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- Herausgeber: Krill Press
- Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
- Sprache: Englisch
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Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2016
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CHANCELLORSVILLE AND GETTYSBURG: CAMPAIGNS OF THE CIVIL WAR - VI
Abner Doubleday
FIREWORK PRESS
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHANCELLORSVILLE AND GETTYSBURG: CAMPAIGNS OF THE CIVIL WAR.—VI.
PREFACE.
CHANCELLORSVILLE.: CHANCELLORSVILLE.: CHAPTER I. THE OPENING OF 1863.—HOOKER’S PLANS.
CHAPTER II. FRIDAY, THE FIRST OF MAY.
CHAPTER III. THE DISASTROUS SECOND OF MAY.
CHAPTER IV. THE ROUT OF THE ELEVENTH CORPS.
CHAPTER V. JACKSON’S ADVANCE IS CHECKED.
CHAPTER VI. SICKLES FIGHTS HIS WAY BACK.—ARRIVAL OF THE FIRST CORPS.
CHAPTER VII. THE BATTLE OF THE THIRD OF MAY.
CHAPTER VIII. MAY FOURTH.—ATTACK ON SEDGWICK’S FORCE.
CHAPTER IX. PREPARATIONS TO RENEW THE CONFLICT.
CHAPTER X. BATTLE OF BRANDY STATION (FLEETWOOD).
GETTYSBURG.: CHAPTER I. THE INVASION OF THE NORTH.
CHAPTER II. HOOKER’S PLANS—LONGSTREET OCCUPIES THE GAPS IN THE BLUE RIDGE— ALARM IN RICHMOND—HOOKER SUPERSEDED BY MEADE.
CHAPTER III. STUART’S RAID—THE ENEMY IN FRONT OF HARRISBURG—MEADE’S PLANS.
CHAPTER IV. THE FIRST DAY OF THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG, WEDNESDAY, JULY 1, 1863.
CHAPTER V. BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG—THE SECOND DAY.
CHAPTER VI. THE BATTLE OF THE THIRD DAY—JOHNSON’S DIVISION DRIVEN OUT.
CHAPTER VII. GENERAL RETREAT OF THE ENEMY—CRITICISMS OF DISTINGUISHED CONFEDERATE OFFICERS.
Chancellorsville and Gettysburg: Campaigns of the Civil War - VI
By
Abner Doubleday
Chancellorsville and Gettysburg: Campaigns of the Civil War - VI
Published by Firework Press
New York City, NY
First published circa 1893
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CHANCELLORSVILLE AND GETTYSBURG: CAMPAIGNS OF THE CIVIL WAR.—VI.
NEW YORK CHARLES SCRIBNER’S SONS 743 AND 745 BROADWAY 1882
COPYRIGHT BY CHARLES SCRIBNER’S SONS 1882
TROW’S PRINTING AND BOOKBINDING COMPANY 210-213 East 12th Street
PREFACE.
IN WRITING THS NARRATIVE, WHICH relates to the decisive campaign which freed the Northern States from invasion, it may not be out of place to state what facilities I have had for observation in the fulfilment of so important a task. I can only say that I was, to a considerable extent, an actor in the scenes I describe, and knew the principal leaders on both sides, in consequence of my association with them at West Point, and, subsequently, in the regular army. Indeed, several of them, including Stonewall Jackson and A. P. Hill, were, prior to the war, officers in the regiment to which I belonged. As commander of the Defences of Washington in the spring of 1862, I was, owing to the nature of my duties, brought into intimate relations with the statesmen who controlled the Government at the time, and became well acquainted with President Lincoln. I was present, too, after the Battle of Gettysburg, at a very interesting Cabinet Council, in which the pursuit of Lee was fully discussed; so that, in one way and another, I have had better opportunities to judge of men and measures than usually fall to the lot of others who have written on the same subject.
