Web3 Marketing E-Book

Amanda Cassatt

• Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
• Kategorie: Fachliteratur
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 377

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2023

Beschreibung

THE ESSENTIAL WEB3 MARKETING BOOK For a limited time, claim an NFT with a copy of your book! Web3 Marketing: A Handbook for the Next Internet Revolution is the essential book for anyone looking to understand the next era of the internet and start building. Beyond the sensational hype and headlines around crypto and NFTs, a real revolution is taking place: new technologies for owning, moving, and organizing value spell the overdue end of an internet where a few huge companies hoard data and power, and open a new frontier for products, services, and applications in which ownership and control belongs to creators, builders, and users. As former CMO of ConsenSys then Founder and CEO of top web3 marketing firm Serotonin--Amanda Cassatt is in a unique position to tell this story, and delivers a remarkably clear, nontechnical guide to the history, key concepts, and still-evolving landscape of Web3. Cassatt explains how Web3 transforms time-tested approaches to marketing and brand-building, including how to build a Web3 community. This book is a must-read for professionals at any level in their Web3 careers--already working or investing in Web3, exploring what it means for their business, or considering a jump into something new--and for anyone who wants to understand the next internet revolution.

Leseprobe

Table of Contents

Cover

Praise for

Web3 Marketing

Title Page

Copyright

Dedication

Preface

Notes

PART 1: What Is Web3?

1 The Evolution of Web1 and Web2

Notes

2 The Evolution of Bitcoin and Ethereum

Notes

3 The Evolution of Ethereum into Web3

Tokenization

Decentralized Applications (Dapps)

Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs)

Non‐Fungible Tokens (NFTs)

Decentralized Finance (DeFi)

Notes

4 The Metaverse

Notes

PART 2: Web3 Marketing in Theory and Practice

5 Inventing Web3 Marketing

Notes

6 Know Your Product and Your Audience

Know Your Product

Know Your Audience

Notes

7 Build a Marketing Team

8 Set Key Metrics

Notes

PART 3: The Web3 Marketing Funnel

9 Introducing the Web3 Marketing Funnel

10 Discovery Break Through

The Origins of Demand

Knife's‐Edge Brand Messaging

Search

Social Media

Earned Media

Events

Notes

11 Engagement and Use Start a Flywheel

Product Websites

Fostering Community

The Community Spaceship

Content

12 Retention Build a Moat

Notes

PART 4: Web3 Transformation and Web2.5

13 Defining Web2.5

Notes

Conclusion

Notes

Acknowledgments

About the Author

Index

End User License Agreement

List of Illustrations

Chapter 9

Figure 9.1 The Web3 marketing funnel

Chapter 10

Figure 10.1 The attention a project gets over time is jagged

Chapter 11

Figure 11.1 A basic Web3 product website

Guide

Cover Page

Praise for Web3 Marketing

Title Page

Copyright

Dedication

Preface

Table of Contents

Begin Reading

Conclusion

Acknowledgments

About the Author

Index

Wiley End User License Agreement

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Praise for Web3 Marketing

“Amanda is the original storyteller of crypto, having been there since the beginning. She has since helped many companies and founders find their voice to be the authors of their own history. Her contributions to the advent of Web3 continue to be tremendous.”

—Min Teo,Managing Partner, Ethereal Ventures

“With the advent of Web3 technology, the rules of the marketing game are changing yet again. Cassatt, who was arguably the first marketer in the space, provides a comprehensive guide that gives a terrific overview of the history of crypto, as well as offers explicit, actionable advice on how a marketer can capitalize on the new tools that are available and on the horizon.”

—Josh Quittner,Founder and CEO of Decrypt

“Web3 may have been conceived by millennials but it's really being built for Gen Z; for their culture of empowerment, digital identity, and their decentralized ambitions for the future. Amanda was there when Web3 took shape and within her book explains clearly how marketers need to shape Web3 value for this future generation who are about to inherit the earth. Compelling storytelling and practical directions, she has clearly already stepped on all the land mines for us and found the path for brands and business to follow.”

—Dickon Laws,Global Head of Innovation, Ogilvy

Amanda CassattCEO, Serotonin

Web3 Marketing

A Handbook for the Next Internet Revolution

Copyright © 2023 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. All rights reserved.

Published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken, New Jersey.Published simultaneously in Canada.

