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- Herausgeber: Charles River Editors
- Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
- Sprache: Englisch
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Seitenzahl: 338
Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2018
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A JOURNAL OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE QUEEN’S RANGERS
John Simcoe
LACONIA PUBLISHERS
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Copyright © 2016 by John Simcoe
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION.
A JOURNAL, &c.
A JOURNAL OF THE OPERATIONS
OF THE QUEEN’S RANGERS,
FROM THE END OF THE YEAR 1777
TO THE CONCLUSION OF THE LATE AMERICAN WAR
BY
Lieutenant-Colonel SIMCOE,
COMMANDER OF THE LATE AMERICAN WAR.
INTRODUCTION.
THE WRITER OF THESE MEMOIRS has been induced to print them by a variety of reasons, among which the following are included. Actions erroneously attributed to Others may be restored to Those who really performed them: His own memory may be renewed, and preserved in their bosoms, whose patronage and confidence he acknowledges with pride and gratitude; while, at the same time, he bears testimony to the merits of those excellent officers and soldiers whom it was his good fortune to command, during the late war in America: a war which he always considered as forced upon Great Britain, and in which he served from principle. Events, however unfortunate, can neither alter its nature nor cancel his opinion. Had he supposed it to have been unjust, he would have resigned his commission; for no true soldier and servant of his country will ever admit that a British officer can divest himself of the duties of a citizen, or in a civil contest is bound to support the cause his conscience rejects.
The command of a light corps, or, as it is termed, the service of a partizan, is generally esteemed the best mode of instruction for those who aim at higher stations; as it gives an opportunity of exemplifying professional acquisitions, fixes the habit of self-dependance for resources, and obliges to that prompt decision which in the common rotation of duty subordinate officers can seldom exhibit, yet without which none can be qualified for any trust of importance. To attain this employment was therefore an early object with the author; nor could he be diverted from his purpose by the shameful character of dishonesty, rapine, and falsehood, supposed to attend it; at least by those who formed their judgment on the conversation of such officers as had been witnesses to the campaigns in Germany. He had fairer examples to profit from; as the page of military history scarcely details more spirited exertions in this kind of service, than what distinguishingly marked the last civil commotions in England; and Massey’s well known saying, “that he could not look upon the goods of any Englishman as those of an enemy,” delineated the integrity of the citizen, and the honourable policy of the soldier.
His intimate connection with that most upright and zealous officer the late Admiral Graves, who commanded at Boston in the year 1775, and some services which he was pleased to entrust him with, brought him acquainted with many of the American Loyalists: from them he soon learned the practicability of raising troops in the country whenever it should be opened to the King’s forces; and the propriety of such a measure appeared to be self-evident. He therefore importuned Admiral Graves to ask of General Gage that he might enlist such negroes as were in Boston, and with them put himself under the direction of Sir James Wallace, who was then actively engaged at Rhode Island, and to whom that colony had opposed negroes; adding to the Admiral, who seemed surprised at his request, “that he entertained no doubt he should soon exchange them for whites:” General Gage, on the Admiral’s application, informed him that the negroes were not sufficiently numerous to be serviceable, and that he had other employment for those who were in Boston.
When the army sailed from Halifax for Staten island, the author was Captain of the grenadier company of the 40th regiment, and during the time of winter quarters at Brunswick, in 1776, went purposely to New-York to solicit the command of the Queen’s Rangers, then vacant. The boat he was in, being driven from the place of its destination, he was exceedingly chagrined to find that he had arrived some hours too late: but he desired that Col. Cuyler, Sir William Howe’s Aid-de-Camp, would mention his coming thither to him, as well as his design. On the army’s embarking for the Chesapeake, he wrote to General Grant, under whom he had served, requesting his good offices in procuring him a command like that of the Queen’s Rangers, if any other corps intended for similar employment should be raised in the country, to which the expedition was destined.
These circumstances are related, not only as introductory to the subsequent journal, but to show how very early his thoughts were bent on attaining the command of a corps raised in America, for the active duty of light troops.
The journal, as it is in its own nature, not generally interesting, and guarded from any observations foreign to the subject, he by no means wishes to obtrude upon the public; but hopes it will be favourably received by those to whom he shall offer it as a testimony of respect, and with whom it may claim some indulgence, as the particular nature and event of the American war gives a degree of consequence to operations however minute: for it terminated not in the loss of some petty fortress, or trivial island, but in the divulsion of a continent from a continent; of a world from a world.