I have always felt it to be the duty of every one who held a prominent position in the great war to give to posterity the benefit of his personal recollections; for no dry official statement can ever convey an adequate idea to those who come after us of the sufferings and sacrifices through which the country has passed. Thousands of men—the flower of our Northern youth—have gone down to their graves unheralded and unknown, and their achievements and devotion to the cause have already been forgotten. It is, therefore, incumbent upon us, who were their comrades in the field, to do all in our power to preserve their deeds from oblivion.
And yet it is no easy task to relate contemporaneous events. Whoever attempts it must be prepared for severe criticism and the exhibition of much personal feeling. Some of this may be avoided, it is true, by writing a colorless history, praising everybody, and attributing all disasters to dispensations of Providence, for which no one is to blame. I cannot, however, consent to fulfill my allotted task in this way, for the great lessons of the war are too valuable to be ignored or misstated. It is not my desire to assail any of the patriotic men who were engaged in the contest, but each of us is responsible for our actions in this world, and for the consequences which flow from them; and where great disasters have occurred, it is due both to the living and the dead that the causes and circumstances be justly and properly stated.
Richelieu once exclaimed, upon giving away a high appointment: “Now I have made one ingrate and a thousand enemies.” Every one who writes the history of the Great Rebellion will often have occasion to reiterate the statement: For the military critic must necessarily describe facts which imply praise or censure. Those who have contributed to great successes think much more might have been said on the subject, and those who have caused reverses and defeats are bitter in their denunciations.
Nevertheless, the history of the war should be written before the facts have faded from the memory of living men, and have become mere matters of tradition.
In a narrative of this kind, resting upon a great number of voluminous details, I cannot hope to have wholly escaped error, and wherever I have misconceived or misstated a fact, it will give me pleasure to correct the record.
NEW YORK, January, 1882.
CHANCELLORSVILLE.: CHANCELLORSVILLE.: CHAPTER I. THE OPENING OF 1863.—HOOKER’S PLANS.
AFTER THE GREAT DISASTER OF Fredericksburg, General Burnside, the Commander of the Union Army, was superseded by Major-General Joseph Hooker, a graduate of West Point, who having formerly held a high position on the staff of General Gideon J. Pillow in the war with Mexico, was supposed to be well acquainted with military operations on a large scale. He had subsequently left the army, and had been engaged in civil pursuits for several years. He was a man of fine presence, of great personal magnetism, and had the reputation of being one of our most efficient and successful corps commanders.
When the campaign of Chancellorsville commenced, the Army of the Potomac was posted on the left bank of the Rappahannock, opposite Fredericksburg, among the Stafford hills, in a position which was considered almost impregnable. It rested upon the Potomac River, and as all of its supplies came by water, they were not subject to delay or interruption of any kind; nor were they endangered by the movements of the enemy.
At the period referred to, General Hooker had under him a force of about 124,500 men of all arms, 11,500 of which were cavalry.
On the opposite side of the river, the Army of Northern Virginia, under General Robert E. Lee, numbered, according to their official reports, about sixty-two thousand men, three thousand of which were cavalry;* but the difference was amply compensated by the wide river in front of the enemy, and the fact that every available point and ford was well fortified and guarded. General Thomas J. Jackson, commonly called Stonewall Jackson, held the line below Hamilton’s crossing to Port Royal. Two out of four divisions of Longstreet’s corps were absent. The fourth, under Major-General Lafayette McLaws, was posted from Hamilton’s crossing to Banks’ Ford. Still farther up and beyond the front of either army, the crossing-places were watched by the rebel cavalry under Major- General J. E. B. Stuart, supported by the Third Division of Longstreet’s corps, that of Anderson.
[* Napoleon says 100,000 men on the rolls are only equivalent to about 80,000 muskets in action. It is doubtful if Hooker had over 113,000 men for actual combat. Lieut.-Colonel W. T. Forbes, Assistant Adjutant General, who has had access to the records, after a careful estimate, places the number as follows. First Corps, 16,000; Second Corps, 16,000; Third Corps, 18,000; Fifth Corps, 15,000; Sixth Corps, 22,000; Eleventh Corps, 15,000; Twelfth Corps, 11,000; total infantry and artillery, 113,000; Pleasanton’s cavalry, 1,500; total effective force, 114,500. He estimates Lee’s army at 62,000, which the Confederate authorities, Hotchkiss and Allan, place as follows: Anderson’s and McLaws’ divisions of Longstreet’s Corps, 17,000; Jackson’s Corps, 33,500; Stuart’s Cavalry, 2,700; Artillery, 5,000; add 4,000 on engineer, hospital duty, etc. This estimate is exclusive of Stoneman’s force.]