No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning, or otherwise, except as permitted under Section 107 or 108 of the 1976 United States Copyright Act, without either the prior written permission of the Publisher, or authorization through payment of the appropriate per-copy fee to the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, [phone], fax [phone], or on the Web at www.copyright.com. Requests to the Publisher for permission should be addressed to the Permissions Department, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 111 River Street, Hoboken, NJ 07030, [phone], fax [phone], or online at http://www.wiley.com/go/permissions.

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data:

Names: Cassatt, Amanda, author.

Title: Web3 marketing : a handbook for the next Internet revolution / Amanda Cassatt.

Description: Hoboken, New Jersey : John Wiley & Sons, Inc., [2023] | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2022052843 (print) | LCCN 2022052844 (ebook) | ISBN 9781394171958 (hardback) | ISBN 9781394172054 (adobe pdf) | ISBN 9781394171965 (epub)

Subjects: LCSH: Internet marketing.

Classification: LCC HF5415.1265 .C38 2023 (print) | LCC HF5415.1265 (ebook) | DDC 658.8/72--dc23/eng/20230124

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022052843LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022052844

Cover Design: WileyCover Image: © Chromie Squiggle #2172, Erick Calderon a/k/a Snowfro. All Rights Reserved.

To Sam, for your patience while I wrote this book on our vacation.

Preface

It was 2019 and my husband and I were badly delayed in the Geneva airport, when a screen caught my attention. I looked up blearily from the box of Kambly biscuits in my crumb‐covered lap to confirm that it wasn't a trick of the eye. It wasn't. Prominently displayed on airport monitors was the word “Ethereum,” accompanied by its price chart.

We had both started contributing to the Ethereum Project when only a small group of people were aware of it. My job as a marketer was to share Ethereum with the world, and now here it was, considered important enough by the Geneva airport's administrators to deserve a place alongside Bitcoin and the top global stocks. Every marketer dreams of the day when a project they've taken from obscurity “goes mainstream.” Excited, I leapt up to snap a photo, showering the carpet with chocolatey bits. This was one of many moments, starting in 2017 and continuing to the present, that would add to my conviction that our movement—building the decentralized third generation of the web—had arrived, and that it was here to stay.

In 2016, when I began doing the work that an editor from Wiley would eventually call Web3 marketing, almost no one had heard of Web3. We barely used the term ourselves. I certainly had no idea that as ConsenSys's chief marketing officer, working under a mandate to bring Ethereum to market, I would become the first Web3 marketer, hire and train the first Web3 marketing team, and bring to market many of the key products underlying Web3. At the time, we were a global network of nerds with a penchant for the esoteric. The nascent industry in which we worked was called crypto. An ether token cost a few dollars, and nobody owned any NFTs. Considering our modest beginnings, our ambitions were laughably grand. We had full conviction that Ethereum would become not only the next great computing platform, but a new foundation for the global financial system, the substrate for building an adjacent economy governed fairly and transparently by code. The offices where we worked practically glowed with expectation.

The future we envisioned back then—one in which millions of people would safeguard their own assets in user‐controlled wallets, benefit from using web applications without becoming the real product being sold, and get paid to create ownable pieces of internet property—is becoming a reality. Admittedly, the process has been slower than many of us expected. Nonetheless, crypto is in the news on a daily basis now, and the leading user‐controlled wallet, MetaMask, has 21 million monthly active users. There are 28.6 million crypto wallets that hold pieces of internet property known as non‐fungible tokens (NFTs).1 Meanwhile Ethereum has grown a nearly $200 billion market capitalization, second only to Bitcoin with its near $400 billion.2 According to estimates, over 200,000 software developers have learned Solidity, the main language for programming applications on the Ethereum blockchain.3 And in 2021, Ethereum's $11.6 trillion transaction volume surpassed even the traditional payments giant Visa, with $10.4 trillion.4 That's a lot of money, and a huge number of people who know about and use Ethereum, considering we started from zero.

If this sounds impressive, though, let us put it into perspective. Ethereum may have transferred more assets by value, but the 1 million transactions per day on Ethereum are no match for the Visa network, which processes over 150 million.5 The total market cap of all cryptocurrencies, which has at times exceeded $1 trillion, pales in comparison to the total US gross domestic product (GDP) of about $25 trillion, or the global GDP of more than $96 trillion.6 Of the total number of the estimated 31 million software developers in the world, fewer than 1% are familiar with Solidity.7 And it's important to keep in mind that 37% of the global population hasn't used the internet, let alone collected NFTs.8 Undeniably, our movement still has a long way to go.

