Antietam and the Maryland and Virginia Campaigns of 1862 E-Book

Captain Isaac Heysinger

• Herausgeber: Charles River Editors
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 328

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2018

Beschreibung

The Pergamum Collection publishes books history has long forgotten. We transcribe books by hand that are now hard to find and out of print.

Das E-Book Antietam and the Maryland and Virginia Campaigns of 1862 wird angeboten von Charles River Editors und wurde mit folgenden Begriffen kategorisiert:
gettysburg; civil war; lecturable; free; robert e lee; mcclellan; battle

Leseprobe

DEDICATION

TO MY COMRADES OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC; AND TO MY COMRADES OF OUR OTHER ARMIES, IN THE WEST; TO THE SURVIVORS OF THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, WHOM IN IDLE HOURS WE LOVED, AND IN BUSY HOURS WE FOUGHT; TO THE MEMORY OF LINCOLN, WHOSE GREAT HEART WAS SO BORNE UPON; AND OF MCCLELLAN, WHO FELT THE SAME WEIGHT; AND OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, WHOSE BRAVE WORDS, “WHEN TWO PARTIES MAKE A COMPACT, THERE RESULTS TO EACH A POWER OF COMPELLING THE OTHER TO EXECUTE IT,” LED HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF HEROES TO BATTLE AND VICTORY; TO MILITARY STUDENTS, AND TEACHERS OF THE ART OF WAR, HERE AND ABROAD; TO THE CALM JUDGMENT OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE; AND TO VINDICATION OF THE TRUTH OF HISTORY, THIS VOLUME IS INSCRIBED.

PREFACE

This work, while in narrative form for the public, is based entirely upon the official records of the United States Government, Union and Confederate; supported, when required, by the endorsement of eminent officers of the United States War Department and the Army, and by evidence taken at the time, but not then published, before the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War; by reports of Cabinet officers of the Government; and by records contained in official Government publications, as, for example. General Upton’s “Military Policy of the United States.”

The facts relating to the Antietam and the Virginia and Maryland campaigns of 1862 are analogous to those in works that treat of Napoleon, of whom to-day no record has any value which has not appeared until nearly forty years after Waterloo, having theretofore been hidden, suppressed, or perverted. Since then thousands of volumes have appeared, and are still appearing, all of which make prior books a travesty on the truth of history. So, too, with Antietam; only latter-day investigations disclose the truth.

Popular or political histories, prejudiced or purposely garbled newspaper accounts,—of which I have read and examined hundreds with the greatest care, and compared with official data,—I have been compelled to totally ignore, as the information was based on unofficial data, and was practically censored by other influences. The personal facts were doubtless often correct, but the inferences, probably from lack of actual knowledge or collateral circumstances quite unknown to the narrator, or from other reasons, were erroneous in nearly every case, as the subsequent records show. To quote from Max Müller, in his “Lectures on India,” before the University of Cambridge: “It is this power of discovering what is really important that distinguishes the true historian from the mere chronicler.”

The principal sources from which was obtained the material brought together in this book were, of course, the great series of works containing the original data, and known as the “War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies.” This great work contains no comments, connections, explanations, or criticisms, but is confined to the literal reproduction of official data—chronologically arranged whenever possible—under the direction of eminent army officers and experts, detailed for that purpose, during twenty years of study, collection, and arrangement.

The first volume was issued in 1881, the last volume in 1900, and the General Index, of 1242 pages, in 1901. The principal part of this stupendous work, as stated on pages xiii and xiv of the Preface to the Index, was arranged as follows:

“Major (now Brigadier-General and Judge Advocate General) George B. Davis, Judge Advocate, United States Army, was appointed military member and president of the board thus authorized.”

The work consists of 128 parts, arranged in 70 volumes, comprising an aggregate of 135,579 pages, and a large folio atlas containing 1006 maps and sketches, all official.

