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- Herausgeber: RUTH
- Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
- Sprache: Englisch
This book explores the causes and trends of the current crisis of the domination system in the Arab world. The Member President of the World Forum for Alternatives invites its authors —outstanding academics from the region— to present an approach to the dynamics of social movements, the challenges of an alternative regional integration, political Islam, and the always complex relationships between the Arab world and Europe.
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Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2017
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Editorial:
Each period generates its critical urgencies. The xx century ended with the categorical frustration of the hopes that the October revolution had created and with the exaltation of imperialism under the most absolute leadership of the USA. These facts sum up the complexities, irrationality, perils and challenges of our time —impugnations to critical thought and to praxis—.
Table of contents:
Samir Amin:Introduction
Alí El Kenz:Euro-Mediterranean relationships
Ivan Ivekovic:The Israeli ethnocracy and the bantustanization of Palestine
Michael Warszawski:Israel
Samir Amin:Towards an Arab and African united front: the desirable alternative in terms of regionalisation
Samir Amin:Political conflicts and social struggles in the Arab countries. Revolutionary advances followed by dramatic retreats
Zohdi El Chami:The issue of agriculture in Egypt: the roots, ramifications and the future of the democratic alternative
Samir Amin:The Arab world fossilised in its powerlessness
The God of all names
Samir Amin: Religion, democracy and modernity
Views
Shahida El Baz:Globalization, Arab women and gender equality
Introduction
The twentieth century witnessed the spreading of the first full-scale wave of awakening of the Asian and African peoples. Their will to free themselves from imperialist domination, combined with the need of progressive social reforms, gave rise to the major transformation of the modern world that was henceforth irreversible. The struggles of the peoples concerned show that the North-South conflict (that is, the conflict between dominant imperialist centers and nations in the dominated peripheral areas) and the battle for socialism are inseparable. During this century, however, accomplishments achieved by the peoples were unequal. The major revolutions of the century (China, Vietnam, and Cuba’s) combined liberation with “socialist construction” projects; the other anti-imperialist liberalization movements were more or less radical, to various degrees. Also, all these achievements had their own limitations, which, in view of the fact they were not properly overcome, led to the drift of the power systems, the mismanagement of economic and social progress, ultimately putting an end to this first “awakening of the South” moment.
The signals of a second wave of this awakening are already seen in the way in which the so-called “emerging countries” are spreading their wings. Nevertheless, the strategic line for the unfolding of this second wave is still vague and full of contradictions. Will the “emerging” countries agree to get trapped in the concept of “emerging markets,” framing their growth within capitalist/imperialist globalization? Or will they impose their own concept of “emerging nations” that necessarily would lead them to enter into a conflict with the imperialist powers?
At present, we are in transition from a phase of this major world transformation to another. And, as Gramsci said, “monsters” take shape in the half-light that separates past (death) and future (what is still to come). The Arab world had led the first spreading of the awakening of the South, at the time of Bandung, du-ring the 1950’s, 60’s and 70’s. At that point in time, the era had created favorable conditions for the crystallization of a project bringing together modernization, economic development (based on industrialization), achieving autonomy vis-à-vis the global system, social progress, along with potential democratic evolution elements implying taking some distance from the religious legacies and the beginning of secularism.
The project’s contradictions and limitations, which finally brought about its defeat, gave birth to the rise of the old-fashioned dream represented by political Islam. And the contemporary Arab world is still immersed in this “half-light.”
Under these conditions, the paramount importance of the “religious question” cannot be overlooked in the analysis or artificially separated from the question posed by economic, political and social challenge. We propose therefore a reflection on this question, which in my opinion cannot be disregarded if we wish, beyond the propositions resulting from the immediate politics, to contribute to the crystallization of a coherent alternative project capable of having the Arab world leave its impasse behind. In this regard, we shall recall the history—or prehistory—of the Bandung project and the contribution made by the Arab progressive forces of the time to the crystallization of the project.
