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The Druze, a much-misunderstood Muslim sect primarily inhabiting the Levant, have endured centuries of persecution by orthodox elements hostile to Islam's rich sectarian diversity on account of their esoteric divergence from mainstream Islam. As a result, they have become a 'fighting minority', as described by one of their most illustrious leaders. Druze religious belief branched out from tenth- and eleventh-century Shi'ism, and includes elements derived from Islamic mysticism. It enshrines all religious schools, but posits istelf as the sole path to mystical knowledge. Druze teachings are kept secret, so libel and slander by their opponents have been generally left uncorrected. The Druze have preferred taqiyya (dissimulation) when independence or freedom of belief proved unattainable, which has exacerbated ignorance of their faith. Such mystification makes any enquiry into Druze doctrine or history a delicate endeavour. In this valuable study, however, Abbas Halabi (himself from a prominent Druze family and closely involved in Lebanese Druze policy) elucidates misconceptions about Druze origins. Halabi elaborates on the political role played by the Druze in the history of the region, and evaluates their chances of survival in an era when religious tolerance and political democracy are still nascent.
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Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2015
THE DRUZE
A New Cultural and Historical Appreciation
Abbas Halabi
2015www.ithacapress.co.uk
The Druze A New Cultural and Historical Appreciation
Published by Ithaca Press 8 Southern Court South Street Reading RG1 4QS UK
www.ithacapress.co.ukwww.twitter.com/Garnetpubwww.facebook.com/Garnetpubblog.ithacapress.co.uk
Ithaca Press is an imprint of Garnet Publishing Ltd.
Copyright © Abbas Halabi, 2014
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without permission in writing from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote brief passages in a review.
First Edition 2015
ISBN: 9781859643549
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Typeset by PHi Business Solution Ltd., IndiaJacket design by Garnet PublishingCover image The Druze pilgrimage to Nabi Sabalan © Hanan Isachar, courtesy of Corbis images
Printed and bound in Lebanon by International Press: [email protected]
To Karl-Abbas, my first grandson and the future generation of my family
Contents
Preface
Foreword
Introduction
Chapter 1Human Geography
Chapter 2The History of the Druze, 1017–1943
Chapter 3Communal and Social Organization
Chapter 4Traditional Culture and the Meaning of the al-Adhā Feast
Chapter 5Civil Status Law
Chapter 6The Diaspora and Cultural Expansion
Chapter 7The Political Role of the Druze from Independence to the Present Time
Chapter 8The Druze Message: Plurality and Unity
Summary and Conclusion
Appendix 1The Impact of European Influences on the Druze Community: “The New Look”
Appendix 2Sheikh Halīm Taqī al-Dīn: A Man of Knowledge, Piety and Wisdom
Appendix 3Mysticism in the Druze Faith
Appendix 4Kamāl Jumblatt: A Man for Dialogue with the Younger Generation
Appendix 5Meeting of the American Druze Society in Durango: An Address on Behalf of the Permanent Office for Druze Organizations
Appendix 6An Address of the Druze Representative to the Synod Convened to Discuss Lebanon
Appendix 7The Mighty Refuge of the Druze: Sheikh Abū Hasan ‘Ārif Halāwī
Appendix 8Muhammad Khalīl al-Bāshā: An Illuminating Personality
Appendix 9In Commemoration of the Druze emir al-Sayyid Jamāl al-Dīn ‘Abdallah al-Tannūkhī
Appendix 10Tawfīq ‘Assāf: 1,000 Men in One
Appendix 11Beating the Odds: The Case of Druze Survival, Linda Abbas Halabi
Appendix 12
Appendix 13
Bibliography
This English edition of my book, the Druze Muwahhidun, completes a series published in three languages: French (2005), Arabic (2008) and, finally, English (2014).
I have encountered great difficulties in publishing the English edition. Since I do not claim the same ability to write in English as I do in French and Arabic, I requested the assistance of more than one informed person to help with the translation. My main concern was to avoid publishing texts containing words or sentences incompatible with the true meaning of the Arabic version. An outstanding knowledge of English was not sufficient for translating a work of this nature since its veracity and conformity to the original Arabic demanded an equal fluency in Arab culture, given that the Druze Muwahhidun are integral to this culture.
Consequently, I restrained my urge to go ahead with the publication of the English book, despite an offer by the publishing house of the newspaper An-Nahar to print it. I pondered who might be able to reproduce this book in what is considered to be the world’s foremost spoken language.
My elder brother, Adnan, suggested recourse to a person who combined fluency in the English language and in the history and culture of the Druze. Therefore, I requested the good offices of an old friend, Walīd Abi-Mershed, a Druze from a notable family living and working as a Senior Editor at the London-based Saudi newspaper As-Sharq Al-Aswsat. In his younger years, Mr. Abi-Mershed was also active in Druze affairs and is thus familiar with both the English language and the content of my text.
Mr. Abi-Mershed’s re-editing spanned approximately one year, during which time he sent me his revised chapters in succession. Once I had finalized my revisions of the text, I submitted the book to the publisher, thus completing my series as I had promised myself. I might also consider publishing in a fourth language – Spanish – should I succeed in finding the right editor.
