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- Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
- Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
- Serie: Journal of Philosophy of Education
- Sprache: Englisch
- Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2022
Educational Explanations Educational Explanations is a comprehensive study of the main philosophical questions that confront empirical educational researchers. The book outlines the sense in which empirical educational research pursues truth and sets out and defends an account of its task as the offering of explanations for the many educational problems that claim our attention. The book goes on to look at the criteria for high quality research, the relationship between different methodological approaches and the scope and limits of intervention studies. At all stages detailed examples are presented to make the argument clearer. A distinctive feature of the book is the presentation of four detailed case studies, over four chapters, of influential educational research programmes that not only examine what they have achieved, but emphasise the conceptual issues that researchers are confronted with as they seek to provide explanations. The book goes on to examine the impact of empirical educational research on educational practice and on the practice of teachers in particular.
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The Journal of Philosophy of Education Book Series
The Journal of Philosophy of Education Book Series publishes titles that represent a wide variety of philosophical traditions. They vary from examination of fundamental philosophical issues in their connection with education, to detailed critical engagement with current educational practice or policy from a philosophical point of view. Books in this series promote rigorous thinking on educational matters and identify and criticise the ideological forces shaping education.
Titles in the series include:
Educational Explanations: Philosophy in Empirical Educational Research
Christopher Winch
Education and Expertise
Edited by Mark Addis and Christopher Winch
Teachers’ Know-How: A Philosophical Investigation
Christopher Winch
Citizenship for the Learning Society: Europe, Subjectivity, and Educational Research
Naomi Hodgson
Philosophy East/West: Exploring Intersections between Educational and Contemplative Practices
Edited by Oren Ergas and Sharon Todd
The Ways We Think: From the Straits of Reason to the Possibilities of Thought
Emma Williams
Philosophical Perspectives on Teacher Education
Edited by Ruth Heilbronn and Lorraine Foreman-Peck
Re-Imagining Relationships in Education: Ethics, Politics and Practices
Edited by Morwenna Griffiths, Marit Honerød Hoveid, Sharon Todd and Christine Winter
Vygotsky: Philosophy and Education
Jan Derry
Education and the Growth of Knowledge: Perspectives from Social and Virtue Epistemology
Edited by Ben Kotzee
Education Policy: Philosophical Critique
Edited by Richard Smith
Levinas, Subjectivity, Education: Towards an Ethics of Radical Responsibility
Anna Strhan
Philosophy for Children in Transition: Problems and Prospects
Edited by Nancy Vansieleghem and David Kennedy
The Good Life of Teaching: An Ethics of Professional Practice
Chris Higgins
Reading R. S. Peters Today: Analysis, Ethics, and the Aims of Education
Edited by Stefaan E. Cuypers and Christopher Martin
The Formation of Reason
David Bakhurst
What Do Philosophers of Education Do?: (And How Do They Do It?)
Edited by Claudia Ruitenberg
Evidence-Based Education Policy: What Evidence? What Basis? Whose Policy?
Edited by David Bridges, Paul Smeyers and Richard Smith
New Philosophies of Learning
Edited by Ruth Cigman and Andrew Davis
The Common School and the Comprehensive Ideal: A Defence by Richard Pring with Complementary Essays
Edited by Mark Halstead and Graham Haydon
Philosophy, Methodology and Educational Research
Edited by David Bridges and Richard D. Smith
Philosophy of the Teacher
Nigel Tubbs
Conformism and Critique in Liberal Society
Edited by Frieda Heyting and Christopher Winch
Retrieving Nature: Education for a Post-Humanist Age
Michael Bonnett
Education and Practice: Upholding the Integrity of Teaching and Learning
Edited by Joseph Dunne and Pádraig Hogan
Educating Humanity: Bildung in Postmodernity
Edited by Lars Lovlie, Klaus Peter Mortensen and Sven Erik Nordenbo
The Ethics of Educational Research
Edited by Michael McNamee and David Bridges
In Defence of High Culture
John Gingell and Ed Brandon
Enquiries at the Interface: Philosophical Problems of On-Line Education
Edited by Paul Standish and Nigel Blake
The Limits of Educational Assessment
Andrew Davis
Illusory Freedoms: Liberalism, Education and the Market
Edited by Ruth Jonathan
Quality and Education
Christopher Winch
Educational Explanations
Philosophy in Empirical Educational Research
Christopher Winch
This edition first published 2022
© 2022 Christopher Winch.
Editorial organisation © Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by law. Advice on how to obtain permision to reuse material from this title is available at http://www.wiley.com/go/permissions.
The right of Christopher Winch to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted in accordance with law.
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Paperback ISBN: 9781119816454; ePDF ISBN: 9781119816478; epub ISBN: 9781119816485; oBook ISBN: 9781119816461
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Contents
Cover
Series page
Title page
Copyright
Foreword
Preface
1 Introduction: What Is the Question?
2 A Criterial Conception of Truth and Objectivity: Its Relevance to Educational Research
3 Why Empirical Educational Research Needs to Be Taken Seriously
4 The Concept of an Educational Explanation and an Account of What Explanatory Adequacy Should Look Like
5 How Good Is Empirical Research – Disaster or Success?
6 Could Empirical Research-Based Knowledge Be Cumulative?
7 Converging Explanations: Quantitative and Qualitative Methods and How They Are Related
8 Intervention Studies, Experimental Methods and Evidence-Based Policy
9 Case Study 1: Bernsteinian Sociolinguistics
10 Case Study 2: The Comparative Study of Vocational Education
11 Case Study 3: School Effectiveness and Improvement Research
12 Case Study 4: Research on the Teaching of Reading Debate and on Dyslexia
13 Educational Faddism and How to (Possibly) Avoid It
14 How Philosophical and Empirical Research Can Work Together
15 Prospects for Empirical Educational Research and Its Future Relevance to Policy and Practice
References
Index
End User License Agreement
List of Figures
Chapter 6
Figure 1.6 The Bernstein Sociolinguistic Research Programme.