The political culture that still rules over the contemporary Arab and Islamic world emerged in the thirteenth century of the Christian era, whereas the legacy left by the first three brilliant centuries of the Islamic era had begun to decline. The autocratic structures of this power—reorganized in the framework of the Ottoman Empire and Sefevide Persia—had not been truly abolished by the modernization process conducted by the ruling classes in order to meet the outside challenge posed by imperialist Europe. Under these conditions, deterioration of legitimacy and efficiency of this power system paved the way for the emergence of a new dream: that one of the alternatives represented by political Islam, which, in fact, traps the societies of the region in an impasse. Recalling the limitations and contradictions of the Nasser experience, the people’s radical model par excellence of the 1950’s and 60’s, we give concrete expression to our critical introduction to the contemporary crisis of the region’s power system. The eight studies put together in this summary tackle the major questions posed nowadays to the peoples of the region, while the possible decline of the capitalist/imperialist globalization system in crisis begins:
The combined effect of insufficiencies that characterized the responses of Arab societies (powers and peoples) to the double challenge posed by modernity and the spreading of globalised capitalism and imperialism on the one hand, and the deployment of the project of the Triad-oriented collective imperialism for setting up a system for the military control of the planet on the other hand, gave rise to the achievements attained during the Bandung era losing ground. Far from representing an alternative on a par with the challenges, political Islam constitutes, on the contrary, a potential reserve ally for imperialism.The difficult question of the existence of an “Arab nation,” or a system of Arab nations, won’t be addressed in this work. We refer the reader to the work of Samir Amin, La Nation Arabe, (The Arab nation). On the other hand, the question of “Arab unity” will be addressed from the standpoint of criticisms of the Arab league and from the articulation of the positions taken by Arab States vis-à-vis Palestine.Is the idea of a possible rapprochement between Europe and the Arab World conceivable? In the light of what we have retained in this work regarding the Euro-Mediterranean project, the answer is negative. We therefore readdress this question here while specifying the conditions of that alternative, even though it is not fully visible today.The social movements in the Arab world are neither less important nor different from those found in other regions of the world. As elsewhere, they are fragmented, on the defensive, and they lack a political project giving them global consistency and efficiency in defining political objectives. Probably the layer of lead that makes up political Islam conceals these realities. But in fact, political Islam is extensively unrelated, in fact an adversary, to all democratic movements and those with social claims. The example of the position adopted by the Muslim brotherhood in Egypt, opposed to worker’s strikes and peasants’ demands, is witness to this fact. The State position regarding these movements comes out of a self-evident conclusion: the key role played by the democratic question.The ongoing struggles analyzed here, in view of the challenges of the 21st century, will be confronted, of course, by the ongoing deployment of the geopolitical project of contemporary imperialism, namely, the project ofthe system leader—the USA (the military control of the region), the methods of the European subordinate project known as “Euro-Mediterranean”; in short, the actions undertaken in this context by the State of Israel. Precisely the riots that have taken place recently in several Arab countries, including the processes occurring in Egyptian Tunisia with the overthrow of Ben Ali and Mubarak regimes, confirm the theses previously raised.The events of Tunisia must be interpreted as a very powerful popular movement uprising, a general uprising. About 80 percent of the population of the country in many areas including in the capital were out in the streets for 45 days and continue to do so. They carried on their protests in spite of the repression and did not give up. This movement has political, societal and economic dimensions. Ben Ali regime was one of the most repressive police regimes in the world. Thousands of people in Tunisia were assassinated, arrested and tortured, but Western powers best friend never allowed these facts to be known. The Tunisian people want democracy, respect of rights.
Economic and social factors were also influential in the uprising of the people. The country experiences rapidly escalating unemployment, particularly of youth, including educated young people. The standard of living of the majority of the population is decreasing, in spite of the growth of the GDP praised by World Bank and international agencies. Growing inequality explains it. The influence of the mafia type of organization is also another important factor. The system was managed to the almost exclusive benefit of the Ben Ali family and its organization.
There is another aspect of the movement that is very interesting. The Islamic influence was not effective in the uprising. Tunisia is really a secular country. People manage to keep religion and politics separate. This is very important and positive. It was said Ben Ali protected the country from fundamentalist Muslims. He used this argument very effectively for many years. Actually it wasn’t Ben Ali but the people that protected the country from fundamentalists.
The fact that the army wasn’t against the people gave strength to the people in the streets. The Ben Ali government gave support and financial aid to the police not the army. This is why the police played such an important role in the suppression of the events in the past. This movement in Tunisia doesn’t belong to a particular group of people. This is a popular general movement. There are no foreign countries or groups behind it. It is social in essence. However it must be said that the Western powers will try to create an Islamic alternative and will try to support a movement of this sort in order to avoid a really democratic alternative. They already have started to do it, reintroducing in the country the language of “Saudi Arabia” as some commentators of the Tunisian people have already said. It is very difficult to try to guess what the future holds for the country. For sure the establishment of a democratic and secular regime is not easy. Assuming the best—that is a democratic government supported by the people (and that is not absolutely guaranteed), such a government will be confronted with the economic and social challenge: How to associate this democratisation of the political management with social progress? That is not easy. Tunisia’s ‘success’ for some time was based on three sources: The delocalisation of some light industries from Europe, tourism, mass out migration to Libya and Europe. Now those three channels have reached their ceiling and even start to be reversed. By which macro policy could be they replaced? Not easy to imagine for a small country, vulnerable and with little resources(no oil!). Solidarity and South-South cooperation might turn to be vital for an alternative. The Western powers will do all they can to have the democratic regime unsuccessful in this respect, and create therefore conditions favourable for a false “Islamic alternative,” labeled “moderate”. On the other hand, the case of Egypt clearly shows that neoliberalism has never been very convincing; it has never been popular in the suburbs of the world because it has brought nothing but desolation, misery and accelerated impoverishment. But it seemed that there was no alternative because the system showed itself so powerful, not only economically, but in police and military terms, by means of its violent repressive regime. This system was perpetuated only through fear.
