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Copyright © 2015 by Richard Lodge
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PREFACE.
MODERN EUROPE.
INTRODUCTION.
CHAPTER I. EUROPE IN THE LATTER HALF OF THE 15TH CENTURY.
I. Italy from 1453 to 1494.
II. Germany from 1453 to 1519.
III. France from 1453 to 1494.
IV. Spain from 1453 to 1521.
V. Ottoman empire, 1453-1520.
CHAPTER II. WARS IN ITALY, 1494-1519.
CHAPTER III. RIVALRY BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE HAPSBURGS— FIRST PERIOD.
CHAPTER IV. THE REFORMATION.
I. Germany.
II. Switzerland.
III. Scandinavia.
IV. John Calvin and the Reformation in Geneva.
CHAPTER V. RIVALRY BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE HAPSBURGS.— SECOND PERIOD.
CHAPTER VI. CHARLES V. AND THE GERMAN REFORMATION. RENEWED WAR WITH FRANCE. 1532-1559.
CHAPTER VII. THE COUNTER-REFORMATION.
CHAPTER VIII. THE REIGN OF PHILIP II., AND THE REVOLT OF THE NETHERLANDS.
CHAPTER IX. FRANCE AND THE WARS OF RELIGION, 1559-1610.
CHAPTER X. GERMANY AFTER CHARLES V., AND THE THIRTY YEARS’ WAR.
CHAPTER XI. FRANCE UNDER RICHELIEU AND MAZARIN.
CHAPTER XII. THE LESSER STATES OF EUROPE IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.
I. Spain and Italy.
II. The Kingdoms of the North.
III. The Ottoman Turks.
CHAPTER XIII. THE AGE OF LOUIS XIV.
I. Louis’ Early Years.—Colbert’s Administration.
II. France at the Zenith of its Power.—Ascendancy of Louvois.
III. The Reunions. Religious Persecution. The league of Augsburg.
IV. War of the Spanish Succession.
V. Last Years of Louis XIV.
CHAPTER XIV. PETER THE GREAT AND CHARLES XII.
CHAPTER XV. FRANCE AFTER THE DEATH OF LOUIS XIV.
CHAPTER XVI. THE REIGN OF THE EMPEROR CHARLES VI.
CHAPTER XVII. PRUSSIA BEFORE THE ACCESSION OF FREDERICK THE GREAT.
CHAPTER XVIII. THE WAR OF THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION.
I. Maritime War between England and Spain.
II. The First Silesian War.
III. Period of Prussian Neutrality.
IV. The Second Silesian War.
V. Conclusion of the War.
VI. Russia and the Northern States during the War of THE Austrian Succession.
CHAPTER XIX. THE SEVEN YEARS’ WAR.
I. The Diplomatic Revolution in Europe.
II. Outbreak of the War.
III. The War from 1757 to 1760.
IV. Conclusion of the War.
CHAPTER XX EUROPE AFTER THE PEACE OF HUBERTSBURG.
I. Southern Europe and the fall of the Jesuits.
II. Eastern Europe and the First Partition of Poland.
III. The Bavarian Succession.
IV. Joseph II. and the League of Princes.
V. The Eastern Question, 1786-1792.
VI. The Second and Third Partitions of Poland.
CHAPTER XXI. THE REIGN OF LOUIS XVI.
CHAPTER XXII. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.
I. Fall Of The Old Régime, 5th Of May To 4th Of August, 1789.
II. The Constitution, 4th of August, 1789, to 30th of September, 1790.
III. Europe and the Revolution.
IV. The Legislative Assembly.—Outbreak of War.—Fall of the Monarchy.
CHAPTER XXIII. THE FRENCH REPUBLIC AND THE EUROPEAN COALITION.
I. The National Convention And The King’s Death.
II. Fall of the Gironde. Reign of Terror. Death of Robespierre.
III. Thermidorian Reaction. End of Convention. 27 July, 1794, to 26 October, 1795.
IV. The Directory. 26 October, 1796, to 9 November, 1799.
CHAPTER XXIV. EUROPE DURING THE AGE OF NAPOLEON.
I. The Consulate.
II. The Third Coalition.
III. The Peninsular War. Campaign of 1809 against Austria.
IV. The War of Liberation.
V. The Congress of Vienna and the Hundred Days.
CHAPTER XXV. EUROPE AFTER THE GREAT WAR.
I. Western Europe and the Holy Alliance.
II. Eastern Europe and the Independence of Greece.
III. France under Charles X. and the Revolution of 1830.
IV. Liberal Movements in Europe.
V. The Reign of Louis Philippe.
CHAPTER XXVI. REVOLUTION AND REACTION.
I. The Revolution in France.
II. The Revolution in Germany and Italy.
III. The Second Republic and the Second Empire in France.
CHAPTER XXVII. THE UNION OF ITALY AND GERMANY.
CHAPTER XXVIII. THE EASTERN QUESTION. 1830-1878.
A HISTORY OF MODERN EUROPE from the Capture of Constantinople by the Turks to the Treaty of Berlin , 1878
By Richard Lodge
THE OBJECT OF THIS WORK is to supply what undoubtedly does not exist at present a clear, impartial, and at the same time, a concise narrative of European history during the last four centuries. No attempt has been made to go into the details of the domestic history of each state, a task which would require as many volumes as there are states. Especially the history of England (which has been admirably treated in Professor Brewer’s recent edition of “The Student’s flume” in this series) has been omitted, except so far as it is directly connected with the history of the continental states.
One of the great difficulties has been that of arrangement. The Author has endeavoured to avoid the baldness of a chronological summary, and to group the history of the different states round the central current of European affairs. This method has necessitated frequent repetitions, but it appeared the lesser evil of the two. At the same time a full chronological table has been inserted at the beginning of the work.
The Author had prepared a number of genealogical tables to illustrate the family relationships which are of such importance for a clear understanding of European history. But they became so numerous and bulky as the work advanced, that it has seemed better to omit them, and to refer the reader to Mr. George’s “Genealogical Tables” (Second Edition, Oxford, 1875).