Chapter 11
Figure 1 Distribution of contextual value-added scores...
Guide
Cover
Series page
Title page
Copyright
Table of Contents
Foreword
Preface
Begin Reading
References
Index
End User License Agreement
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Foreword
It is no secret that enquiry into education has been dominated for several decades by empirical research. For many this has extended into an ideology of empiricism, the belief that it is only through empirical research that education can be studied. The harm that is done by this ideology lies not just in its substantive misconceptions but in its effects on research methods courses and on the forms, structures, and protocols within which educational research proposals are formulated and funding granted. This has squeezed and distorted enquiry into education originating in the humanities, not least in philosophy.
For its part, however, and in reaction perhaps, philosophy of education has tended to distance itself from this mainstream. But its justifiable honouring of its disciplinary principles and commitments has sometimes carried with it an air of superiority, if not of muted disdain – and clearly this will not do. There is a fundamental importance to philosophical questions regarding education, but if these are addressed without due cognizance of the realities of educational practice, there is a danger that enquiry will drift off into vague speculation and lose its footing in the rough ground of experience.
Now it would be facile to assume that empirical educational research has a secure footing in this way simply in virtue of its adoption of empirical methods. Research methods sometimes involve templates of assumption and received ideas that skew or determine in advance their findings, and procedural anxieties, extending at times into ‘paradigm wars’ or tribal posturings of other kinds, can stand in the way of fitting attention to the realities of human lives. But acknowledgement of this weakness is no excuse for neglect, let alone disparagement, of the considerable achievements of empirical research, and philosophy of education is more adept when it is responsive to these. In fact, a lack of sensitive and realistic appraisal has exacerbated the crisis of confidence under which educational research as a whole continues to labour.
It is against this backdrop that the pertinence and importance can clearly be seen of the book that follows. In Educational Explanations: Philosophy in Empirical Educational Research, Christopher Winch demonstrates how this troubled relationship between philosophy and empirical research can and should be mended. He does this through a searching examination of what constitutes an explanation in educational research, with implications for both sides of this divide. It is important, moreover, that these are implications that pertain to the feasibility of advancing the understanding of educational practices and, on the strength of this, to the potential, through research, of laying the way for some improvement.
Central to the discussion is a reaffirmation of the nature and importance of truth in educational enquiry: Winch leads the reader away from preoccupation with supposedly timeless truths and idealised visions – and, still more strongly, away from any postmodern undermining of the very idea of truth – and towards a more pragmatic critical engagement with the realities of policy and practice. Yet he is at pains to show that we should not rush ahead too quickly here: Does it even make sense to talk of ‘an educational reality’, of ‘educational truth’? How is it possible for us to know such things, and how might they have a bearing on teaching? Addressing these questions are steps on the way. In a complementary manner, he underlines for the empirical researcher the importance of critical appraisal of the nature and purposes of enquiry, clarity in the concepts they are working with and recognition that empirical educational enquiry should seek after truth wherever possible.
Winch himself lives up to these requirements, and this is amply demonstrated in his discussion. In particular, the later chapters of the book explore examples of influential empirical research, carefully selected from the past five decades. Philosophical questions are shown to be inherent in the cases discussed, but it is also important that the research in question in each case itself generates findings that have a bearing on philosophical reflection. The mutuality of interest here is richly developed.
It is important that Winch comes to the writing of this book on the strength of a wealth of relevant earlier publications. His Teachers’ Know-How: A Philosophical Investigation, also in this series (2017), argued not only that substantial philosophical work needed to be done in order to intelligibly formulate questions amenable to empirical educational research (a stance shared by many philosophers of education), but also that teacher education and teachers’ practice should be informed by the kind of systematic understanding that such research might generate (a view that partly conflicts with the craft-like conception of teaching that is generally more favoured among philosophers). The present text also builds on Winch’s philosophical and empirical work on knowledge, skills and competence in the European labour market, as it does on his influential research on expertise. His experience as an empirical researcher has, no doubt, led to his appreciation of the importance of collaboration and teamwork, while his practice as a philosopher and teacher has enhanced his understanding of the different ways in which ethical considerations have a bearing on the roles of the teacher and the researcher, on the policy-maker and the academic. As the book shows, the prospects for such teamwork may well be diminished where research training underestimates the degree of philosophical engagement required to construct coherent conceptual frameworks for research and a proper appraisal of the ways in which ethical considerations weigh within these.
Educational research seeks explanations of problems, and there is a need to understand not only the differences in kind between explanations but how they can work in complementary ways, in conducting reason-based explanations appropriate to the task at hand. This book provides a clear and engaging account of how this can be done. Winch has provided a clear guide to show how those involved across the range of research into education can work together better in furtherance of this aim.