That Nasser’s Egypt had a social and economic system is certainly questionable, but coherent. Nasser opted for industrialization to overcome the colonial international specialization, forcing the country on the task of exporting cotton. This system was able to ensure a good distribution of income in favor of the middle classes, but without impoverishing the working classes. This page of Egyptian history concluded as a result of military aggression in 1956 and 1967. Sadat and Mubarak indeed worked for the dismantling of the Egyptian production system, replacing it with another completely incoherent, based solely on the search for yield. Egyptian growth rates, allegedly high and invariably celebrated for 30 years by the World Bank, are totally devoid of meaning. Egyptian growth is very vulnerable, dependent on foreign markets and capital flows from Gulf oil countries. With the crisis in the global system, this vulnerability has been expressed with a brutal stagnation. That growth was accompanied by an incredible increase in inequality and appalling unemployment that punishes the majority of young people, a truly explosive situation that has finally burst. What happens from now, and beyond the initial claims of the regime ending and the establishment of public liberties, will represent a political battle.
The movement of the Egyptian people possesses four basic components very politicized. First, the urban young, particularly holders of diplomas with no job. They handle modern technology, Internet, Twitter, etc.; not trivial to keep in touch, but to do away with political discussions and debate. Many of them come from families with a communist tradition. They are sincere democrats, who have a refusal of reject the police dictatorship and want real social change in favor of the popular classes. They are anti-capitalist in the sense that this system is considered unacceptable. They are nationalists in the sense that Egypt cannot and should not be subject to the will of others in its role in the region and globally, in order to serve US strategic goals. This national feeling is very strong. In all the speeches in the streets and squares, it is claimed this independence and the opposition to allow Israel to exterminate Palestinians. For them to overthrow the regime is not only to remove Mubarak, but national independence and social reforms for the benefit of the masses. It has provoked that trade unions, which grew in the last decade or so, entered the revolutionary movement.
The other component is the radical left. In particular, the communists, who have always existed in Egypt. They have, in a greater or lesser extent, enjoyed general and popular respect. The difference, compared with 50 years ago, is that young people, though naturally sympathetic, are reluctant to join organized parties.
The third component is represented by segments of the democratic middle-class. Some sectors of that middle-class are suffering from the effects of the system. Although mildly nationalist, they do not attach much importance to international politics. El Baradei is a representative of this trend. This middle class is quite mixed. There are many elements of the professional occupations: doctors, lawyers, engineers, the upper layers of the working class, civil servants, but also many are representatives of small and medium enterprises, which suffer unfair competition by monopolies. And this group wants democracy.
Finally, the fourth component is the Muslim brotherhood. They initially boycotted the movement because they thought the movement would be defeated by the police, but when they saw that the movement could not be defeated, the leadership thought they could not stay out, and they moved in.
The Muslim brotherhood tries to appear as moderate when in fact they never have been. This group is not a religious movement but a political movement that uses religion. The Muslim brotherhood is not a democratic organization. It is a top down military organization and a quasi fascist party, and it has different constituencies. The leaders are multi billionaires, the cadres are backward segments of the petty bourgeoisie, mostly religious. The masses are poor chaps, recruited through social activities financed by Saudi Arabia. Since its founding in 1920 by the British and the monarchy, the movement has played an active role as an anti-communist, anti-progressive and anti-democratic agent. It is the raison d’être for the Muslim brotherhood, and they are proud of it. They claim openly that if they win an election; will be the last, because the electoral system would be an imported Western system, contrary to the Islamic nature. In that regard, they have not changed anything. In fact, political Islam has always been supported by the USA. Under this strategy, the Mubarak regime never fought against political Islam. On the contrary: what he did was to integrate it into their political system. Mubarak entrusted to the Muslim brotherhood three fundamental institutions: justice, education and television. But the military regime wanted to keep for him the direction, also claimed by the Muslim brotherhood. The USA has used this minor conflict between the military and Islamist alliance to ensure the docility of each other. It is essential that everyone accepts capitalism as it is. The Muslim brotherhood has never seriously thought of changing things. Moreover, during the great labor strikes of 2007-2008, its parlamentarians voted with the government against the strikers. Faced with the struggles of peasants forced off their land by large landowners renters, the Muslim brotherhood take sides against the peasant movement. For them, private property, free enterprise and profit are sacred things.
The US imperialist strategy in Egypt is to change everything to not change anything. It is based on giving all the power to the army, to remove the brutal aspects of dictatorship and allow elections. The White House could probably establish a strategic alliance with the Muslim brotherhood to isolate young people. Mubarak wanted to lead this process but did not succeed.
Egypt is a cornerstone in the US strategy of global control. Washington will not tolerate any attempt of Egypt to move out of its total submission. This is the main target of Washington “involvement” in the organization of a “soft transition.” Mubarak was sacrificed pragmatically by the USA, but they won’t give up saving the essential, the military and police system, and could envision their salvation in an alliance with the Muslim brotherhood.