No single work has been taken as the basis of this book, and it would be impossible to refer to authorities without writing a bibliography of modern European history. The Author has spared no pains in consulting the best authors on each period, and has endeavoured to elicit the truth by a careful comparison of their statements. The amount of his success must be left to his readers to estimate.
WITHOUT DENYING THE ESSENTIAL UNITY of history, it is not only convenient but possible to draw a fairly well-marked line between certain periods. Such a line is that which is usually drawn between ancient and modern history at the fall of Rome. It was not true that Roman civilization ceased to affect the world, but a number of new influences came into working with the barbarian invasions, which were sufficient to mark a new epoch. Very similar is the line which can be drawn between the middle ages and later times. The two differ in innumerable points, in art, philosophy, language, literature, and commercial principles. But the historian is pre-eminently concerned with the radical difference in men’s conceptions of politics and society.
In the middle ages there was nothing which corresponds to the modern conception of the state as a nation. The political unit was not fixed as it is now, nor was it so large as now. In some places it was the feudal lord and his vassals, who were bound together by reciprocal duties of service and defence. Elsewhere it was the commune, the association of citizens under a more or less independent municipal government. In other places it was still smaller, the guild or voluntary association of men for some common object, either mercantile or religious. These and other similar bodies were the practical units of mediaeval politics.
But in theory they were not units at all. The political theorist regarded the whole of Christendom as forming one state, at once religious and political. This was the result of the influence of the Roman Empire, which fascinated the barbarians who broke it to pieces. This idea of unity lay at the root of the Holy Roman Empire, which in theory still represented the universal rule of Rome, long after it had lost all practical power and even influence The theory was rendered more fanciful by the separation of Church and State, unknown before the introduction of Christianity. The papacy rose side by side with the empire, and the medieval, world regarded itself as one state with two heads. The quarrels of emperors and popes did much to weaken the system which both represented. Thus in its theoretical unity and its practical division the political condition of Europe in the middle ages differed completely from that of our own times.
Its social condition differed no less. The unit was not smaller, but larger than it is now. The modern unit of society is the individual. In the middle ages the individual was powerless. He could only obtain separate importance as the holder of some office, as emperor, king, or bishop. Otherwise he must efface himself in a corporation. The social units of mediaeval times were the families, guilds, and corporations, which were in some cases also political units, but which, even when they had begun to form part of some larger whole, continued to exist as the bases of social life.
Though the two periods are thus distinctly divided, it is not possible to fix any absolute date of division. The fall of Constantinople in 1453, which brought the Eastern Empire to an end, which spread Greek literature and culture in western Europe, and which made the Turks a first-rate European power, serves as a convenient landmark. But the transition from the middle ages was going on throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The most notable points in the great change are: (1) the decline of the empire and the papacy; (2) the rise of the people, and their acquisition of a share in political power; (3) the formation of nations; (4) the rise of monarchy.
(1.) The practical power of the empire had been weakened by its long struggle with the papacy; it was almost destroyed by the great interregnum (1251-72) which followed the fall of the Hohenstaufen. The accession of Rudolf of Hapsburg restored order, but the empire had sunk to an ordinary territorial lordship, or something even less. But the papacy did not reap the expected advantage from the fall of its old rival. The championship of the temporal power fell to other and stronger hands. Philip IV. of France defeated and humbled Boniface VIII. Boniface’s successor, Clement V., transferred his residence from Rome to Avignon, and during a Babylonish captivity of seventy years (1305-77), the papacy was subservient to France. The enemies of France became the enemies of the pope This gave a great impulse to that national opposition to the papacy which did much to direct the course of the Reformation. The return to Rome in 1377 was followed by the outbreak of the great schism (1373-1417). Two popes, one in Rome, and one in Avignon, claimed the allegiance of Christians. In 1409 the Council of Pisa elected a third pope. The Council of Constance terminated the schism by the election of Martin V. But his successor Eugenius IV. embarked in a quarrel with the Council of Basel (1431-1449), in which the papacy was victorious, though it never really recovered its strength. From this time the popes sink more and more into temporal rulers of the States of the Church.
(2.) As the empire and papacy declined, a new power, that of the people, rose into prominence. In most European countries the towns had early established their right to form part of the political assemblies. But within the towns themselves democratic movements were going on in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The artisans revolted against the arbitrary rule of the merchants or city nobles. And gradually the conflict extended beyond the town-walls. The fourteenth century is an age of great popular movements. In 1291 the cantons of Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden formed their famous league. In 1315 their peasants defeated Leopold of Austria at Morgarten. Thus strengthened, the league extended itself and took in Lucerne in 1330, Zurich in 1350, Glaris, Zug and Berne in 1352. Thus was formed the league of the eight old cantons which in 1386 secured its independence by the victory of Sempach. Flanders was another important scene of popular progress. In 1302 the Flemish burghers defeated Philip IV. at Courtrai. The people found leaders in Jacob van Artevelde, the ally of Edward III., and Philip van Artevelde, who was ultimately slain at Rosbecque in 1382. In France Etienne Marcel headed a movement of the third estate in 1355, which aimed at first at constitutional reforms, but which degenerated into a selfish insurrection of the Parisian mob. This was accompanied in 1358 by the fearful peasant outbreak, called the Jacquerie. In England we find the Lollards teaching doctrines of democratic equality, and in 1381 the insurrection of Wat Tyler necessitated the enfranchisement of the villeins. In the fifteenth century we come to the greatest of these popular movements, that of the Hussites in Bohemia, which for twenty years threatened to proselytise by force, first Germany and then Europe. But it failed because it was too destructive, and because it offered no satisfactory substitute for the system which it attacked. These movements were by no means uniformly successful, but even when they failed they were not without results, and they testify to a general ferment, which is a sign of the breaking-up of old political forms.