Paul Standish (Series Editor)
Preface
The present writer has been active in the philosophy of education for over thirty five years and an empirical education researcher for thirty. Although I am by no means unique, the combination of the roles of philosopher and empirical educational researcher is fairly uncommon. Despite the widespread critique of empirical educational research within the philosophy of education community I am convinced that I have gained much in knowledge and understanding from both these enterprises and indeed one of the arguments of this book is that they are more closely related than is often supposed. No-one will be convinced of this stance if those who defend it are not prepared to engage in a careful accounting of the strengths and weaknesses of empirical educational research as it is conducted and in a critical appraisal of its presuppositions. This the present book attempts to do.
Without the resources available to philosophy of education, educational policy and practice is likely to remain blind, assuming philosophical positions without being aware of doing so, let alone adopting a critical stance towards them. Philosophy of education, if it ignores the methods and findings of empirical educational research, however flawed or incomplete these may be, has to rely on a ‘commonsense’ vision of educational reality, either based on personal experience or on unexamined assumptions about the way the educational world works. With a few notable exceptions, to be found for example in the work of Richard Pring, D.C. Phillips and Tone Kvernbekk, constructive engagement with empirical educational research on the basis of a willingness to assess its value and to profit from it when it does have valuable insights or findings, is rare. Too often the philosophical arguments against empirical educational research are unconvincing and lack either engagement with or sympathy for what empirical researchers are trying to accomplish. For their part (and partly in reaction to the attitude of some philosophers of education) empirical educational researchers too often neglect the philosophical presuppositions of their work or disregard the possibilities of an empirical investigation of conceptual variation. They often fail to adopt a coherent conceptual framework for thinking about educational issues.
There are good reasons, therefore, for revisiting this troubled academic relationship and to try to effect a more fruitful engagement between the two research communities to the mutual profit not just of them but of educational practices and those who benefit from them. I am well aware of the difficulties of moving individuals from entrenched positions, but, among other things, this book is an attempt to do so.
There are a number of tasks which this book aims to accomplish. First, to establish that empirical educational enquiry should seek after truth wherever possible. Second, to show that empirical educational enquiry aims to present explanations for how and why educational institutions exist and educational processes occur. Third, the nature of educational explanation as a truth-oriented but pragmatic rather than absolutist enterprise is advocated. Fourth, the importance of understanding in terms of conceptual structure, internal meanings and reasons are emphasised as prerequisites of satisfactory educational explanations. Fifth, the preceding four theses are defended through the examination of four case studies of empirical educational research programmes. Sixth and finally, the implications of this account of educational explanation are drawn out for future research programmes and the preparation of teachers.
1 Introduction: What Is the Question?
THE PRINCIPAL CLAIMS OF THE BOOK
Millions of pounds are spent on educational research each year in the UK alone.1 By far the greatest proportion of this expenditure is on research which is thought to have practical relevance to educational problems, and the vast majority of this is spent on empirical educational research (EER), that is educational research which examines and seeks explanations for actual or proposed educational practices or the kinds of activities, institutions or policies that prepare young people for life (Pring 2015, p. 27). Invariably, the aim of such research is not merely to gain understanding of these practices but to improve or replace them with better ones. This practical aspect of educational research exercises most commentators, although it should not be forgotten that educational research can be carried out in a relatively disinterested manner, out of intellectual curiosity (Hammersley 2006). There are two related issues to be considered here: (1) Is it possible to gain knowledge of how educational practices work? (2) Is it possible to use such knowledge to improve existing practices, replace existing ones with better ones or introduce practices which will improve the overall practice of education? In this book, both these questions will be addressed. If the answer to (1) is negative, then it is futile to address (2). By implication then the answer to (1) will be positive. The answer to (2) will not be negative, but there are degrees of positivity attached to a positive answer and what those degrees are will be crucial to the ultimate claims of the book.
It is no exaggeration to say that in recent decades educational research has undergone a crisis of confidence, particularly but not exclusively within the world of educational policymaking. Dissatisfaction has been expressed both with the quality and the usefulness of such research. Conceptual research on education tends to be regarded with some suspicion as something that is either of little practical value or which undermines existing practices. But empirical research fares little better, with scepticism expressed both about its quality (Tooley and Darby 1998) and about its applicability (Hillage et al. 1998). More recently there have been moves to tie funding to preferred approaches to empirical research such as intervention studies and randomised control trials (RCTs) and to disseminate in accessible form what the findings of such studies are and how they are relevant to the improvement of educational practice. In the UK alone we see organisations such as the Educational Policy Institute (EPI), the Educational Endowment Foundation (EEF), and the Sutton Trust, not to mention meta-researchers Robert Slavin and John Hattie gaining a significant amount of influence in the propagation of studies of ‘what works’ in educational practice. One should also mention the rising interest in the deliverances of educational research from within the teaching profession, such as ResearchEd in the UK, which betoken a wish by teachers to become more active consumers of and even participants in educational research and also to have a say in what counts as quality and relevant research. It is fair to say that the importance of educational research is growing, alongside the debates about its value. The questions that it raises, however, are complex and not fully understood either within the world of educational research itself or within the communities that commission, evaluate and use it.