Both armies had spent the winter in much needed rest, after the toilsome and exhausting marches and bloody battles which terminated Lee’s first invasion of Maryland. The discipline of our army was excellent, and it would have been hard to find a finer body of men, or better fighting material than that assembled on this occasion, in readiness to open the spring campaign. Hooker was justly popular with his troops. They had confidence in his ability as a general, and he had gained their good will by anticipating their wants, and by generously grating furloughs to those who were pining from home- sickness; trusting that old associations and the honor of the men would induce them to rejoin their colors when the leaves of absence had expired. In this way he almost stopped the desertion which had been so prevalent under Burnside. Only one portion of the army was dissatisfied; the position recently occupied by General Franz Sigel, the favorite commander of the Eleventh Corps, had been given to General O. O. Howard. The numerous Germans in that corps were discontented at the change. They cared little for Howard’s reputation as the Havelock of the army; an appellation he had gained from his zeal as a Congregationalist. They felt, when their countryman Sigel was deprived of his command, that it was a blow to their nationality, and therefore lost some of the enthusiasm which always accompanies the personal influence of a popular leader.
The rainy season was nearly over, the time had come for action, and it was essential to strike a decisive blow before the term of service of the nine months’ and two years’ men had drawn to a close. Hooker’s plan of campaign was simple, efficacious, and should have been successful. The rebels occupied a long line and could not be strong everywhere. He resolved to make a pretence of crossing with three corps, under Major-General Sedgwick, below Fredericksburg, while the remaining four corps under Major-General Slocum made a detour and crossed twenty-seven miles above at Kelly’s Ford. The latter were then to march down the river against the left flank of the rebel army and re-open Banks’ Ford; thus re-uniting the two wings of the army and giving a secure line of retreat in case of disaster. When this was accomplished it was proposed to give battle in the open country near the ford, the position there being a commanding one and taking the whole line of rebel works on the heights of Fredericksburg in reverse. Owing to his great preponderance of force, Hooker had little reason to doubt that the result would be favorable to our arms. To carry out this plan and make it a complete surprise to the enemy it became necessary to leave Gibbon’s division of Couch’s corps behind, for as his encampment at Falmouth was in full view of the Confederate forces on the opposite side, to withdraw it would have been to notify them that some unusual movement was going on. So far the idea was simply to crush the opposing army, but Hooker’s plan went farther and involved the capture of Lee’s entire force. To accomplish this he directed Stoneman to start two weeks in advance of the main body with ten thousand cavalry, cross at the upper fords of the Rappahannock, and sweep down upon Lee’s communications with Richmond, breaking up railroads and canals, cutting telegraph wires, and intercepting supplies of all kinds. As the rebel commissariat found great difficulty in keeping more than four days’ rations on hand at a time, Stoneman’s raid would almost necessarily force Lee to fall back on his depots and give up Fredericksburg. One column under Averell was to attack Culpeper and Gordonsville, the other under Buford to move to Louisa Court House, and thence to the Fredericksburg Railroad. Both columns were to unite behind the Pamunkey, and in case our army was successful Stoneman was directed to plant his force behind some river in an advantageous position on Lee’s line of retreat, where he could detain the rebel army until Hooker could again assail it and compel it to surrender. A brave programme! Let us see how it was carried out.