In the introduction to my book, I refer to my early involvement in Druze affairs in Lebanon. I have progressively furthered my insight into the varied aspects of Druze life – be it on the confessional, religious, organizational, cultural or social and welfare levels. This endeavour was crowned by my election as Chairman of the Druze Endowments Committee, following my election to the membership of the Druze Community Council in April 2006 – a post that I still hold.
My long working experience of more than 40 years in Druze public affairs has enabled me to acquaint myself with the realities of the Druze, with the community’s chronic problems and points of strength. It has also enabled me to forge strong relations with many elements of the Druze social strata in Lebanon – particularly its leadership, its elderly and youthful figures, and especially its civil society. Within the framework of this society, I constantly held a role or a position in all of its organizations or committees, either in my capacity as a founder or as a personal contributor to its activities and development. These relations enabled me to probe the points of strength and weakness of the Druze community, and induced me to ponder about its situation, concerns, needs and prospects.
In the course of this long experience, I reached certain convictions made possible by the freedom and independence of thought that I maintained throughout. From the onset, I did not commit myself to a political party or to any specific political trend. I was able to avoid the labels that categorize a Druze, wherever they are and wherever they come from.
I was close to the late Kamāl Jumblatt, and am still close to his son, Walīd. I knew Emir Majīd Arslān, and am now acquainted with his son, Emir Talāl. However, I was closer to His Eminence, the late Sheikh al-Akl Mohammed Abou-Chacra, who enabled me to found and consolidate the Druze Health Organization, which was one of his major achievements, in addition to the Druze Community Home in Beirut, an initiative with which were also associated Sheikh Toufīc Assāf (my father-in-law) and other prominent Druze.
I always strived to retain every small detail in everything I read. I was able to discern the positive influence of the Druze leaders without overlooking the negative. My assessment of their role remained generally positive, despite several criticisms I made in writing or orally in the media, or even in the presence of some of them.
Druze civil society is passing through a phase of weakness as a result of the overbearing influence of its leaders on its public activities. The main concern of prominent Druze figures has become to gain the approbation of one leader or another and the recognition of their role in one achievement or another. The long years of the civil war had already deterred this society from fulfilling its expected role as certain parties resorted to violent means to repress it, in the absence of any kind of protection from a state paralysed by feudal influence. The activities of civil society relented and, in the process, its elite lost its stature and left the field open to organizational entities connected to political leaders in Mount Lebanon. Clearly, had it not been for the persevering audacity of some Druze elites, all social activities would have been limited to whatever is affiliated with a political leader. This explains the absence of any significant cultural or social activity in the Mountain that is worthy of being considered a significant contribution to the resolution of the general issues affecting the constituents of the Druze Muwahhidun community.
The situation was made worse by the monopolization of Druze political representation and the stagnation of their political classes following the assassination of their leader Kamāl Jumblatt. Consequently, we rarely encounter nowadays an ex-Druze minister or deputy. In 2006, we witnessed the test of the election of the Community’s Council, which, instead of promoting all-out support for the council, worsened the state of internal division. Then came the events of May 2007, which unified a number of political forces with the resulting increase in political pressures on the Druze community. The Druze traditionally advocate diversity within unity, allowing for the expression and promotion of various points of view, thus granting all members of the community of choice between different positions.
The events of May 2007 put an end to this brand of diversity. Druze political forces united their ranks along a single project in an attempt to safeguard their community; they wished to spare it the scourge of a renewed civil war fomented by an arrogant force whose ambition extends beyond the control of Lebanon to encompass a regional axis that begins in Damascus and extends beyond it to Tehran. The outcome turned out to be the political condemnation of the very forces that had heroically opposed these attacks. This condemnation went so far as to accuse them of treason, even heresy. The diversity that provided the Druze community with a narrow margin of action and freedom was unquestionably eroded. The lesson we derive from this experience is that any agreement among the Druze leaders is a problem … and any disagreement, an even bigger problem.
The unification of the Druze political agenda did not generate unity in their internal agenda. Therefore, and parallel to the legally elected Sheikh al-Akl, we were presented with another Sheikh al-Akl whose main concern was to denounce the elected Sheikh al-Akl. The custodians of the Druze Endowments Committee were also subjected to wild accusations, and their numerous achievements were slandered by false accusations forged by turbaned men, wearing religious garb but devoid of any religious faith. This situation served the purposes of those who unjustifiably control the most important sector of Druze Endowments in Beirut. In an environment of contradiction and ambiguity, it becomes possible to circumvent the law, along with rights and order. Therefore, all the Endowments Committee’s efforts to recuperate its properties in Beirut failed, which prevented it from developing and investing in a sizable asset capable of providing for the healthcare and educational needs of the Druze community at large.
Some observers consider the Druze Muwahhidun still to be living under the hegemony of a single leadership and single party in the era termed “The Arab Spring”, which witnessed the Arab people’s uprising against their longstanding oppressive rulers, their revolt against tyranny, clannish nepotism, hereditary succession, repression and persecution, and their determined demands for freedom, democracy, pluralism and the legitimate transfer of power. In their opinion, the Druze forfeited a “Spring” that had never blossomed at their doorstep nor at the doorsteps of their leaders. As to the phenomenon of hereditary succession, its customs have overburdened the Druze for hundreds of years – and still do – keeping them subjects of an ancient Lebanon despite being contemporaneous to ongoing events.