In fact, US leaders have in mind the Pakistani model, which is not a democratic model, but a combination of a supposed Islamic power and a military dictatorship. The Muslim brotherhood and the military in Egypt, and the moderate political forces of other Arab nations are functional elements of Washington’s strategy. They accept US hegemony in the region and the peace with Israel in the current terms and, therefore, will allow Tel Aviv to continue the colonization of what remains of Palestine. However, in the case of Egypt, the mobilized popular forces are well aware of that. The Egyptian people are highly politicized. The history of Egypt is that of a country trying to emerge from the early 19th century, which has been defeated by his own shortcomings, but mainly by external aggressions suffered repeatedly. The four components of the Egyptian movement above mentioned have agreed to coordinate, a standing conference which aims to draft a new constitution. And what is hoped is not a short transition, but paradoxically a long one. At least one or two years, in order to allow the left and young people to acquire the means to make themselves known, to inform the country about their program. To have elections in a few days is meaningless, that is what Americans want, a short transition.
The events that have taken place recently in the Arab world are social uprisings that potentially carry the crystallization of alternatives that could reach a socialist perspective in the long term. However, each country has absolutely different conditions. Tunisia is a small country, with a higher level of education and of living, but it is a small country and vulnerable in the global economy. Bahrain is a tiny country, but the majority being Shiite, and the monarchy being Sunni, there have always been tensions. The popular demand is only for constitutional democracy, and equality between the Shiites and the Sunnis in the kingdom. In Yemen, the movements in the north and the south are different; the north is relatively moderate, whereas the south is much more radical because the trade unions and the Communist Party are stronger. The actual conditions are very different from one country to another. But this is a qualitative change. What we will see in the coming months and the years ahead is the deployment of movements like the Egyptian one, in many places, with advances and retreats and defeats, as always takes place in history.
That’s why the capitalist system, the capital of dominant monopolies on a global scale, cannot tolerate the development of those movements. They will mobilize all possible means of destabilization, economic and financial pressures, and also the military threat. They will support, according to the circumstances, either fascist or false alternatives, or the establishment of military dictatorships.
Samir Amin*1
Publisher
Alí El Kenz* /Euro-Mediterranean Relationships
Apart from the relatively small economic interest that the EU has in the countries south of the Mediterranean, the latter find themselves in a most strategic position for the future of the European Union—at least in the present regional and global configuration. This is because of the importance for the Europeans of the immigration issue, as well as of the Israel-Palestinian and Israel-Arab conflicts. This position that makes them obligatory “partners” of the European States, which, according to us, largely justifies the laborious construction of the Barcelona process and the interest the EU is taking in the countries south of the Mediterranean.
1. Globalization and regionalization
Introduction
In light of recent events, it is Eric Hobsbawm to whom we turn when asking ourselves what is going on in the world. He has captured better than anyone the turbulent, often tragic activities of capitalism, in his excellent, dense work,The Short Twentieth Century1which begins with the First World War and ends with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. But we also turn to Samir Amin who, as an observer of ourcontemporary world, relentlessly criticizes the illusions promoted by present-day capitalism and warns us of the latest illusions, those of “globalization”—the newera which will make a “global village” of our planet.
1AfterThe Age of Revolution, The Age of CapitalandThe Age of Empire, Eric Hobsbawm completes his work withThe Age of Extremes in which he paints a comprehensive, fascinating picture of what he calls this “short twentieth century”, the end of which is symbolically marked by the fall of the “Berlin Wall” and which, far from announcing some “end of history,” opens up a new period of uncertainty.
People often used to laugh at the naivety of socialist propaganda when it proclaimed the “radiant dawn” of the future. They forget that this belief in “progress,” typical of modern times, lies also at the heart of the capitalist adventure. It has often been belied by history but it is constantly renewed by tame intellectuals whose job it is to announce the glorious future to those who, understandably enough, have their doubts.2
2These intellectuals are in no way “free thinkers” acting within the cultural superstructure, motivated mainly by the development of their ideas. As Keith Dixon, in his short but incisive historical study has shown, “think tanks” have been formed and educated in institutions created for this purpose by groups of capitalist interests in the West. They are supported in their tasks by prestigious training centres and their ideas are relayed by the vast international media. The whole thing seems to be a completely coherent system of production and distribution of the “glorious future” which is called, for the present cycle of capitalism, globalisation. See: Keith Dixon:Les Evangélistes du marché,Liber. Raison d’Agir, Paris, 1998. See also an excellent number of the journalActes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales: “Les ruses de la raison impérialiste”. Seuil, Paris, March 1998.
We should recall the appalling era of colonization, which the conquerors presented as a modernization of traditional societies, or the no less terrible era of decolonization and the enormous sacrifices needed to leave it behind. Two so-called “world” wars caused millions of deaths and gave rise to weapons of mass destruction like the nuclear bomb. Far from appearing as the monstrous effects of the conflicts of interest generated by capitalism, these were presented, instead as the struggle of Good against Evil. And this very convenient myth was rapidly employed, once again, to justify the Cold War and the billions of dollars spent on nuclear weapons, as it was used later on to cover up the sordid interests which detonated the Gulf War and, more recently, the Balkan war.