In Teachers’ Know-How (Winch, C. 2017), I argued for a preferred conception of teachers as those who, among other things, bring to bear the fruits of the systematic study of education and educational practices on their own work. This systematic study includes but is not exhausted by empirical research in the sense described above. It is now time to further substantiate that claim by showing whether and how such research can positively inform teachers’ work. Within philosophy of education this is a problematic claim. The dominant conception of the teacher within the discipline is that of a craftworker whose primary assets are experience, intuition, commonsense, situational judgement and subject knowledge (e.g. Carr, D. 1999; Carr, W. 2004, 2005, 2006; Dunne 1993; Barrow 1984 for representative examples). On the other hand, there are also commentators who take a more positive view of the deliverances of educational research (e.g. Pring 2015). Like Pring I take the view that substantial philosophical work has to be done in order to intelligibly formulate questions amenable to EER. It follows therefore that in order to make out a case for the potential usefulness of such research, philosophical clarity about its possibility, scope and limits needs to be achieved. This is one of the main objectives of this volume, mainly concerned with question (1). Empirical educational research is enormously varied and, in order to answer (2) we will need to consider a variety of styles of EER in order to arrive at a balanced picture of its value and limitations for the work of teachers and educators more generally. This latter objective will be achieved in no small measure by examination of a series of case studies, which will occupy Chapters 9–12.
Before we arrive at that point however, some substantial philosophical issues, located broadly within the philosophy of the applied social sciences, will need to be addressed. These issues can be summarised as follows:
(i) Does it make sense to talk of an educational reality?
(ii) Does it make sense to talk of educational truth and falsity?
(iii) If there are such things as educational truths, is it possible for us to know them?
(iv) If we can know them, can they be used in educational practices such as teaching?
The first claim needs to be answered before the second can, the second before the third and the third before the fourth. Failure at any point in the chain of justification will jeopardise the overall claim of the book.
A STRATEGY FOR ADDRESSING THE CLAIMS
In Chapter 2, we will address the most fundamental issues at stake in the enterprise, namely whether it makes sense to talk of educational reality and the closely associated question as to whether there are truths about educational practices and whether we can know them? In order to get clearer about what is at stake, it is helpful to distinguish between perception-independent reality and conception-dependent reality (e.g. McNaughton 1988). We presuppose a world which continues whether or not we are aware of it and indeed whether or not we have the sensory or cognitive ability to be aware of or to understand it.2 Even if our ‘knowing our way around’ in such a world makes certain aspects of it rather than others salient to us as human beings with particular interests, needs and abilities, that does not alter the independence of that world from us in most, if not all, respects.3
As creatures with conceptual cognitive equipment (e.g. the ability to make judgements – Geach 1957), we relate to the world through our conceptual as well as our sensory abilities. However, some features of our world cannot intelligibly be considered except as in some sense products of our conceptual abilities. These include the practices, customs and institutions of our societies. Were we not to conceive of these in certain ways (i.e. to have practices of judgement and action associated with them), it would not make sense to say that there were such practices, customs and institutions. They constitute a social reality which is conception dependent. This social reality is the one that we make for ourselves through our practices of judgement within which we employ the concepts that constitute our understanding of our world. Naturally, we also see the non-social world conceptually as well and it is intimately related to our social world. However, while it might exist without us, our social reality is constituted by our conceptual abilities exercised in everyday social practices.
SOME BASIC IDEAS ABOUT EDUCATION
All human societies need to renew themselves. Bringing up the young and preparing them for adult life is a fundamental practice everywhere, however it is done. In this book, this practice is what will be called ‘education’ in its broadest sense. There is not much else that one can say about education in this categorial sense, but it is important.4 Education is concerned with learning: both knowledge of the propositional and acquaintance kinds and various kinds of know-how. It also aims to prepare young people for something worthwhile, either from the point of view of themselves, their parents or their community.5 We should merely note at this point that what a community sees as worthwhile for that community may not be seen as worthwhile from the point of view of the parents or young people. We could also add that what is seen as worthwhile by the state (if one exists within such a society) is not necessarily seen as such by the community, the parents or young people. We will often return to this point.
CATEGORIAL CONCEPTS AND CONCEPTIONS
So much for the categorial conception which has minimal although significant content. As to education in any particular society or community we can, however, say much more. Education is intimately connected with the society in which it takes place. This cannot be otherwise, since education is primarily concerned with preparing young people for life in that society and must reflect its main features, concerns and priorities. We can add that in societies with any significant degree of complexity, there will be different kinds of preparations for different kinds of roles within that society. Societies with gradations of social class, caste, division of labour, religion, regional variation, will tend to differentiate education according to preparation for living within (and occasionally between) these gradations. The education offered to young people within these different gradations of society will also differ, often to a quite striking degree. One only has to look at Plato’s Republic and Laws (Plato 1950, 2016) to note the radically different education proposed for future citizens and workers or helots, for whom a form of industrial training was deemed appropriate.
If this is true for any particular society, then the differences between educational aims and practices in different societies are also likely to be very great. The question arises then as to whether we have any useful overarching concepts that can at least allow us the beginnings of a conceptual framework for thinking about, comparing and studying the vast variety of educational practices that exist in the world. A tentative answer to this question is ‘yes’, that there is such a categorial framework available if we use it with care.
We have already mentioned the constraints of human biology which guarantee the existence of educational practices in any society. But we can add more. Any society has non-negotiable conceptions of the good and the worthwhile which it regards as non-negotiable because constitutive of what a worthwhile life is in that society.6 These are its values. And, given these values and the exigencies of life in that society, concerned with making a living and getting one with one’s fellow humans, the aims of education would normally be expected to reflect these values and exigencies. It is important to note that such aims may be implicit rather than explicit, more often than not, the former. They may also be variegated, some applying to one group within the society rather than another, while others apply to other groups. Aims of education are nothing more than the overriding purposes for which the society’s educational practices exist. They may be difficult to discern clearly if their articulation risks exposing divisions, sometimes painful, within the society.
