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European Integration in Times of Security Challenges E-Book

Andreas Kellerhals

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The European Commission’s “Enlargement Package 2023” proposed opening accession negotiations with Ukraine, Moldova, and Bosnia and Herzegovina while granting candidate status to Georgia, bringing the total to seven candidate states and two potential candidates. Ensuring compliance with the Copenhagen criteria remains a key challenge, alongside necessary institutional reforms, particularly regarding EU decision-making and unanimity rules. In migration policy, the adoption of the “New Pact on Migration and Asylum” in December 2023 marked a major step toward a unified approach. Based on solidarity, shared responsibility, and human rights, it aims to improve long-term migration management, though implementation remains a challenge. Meanwhile, the EU continues to navigate its digital and green transitions. A milestone in 2023 was the adoption of the world’s first legal framework for AI regulation, reflecting the EU’s ambition to set global standards, though its impact on the digital economy remains uncertain. This publication explores these key developments, highlighting the interplay between policy-making and societal engagement in a shifting geopolitical landscape. It features contributions from Fatlum Ademi, Jelena Ceranic Perisic, Viorel Cibotaru, Iris Goldner Lang, Christos V. Gortsos, Gabor Halmai, Dorian Jano, Andreas Kellerhals, Maroje Lang, Lee McGowan, Roman Petrov, Carla Portela, and Juan Santos Vara. Network Europe was founded in 2003 by the Europa Institute at the University of Zurich with support from the Swiss government. It serves as a forum for scholarly exchange on legal and political aspects of European integration, bringing together researchers from across Europe.

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European Integration in Times of Security Challenges Copyright © by Tobias Baumgartner; Andreas Kellerhals; and Fatlum Ademi is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License, except where otherwise noted.

© 2025 – CC BY-NC-ND (Book), CC-BY-SA (Text)

Editors: Prof. Dr. Andreas Kellerhals, Dr. Tobias Baumgartner, Fatlum Ademi – Europa Institut an der Universität ZürichPublisher: EIZ Publishing (https://eizpublishing.ch)Layout & Production: buch & netz (https://buchundnetz.com)ISBN:978-3-03805-784-0 (Print – Softcover)978-3-03805-785-7 (PDF)978-3-03805-786-4 (ePub)DOI: https://doi.org/10.36862/eiz-784Version: 1.01 – 20250310

This work is available in print and various digital formats in OpenAccess. Additional information is available at: https://eizpublishing.ch/publikationen/european-integration-in-times-of-security-​challenges/.

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Preface

This publication comprises the contributions presented at the 15th Network Europe Conference, held in Split, Croatia, in September 2024. The conference addressed various challenges facing the European integration process in light of current global developments, as well as aspects of the EU’s enlargement perspectives.

The European Commission’s Enlargement Package for 2023 proposed opening accession negotiations with Ukraine, Moldova, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, while also granting candidate status to Georgia. As a result, the EU now has seven candidate states and two potential candidate countries. In this context, the EU must ensure that accession requirements are met in accordance with the Copenhagen criteria. Another round of enlargement also necessitates institutional reforms, including adjustments to the composition of EU institutions and the requirement for unanimity in decision-making. The Conference on the Future of Europe (2022–2023) provided significant impetus for such reforms, with strong involvement from civil society.

In the realm of migration policy, notable progress has been made. The New Pact on Migration and Asylum, adopted in December 2023, represents a landmark initiative aimed at normalizing and managing migration in the long term. Anchored in principles of solidarity, shared responsibility, and human rights, the agreement aspires to establish a coherent and unified approach to migration and asylum across member states. Meanwhile, the EU continues to navigate the complexities of its twin digital and green transitions, with debates often reflecting the diverse interests of its members.

Another significant milestone in 2023 was the adoption of the world’s first legal framework regulating artificial intelligence, underscoring the EU’s ambition to set global standards. However, questions remain regarding its implementation and its implications for the digital economy, leaving room for further deliberation and adjustment.

