Entebbe Declassified E-Book

Sayeret Matkal Operators

• Herausgeber: BooxAi
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2021

Beschreibung

"This is a must-read for anyone interested in military history. It tells the story of one of the boldest and most successful special operations of all time, and it tells it in a unique and riveting way, in the words of the fighters who executed it."
Ehud Barak, former Prime Minister, Defense Minister, and Chief of Staff, served as commander of Sayeret Matkal from 1971-1973.


“An incredibly important piece of history, not just for Israelis, but for every commando who picks up a gun.”
Admiral William H. McRaven
Commander, United States Special Operations Command

"A fascinating book that grants the readers a glimpse at the testimonies and different vantage points of the warriors at the fore. There is a unique strength to the individual testimonies. The unbelievable story of the operation is made real."

Reuven Rivlin, President of Israel.

There have been books and articles and blockbuster movies, but here at last is THE REAL STORY of the most daring rescue operation ever, as TOLD BY THE OPERATORS THEMSELVES.
In June 1976, when AF Flight 139 was hijacked by German and Arab terrorists and flown to Entebbe, Uganda, many around the world thought there was no choice but to succumb to the hijackers’ demands. Instead, a few nights later, an Israeli special operations force flew an unprecedented 2,500 miles—largely over hostile territory and with only enough fuel for one leg of the journey.
These operators were the first ones to land in Entebbe. They eliminated the terrorists and freed 103 hostages. Their 33 stories, told in their own words, illustrate precisely how Sayeret Matkal pulled off the impossible on that fateful night. 

---

Sayeret Matkal operators, then as now, endure a harsh selection process. They’re trained as clandestine warriors, taught to contain the secrets they hold. For these thirty-three authors that creed has been a way of life. Now, after decades of silence, they’ve decided to share their stories of Entebbe. These individual testimonies, sure to leave an indelible mark on the historical record, were written out of goodwill, and goodwill, too, has dictated that all proceeds be donated to charity.

Leseprobe

Entebbe Declassified

The Untold First-Hand Stories of the Legendary Rescue Operation

Authors: Sayeret Matkal Operators

Entebbe Declassified

The Untold First-Hand Stories of the Legendary Rescue Operation

Authors:

Sayeret Matkal Operators

Editors:

Yiftach Reicher Atir, Shlomi Reisman, Aviram Halevi

Cover design by Peleg Michaeli

Translated from the Hebrew by Mitch Ginsburg

All rights reserved

Copyright © 2021 by the authors

This book or parts thereof may not be reproduced in any form, stored in any retrieval system, or transmitted in any form by any means—electronic, mechanical, photocopy, recording, or otherwise—without prior written permission of the publisher, except as provided by Israeli copyright law. For permission requests, please contact the Israel Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center (IICC).

The publishing house has done all in its power to locate the rights holders to all material herein (including photos) taken from outside sources. We regret any and all mistakes and omissions, and, if any such are brought to our attention, we shall act to rectify this in further editions.

Published by BooxAi

ISBN: 978-965-577-907-3

Originally published in Hebrew by Effi Melzer LTD, Israel.

“The opposite of to write is to forget.”

Maj.-Gen. Nehemia Tamari (died in a helicopter crash in the line of duty in 1994), Sayeret Matkal commander 1978-1980

Writers

Intro to the English Edition

To the Readers

Introduction

1. Staff Officers and NCOs

Avi Weiss (Livne)

Yael Zangen Taterka

Michael Aaronson

2. Yoni’s Command Squad

Tamir Pardo

David Hassin

3. Assault Force

Amir Ofer

Amnon Peled

Giora Sussmann

Shlomi Reisman

Ilan Blumer

Adam Kolman

Yiftach Reicher

Rani Cohen

Yonatan Gilad

Pinchas Buchris

Amos Goren

Alex Davidi

Gadi Ilan

Dani Arditi

Amos Ben Avraham

4. Suppressive Fire Force

Eyal Yardenay

5. APC Force

Shaul Mofaz

Yohai Brenner

Dani Dagan

Eldad (Perkal) Dolev

Udi Salvi

Yuval Fine

Alon Shemi

Eyal Oren

Yoni Raz

Yossi Shak

Arik Shalev

Omer Bar Lev

6. Operation Yonatan: List of Operators and Authors (roles and positions of those deployed)

Notes

Acknowledgments

INTRO TO THE ENGLISH EDITION

Forty years after the hostage-rescue operation in Entebbe, we published the Hebrew edition of “Operation Yonatan in First Person: Sayeret Matkal Operators Tell the Tales of Battle at Entebbe.”

Over the ensuing five years, we’ve come to realize that the world at large, too, ought to be exposed to these first-person accounts of one of the most unique operations ever pulled off, and that is why we decided to have the book translated and to make it accessible to a far wider audience in English.

All proceeds from the sale of this book will be used for social programming that, like the operation in which we took part, benefits the entirety of Israeli society.

The English edition includes the accounts of 33 soldiers and operators, whose voices, at times with their own help, were skillfully and devotedly brought into English by our translator, Mitch Ginsburg.

TO THE READERS

Yonatan Netanyahu, killed at age thirty, never had the chance to tell his tale.

On Sunday, when the plane was hijacked, Yoni was in command of a covert Sayeret Matkal operation in the south. He instructed the Unit’s officers to participate in all preparations and planning sessions regarding the hijacked aircraft and asked to be kept abreast of all developments.

On Thursday Yoni returned from the Egyptian border. He received from Brig.-Gen. Dan Shomron, the commander of the whole operation, the mission orders for Sayeret Matkal, was updated by his staff officers on the situation, and planned, along with them and the Unit officers and operators, the takeover of the old terminal and the rescue of the hostages.

Yoni determined the shape of the force and its personnel, authorized the plans of each and every squad leader, and presented the operational orders. The force was formed and organized, outfitted and trained, its operational plans adjusted in real time - all under his command.

On Friday Yoni presented the operational plan to Dan Shomron and to the IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Motta Gur and Defense Minister Shimon Peres, and instilled in them the confidence that the Unit could accomplish its goal of killing the terrorists and freeing the hostages. That faith in the Unit and its commander had a pivotal role in the government’s decision to authorize the mission.