(3.) With the rise of the people is intimately connected the rise of nations. Hitherto Europe had been mainly divided into classes. Chivalry was pre-eminently a class institution. Knighthood was a link between the upper classes of all countries. A French and a German knight had more in common with each other than either had with a citizen or peasant of his own country. But this came to an end as the lower classes forced their way upwards. Europe began to be divided vertically, instead of, as before, horizontally. The rise of nations was the result of the gradual growth of common interests which bound together the inhabitants of certain countries in opposition to the class-interests which had hitherto kept them divided. The most vivid form of common interest is common danger, and the chief creator of such danger has always been war. Thus the Hundred Years’ War created the French, and consolidated the English nation. In Spain the ancient and well-marked divisions of Castile, Aragon and Navarre proved very difficult to unite. The first impulse to union was the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella, who held the crowns of Aragon and Castile. They conquered Granada and crushed the Moors. Ferdinand annexed Navarre, but provincial jealousies continued to exist, and it was not till local life and independence had been stifled by the inquisition and the policy of Charles V. and Philip II., that the Spanish nation was crushed and created at the same time. Two countries, Germany and Italy, were complete exceptions to the rest of Europe. Germany, nominally united, was really a loose federation. Italy was the battle-ground for foreign powers, and had no unity of its own.
(4.) In all the nations which arose in Europe at the close of the middle ages, the growth of unity was accompanied by the rise of a strong monarchical power. The same causes were at work in both cases. The rise of the people, and the consequent weakening of class distinctions, as they aided the gradual union, so also they strengthened the central power. This was specially the case in France. There the crown allied itself with the third estate against the nobles, and thus raised itself till it could tyrannise equally over all classes. Foreign war too was as serviceable to monarchy as to nationality. Victory over the English enabled Charles V. and Charles VII. to found a power, which was rendered despotic by Louis XI. In England the whole course of events was different from that in France. But the result was not dissimilar. Lollard schemes of confiscation drove the church, formerly the champion of liberty, to the side of the crown. The nobles destroyed themselves in the Wars of the Roses. The commons by themselves were for a time powerless, and the Tudors established despotism. In Spain it was the successful wars, first against the Moors and then in Italy, that founded the power of the monarchy. The accession of Charles V. gave the crown the assistance of foreign territories. This power was ruthlessly employed by Charles and his son to crush more ancient and more firmly established liberties than existed in any other country in the middle ages. Germany and Italy are again exceptions. As they had no unity, so they could have no strong central power.
The period of transition is also marked by a great social change, viz., the rise to importance of the individual. This change is closely connected with the so-called Renaissance, which in its essence was the assertion of the rights of the individual against the mediaeval chains which had hitherto bound him down. Literature and art opened up a new career, over which the old restrictions had no control. The change was completed in the 16th century by the Reformation, which broke through the most oppressive trammels of the mediaeval system.
These then are the chief points of the great change which inaugurated modern history. The empire and papacy, the representatives of the old theoretical unity, lost their influence. That unity was replaced by large and united nations under powerful monarchies. Feudalism, chivalry, and the class interests which those institutions represented, were weakened by the rise of the people. And lastly, a vigorous attack was made on the repressive influence of the old system by the growth of freedom of thought and individual liberty. One may also mention without comment, the rise of national churches and of national literatures; the military change which substituted infantry for cavalry; the invention of gunpowder, which gave a death-blow to military feudalism; and the great scientific and geographical discoveries which opened up a new world of thought and action.
I. ITALY FROM 1453 TO1494.—§1. Decline of the imperial power. §2. Milan under the Sforzas. §3. Naples and Sicily under the House of Aragon. §4. The Papacy; growth of nepotism. §5. Florence under the Medici. §6. Venice; policy of territorial aggression. II. Germany from 1453 to 1519.—§7. Union of royal and imperial power; decline of central authority. §8. Chief principalities of Germany; the knights; the free cities; fatal results of German disunion; attempted reforms under Frederick III. §9. Hungary, Bohemia, and Poland; Ladislaus Postumus and the siege of Belgrad; Hungary and Bohemia separated from Austria; George Podiebrad and Matthias Corvinus. §10. Maximilian I.; reforms in the empire; advance of the House of Hapsburg. III. France from 1453 to 1494.—§11. Growth of the French monarchy; the dukes of Burgundy; the War of the Public Weal. §12. Rivalry of Louis XI. and Charles the Bold; importance of Louis’ reign. §13. Regency of Anne of Beaujeu; Charles VIII. prepares for his Italian expedition. IV. Spain from 1453 to 1521.—§14. Divisions of Spain; Navarre; Aragon; Castile. §15. Ferdinand and Isabella; fall of Granada; the royal family; Ferdinand’s rule after Isabella’s death. §16. Accession of Charles I.; revolt of the Communes. V. Ottoman Empire, 1453 to 1520.—§17. Causes of Turkish success; conquests of Mohammed II.; Bajazet II.; lull in Turkish aggression. §19. Selim.; conquest of Syria and Egypt.
§1. Italy and Germany, the two countries whose history stands out in complete contrast to the rest of Europe, were connected together by the fact that both were nominally subject to the same power, the Holy Roman Empire. This was the chief cause that neither of them attained to national unity. The Empire, by its nature, could not be hereditary. Elective princes held their power on very precarious terms; they had none of the ordinary motives for extending that power; and the electors were able to extort concessions which secured their own independence. Moreover, the attempt to rule two such distinct countries did much to destroy any real authority over either.
It was in Italy that the imperial power first became practical nullity. The Hohenstaufen were the last emperors who made a serious effort to rule the southern kingdom. The invasions of Henry VII. and of Lewis the Bavarian, only proved the vanity of such an effort. Charles IV. (1346-1378), the founder of the greatness of the Luxemburg house, with a self-control rare in that age, purposely left Italy to its fate. The decline of the imperial power enabled independent despots to establish their power in most of the Italian states. Nearly every city had its own petty dynasty, as the Estensi in Ferrara, the Gonzagas in Mantua, the Bentivogli in Bologna, and the Baglioni in Perugia. But the most important of the States subject to despotism were Milan in the north, and Naples and Sicily in the south.