The officer who conducts a light corps properly, will in his small sphere make use of the same principles which Generals apply to the regulation of armies. He will naturally imitate the commanders under whom he serves; while the individuals of his corps (for in such a service only individuals become of importance) will manifest a spirit which probably the whole army may possess without having similar opportunities of calling it into action.
History cannot produce examples of more ardent zeal in the service of their country, than that which characterised the British officers and soldiers in America. They despised all those conveniences without which it would be thought impracticable for European armies to move. They did not tamely wait for the moment of exertion in the precise line of their duty, but boldly sought out danger and death; and no sooner was one officer lost on any hazardous service than many competitors appeared to succeed in the post of honour. It was this spirit which, among uncommon difficulties, so frequently triumphed over numbers of brave, skilful, and enterprising opponents. The British soldier who thought himself superior, actually became so; and the ascendancy which he claimed was in many instances importantly admitted by his antagonists. Nor was this spirit, the result of principle, confined to the operations of the field: it was shown in the hour of civil persecution and rigorous imprisonment; in situations where coolness supplies the place of activity, and thought precedes execution. General Gage in a celebrated letter to Washington at the commencement of the war, had said, “that such trials would be met with the fortitude of martyrs;” and the behaviour of the loyalists amply confirmed his prophesy.
The British Generals were commonly obliged to hazard their armies without any possibility of retreat in case of misadventure: they trusted to the spirit and discipline of their troops; and the decision, with which they risked themselves, forms the most striking and singular feature of the American war. Nor was this only done when the armies were in their full force; by Sir William Howe in his campaigns, particularly in the glorious battle of the Brandywine; by Sir Henry Clinton in his celebrated march through the Jersies; by Earl Cornwallis in a latter period at Guildford, when the war was transferred to the Carolinas; and eminently by Lord Rawdon, who was
“Left to bide the disadvantage of a field
“Where nothing but the sound of Britain’s name
“Did seem defensible;”—but the same spirit was infused into the smallest operations; and the light troops in their enterprises, confident in the superiority of their composition, scarcely admitted the idea of retreat, or calculated against the contingency of a repulse. An account of the Queen’s Rangers, and their operations, will elucidate the preceding positions; show in such a point of view their similitude to the British army, and contain, as it were, an epitome of its history.
This Journal alleges no fact but what the author believes to be true; the frequent introduction of his own name may appear redundant, but is absolutely necessary to the perspicuity of the work. He never valued himself so highly on the actions which it was his good fortune to perform to the satisfaction of his superiors, as voluntarily to prescribe them for the boundaries of his professional ambition. Yet, as a British officer, should he live to double the number of years which he has already devoted to the service of his country, it is scarcely possible that he shall ever be appointed to so important a trust as that which he solicited, when he offered to fortify and maintain Billing’s Port: And as an European soldier, and an European subject, what field for honourable enterprise can ever be so wide, as that which he would have expatiated in, had he according to his own plan, joined the Indians; directed them to collateral exertion; and associating the loyalists of the back countries zealous in the British cause, united them with the enemies of Congress; set before them the Queen’s Rangers as their most necessary guides and examples; led the whole combination to incessant and adventurous action during the war; and if victorious, had remained at their head in that hour when America was declared independent by a critical and unexpected peace!
A JOURNAL, &C.
ON THE 15TH OF OCTOBER, 1777, Sir William Howe was pleased to appoint Captain Simcoe of the Grenadiers, with the Provincial rank of Major, to the command of the Queen’s Rangers j the next day he joined that regiment, which was encamped with the army in the vicinity of German-Town.
On the 19th the army marched to Philadelphia, the Queen’s Rangers formed the rear guard of the left column, and, in the encampment, their post was on the right of the line, in front of the village of Kensington; the army extending from the Delaware to the Schuylkill.
On the 20th the regiment was augmented with nearly an hundred men, who had been enlisted by Captain Smyth during the various marches from the landing of the army in the Chesapeake to this period.