At the beginning of the third millennium, this belief or system of beliefs, developed and expanded by the new means of communication and information, is called “globalisation.”3 This is not the place to dwell on the tremendous media barrage, which runs from scholarly debates to forums such as Davos; or from the economic and mathematical justifications of the exceptionally gifted experts of the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund to “popular” best-sellers like Fukuyama’s The End of History or Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations. But we should bear in mind the prodigious measures to legitimize, at a worldwide level, this new cycle of capitalism. The stakes are enormous.
3As Pierre Bourdieu has remarked: “The notion of globalisation, which has so many meanings, has the effect, if not the function of imposing, in a kind of cultural ecumenism, the economic fatalism of the effects of imperialism and to make it seem that transnational relationships are a natural necessity.” InActes de la Recherches en Sciences Sociales,no. 121-122, p. 110. Seuil, Paris.
Let us look at some of its main characteristics.
Capitalism as a system of production is not new, nor is its development at the international level. “The Great Transformation,” to use Karl Polanyi’s4 phrase, began several centuries ago and it has not finished its task of submitting all forms of social life to the profit motive. It has been marked by economic and social crises, bloody conflicts, massive destruction of entire populations and cultures, but it has continued its homogenizing action, spreading it to all continents and all spheres of human activity. It is “totalitarian” by definition because its logic excludes all other logic. But its “totalitarianism” is far from being uniform and there are many and varied resistances, from the most conservative like ethnic and religious identities to the more innovatory, like movements such as Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions and for Citizens’ Actions (Attac).
4Karl Polanyi,The Great Transformation,Beacon Press, Boston, 1944.
The most important and best organized resistance was the one portrayed by the “actually existing socialism” which forced capitalism to “humanize” its action throughout the 20th century. Keynesianism, the Welfare State, Fordism, developmentalism were in large part made possible by the existence of a strong, organized alternative to pure capitalism.5
5Eric Hobsbawm’sThe Age of Extremesis an impassioned account of this world competition between two systems. But, as the author notes, it is paradoxically the capitalist societies that draw the greatest social benefits from this competition.
With the collapse of the “socialist camp,” which all the media images showing the fall of the Berlin Wall have transformed into the founding event of a new epoch, the “end of history” was announced and, for a temporarily victorious capitalism, the constraints imposed by competition between the two systems did no longer counted. “Liberalism,” finally liberated from its socialist alter ego, shook off its social and political encumbrances and became “neoliberal”—in other words openly and entirely liberal. It is the time of “deregulation,” exclusive market-oriented laws to organize not only production, but also culture, education, health, the relations between States and societies, between nations and corporations, between generations, etc.
This trend of course started well before 1989, but at the beginning it only affected the less resistant Western societies like the USA under Reagan and Great Britain under Thatcher, or the weakest nation-States of Africa and Latin America through the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs).
Having disappeared the barrier created by the socialist alternative and discretion no longer being necessary, the contemporary form of capitalism, neoliberalism, thus became today’s hegemonic way of thinking and the liberation of market forces, the ultimate aim of “good governance.”
This strategic victory coincides with a profound change in the production system, especially in the field of communication and information.
As Manuel Castells6 has observed:
The new information technologies, by transforming the process of information treatment, influence all spheres of human activity and make it possible to establish innumerable connections between different fields, as well as between the elements and agents of the said activities. Thus an extremely independent network economy emerged, which became increasingly able to apply the progress of its technology, knowledge and management to technology, knowledge and management themselves…This new economy is informational because the productivity and competitiveness of its units essentially depend on their capacity to apply effective information based on knowledge…this new economy is global because the key activities of production, consumption and distribution, as well as their constituents (capital, labour, raw materials, management, information, technology, markets) are organized at the world level, either directly or through a network of contacts among the economic agents.
6See the detailed study made by Manuel Castells inLa société en réseau,Fayard, Paris, 1998, p. 94.
The strategic victory of capitalism and the information revolution thus combine to accelerate the globalisation movement “inserting economic activities all over the world into an interdependent system that functions as a unit in real time.”7
7Manuel Castells,op.cit., p. 22.
Capitalism is therefore a double winner. First, at the strategic level: with the collapse of the competing experience of “actually existing socialism,” the ruling classes are freed from the political, social, and even ethical restraints they had when adopting—as a philosophy—the old bourgeois humanism of the nation-State, European style, with the regulation of public policies, as well as the Keynesian regulation of the economy. Second, at the technological level: with the constraints of space-time breaking down, one after the other, it became possible to manage globalised economic units (production, trade, finance) in real time.
