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Cognition Switch: An Artefact for the Transmission of New Ideas
Issue #1: December 2018
Featuring Ideas by: Peter Harrison, Marcel Zentner, George Zarkadakisis, Danielle Celermajer, Paul Raeburn, Scott Samuelson, Nicolas Langlitz, Andrew Taggart, Donald S Lopez Jr, and Regina Rini
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Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2018
COGNITION SWITCH #1
Featuring ideas by:
Peter Harrison, Marcel Zentner, George Zarkadakisis, Danielle Celermajer, Paul Raeburn, Scott Samuelson, Nicolas Langlitz, Andrew Taggart, Donald S Lopez Jr, and Regina Rini
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License
Originally published by Aeon
Published 2018 by Cognition Switch
ISBN: 9788829550524
Please visit our website: www.cognition-switch.com
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CONTENTS
I. ‘I believe because it is absurd’: Christianity’s first meme
II. Men want beauty, women want wealth, and other unscientific tosh
III. The economy is more a messy, fractal living thing than a machine
IV. A nation apologises for wrongdoing: is that a category mistake?
V. How game theory can help you do a better job of parenting
VI. Suffering, not just happiness, weighs in the utilitarian calculus
VII. Psychedelics can’t be tested using conventional clinical trials
VIII. If work dominated your every moment would life be worth living?
IX. The Buddhist monk who became an apostle for sexual freedom
X. Should we rename institutions that honour dead racists?
Peter Harrison is an Australian Laureate Fellow and director of the Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities at the University of Queensland. He is the author of The Territories of Science and Religion (2015), and the editor of Narratives of Secularization (2017).
https://aeon.co/ideas/i-believe-because-it-is-absurd-christianitys-first-meme
Religious belief is often thought to evince a precarious kind of commitment, in which the degree of conviction is inversely proportional to correspondence with the facts. Exhibit A for this common characterisation of religious belief is the maxim of the third-century Christian writer Tertullian, who is credited with the saying ‘I believe because it is absurd.’ This paradoxical expression makes a routine appearance in philosophical evaluations of the rationality of religious belief, in contemporary polemics addressed to an imagined opposition between science and religion, and in virtually every reputable dictionary of quotations.
Scholars of early Christianity have long known that Tertullian never wrote those words. What he originally said and meant poses intriguing questions, but equally interesting is the story of how the invented expression came to be attributed to him in the first place, what its invention tells us about changing conceptions of ‘faith’, and why, in spite of attempts to correct the record, it stubbornly persists as an irradicable meme about the irrationality of religious commitment.
On the face of it, being committed to something because it is absurd is an unpromising foundation for a belief system. It should not come as a complete surprise, then, that Tertullian did not advocate this principle. He did, however, make this observation, with specific reference to the death and resurrection of Christ: ‘it is entirely credible, because it is unfitting … it is certain, because it is impossible’ (For Latinists out there: prorsus credibile est, quia ineptum est … certum est, quia impossibile). This might seem to be within striking distance of the fideistic phrase commonly attributed to him. Puzzlingly, though, even this original formulation does not fit with Tertullian’s generally positive view of reason and rational justification. Elsewhere, he insists that Christians ‘should believe nothing but that nothing should be rashly believed’. For Tertullian, God is ‘author of Reason’, the natural order of the world is ‘ordained by reason’, and everything is to be ‘understood by reason’.
One likely explanation for this apparent incongruence is that, in his paradoxical juxtaposition of impossibility and certainty, Tertullian is drawing upon a principle set out in Aristotle’s Rhetoric. Addressing himself to the credibility of highly improbable events, Aristotle observes: ‘We may argue that people could not have believed them, if they had not been true or nearly true. And that they are more likely to be true because they are incredible.’ His point seems to be that the apparent incredibility of a reported claim can actually provide a reason for believing it, since a witness seeking to perpetuate a false story would most likely have come up with something that at least seemed plausible. If this connection is on the right track, Tertullian, who almost certainly knew Aristotle’s Rhetoric, is not advocating belief without justification, but suggesting that we sometimes have good reasons to believe the highly improbable.
This leaves us with the question of how Tertullian came to be attributed with authorship of the rather different expression: ‘I believe because it is absurd.’ For this, we need to look to two decisive moments in the early modern period.