It was an essential part of Hooker’s project that the cavalry should begin operations two weeks before the infantry. If they did their work thoroughly, Lee would be out of provisions, and his retreat would give us all the moral effect of a victory. The rebel cavalry at the time being reduced to about 3,000 men, it was not supposed that Stoneman would encounter any serious resistance. He accordingly started on April 13th to carry out his instructions, but another rain storm, which made the river unfordable, and very bad roads, detained him until the 28th. It has been suggested that he might have crossed higher up, but cavalry officers who were there, tell me that every ravine had become an impassable river. Hooker became impatient and refused to wait any longer; so when the water subsided, all—infantry, artillery, and cavalry—were sent over together. The result was that the battle was ended before Stoneman got fairly to work, and his operations had little or no effect in obstructing Lee’s movements.
To confuse the enemy as much as possible, demonstrations had been made at both ends of the line. On April 21st a small infantry force was sent to threaten Kelly’s Ford. On the same day, I went with part of my division down the river to Port Conway, opposite Port Royal, twenty miles below Fredericksburg, made a pretence of crossing in pontoons, and built fires in every direction at night, to give the impression of a large force. On the 24th General Wadsworth went on an expedition to the same place, and two regiments under Colonel Morrow, 24th Michigan, crossed over in boats, and returned. Those movements caused Jackson to strengthen his force in that quarter. On the 27th, the storm having abated, Meade’s corps (the Fifth), Howard’s corps (the Eleventh), and Slocum’s corps (the Twelfth), the whole being under the command of General Slocum, left camp for Kelly’s Ford, each accompanied by three batteries. A detachment was thrown over, in boats, on the evening of the 28th, which dispersed the picket guard; and by the next morning the entire force was across the river and on their way to the Rapidan, the Fifth Corps taking the direction of Elley’s Ford and the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps that of Germania Ford. Stoneman’s cavalry crossed at the same time with the others, and moved to Culpeper, where he halted for a time to reorganize his force, and get rid of surplus horses, baggage, etc., which were sent to the rear. The next day Averell kept on to Rapidan Station with 4,000 sabres, to engage W. H. F. Lee’s rebel brigade, so that it could not interfere with the operations of the main body, which moved southeast across Morton’s Ford and Raccoon Ford to Louisa Court House, where the work of destruction was to begin. Stoneman’s further movements will be related hereafter. One small brigade of three regiments with two batteries was placed under the command of General Pleasonton and directed to report to General Slocum, to precede the infantry on the different roads.
Stuart, who commanded two brigades of rebel cavalry, under Fitz Hugh Lee and W. H. F. Lee, and whose duty it was to watch these upper fords, received news of the crossing at 9 P.M., on the 28th.
The turning column reached Chancellorsville with but little opposition, as both Lee and Stuart thought it was making for Gordonsville and the Virginia Central Railroad. In consequence of this miscalculation, Stuart planted himself at Brandy Station. When he found that he was out of position and that it was too late to prevent the crossing at Germania Ford, he made a circuit with Fitz Hugh Lee’s brigade to get between Slocum and Lee, and sent W. H. F. Lee’s brigade to impede Stoneman’s operations. The passage of Germania Ford turned Elley’s Ford and United States Ford, and Mahone’s and Posey’s brigades, who were on guard there, retreated on Chancellorsville, where Anderson had come up with Wright’s brigade too late to prevent the crossing.
By 6 P.M. on the 30th, Hooker found himself in command of four corps at Chancellorsville, with another—that of Sickles—near at hand. Anderson fell back to Tabernacle Church as our troops advanced, and began to fortify a line there. Stuart sent Fitz Hugh Lee’s brigade, which was very much exhausted, to Todd’s Tavern for the night, while he started with a small escort, to explain the situation to General Lee at Fredericksburg. On the road, not far from Spottsylvania, he came unexpectedly upon one of Pleasonton’s regiments, the 6th New York Cavalry, numbering about 200 men, which was returning from a reconnoissance it had made in that direction. He avoided the encounter and sent back to Todd’s Tavern, at first for a regiment, but subsequently for the entire brigade. When there reinforcements came up a furious cavalry contest took place, with charges and counter-charges, and hand to hand combats. It was not without an element of romance, in that lonely spot, far from either army, under the resplendent light of the full moon; recalling, in the words of a Southern chronicler, some scene of knightly glory. Our troops were surrounded, but cut their way out with the loss of their gallant commander, Lieutenant-Colonel McVicar, who led them in the charge.