§2. Milan was ruled from the beginning of the 14th century by the Visconti. In 1395, the emperor Wenzel gave to Gian Galeazzo Visconti the title of duke. But in 1447 his son Filippo Maria died without legitimate issue. After a short-lived effort to restore republican government, which failed through the jealousy of the neighbouring states, a successful military leader, Francesco Sforza, conquered Milan and established a new dynasty. His first task was to defend himself against Venice, the rival of Milan for the supremacy in northern Italy. But the news of the fall of Constantinople terrified the combatants, and the war was terminated by the peace of Lodi in 1454. From this time Francesco Sforza gave up his military career and devoted himself to the peaceful government of his duchy. His chief supports were the friendship of Louis XI. of France, and of the Florentine Cosimo de Medici. He also maintained a close alliance with the kings of Naples. His connection with France enabled Sforza to annex Genoa in 1464. This was his last great success; and he died in 1466 leaving Milan to his eldest son Galeazzo Maria. Galeazzo Sforza represents the worst type of an Italian despot; he was selfish, debauched, suspicious, and cruel. Fortunately the continued influence of his father’s ministers kept him for some time to a peaceful policy. The French alliance was cemented by his marriage with Pona of Savoy, whose sister was the wife of Louis XI. But Galeazzo was rash enough to alienate Louis by an alliance with Charles the Bold. The defeat of the latter at Granson (1476) compelled him to sue for pardon which was contemptuously granted. After ten years of tyranny and misgovernment, he was assassinated by three of the citizens whom he had grievously injured. He left an infant son, Gian Galeazzo, under the guardianship of Bona of Savoy. The guiding spirit of the regency was Francesco Simonetta, formerly secretary to Francesco Sforza and the devoted adherent of the policy of his former patron. The regency was attacked by the brothers of the late duke, who were indignant at their exclusion from power. They were foiled by Simonetta’s vigilance and forced to leave Milan. But Simonetta’s adherence to the Medici roused powerful enemies. Ferdinand of Naples and Sixtus IV., who were anxious to crush Florence, determined, as a preliminary, to overthrow the Milanese regency. They encouraged Lodovico Sforza, the ablest of the exiled princes, to renew his intrigues. In 1479, Simonetta was imprisoned and put to death, Bona of Savoy was removed from the regency, and Lodovico Sforza became supreme in Milan as the guardian of Gian Galeazzo. Lodovico was personally timid, but endowed with more than Italian cunning. His ambition was to supersede his nephew and to make himself duke. His unscrupulous pursuit of this object was destined to bring the greatest disasters upon Italy and ultimately upon himself.
§3. Naples and Sicily, in the 11th century, had been formed into one kingdom under Norman rule. Two centuries later they had been conquered by Charles of Anjou, brother of Louis IX. of France, who was called in by the popes to oppose the Hohenstaufen. But in 1282, a revolt, known as the Sicilian Vespers, drove the French from Sicily, and gave that island to the house of Aragon. From this time Naples and Sicily were divided until the extinction of the original house of Anjou by the death of Joanna II. in 1435. Alfonso V., already king of Aragon, Sicily, and Sardinia, now obtained the crown of Naples after a contest with Réné le Bon of Provence, the representative of a second Angevin line which was descended from Louis, brother of Charles V., and which rested its claims not on descent but on adoption. Alfonso V., by his patronage of literature and art, and by maintaining Naples in unwonted peace, has earned from historians the title of “the Magnanimous.” On his death in 1458, he left Aragon, Sicily, and Sardinia to his brother, John II., while Naples, as a more personal possession, he bequeathed to his natural son Ferdinand I. This arrangement was contested in Naples where the Angevin claim was revived. Réné le Bon resigned his pretensions to his son John of Calabria, who was at this time governor of Genoa for Charles VII. of France. At first John gained important successes. But other Italian powers were opposed to the establishment of French influence in Italy. Especially, Francesco Sforza, though formerly the enemy of the house of Aragon, now gave consistent support to Ferdinand. And John’s failure was assured when Charles VII. was succeeded in 1461 by Louis XI., who regarded with jealousy the house of Anjou. In 1464 John left Italy and showed his sense of Louis’ hostility by joining the league of French nobles against him. Ferdinand I. was now firmly established in Naples. His foreign policy will be best noticed in connection with the history of other states. At home his rule was in the highest degree oppressive and tyrannical, especially after the association in the government of his son, Alfonso of Calabria. The treacherous cruelty with which these princes treated the Neapolitan barons was one among the many circumstances which helped to bring the French into Italy.
§4. The papacy occupied a unique position among Italian powers. From a very early time the popes had endeavoured to supplement their universal spiritual authority by obtaining the secular rule of Rome and the neighbouring territory. Their claims were based on donations, real or pretended, of Roman emperors and Frankish kings. Their temporal dominions may be regarded as legally established by the cession of Rudolf of Hapsburg, and included Rome itself, the Patrimony of St. Peter, Romagna, and the March of Ancona. But the withdrawal of the popes to Avignon (13051377) enabled nobles and towns nominally subject to them, to throw off their allegiance, and the states of the church fell into the wildest anarchy. Cardinal Albornoz, as papal legate, restored the suzerainty of the popes, but only by confirming local independence. The Great Schism (1378-1417) again reduced the papal authority to a shadow. Martin V. (1417-1431) re-established his government in Rome, but only by identifying his interests with those of the Colonnas, his own family. Eugenius IV. (1431-1447), who endeavoured to abase the Colonnas, was driven by them from the city. But while he resided in Florence, his legates, Vitelleschi and Scarampo, reduced Rome to submission. Under Nicolas V. (1447-1458) a last attempt to revive republican independence in Rome was put down, and the ring-leader, Stephen Porcaro, was put to death. From this time the temporal sovereignty of the popes produced its natural result, nepotism. Men who had no chance of founding a dynasty, and who, elected in their old age, could expect but a short tenure of power, made their first object the aggrandisement of their relatives. Only one or two, more magnanimous than the rest, were roused by the Turkish advance to energetic labours on behalf of Christendom.