The Druze Muwahhidun may feel disappointed by the continuous relocation of political power from one party to another, having been in the vanguard of Lebanon’s struggle for freedom, independence and sovereignty. They relinquished these aspirations for the sake of the “resistance”, but the question remains: resistance to whom after the application of UN Council resolution 1701 … unless its aim is to resist the Lebanese people and allow the advocates of “resistance” to control all aspects of the state? Today, everyone can see how a political repositioning is unfolding as a result of the weakening of the Syrian regime and the growing worries of the “resistance” vis-à-vis the findings of the International Tribunal investigating the assassination of the late Prime Minister Rafic Harīrī and several of his political colleagues … and all of this in the avowed aim of preserving the Druze community and its role in Lebanon.
This is enough comment on the political level.
A more sensitive issue is the attempt to strengthen the trend claiming that Druze “particularity” resides in its esoterism, while the exoteric is the practice of the People of the Tradition and the Congregation (ahl al-sunnah wa al-jamā'ah). Some Druze hold the prayer rituals of al-Jama’ah on the occasions of the Feasts of the Fitr and the Adha, fast during the month of Ramadan, organize readings of Qur’anic verses in services taking place at the Druze Community Home in Beirut, and organize Iftars and prayers in one of its halls. Moreover, some brochures were published with instructions about the ways of washing the dead, conducting funeral prayers, teaching, praying and kneeling (rak‘āt) to religious sheikhs, reciting Qur’anic verses and following Muslim rituals in marriage procedures …. Such practices only compound the Muwahhidun’s confusion with regard to their religious affiliation and the worship of their faith, and raises the fear of an eventual loss of identity and the scattering of Druze particularity.
Any reader acquainted with my writings about the Druze Muwahhidun, as well as the many articles I have published on this topic, knows that I consider the Druze to be a Muslim Islamic denomination, belonging to the broader Islamic realm. The Druze are Muslim by affiliation and origin. However, they possess a doctrinal and religious particularity that should not be lost since they were brought up within its confines. It is worth mentioning that the bond that unites the Muwahhidun is due not solely to a religious factor – which accounts for their tolerance – but also to a minority sense of “togetherness” (esprit de corps) that brings them together in the face of adversities, as a natural reaction, to fend off eventual attacks that would deprive them of their identity, land or culture. The advocates of the new rituals clearly do not seem to comprehend the deep rift they might cause within the community, nor its devastating effects on the unity of its ranks and word.
Our brethren in the diaspora have experienced this confusion and rejected it. It may lead to an unsolicited schism within the Druze community.
I will not elaborate further on this sensitive issue.
This book targets primarily the Druze Muwahhidun who cannot afford, by reasons of upbringing and education, to read its Arabic version. I have resorted to this translation in order to allow them to become acquainted with their history, culture and the message of their religious community in the complicated Eastern Arabic language. The Druze have had a continuous near-millennial history since the initiation of Al-Hākim’s call in Egypt. They were able to survive due to their historical role as guardians of Islam and Arabism, unimpeded by a minority complex in this vast world. In fact, they have always been part of the governing majorities. Their esprit de corps was heightened by their constant subjection to oppression and abuse on a political level, and to misinterpretations and distortions on the religious level. Their resilience proves that their esprit de corps has been stronger than the attempts to undermine them. As the saying goes: “Contentment disperses them and distress unites them.” For this reason, the Druze are currently united in facing risks from all directions: a rise in religious extremism transcending Islamic currents to encompass Jewish religious fanaticism in Israel; Christian extremism in the West; and the dwindling role and numbers of the Christian minorities in the Middle East who are sometimes subjected to oppression and harassment. At the local Lebanese level, the Druze are faced with the display of an excessive means of might appropriated by the leadership of a single religious community, which might eventually prove harmful to the very essence of the Lebanon they have worked to preserve since they began to play a prominent role in its history – that is, since the sixteenth century AD.
The Druze consider Lebanon a unique experiment in the Middle East, based on a system of religious and sectarian diversity that recognizes individual rights and provides guaranties to its religious communities. Lebanon practises a democratic transfer of power and, regardless of its might, no political entity can monopolize the process of decision-making.
Lebanon adopted a system of equal power sharing between Christians and Muslims. It grants each religious community its share of the seats of power, whether in the executive, the judiciary or the military. Lebanon belongs culturally to the Arab world, but does not share its ideological definition: Islam is one, but not its exclusive, component. Lebanon also believes in the role of its Christian constituents regardless of their number and effectiveness. If there is any raison d’être for the existence of Lebanon it would be the Christian presence with which the Druze Muwahhidun share similar uncertainties and concerns and, above all, a common life in Mount Lebanon.
I have frequently emphasized (in the meetings of the Druze Communal Council) the necessity of organizing a Druze Conference – but one that, unlike the Expatriates’ Conference that deviated from its aims for the sake of political expediencies, would be a cultural conference addressing the challenges of the present and the apprehensions of the future. (At the time of writing, and) within its current term of election, it is too late for the present council to sponsor such an event despite its importance for the revival of the cultural and educational life of the Druze community away from politics and politicians.
It may be that we still lack the proper vision to answer the questions of the new generation – rent by political division and blind partisanship – concerning its future as an essential component of its country, both in its role and message.
Readers of this book will find a preliminary vision of this message in Chapter 8 and its annex. However, regardless of how keen the ability of an individual, this vision should be formulated within the context of a general dialogue and as the result of an exchange of ideas within a community whose members are reputed for their culture, wisdom and faith, and who are known above all for their intellectual integrity and for probity unmarred by bowing to special interests, benefits or paybacks.