On Saturday we headed out under Yoni’s command. We trusted in him. We considered him to be an outstanding combat officer and, despite the difference in age and in background, a friend.

He led the force to the terminal and decided - rightly, in most of our opinions - to eliminate the Ugandan guards blocking our path. Yoni led the force to the building, gave the order to charge, spurred the troops on when he noticed a blockage, had the chance to see the first of his operators storming through the door, and charged ahead until he himself was felled.

The story of his abruptly severed life is woven in the story of our lives. We were given the opportunity to return from Entebbe, garlanded in glory. Our lives continued. We matured, formed families, crossed the border of middle age.

Our stories are devoted to him, our commander. May his memory be a blessing.

Operation Yonatan was a multifaceted, long-distance raid conducted on the night of 3-4 July 1976. Forces from the ground, air, and sea took part in the operation, during which passengers from the Air France flight were freed after being taken hostage and brought to Entebbe by members of Wadia Haddad’s organization.

During the planning and execution of the mission it was known as Operation Thunderball, and the name was subsequently changed to Operation Yonatan, in memory of Lt.-Col. Yonatan Netanyahu (may he rest in peace), the commander of the force that liberated the hostages, who fell in battle during the operation.

Excerpted from: Operation Yonatan (Thunderball), Operations Directorate, History Department, IDF, November 1977

INTRODUCTION

Sayeret Matkal’s role in the hostage-rescue operation at Entebbe was to kill the terrorists, neutralize the Ugandan soldiers aiding the terrorists, and free the hostages. We, together with combatants and pilots from the Israel Air Force, troops from the Paratroop and Golani brigades, doctors and medical personnel from the IDF Medical Corps (over 250 soldiers in total), accomplished our mission and returned to Israel, carrying the body of our commander, Yonatan Netanyahu, who was killed in battle. After the funeral, the operators and staff officers and the entire personnel of the Unit returned to the routine of clandestine operational activity; Operation Yonatan - the most dramatic hostage-rescue in history - became just another chapter in our operational record.

Maj. Amiram Levin, who was appointed commander of Sayeret Matkal after Yoni’s death, sent the post-operation report to the IDF General Staff. Amiram began his summation with a single sentence: “All forces accomplished their mission.”

The entire report, including the commander’s summation, is but 14 pages-long. Only 11 of the 65 Sayeret Matkal soldiers sent to Entebbe participated in it, having sent in their written version of events. Looking back across the decades, this is something one can only regret.

Over the years, only the most vociferous voices have been heard, providing differing accounts and generally obscuring what a wealth of voices would have made clear. This volume, a collection of thirty-three first-person accounts, affords freedom of expression to each writer. It gives each individual the choice of deciding what to include, what to exclude, what to underscore. In this it is unique. We have not written a historical account with a single driving narrative; that is why we did not touch the texts submitted to us, aside from copy editing and proofreading. The many accounts and the repetition of certain facts, always from a fresh perspective, allow the reader to follow the trail of preparations, the unfolding of the mission, and to construct his or her own analysis of what took place. He or she must choose what to believe, which version to cling to. And despite all, despite the individual points of view, the discrepancies are not vast.

Yoni Didn’t Write

We’ve asked ourselves what Yoni would have done had he returned from the mission, taken his place behind the commander’s desk, and looked ahead. We have no doubt that he would have conducted a rigorous internal debriefing and given each and every one of the operators and support staff an appropriate platform to speak his mind. That is how an operational review is conducted in the Unit. You get on the stage and you report, without cutting any corners and without burnishing the facts, precisely what occurred from your perspective - to ensure that the lessons are learnt and that, next time around, the troops arrive better prepared. Yoni would have stated his role in the operation and analyzed in detail the process that began with the order he received from Brig.-Gen. Dan Shomron (may he rest in peace), who was - it bears recalling - the commander of Operation Yonatan and the ranking officer on the ground at the airport in Entebbe.

Sayeret Matkal’s soldiers and officers needn’t be reminded of the way in which the Unit’s unique operational activity demands an uncompromising effort in pursuit of perfection. The operation in the south - headed by Yoni until the Thursday before departure - prevented him from being personally involved in the creation of the operational framework; nevertheless, he trusted that the Unit’s officers would do their utmost to ensure that the Unit was given the mission’s central role, which they did. It stands to reason, then, that Yoni would have reported that, on his way back from Beit Ha’tzanchan (the Paratroopers’ House), where he first touched base with his staff officers, he found the troops organized and ready, set to begin planning and preparing for their role in the operation.

He would have thanked his staff and administrators for their work during the preparation stage, praised the operators for their actions, and been unsparing, where necessary, in his operational critique. That is who he was - a combat officer with vast experience, a demanding and precise field commander who threw himself in his entirety into the mission at hand, and led his soldiers from the fore, until he was stopped cold by an enemy bullet.

Most of the people who submitted testimony to this collection recall Yoni’s final briefing on the ground in Sharm el-Sheikh before takeoff; his faith in the Unit’s capabilities, in the justness of the action, the likelihood of the mission being inscribed upon the pages of history. One of the soldiers who submitted an account for this volume even described the personal briefing he received from Yoni after his operational role was changed at the last minute and he was posted to the assault team’s lead squad. Yoni, the commander of the Unit, briefed him personally, along with his squad commander. Before landing, Yoni walked through the crowded plane and shook soldiers’ hands, slapped men on the back, offered encouragement with a glance and a kind word. On the ground, facing the terminal, he spurred the force forward at the critical moment.

We thought that upon return, after the debriefing, which in no way resembled the standard operational debriefings that were conducted in the Unit, and after the elation and exultance at having pulled off the mission, and once we’d internalized (according to the customs of the time) the loss of our commander, there would be nothing left to say.

We were wrong. We found ourselves not just bereft of our commander but also lacking a comprehensive report detailing the Unit’s actions in full. Together we decided that rather than writing yet another book that depicts the single narrative of its author, no matter how esteemed a historian that person may be, we would do well to have the operators who were there, forty-five years ago, put their stories at long last to paper.