Calixtus III. (1455-1458) conferred the cardinal’s hat on his nephew, Rodrigo Borgia, who was destined to carry nepotism to its extreme, and to bring lasting discredit on the papacy. Pius II. (1458-1464), the famous Æneas Sylvius Piccolomini, redeemed a worldly and careless youth by devoted efforts to rouse the temporal princes to a crusade against the Turks. But the age of crusades was past; international jealousy and the desire of territorial aggrandisement were too powerful to allow any combination of European powers in a joint enterprise. The Congress of Mantua (1459) proved a complete failure, and Pius had to content himself with renewing the war between Venice and the Turks. The old pope died on the beach at Ancona, whither he had proceeded to superintend in person the embarkation of the crusading fleet. Paul II. (1464-1471), himself a Venetian, was expected to give great assistance to his countrymen. But he was absorbed in secular interests, and he even aided the Turks by impelling Matthias Corvinus, the ally of Venice, to make war on the Bohemian heretics. His successor, Sixtus IV. (1471-1484), was one of the worst popes even of the 15th century. He had five nephews: Girolamo and Pietro Riario, Lionardo, Giuliano and Giovanni della Rovere. All of them were raised to distinction either within or without the church. For Girolamo Riario he obtained Imola and Forli; and the endeavour to carve out a principality for this favoured nephew involved Italy in wars which still more divided the country and prepared the way for foreign invasion. Innocent VIII. (1484-1492), far less active than his predecessor, is notorious as the first pope who openly acknowledged his own children. But he was content to enrich his son, Franceschetto Cibo, with the spoils of the Roman curia, without attempting to alienate papal territories in his favour. On Innocent’s death, the most prominent aspirants to the tiara were Giuliano della Rovere, nephew of Sixtus IV., and afterwards pope as Julius II., and Ascanio Sforza, the younger brother of Lodovico. As neither could obtain the requisite majority, the cardinals allowed their votes to be purchased by Rodrigo Borgia, the nephew of Calixtus III., who in 1492 became pope with the title of Alexander VI.
§5. There were only two important states in Italy whose government was professedly republican, Florence and Venice. The liberties of Florence had long been undermined, first by the Albizzi, (1378-1434), and afterwards by the Medici. Cosimo de Medici, the founder of the greatness of his family, headed the opposition to the Albizzi as the champion of the lower classes. In 1433 Rinaldo Albizzi procured the banishment of his rival. But during his absence a revolution took place, the Albizzi were driven into exile, and Cosimo returned from Venice to become the ruler of Florence. He was careful to disguise his supremacy by the maintenance of constitutional forms and by retaining the habits of life of a private citizen. He found his chief supports in the favour of the lower classes and the wealth which he obtained by commerce. He was a distinguished patron of art and literature. By maintaining friendly relations with Milan on the one side and Naples on the other, he was able to act as a mediator in Italian politics. He died in 1464, and the title of pater patriae was inscribed upon his tomb. His son Piero (1464-9), who succeeded him in middle age, had to confront a confederacy of powerful citizens who were jealous of the Medici supremacy. But though the conspirators were supported by Venice, always jealous of the commercial prosperity of Florence, they were defeated; and Piero, in spite of the ill-health which crippled him, left his family more powerful at his death than it had been at his accession.
Piero left two sons, Lorenzo and Giuliano, the elder of whom now became the ruler of Florence, and has obtained a great name in history. For nine years he governed in peace and prosperity. He was careful to follow his grandfather’s policy, and to maintain the alliance with Milan and Naples. But his power was shaken and almost destroyed by a quarrel with Sixtus IV. Lorenzo had gone in person to congratulate the pope on his accession, and the Medici had been appointed receivers of the papal revenues. This good understanding did not last long. Sixtus gave the archbishopric of Pisa to Francesco Salviati, but Pisa was subject to Florence, and Lorenzo refused to recognise the appointment. A far more important cause of quarrel was the opposition of the Medici to the pope’s schemes on behalf of Girolamo Riario. The Florentines were hostile to the creation of a new dynasty in Romagna, and when Sixtus wished to borrow money for the purchase of Imola, the Medici refused the loan. Their post at Rome was taken from them and given to the Pazzi, another and hostile Florentine family. But the pope, not content with this, wished to destroy the Medici supremacy in Florence. With his sanction a conspiracy was formed by Girolamo Riario, Salviati, and the Pazzi. It is doubtful whether the pope was cognisant of the scheme for assassinating the two brothers. On Palm Sunday, 1478, the attempt was made in the cathedral of Florence. Giuliano de Medici was slain, but the priests who had been specially chosen to commit the sacrilege of murder in a church, failed in their attack on Lorenzo, and he escaped, though wounded, to the sacristy. The city rose in his defence, and prompt vengeance was taken on the conspirators. Salviati, in his archiepiscopal robes, was hanged with his colleagues from the windows of the Palazzo Vecchio. The news of these events infuriated Sixtus IV., who excommunicated the Florentines, and concluded an alliance against them with Ferdinand of Naples. Thus the balance of the Italian states, which had been so dear to Cosimo de Medici and Francesco Sforza, was suddenly overthrown. Hitherto Milan, Florence, and Naples had stood together, and had been strong enough to maintain the peace against Venice and the papacy. Now Italy was geographically divided into two hostile leagues; in the north, Milan, Venice, and Florence; in the south, Naples and the pope.
In the war which followed Florence was reduced to the greatest straits. Venice was a feeble and vacillating ally; Milan rendered what assistance it could, but, as has been seen, the friendly government of Simonetta was weakened and overthrown by the intrigues of Ferdinand of Naples. Lorenzo de Medici relied with confidence on the support of France. Louis XI. sent Philippe de Commines to Florence, but an envoy without troops could effect nothing. Thus Florence was left to its own defence. Alfonso of Calabria took Siena and a number of the Florentine fortresses. But fortunately a coolness sprang up between the pope and his ally, and Lorenzo took advantage of this to pay a personal visit to Ferdinand. With him he concluded a separate treaty, which was at last reluctantly accepted by Sixtus IV. Florence was not yet out of danger, as Alfonso of Calabria tried to obtain permanent possession of Siena. But the capture of Otranto by the Turks in 1480 compelled the Neapolitan troops to withdraw for the defence of their own country.