We called it crypto—short for cryptocurrency—at the beginning, because its first applications were financial. Bitcoin was the first successful digital money system built on a decentralized blockchain. Many of the early applications on Ethereum had to do with financial value. Between 2012 and 2019, most of the value coming into the crypto ecosystem arrived through exchanges, superhighways like Coinbase where people could trade in their fiat currencies like dollars for investments in bitcoin or ether.9 Not only the money, but the people working in the industry came from technology and finance backgrounds.

Our nascent industry's parents were finance and technology, but starting in 2020 with the rise of NFTs, that changed. The crypto industry began intersecting with the arts, entertainment, fashion, and media. This brought an entirely new wave of personalities into our space, from creators to entrepreneurs and professionals, who reshaped its character. Suddenly, the audience downloading MetaMask included buyers of digital handbags for their avatars to wear in the metaverse, people who wanted to support their favorite artists, and gamers hoping to earn in‐game assets. No longer was our industry purely about money; “cryptocurrency” interested only a subset of users.

It was only natural that the community began elevating the less‐used but long‐existing term Web3 to describe a holistic technology movement with broad cultural as well as financial implications. The movement has its own particular values: one is that people should be autonomous and resilient, taking personal responsibility for the decisions they make on the web, safeguarding their own value rather than depending on corporations; another is that the systems for governing the web should be open and transparent, applying the same set of rules fairly to all participants. Some of these values are derived from the origins of the web. Others are still being shaped by newcomers to Web3. These are the next 100 million users, and they come from absolutely everywhere.

Web3 swept beyond finance and technology, and today, it's poised to intersect every industry. Similar to how every industry was affected by digitization, each will need to adapt to Web3. But the computer scientists and economics professors who got us here, to this level of crypto adoption and the starting line of Web3, won't get us there, to the next 100 million “mainstream” users. They will be joined by professionals leading Web3 teams inside their organizations, creative entrepreneurs and artists who understand how to engage with Web2 retail consumers, and investors who can read not only open source code on Github and academic whitepapers but also intricacies of human behavior. Far beyond a screen in the Geneva airport, this technology is truly on the verge of mass adoption. The people, projects, and companies that catalyze this next wave of adoption can expect vast rewards—and they won't all be engineers. There is a path for the brightest nontechnical marketing and business minds to lead with them.

My objective in writing this book is to empower fellow marketers to start building in Web3. I use the term marketer very loosely throughout to describe those who, like me, love telling stories and putting ourselves in other people's shoes, who care about how the things we create look and feel. We are businesspeople and strategists, artists and designers, community leaders and educators. As our movement touches wider audiences and more diverse industries, I believe minds like ours have a crucial role to play driving the next wave of Web3 adoption. To date, there exist few high‐quality educational materials on Web3 for non‐engineer readers. This is a shame because it deters some of the sharpest thinkers and most experienced professionals from entering the space.

In this book, I attempt to explain Web3 in the clearest way possible to anyone familiar with the internet. The most important point to understand about Web3 is that it's not a predetermined set of outcomes, but rather a substrate, a clay we can mold in our hands. Like an artist learning a new medium, we must understand our materials thoroughly before we can begin creating with them. For this reason, I spend the first third of the book tracing the history of how Web3 emerged from its origins in Web1 and Web2, showing that Web3 isn't a new set of ideas, but rather a novel realization of the original vision for the web. Then, I explain its key properties, the ones the readers of this book can use to mold their own Web3 systems. These include tokens, NFTs, decentralized applications (dapps), decentralized finance (DeFi), decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs), and Web3‐enabled metaverse worlds.

Nearly halfway through this book readers will encounter the first sections explicitly about marketing. These benefit from insights I've gleaned from reading numerous texts on marketing, and I cite many of my favorites throughout. No prior familiarity with marketing concepts is required to understand them, especially because many of my recommendations cut against the grain of traditional marketing wisdom. The marketing‐focused chapters mostly detail the best practices and learnings my teammates and I have gathered over seven years as the first Web3 marketing team, first focused on Ethereum at ConsenSys, and now at Serotonin, the marketing agency and product studio I founded afterwards.

These chapters offer the reader—the artist molding the clay of Web3—examples from the work of the artists who came before, including ConsenSys companies, Serotonin clients, and other notable Web3 projects. The goal of these chapters is not to provide readers with blueprints or templates to copy exactly—though at certain points I do lay out specific strategies—but to shape an approach to Web3 marketing informed by past triumphs and failures. I've taken this approach so this book can remain useful for some time, even in a rapidly evolving space. These chapters include a design for a Web3 marketing funnel, suggestions of channels to use at each stage, and strategies for how best to use each channel.