If aims of education are to be met, then there must be some content in terms of knowledge and know-how to be imparted to young people which allows those aims to be met. This applies to any educational practice, whether formal or informal. That content is prescribed (Barrow 1976) and is what is deemed necessary to the achievement of educational aims.7 Where aims are implicit as they very often are, then they may be inferred from the prescribed content of education, the curriculum. Just as there must be a prescribed content in order for education to embody values and to be purposeful, so there must be methods of learning and teaching which are deemed to be the best way, both pragmatically and morally, for acquiring the prescribed knowledge and know-how. Again, these may be formal or informal, but they do need to exist. These can be called the pedagogical practices sanctioned by the society and, like the curriculum, they will not normally be allowed to contradict the aims and values of education.
There need to be success criteria for any educational practice. We assume that such practices are purposeful and therefore that there are means of determining whether or not those purposes have been achieved, whether that be at the level of an individual session of instruction or learning, at the systemic level or at the level of completion of someone’s education. The family of such practices can be called assessment. Finally, educational practices require resources for their purposes to be achieved (Naik 1975). These include not only physical resources such as buildings and playgrounds but also intellectual resources such as textbooks, software and last, but by no means least, teachers.
A case has been made out for a categorial framework for thinking about education as set out briefly above. It is a corollary of our categorial account of the concept of education that there will be multiple realisations or conceptions of what education is. This follows from the fact that there are many different conceptions of a worthwhile life both between and within different societies. ‘X is a worthwhile life’ is in fact a concealed two-place predicate which, properly understood, amounts to ‘X is a worthwhile life for Y’ where Y is a particular person or category of people. It does not follow therefore that ‘X is a worthwhile life for Z’ where Z is not identical with Y.8 A conception of education is a particular instantiation of an educational practice within a society or within a particular social group within a society. A particular conception may also contain within itself views concerning whom the conception is appropriate for. It is more likely to be an exception rather than the rule that any preferred conception is considered to be universal, applying without exception to all groups at all times and places. In particular, it is often the case that an educational conception suitable for a group or individual X may be considered unsuitable for a group or individual Y, when what is considered to be worthwhile for X is not considered to be worthwhile for Y and vice versa. We may also expect to find disagreement among groups concerning what kind of education is suitable or worthwhile for them.
EDUCATION AND CONTESTABILITY
So far we have argued that there is a categorial framework for thinking about education and educational practices. We have also argued that, within the framework, different conceptions of education will be found both between and within different societies. It is likely that there will often be disagreement about what is a suitable education and for whom. This points to a pervasive, if not universal feature, of education that particular conceptions and their suitability are contested between different groups. Sometimes these disputes will, as a matter of fact, concern which conception should be implemented and for whom. More likely though is the possibility that what is understood by rival conceptions may itself need interpretation, either because the contending parties are themselves not completely clear about what they are advocating, or because there is a misunderstanding between those contending parties concerning what they understand by those contending conceptions.
An example, which we shall further consider in Chapter 10, would be whether vocational preparation should count as education or as something else such as training Winch P. 2015.9 The issue can be seen as one of contesting conceptions between different societies, such as the Germanic tradition of Bildung and its related conception of Ausbildung or educative preparation for working life and the British tradition of training, which bears more relation to the classical Greek conception of vocational preparation mentioned earlier. These different conceptions come with their own conceptual frameworks, which include subtle conceptual variation in the concept of know-how between the two societies (see Brockmann et al. 2011). But the issue can also arise within a society such as Britain, where one can trace a change in the attitude to the educative role of industrial training in the post-war period and an increase in the influence of the idea of outcomes-based qualifications, which have their own conceptual peculiarities.
In this example we can see how substantive questions about educational policy and practice, for example – ‘what kind of vocational preparation should a developed country have?’ can become entwined with conceptual questions (and misunderstandings) about what exactly is vocational preparation (a conceptual question) or what should count as an acceptable form of vocational preparation and for whom (both a conceptual and a normative question). Here, as in other examples, investigation of the nature of an educational practice involves both questions about whether or not something is an educational practice and questions about what kind of educational practice it is or should be? We shall find that many empirical investigations of education involve a conceptual or hermeneutic element, both as preliminaries and as part of ongoing investigations. Failure to realise this and a lack of associated disciplinary expertise has often compromised the variety of approaches that are needed to effectively answer questions concerning education practice.
Recognition of contestability and the pervasive fact of contestation about educational contexts and practices opens up another difficult element of the understanding of educational research. The fact that a concept or a practice is contested usually means that it is understood or viewed from different perspectives by different observers or participants. Even when there is no overt contestation, the very fact that different categories of individuals tend to have a different perspective from individuals in other involved categories introduces the fact of multiple perspectives on educational concepts and practices. In this connection we have already mentioned the importance of a hermeneutic role in considering the conceptual frameworks involved in EER, but we now need to also take account of the different perspectives that may arise on educational practice.
Multiple Aspects and Phenomenology: Why Perspectivalism Does Not Have Relativistic Epistemological and Ontological Implications
One of the criticisms of much ‘qualitative’ educational research is that it adopts ontologically and epistemologically relativistic stands, maintaining that there are multiple realities which researchers need to take account of and that truths about one ‘reality’ do not necessarily apply to another and that each perspective is equally valid from the point of view of the researcher (an idea that seems to have been originally derived from the work of Schutz (1932, 1976) and which has been further developed and cast into more overt versions (Guba and Lincoln 1989; Schoonenboom 2018)).10 The reality of multiple, often contested, perspectives makes relativism a tempting option for the educational researcher struggling for a framework to take account of this very pervasive feature of education. However, it is a temptation which should be resisted as the price to be paid is too high to be acceptable.