This was a very seasonable recruit to the regiment; it had suffered materially in the action at Brandywine, and was too much reduced in numbers to be of any efficient service; but if the loss of a great number of gallant officers and soldiers had been severely felt, the impression which that action had left upon their minds was of the highest advantage to the regiment; officers and soldiers became known to each other; they had been engaged in a more serious manner, and with greater disadvantages than they were likely again to meet with in the common chance of war; and having extricated themselves most gallantly from such a situation, they felt themselves invincible. This spirit vibrated among them at the time Major Simcoe joined them; and it was obvious, that he had nothing to do but to cherish and preserve it. Sir William Howe, in consequence of their behaviour at Brandywine, had promised that all promotions should go in the regiment, and accordingly they now took place.
The Queen’s Rangers had been originally raised in Connecticut, and the vicinity of New-York, by Colonel Rogers, for the duties which their name implies, and which were detailed in his commission; at one period they mustered above four hundred men, all Americans, and all loyalists. Hardships and neglect had much reduced their numbers, when the command of them was given to Colonel French, and afterwards to Major Weymess, to whom Major Simcoe succeeded; their officers also had undergone a material change; many gentlemen of the Southern colonies who had joined Lord Dunmore, and distinguished themselves under his orders, were appointed to supercede those who were not thought competent to the commissions they had hitherto borne; to these were added some volunteers from the army, the whole consisting of young men, active, full of love of the service, emulous to distinguish themselves in it, and looking forward to obtain, through their actions, the honor of being enrolled with the British army.
The Provincial corps, now forming, were raised on the supposed influence which their officers had among their loyal countrymen, and were understood to be native American loyalists; added to an equal chance among these, a greater resource was opened to the Queen’s Rangers, in the exclusive privilege of enlisting old countrymen (as Europeans were termed in America), and deserters from the rebel army; so that could the officers to whom the Commander in Chief delegated the inspection of the Provincial corps have executed their orders, the Queen’s Rangers, however dangerously and incessantly employed, would never have been in want of recruits; at the same time, the original loyalists, and those of this description, who were from time to time enlisted, forming the gross of the corps, were the source from whence it derived its value and its discipline; they were men who had already been exiled for their attachment to the British government, and who now acted upon the firmest principles in its defence; on the contrary, the people they had to oppose, however characterised by the enemies of Great Britain, had never been considered by them as engaged in an honourable cause, or fighting for the freedom of their country; they estimated them not by their words, but by an intimate observance of their actions, and to civil desecration, experience had taught them to add military contempt. Such was the composition of the Queen’s Rangers, and the spirit that animated it.
The junction of Captain Smyth’s company augmented the regiment into eleven companies, the number of which was equalized, and the eleventh was formed of Highlanders. Several of those brave men, who had been defeated in an attempt to join the army in North Carolina, were now in the corps; to those others were added, and the command was given to Captain M‘Kay; they were furnished with the Highland dress, and their national piper, and were posted on the left flank of the regiment, which consisted of eight battalion, a grenadier, and light infantry company. Upon the march from German Town to Kensington, Sir William Erskine, in directing what duties Major Simcoe should do, had told him to call upon him for dragoons whenever he wanted them; upon this, Major Simcoe took the liberty of observing, “that the clothing and habiliments of the dragoons were so different from those of the Queen’s Rangers (the one being in red, and with white belts, “easily seen at a distance, and the other in green, and accoutred for concealment) that he thought it would be more useful to mount a dozen soldiers of the regiment.” Sir William Erskine highly approved of the idea, and sent a suitable number of horses, saddles, and swords; such men were selected for the service as the officers recommended for spirit and presence of mind; they were put under the direction of Kelly, a Serjeant of distinguished gallantry. A light corps, augmented as that of the Queen’s Rangers was, and employed on the duties of an outpost, had no opportunity of being instructed in the general discipline of the army, nor indeed was it very necessary: the most important duties, those of vigilance, activity, and patience of fatigue, were best learnt in the field; a few motions of the manual exercise were thought sufficient; they were carefully instructed in those of firing, but above all, attention was paid to inculcate the use of the bayonet, and a total reliance on that weapon. The divisions being fully officered, and weak in numbers, was of the greatest utility, and in many trying situations was the preservation