In the wake of this translation, I present my book to the reader as a personal point of view that does not commit anyone but myself. It is left to the reader to accept or refute it. However, I assure the reader that I have presented it with sincerity and objectivity, and as the result of the personal experience that I went through, hoping for fair judgement and uttering the Qur’anic verse: “Then to your Lord is your return so He will inform you of that in which you differed” (Q6:165).1
1
The Druze have safeguarded the privacy and secrecy of their beliefs and customs as a natural reaction to the persecution they have experienced throughout their history. They have also ignored legitimate and inquisitive questions about their identity and discipline of life. This attitude has led to the propagation of a distorted picture of their monotheistic beliefs and customary mores.
This distorted picture was propagated by the works of many orientalists, whose perception of the Druze was as fighters armed only with daggers, ready to slaughter Christians at any opportunity. The time has come to correct this image.
When it comes to defending the interests of their community and their clan, the Druze are certainly fighters loyal to the command of their ancestors “to protect the brethren”. But the Druze, just like other religious communities, have their difficulties and needs: they long for a comfortable and fair life, and stability in their relations with their fellow citizens.
They do not constitute an “island”, isolated from the world. Rather, they suffer from all the problems of Lebanese society, just like any other Lebanese person, and are affected by the behaviour of the other religious communities. They have both strengths and weaknesses and, as followers of a monotheistic creed that focuses basically on reason and logic, they should not go astray or lose their way.
In this book, I will attempt to dissipate the ideas referred to above, break down the myths, remove the taboos and present an authentic picture of the Druze and other Lebanese communities devoid of hypocrisy and flattery, allowing the Druze to feel proud of their identity in relation to the “other”. Some Lebanese have contributed to complicating this task by using opportunities arising from differences of political opinion to try and disfigure and confuse the situation, even inflicting harm by throwing false accusations and attempting to project a harmful image of their Druze fellow citizens.
However, what amazes me most is that the problems I encountered when I first became committed to Druze and national issues 38 years ago, are still present today, and with the same degree of intensity I realized, by following the historical development of these problems, that they tend to repeat themselves, year after year and even, without exaggeration, century after century. The issue is, more than anything else, a matter of the basic problems of upbringing, to which are added transitional issues that complicate the general picture.
It is easy to lay the complete responsibility of this state of affairs at the doorstep of the political leadership, and I do not deny their part in it. But I must say that the Druze cultural elite, which was granted by Kamāl Jumblatt an utmost importance, has become almost excluded from the search for a solution to these problems. Similarly, it is impossible to lay this burden upon Druze religious leaders alone, due to the particularity of their upbringing, formation, and their asceticism and piety.
We are thus all responsible, at various levels, for the current situation, although those in positions of power and the rank and file Druze may not carry equal responsibility since attaining any public post may hinder the credibility of any endeavour, and reaching any seat of prominence may justify subservience or even the loss of the prerequisites of any commitment.
This book is a new work, although some of its contents have been drawn from my previous work, Les Druzes: vivre avec l’avenir, published in French by Dār al-Nahār in 2005, which sold out so quickly that Dār al-Nahār issued a reprint in 2006.
The present volume targets a broader spectrum of readers than the French version. Moreover, this edition, translated from the Arabic, confronts me with the dual responsibility of, first, obtaining the approval and direct moral support of the Druze religious authorities involved in the cultural and religious heritage of their faith, and, second, to attract the attention of the “others” – Lebanese or Arab, Muslim or Christian.
Therefore, I have endeavoured, while working on the text, to benefit from observations and opinions previously expressed about my French book, and I particularly undertook to add a complete account of the new developments in the affairs and status of the community of the “Druze Monotheists” (Muwahhidun) – the new term used in a law promulgated on 9 June 2006. Much as I was grieved in my previous book by the lack of organization of the affairs of the community, this time I found myself witnessing a new organization, which may not be devoid of faults, but which, nevertheless, lays a new path and offers the Druze community a new opportunity to confront modernity through institutions.
I have thought at times that the Druze political leadership was reluctant to organize the affairs of its community, or at least unable to achieve it lest it loses its absolute control over the process of decision making. But today I find myself admiring it for taking the initiative to facilitate the creation of a new opportunity to organize Druze communal affairs. This may give rise, in time, to another opportunity to organize religious affairs in need of modernization, revision and renewal following a long period of stagnation, stirred from time to time by parties lacking the credibility of religious reformers or by over-reactionary attempts to bring the creed out of its historical captivity, without taking into consideration the fact that moving on from one stage to another, if it is to be achieved safely and peacefully, entails an intellectual and cultural journey that must be carefully undertaken by stages.
I have spoken about the lack of organization, the laxity of administration, the fragmentation in preserving the awqāf, the absence of the spiritual and mundane leadership, and other matters that escaped the attention of the new generations brought up in the midst of a tragedy, considering the difference between their history rich in heroic exploits and glorious deeds and their present gloomy situation. In spite of attempts to bridge the gap between the new generations and their faith undertaken by a number of religious leaders aware of the danger of their alienation from their faith, there is still a great need to revive and renew the heritage in order to achieve a reconciliation between the Druze Muwahhidun and the period in which they live.