Throughout these practical chapters, several refrains recur. At the risk of sounding like a broken record: the most important thing for marketers to remember in Web3, as it was in Web2 and long before, is to know their audience and to understand their product. A marketer's choice of product can make all the difference; if we hadn't chosen Ethereum, our team would surely have enjoyed far less success.

In the final practical chapters, I focus on strategies for building community, defining what that term means in Web3, and how it is the key to unlock sustainable, long‐term growth for Web3 projects—giving them, I believe, the power to outcompete traditional and Web2 businesses over time.

Whether the projects you support end up beamed down from a Times Square digital billboard, spotted on the fashionable streets of the metaverse, or atop the rankings on Defi Llama, I hope every marketer has their own version of the experience I had in the Geneva airport. My hope is that by the end of this book, you will gain the confidence to seize the opportunity to shape the future of Web3. When you are ready use the code and instructions in the front of this book to claim your NFT membership to the Web3 Marketing community. There you will find more educational resources and training programs, as well as mentors and potential collaborators. I look forward to meeting you there, and I hope you enjoy the book.

Notes

1.

Jeff Benson, “Ethereum Wallet MetaMask Reports 21 Million Users, Up 420% Since April,”

Decrypt

, November 17, 2021,

https://decrypt.co/86263/ethereum-wallet-metamask-reports-21-million-users

; Elizabeth Howcroft, “NFT Sales Hit $25 Billion in 2021, but Growth Shows Signs of Slowing,” Reuters, January 11, 2022,

https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/nft-sales-hit-25-billion-2021-growth-shows-signs-slowing-2022–01–10/

.

2.

CoinMarketCap, August 30, 2022,

https://coinmarketcap.com/

.

3.

Ryan Daws, “Ethereum Officially Kicks Off Its One Million Devs Initiative,” Developer Tech News, January 20, 2020,

https://www.developer-tech.com/news/2020/jan/20/ethereum-officially-kicks-its-one-million-devs-initiative/

.

4.

Josh Stark and Evan Van Ness, “The Year in Ethereum 2021,” Josh Stark, Mirror.xyz, January 17, 2022,

https://stark.mirror.xyz/q3OnsK7mvfGtTQ72nfoxLyEV5lfYOqUfJIoKBx7BG1I

; Visa,

Annual Report 2021

,

https://s29.q4cdn.com/385744025/files/doc_downloads/Visa-Inc_-Fiscal-2021-Annual-Report.pdf

.

5.

Stark and Van Ness, “The Year in Ethereum 2021”; Visa,

Annual Report 2021

.

6.

“Gross Domestic Product (Second Estimate) and Corporate Profits (Preliminary), Second Quarter 2022,” U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), August 25, 2022,

https://www.bea.gov/news/2022/gross-domestic-product-second-estimate-and-corporate-profits-preliminary-second-quarter

; “GDP (Current US$)—World,” World Bank Open Data, accessed August 30, 2022,

https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD

.

7.

Konstantinos Korakitis, Richard Muir, Simon Jones, and Michael Condon,

State of the Developer Nation, 22nd Edition

, SlashData, April 2022,

https://slashdata-website-cms.s3.amazonaws.com/sample_reports/VZtJWxZw5Q9NDSAQ.pdf

.

8.

International Telecommunication Union Development Sector,

Measuring Digital Development: Facts and Figures 2021

, December 1, 2021,

https://www.itu.int/itu-d/reports/statistics/facts-figures-2021/

.

9.

Bitcoin, the system, is usually capitalized; bitcoin, the token, is not.

PART 1What Is Web3?

1The Evolution of Web1 and Web2

It's natural to be skeptical of claims that a new technology will change everything. I was born in the early 1990s in a moment of techno‐optimism. The recent fall of the Soviet Union had Americans like my family convinced that our system was basically correct, and that with this system in place, our society was ripe for innovation. The scale that new innovations could reach suddenly seemed infinite, thanks to Clinton‐era globalization introducing low‐cost production and efficient transnational supply chains. There was no doubt technology would progress linearly, if not exponentially, unlocking opportunities for prosperity and making them available to all. The invisible hand of social progress appeared to be steering us inevitably toward a more accepting world without borders. It was the end of history and the beginning of the greatest era in technology. For my cohort of friends, we expected a life of relative ease compared to our parents, our needs entrusted to kindly robots, our days spent whizzing over futuristic cities in flying cars, like those in “The Jetsons.”