The publication was authorized under Act of Congress in 1874. The first volume was issued in 1881, the last volume in 1900, and the general index in 1901. The cost of publication alone has been $2,858,514, besides the pay of army and Confederate officers detailed or employed on this work, and other necessary and very large expenditures.

The whole constitutes the most complete and comprehensive record of actual war that has ever been put forth by any government, and is a mine which will constitute the storehouse and basis of all authentic history of this war for all time to come.

It may be well to note here, however, that the Supplemental Volume (LI), in two parts, was not issued until late in 1898 or in 1899. The importance of this note lies in the fact that a large portion of this supplemental volume, relating to the events I describe, and which should have been embodied in Volume XIX, published in 1887, had been hidden or suppressed, so that the records were not available for public use until ten years or more later, when they appear only in a supplemental volume. This material comprises thousands of dispatches, reports, notes, orders, and other data of the highest importance, and all, so far as I know, entirely new to the public, and which never has been used in any history.

Every part, volume, and page of this great work has been studied, selected, arranged, and annotated in writing, in the preparation of this volume. From these records, examined and carefully annotated,—a work of years,—the narrative embodied in the following pages has been studied, compared, and arranged.

I have also cited in a number of cases the autograph letters of Major-General Emory Upton which are found in the biography of that great soldier, by General Peter S. Michie, published by Appleton & Co. in 1885.

General Michie, professor at the West Point Military Academy, was graduated from that institution in 1863, standing second in his class. Assigned to the engineer corps,—the highest grade,—he was immediately made assistant, and then chief engineer in the operations against Charleston, and then chief engineer of the Army of the James, where I first came to know him personally. He was made Brigadier-General January 1, 1865, in 1867 was appointed on the staff of instruction at West Point, and in 1871 professor of natural and experimental philosophy. In 1871 Princeton University gave him the degree of Ph, D., and in 1873 Dartmouth the degree of M. A. He has served on Government commissions in Europe, and is the author of several important scientific works besides his “Life of General Upton.”

Major-General James H. Wilson, of the Army, wrote a twenty-page introduction to Michie’s “Life of Upton.” General Wilson was the celebrated Western cavalry commander, in our army, of the War. He was graduated at West Point in 1860; was assigned to the corps of topographical engineers; served as chief topographical engineer of the Port Royal Expedition, then in the Department of the South; was an aide-de-camp to McClellan till October, 1862, and was at the battles of South Mountain and Antietam. He was appointed lieutenant-colonel of volunteers in November, 1862, and afterwards, in our Western Army, commanded a cavalry corps of fifteen thousand men. He was the author of several important works, among others his work on China, made from his own personal observations, and was the co-author, with Charles A. Dana, of the “Life of General Grant.”

Of General Upton Wilson says: “I have constantly maintained, since the close of the War, that at that time Upton was as good an artillery officer as could be found in any country, the equal of any cavalry commander of his day, and, all things considered, was the best commander of a division of infantry in either the Union or Rebel army. He was incontestably the best tactician of either army, and this is true whether tested by battle or by the evolutions of the drill field and parade. In the service, it is not too much to add that he could scarcely have failed as a corps or an army commander had it been his good fortune to be called to such rank.”

In an address delivered by the Secretary of War at the laying of the corner-stone of the Army War College at Washington, February 21, 1903, the Secretary spoke of General Upton in the following terms:

“Brevet Major-General Emory Upton, colonel of the Fourth Artillery, graduated from West Point in the year 1860, became, while almost a boy, one of the most distinguished officers of the Civil War. He commanded successively a battery of artillery, a regiment of infantry, a brigade of artillery, and a division of cavalry. Constantly in the field, he exhibited in camp and march and in scores of battles dauntless and brilliant courage, strict and successful discipline, and the highest qualities of command.”

I cite the above—which could be greatly amplified—to show that in relying, as I have done, on the official statements and letters of General Upton, I am supported by an authority as competent and valid as any of those cited directly from the Official War Records, especially so since his great work, “The Military Policy of the United States,” from which I have freely quoted, has been officially published by the United States, “Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904.”