The first reason is that it seems to commit the researcher to a form of idealist ontology, where reality is perspective-dependent. This in itself threatens to compromise the possibility of providing an objective view of an educational practice, although it does seem to allow for disagreement and the making of mistakes within a perspective (von Wright 1971; Kölbel 2005). The second is that it threatens the possibility of applying the concepts of truth and falsity to beliefs about educational practices to any form of cross-perspectival judgement. The third is that it drastically limits the extent to which research can have practical implications for teachers and policymakers. One might, perhaps, be prepared to live with these consequences of relativism if there were no alternative. But there is a much less drastic alternative way of making sense of multiple perspectives.
Even were we to adopt Mulhall’s (1990) Wittgenstein-derived account of permanent aspect perception as a way of thinking about multiple perspectives, it would not follow that each perceived aspect implied a distinct reality. What would follow is that reports of such intentional perception (McGinn 2015) could only be subjected to assessments of their sincerity rather than their truth. In fact, there are good grounds for thinking that what Wittgenstein termed ‘permanent’ aspect perception does not correspond to the phenomenon described by Mulhall, which as Arahata (2015) has argued, could be better described as ‘chronic’ aspect perception or the sense of knowing one’s way about in the world, of features of the world assuming a salience corresponding not only to biological needs and capacities, but also to particular cultural preoccupations and interests. Chronic aspect perception carries no implication of multiple realities.
Ironically, the idealism of the phenomenological approach is ultimately based on a kind of realism. It is assumed that true judgements correspond to reality and since such judgements are perspectival and there are potentially multiple perspectives, we have to assume that there are multiple realities which correspond to these perspectives. But, as we shall see in Chapter 2 we do not need to subscribe to a dogmatic form of realism in order to hold on to a secure concept of objective truth. There also appears to be a view implicit in the phenomenological approach that there are multiple incompatible perspectives on the same educational practices and because each perspective requires a reality to validate its statements, there must also be multiple realities corresponding to each incompatible perspective. But the assumption remains implicit that all the perspectives are about the same reality; otherwise there would be little sense in calling them alternative perspectives – they would merely be perspectives unrelated to each other, rather than a parent’s, a child’s or a teacher’s perspective on a particular educational practice. The phenomenological approach, in formulating its claims, arguably makes the very assumption that it seeks to reject. In other words, by assuming that there is a linkage between perspectives, it assumes tacitly that there is something which the different perspectives are perspectives on. Different individuals may look at a landscape from radically different perspectives with radically different results, but it is still the same landscape that they are all contemplating. It may be that we need to locate the problems that phenomenology encounters when seeking to deal with perspectivalism in both its hidden and its more overt realist assumptions. In Chapter 2 we will examine more closely how it is possible both to do justice to the reality of multiple educational perspectives and to work with a robust account of objective truth in EER.
SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTERS
Chapter 2 considers the issue of the possibility of objective and truthful educational research in more detail. The chapter will develop the claim that there can be a criterial understanding of truth which allows us to make objective claims about educational practices without submitting to a dogmatically realist account of truth, drawing principally on the work Ellenbogen (2003). Such an account will also do justice to the conception-dependent nature of educational practice and the fact of multiple perspectives on educational practices. An objective account of an educational practice can take account of the multiple perspectives in play and the conceptions of education that inform them, together with the possible conceptual distinctiveness of certain conceptions.11
The argument stresses the hermeneutic or interpretive tasks of EER. It is very often not possible to provide any explanation of an educational state of affairs or process until the conception and associated perspectives on the practice have themselves been adequately explained. Interpretation is a key, if neglected part of EER. In this sense, EER as one of the social sciences is, as Peter Winch (1958) argued, a philosophical enterprise. One of its main, although by no means the only one of its tasks, is an empirical investigation of educational and related concepts. In order to understand an educational phenomenon, there is no avoiding of the consideration of how its participants understand it.
This brings us on to a discussion of how the concept of rationality can inform our understanding of the great diversity of practices in education. Some distinctions are made which strengthen our view that we are not dealing with ‘multiple realities’ in the face of such diversity, while at the same time taking account of the reality of that diversity and the imaginative challenge involved in comprehending it.
Chapter 3 takes up the issue of the very possibility of EER and the various sceptical arguments that have been advanced against it. Scepticism concerning whether there really are such things as educational practices will be considered first. Such claims usually rely on a strong form of perspectivalism which denies the existence of a single educational reality. Another form of such perspectivalism maintains that, since educational practices are always value laden, there can be no investigation of such practices that does not involve some form of identification with those values. The confusions in these approaches will be set out.
Next, the claim it is not possible to know as opposed to believe any educational facts through EER will be considered. It will be argued that this claim is, in the end incoherent. Claims that educational phenomena can be considered through a faculty called ‘common sense’ will also be considered and rejected as incoherent. Finally the claim that EER is inherently unreliable and unable to fulfil its promise will be considered. This is the most serious objection to EER and will need to be considered with great care, paying due regard to the scope and limitations of EER. However, the conclusion will be a qualified positive one, albeit one which more positivistically inclined philosophers of EER may find difficult to accept.