Meanwhile the other portion of the contemplated movement had also been going forward. On the 28th, the Sixth Corps, under Sedgwick, and the First Corps, under Reynolds, were moved down near the river, three or four miles below Fredericksburg, and bivouacked there in a pouring rain. As it was possible that the two corps might be attacked when they reached the other side, the Third Corps, under Sickles, was posted in the rear as a reserve.
The next day two bridges were laid down at Franklin’s old crossing for the Sixth Corps, and two more a mile below for the First Corps. Men in rifle-pits on the other side impeded the placing of the pontoons for a while, but detachments sent over in boats stormed their intrenchments, and drove them out. Brooks’ division of the Sixth Corps and Wadsworth’s division of the First Corps then crossed and threw up tête du ponts. The enemy made no other opposition than a vigorous shelling by their guns on the heights, which did but little damage. A considerable number of these missiles were aimed at my division and at that of General J. C. Robinson, which were held in reserve on the north side of the river; but as our men were pretty well sheltered, there were but few casualties.
It soon became evident that the enemy would not attack the bridge heads, they being well guarded by artillery on the north bank, so Sickles’ corps was detached on the 30th and ordered to Chancellorsville.
Sedgwick used the remainder of his men to great advantage by marching them back and forth among the hills in such a way as to lead Lee to suppose that a very large force confronted him. As, however, Sedgwick did not advance, and more accurate reports were furnished by Stuart in relation to what had taken place up the river, Lee saw, on the night of the 30th, that the movement in front of Fredericksburg was a feint, and his real antagonist was at Chancellorsville. He had previously ordered Jackson’s corps up from Moss Creek and now advanced with the main body of his army to meet Hooker, leaving Early’s division of Jackson’s corps and Barksdale’s brigade of McLaws’ division of Longstreet’s corps to hold the heights of Fredericksburg against Sedgwick. Jackson, who was always prompt, started at midnight, and at 8 A.M. the next day stood by the side of Anderson at Tabernacle Church. McLaws’ division had already arrived, having preceded him by a few hours.
The error in the movement thus far made is plain. It is a maxim in war that a single hour’s delay, when an enemy is strengthening his position or when reinforcements are coming up, will frequently cost the lives of a thousand men. In the present instance it was simply suicidal for Hooker to delay action until Anderson had fortified his lines and Lee had come forward with the main body to join him. Hooker should have pressed on immediately to seize the objective. Banks’ Ford was almost within his grasp, and only a portion of Anderson’s division barred the way. The possession of that ford would have brought Sedgwick twelve miles nearer to him, and would have forced Lee to fight at a great disadvantage both as to position and numbers. Hooker knew from a captured despatch which Pleasonton placed in his hands, that Lee was still in Fredericksburg on the 30th, uncertain how to act; for he did not know the strength of Sedgwick’s column, and feared that the main attack might come from that direction. The four corps at Chancellorsville amounted to about forty-six thousand men; and 18,000 more were close at hand under Sickles. The troops had made but a short march, and were comparatively fresh. Four miles further on lay the great prize for which Hooker was contending. He had only to put out his hand to reach it, but he delayed action all that long night and until eleven o’clock of the next morning. When he did make the effort the line he was about to occupy was well fortified and held by all but one division and one brigade of Lee’s army.
CHAPTER II. FRIDAY, THE FIRST OF MAY.
THERE ARE TWO EXCELLENT ROADS leading from Chancellorsville to Fredericksburg—one a plank road, which keeps up near the sources of the streams along the dividing line between Mott Run on the north and Lewis Creek and Massaponax Creek on the South, and the other called the old turnpike, which was more direct but more broken, as it passed over several ravines. There was still a third road, a very poor one, which ran near the river and came out at Banks’ Ford.
On May 1st, at 11 A.M., Hooker moved out to attack Lee in four columns.
Slocum’s corps, followed by that of Howard, took the plank road on the right.