And there’s another reason. The world’s reaction to Operation Yonatan - and not just that of the Jewish People, the State of Israel, and the Israel Defense Forces - exceeded and continues to exceed that of similar military missions. The documentary and feature films, the books and countless articles, are testament to this. Additionally, the many items in the media have contributed to the image of the operation as one that was unprecedented, never to be surpassed. It has become synonymous with success and daring.

Not only the operation was made public. The individual stories of several of the soldiers were widely heard. But not all. Not remotely. There were sixty-five operators from Sayeret Matkal on the ground in Entebbe. Many staff officers and hundreds of soldiers back at the base helped with preparations. Their voices have not been heard until now.

This book is being brought into the world for them, the silent voices.

This book is a collection of first-person testimonies written by soldiers who took part in the mission. The Unit’s code, signed by us, the veterans, states that secrets are not to be revealed and the operational activity of the Unit is not to be publicly discussed; this agreement was adhered to during the compilation of the book. The accounts herein include the testimony of three people who did not land at Entebbe. Their written account sheds light on elements that have up until now been shrouded.

Thirty-three soldiers and officers submitted their stories to us (we asked all of the participants to submit their recollections and hope that one day we will be given the opportunity to read their stories,) and we believe that the diversity of perspectives will shed light on the roles played and the actions taken by those who opted not to write.

Not all were given the opportunity to write. Zvi Chibutro, Yoel Tzibulski, Tzachi Fuchs, and Uri Ben Ner have all passed away. May their memories be a blessing.

Let us also remember the hostages who were killed during and after the mission. Jean-Jacques Meimoni, Pasco Cohen, Ida Borochovich, and Dora Bloch, who was in the hospital in Kampala at the time of the mission and was subsequently murdered on orders from Idi Amin.

This is also the space to thank the dozens and hundreds of soldiers and civilians, Africa hands, Mossad combatants, and unnamed people who did their best to ensure the success of the mission and to adequately prepare the soldiers for the task at hand.

Aside from myself, none of the participants are writers. They are not historians or journalists. They are former Sayeret Matkal operators and staff officers, who concluded their service with ranks ranging from staff-sergeant to lieutenant-general (the IDF Chief of Staff), and one former head of the Mossad, all of whom today work in an array of different professions. Many of the accounts are enriched by the crucial and fascinating retrospective that was lacking in the days immediately following the operation. The passage of time and the trajectory of each different life enrich the text and add diversity, and that is why we added a short bio at the end of each account.

The personal accounts appear in chronological order. First, several participants who helped with the planning but were not on the ground in Entebbe: The Unit’s chief intelligence officer, followed by Yoni’s personal secretary, and then a reserves soldier from the Unit, who was working in Kenya at the time. Next are the recollections of the two soldiers in Yoni’s command formation - his radio operator, (who happened to go on to head the Mossad) and the doctor. After them come the testimonies of those who charged into the terminal and fought there, each in order of his actions. Let us not forget that the battle waged by the entry team was curt and compressed, and therefore, though the texts are delivered chronologically, much of the action happened nearly simultaneously. From seventeen different accounts, we receive deeply personal perspectives and a vivid collective portrait.

One account details the actions of the Land Rover and Mercedes drivers; these operators drove the assault team to the terminal, provided suppressive fire at the control tower and prevented the enemy from mowing down our forces from above, before driving the hostages and the assault team back to the waiting planes.

Finally, we have the accounts of the soldiers on the armored personnel carriers. Their role was to create a perimeter around the old terminal, to make sure that the Ugandan army was not able to intervene, and to destroy the Ugandan planes on the ground. The twelve accounts detail that force’s actions and include the recollections of the last soldier to board the final homeward-bound plane.

Secrecy and security. After the mission we returned to the blessed anonymity of the Unit and there was hardly a one of us who thought about revealing his experiences during this and other missions. We believe that the Unit’s actions ought to remain in the shadows and not the limelight, and, in the past, have felt that even the Unit’s very existence was best left unstated. But after over forty years and ample deliberations, we’ve reached the conclusion that actually there are some things that are best left said. For example, delving into the details of the operation in Entebbe, in pursuit of truth.

Operation Yonatan exceeds all that we have known. It is the most famous rescue operation in the world and our soldiers and others lecture about it regularly, and factually we are not revealing anything that has not yet been revealed. We are instead offering the first-person testimonies upon which the books were based, the movies made, the analyses written -the unfiltered perspective of those who took part. We hope that this diversity of voices, each independently written, will fix, in the historical record, that which needs fixing.

We’ve done our thing. We’ve written our truth. Thirty-five truths. We hope that the readers will reach the same conclusion that we have: we took part in a bold mission that encompasses the very essence of Zionism. We succeeded. There’s enough fame to go around. For us too.

Who dares wins.

In the name of the editors: Yiftach Reicher-Atir Brig. Gen. (ret.)

Deputy commander of Sayeret Matkal at the time of the mission, commander of the entry force assigned to the Ugandan soldiers’ hall.

1

Staff Officers and NCOs

Authors:

Avi Weiss (Livne)

Yael Zangen Taterka

Michael Aaronson

Captain Avi Weiss (Livne), Sayeret Matkal Intelligence Officer

Unit Intelligence Officer for Operation Yonatan

* * *

Avi’s Story

Background

Several days before the Yom Kippur War, I, a young officer, was sent to the Suez Canal to compile the reconnaissance reports from the southern sector. I set up camp at an outpost called Mefatzeach. During the days before the war, we relayed multiple reports about Egyptian Army actions, which, to my dismay, were not treated appropriately, to say the least; in fact, they were ignored! The Yom Kippur War came and I - like all of Israel - greeted its onset with complete surprise as the roar of the jets and the artillery violated the serenity that had preceded it. After three days of war, our ammunition ran out and all of the soldiers stationed at the outpost surrendered and submitted to captivity. The forty days I spent in Egyptian captivity were for me a foundational period in my life, and upon returning to Israel I realized the severity of the national intelligence failure to which I had been part.

After a period of rehabilitation, I requested to return to the Sinai as an intelligence officer and was posted as the 401st Armored Brigade’s intel officer, serving under brigade commander Ehud Barak. The decision to return to the Sinai and serve there was, among other things, rooted in my desire to contribute to the revival of the intelligence corps’ image, and to lend a hand, so as to ensure that the disgrace of the Yom Kippur War, from an intelligence perspective, would not recur.