The failure of the conspiracy of the Pazzi and the extrication of Florence from pressing danger, strengthened the hands of Lorenzo. He was now able to make his government more despotic, and to get rid of many of the popular forms which had hitherto hampered him. The citizens began to address him with a servility hitherto unknown, and Florence witnessed the establishment of a splendid court, which resembled while it surpassed the courts of the northern despots. Lorenzo was himself a poet of no mean capacity, and his munificent patronage of art and literature, while it benefited Italy and the world, has helped to give him too lofty a reputation. His abilities, both as a ruler and a diplomatist, were unquestionable. But his honesty was not above the conventional Italian standard, and by destroying Florentine freedom he helped to degrade the political life of Italy. Lorenzo found it impossible to combine, as Cosimo had done, the functions of a statesman and a man of business. As the political power of the Medici increased, their mercantile profits diminished, and there can be no doubt that Lorenzo employed the public funds to support his own failing credit. But his name was gratefully remembered in Italy as the successful advocate of peace. When war was inevitable he laboured to maintain the balance of power. His death in 1492, at the early age of 41, was felt as a national disaster, and his best fame is the general belief that had he lived longer he might have averted many of the subsequent troubles from Italy.
Lorenzo left three sons; Piero, who succeeded him, Giovanni, afterwards famous as pope Leo X., and Giuliano. His brother Giuliano, the victim of the Pazzi conspiracy, had left a natural son, Giulio, who plays a prominent though ill-fated part in later history as Clement VII. The Florentines were soon made conscious of the loss they had sustained. Piero de Medici was as rash as his father had been prudent. He irritated the citizens by his contemptuously public assumption of despotic authority. And his foreign policy was still more ruinous. Deserting the traditional policy of his family, he identified his interests wholly with Naples, and thus alienated Milan just at a time when the unity of Italy was required to avert a foreign invasion.
§6. Perhaps the most prominent of Italian states in the eyes of Europe was Venice. The stability of its institutions, its commercial wealth, and the success of its cautious policy, combined to dazzle both philosophers and practical politicians. The Venetian government was a close and suspicious oligarchy. Power was confined to those families whose names were inscribed in the Golden Book. But among them a number of institutions had been devised which gradually restricted executive power to fewer and fewer hands, and thus secured that secresy which the Venetians regarded as the highest object of government. In the 15th century the famous Council of Ten was supreme in Venice.
Ever since the fourth crusade (1204), Venice had held important possessions in Eastern Europe, and had enriched itself with the commerce of the Levant. But the advance of the Turks had diminished their territories and crippled their commerce. To compensate themselves for these losses in the east, they aimed at increasing their power in Italy. Under the famous doge, Francesco Foscari (1425-1457), they acquired large possessions, and contested with Milan the supremacy in northern Italy. But the acquisition of empire diverted the Venetians from their true task, and in the end proved fatal to their greatness.
When Constantinople fell, the Venetians were most immediately concerned in resisting the Turks. But the party of peace, which had opposed the aggressive policy of Foscari, had now the upper hand, and the republic concluded a separate treaty with Mohammed II., by which it expected to secure its own interests while sacrificing those of Europe. Soon afterwards Foscari, who had been already attacked through his son, was compelled to resign, and died as the bells were ringing to announce the election of a new doge. But the selfish policy of his opponents proved a failure. The Turks annexed Greece and most of the adjacent islands, and the Venetians were at last compelled to take up arms. In the war they met with great and almost unmixed reverses, and in 1479 they concluded the ignominious treaty of Constantinople, by which they surrendered great part of their territories, and consented to hold the rest as tributaries of the Sultan. It was but a slight compensation that they were able soon afterwards to annex Cyprus. The last king, James of Lusignan, had married a Venetian lady, Catharine da Cornaro, whom the republic adopted as a daughter. On the king’s death (1473), the Venetians stepped in as guardians of the widow, and before long compelled her to abdicate in their favour.
The Venetians now devoted themselves to a policy of selfish aggrandisement in Italy. Always hostile to Naples, they were suspected, not without reason, of encouraging the Turks to attack Otranto. And in 1482 they commenced a wholly unprovoked war against their neighbour, the duke of Ferrara. Sixtus IV., hoping to turn a disturbance in Romagna to the profit of Girolamo Riario, allied himself with them. The Venetians seized the Polesine of Rovigo, and the duke of Ferrara was brought to the verge of ruin. But Lorenzo de Medici considered that the war threatened the balance of power, and formed a league for the defence of Ferrara with Ferdinand of Naples and Lodovico Sforza. Thus the old balance of the Italian states, which had been overthrown after the Pazzi conspiracy, was restored, a great triumph for Lorenzo’s diplomacy. Sixtus, finding that he was excluded from all share in the Venetian spoils, joined the league, and Venice was reduced to great straits. But Lodovico Sforza had become suspicious of the Neapolitan rulers, who were inclined to support his nephew against him; He opened relations with the Venetian commander, Robert of San Severino, and negotiated the treaty of Bagnolo which closed the war in 1484. By this the Venetians retained the Polesine, and the duke of Ferrara was the only sufferer. Sixtus IV. was extremely chagrined at the news of the treaty, and died soon afterwards as the lampooners would have it of peace. In this war the Venetians had displayed a selfish contempt for Italian interests which boded ill for the country in its coming trials.
§7. Germany, like most the European states, was subject to a king. He was chosen by seven electors, the Archbishops of Mainz, Koln, and Trier, the count palatine of the Rhine, the duke of Saxony, the margrave of Brandenburg, and the king of Bohemia. By a series of events, which it is beyond our province to trace, the German king had come to be regarded as the head of the Holy Roman Empire, the apex of the political system as the pope was of the hierarchy. He assumed the title of King of the Romans on election, and the higher title of Emperor after coronation by the pope. This combination of two offices in themselves distinct, had important results. The monarchy remained elective, because the highest temporal dignity on earth could hardly be confined to a single family. And the vague nature of the more lofty authority tended to make the royal power equally vague and indistinct. The German monarchy, in the early middle ages the strongest in Europe, had sunk by the 15th century to be the weakest and most neglected. The princes who nominally acknowledged the imperial authority had made themselves practically independent.
This had not taken place without numerous efforts to prevent it. Charles IV. (1346-1378) whose policy has long been an unsolved puzzle, tried to get rid of the profitless burden of the empire and to found a territorial monarchy like that in France and England. But he died before this could be accomplished, and his sons had neither the will nor the ability to complete his schemes. Under his successor Wenzel, a schism broke out (1400-1411) which was almost as fatal to the empire as the contemporary schism in the church to the papacy.