Of the Battle of Antietam, which constitutes the central axis, as it were, of the present work, and which battle purposely was so greatly minimized and depreciated by political officialdom at the time, President Roosevelt more than forty years afterward, at the dedication of the New Jersey Soldiers’ Monument on that battle-field September 17, 1903, placed it in its full light and proper perspective in his own vivid and incisive way:

“We meet to-day upon one of the great battlefields of the Civil War. No other battle of the Civil War lasting but one day shows as great a percentage of loss as that which occurred here upon the day on which Antietam was fought. Moreover, in its ultimate effects this battle was of momentous and even decisive importance.

“If the issue of Antietam had been other than it was, it is probable that at least two great European Powers would have recognized the independence of the Confederacy, so that you who fought here forty-one years ago have the profound satisfaction of feeling that you played well your part in one of those great crises big with the fate of all mankind.

“The great American Republic would have become a memory of derision; and the failure of the experiment of self-government by a great people on a great scale would have delighted the heart of every foe of republican institutions.”

It seems almost a coincidence that Napoleon, too, subjected to similar malign influences, had to wait for his vindication and fame till forty years after Waterloo, which now the whole world, including his opposing enemies, fully and grandly acclaims.

Based, as the following work is, strictly on official records, many of which were long suppressed, I can appeal with confidence to the United States War Department for its correctness, as has already been done.

Of a somewhat similar case, in American history, Parkman says: “Some of the results here reached are of a character which I regret, since they cannot be agreeable to persons for whom I have a very cordial regard. The conclusions drawn from the facts may be matter of opinion: but it will be remembered that the facts themselves can be overthrown only by overthrowing the evidence on which they rest, or bringing forward counter-evidence of equal or greater strength; and neither task will be found an easy one.”

This work is a simple, straightforward, and dispassionate record of the truth, and its statistics, all new, and its stragetical movements, which to the civilian may appear dry reading, to the old soldiers will be bread and meat, for they understand them like the multiplication table, and have always longed to learn just what they were “up against.”

THE AUTHOR.

ANTIETAM AND THE MARYLAND AND VIRGINIA CAMPAIGNS OF 1862

I.INTRODUCTORY INACCURACY OF ALL THE CURRENT HISTORIES

In order to fully understand the Maryland campaign of 1862 it is necessary to consider the events which immediately preceded, and of which this momentous chapter in the War of the Rebellion was the consequence.

Full significance, and the high importance of the military operations of this epoch have never, for many reasons, been found in the ordinary histories of this period. There is, indeed, no campaign of the war so little understood in its military and national aspects as this, which had for its central feature the battle of Antietam, but which bristles from end to end, at every point, with questions which never have been answered, and never could have been answered, until the Government, with a care and cost which must extort the heartfelt gratitude of every patriot and soldier, has placed in our hands the whole original record, without blot or emendation, and without the possibility of question, and has made for us and for the historian of the future all these events so clear and startling that no student of war or of his country need longer doubt or hesitate. I will endeavor to briefly depict the facts. I cannot in this brief presentation cite all the authorities at length by page and date, but in a case of this kind every statement made must be reenforced by unimpeachable original authority, and these I have included in the text as references in corroboration of the various facts hitherto doubtful or ignored.

I trust that in presenting these facts entirely without prejudice, and in vindication of historic truth and of the noble army which did such glorious service in these campaigns, the writer may ask for that consideration which long and faithful study of the records contained in many volumes, and a personal participation in the events themselves, as well as a perfect familiarity from boyhood with the whole country covered by these operations, may appear to deserve. Forty-nine years is full long enough to enable the calm light of history to displace the temporary and partial views of the great events with which I shall so briefly undertake, in outline at least, to deal.

When General Emory Upton had written his great work, “The Military Policy of the United States,” published by the United States Government, up to the campaigns of 1862 he had found during all the preceding military operations of our country no especial difficulty; but he now encountered problems impossible of solution on any military principles. He found defeats and disasters, movements and disco-ordinations, and a labyrinth of incompatibilities which could not be accounted for with the ordinary historical data at hand.