Brigade commander Barak demanded, from the start, a high professional level. I would later learn that his intelligence expectations - the height of the bar - were in accordance with the norms of the Unit. In the spring of 1975, he summoned me to his office. “I’ve decided that it’s important that you be transferred,” he said. “Your next post is as intel officer for Sayeret Matkal. You can pack your things and report for duty at Sayeret Matkal.”

Surprised on the one hand and pleased on the other, I reported for duty with no preparation whatsoever. That is how I arrived at the covert unit, which I had hardly heard of beforehand. I showed up at the base during the transition period between the command of Giora Zorea and Yoni Netanyahu. It worked out, then, that I accompanied Yoni from his first day as commander of the Unit. Only with the passing of the years did I realize what a major impact my service in Sayeret Matkal had on the course of my life, and how lucky I was to have been a partner to one of the more significant episodes in the history of the State of Israel.

Quickly upon arrival, I discovered that whatever I had done up to that point, whatever I had learnt, was unlike what was expected of me in the Unit. The commander’s demands were higher, the concepts were utterly new, the professionalism was at another plain altogether. The time given me for acclimation was short, the grace period nonexistent.

* * *

Sunday 06.27.76 - roughly a year after Yoni had taken the reins - started as just another week of operational activity, this time down in the Sinai. Yoni and some of the Unit’s staff, along with a group of operators, headed down to the Sinai for a week of operational action. Already on the way south we received word of the hijacking of an Air France flight, en route from Athens to Paris. Later in the day the plane was reported to have landed in Libya and, after a short layover there, to have continued south to the airport at Entebbe in Uganda. According to Unit protocol, the operators on base remained on alert for the eventuality that the plane would circle back and land at Lod. But as soon as the plane touched down at Entebbe, some 4,000 kilometers from Israel’s border, the state of readiness was called off, the assumption being that we’d done our part and that, from here on in, the matter was in the hands of the politicians, who would commence with negotiations.

On Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday - while engaged in operational action in the Sinai - we followed the developments, like all of Israel, and received updates from Muki Betser (who was on the base) to Yoni (who was in the Sinai) regarding the IDF General Staff discussions on the various hostage-rescue options.

The reports that reached us, regarding the IDF’s plans to carry out a mission beyond the mountains of darkness, brought smiles to our lips and at times sparked outright derision.

Comment: By this point the Unit had acquired vast experience with hostage-rescue operations in Israel, including the Savoy Hotel, Ma’alot, Sabena Airlines and more. However, Israel had carried out no such operation beyond its borders, and the implications of that were significant.

On Thursday, 07.01.76, early in the morning, once the operational activity had come to a close, we hustled back in Yoni’s car, driving from the Sinai to the base in 6-7 hours. The previous evening Yoni and Muki had agreed that, immediately upon return to the base, we would get our things together and head out to Beit Ha’tzanchan for a meeting with Brig.-Gen. Dan Shomron, where the various IDF operational plans, already under consideration, would be presented to us. I got ready quickly and set out for the scheduled meeting with Yoni and several staff officers. There I met Muki Betser, who had, up until that point, been the Unit’s representative in all Chief Paratroop and Infantry Officer and General Staff forums. Dan Shomron, at this stage, presented to us the two central ideas that had been considered thus far.

A) Parachuting a force into Lake Victoria, from which it would reach the shore and launch an assault on the terminal in Entebbe, freeing the hostages and taking them, by (commandeered) vehicle overland to Kenya.

B) A large military force, arriving on eight Hercules C-130s, would seize control of the airport, free the hostages, and fly them back to Israel.

At this stage, at least as far as I was concerned, these ideas seemed to me to be on the cusp of the surreal, and I was in doubt as to whether the options were even operationally feasible. At the close of the meeting, Dan Shomron charged the Unit with planning the assault on the old terminal at Entebbe and rescuing the hostages therein. We were not surprised by Dan Shomron’s decision to assign the mission to the Unit, as Sayeret Matkal had, by then, amassed plenty of experience in hostage-rescue scenarios. Toward evening, upon arrival back at the base, an initial meeting was convened in Yoni’s office. The following people were present: Yoni, Muki Betser, Ehud Barak, Avraham Arnan (the founder of the Unit), and Avi the intel officer (me).

Comment: By Wednesday evening, once the foreign hostages had been freed and flown to Paris, we learned that, in Entebbe, the hostages had been taken off the plane and led to the old terminal, where they were put through a selection, separating the Israelis from the rest of the passengers. This incident, reminiscent of the Holocaust, brought home the significance of the term selection in the historic memory of the Jews.

From open sources (news and TV) we learnt that Idi Amin himself had paid a visit to the hostages in the old terminal. Additionally, we received information regarding the release of the remaining foreign passengers on Thursday morning, at which point they were flown to Paris. In light of this information it was decided to dispatch Amiram Levin to the French capital to question the released hostages, as per a prioritized set of intelligence requirements.

Significantly, we learned that Idi Amin and the hijackers were collaborating with one another and that dozens or perhaps hundreds of Ugandan troops were deployed to guard the old terminal.

During the first part of the meeting, Muki, the Unit representative earlier in the week, updated the forum in a detailed fashion about the discussions and ideas that had surfaced in and around the General Staff during the previous days, where they had sought an acceptable operational format, and not yet a detailed plan. During the second half of the meeting, Yoni, knowing that Muki had spent years in Uganda training the Ugandan armed forces, asked Muki for a tour d’horizon of the country and its army, and insight into the conduct and leadership of Idi Amin. During the third part of that meeting we discussed how to surprise the terrorists and the Ugandan troops. The matter of surprise is central and deeply significant to a mission of this sort; it has a decisive influence on the chances of success and a lack thereof.

Aware that Idi Amin had personally come to visit the hostages in his presidential vehicle (a Mercedes), we discussed the idea of using a similar vehicle to lead the convoy of operators from the aircraft to the terminal. Our initial premise was that traveling in this way would enable a ‘quiet’ arrival at the terminal, using to our advantage the guards’ hesitancy to open fire. Muki provided detail on the sort of Mercedes used by Amin, including the Ugandan flag ornaments typically resting on the front of the hood. TV footage helped us fill in the rest of the blanks. During the course of the meeting we were informed that the General Staff and the Chief Paratroop and Infantry Officer had determined the IDF force structure for the mission: four Hercules aircraft and a specified number of operators from the Unit along with a maximum number of vehicles.