of the corps; two files in the centre, and two on each flank, were directed to be composed of trained soldiers, without regard to their size or appearance. It was explained, that no rotation, except in ordinary duties, should take place among light troops, but that those officers would be selected for any service who appeared to be most capable of executing it: it was also enforced by example, that no service was to be measured by the numbers employed on it, but by its own importance, and that five men, in critical situations or employment, was a more honourable command than an hundred on common duties. Serjeants guards were in a manner abolished, a circumstance to which in a great measure may be attributed, that no sentinel or guard of the Queen’s Rangers was ever surprised; the vigilance of a gentleman and an officer being transcendantly superior to that of any non-commissioned officer whatsoever. An attention to the interior œconomy of a company, indispensable as it is, by no means forms the most pleasing military duty upon service, where the officer looks up to something more essentially useful, and values himself upon its execution. A young corps raised in the midst of active service, and without the habits of discipline, which are learnt in time of peace, required the strictest attention in this point. It was observed, that regularity in messing, and cleanliness in every respect, conduced to the health of the soldier; and from the numbers that each regiment brought into the field, superior officers would in general form the best estimate of the attention of a corps to its interior œconomy; and to enforce the performance of these duties in the strongest manner, it was declared in public orders, “that to such only when in the field, the commanding officer would entrust the duties of it, who should execute with spirit what belongs to the interior œconomy of the regiment when in quarters.” To avoid written orders as much as possible, after the morning parade, the officers attended, as the German custom is, and received verbally whatever could be so delivered to them, and they were declared answerable that every written order was read to the men on their separate parades.
Near the end of October the Queen’s Rangers were directed to patrole beyond Frankfort, four miles from Philadelphia; it was the day that Colonel Donop made his unfortunate attempt on Red Bank; they advanced as far as the Red Lion, which several of the rebel officers had left a few minutes before.
The country in front of Philadelphia, where the Queen’s Rangers were employed, was in general cleared ground, but intersected with many woods; the fields were fenced out with very high railing: the main road led straight from Philadelphia to Bristol Ferry on the Delaware; about five miles from Philadelphia, on this road, was Frankfort Creek which fell into the Delaware nearly at that distance, and the angle that it formed was called Point-no-Point, within which were many good houses and plantations.
Beyond the bridge over the creek, on a height, was the village of Frankfort; below the bridge it was not fordable, but it was easily passed in many places above it. The rebels frequently patrolled as far as Frankfort, and to a place called the Rocks, about a mile beyond it. Four miles farther was Pennypack Creek, over which was a bridge; three miles beyond this was the Red Lion tavern, and two miles further was Bristol, a small town opposite Burlington: this road was the nearest to the river Delaware; nearly parallel to it was the road to York, which was attended to by the light infantry, of the guards, and the army; there were many cross roads that intersected the country between these main roads, a most perfect knowledge of which was endeavored to be acquired by maps, drawn from the information of the country people, and by occular observation.
The village of Kensington was several times attacked by the rebel patrolling parties; they could come by means of the woods very near to it undiscovered; there was a road over a small creek to Point-no-Point; to defend this a house was made musket proof, and the bridge taken up; cavalry only approached to this post, for it lying, as has been mentioned, in an angle between the Delaware and the Frankfort road, infantry were liable to be cut off; on the left there was a knoll that overlooked the country; this was the post of the picquet in the daytime, but corn fields high enough to conceal the approach of an enemy reached to its basis; sentinels from hence inclined to the left and joined those of Colonel Twistleton’s (now Lord Say and Sele) light infantry of the guards, so that this hill projected forward, and on that account was ordered by Sir William Erskine not to be defended if attacked in force, and it was withdrawn at night. It was usual, if the enemy approached, to quit this post till such time as the corps could get under arms, and the light infantry of the guards were informed of it; when, marching up the road, the enemy fearing to be shut up within the creek that has been mentioned, abandoned their ground and generally suffered in their retreat to the woods. At night the corps was drawn back to the houses nearer Philadelphia, and guards were placed behind breastworks, made by heaping up the fences in such points as commanded the avenues to the village, (which was laid out and enclosed in right angles); these were themselves overlooked by others that constituted the alarm post of the different companies. Fires also were made in particular