

Detachment, 24th and 30th Replacement Drafts

442nd Port Company (less 1st and 3rd Platoons)

Liaison and Forward Observation Parties, 3/14

Divisional Artillery

14th Marine Regiment

4th Amphibian Truck Company

476th Amphibian Truck Company

VMO-4 (Marine Observation Squadron)

Support Group

Headquarters Battalion (less detachment)

4th Tank Battalion (less Companies A, B, C; plus Tank Maintenance (Main) Platoon, Ordnance Company, 4th Service Battalion)

4th Engineer Battalion (less Companies A, B, C)

2nd Armored Amphibian Battalion (less Companies A, B, C, D, and Detachment Battalion Headquarters)

4th Service Battalion (less detachments)

Divisional Reconnaissance Company

1st Joint Assault Signal Company (less detachments)

1st Provisional Rocket Detachment (less 1st and 2nd Secs)

Detachment, 726th SAW Company

Joint Intelligence Centre Pacific Ocean Area Team

Detachment, Signal Battalion, V Amphibious Corps

Corps Liaison Group

CHAPTER TWO

MARINE CORPS STATIC ORGANISATIONS

This chapter covers the general static elements of the United States Marine Corps and explains how their organisation evolved during the war, highlighting the main important elements, such as the Headquarters Marine Corps and the training establishments. Not included here are the operational elements of the USMC, such as the Fleet Marine Force, the amphibious corps, the Marine divisions, brigades and tactical groups, and finally, the defense battalions and balloon squadrons, which are covered in the next three chapters. More specialist outfits, like the Marine aviators, the Marine paratroopers, Marine raiders and the Women’s Reserve, all of whom merit chapters to themselves, follow later. Tucked in with the paratroopers is the short-lived Marine Glider Group.

Before 1941, the largest existing Marine formations were 1st and 2nd Marine Brigades, which had been formed on the east and west coasts of the USA in 1935–6. Each brigade had as its central core an under-strength Marine infantry regiment and an aircraft group. If either brigade had to deploy to meet an emergency, then numbers would, in theory, be made up from ships’ guards (see later). General foreign policy at that time dictated that the Fleet Marine Force was to be more focused on possible operations in the Atlantic and the Caribbean rather than in the Pacific. This policy was vindicated when the Second World War began and German U-boats became a major threat to shipping to and from the USA through the North Atlantic. Additionally, after the fall of France in 1940, there was the distinct possibility that Germany might occupy erstwhile French possessions in the Caribbean, almost directly on America’s ‘doorstep’. Unfortunately that was not all. By late spring 1941, when Britain was fighting alone against Germany and Italy, the British Prime Minister asked President Roosevelt to send troops to Iceland to replace the British garrison there, the danger being that, with Norway and Denmark overrun, Iceland could be the next to fall, which strategically would have adversely affected Britain’s North Atlantic ‘lifeline’. This was agreed, with the proviso that the Icelandic government approved, which they did with some reluctance. The only operationally ready troops available were 1st Marine Brigade (Provisional), and so the 4,095-strong brigade left Charleston for service in Iceland on 22 June 1941. It would not return to the USA until the end of March 1942.

Thus it was that American attention would not really be directed towards the Pacific area until after Japan had become the third member of the Axis in September 1940, and they had made their unprovoked attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. For the Marine Corps, this would lead not only to a massive expansion but also a drastic change of operational theatres, the Pacific theatre now becoming virtually their raison d’être.

MISSIONS

The USMC is a component of the Navy Department serving under the Secretary of the Navy. It is not a component of the US Navy. The Corps was subject to the Articles for the Government of the Navy. It is commanded by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, who was known as the Major General Commandant before January 1942. It was (and still is) tasked to support the Navy with the following specific missions:

1.  Maintain a mobile force in immediate readiness as a part of the US Fleet for use in operations involving shore objectives.

2.  Maintain Marine detachments as a part of the ship’s crew on battleships, aircraft carriers and cruisers.

3.  Provide garrisons for the safeguarding of Navy yards and naval stations at home and in outlying possessions of the United States.

4.  Provide forces for the protection of American lives and property abroad.

(Source: Rottman, US Marine Corps World War II Order of Battle)

However, as Gordon Rottman goes on to explain, during the Second World War the USMC missions went far beyond these straightforward tasks and would soon encompass the broad spectrum of global warfare. This would include such tasks as the defense of remote island bases, fleet amphibious operations, prolonged offensive land campaigns, amphibious reconnaissance, naval base and installation security, close air support, offensive air strikes, aerial reconnaissance and patrols, ships’ guards, landing forces, native militia and foreign troops training, foreign advisory missions, embassy guards, logistical support, ceremonial duties; clandestine operations, disarming and repatriating surrendered enemy forces, and occupation duties; the list was endless. Moreover, these often-complex duties had to be carried out in a joint environment operating together with the Army, Navy and Allied forces, and with those services’ air arms.

THE MARINE CORPS ESTABLISHMENT

This comprised all the Marine Corps supporting activities, posts, stations, etc. that were located in the USA and its outlying territories and stations overseas. Hence there were establishments such as supply depots, procurement (recruiting) divisions and stations, recruit depots, Marine Corps Schools, administrative and security activities, bases, stations, yards, depots and air stations, etc. The list is a long one, made all the longer here by also including ships’ detachments, as this is a convenient place to cover them. However, they were strictly part of a ship’s crew and thus a part of the fleet, while during the war most training establishments were strictly part of the FMF.

Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC)

In 1941, the senior Marine Corps headquarters was located in the Navy Department Building on the Mall in Washington, DC, where it had been since 1919. In 1941, it was relocated to the Arlington Annex of the Navy Department, some 1¼ miles from the yet-to-be-completed Pentagon (opened 15 January 1943). Here it remained throughout the war.

The HQ had six main responsibilities: the procurement, education, training, discipline, distribution and discharge of all Marine Corps personnel. By the end of the war, some 87 per cent of the enlisted staff posts at HQMC were filled by women Marines.