Yoni, in summation, instructed the relevant staff officers to procure a black Mercedes sedan and tasked the intel officer (me) with, among other things, the job of making a Ugandan flag that could flutter on the hood of the Mercedes. Once the room was cleared, Yoni called in some of the staff officers and team leaders.

As the intelligence officer of the Unit, I presented there for the first time an architectural sketch of the old terminal. Amnon Manki, Muki’s intelligence officer, had given it to me. The sketch had been made by Military Intelligence Directorate personnel, who’d used old photos and video footage that had poured in from private individuals and Israeli army officers who had been stationed in Uganda during the heyday of the Israel-Uganda relationship.

On the basis of that sketch and the additional information that had come in, we began to discuss and form an operational plan, and to delineate forces and objectives.

During that meeting Yoni determined the force formation as based on the primary objectives:

A) Five strike squads, delivered to the terminal by vehicle, to storm through the four entrances and to secure the halls and the second floor, where the Ugandan soldiers were housed.

B) A vehicular force to provide perimeter security around the old terminal, preventing the arrival of backup.

C) A Mercedes sedan to lead the strike force convoy.

D) A command-and-control squad led by Yoni.

E) A suppressive fire force to zero in on the control tower alongside the terminal.

During the meeting, Yoni debated which teams ought to take part in the mission. On the one hand, it was important to take veteran troops with ample experience; on the other, some of those operators were slated to participate in a pending mission of great importance.

Furthermore, in keeping with Unit tradition - everyone wanted in and no one was willing to relent. As is common, and again happened here - the rumors reached the ears of the reserves operators and they began calling Yoni and staff officers and demanding to be included in the operational roster. By Thursday night (at around midnight), and in the wake of internal “battles” between the team leaders and groups of reservists in the know, Yoni finalized the list of participants for the mission.

The staff and team leaders dispersed and Yoni remained secluded in his office late into the night, thoroughly planning the operation in his typical way, writing down in his notebook all the gaps that still needed to be bridged and the operational points that still needed to be underscored. Staff officers came in every now and again with an update or a request for further instructions.

I - as the intel officer - tried via military intelligence and the Chief Paratroop and Infantry Officer to attain further information regarding the terminal and its surroundings. In the meanwhile, I acquired an atlas and familiarized myself with the pattern and colors of the Ugandan flag. The staff in our bureau, using a bed sheet taken from one of the rooms, started sewing it together.

From that moment until Friday morning - the staff personnel, the team leaders, and the operators, all focused on their respective assignments.

During the night on Thursday - Yoni sent word that at 08:00 on Friday morning there would be a formal, force-wide briefing for all mission participants.

Comment: It bears noting that, from the Thursday meeting with Dan Shomron, in which the Unit was effectively assigned the hostage-rescue mission, until the Friday morning briefing, the Unit, under Yoni’s leadership, and by the force of his personal example and his devotion to the goal and belief in the righteousness of the mission, managed to present a detailed operational plan - this in the span of 12 hours. From my perspective, that is a noteworthy achievement.

On Friday morning - at around 08:00 - the entire force was briefed, in a formal and organized manner, on the operational plan.

As is customary, after an introduction by Yoni, I gave a detailed intelligence snapshot of the target. The data at my disposal that morning included, among other things:

A) An architectural sketch prepared by the Military Intelligence Directorate on the basis of photos and video footage.

B) Partial information, still incoherent and unorganized, relayed to us from Paris on the basis of an initial questioning of the released hostages.

First, I presented a 1:500,000 scale map of Uganda and its neighboring countries and began the briefing by stating the country’s geographic location. From there I segued into the surrounding countries, and provided some facts about the Ugandan armed forces. All of this was information that I’d managed to glean during the previous night. Carrying on, I presented the contours of the terminal on the basis of the sketch and conveyed that there were reportedly ten armed terrorists and dozens, or perhaps hundreds, of Ugandan soldiers ringing the perimeter of the terminal; furthermore, explosive devices had allegedly been placed within the terminal where the hostages were being held.

Comment: In this type of operation the majority of the operable intelligence is collected on-site, in real time, as the troops prepare for action; this is done by the intel officer and the troops on hand and the timing of the counter-strike is based on this real-time information. It was clear to me that in this case, based on the conditions on the ground, that would be impossible. This served to underscore one of the primary weak points of the operation: the lack of constant contact with the target area. A consequence of that given situation was our inability to monitor the actions and changes on the ground, which could prove critical to the success of the mission and to our ability to mitigate casualties among our forces.

In light of this, I felt uncomfortable - to put it mildly - with our intelligence picture of the terminal. The physical details were based on old materials and the snapshot of the situation on the ground was far from complete. At the close of the intelligence presentation, the other staff personnel presented their relevant areas of expertise and Yoni summed up. As soon as the briefing was over, I rode with other staff officers to the Chief Paratroop and Infantry Officer’s central bureau in Ramla, where formal operational orders were issued. Brig.-Gen. Dan Shomron presented the general outline of the operation and introduced the forces taking part in it. After his address, an Israel Air Force representative presented the IAF’s role in the mission, followed by Golani and Paratroop Brigade officers, whose role was revealed to us for the first time.

At the same time, Yoni was summoned urgently to IDF headquarters in Tel Aviv for a meeting with the IDF Chief of Staff and the Defense Minister. They wanted to hear directly from him about the Unit’s readiness for such a mission and his opinion regarding its feasibility. Yoni expressed to them his feeling that the mission could be accomplished and that the Unit was fully equipped to pull it off successfully. There’s no doubt that Yoni’s stance was important to the decision-makers and helped the leaders form a positive opinion of the mission.

After receiving our operational orders, we returned to the base, which hummed like a swarm of bees. Inside, staff officers and force commanders were running around, acquiring the necessary gear and preparing for the mission; outside, the other forces, the troops from the Golani and Paratroop Brigades, gathered for briefings and simulations in advance of the mission. During the day on Friday, information continued to trickle in from Israelis who had spent time in Uganda. This information was amassed by Amnon Biran, the Chief Paratroop and Infantry Officer’s intelligence officer. It consisted mostly of photos and old videos collected by intel officers of various army units.