Sykes’ division of Meade’s corps, followed by Hancock’s division of Couch’s corps, went by the turnpike in the centre.
The remainder of Meade’s corps—Griffin’s division, followed by that of Humphreys—took the river road.
Lastly, French’s division of Couch’s corps was under orders to turn off and march to Todd’s Tavern.
Each column was preceded by a detachment of Pleasonton’s cavalry, which, in fact, had been close to Anderson’s pickets all the morning.
Before these troops started, Sickles’ corps arrived, after a short march, from Hartwood Church, and were posted in rear of the Chancellorsville House as a reserve, with one brigade thrown out to Dowdall’s Tavern, otherwise known as Melzi Chancellor’s house. Another brigade was left at the Ford to guard the passage against Fitz Hugh Lee’s cavalry.
Hooker, who was a very sanguine man, expected to be able to form line of battle by 2 P.M., with his right resting near Tabernacle Church, and his left covering Banks’ Ford. It did not seem to occur to him that the enemy might be there before him and prevent the formation, or that he would have any difficulty in moving and deploying his troops; but he soon found himself hampered in every direction by dense and almost impenetrable thickets, which had a tendency to break up every organization that tried to pass through them into mere crowds of men without order or alignment. Under these circumstances concert of action became exceedingly difficult, and when attempts were made to communicate orders off the roads, aids wandered hopelessly through the woods, struggling in the thick undergrowth, without being able to find any one. It was worse then fighting in a dense fog.* The enemy, of course, were also impeded in their movements, but they had the advantage of being better acquainted with the country, and in case they were beaten they had a line at Tabernacle Church already intrenched to fall back upon. The ravines also, which crossed the upper roads at right angles, offered excellent defensive positions for them.
[* One brigade of Griffin’s division was out all night trying to find its way through the thickets, and did not reach the main army until 4 A.M. Wilcox’s brigade, which came the next day from Banks’ Ford to reinforce the enemy, had a similar experience.]
McLaws, who had advanced on the turnpike, managed to form line of battle with his division on each side of the pike, against Sykes, who had now come forward to sustain his cavalry detachment, which, in spite of their gallantry—for they rode up and fired in the faces of the enemy—were driven in by the 11th Virginia Infantry of Mahone’s brigade. Jackson on his arrival, had stopped the fortifying which Anderson had commenced, and according to his invariable custom to find and fight his enemy as soon as possible, had moved forward; so that the two armies encountered each other about two and half miles from Chancellorsville. Sykes indeed, met the advance of McLaws’ division only a mile out, and drove it back steadily a mile farther, when it was reinforced by Anderson’s division, and Ramseur’s brigade of Rodes’ division. Anderson gave Sykes a lively fight and succeeded in getting in on his flanks; for, owing to the divergence of the roads, neither Slocum on the right nor Meade’s two divisions on the left were abreast with him. He tried to connect with Slocum by throwing out a regiment deployed as skirmishers, but did not succeed. As the enemy were gaining the advantage he fell back behind Hancock, who came to the front and took his place. Slocum now formed on the right, with his left resting on the plank road, and his right on high ground which commanded the country around. Altogether the general line was a good one; for there were large open spaces where the artillery could move and manoeuvre, and the army were almost out of the thickets. The reserves could have struggled through those in the rear, and have filled the gaps, so that there is no reason to suppose our forces could have not continued to advance, or at all events have held the position, which, from its elevation and the other advantages I have stated, was an important one, especially as the column on the river road was in sight of Banks’ Ford, which it could have seized and held, or have struck the right flank of the enemy with great effect. The troops had come out to obtain possession of Banks’ Ford, and all the surplus artillery was waiting there. To retreat without making any adequate effort to carry out his plans made the General appear timid, and had a bad effect on the morale of the army. It would have been time enough to fall back in case of defeat; and if such a result was anticipated, the engineers with their 4,000 men, aided by Sickles’ corps, could easily have laid out a strong line in the rear for the troops to fall back upon. General Warren, the Chief Engineer on Hooker’s staff, thought the commanding ridge with the open space in front, upon which Hancock was posted, a very advantageous position for the army to occupy, and urged Couch not to abandon it until he (Warren) had conferred with Hooker. After the order came to retire, Couch sent to obtain permission to remain, but it was peremptorily refused. Hooker soon afterward changed his mind and countermanded his first order, but it was then too late; our troops had left the ridge and the enemy were in possession of it. There was too much vacillation at headquarters. Slocum, who was pressing the enemy back, was very much vexed when he received the order, but obeyed it, and retreated without being molested. It is true, Wright’s brigade had formed on his right, but the advance of the Eleventh Corps would have taken that in flank, so that the prospect was generally good at this time for an advance. The column on the river road also retired without interference. As Couch had waited to hear from Hooker, Hancock’s right flank became somewhat exposed by the delay, but he fell back without serious loss. French also, who had started for Todd’s Tavern, returned. He encountered the enemy, but was ordered in and did not engage them.