To Colonel DuPont, his classmate at West Point and life-long friend, he writes in 1879: “Tomorrow I shall finish the original draft of the campaign of 1862. Its volume is startling. Twice I destroyed all that I had finished, because it fell short of carrying conviction…. The McClellan question has run the manuscript up by nearly four hundred pages. The campaign of 1862, the most critical of the war, is hardly in shape for your painstaking revision. I fear I have made too many quotations, and yet nothing will be received as condemnatory of Stanton’s interference unless substantiated by documentary proof.” He continues: “The campaign of 1862 is very difficult. If I make it short, the reader may doubt my facts and conclusions. If too long, he may weary of the subject. If you want to know who was the cause of a three years’ war after we created a disciplined army of six hundred thousand men, it was Stanton. But Stanton did not create the system—the system created Stanton.”

In a letter to General,—afterwards President,—Garfield, in 1879, he says: “When in 1862 General McClellan, after being relieved from command, rode the lines of his army, neither my regiment nor myself joined in the demonstrations of affection and applause which nearly everywhere greeted his appearance…. The son of an Abolitionist, an Abolitionist myself, both as a cadet and an officer, my sympathies were strongly on the side of the Administration in its effort to abolish slavery, and I could not therefore even indirectly participate in an ovation which might be construed as a censure on either the civil or military policy of the Government. With these views you will naturally infer that I have always been anti-McClellan, anti-Fitz-John Porter, and such is the fact.

“Up to a few months ago, when I began our military policy during the Rebellion, I believed that these officers, differing in policy from the Administration, had not done their whole duty to the country. But in the process of this investigation I have been compelled to change my mind. Like many millions of our people, my opinions were vague and shadowy; they had no foundation in fact.

“You will remember that from the 11th of March till the 11th of July, 1862, we had no general-in-chief. Our armies, numbering more than six hundred thousand men, were commanded by the President and the Secretary of War. Could I lay before you all the facts that have come under my observation, I believe you would be convinced that the causes of a four instead of a one year’s war can all be traced to this brief but disastrous period.

“It was during this time that the troops east of the Alleghanies were divided up into six independent commands. It was during the same period that the great army concentrated at Corinth, and which might have made a summer excursion to Vicksburg and Jackson, was dispersed from Memphis to Cumberland Gap, a distance of nearly three hundred miles. In both cases the result was the same. The Army of the Potomac was called back to the Potomac; the Army of the Ohio was called back to the Ohio. It may be added, as a further coincidence, that the commanders of the two armies, against whose protests the division of our forces was made, were relieved from their command.”

It may be added further, that when Halleck was brought east as general-in-chief, in July, 1862, he came with a handicap known to Stanton, but unknown to the country, which General Pope used against him to force the removal of McClellan, saying, “The circumstances under which you came to Washington and I undertook the campaign in Virginia are well-known to one-half of Congress.”

With this bomb-shell—to which I shall again refer—in the hands of Pope and Stanton, and ready to be exploded under him, Halleck became a mere agency in carrying, out the military projects of the civilians who had so long dominated and directed the operations of the army.

Says General Michie, the biographer of Upton: “The great War Secretary, Stanton, a man of imperious will, became the supreme and controlling spirit in every military movement, and in the conduct of military affairs, and to his interference all our military disasters of that year may be traced.”

And we shall find that these disasters did not cease with the second Bull Run campaign, but that Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville are a part of the same, in the midst of which McClellan’s interregnum, enforced by the personal orders and righteous wrath of the President, who took the bit between his teeth and rose to an almost unapproachable majesty in this great emergency, shines out like a glorious star.