Up until that point - due to security clearance restrictions - the Unit’s base was closed to all military and other personnel not directly affiliated with the Unit. But on that Friday, each time new information arrived, be it photos or films, the rumor circulated, the gates to the base were opened, and we all huddled in one of the rooms to study the incoming material. Personnel quartered in a neighboring base came freely in and out of the Unit gates.

On Friday evening, after a tense waiting period, Amiram Levin, who’d flown to Paris to interview the released foreign hostages, sent a detailed and updated intelligence dossier. In effect, this was the only current report we had, and it included crucial details that assisted us in buttressing the plan.

Comment: It should be noted that this dossier was current as of Thursday morning, the day that the foreign hostages were released and flown out of Uganda. In essence, it was the first and last updated report that we had at our disposal until the H-hour for departure. It was clear that the chances of receiving additional information, covering the period between Thursday and Saturday night - when the mission was to be launched - were slim to none. The meaning of this was that we were going to embark on a mission with a three-day gap in intelligence, wherein we had no chance of receiving updates about the hostages and the activity around the terminal in Entebbe. All this in a dynamic operation in which the variables are in constant motion. Accordingly, we had to hope there would be scant changes on the ground and, at the same time, be ready for changes that we had not foreseen.

The dossier’s main points were as follows:

A) Further information about the old terminal, which, luckily, largely supported the information we had already gleaned from the sketch. The Amiram Levin dossier confirmed that there was no need for a rehaul of the plan, but merely refinements.

B) The Israelis were being held in the large hall in the old terminal.

C) The Israelis were being guarded by approximately ten terrorists armed with personal firearms.

D) Ugandan army personnel were cooperating with the terrorists, and 50-100 soldiers were deployed in and around the old terminal.

E) The dossier refuted the information about the passenger hall being booby-trapped with explosive devices.

Upon receiving the dossier, I reported to Yoni’s office and he called in the relevant personnel and the force leaders. Together we went over the report. The dossier did not necessitate changes to the plan, but rather pointers that were given by Yoni. At the close of that meeting, I felt a degree of relief in light of the fact that the old information, upon which we had based our planning, largely dovetailed with the reality on the ground. Our central concern revolved around the dozens of Ugandan soldiers stationed at the terminal, and the understanding that their positioning and number could change by the time we arrived.

In effect, after receiving Amiram’s dossier, I finished the intelligence planning in advance of the operation. There was little chance of receiving additional updated material and I understood that, with the information we had at our disposal, the troops would depart for Entebbe.

Comment: There can be no doubt that the information made available to me and placed at the disposal of the operational forces during the planning stage was far from the customary high standard of the Unit. That said, it was clear we were operating under pressure applied by the terrorists and the ultimatum they had issued. Therefore, throughout the planning stage I felt that I was not able to provide the operational force with the high quality, up-to-date intelligence so fundamentally necessary for the success of such a mission; information that is inextricably linked to the minimization, if possible, of casualties. Truly, Amiram Levin’s dossier lightened that feeling, but the fact remained that there was a three-day window between Amiram’s report and the date of the operation, which, in this sort of an operation, created an unacceptable intelligence gap. When I expressed these feelings to Yoni he noted, in a soothing manner, that when all was said and done, we would be the superior force in the field and we’d know how to address whatever events and surprises came our way.

At this stage there was a brief intermezzo, and for the first time I was able to take a moment and consider what I’d done in the past two days, the events I’d been partner to, and to consider if, what had seemed to us, several days ago, to be nearly imaginary, would become reality. I admit that even at this stage, with all of us awaiting the government’s decision, I was very much in doubt about the mission being authorized.

On Friday evening, after completing the model drill, the feeling among some of the force commanders and operators was that the operation, with all of its many variables, carried a risk factor that was unacceptably high. In light of this sentiment, which reached the ears of the Unit commander, a meeting was called for all force commanders at 08:00 on Saturday morning, in the Unit’s memorial room.

Saturday, 08:00

At the meeting, some of the force commanders raised qualms about the risks inherent in the mission. They made plain their feelings about the degree of readiness for such a mission, the acceptable threat level, and the existing information gaps. All were well below the norm in the Unit. Yoni listened carefully to what the commanders had to say, and though he agreed with some of their points, he addressed the underlying significance of the mission. He emphasized the importance of carrying out this mission, and his faith that, despite the unknowns, and despite the fact that the preparations were beneath Unit standards of readiness, the risk was reasonable and the chances of success were high; come what may, he said, we would be the superior force in the terminal at Entebbe. Hovering above all of the participants at the meeting (including Yoni) was the history-stained vision of Israelis/Jews being separated from the pack and executed. This feeling, and the fact that the terrorists’ final ultimatum was to expire on Sunday afternoon, at which point the first round of executions was to begin, fortified the feeling and the belief that this was far more than just another run of the mill operation. Raising the bar on risk, therefore, was justified. The commanders left the meeting strengthened and full of faith.

Comment: I’d like to highlight that this complex operation was prepared in a mere 36 hours. From Thursday evening, when the Unit was given its directives, till Saturday, when the planes took off. For that, all who took part in the planning of the mission are worthy of special appreciation.

At nine in the morning, I drove with Yoni in his Rom Carmel car to the Lod Airbase, where there was to be a final briefing before departure. On the way we talked about the mission, and I felt that Yoni was confident, determined, and very much aware of the significance of the success of this mission. In the squadron’s briefing room there was a final briefing for the commanders while the soldiers loaded the gear and the vehicles onto the planes. During the course of the briefing we expected to receive word of authorization of the mission from the political echelon, yet confirmation was slow in coming. The military leadership, therefore, decided to depart without authorization, making a pitstop in Sharm el-Sheikh, in hopes that, in the interim, the long-awaited authorization would be given.