That portion of the country around Chancellorsville within the Union lines on the morning of May 2d, may, with some exceptions, be described as a plain, covered by dense thickets, with open spaces in the vicinity of the houses, varied by the high ground at Talley’s on the west and by the hills of Fairview and Hazel Grove on the south, and terminating in a deep ravine near the river. Our general line was separated from that of the enemy by small streams, which principally ran through ravines, forming obstacles useful for defensive purposes. This was the case on the east and south, but on the west, where Howard’s line terminated, there was nothing but the usual thickets to impede the enemy’s approach.
As the narrative proceeds, the position of the Confederate army, who held the broken ground on the other side of those ravines, will be more particularly described.
After all, a defensive battle in such a country is not a bad thing, for where there are axes and timber it is easy to fortify and hard to force the line; always provided that free communications are kept open to the central reserve and from one part of the line to another. It must be confessed that the concealment of the thickets is also favorable to the initiative, as it enables the attacking party to mass his troops against the weak parts without being observed. Hooker probably thought if Lee assailed a superior force in an intrenched position he would certainly be beaten; and if he did not attack he would soon be forced to fall back on his depots near Richmond for food and ammunition. In either case the prestige would remain with the Union general.
The rebels followed up our army closely, and it is quite possible that a sudden attack, when it was heaped up around Chancellorsville, might have been disastrous to us. Gradually, under the skilful guidance of Captain Payne of the Engineers, who had made himself well acquainted with the country, the different corps took the positions they had occupied on the previous night, and order came out of chaos. The line, as thus established, covered all the roads which passed through Chancellorsville. The left, held by Meade’s corps, rested on the Rappahannock, near Scott’s Dam; the line was then continued in a southerly direction by Couch’s corps, facing east, French’s division being extended to a point near to and east of Chancellorsville, with Hancock’s division of the same corps holding an outpost still further to the east. Next came the Twelfth Corps under Slocum, facing south, and then, at some distance to the west, in echelon to the rear along the Plank Road, Howard’s corps was posted. The Third Corps under Sickles was kept in reserve, back of the mansion. The next morning two brigades and two batteries of Birney’s division were interposed between Slocum and Howard, with a strong line of skirmishers thrown out in front. The 8th Pennsylvania Cavalry picketed the roads and kept the enemy in sight. The thickets which surrounded this position were almost impenetrable, so that an advance against the enemy’s lines became exceedingly difficult and manoeuvring nearly impracticable, nor was this the only defect. Batteries could be established on the high ground to the east, which commanded the front facing in that direction, while our own artillery had but little scope; and last, but most important of all, the right of Howard’s corps as “in the air,” that is, rested on no obstacle.
Hooker was sensible that this flank was weak, and sent Graham’s brigade of Sickles’ corps with a battery to strengthen it; but Howard took umbrage at this, as a reflection on the bravery of his troops or his own want of skill, and told Graham that he did not need his services; that he felt so secure in his position that he would send his compliments to the whole rebel army if they lay in front of him, and invite them to attack him. As Hooker had just acquiesced in the appointment of Howard to be Commander of the Eleventh Corps, he disliked to show a want of confidence in him at the very beginning of his career, and therefore yielded to his wishes and ordered the reinforcements to return and report to Sickles again.