places before the picquet, to discover whatsoever should approach. Before day the whole corps was under arms, and remained so ’till the picquets returned to their day post, which they resumed, taking every precaution against ambuscades; the light infantry of the guards advanced their picquets at the same time, and Colonel Twistleton was an admirable pattern for attention and spirit, to all who served with him. He was constantly with the picquets, which generally found out the enemy’s patroles, and interchanged shot with them: his horse was one morning wounded by a rifle shot. The mounted men of the Queen’s Rangers were found very serviceable on these occasions. The woods in the front were every day diminishing, being cut down for the uses of the army, and the enemy kept at a greater distance. An attempt was made to surprize the rebel post at Frankfort; by orders from head quarters the Queen’s Rangers were to march near to the bridge at Frankfort, and to lay there in ambuscade ’till such time as Major Gwyn, who made a circuit with a detachment of cavalry, should fall into the rear of the town. Accordingly the corps marched through bye paths, and attained its position: some dragoons at the appointed time passed the bridge from Frankfort. The light was not sufficient to enable the Rangers to discover whether they were friends or enemies, till upon their turning back and hearing a shot, the corps rushed into the town; unfortunately, either by accident or from information, the rebel post had been withdrawn. Some days after the Queen’s Rangers, with thirty dragoons of the 16th, under Lieutenant Pidcock, marched at midnight to attempt the same post; after making a circuit, and nearly attaining the rear of the Jolly Post, the public house where the guard was kept, the party fell in with a patrole; this was cut off from the house; it luckily did not fire, but ran towards the wood: the detachment was carefully prevented from firing. No time was lost in the pursuit of the enemy, but the infantry crossed the fields immediately in the rear of the house, and a disposition was formed for attacking it, in case, as it well might have been, it should be defended: the cavalry made a circuit to the road in the rear, and the post was completely surprized. An officer and twenty men were taken prisoners, two or three of whom were slightly wounded in an attempt to escape; they were militia, and what is very remarkable, they had the word “Richmond” chalked in their hats; the officer said “Richmond was the countersign, and that he chalked it there that his men might not forget it.” Serjeant Kelly dismounted an officer, and in pursuit of another man, left him; the officer gave his watch to another dragoon; it was however adjudged to the Serjeant, as he was the person who dismounted him, spared his life, and pursued his duty. It is not improper here to observe, that formerly Major Simcoe had forbidden the soldiers to take watches, and indeed did so after this, ‘till he accidentally overheard a man say it was not worth while to bring in a prisoner; he therefore made it a rule, that any one who took a prisoner, if he publicly declared he had his watch, should keep it; so that no soldier was interested to kill any man. This spirit of taking as many prisoners as possible was most earnestly attempted to be inculcated, and not without success. Soon after, as a strong patrole of cavalry, under Major Gwyn, was out, some of its men returned in great confusion, saying, “that they were attacked by a superior body, both in front and rear:” at the same time Colonel Twistleton and Major Simcoe, who were on the Knoll, occupied by the picquet of the Rangers, could perceive by the glittering of arms, a large body of foot in a wood, near which Major Gwyn was to return, they immediately took their respective picquets, about twenty men, and marched to mask the wood. The soldiers in camp were ordered to run to the Knoll, without waiting, and the officer of the picquet was directed to form them as fast as they came up, by twelves, and to forward them under the first officer or Serjeant who should arrive. The whole regiment and the light infantry of the guards were soon on the march; the enemy in the wood retreated; and gaining better intelligence, Colonel Twisleton halted on the verge of it, ’till Major Gwyn, who had beaten back the enemy, returned. The next day it was known that Pulaski had commanded the enemy: a skirmish had happened the day before, between smaller parties, and he, supposing that a large patrole would be sent out from Philadelphia, obtained the command of a very strong one to ambuscade it; but, however able and spirited he might be, he was soon convinced that his irregulars could not withstand the promptitude and strength of the British cavalry.
Parties of the Rangers every day went to Frankfort, where the enemy no longer kept a fixed post, though they frequently sent a patrole to stop the market people. A patrolling party of the Rangers approached undiscovered so close to a rebel sentinel, posted upon the bridge, that it would have been easy to have killed him. A boy, whom he had just examined, was sent back to inform him of this, and to direct him immediately to quit his post or that he should be shot; he ran off, and the whole party, on his arrival at the guard, fled with equal precipitation; nor were there any more sentinels placed there: a matter of some consequence to the poor people of Philadelphia, as they were not prevented from getting their flour ground at Frankfort mills.