Referring to this “War Department strategy,” as General Upton designates it, he demonstrates that It was a clear usurpation, saying: “Neither by the Constitution nor the laws is the Secretary of War entitled to exercise command. Whenever he departs from the sphere of administration to control military operations he is nothing more or less than a usurper. The Constitution, laws, decisions of the Supreme Court, and of the Attorney-General, nowhere give him the authority to command.”

In other words, the Secretary’s duties were those of administration, and the President is made, by the Constitution, the commander-in-chief, and the commander-in-chief has no more power to delegate his command than the President has to delegate his veto.

Just on the eve of McClellan’s movement by water to the Peninsula, in March, 1862, his position as general-in-chief was taken away from him, and he commanded, henceforth, only the ground which his army covered and only the troops which covered it.

Says General Michie: “By thus assuming the direction of military affairs both the Secretary and the President became from this moment as much responsible for whatever of disaster might befall the army as if they had actually taken command in the field. No sooner had the commander of the army of the Potomac sailed for Fortress Monroe than the disintegration of the forces which he had relied upon for his purpose, and which had been promised him, began to take place.”

II.THE PENINSULA

We know the result. When the Army of the Potomac had reached the front of Richmond its line of supply was by the York River, on the left bank of the Chickahominy, while Richmond, the objective, was miles away on the right bank of the Chickahominy. This uncanny stream thus of necessity divided our army. As soon as the James River had become free, by the destruction of the Merrimac, and with the ascent of our war vessels to the Chickahominy and above, correct military principles required that our base should be changed to the James.

But this was forbidden by two circumstances. By Stanton’s order of May 18 McClellan was directed to extend his right wing so as to effect a junction with McDowell’s left wing advancing from Falmouth, and to establish this connection as soon as possible, by extending McClellan’s right wing to the north of Richmond; and Stanton’s orders to McDowell of June 8 directed that officer to move his command immediately in the direction of Richmond, to cooperate with McClellan. Wrote McDowell, to McClellan: “For the third time I am ordered to join you, and this time I hope to get through.” (See War Records, vol. xi.)

But he didn’t, and McDowell was tied fast, and Stonewall Jackson was turned loose. Then came the heroic Seven Days’ battles, when McClellan, having no hope from McDowell, but altogether the reverse, made that remarkable change of base to the James River, at almost precisely the spot where Grant, two years later, did the same, after sacrificing more men overland than his antagonist had with which to oppose him, and finally opened the door to Richmond and brought about the end of the war. McClellan’s plan was outlined in his correspondence with Commodore Rodgers,—who commanded the fleet in the James River,—under dates June 24 and 25, and with Woodruff and Felton, June 20. (War Records, vol. xi, part 3, page 220.)

McClellan’s plan, in brief, was to hold the Confederate army in front of his heavy works on the right bank of the Chickahominy and throw the bulk of his army across to, and over, the James River, attacking Richmond from the south and west. He had had all the roads through this wilderness already surveyed and mapped for this purpose (See “W. R.” vol. xi; vol. xi, part 1, pp. 37, 152, 264, 270, 998; part 3, pp. 24, 226, 229, 236, 246, 250, 251, 255, 256, 258, 262, 265, 272.) Confirmatory of the above is the statement of Lieutenant-General Dick Taylor (son of President Taylor), who commanded a division in Lee’s army in the battles from Gaines’ Mill to Malvern Hill, ("Destruction and Reconstruction,” page 87), “The Confederate commanders knew no more about the topography of the country than they did about Central Africa… McClellan was as superior to us in knowledge of our own land as were the Germans to the French in their late war.” But the junction of Jackson with Lee—directly due to the authorities at Washington—and their combined attack on McClellan’s right, at Gaines’ Mill, disarranged these plans, and compelled him to do, in the midst of open battle, what he had intended to do in advance by secret movements.

And now we come to the question of forces engaged on each side, and this question will dominate the entire Maryland campaign as well. It is needless to say that the Confederate force was purposely minimized, and McClellan’s exaggerated, in both cases, in all the War Department figures, at Washington.