Chancellorsville being a great center of communication with the plank road and turnpike heading east and west, and less important roads to the south, and southeast, Hooker desired above all things to retain it; for if it should once fall into the hands of the enemy, our army would be unable to move in any direction except to the rear.
General Lee formed his line with Wickham’s and Owens’ regiments of cavalry on his right, opposite Meade’s corps, supported by Perry’s brigade of Anderson’s division; Jackson’s line stretched from the Plank Road around toward the Furnace.
Before night set in, Wright and Stuart attacked an outlying part of Slocum’s corps and drove it in on the main body. They then brought up some artillery and opened fire against Slocum’s position on the crest of the hill. Failing to make any impression they soon retired and all was quiet once more.
The enemy soon posted batteries on the high ground a mile east of Chancellorsville, and opened on Hancock’s front with considerable effect. They also enfiladed Geary’s division of Slocum’s corps, and became very annoying, but Knap’s battery of the Twelfth Corps replied effectively and kept their fire down to a great extent.
As the Union army was hidden by a thick undergrowth, Lee spent the rest of the day in making a series of feigned attacks to ascertain where our troops were posted.
When night set in, the sound of the axe was heard in every direction, for both armies thought it prudent to strengthen their front as much as possible.
The prospect for Lee as darkness closed over the scene was far from encouraging. He had examined the position of the Union army carefully, and had satisfied himself that as regards its centre and left it was unassailable. Let any man with a musket on his shoulder, encumbered with a cartridge-box, haversack, canteen, etc., attempt to climb over a body of felled timber to get at an enemy who is coolly shooting at him from behind a log breastwork, and he will realize the difficulty of forcing a way through such obstacles. Our artillery, too, swept every avenue of approach, so that the line might be considered as almost impregnable. Before giving up the attack, however, Stuart was directed to cautiously reconnoitre on the right, where Howard was posted, and see if there was not a vulnerable point there.
CHAPTER III. THE DISASTROUS SECOND OF MAY.
AT DAWN OF DAY GENERAL Lee and General Jackson were sitting by the side of the plank road, on some empty cracker boxes, discussing the situation, when Stuart came up and reported the result of his reconnoissance. He said the right flank of Howard’s corps was defenceless and easily assailable. Jackson at once asked permission to take his own corps—about 26,000 muskets—make a detour through the woods to conceal his march from observation, and fall unexpectedly upon the weak point referred to by Stuart. It was a startling proposition and contrary to all the principles of strategy, for when Jackson was gone Lee would be left with but a few men to withstand the shock of Hooker’s entire army, and might be driven back to Fredericksburg or crushed. If the Eleventh Corps had prepared for Jackson’s approach by a line properly fortified, with redoubts on the flanks, the men protected in front by felled timber and sheltered by breastworks, with the artillery at the angles, crossing its fire in front, Jackson’s corps would have been powerless to advance, and could have been held as in a vise, while Lee, one- half of his force being absent, would have found himself helpless against the combined attack of our other corps, which could have assailed him in front and on each flank.
There was, therefore, great risk in attempting such a manoeuvre, for nothing short of utter blindness on the part of the Union commanders could make it successful.
Still, something had to be done, for inaction would result in a retreat, and in the present instance, if the worst came to the worst, Jackson could fall back on Gordonsville, and Lee toward the Virginia Central Railroad, where they could reunite their columns by rail, before Hooker could march across the country and prevent the junction. Jackson received the required permission, and started off at once by a secluded road, keeping Fitz Hugh Lee’s brigade of cavalry between his column and the Union army to shield his march from observation.
At 2 A.M., Hooker sent orders for the First Corps, under Reynolds, to which I belonged, to take up its bridges and join him by way of United States Ford, and by 9 A.M. we were on our way.
The first sound of battle came from some guns posted on the eminence from which Hancock had retreated the day before. A battery there opened fire on the army trains which had been parked in the open plain in front of the Chancellorsville House, and drove them pell mell to the rear.