Suffice it to say I was disappointed. It was not the end of history, as Francis Fukuyama infamously proposed at the turn of the 1990s. Global hunger, poverty, and violence would continue shrinking, but my friends and I would contend with economic disasters, physical and psychological disease, and the collapse of trust in institutions and between people, which is arguably the true wealth in a society. Not only that, there were no flying cars. The innovation that sprung up during my early life was in the field of bits, not atoms. In America, we would close our factories and retreat from building the kinds of things in the physical world that had captured my childhood imagination. We would instead turn inward: away from the kinetic world, toward the computer.

The breakthrough innovation of the 1990s would not be the flying car, but the internet. The global network of computers known as the internet dates back to the 1960s, and for decades its use was limited mainly to government and university researchers. At the turn of the 1990s, however, the internet became available to the public—and its growth exploded with the invention of the World Wide Web. The World Wide Web comprises a set of tools for creating and accessing documents (web pages) full of text, images, and other media, and most crucially, clickable links (also called hypertext) to other documents and resources on the global network. The development of graphical web browsers for personal and commercial computers made navigating the rapidly proliferating linked pages of the World Wide Web increasingly easy—and fun. Networking computers together in a web drew massive use to the internet by fostering conditions akin to Renaissance Florence: it became the place for information‐sharing and access to like‐minded people, but at a previously impossible scale. An ecosystem of content‐rich, increasingly multimedia websites for governments, businesses, organizations, and individuals flourished, as first web message boards and later personal blogs provided tremendously popular platforms for regular people to publish and communicate online.

Although websites in this era were far more static and less interactive than what we have become accustomed to, the technology paradigm many have retrospectively come to call Web1 exponentially multiplied the amount and quality of information available on a global scale, democratized access to it, and radically lowered the barrier to entry to communicate and share knowledge. And the almost indefinite scalability of a piece of software on the web, which can in theory reach billions of people without additional up‐front labor or production costs, introduced previously unheard‐of opportunities for value capture that allowed the San Francisco Bay area to double down on its position as a global technology hub. Already home to the semiconductor industry, major players in personal computing hardware and software, and Stanford University, the area had the capital and technical acumen to begin supporting web companies. Web1 engendered an information revolution. Like other dreamers, I sighed about the lack of Jetsons‐style flying cars—but encouraged by my savvy computer scientist father and neuroscientist mother, both of whom saw the future glowing on the other side of the computer screen, I begrudgingly adopted their optimism about the world of bits.

The original architects of the web were techno‐optimists who believed open, networked systems would bring important social and scientific facts to light, helping break any grip on power by the nefarious or undeserving. Sunlight would be the best disinfectant. They intended the internet to be a place for discovering truth and having fun. The inventor of the World Wide Web, Tim Berners‐Lee, and his collaborators took a philosophically decentralized approach to designing the first web architectures. The early web pioneer John Gilmore—a contemporary of Berners‐Lee who started the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a nonprofit that promotes internet civil liberties—famously said of decentralized design, “The net interprets censorship as damage and routes around it.”1 Protocols like BGP (Border Gateway Protocol, allowing IP addresses to resolve to physical computers), TCP/IP (allowing information to flow between those computers), and DNS (allowing names to resolve to IP addresses) were all intended to be decentralized. Unfortunately, Berners‐Lee and others didn't design for decentralization in the face of a malicious actor who wished to control the web, such as a government—and in fact, DNS, BGP, and other key web protocols are now largely under government control. There were technical limitations, too; early web architecture didn't allow for files to be stored in a decentralized manner, across multiple servers.

Despite these issues, from its underlying architecture to much of its early content, the internet met and exceeded the web pioneers' hopes. Many of them shared an ethos of utopian optimism with the first generations of hackers, whose exploration (sometimes malicious, often not) of computer networks and phone systems long predated the web. The Hacker Manifesto of 1986 envisions a borderless world of bits free from bias and discrimination, an even playing field where anyone with a computer and the necessary skills can fight to defend the underdog against the excesses of arbitrary power. Hackers took up arms against the functionaries of the decaying institutional order—the empty suits and clueless bureaucrats who couldn't even use a word processor—and sometimes they profited from it, breaking into insurance company databases, draining funds from faceless corporations, or simply enjoying free long‐distance calling. These same computer geeks and their spiritual heirs would go on to run circles around their old‐guard adversaries, not in the shadows as black‐ and gray‐hat hackers, but on the open field of capitalist competition as developers of a new information economy, taking the highest‐salaried jobs and launching phenomenally lucrative startups.