Chapter 4 broaches the issue of what kinds of explanation are available for educational phenomena and is also concerned with the scope of educational explanations. There are a number of issues to be dealt with in a chapter on educational explanations. The first is what an educational explanation actually is. In order to deal with this, we need to remember the focus that most educational research has in trying to improve educational practices. Generally speaking, that purposive feature of EER shapes the kinds of explanations that are offered. But here we need to remind ourselves that explanation is closely tied to interpretation (see von Wright 1971, Ch. 4), not only in the sense that interpretation often has to precede explanation, but also in the sense that explanation sometimes involves interpretation. Explanations in EER tend to be focused on a practical issue, so they concentrate on why certain phenomena occur, in the sense of what causes and reasons are operative in bringing them about, but also on how they occur, in the sense of looking at the unfolding of processes in and around educational practices. In this sense, explanations are closely related to descriptions.The object (Achinstein 1975 in Körner ed. 1975) of an educational explanation is usually an educational phenomenon, but the origin of such an explanation arises from a question arising from a need for explanation.
This chapter will argue that the kinds of explanation appropriate to EER cannot be confined to one type, and that both what might be called causal and reason-based explanations will be deployed, sometimes in relation to the same phenomenon. We should be wary of making too strict a distinction between these two types of explanation and in particular should be aware of the Aristotelian distinction between efficient causes, which are primarily what causal explanation nowadays involve and formal causes. The distinction is well explained by Mulder (2016): ‘The formal cause determines what can happen, the efficient cause determines that something happens’ (p. 165). Another way of putting the distinction is that the formal cause concerns the structural properties of something that produces a cause: an object or process for example, while the efficient cause usually relates two events to each other in such a way that one is said to give rise to the other.12
Explanations which relate to the functional role of institutions and practices will be very important for educational explanations, together with the closely related concept of a teleological explanation which relies on goals and purposes as an organising principle (see also von Wright 1971 for more on this). We will also be looking at the concept of a good explanation, making use of some of the insights of Lipton (2004). Although Lipton is primarily concerned with explanations which involve efficient causation his work has wider applicability. Finally, we will also be looking at the important role that context plays in both shaping and limiting the scope of educational explanations.
Chapter 5 takes these concerns further, focussing on what a good educational explanation might look like. The importance of plausible methodological assumptions constituting a research tradition is emphasised, along with the purposive nature of research which entails the posing of questions that need to be answered by the research. Further issues dealt with include the following:
Explanatory adequacy. How can we tell whether an explanation does actually address the question posed which gave rise to it? An example would include Bernsteinian educational sociolinguistics, discussed in Chapter 9.
Coherence. To what extent is an explanation not only internally consistent, but also whether it is well-articulated through sound inference and appropriate transition from evidence to conclusion. We will also be concerned with the extent to which explanations can be externally consistent, with those offered for the same or related phenomena. Closely related to this is the property of economy – is the explanation overly complicated and does it contain features that do not really add to understanding of the phenomenon? See the discussion of dyslexia research in Chapter 12.
Methodological probity. To what extent is there a strategy for answering a research question or line of inquiry and the appropriateness of the techniques used for answering it and the explanatory concepts deployed to do so? See the discussion of School Effectiveness Research in Chapter 11.
Appropriateness of methods. Closely related to this is the question of whether the array of techniques of data gathering and analysis employed actually work together effectively to produce explanations that can cohere. Some of the problems encountered by school effectiveness research illustrate this need.
Evaluability and comparability. A very current concern is the extent to which the explanations offered can be properly evaluated for their quality and whether or not meaningful comparisons can be made between explanations of different but related phenomena. Questions of methodology, technique, purpose and context are all relevant here. Comparative research on vocational education, discussed in Chapter 10, is a useful example.
Knowledge cumulation. How well does educational research fare in building up knowledge? This vital issue needs to be addressed in an honest way which avoids the Scylla of excessive scepticism about the ability to build up a corpus of educational knowledge and the Charybdis of excessive optimism and careless overgeneralisation that has been the bane of much EER. Both Chapters 11 and 12 provide case studies relevant to this issue.
Chapter 6 takes up the issue of knowledge cumulation and seeks to make a measured response. Issues taken up include the fact that different paradigms – in Kuhn’s sense (1962) – are often used, sometimes relating to the same phenomena. Here we need to consider both the possible incommensurability and incompatibility of different paradigms. The chapter also addresses the question as to whether there can ever be a common conceptual framework for the conduct of systematic educational enquiry. I go on to consider what makes particular research programmes progressive or degenerating – in Lakatos’ sense (1970) – and the relevance of Lakatos’ account for EER. This leads on to questions of the replication of research and the cumulation of findings within metasurveys and metaevaluations, together with the extent to which it is safe to recommend policy and practice arising directly from the research. In this context we also have to take into account Kuhnian-style revolutions in which large-scale conceptual revision and change become a feature of the educational research landscape and the extent to which such changes compromise cumulation.
Chapter 7 broaches the broad divide so often made in EER between quantitative and qualitative methods in data gathering and analysis. The distinction is often made wrongly in terms of two different paradigms in the Kuhnian sense, but it is argued in this chapter that this is a misleading way of framing the issue. It would be more helpful to say that ‘quantitative’ and ‘qualitative’ refer to two more or less contrasting families of techniques used in hypothesis formation, data gathering and data analysis. It is important to see them both as primarily belonging in the ‘methods’ category rather than the paradigmatic or even the methodological category. Some paradigms will favour quantitative methods, particularly those that seek a close identification of the aims and approaches of EER with those of the physical sciences.