It was the object, to instil into the men, that their superiority lay in close fight, and in the use of the bayonet, in which the individual courage, and personal activity that characterise the British soldier can best display themselves. The whole corps being together on the Frankfort road, information was received that Pulaski with his cavalry was approaching; on each side of the road, for some distance, there was wood, and very high rails fenced it from the road; the march was not interrupted, and the following disposition was made to attack him. The light infantry in front were loaded, and occupied the whole space of the road; Captain Stephenson, who commanded it, was directed not to fire at one or two men, who might advance, but, either on their firing or turning back, to give notice of his approach, to follow at a brisk and steady rate, and to fire only on the main body when he came close to them. The eight battalion companies were formed about thirty feet from the light infantry, in close column by companies, their bayonets fixed, and not loaded; they were instructed not to heed the enemy’s horses, but to bayonet the men. The grenadiers and Highland company were in the rear, loaded; and the directions given to Captain Armstrong were, that the grenadiers should cross the fences on the right, and the Highlanders those on the left, and secure the flanks; the men were so prepared and so cheerful, that if an opportunity of rushing on Pulaski’s cavalry had offered, which by the winding of the road was probable, before they could be put into career, there remains no doubt upon the minds of those who were present, but that it would have been a very honourable day for the Rangers.
On the 3d of November the news of the surrender of General Burgoyne’s army was communicated in general orders. It was read to the Rangers on their parade; and amidst the distress that such an event must naturally occasion to Englishmen and soldiers, never did Major Simcoe feel himself more elevated, or augur better of the officers and men he had the honour to command, than when he came to the rejection of one of the proposed articles, in the following terms: “Sooner than this army will consent to ground their arms in their encampment, they will rush on the enemy, determined to take no quarter;” the whole corps thrilled with animation, and resentment against the enemy, and with sympathy for their fellow soldiers; it would have been the most favorable moment, had the enemy appeared, to have attacked them.
Major Grymes, a Virginia gentleman of loyalty, education, and fortune, who was second Major of the Queen’s Rangers, at this time resigned his commission, to the great regret of Major Simcoe and of the corps, whose confidence he had won by extricating them from a very disadvantageous situation, by a decisive and bold exertion at Brandywine: he was succeeded in duties, with the rank of Captain Commandant, by Lieutenant Ross of the 35th regiment, with whose intrepidity, and zeal for the service, Major Simcoe was well acquainted.
The redoubts in front of Philadelphia being finished, the advance picquets were withdrawn and posted in them, that of the Queen’s Rangers excepted; it remained without the redoubt, though it had fallen back much nearer to it: it was liable to insult, but it would have been difficult to have surprized it. The Knoll was still the outpost, and the general place to which many of the officers of the line rode, in order to laugh at the mounted men and their habiliments; but other troops of cavalry were now raising, and the utility of them, through all the ridicule of bad horses and want of appointments, became very obvious.
On General Washington’s occupying the camp at Whitemarsh, Sir William Howe thought proper to move towards him, and the army marched accordingly on the 5th of December; the Queen’s Rangers were ordered to flank the right of the baggage. The army encamped on Chesnut-Hill and its vicinity; and the picquet of the Rangers made fires on the road that led to it, so that the approach of any parties of the enemy could easily be seen. The army remained the next day in the same position. On the 7th, at night, Major Simcoe with the Queen’s Rangers, and a party of dragoons under Captain Lord Cathcart, took up the position of some of the troops who had retired; this post was sometime afterwards quitted in great silence, and he joined the column that was marching under General Grey. The General marched all night, and on approaching the enemy’s out-post, he formed his column into three divisions; the advanced guard of the centre consisted of the Hessian Yagers, who marched with their cannon up the road that led through the wood, in which the enemy’s light troops were posted; the light infantry of the guards advanced upon the right, and the Queen’s Rangers on the left; the enemy were outflanked on each wing, and were turned in attempting to escape by the unparalleled swiftness of the light infantry of the guards, and driven across the fire of the Yagers, and the Queen’s Rangers. The loss of the rebels was computed at near an hundred, with little or none on the part of the King’s troops; a mounted man of the Queen’s Rangers, in the pursuit, was killed by a Yager, through mistake: he wore a helmet that had been taken from a rebel patrole a few days before. General Grey was pleased to express himself highly satisfied with the order and rapidity with which the Rangers advanced. The night was passed in a wood not far from the enemy’s camp. The next day Major Simcoe patrolled in the vicinity: he left the infantry of his party at the edge of the wood, and approached a house; the owner of it, who supposed that all the British soldiers wore red, was easily imposed upon to believe him a rebel officer, and a cow-bell being, as preconcerted, rang in the wood, and an Officer gallopping to Major Simcoe and telling him that the British were marauding and hunting the cattle, the man had no doubt of the matter, and instantly acquiesced in a proposal to fetch some more cavalry to seize the British; he accordingly mounted his horse and gallopped off. The ambuscade was properly laid for whomsoever he should bring, when Captain Andre came with orders to retreat, the column being already in motion; the infantry were scarce sent off and the mounted men following, when about thirty of the rebel dragoons appeared in sight and on the gallop; they fired several carbine shot, to no purpose. The army returned to Philadelphia.