As it turns out, though, the real adversaries to the original spirit of Web1 were neither corporate suits nor government agents, but other web founders and their solutions for making the internet more widely usable—and wildly profitable. In contrast to the open, decentralized technology architecture of Web1, this crop of founders developed closed, walled‐garden environments in the name of making the internet easier for everyday users to access. Internet service providers such as CompuServe, Prodigy, and, most significantly, America Online (eventually just AOL) essentially became competitors to the Web1 open standard, even as they formed the on‐ramp to the internet for millions of regular users.

By the mid‐1990s, many companies had begun providing consumers with internet access via a combination of software and dial‐up connections. ISPs like AOL came to dominate, partly due to effective marketing (such as blanketing the country with free install CDs), partly due to user experience (UX) design maximizing ease of use. AOL and its ilk acted as mediating surfaces between the user and the actual open internet: a friendly voice welcoming you and letting you know you had mail, plus user‐friendly design that made it easy to access chat and instant messaging, a fair amount of proprietary content that lived within an ISP's centralized system, and a web browser leading out to the open internet.

These holding tanks for users charged fees—at first by the minute, then in unlimited‐use subscriptions—whereas the internet itself was intrinsically open and free. These companies were also able to collect substantial data on user activity, from user identity information, to shopping preferences as e‐commerce began to emerge, to the actual content of user messaging. Without realizing it, consumers had begun to form habits with their internet use that involved certain trade‐offs in cost, centralization, and privacy.

To a significant percentage of AOL customers, AOL was simply synonymous with the internet, and by the late 1990s, AOL was by far the largest ISP in the United States. Meanwhile innovation on the actual open internet continued chugging along. On the infrastructure end, advances in broadband technology meant that for regular consumers, not just institutions and businesses, the internet was increasingly something that was always on, not dialed into, and getting much faster. On the content end, just as broadband access from phone and cable companies were making AOL's phone numbers largely obsolete, the evolution of search removed the need for AOL's protective surface layer.

People were building more and more websites—but how was anyone supposed to find them? Early on, the web had portals, directory websites with lists of links. Yahoo! was originally called “Jerry and David's Guide to the World Wide Web” and was simply a list of links. Eventually, portals were replaced by search engines, including Altavista, Lycos, and Yahoo! itself. Google came later and eventually won because their PageRank algorithm was better than other search engines. Google Search made it so much easier to access the website a user was looking for, while avoiding dangers and distractions, that eventually there was no need for users to operate inside an enclosed environment to get the most out of the internet. Increased user volume coupled with excellent machine‐learning algorithms conferred on Google the network effects that would make it a giant, with a sleek UX that was optimized into the single search bar.

By the early 2000s, social networking similarly provided users a mediated way to interact with the internet via a simplified UX. Although companies like WordPress would make it easier for users with no coding skills to publish their own websites, MySpace and other early social media sites enabled the noncoding majority to publish websites with the content and aesthetic qualities of their choice, at least within a standard template. From ancient astrology to the Myers‐Briggs to BuzzFeed quizzes, humans have always craved learning more about themselves and finding ways to wrap that information in standard packages to project to others. Social networking offered us that treat at scale: one's profile, which in the kinetic world might reach thousands of people over the course of a lifetime, in the world of bits could reach millions or billions at once, if only they would pay attention. Facebook would introduce tighter standardization across its profiles and, with perhaps unintended brilliance, launch into one of the most aspirational market segments: Harvard students. Expanding at first only to other Ivy League universities in the United States, one at a time, Facebook achieved a veneer of exclusivity and attracted a long line of colleges and individual users waiting behind their velvet rope to be admitted to the club.

Google and Facebook are signature institutions of what some in the 2000s began calling Web 2.0, and what today we might simply call Web2. Web2, which is where most of us currently spend our time online, ushered massive numbers of users onto the internet. They came to shop, chat, and learn. With the advances in interactivity presented by higher connection speeds and evolving software and hardware infrastructure—including the explosion of mobile internet technology catalyzed by the 2007 arrival of the iPhone—these users were now creating, posting, and consuming increasingly massive amounts of content, day and night, wherever they were. The companies that onboarded them offered real value propositions and were effective at saving people time and money, helping friends stay connected, and disseminating knowledge. Instead of visiting multiple libraries and bookstores, we could instantly order any book we desired on Amazon. Information appeared at the click of a mouse, and Wikipedia garnered so many contributions (and revisions) it became as accurate as Encyclopaedia Britannica.2 Decades after losing touch, without spending hours poring through dusty phonebooks, Facebook users reconnected with their childhood friends no matter where they lived. Even those who worried the most about sharing their credit card information became avid online shoppers as secure checkout systems emerged, thanks to a new generation of payment and e‐commerce companies like PayPal and eventually Shopify. Each of these platforms was incentivized to onboard as many internet users as possible, so they used the data they gathered to make the UX they offered easy and accessible to everyone.