I left the squadron briefing room with Yoni and accompanied him to his car. He withdrew his battle vest and personal gear; we parted with a handshake, a slap on the back, and I wished him luck. While standing there outside Yoni’s car, with the roar of the plane engines in our ears, a representative of the Chief Paratroop and Intelligence Officer’s bureau arrived with new photos taken by a Mossad combatant. I snatched the photos and ran toward the runway, where the Hercules C-130s, some of which had already taken off, were waiting. I managed to flag down the last of the planes, which was already in motion. It stopped, and the door opened. I threw the photos in and asked that they be given to Yoni upon arrival at Sharm al-Sheikh. Those photos, taken by a Mossad combatant who had flown from Kenya to Entebbe in a light aircraft and then circled overhead and landed at the airport before finally departing, were the first and last up-to-date photos that we had at our disposal in advance of the operation.

The photos were given to Yoni in Sharm and distributed among the operators for study and reflection. There’s no doubt that those photos, even though they were delivered as is, with no intelligence processing, greatly improved the operators’ feelings about the mission. Afterwards I drove Yoni’s car back to the base, to the quiet in the eye of the storm. I received word that the political echelon had authorized the mission and that all systems were go. Additionally, I was told that Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s main concern, in weighing whether or not to authorize the mission, had revolved around the number of Ugandan troops stationed at the airfield. The information we initially had at our disposal, put the number at dozens to hundreds of Ugandan soldiers.

The Mossad man, besides managing to photograph the airfield and deliver up-to-date photos, reported seeing only dozens of Ugandan soldiers around the old terminal. That information, along with the similar report relayed by Amiram Levin from Paris, held considerable weight in Prime Minister Rabin’s decision to authorize the mission.

On Saturday night I drove to the IDF headquarters in Tel Aviv, where there was a command-and-control room that operated alongside the airborne war room run by Deputy IDF Chief of Staff Kuti Adam. I need not detail the excitement in the room as the planes landed at Entebbe, the tension and the anticipation, the relief we all felt with word of the last plane lifting off. I returned to the base and, finally, after three days with hardly any sleep, went to bed.

On Sunday at 05:00 I was woken by the ring of the phone (I don’t remember who was on the other end of the line) and informed that Yoni, the commander of the Unit, had been killed during the operation. The satisfaction that had coursed through me since the last of the planes had taken off from Entebbe, curdled at once into sorrow and deep pain over the loss of my esteemed, brave, and daring commander, Yoni.

Epilogue

I cannot complete this story without a personal note about Yoni, the man and the commander. It was a great privilege to serve under him as his intel officer. Despite his introverted nature, we forged ties of mutual trust, appreciation, and friendship. I got to know a man and an officer for whom the love of the land and the fate of its people were always a guiding light.

Our intense year of work together was a continuum of days and nights, one-on-one meetings and plans and war rooms and more…and what we weren’t able to accomplish in six days of work we routinely finished on Shabbat at Yoni’s house in Ramat HaSharon.

During this period Yoni led the Unit on groundbreaking operations that continued to contribute significantly to the security of the State of Israel for many years after his death. Getting to know Yoni during this year exposed me to the eclectic nature of his personality. On one hand - a brave commander, level-headed and daring, a thorough professional who knew how to make a decision. And on the other hand - a lover of the written word, who utilized every pause in the action to read a few more pages in his book or write a few more lines in his notebook. These characteristics came to the fore during the lead up to Operation Entebbe, both within the Unit and beyond. Despite the doubts about the ability to implement the mission, Yoni, from Thursday evening on, harnessed himself with great determination to the mission and towed the staff and the operators behind him.

Yoni organized all stages of mission planning. He assigned staff and commanders and personally built the roster of operators filling the ranks. With the passing of the hours, I felt his faith in the feasibility of the mission grow.

Beyond that - in his meeting with the Chief of Staff and the Defense Minister, Yoni projected great confidence in the Unit’s ability to carry out the mission. His firm and level-headed position carried a lot of weight with the political leadership in their eventual decision to authorize the mission. I appreciated and valued Yoni. His death left me with a wound that to this day has not healed.

Personally, I feel, even today, some forty-five years after the fact, that I was lucky to have lent a hand in one of the most significant episodes that the State of Israel has ever had to face.

* * *

Maj. (res) Avi (Weiss) Livne is from Moshav Kerem Maharal; during the Yom Kippur War he served as an intelligence officer at the Mefatzeach outpost along the Suez Canal and was taken captive by Egyptian armed forces. Upon return from captivity, he returned to the IDF and to the Sinai as the intelligence officer of the 401st Armored Brigade under the command of Ehud Barak. From 1975-1979 he served as the intelligence officer of Sayeret Matkal, under the command of Yoni Netanyahu (may he rest in peace), Amiram Levin, and Nehemiah Tamari (may he rest in peace). He was discharged from the IDF in 1979 and began to work for the Mossad, where he served for more than two decades, rising to the rank of deputy department head before retiring in 2002.

Sgt. Yael Zangen Taterka

Administrative Bureau Chief to Unit Commander Yoni Netanyahu

* * *

Yael’s Story

The commander’s bureau, the nerve center of the Unit, was run by Eilat Kantor and me, two of around five or six female soldiers on the base. We were not a “team.” The ties between us were not tight. Each of us came to her post in a different way. I was not the “daughter of” nor the “sister of” anyone…no family ties nor friends in high places brought me to the Unit. I started my army service in the IDF Operations Directorate (in “the Pit”) as a bureau clerk in the office of Moshe “Moishe-and-a-half” Levi, the commander of the directorate. After a year of service, I felt I wanted a change and I made contact with the Unit. Right around then they were looking for an administrative bureau chief and that’s how I transferred to the Unit. I must say that it’s a bit difficult for me to dredge up memories from this period. I’ve never examined my memories from then, and yet the impressions remain powerful, likely never to be forgotten.

Before the hijacking there was a rather intense period of general and specific assignments, the usual grind of operational activity. An intense period of plans, actions, preparations, model simulation drills. Around one week before the hijacking I returned from a pre-discharge trip to Sinai with one of the teams.

After the hijacking, our role as bureau directors didn’t notably change. During the preparation and planning stage of the mission we wrote up gear lists, made schedules, did intense office work into the wee hours of the night. The soldiers conducted model drills all through the day and night. Afterwards, once they were done training, meetings were held in the bureau: discussions, conclusions, future plans. A string of nights with no sleep and intense work. Officers of all rank and from all branches of the armed services milled around the base, along with enlisted soldiers and reservists and others involved in the planning and organizing of the mission.