The whole new ideology of globalization rests on this double success. Cleverly playing on these two keyboards, the fantastic successes of the new technologies and the lamentable failure of the socialist experience, the “new evangelists of the market” highly proclaim that the new opened path is unique and irrefutable. That thanks to the laws of the market and of profit and, therefore, by extending them to all societies and all aspects of social activity, humanity can move forward; that this new capitalist ideology effectively “gives new life” to capitalism, by presenting it as a system of production, which is new, global (or becoming so), inevitable and unavoidable. Like any ideology closed up within its own dogmas, it prohibits any alternative thinking, dismissed in advance as being conservative and reactionary.
Backed by the powerful Bretton Woods institutions, taking full advantage of the most modern communication and information techniques, its job is to provide universal legitimacy to what, after all, is but the result of a specific history and, as such, is susceptible to change.
Globalization and regionalization
The new developments help us to understand the present dynamic of the capitalist system and we will use these insights to try to analyze the efforts being made to create a “Euro-Mediterranean” space.
We should first remember that the nation-State as a socio-historical form of capitalist development does not exclude “in itself” other forms, be them local,regional or transnational. Merchant capitalism existed in the oldest empires8, in China, India and the Middle East. But it is in Europe that capitalism, driven by the first industrial revolution, takes real root in productive activities and becomes the leading mode of production. At the same time, new kinds of States appeared on the scene, which shaped, in different ways, the social milieu in order to make create “nations”: England, France, Germany and, later on, the countries to the south and east of Europe.
8The French historian François Braudel set out to reconstruct the main lines of the capitalist history of the world.
These capitalist nation-States like England and France possessed a far flung collection of colonies and were already global capitalist systems.
The former developed with the British industrial revolution and it affected all of Europe and later on the USA, before the cycle was closed with Russia and Japan. Western Europe ruled the world, but the existing rivalries among the European countries exploded in 1914 in what is known as the First World War.
The post-war period was instable. It saw the rise of the USA and its “challenger” the Soviet Union (USSR), but also the increasing power of the latest capitalist nation-States, Germany and Japan. All of this ended with the gigantic explosion of the Second World War, followed by the “Cold War,” a period of structural competition between the two systems. It accelerated decolonization but it also changed imperialism: the territorial possessions lost out to more cunning forms of domination, such as economic and technological “dependence.”
With the end of the Cold War, the primacy of the USA was evident and the new system that has developed could be termed “more capitalist than ever,” but also more “American.” Accumulation takes place at unequal levels, assisted by theelimination of customs duties that the WTO (World Trade Organization) expects to complete within a few decades, the deregulation of the economy in different nation-States as well as the liberalization of financial flows, but also helped out by the information revolution which provides it with an extraordinarily effective technological base.
However, at the same time, there has been a structural change in the economy with an increasing number of multinationals or, more precisely, “transnationals” operating in networks.9The multiplication and concentration of these corporations in certain sectors over the last few decades is one of the main characteristics of contemporary capitalism. They have contributed to accelerate the commodity exchanges and are now responsible for 60 percent of world trade and around 30 percent of the production. They have been helped by large banks and financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade organization, whose main target has been the old forms of State regulation, as their main target of attack. In this way, they directed much of the capital flow towards short-term investment (hot money), weakening the central bank’s monetary creation framework and, as a result, promoting a stock market crash, capable, within days, of bringing down entire national economies.
9Manuel Castells,op.cit.
The structure of the world economy becomes instable, while it weakens State forms of intervention in the fields of taxes, banking, customs and stock markets.
In the new system, however, the unequal development of classes, countries and regions is destined to worsen. The general freeing up of trade and financial transactions enfeeble all national institutions, beginning with those of the weaker countries. Certain countries have been resisting, like Korea, Malaysia and China, or are organizing themselves regionally, but most of them are trying to accelerate the “reforms” (concerning taxes, banking and social affairs) which are supposed to promote general growth but in fact mainly benefit the new neoliberal credo.
Since 1990 there has been a geographical polarization which has taken the form of regional bodies that go beyond national frontiers. The most active regionalization have been those forged around the central poles of the world economy, the Triad: Japan and Southeast Asia, the USA, Western Europe.
The European Union (EU) is the oldest of these regional constructions. Launched by the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the European Economic Community (EEC) was then composed of only six countries and grew out of former organizations, created just after the Second World War, like the Organization for European Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Their aims were to reconstruct a Europe that had been ruined by the war, to calm French/German conflicts and, under the leadership of NATO, to constitute a front vis-à-vis the countries of Eastern Europe.