It is important to note, however, that a refusal to abide by the canons of natural scientific research does not imply rejection of quantitative methods. By the same token, paradigms that reject close identification of EER with natural science cannot be taken to automatically reject quantitative techniques. The argument of Chapter 7 will be that research questions should generate a research strategy or methodology that in turn prescribes appropriate methods, without prejudice as to whether or not these fall into the ‘quantitative’ or the ‘qualitative’ camp. The role of both families of methods in the context of hermeneutic inquiries will be discussed there.
Chapter 8 focuses on a currently influential paradigm with a close relationship to approaches in natural science. This paradigm, which valorises intervention studies as a way of understanding educational practices, consists of a family of approaches, including natural experiments, quasi experiments and RCTs (Smith, H.W. 1975). Because the RCT has become so influential and has been held up as the gold standard of scientific probity in educational policymaking circles, it is appropriate to pay particular attention to its use, appropriateness and strengths and limitations. Particular attention will be paid to the structure of inference that underpins RCTs, to the causal mechanisms that can be assumed to underlie them, to the types of explanation that they sanction and to the relationship between significance testing for an intervention variable and a claim for the causal efficacy of that variable. Mackie’s (1965) introduction of the concept of a causal field will be introduced as a way of understanding some of the problematic features of the use of RCTs and will be discussed with some examples. Conclusions about the advantages and limitations of the use of RCTs and associated methods will be drawn, together with a reflection on the use of these in metasurveys and metaevaluations.
Chapter 9 is the first substantial case study chapter and examines the rise and fall of the Bernsteinian sociolinguistic research programme (Bernstein 1973a, 1973b). This research programme has been chosen to illustrate the ambitions of EER in a time of considerable optimism about its potential to change educational practice, its relatively innovative approach to empirical research and the way in which it appeared to tie together various factors involved in educational achievement in a convincing looking explanatory framework. At the same time, the weaknesses of the programme, which eventually led to its abandonment, will be looked at. The included: inadequate conceptualisation of the key organising concept of linguistic code; ignoring of factors such as acquaintance with literacy; inappropriate intervention methods of data collection and a weak empirical basis for large-scale generalisations. The case also illustrates how a research programme which is getting into difficulties tries to solve its problems through semantic redefinition rather than data collection, following predictions made by Lakatos. Some key lessons about future research in the area are drawn.
Chapter 10 takes up research in comparative vocational education. Much has been achieved over the last quarter of a century in understanding how vocational education and training systems differ from country to country. Economists and comparative educators have co-operated in trying to show how VET systems are embedded in their societies and national economies and how they are expressive of different forms of capitalism (Ashton and Green 1996; Brockmann et al. 2011). The case study shows how these primarily descriptive studies manage to do this within limits. Descriptive accounts of differing VET systems and their embedding within their societies are not always accompanied by adequate interpretation and explanation of the phenomena described. In particular, interpretative work can show how practices which may look superficially similar from society to society are very often very different when subjected to closer scrutiny. Comparative VET research poses methodological challenges if it is to advance further in explanatory force. Among these is the need for empirical investigation of conceptual variation in different, albeit quite similar societies. The ways in which different national VET systems are to be understood have important implications both for policy borrowing in VET and for the attempt to develop transnational policy tools. This will be discussed in relationship to VET policy in the EU over the last quarter of a century.
Chapter 11 takes up the case of School Effectiveness Research (SER). From the 1970s onwards, dissatisfaction with the paradigmatic view that ‘Education cannot compensate for Society’ grew and the search was on for ways of distinguishing effective from ineffective schools. I will examine the choices available for investigating this issue and explain those that were eventually made in the dominant research programme in this area. Key methodological decisions and conceptual approaches are examined and the course of SER and its achievements and limitations are described and discussed. A number of critical issues are identified. These include the definition of ‘school effectiveness’ adopted; the limitations of the regression-based methods for measuring effectiveness, including measurement error, the problem of missing values and the problem of unstable results. Problems to do with generalisation of findings will also be broached. These include the difficulties of putting SER research into viable school improvement strategies, the interpretation of the regression-based findings for the identification of features of effective schools and the relativistic nature of the data. The chapter will include an estimation of the achievements as well as the setbacks of the SER programme.
Chapter 12 examines the history of research on learning to read, with particular references to difficulties that some children have in learning to read. Despite vigorous controversies concerning effective ways of teaching reading, which have raged over the past century, the field has also shown positive gains in understanding, albeit ones which may be more limited than some of their proponents have been willing to admit. However, by and large, the more serious empirical researchers in this field have been cautious, while research which incorporated some doubtful metaphysical assumption has declined in influence. Within the field, conceptual challenges abound and these have not always been addressed with the seriousness that they deserve. These include both what is understood by ‘reading’ and different levels of reading ability and critically, the concept of a reading difficulty and the associated diagnosis of dyslexia. It will be shown that the understanding of what dyslexia is involves considerable conceptual work and that the issue as to whether there is such a phenomenon is by no means resolved. This chapter will also examine the ways in which research on reading has affected policy and will look at a case study which plausibly shows how such research can be used effectively.
Chapter 13 takes us to an issue which has always plagued EER and its application. This issue, which involves the uncritical and enthusiastic acceptance of the deliverances of EER, usually followed by disappointment and the entry of a new challenger in the lists, I call educational faddism. Educational faddism is the shared responsibility of governments and policymakers, teachers and educational researchers. I will describe the pressures which make educational faddism based on EER so irresistible and also show how it has also undermined faith in EER. Ironically, this point applies to recent attempts to transcend it through the use of metasurveys which seem to provide clear deliverance of the implications of any such research. Failure to attend to Mackie’s point about causal fields, described in Chapter 8