The regimental organization in both armies was identical. The very day McClellan had landed on the Peninsula, and when about going into a long, exhaustive, and depleting campaign. Secretary Stanton issued his general order of the War Department April 3, 1862: “The recruiting service for volunteers will be discontinued in every State from this date. The officers detailed on Volunteer Recruiting Service will join their regiments without delay…. The public property belonging to Volunteer Recruiting Service will be sold to the best possible advantage.” (See Official Orders, War Department, 1862.)

As stated in Lee’s letter of August 16, 1862, and Jefferson Davis’s “History of the Confederacy,” the Confederates immediately countered on this order, April 13, ten days afterward, by the first general conscription of “All white men resident of the Confederate States, between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five years, and to continue those already in the field until three years from the date of their enlistment.” Those under eighteen and over thirty-five were required to remain ninety days. And as a counter to the President’s War Order No. 3, of March 11, just before the Peninsula campaign began, relieving General McClellan from the control of our armed forces as a whole, General R. E. Lee, by General Orders No. 14, dated Richmond, March 13 (only two days afterward), was “assigned to duty at the seat of government, and was charged (directly under the President) with the conduct of military operations in the armies of the Confederacy.”

The above general conscription alone should have given the Confederate armies more than 800,000 men, in addition to the forces already in the field; the entire Union armies at this time, East and West, did not number, even on paper, more than 600,000 men. (See General Michie’s “Biography of Emory Upton,” p. 459) The results of this suicidal policy at Washington, and of this magnificent counter-stroke at Richmond, were soon apparent. In war, military principles as contrasted with political practices will win in every case.

It will be necessary for the purposes of this history to determine the actual numbers of the opposing forces during the Seven Days, as this will give us a standard of comparison for the succeeding campaigns.

It is well known that for purposes of comparison, the Union official figures are worthless, as our generals were obliged to report the “ration strength,” while the Confederate forces reported only the “fighting strength.”

The reports of a great many regimental and other organizations engaged in the Seven Days’ battles, on both sides, give the number of their men taken into action. These came from all parts of each army, and are a fair index of the average strength, conforming also to the ratio of officers and the system of organization, which was alike in both armies. The average strength of the Confederate infantry was 542 officers and men for each regiment. For the Union army the average was 487 per regiment. (See vol. xi, “War Records.")

As the conscription had brought in its men freely, during the previous two and one-half months, and recruiting had brought none at all to the Army of the Potomac, we may be sure that if there be any error it must be in underestimating the Confederates.

It may be well to pursue this question somewhat further. In vol. xi, part 3, p. 615, W. R., is given the “present” on June 23, 1862, of twenty-four Virginia regiments,—which (see Longstreet’s letter on page 614, ibid.), are really present for duty in battle,—as “7000 are at times absent from their posts.” Excluding these, the total is 11,380; but in the letter Longstreet sums up the whole (including officers) at 13,000. This gives an average regimental strength of 542. As the 6813 others are only “absent at times,” the effective strength in battle would be considerably greater. On the same page the average battery strength of thirteen batteries is given as present for duty in battle 76 men, besides officers, per battery. The total per battery may be put at a minimum of 80.

Lee’s published field return for July 20, 1862, gives as present for duty, exclusive of Jackson and Ewell, 69,732. This includes Holmes’s division; but this division was present and engaged in the Seven Days’ battles. (See volume xi, part 2, p. 906.) Lee, in his letter to Jackson of July 27 (see War Records, vol. xii, part 3, p. 918), gives the effective strength of Jackson and Ewell at 18,000 men. Adding officers in the proportion of Lee’s army—1200—would make this force 19,200. The Confederate losses in the Seven Days, which are much underestimated in the returns, since there are large discrepancies in their own accounts (compare volume xi, part 2, pp. 973-984 with p. 502), were not less than 20,077.

Aggregating these items, we have a Confederate total taken into action in the Seven Days’ battles of 108,899, which is less than the true aggregate.