The EEC increased its forms of cooperation in order to ensure the independence of the region in the fields of energy and, especially, agriculture, with the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The regionalization movement gathered momentum, spreading to other sectors and then, in 1986, the “Single Act” was signed, which envisage the removal of internal frontiers and the free circulation of people, goods and capital. In 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht envisaged the relaunching of the political union but also the construction of an economic and monetary union, with the establishment of a European central bank by 1997 at the latest. And, while the regionalization movement consolidated the
EU (now with fifteen members), in other regions emerged NAFTA, formed around the USA, andAssociation of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN) surroundingJapan. As this regionalization process took place in an avowedly neoliberal framework, it weakened the traditional means of regulation of nation-States without, however, transferring their powers to a regional regulating authority. Brussels has remained a soul less bureaucratic apparatus, strongly influenced by the Bretton Woods institutions and by policies aimed at freeing up the market. Unemployment, the job crisis, the deregulation of the economy, the reductions in non-productive expenditure (health, education, etc.) were the results of the famous “Maastricht criteria” which was but the European velvet glove covering the iron hand of world neoliberalism. As Pierre Bourdieu has remarked:10
What is at issue is the role of the State (both the national State as it now exists and the European State that is to be created), particularly as concerns social rights and therole of the social State, which is the only force able to act as a counterweight to the inexorable results of the market economy when left to itself. One can be against a Europe like that of Mr. Tietmeyer, which will serve the interests of the financial markets, while at the same time being in favour of a Europe which, by mutually agreed policies, can impede the violence of those markets. But there is little hope of this happening in the Europe the bankers are preparing for us. One cannot expect that social integration will be ensured through monetary integration. On the contrary: we know that the countries that want to preserve their competitiveness within the Euro area to the detriment of their partners will have no other choice but to lower their wage expenditure by reducing social charges. Social and wage dumping and the “flexibility” of the job market will be the only choices left open to countries, after losing their right to interfere with the rates of exchange…Only a European social State will be able to counteract the disintegrating effect of the monetary economy. But Mr. Tietmeyer and the neoliberals do not want national States, which they consider just an obstacle to the working of the economy, or, even less, a supranational State, which they would like to reduce to a bank.
10Pierre Bourdieu,Contre-Feux.Raisons d’Agir, Paris, 1998. p. 67.
This long quotation from one of the most insightful “social” observers of this Europe, in its creation process, clearly shows the ambiguity of the regionalization processes at work in the world today. It is a response, as well as a reaction, to the acceleration of a polarizing globalization in the precise sense of the term given by Samir Amin.11 These processes could follow the neoliberal logic of this polarizing globalization—or they could resist it. It will depend on the forms of action and alternatives that the social struggles in the region develop in the future.
11“The polarization of the ‘classic’ era,” observes Samir Amin, “was virtually synonymous with the contrast between industrialized and non-industrialized countries. The monopoly of the centres, through which unequal accumulation was reproduced and deepened at the world level, was accomplished through industrialization…The polarization which is now at work in the world system is no longer based on the industrial monopoly of the centres alone. The more important peripheries have also, in their turn, entered into the industrial era (although Africa has not really done so). Rather than the old industrial monopoly, there is now what I would call the ‘five monopolies’ of the centres: technological initiative, access to the planet’s natural resources, control of globalised finance, communications, armaments of massive destruction. Taken all together, these five monopolies define the form and new contents of the globalised law of value on the basis of which accumulation at the world level reproduces and deepens the polarization.”
While the interests of the European popular classes are being constantly threatened by the shape the construction of Europe is taking and while, therefore, the future of this region will depend on the extent to which the social movements and intellectuals take part in this construction, what about the interests of the less developed countries peoples, who are the most vulnerable? You can bet that it is not Mr. Tietmeyer who is going to take pity on their fate.
We should remember that, at the gates of the EU, to the south of the Mediterranean, there are countries with fast growing populations that have provided Europe, during the Thirty Glorious Years (mid-forties to mid-seventies), with the workers it needed. Now job opportunities for them are closing up in Europe, while in their own countries, Structural Adjustment Programmes have already produced their quota of unemployment, underemployment and pauperization. The question of control over the European frontiers vis-à-vis the southern side of theMediterranean—but also Eastern Europe and the Balkans—is thus a central issue in the construction of the EU. The Mediterranean is becoming one of the most sensitive borders of our time.12
12During the “European days for the Territorial representatives of the State,” which were held in Paris in 1999, the workshop on the “State representatives when faced by crises” discussed clandestine immigration, which was felt to be a “worrying potential source of crisis.” The final report read: “It is worth mentioning an issue that has already created serious difficulties for many Europeans and will continue to do so: clandestine immigration. All European countries may fear the consequences…regulating immigration, the social integration of immigrants, development assistance and the struggle against the gangs that organize clandestine entry are all serious challenges for the EU…It is essential to be prepared for crisis situations”.
Public officials and their teams should be trained for action and how to behave effectively before, during and after a crisis.” See IHSE,La Documentation française,Paris, 1999.
This issue shows up a major contradiction in neoliberal philosophy which preaches the freedom of movement for goods and capital in all their forms, while prohibiting people freedom of movement. With the polarized, unequal development that this logic will certainly accentuate where it already exists and be constantly stimulated when considered necessary, we can only expect huge and “uncontrollable”13migratory movements throughout the world, particularly from the southern side of the Mediterranean. The construction of the EU is—and will always be—torn by this contradiction inherent in its own logic, as indeed is the case with the USA vis-à-vis NAFTA.