The founders of Google and Facebook—even more than the leaders of AOL and CompuServe before them—were young engineers, not the corporate and government drones who had been the laughingstocks of Web1 hackers. They were creating more scalable value through software and building on fundamentally decentralized technologies on the open internet. But as their organizations grew and took on investors from the now‐booming Silicon Valley venture capital industry, they began facing commercial pressures. Namely, they needed to monetize their growing companies, and the best answer to the monetization question seemed to them and their investors to be found in advertising. Instead of companies charging users subscription fees, the users themselves would become the product—sifted, sorted, and sold to advertisers, who could use the data generated by users' online lives to target audiences with pinpoint accuracy. We would pay this price for the remarkable benefits of the internet today.

Google and Facebook were built on the open internet, rather than by creating an enclosed environment between the user and the internet as CompuServe or AOL had. But once users arrived on their websites, Google and Facebook could gather data on those users and hold it in centralized databases owned by those companies, as opposed to being visible and available on the open internet. These data silos were simply a new type of walled garden. A user wouldn't be aware of being tracked or having data about them collected. Instead, Facebook users would freely input their personal preferences (especially in the early days, listing favorite movies and books) and build a treasure trove of data with their activities on the platform, like the other profiles they chose to look at, whom they friended, whom they poked. Data collection was similarly unobtrusive to the Google user: Google's data collection engine hummed quietly in the background, feeding information about a user's searches, and eventually, once login, email, and the rest of the Google Suite were introduced, their personal identity.

What Google and Facebook learned about people personally—their interests, how they used the platform, and what they bought—powerfully informed the optimization of both platforms' UX to induce users into spending the maximum time on the platforms and maximally monetizing that time by exposing the users to advertising. For the first time, advertisers, or anyone at all who wanted to pay to reach people with any message, could pay to reach almost anyone, sorted by geography, age, income, preferences, or other identifiers.

By the 2010s, Facebook and Google had successfully disrupted the market for advertising, previously the domain of newspapers, magazines, and television stations, none of which could provide as direct access to users, as highly specified personal data about targets, or the low rates made possible by enormous scale. It was as if the newspaper boys of yesteryear had decided to unionize and demand an enormous share of subscription value because they were the ones with the direct access to the advertisement targets—what was termed in mediaspeak “the eyeballs,” the scarce resource that Facebook and Google were actually monetizing.

The traditional media that depended on advertising were done for. The same for much of the digital media. Their death knell was becoming reliant on Facebook and Google for access to their own audiences, putting their distribution in the hands of new intermediaries they naively believed shared their interests. Today, advertising‐based editorial media is almost completely dead, except for television, which is holding on longer. Other than TV, the only media companies that have persisted are legacy brands like the New York Times and Wall Street Journal, which can charge subscriptions, and those funded by billionaires or special interest groups for their own purposes that do not require the businesses to be profitable.

It's hard to say whether the young engineer founders of Google and Facebook were concerned they were causing harm. Both were executives of large companies bound by fiduciary duty to investors to grow the value of shares. Google was concerned enough to institute the unofficial motto “Don't be evil” (which it jettisoned in 2018) and has a reasonable argument to make that it adds positive value to billions of people's lives by indexing the world's information and organizing it to be discoverable. Similarly, Facebook's Mark Zuckerberg has insisted that connecting people with each other is inherently a social good, and indeed, users in disparate parts of the world who suffer from a rare disease can find moral support and raise funds in a Facebook group; a gay teen in a remote, politically conservative town can connect with others and learn they are not alone. Facebook and Google have undoubtedly led to lives being enriched and even saved. However, there are also strong arguments that companies such as Google and Facebook have caused significant ills, of the social, political, and economic varieties.