I have included in this book appendices containing writings, articles and quotations relating to prominent Druze personalities, whose lives and achievements I have had the opportunity to write about, and thanks to whom I have completed this task. I have particularly endeavoured to acquaint the reader with their work, personalities and achievements. Maybe we need, today, to enhance our knowledge of these distinguished personalities in the context of an institute or university concerned with Druze studies that could become a centre for clerical training based on true knowledge and grateful cognizance, which would also seek to revive the heritage of our pious forefathers and pave the way to progress and the future.
Following the publication of the French edition of my book I received some criticism which did not, regrettably, relate to its approach or contents, but restricted its concern to the omission of certain names that perhaps deserved to be mentioned. I tried in vain to persuade the inquirers that far from holding any negative attitude towards anyone, the purpose of the book was completely different. Similarly, the lack of in-depth coverage of doctrinal matters gave rise to criticism from others who were not satisfied with the fact that the aim of the book was to provide a brief essay on the Druze community and that it was not, in fact, a book about religious beliefs. When I looked into this aspect and investigated what was being written and published, I noticed that numerous works written by Druze and non-Druze alike had appeared during this period, and copiously dealt with these matters. I do not intend, here, to assess them.
From a political point of view, I tried my utmost to describe events without expressing a personal opinion – which I have done in my numerous published writings on these topics. However, I have tried to separate my opinions from the subject of this book in order to preserve the objectivity of my presentation, and retain the aim and purpose of the text.
I feel a sense of contempt and satisfaction while writing about banu ma‘rūf,1 the upholders of monotheism and truth, and I have dedicated and devoted my life to supporting their progress, the improvement of their standing and their reconciliation with modernity. I first became involved in this cause as a young man influenced by a liberal education, which I also tried to instil in my own small family, considering that misanthropy is a deadly disease, fanaticism a lethal sickness and narrow-mindedness an unnatural phenomenon in a world open to cultures, civilizations and creative interaction, without, however, denying my firm roots and primary allegiances.
Participating in conferences and seminars in Lebanon and abroad offered me an opportunity for openness without abandoning the religious and cultural basic beliefs I have adopted from a monotheistic creed, and my understanding of it as a revolution against blind traditions and rigid formalities. My distress increases when I see some of those entrusted with this revolution willing to submit to a painful current political and religious situation.
Having been an active Druze since 1969, I have become very attached to my community affairs and its legal, historical, political and cultural foundations. Since that time, my companions and I, full of the same fervour, became concerned about portraying the Druze community as a solid factor in guaranteeing the unity, independence and sovereignty of Lebanon and the stability of the Middle East, or at least the region historically known as Bilād al-Shām.
I am a former judge and currently hold the position of vice-president of the Board of Administration and legal adviser of the Bank of Beirut and the Arab Countries (SAL). I am also active in revitalizing public office in my capacity as member of the Board of Administration of the Lebanese National Institute for Administration (ENA-Lebanon). Additionally, I have participated in numerous activities and in the founding of several societies concerned with charities, culture, health, education and sport. There is no ongoing Druze association in whose establishment or activities I have not been involved and, in November 2006, my efforts were crowned by my election to the new Druze Communal Council and my appointment as Chairman of the Awqāf Council. Meanwhile I have not neglected my openness to the “other”, through taking up responsibilities and undertaking activities in the realm of Muslim–Christian dialogue both at the Lebanese and Arab levels above and beyond the many tasks incurred by my banking and legal responsibilities.
As well as these positions and concerns, I am eager to remain aware of the affairs and needs of the Druze community, to maintain strong relations with its religious leaders, and to play an active role in civil society, trying always to preserve and support its activities in order to allow it to effectively play its part in it lest it becomes marginalized by the pressures of the traditional political leadership or its organized clans.
Faced with the existence of similar challenges to the role of other Lebanese confessional groups in our national life, and in the absence of the presumed role of the Druze cultural elite – marginalized by the influence and arrogance of its politicians – the Druze community needs to channel all its energy to bring to the fore its historical and national heritage.
The Druze need to contemplate with wisdom and discernment how to survive in the Middle East and secure their future in their area and in the world, where minorities, and even moderate majorities, are threatened by extremism.
I hope this book will be received with good will, a warm welcome and genuine understanding. I salute all those who have written before me about the Druze and do not, by any means, belittle their contribution, and I apologize in advance for any unintended shortcomings this book may contain.
Most of the chapters in the book were written with determination and courage emphasizing descriptive aspects drawn from other sources. However, I have added material drawn from my personal experience and perceptions that do not commit any other person than me alone. As to the analytical sections, they have been written in conjunction with the historical developments in an endeavour to foresee the future and present the issues in the way I, and the cultural elite, see them whenever their discussion takes place.
I also apologize in advance to all those individuals who contributed alongside me in joint activities for not mentioning them by name in this book. These omissions should not be taken as a personal choice, but rather within the context of the rationale of the book, which does not lend itself to mentioning all names, let alone the danger of overlooking some of them and the consequences that may entail. This is why I have tried to refrain from mentioning the names of particular individuals as much as possible, and reverted to it only in the process of establishing that the work I have undertaken in relation to the community was never an individual work, but a work shared with others.
I address my heartfelt greetings and sincere thanks to all those who have worked with me, and I call on the new generation to seize the initiative and never forget the roots and past we are proud of, nor the need to work for the welfare of their country – although within the context of a more complex atmosphere than before – without forgetting the communities to which they belong.