13Commentators agree on the present “paradox” of the “globalisation” movement. While modern means of transportation continue to develop, the number of reception centres for international immigrants has diminished: apart from the port and border regions, the big cities are served by this transportation. The result, in developed countries, is that the migratory flows tend to concentrate, thus reinforcing the impression that the phenomenon is rapidly expanding. SeeSciences Humaines,occasional paper no. 8, March 1995. Paris.
The Euro-Mediterranean partnership project should also be seen in this perspective, although it should not be reduced to this sole dimension. For it reveals, in spite of all the diplomatic euphemisms and solemn declarations, a duplicity, or at least an ambiguity, that is cunningly concealed in the discourse. It is our view that this project is principally a “defence” agreement, which protects the EU against possible social, political and cultural “overflowing” from the countries on the southern side of the Mediterranean. Regarding the presentation of the project, which is nothing if not Byzantine, it merely reflects a more “civilized” European style, in comparison with the brutality of the American approach to the subject. But we get the impression that the objectives are the same.
2. The Euro-Mediterranean partnership: fiction and fact
The process launched by the Barcelona conference of 1995, which brings together the European countries and those on the southern side of the Mediterranean, is aimed at creating a free trade area, the Mediterranean Free Trade Zone (MFTZ) like the one created in North America, consisting of the USA, Canada and Mexico (NAFTA) or the one in Asia (ASEAN). As will be seen later, this initiative clearly reflects the new dynamics of globalization and is barely more original, at least in its economic purposes, than other such efforts.
Our investigations therefore start with them, because of the importance given to the “discourse” and institutions that have been set up to make the whole process permanent. The discourse is above all rhetorical, as can be seen from the following example:
However, we feel, what makes the process significant are the historic and strategic conditions in which it is taking place: the Israeli-Palestine and Israel-Arab conflicts and the huge migratory flows from the south to the north of the Mediterranean. These conditions obviously determine the political and institutional forms the Europeans, who conceived the project, have adopted in order to carry it out. Our investigations therefore start with them, because of the importance given to the “discourse” and the institutions that have been set up to ensure the permanence of the process. The discourse is, above all, rhetorical, as the following example shows:
The Euro-Mediterranean partnership, born during the conference of the ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Euro-Mediterranean countries which was held in November 1995 in Lisbon, constitutes the most important initiative taken in modern times to develop sustainable and solid ties between both sides of the Mediterranean.14
14Annual Report of the MRDA Programme, 1999. Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 2000, p. 3.
Those concerned with the present relationships between the European countries and the southern side of the Mediterranean must surely feel nauseous at the incredible verbosity of the discourse. There have been a large number of reports, studies, reviews, colloquies and other forums in connection with more or less important meetings which have taken place at more or less regular intervals. But they have always been given far more attention in the media than their achievements on the ground, as we shall see later.
The experience has been so visible because it has been deliberately publicized; talking too much about itself, using excessive rhetoric, stodgy “techno-scientific” analyses and philosophical, and literary attempts to try to give a historical and human depth. These three kinds of discourse correspond neatly with the three levels of the institutional construction of the relationship: the political, the economic and the level of the “civil society.” These three levels, in turn, determine the three categories of actors: the politicians, the technocrats and “civil society” leaders.
A few examples give an idea of the general ethos surrounding this project.
Let us start with the first one, that of the politicians.
The Euro-Mediterranean partnership, inaugurated during the conference of Barcelona in 1995, defines a policy with ambitious and long-term objectives (the Barcelona process). It should be distinguished from earlier European Union policies vis-à-vis the Mediterranean, which gave more importance to development assistance than to a partnership among equals. The greater commitment that followed the declaration of Barcelona originated in the European Union’s vital strategic interests in its immediate Mediterranean neighbours…The main objectives of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership are: 1) the creation of a zone of peace and stability, based on the principles of human rights and democracy; 2) the construction of a zone of shared prosperity by the gradual setting up of an area of free trade between the European Union and its Mediterranean partners and among these same partners, accompanied by a large financial support from the community to facilitate economic transition and assist partners in dealing with the socio-economic challenges caused by this transition; 3) the improvement of mutual understanding among the peoples of the region and the promotion of a free and flourishing civil society, thanks to the organization of cultural exchanges, the development of human resources and support for civil societies and social development.15
15Chris Patten, “Barcelona, Five years later.”
This extract from a report on the Euromed project by one of the top officials on the European side is paradigmatic. There is the wordy core from which stem, in successive layers, the other elements of the Euro-Mediterranean rhetoric: peace, stability, human rights and democracy, then prosperity and free trade, and finally social development, the emergence of civil society and the increase in cultural exchanges between both sides of the Mediterranean, which should close the virtuous circle of this new kind of partnership.
Because the relationship should cover these three fields it must be based on a partnership because “the Barcelona conference,” we are told,16 “has transformed Mediterranean policy into a global, coherent approach, respectful of a certain balance among the different fields. By combining the three constituents within a global policy, it recognizes that it makes no sense to have a separate approach to financial, economic, cultural and security questions.”
16Chris Patten,op. cit.