I will only briefly touch on the social and political havoc wrought by the technology giants that are now considered the problem children of Web2 to the degree these are relevant context for the emergence of Web3. From a social perspective, it's clear the interests of these platforms are fundamentally misaligned with those of the individual user. Let's imagine that a Facebook user wants to live a balanced life of sleeping, eating, working, using Facebook, and physically spending time with friends and family. But the Facebook corporation would rather they shirk their duties, constantly interrupt family dinner, and stay up later than is healthy at night—to spend more time on Facebook, so their company can then mine for data and monetize facing advertisers. There is also increasing concern about the mental health consequences of social networks. Intuitively, it doesn't seem particularly healthy for a girl in Poughkeepsie going through an awkward phase of puberty to be comparing herself to a supermodel in London on a platform that, far more effectively than a drugstore copy of People magazine, has been machine‐optimized to fit her brain to the point where she can't look away.

Politically, too, fault can be found with both Facebook and Google. Massive audiences on those platforms have been reached by unidentified advertisers and possibly adversarial countries with the intention of manipulating public opinion. And paid ads are only one part of the problem. Bots and click farms that deal in engagements, content sharing, and participation in groups account for an unknown percentage of activity on Web2 social media platforms. The algorithms that govern discoverability and visibility have tended to privilege content that provokes the strongest emotions, as opposed to that with the greatest factual accuracy. Some thinkers like Yuval Harari worry that ever‐optimizing machine‐learning algorithms will grow to understand us better than we know ourselves, undermining the basic idea of democracy: that each citizen inherently has their own views, and the best way to govern is by drawing out and generally heeding what the majority thinks. If we spend so much of our lives being manipulated by algorithms to the point where our views are no longer truly our own, can the fundamental unit of democracy—the informed citizen—still exist?

While Web1 laid the foundation for an open, accessible information‐sharing system, Web2 platforms are characterized by business models that are misaligned with users and sacrifice their interests in favor of shareholders’. From the perspective of early members of the Web3 community, the Facebook and Google business models epitomize the pitfalls of Web2. Many early Web3 founders conceived their projects as efforts to right the wrongs of a web whose original intentions were perverted into business models that aggregate personal data in walled gardens and monetize it in ways that cut users out of the value flow and benefit only the company shareholders. The rationale is one of economic fairness: if billions of individuals co‐created the data product that a company is monetizing, should they not also benefit from the value generated by monetizing an asset—their data—that is fundamentally theirs? Web2 companies might argue that individuals agreed to terms of service allowing their data to be used in this manner. But just because something is nominally legal doesn't mean it's fair, and the economic ramifications of this unfairness are increasingly visible.

The Pareto distribution in economics refers to a system where winners accumulate more over time and losers lose more over time, leading to a widening divide between those with more and those with less, reaching an equilibrium where the top 20% hold 80% of the value. Many systems in nature, such as the allocation of water to plants through root systems, over time look like a Pareto distribution, with the healthiest plants getting healthier and the least healthy plants increasingly dying. This is sometimes called a “winner‐take‐all distribution” and sometimes the “Matthew effect,” from the verse in the Gospel of Matthew, “For to all those who have, more will be given, and they will have an abundance, but from those who have nothing, even what they have will be taken away” (Matthew 25:29, New Revised Standard Version).

One of the most poignant effects of Web2 platforms is a widening Pareto distribution, whether in the context of how often a video is viewed on YouTube, a song is streamed on Spotify, or buyers are directed to a store on Amazon. Take the example of a musical artist on Spotify: if the main place to get access to listeners is Spotify, and hundreds of millions of listeners are on Spotify being served by algorithm and curated playlists, the small group of the most popular musicians will eventually receive an increasingly outsized share of total streams and therefore total economic returns from the platform. The bar for breaking into top playlists and attracting algorithmic attention is considerably higher than for attracting the attention of a local DJ. Then, if Spotify has a near‐monopoly on demand for streaming, it gains the leverage to pay very little to creators for intermediating their access to audiences (on top of the relatively little that record companies have always left for artists after taking out their cut for intermediating access to audiences).

The economics for a top streaming artist may still be favorable even at those rates, but may be prohibitive to the emerging or niche artist, who is forced to look to other revenue sources (like touring, merchandise, subscription‐style patronage) rather than profiting directly off the sale of music or streams. Streaming may generate more revenue for artists than the immediate prestreaming Web2 era, when users made digital copies of countless recordings available online for free—enriching both the networks who hosted the files (and advertised to downloaders) and the technology companies, like Apple, who benefited from users having access to free content to use on their devices. Nonetheless, Spotify's model does not currently allow many artists to enjoy a middle‐class income, even as it benefits from the value contributed by the vast array of musicians who feel they must participate in the dominant music market of the day. Web2 has stretched the Pareto distribution for success creating all kinds of content, while funneling profits to those who preside over these hyperefficient digital networks.3