The sensation was that something major was afoot. I recall that one of the people very much involved in the planning was Muki Betser, who had knowledge of Uganda and of the airport. We, the girls, worked really hard. I don’t remember anyone talking to us, or inviting us to a meeting or explaining the ongoing activity or the possible future scenarios. Dr. Arik Shalev was a reservist in the Unit. One night, shortly before the mission, he invited me to join him on the rooftop of one of the hangars. From up there we watched the preparations. Only then did the nickel drop.

On Saturday, before takeoff to Entebbe and before leaving the bureau, Yoni called me in. As usual, he was taciturn and task-oriented. I can’t really remember the words that were said, but the feeling I got from him was that we were headed towards a large mission. Alongside his confidence in the planning and preparations, there was the unspoken understanding that something could go wrong. A single picture stands clear and sharp in my memory: in Yoni’s office, on his desk, there was a copy of Alistair MacLean’s novel The Way to Dusty Death. I have no idea what happened to that book. I can’t remember.

The soldiers left the base and took off for Sharm. Those who remained behind were on edge about whether the mission would be authorized, and concerned and scared about the results. The tension was hard to bear. The soldiers that stayed behind on the base were also tormented with a feeling of having missed out. Some walked around “in mourning, heads covered” and tried to come to terms with their exclusion. Looking to change the mood a bit, I went with one of the other girls to my parents’ house in Hod HaSharon. A hot shower and a good meal soothed us a bit. A short while later we returned to the base. We, the girls, did not talk amongst ourselves about what was happening.

On Saturday, once the prime minister’s authorization had been given, the forces took off from Sharm and embarked on the mission. Avi Weiss offered me a ride to the Operations Directorate, to “the Pit,” a place I knew well from my previous post, to follow the mission from there. We arrived and found vigorous activity and tension in the air, but also a lot of hugging and mutual support. We were there till very late. We returned to the Unit and grabbed a few hours of sleep.

Only on Sunday morning did I learn that Yoni had been killed. Amiram Levin replaced Yoni immediately. He arrived at the bureau in the morning. It was a strange sensation. We waited for the arrival of the troops. Mixed feelings. A euphoric happiness for the success of the mission, mixed with sadness over Yoni having fallen. But there was no choice. We knew that life goes on, and that we had to get back to routine. Around the world and around Israel, among the families and friends of the operators - celebrations; on the news, on TV, in get-togethers and all around. Word was that there were cakes and other goodies left at the gates to the base. The world rejoiced. Only we were sad and marked by loss. I don’t remember anyone gathering us, the female soldiers, to speak, to listen, to process our feelings. Each of us was left with her own baggage. If my memory serves, the first funeral I ever attended in my life was that of Yoni Netanyahu. Even at that stage there was no preparation of any sort besides technical! The only warm embraces were given by officers and others not from the Unit. In the Unit, emotions are shielded.

The Shiva visit at the Netanyahu family home was difficult. The meeting with Bruria, Yoni’s girlfriend, was powerful and significant. Bruria asked me to come with her and speak in private. The only available room - the bathroom. I was afraid…I wondered: what is it that she wants? What sort of answers can I provide? And then Bruria put me in front of the mirror and asked: “What do you see in the mirror?” I replied: “Myself.” And she asked that I look again, and tell her: “Is this what a twenty-year-old girl looks like? Is there anyone looking out for you, for all of you, the girls? Is there someone around to help you cope, to talk with you and take care of you?” I didn’t let my guard down. I replied: “Everything’s fine!” After all, in the Unit, emotions are not to be revealed. Those questions have endured. They’ve stayed with me all these years. I hope it is no longer like that in the army today. For several more months Yoni’s driver and I stayed in touch with Bruria.

Personally, this was one of the more significant events of my life. For more than ten years after my discharge from the military, I veiled my service in the Unit and the fact that I had been administrative bureau chief to Yoni Netanyahu. I wanted to be appreciated for who I was and not for a certain role I’d filled. I’m grateful for the opportunity to put these thoughts to paper and to process them.

* * *

Sgt. (res) Yael Tsengen Tatarka was born and raised in Hod HaSharon. For 22 years she lived in Kibbutz Givat Haim Ichud. She is a mother to a wonderful daughter and son.

Staff-Sgt. Michael Aaronson, Operator Shai-Sussmann Squad

Newly Discharged; Military Instructor in Kenya During the Mission

* * *

Behind the Scenes of Operation Yonatan

In early 1976 the Israeli intelligence community learned of a plot to attack an El-Al airplane at Nairobi’s international airport. The Kenyan authorities arrested the Black September terror cell in advance of the attack and covertly turned the terrorists over to Israel. In return, the Kenyan government asked Israel to establish, train, and arm an anti-terror unit that could serve as President Jomo Kenyatta’s presidential guard force. Israeli authorities offered this assignment, as a bonus, to officers from the Unit at the end of their service.

A Mossad unit was chosen to run the operation and four officers from the Unit were selected as candidates for the mission: Shai Avital, the commander of the delegation; Amnon Peled, Yochai Yazdi (Rotem), and Rami Sherman. Three kibbutzniks and one moshavnik. The Mossad officers inquired: who among this group spoke English well. Well? None of them. They instructed Shai to find someone who had a strong command of the language. Shai asked Dani Avnon, but he had a prior obligation. Then he turned to me, as someone who was born in London and was presumably well acquainted with this “strange” language. I agreed immediately. It was decided that as a first stage Shai and I would depart for Kenya and establish a commanders’ course for the presidential guard officers. Later, Amnon and Yochai would join us and together we’d train the entire unit. The task would take four more months, with the final two weeks devoted to anti-terror skills.

The following day we were summoned to a meeting with the Mossad officers in charge of the project, including the commander of that geographic region (Nahum Admoni, who would later go on to head the spy agency). Much of the details relating to our stay in Kenya were decided at that meeting, including the type of gear we would be traveling with, and, no less importantly, the decision that, during the second part of the course, once the rest of the guys had showed up eight weeks later, our girlfriends would be allowed to join us.