I also wish to salute the spirit of my late mother who raised me within the monotheistic values. I also acknowledge the patience of my wife, Randa, throughout the long years in which we have shared sweet and bitter times, and I thank her for all her observations and suggestions, drawing from her pure inner soul the necessary steadfastness, strength and determination to public services.
I also thank my children for the questions they asked me as they were growing up about their community’s heritage and culture. I drew strength from their inquisitiveness and have often held “council” with them in Ra’s al-Matn, my home, in the shade of the ancient pine trees, where I have arranged special sessions for them and their cousins with the Druze elders on the eve of ‘Id al-Adha.
Last but not least, I recall the spirit of Kamāl Jumblatt, always supportive of any cultural activity not only among the Druze community but also throughout Lebanon and the wider Arab and Islamic world.
I place this book in the hands of those who have pure intentions, hoping they will receive it in good will.
Ra’s al-Matn, 7 December 2012.
1Banu ma‘rūf is another appellation of the Druze or Muwahhidun.
The demographic make-up of the Druze community in Lebanon has not prevented its members from playing an important role throughout Lebanese history, notably in the political, economic, cultural, social and spiritual spheres. One of their most important contributions was their deep involvement in the founding vision for what Fr Joachim Mubarak has called “the Lebanese idea” – that is, the idea of an independent Lebanese state. The Druze have been outstanding throughout their history in their opposition to every form of colonialism, mandate and domination, particularly in the Arab East. Throughout the ages, they have resisted the Crusaders, the Mongols, the Mamluks, the Ottomans and the French Mandate and, at present, they have, with encouragement from the West, defied Syrian domination to the extent that they have been described as a war-like, rebellious and obstinate people.
But even if their resistance has been correctly described, the true history of this community is surrounded by profound ignorance. The reason for this ignorance goes back, on the one hand, to their enemies determination to distort the truth in order to discredit their beliefs, and, on the other, to the care of the religious authorities within the community to hide their beliefs both to prevent them being corrupted and to protect their followers from persecution.
Druze doctrine has a mystical character, different from traditional (that is, orthodox or official) Islam in many aspects, specifically in the rules of worship and conventions for initiation. This has led to the religious beliefs of the Druze being largely secret, or one may say esoteric, so that their truths are only made openly available to a select few wise initiates. This esotericism has made it possible to ward off all attempts to pervert the Druze creed and has kept it alive through successive ages in an environment that was intolerant and hostile towards any belief suspected of being different from its own, to the point of provoking accusations of false doctrine and heresy.
But this excessive concern to rely on the esoteric way, known as taqiyya, led to the spread of speculation, rumours and false accusations against the Druze, which built up in the minds of many a perception of them as belonging to a false religion confounded with a distorted historical portrayal. Consequently, the unique nature of their beliefs became impossible to justify with regard to questions raised about the extent of their belonging to the Muslim community, especially in view of the numerous misleading publications that have appeared about their identity and beliefs. These questions continue to be asked today, and to constitute a significant part of the records, which give rise to unjustifiable reactions towards them and is in itself enough to show the particular place the Druze occupy in the confessional landscape, not only of the Arab East but also across the world map.
Ignorance, partial information, distortions of reality, myths and unfounded rumours, as well as the select use of the records and historical controversy, have encumbered the Druze identity and they seriously need to lift the shroud of secrecy, refute the exaggerated fallacies and restore the truth by presenting a contemporary cultural approach.
Every attempt to undertake this approach needs to trace the whole historical, religious, cultural and social heritage of the Druze, without being restricted only to the Druze of Lebanon. Although it is practical to differentiate between the Druze of Lebanon and their brethren in Syria and Palestine at the present time, this differentiation need not necessarily apply, and indeed should not be applied, to earlier periods of history. Moreover, only a chronological perspective can make it possible to clearly grasp the true “spirit” of the Druze faith, and specifically their beliefs and practices, particularly since they have grown in gradual stages of conceptual development since the emergence of the sect in the Middle Ages and have taken shape in numerous geographical areas, including Lebanon. From this perspective, the Druze way appears to be the result of both a series of Islamic schisms and a chain of transmission of ancient and specific religious ideas. This requires a detailed explanation of these two factors by way of introduction.
In the course of its history, Islam experienced divisions and trends, splits and tendencies, each of which, despite drawing from the same source, introduced a number of religious interpretations and new doctrines. The question of the rightful succession to the Prophet Muhammad (may God bless him and give him peace) has been the main cause of these divisions, which multiplied due to the numerous interpretations supporting the line of descent of one Imam or Caliph or another.
The introduction of new religious theories, along with oblique or even obscure formulations of some ancient beliefs, has made the legitimization of this or that line of succession possible. Apart from political considerations, the original message of Islam, and specifically the Druze doctrine, emerged through the complementarity of these trends and tendencies, until it reached its final form in the Druze way. So a review of these trends and tendencies, highlighting their differences and roles, will be useful, even if it can only be brief.
The Islamic state, according to the ideal vision left by the Prophet (may God bless him and give him peace), derived its sovereignty from God alone and is therefore submitted to the divine law above any other law. Thus, from the beginning, political authority in Islam was inseparable from religious authority, in complete contrast to Western and Christian concepts. As a result, every political dispute, whatever its causes or origins, became a religious dispute, and vice versa. Therefore every dissident faction took on a particular doctrinal and theological discourse and used this discourse to promote the possibility of overthrowing the established order, and was happy to organize the groups of its supporters along religious lines.