Comparing Lee’s field return of officers present for duty July 20, and adding the officers of Jackson and Ewell, 1200, we have a total of 5533 commissioned officers left in Lee’s army after the Seven Days’ battles.

McClellan’s field return of July 10, after deducting Dix’s command, which had remained at Fort Monroe and was not under McClellan’s command, gives an aggregate of 3834 commissioned officers present for duty with McClellan’s entire army after the Seven Days.

McClellan made no complaint of his army being under-officered.

Lee (see vol. xi, War Records, part 3, pp. 669 and 671), wrote urgently and repeatedly to the Richmond authorities about his shortage of officers. He says: “The want of officers of proper rank renders many regiments and companies inefficient; regiments being in some cases under the command of captains and many companies without their proper complement of officers.” Again, later, he writes: “I am very anxious that the vacancies among the regimental officers should be filled as soon as possible,” etc., etc.

As Lee’s losses in the Seven Days’ battles were at least one-third greater than those of McClellan, after making due allowance for this casualty deficiency of officers in Lee’s army, we still see that his force after the battles must have been decidedly in excess of that of McClellan. So much so, in fact, that one might suppose that the Confederate strength in the Seven Days was really much greater than the estimated regimental strengths would aggregate, since Lee had one-third more officers after the battle than McClellan had, and was nevertheless urging the Richmond authorities that his shortage of officers rendered many of his organizations inefficient.

It is needless to repeat, of course, that the system of organization was the same in both armies.

At the end of July Lee sent to Jackson A. P. Hill’s division and two Louisiana regiments, the latter to be brigaded with those already in Jackson’s force. These numbered altogether thirty regiments. (See War Records, vol. xi, part 3, p. 648, and vol. xii, part 3, p. 918.) Lee says: “These troops will exceed 18,000 men.” Adding their officers, we have 19,200 at least, and dividing by thirty we have an aggregate regimental strength of 640 each, officers and men.

It should be noted that the Confederates did not multiply new regiments as we did, but kept filling up their old regiments. Very few of the Confederate States show regimental numbers exceeding 50 or 60. The highest regimental number in Virginia was 61, and this number appears in the Seven Days. So also of Georgia and the other States. This system, of course, added enormously to the value and efficiency of these organizations.

Coming directly now to the numbers engaged on each side in the Seven Days’ battles, we find, from the Confederate roster (vol. xi, part 2, pp. 483-489) that General Lee had under his direct command, and actually engaged in these battles, 182 regiments of infantry, 11 regiments of cavalry, and 87 batteries of field artillery,—besides the heavy guns in the works,—making a total battle-field strength of 110,802, which is a minimum.

McClellan had under his command at the same time 143 regiments of infantry, 6 regiments of cavalry, and 57 batteries of artillery, making a total battle-field strength of 81,797, which is a maximum.

The Confederates had an excess over the Army of the Potomac of 44 regiments of infantry, 5 regiments of cavalry, and 30 batteries of field artillery, making an aggregate excess in numbers of, at least, 29,000 men.

At the battle of Gaines’ Mill, June 27, when the combined divisions of Stonewall Jackson, Ewell, A. P. Hill, D. H. Hill, and Longstreet, with Stuart’s cavalry, made a concerted attack on three sides, the Confederates had engaged 124 regiments of infantry, 8 regiments of cavalry, and 27 batteries of artillery; while the Union forces comprised only 49 regiments of infantry, 3 regiments of cavalry, and 21 batteries of artillery. (See casualty returns of opposing armies in vol. xi, W. R.)

The strength of the Confederates in this battle was nearly in the proportion of three to one, yet under McClellan’s eve. and with Fitz-John Porter in immediate command, our troops inflicted far greater losses than they sustained, and at nightfall crossed the Chickahominy with all their force intact and ready for the battles yet to follow, which battles concluded with that astonishing and overwhelming victory over all Lee’s army at Malvern Hill, which perhaps gave the highest example of what artillery can do when properly handled, to be found in all history, unless Antietam may furnish another instance.