From this time the main interest of German history centres round the efforts which were made to form a federal union in place of the monarchy, and thus to repress disorder. The Hussite war gave a great impulse to such attempts, and notable changes were proposed, especially in 1427, by Frederick I., the first Hohenzollern margrave of Brandenburg. His scheme was to found an imperial standing army and to inaugurate regular assemblies and a system of common taxation. But he was foiled by the party among the princes which regarded anarchy as the best security for their own independence. In 1438 this party secured the election of Albert of Austria. From this time to the fall of the empire in 1806 it remained practically hereditary in the house of Hapsburg. This family represented devotion to dynastic interests, and did nothing for the unity of Germany. During the long reign of Frederick III. (1440-1494) that unity seemed likely to disappear altogether.
The German diet was a purely feudal assembly, and contained only direct tenants in chief of the empire. This secured the power of the princes, as their subjects had no share in the assembly. The diet was divided into three chambers which sat separately. The first comprised the six electors, excluding the king of Bohemia who took no part in the diet. Next came the princes, both lay and ecclesiastical, and thirdly, the deputies of the free imperial cities, who had obtained a place in the diet in the 14th century, but were looked down upon by the other chambers
§8. The most prominent of the German states were Brandenburg, Saxony, the Palatinate, Bavaria, Austria and Wurtemburg. Brandenburg had been given by Sigismund in 1415 to the house of Hohenzollern, previously burgraves of Nuremberg, and the ancestors of the later kings of Prussia. Saxony, on the extinction of the male Welf line in 1422, had fallen to the house of Wettin. This was now represented by two brothers, Ernest and Albert, who agreed in 1484 to divide their territories by the treaty of Leipzig. Ernest kept Saxe-Wittenberg and Thuringia with the electoral title, while Albert took the remaining territories with the title of duke. The Palatinate was held by the elder branch of the house of Wittelsbach. The death of Lewis IX. in 1449 left the country to an infant son Philip under the guardianship of his uncle Frederick. This Frederick the Victorious, who obtained a great reputation, was allowed on the plea of the troubled times to supplant his nephew in the electorate on condition that he would never marry. The emperor Frederick III. refused to ratify this agreement, and found an implacable opponent in the able and energetic elector. On the death of Frederick the Victorious in 1476, the Palatinate passed again to his nephew Philip. Bavaria was held by a younger branch of the same house of Wittelsbach, and was weakened at this time by division into three duchies, Ingolstadt, Landshut and Munich. The two former lines became extinct, and in 1502 Bavaria was reunited under Albert II. of Munich.
Austria, the most powerful of the non-electoral territories, had been acquired in the 13th century by Rudolf, count of Hapsburg in Swabia, who was also king of the Romans. His descendants had since occasionally held the empire, and from 1438 obtained uninterrupted possession of that dignity. But the most striking point in their history hitherto was their steady acquisition of territories in the east. One after another, Styria, Carinthia and Tyrol had been annexed, and for a time Hungary and Bohemia were subject to them. Like other German families, the Hapsburgs had often been weakened by the practice of subdivision, but under Frederick III. and his son Maximilian, all the family territories were reunited. From this time the Hapsburgs became a prominent European power. Wurtemberg, previously a small country, was raised to the rank of a duchy in 1495 for Eberhard the elder.
It is obvious that German unity had little chance amidst the jarring interests of so many independent princes. But this was not the worst evil under which the country suffered. Below the princes were an important body of lesser nobles, the knights or Ritters. They claimed to be independent of any power except the empire, but they were excluded from the diet. Thus they had no interest in the general welfare and fought for their own hand. Living in stray and isolated castles, they organised a regular system of highway-robbery which destroyed peaceful industry. At the same time by incessant feuds with the princes and among themselves they kept the country involved in civil strife.
The free cities were the most progressive and promising elements of German political life. Many of them had acquired great wealth, which with their fortifications made them important. But the opposition of their interests to those of the princes and knights compelled them to pursue a selfish policy, and thus they too were a hindrance rather than a help to the unity of Germany.
The evil results of German division were clearly visible in the gradual falling away of border-territories, and in the aggressions of foreign princes. Italy had already gone. When Frederick III. went to Rome in 1452 to receive the imperial crown, he was compelled to go without an armed retinue and to leave the country directly after the ceremony. The Swiss cantons, which had established their independence in opposition to the Hapsburgs, would pay no obedience to the empire while it was held by that house. In the north the Hanseatic League, which was strong enough to overcome both Scandinavian kings and German princes, stood practically outside the empire. The kings of Poland gained constant successes against the Teutonic knights, who in 1486 were compelled to cede great part of their territories and to hold the rest under Polish suzerainty. But the most considerable losses of Germany were in the west. The dukes of Burgundy, members of the royal family of France, had obtained, by marriage, conquest or cession, a number of imperial provinces, which they annexed to large French possessions. There was little doubt that Charles the Bold (1466-1477) intended to fuse these provinces into an independent kingdom, and was only prevented by a series of unforeseen accidents which terminated in his death.
In the face of these disasters and the still graver dangers which were threatened by the Turks, Frederick III. remained obstinately inactive. The princes, who had elected him mainly on account of his inactivity, began to repent when they discovered that they were left defenceless. A scheme was formed to depose him and to elect George Podiebrad, the Hussite king of Bohemia. But in face of this common danger, those old rivals, the empire and the papacy, formed a close alliance, and the scheme fell through. But the desire for reform had been roused and could not now be suppressed, though it was diverted to another direction. As the emperor would do nothing, the task of reform fell upon the estates. The first need was to put an end to private wars, and the measure known as the Public Peace was passed by successive diets from 1466 to 1486. But it was found to be of little use to make laws while there was no machinery to enforce them. An attempt was therefore made in 1486 to extort from Frederick III. the establishment of a central judicial court, the Imperial Chamber. But Frederick clung obstinately to his traditional rights, and succeeded in postponing reform during his lifetime. Some success, however, was attained. In 1488 the Swabian League was formed of princes, knights and citizens to decide disputes by arbitration. In 1492 the league, supported by the empire, gained a great success in compelling Albert II. of Bavaria to cede territories which he held unlawfully.