Thus the first four centuries of Islam witnessed the birth and establishment of numerous Islamic parties, each based on specific social, political and cultural factors. It should be noted that the declaration by each of these parties of a new doctrinal discourse, even though it derived from the original Islamic discourse and its first divisions, was in complete harmony with the historical environment and heritage that accompanied its birth. Druze doctrine, which was elaborated and elucidated between the end of the tenth and beginning of the eleventh centuries, contained within its context the consummation and final form of religious principles and ancient ideas that Islam contained or drew from, which matured and became more clearly defined with the rise of Shi‘ism – and more particularly Fatimid Isma‘ilism – and led to the preaching of the Druze doctrine.
The greatest and most important division in Islam took place in AH 11/632 AD, only a short time after the death of Prophet Muhammad (may God bless him and give him peace). As he had left no instructions regarding his succession, a disagreement emerged over the identity of the future leader. This crisis could have torn apart the still young and fragile community apart, if they had not all agreed (after some serious tension) to choose as their head the most senior and most respected of Muhammad’s Companions, Abu Bakr.
He took on the title of Caliph (khalīfa) – that is to say the lieutenant, or deputy, of the Prophet, which conferred upon him both religious and political authority, and he became the “Prince of Believers”. He was the master of the Muslim community, and the first to lay the foundations of the historic Islamic institution known as the caliphate. Abu Bakr ruled for only two years and three and a half months (AH 11–13/632–634 AD), but he was keen on appointing a successor before his death. His heir was ‘Umar Ibn al-Khattab, who ruled until his assassination in 644 (AH 13–23/634–643 AD). He provided for the system of succession by creating the means of appointing his successor. He entrusted this responsibility to a council of six members chosen from among the most senior of the Prophet’s Companions and those closest to him; they selected ‘Uthman ibn ‘Affan, an Umayyad, to be the new Caliph (AH 23–36/643–656 AD).
However, from the first days of the caliphate, a group of the believers held the opinion that it would have been more legitimate to assign this responsibility to the first convert to Islam, ‘Alī ibn Abi Talib (Peace be upon him). ‘Alī was related to the Prophet, being both his cousin and his son-in-law. He was pious and courageous in defending Islam. This group of believers was first given the name Shī‘at ‘Alī (‘Alī’s party), and later simply the Shī‘a. Initially, they were just a political faction with no doctrinal or religious position. At first, ‘Alī made no objection to the choice of others to be Caliph because of the justice and equality that had characterized the rule of Abu Bakr and ‘Umar. ‘Uthman’s reign, on the other hand, was characterized by the appearance of injustices within the Muslim community resulting from the accumulation of wealth and privileges by the Umayyad clan thanks to the favours and partiality the Caliph bestowed upon his family. All this led to widespread protests and finally to ‘Uthman’s assassination in AH 36/656 AD allowing ‘Alī to claim the title of Caliph. ‘Alī’s caliphate (AH 35–41/655–661 AD) saw an increase in disturbances and the outbreak of numerous political and religious divisions within the Muslim community. ‘Alī notably came up against the hostility of the Umayyad clan, especially Mu‘awiya ibn Abi Sufyan, the governor of Bilād al-Shām from ‘Umar’s time, and who had extended his power under ‘Uthman. Mu‘awiya had refused to recognize ‘Alī as Caliph.
‘Alī (PBUH) was assassinated in AD 41/661 AD and his death ended the period of the first four Caliphs, the Rāshidūn “Rightly Guided”. The accession of Mu‘awiya to power inaugurated the establishment of a hereditary monarchy which was to increase inequality and discord between the Muslims, and favour a privileged and dominant aristocracy and the spread of their dominance. In the eyes of many Muslims, the state had turned away from the true way of Islam. In a society governed by religion and whose leaders represented the official doctrine, it was inevitable that this kind of discontent would manifest itself in the formation of religious parties, which offered a safe refuge for the under-privileged. ‘Alī’s party, which continued after his death, made increasing political, social and religious demands, and Islam was divided into two factions. Over and against the Sunnis, who followed the “orthodox” faith and the official authority, the Shi’is gathered an increasing number of malcontents and opponents of the regime. At the Battle of Karbala in 680 AD, Husayn (PBUH), the youngest son of ‘Alī and Fatima (the Prophet’s daughter) was killed, and a Shi‘i contingent was completely wiped out by the Umayyad army. Thus fell the first prominent martyrs of Al al-Bayt – the Prophet’s family, and the Shi‘a movement arose with a power and religious fervour that sprang from suffering and oppression, and was reinforced by a determination to defend the true faith. From then on, the fierceness of the opposition and the bitterness towards the Umayyad dynasty increased, and the devotion of numerous believers to the descendants of ‘Alī grew stronger. Umayyad rule came to an end in 750 AD, making way for the ‘Abbasids, who came to power through the support of the Shi‘is, although they soon distanced themselves from them and chose to keep the Sunni tradition as the official religion. As a result, Shi‘ism turned into a movement associated with both covert discontent and open rebellion. Later, numerous groups came into being within the Shi‘a, each gathering around one or another member of Al al-Bayt, feeding the resentments of its followers against the rulers and supporting the rise to power of its own members. At the end of the eighth century, Shi‘ism was violently shaken by a decisive struggle concerning the person of the Imam.