The obvious course for the Union army, now, was to do as we did two years later, for the James and the York rivers, the Peninsula and the Appomattox, were all in our possession, and the vast defensive works in front of Petersburg and Richmond had been as yet barely begun. (See Confederate engineers’ reports, W. R.)

McClellan, perfectly secure in his magnificent position at Harrison’s Landing, with tidewater supplies open from every quarter, and with natural defenses all around, and almost under the shadow of Malvern Hill, of unsavory memory to the Confederates, awaited support from Washington, as Grant did two years later, to complete his work.

The editors of Upton’s United States Government publication, “The Military Policy,” in a note, describe Harrison’s Landings as one of the best on the James River. It was twenty-five miles below Richmond, with a high and open country between, and guarded by water on both flanks and in front. It was, in fact, immediately across the James River from, and less than four miles below, City Point; whence Grant carried on his final campaign, in 1864 and 1865. In fact, McClellan occupied both sides of the James River, as the War Records (vol. xi) show.

But other counsels prevailed.

Concerning the operations from Harrison’s Landing, including General Sumner’s report of the capture of Malvern Hill, August 5, see War Records, vol. xi, part 3, p. 356; of McClellan’s urgent appeals for ferry-boats to cross the James River in force, August 3, see same volume and part, p. 351; of Averell’s cavalry action south of the James, August 9, see same volume, part 2, pp. 946-948, and D. H. Hill’s report of same, p. 948; and of other occupations of the southern side, pp. 949, 950. See also Fitz-John Porter’s letter to McClellan of August 5, to push over to the Suffolk Railroad, destroying all bridges over the Blackwater River, etc., etc.

The protest of Commodore Wilkes to Secretary of the Navy Welles, of August 5, 1862, against the removal of the army from the front of Richmond to Washington is an important and elaborate statement of the facts, on the spot and at the time, and will be found at length in the War Records, vol. xi, part 2, pp. 356-358. He concludes: “I trust in God this direful act will not be carried out; our noble cause will be ruined if it is. General McClellan is confident as I am in the result, if left here, the capture of the Rebel capital, and of maintaining the honor, safety, and glory of the Union and its army.”

III.THE ADVENT OF POPE

Pope had been brought to Washington and been given command of a new army, the Army of Virginia, made up of the scattered forces of Frémont, Banks, McDowell, and the garrisons at Washington, with comprehensive orders from the civilians at Washington to “operate in such manner as, while protecting Western Virginia and the national capital from danger or insult, it shall in the speediest manner attack and overcome the Rebel forces under Jackson and Ewell, threaten the enemy in the direction of Charlottesville, and render the most effective aid to relieve General McClellan and capture Richmond.”

Surely it was a task worthy of those fabled ancient heroes, and we need not wonder that General Pope, in command of this “one army,” should in his published address “To the Officers and Soldiers of the Army of Virginia,” tell them what manner of man he was. “Let us understand each other,” he said. “I have come to you from the West, where we have always seen the backs of our enemies; from an army whose business it has been to seek the adversary and beat him when he was found; whose policy has been attack and not defense. In but one instance has the enemy been able to place our Western armies in defensive attitude. I presume I have been called here to pursue the same system, and to lead you against the enemy. It is my purpose to do so, and that speedily. I am sure you long for an opportunity to win the distinction you are capable of achieving. That opportunity I shall endeavor to give you. Meantime, I desire you to dismiss from your minds certain phrases which I am sorry to hear so much in vogue among you. I hear constantly of ‘taking strong positions and holding them,’ of ‘lines of retreat,’ and of ‘bases of supplies.’ Let us discard such ideas.”

But he might have been more modest; for an analysis of his returns from the official War Records, for the nine months up to April 8, 1862, while in the West, when his force was 25,000 men, shows that his entire losses were only 11 men killed and 35 wounded; while during the so-called siege of Corinth his entire losses aggregated only about 20 killed and 180 wounded and missing.