The disaster that happened to the mounted Ranger determined Major Simcoe to provide high caps, which might at once distinguish them both from the rebel army and their own; the mounted men were termed Huzzars, were armed with a sword, and such pistols as could be bought, or taken from the enemy; Major Simcoe’s wish was to add a dagger to these arms, not only as useful in close action, but to lead the minds of the soldier to expect that decisive mode of combat. Several good horses had been taken from the rebels, so that the Huzzars were now well mounted, on hardy serviceable horses, which bore a very unusual share of fatigue. Lieutenant Wickham, an officer of quickness, and courage, was appointed to command them, and a Serjeant of the 16th regiment of light dragoons attended their parade, to give them regularity in its duties.
Several men having deserted, Major Simcoe directed that the countersign should not be given to the sentinels; they were ordered to stop any persons at a distance, more than one, until the guard turned out; and in posting of sentinels, the rule was, to place them so that, if possible, they could see and not be seen, and in different posts in the night from those of the day. Near high-roads, double sentinels, without being loaded, were advanced beyond the front of the chain; these were composed of old soldiers who, with all others, were sedulously instructed to challenge very loud. The sentinels were relieved every hour. The subaltern frequently patrolled, as did the captain of the day, and the field officers: the consequence was, that the Queen’s Rangers never gave a false alarm, or had a sentinel surprised, during the war. It is remarkable that a man deserted at this time who left all his necessaries, regimentals excepted: he had lately come from Europe, and, to all appearance, had enlisted merely to facilitate his joining the rebel army.
It may be here a proper place to describe the country in front of Philadelphia; and the general duties on which the Queen’s Rangers were employed, during the winter.
The road on the right, and nearest the Delaware, has been already mentioned by the name of the Frankfort road: from the centre of Philadelphia, the main road led up the country, and about two miles off, at the Rising Sun, it branched into the Old York road on the right, and that of the Germantown on the left. The light infantry of the guards patrolled up the York-Town road, as that of the line did the Germantown; those that ran on the side of the Schuylkill, were in front of the Yagers, and patrolled by them. The Queen’s Rangers, by their position, were at the greatest distance from Mr. Washington’s camp, which was now at Valley Forge, beyond the Schuylkill, and as the course of the Delaware inclined away from the Schuylkill, the distance was considerably increased; so that no detachment from his camp could have been made without extreme hazard; from the York-Town road, therefore, on the left, and the Delaware river on the right, Major Simcoe felt no apprehensions; when he passed Frankfort creek in front he was to be guided by circumstances. The general directions he received was to secure the country, and facilitate the inhabitants bringing in their produce to market.
To prevent this intercourse, the enemy added, to the severe exertions of their civil powers, their militia. The roads, the creeks, and the general inclination of the inhabitants to the British government, and to their own profit, aided the endeavour of the Queen’s Rangers. The redoubt on the right had been garrisoned by the corps till, on Major Simcoe’s representation that the duty was too severe, it was given to the line: within this redoubt the corps fitted up their barracks. The 4th of January was the first day since their landing at the head of Elk, that any man could be permitted to unaccoutre.