In Shi‘i doctrine, the Imam is a central figure. He is a religious leader and the repository of theological knowledge entrusted to ‘Alī’s descendants, members of Al al-Bayt. He also holds legal authority over the Muslim community which wrested from the Umayyads and the ‘Abbasids the power they had usurped. The Imams succeeded each other from father to son in the line of ‘Alī and Shi‘is agreed on the first six of them: ‘Alī (d. 661 AD), al-Hasan (d. 673 AD) and al-Husayn (d. 680 AD) (peace be upon them), ‘Alī Zayn al-‘Abidin (d. 714 AD), Muhammad al-Baqir (d. 732 AD) and Ja‘far al-Sadiq (d. 765 AD) (PBUH). But a disagreement arose over the succession following the last of them, Ja‘far, having designated as his successor his son Isma‘il al-Mubarak. However, the latter died while his father was still alive and Ja‘far did not appoint a substitute (although the Twelver Shi‘is say that he appointed his second son Musa to be Imam after him). When al-Sadiq died, most of the Shi’is recognized his other son, Musa al-Kazim, as their Imam, followed by his descendants up to Muhammad ibn Hasan al-‘Askari, the twelfth in the line of Imams after ‘Alī, which is why this majority group is called the Twelvers. However, a small group of Shi‘is continued to recognize the imamate of Ismā‘īl, who had died, and maintained that, before his death, he had designated his son Muhammad to succeed him. This group was called “Isma‘ilis” after the name of their Imam and the line they recognized became the dynasty of the Fatimid Caliphs.
The ‘Abbasids pursued Muhammad ibn Isma‘il and his companions and persecuted them, forcing them into hiding. This led his followers to practise their rites and live their lives clandestinely. In spite of the secrecy of their movement and the need to conceal their aims and ambitions, the Isma‘ilis succeeded in forming a cohesive and well-organized religious movement. As for Ismā‘īli doctrine, it developed in a complicated form, which allowed the establishment of numerous levels of exegesis and interpretation. This doctrine was spread through the Muslim world by preachers, who preached and articulated the message of the Imam.
The greatest success of the Isma‘ili movement was the establishment in North Africa of an independent kingdom. Far removed from the heart of the ‘Abbasid caliphate, and populated by Berbers ready to rebel against the established authorities, North Africa was fertile soil for dissident messages of opposition. The Ismā‘īli preachers prepared the ground there until ‘Ubayd Allāh al-Mahdī, who was from the Maghreb and a descendant of Ismā‘īl, declared himself publicly as Imam at the beginning of the tenth century AD. He was proclaimed Caliph and Imam in 909 AD and inaugurated the era of the Fatimid dynasty in Tunisia after the Isma‘ilis had gradually assumed complete control of North Africa, providing their faith and doctrine with the security of a state, which became their state. The Fatimids, in order to mark themselves out and vindicate the legitimacy of their struggle, added to the classical Islamic call to prayer the phrase “hayya ‘ala khayr al-‘amal” (“come to good works”). During the reign of al-Mu‘izz li-Din Allah, the fourth Caliph descended from ‘Ubayd Allah al-Mahdi, the conquest of Egypt took place and al-Mu‘izz founded the city of Cairo, transferring the capital of the caliphate to Egypt. The city remained for two centuries the first city of the Islamic empire, the heart of the caliphate and the capital of a powerful and flourishing empire that rivalled the ‘Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad; it was also an intellectual centre from which Isma‘ili teaching spread.
Druze doctrine was developed in Egypt during the reign of the sixth Fatimid Caliph, al-Hakim bi-Amr Allāh (996–1021 AD), when a group of Ismā‘īlis, going beyond the official Fatimid doctrine, declared that the Caliph and Imam al-Hākim was possessed of a nature superior to that normally conferred by the imamate. It even went as far as to attribute to him a divine nature, using the very preaching methods of the traditional official Isma‘ili line. The preachers of this teaching spread their new doctrines everywhere, reaching as far as India. Although these new ideas met with a sympathetic response among some peoples, the official teaching of Cairo did not endorse them and indeed condemned them. After the disappearance of the Caliph al-Hakim, the followers of this new doctrine were persecuted and were called Druze after the name of one of their preachers, Nashtakin al-Darazi. They were forced to flee Egypt for countries more receptive to their ideas and their preaching.
The Druze community found itself carrying the historical and religious heritage of the Shi‘i and Isma‘ili movements. However, the true roots and spiritual influences of this movement lie, according to some sources, in pre-Islamic religions and philosophical trends that go back to ancient times. Although successive schisms within Islam systematically introduced new religious formulations, some of these ancient concepts found their way to immortality by being absorbed into the core of Druze doctrines. This chain of intellectual transmission is easily explained. It must be borne in mind that, through a century of conquests, the Arabs were able to build an Islamic empire that extended from the Pyrenees in northern Spain to north-west China. The heart of this empire, which stretched around the eastern Mediterranean, was the crossroads of the most ancient civilizations and was subject to influences from India and Persia to the east and Greece to the west. The transfer of ideas took place freely across the whole Mediterranean basin, flowing with the movement of populations.