The reign of Frederick III. is of primary importance in the history of the house of Hapsburg. By marrying his son Maximilian to Mary, the heiress of Burgundy (1477), he founded the European greatness of his family. But in spite of this and other successes, in his personal relations with his subjects and his neighbours he was hardly more fortunate than in the empire.
§9. In the fifteenth century the eastern kingdoms, Hungary, Bohemia, and, Poland had an importance quite out of proportion to their present condition. This was due, in the case of Hungary, to its position as a barrier against the Turks, in the case of Bohemia and Poland, to the great conflict between the Germans and the Slavs. In the eleventh century the Slavs occupied northern Germany almost to the North Sea. From this territory they had been gradually driven eastwards, first by the dukes of Saxony, then by the Hanse towns, and lastly by the Teutonic knights, who occupied Prussia. Thus the southern coast of the Baltic became German. But in the fifteen century the tide of victory turned. The house of Jagellon obtained Poland in 1386, and undertook the championship of the Slavs. From this time they were engaged in constant war with the Teutonic Order. The Hussite movement in Bohemia was to a great extent a national revolt against German influences. The height of the Slavonic reaction was reached in 1466, when the peace of Thorn annexed great part of Prussia to Poland.
The Emperor Albert II. (1438-9) had been the first to unite Hungary and Bohemia to Austria. But he died within two years of making this acquisition, and his only son, Ladislaus Postumus, was not born till after his death in 1440. Austria and Bohemia acknowledged the infant prince, but the Hungarians, under the influence of John Huniades, chose Ladislaus VI, of Puland. The Polish king was killed in 1444 at the battle of Varna, and Hungary also acknowledged Ladislaus Postumus, who had been placed under the guardianship of Frederick III. It was not till 1453 that he became independent at the age of fourteen. Hungary and Bohemia remained under regents, John Huniades and George Podiebrad. Ladislaus himself fell under the influence of an Austrian noble, the Count of Cilly, who tried to make him jealous of the other governors, especially of Huniades. But the latter’s presence in Hungary was now a European necessity. Mohammed II., who had paused after the capture of Constantinople in 1453, resumed his advance, and in 1456 laid siege to Belgrad. Belgrad stands at the junction of the Danube and the Save, and its capture would have opened to the Turks, not only Hungary but the whole of Germany to the Rhine. At this crisis Huniades, assisted by a friar Capistrano, but neglected by the European princes, raised an untrained and ill-equipped force. With this he first destroyed the Turkish fleet on the Danube, and having thus secured an entrance to the fortress, he repulsed the assault of the whole Turkish army. Mohammed II., completely defeated, fled to Sofia. Soon after this marvellous success, Huniades died, leaving two sons Ladislaus and Matthias. The elder son murdered Cilly, the king’s favourite, at Belgrad, and for this was put to death in 1477. The younger, Matthias, was carried a prisoner to Prague. There, in the midst of preparations for his marriage with Madeleine, daughter of Charles VII. of France, Ladislaus Postumus died of the plague (Dec. 1457). His death severed the connection of Hungary and Bohemia with Austria for more than half a century.
Austria being a male fief, passed without question to the three surviving Hapsburg princes, and ultimately to Frederick III. But in Bohemia and Hungary the settlement of the succession was far more difficult. Ultimately it was decided to pass overall dynastic claims, whether based upon treaties or hereditary right. Hungary, to show its sense of the heroic and ill-requited services of Huniades, elected his surviving son Matthias Corvinus. Bohemia, in defiance of German claims and in still more open defiance of the papacy, gave the crown to the Utraquist leader, George Podiebrad.
Matthias Corvinus emulated the achievements of his father as the champion of Europe against the Turks. But unfortunately he became involved in quarrels with his neighbours. Ecclesiastical intolerance could not endure a Hussite on the Bohemian throne. Pope Paul II. issued a bull deposing Podiebrad, and entrusted its execution to Matthias. The war between Hungary and Bohemia was still going on when Poliebrad died in 1471. The Bohemians, to obtain the support of the other Slavs, now elected Wladislaus, the son of the king of Poland. Matthias himself claimed the crown and carried on the war with great vigour. Frederick III., who had been his ally, deserted him to go over to Wladislaus. In 1479, the treaty of Olmütz was concluded between Hungary and Bohemia, by which Lausitz, Moravia and Silesia were ceded to Matthias. He now turned his arms against Austria and, in 1485, captured Vienna. The lord of the world became an exile from his own capital. Under Matthias, Hungary reached the zenith of its power. He died in 1490, and his subjects elected as his successor his former rival, Wladislaus of Bohemia. Maximilian, Frederick III.’s son, now recovered Vienna, and even invaded Hungary, but without permanent result. In 1491 the treaty of Pressburg restored all Austrian territories to Frederick III., and the succession in Hungary and Bohemia was secured to the Hapsburgs on the extinction of the male descendants of Wladislaus.
§10. Soon afterwards Frederick III. died in August, 1493. Maximilian, who was already lord of the Netherlands by his marriage with Mary of Burgundy, and who had been elected King of the Romans in his father’s lifetime, now obtained the empire and all the Austrian territories. The accession of a young and vigorous prince gave a new impulse to the schemes of reform which had been foiled by the obstinacy of Frederick III.
In 1495 Maximilian summoned the important diet of Worms. He himself wanted money to oppose the French in Italy, and the estates, under the guidance of the elector Berthold of Mainz, took advantage of his needs to demand constitutional concessions. A general tax, the “Common Penny,” which had been one of the schemes of 1427, was now imposed in proportion to the population. Its collection and expenditure were entrusted, not to the emperor, but to nominees of the estates. The Public Peace was again enjoined, and to enforce it a great reform was made in the supreme court of justice. Hitherto it had always followed the emperor, and its members had been appointed by him. It was now fixed in a definite place, its members were appointed by the diet, and the president alone was nominated by the emperor. This reformed court, the Imperial Chamber, plays a great part in later German history.
But these reforms did not produce immediate results of importance. Maximilian had only accepted them to further his foreign policy. As that policy proved unsuccessful, he was by no means anxious to fulfil his engagements and to weaken his personal power. Constant struggles ensued between him and Berthold of Mainz, the leader of the constitutional party. In 1502 fresh concessions were extorted from the king. A Council of Regency (Reicshsregiment