Against this backdrop, the contributions in this publication address various crucial topics. In retrospect, the developments discussed during the conference have gained even greater significance. They highlight the dynamic interplay between policy-making and societal engagement and underscore the EU’s ongoing efforts to balance its ambitious goals with the practical challenges of governance in a geopolitically shifting world.

Zurich, Febraury 2025 Prof. Dr. Andreas Kellerhals Dr. Tobias Baumgartner MLaw, Fatlum Ademi

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Authors/Editors

Ademi Fatlum, MLaw, Europa Institute at the University of Zurich, Switzerland

Baumgartner Tobias, Dr., LL.M., Deputy Director, Europa Institute at the University of Zurich, Switzerland

Ceranic Perisic Jelena, Prof. Dr., Director of the Institute for Comparative Law of Belgrade, Serbia

Cibotaru Viorel, Ambassador of the Republic of Moldova to the Kingdom of Belgium and Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Head of Mission to NATO, Belgium, Former Director of the European Institute for Political Studies in Moldova, Moldova

Goldner Lang Iris, Prof. Dr., Professor at the University of Zagreb, Croatia

Gortsos Christos V., Prof. Dr., Professor of Public Economic and European Union Law, Law School of the National and Kapodistrian, Greece

Halmai Gabor, Prof. Dr. (em.), Em. Professor of Law, Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest, Hungary

Jano Dorian, Prof. Dr., Executive Director with the Albanian Institute of Public Affairs in Tirana, Holder of the Jean Monnet Chair, Albania

Kellerhals Andreas, Prof. Dr., Director at the Europa Institute at the University of Zurich, Switzerland

Lang Maroje, Dr., Vice Governor at the Croatian Central Bank

McGowan Lee, Prof. Dr., Professor at the School of History, Anthropology, Philosophy and Politics, Queen`s University Belfast, Northern Ireland

Petrov Roman, Prof. Dr., Jean Monnet Chair in European Union Law National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Ukraine

Portela Clara, Prof. Dr., Professor of Political Science at the Law School of the University of Valencia, Spain

Santos Vara Juan, Prof. Dr., Professor of Public and International Law at the University of Salamanca and Jean Monnet Chair in EU External Action, Spain

3

Table of Contents

The Process, The Policy, and The Strategy of EU Enlargement

Dorian Jano

Impact of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine on the Accession of Ukraine to the EU

Roman Petrov

Key Elements of the Republic of Moldova – European Union Relations

Viorel Cibotaru

The CFSP and Nuclear Weapons Policy

Clara Portela

The Dark Side of Free Movement: When Individual and Social Interests Clash

Iris Goldner Lang, Maroje Lang

The 2024 reform of the economic governance framework

Christos V. Gortsos

The Rise of the Far Right in the European Union: Assessing its Significance following the June 2024 European Parliamentary Elections

Lee McGowan

Neutrality in Times of War: The Case of Switzerland

Andreas Kellerhals, Fatlum Ademi

Digital transformation: Regulation of Artificial Intelligence in the European Union

Jelena Ceranic Perisic

The management of migration at the EU external borders in the New Pact of Migration and Asylum

Juan Santos Vara

Value Conditionality As a New EU Mechanism Used Against Autocratizing Hungary

Gabor Halmai

The Process, The Policy, and The Strategy of EU Enlargement

Dorian Jano

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Dorian Jano, PhD, is Jean Monnet Lecturer (ENLARGEU, 101085529) at the University of Amsterdam and Research Fellow of the ERC SolRoutes (101053836) project at the University of Genoa.
Abstract

The European Union’s (EU) enlargement represents one of its most transformative projects, reflecting the Union’s capacity to foster integration, stability, and regional development. By expanding its borders, the EU not only reshapes its internal dynamics but also reinforces its normative and geopolitical influence. This article provides a comprehensive analytical framework for understanding the dynamics of EU enlargement by discussing its three aspects: process, policy, and strategy. The interplay between these aspects offers an integrated perspective to explore the contemporary discourses on institutional mechanisms, rule-based governance, and geopolitical strategy in EU enlargement.

Table of Contents
IntroductionThe Process: Navigating the Path to MembershipThe Policy: Anchoring Enlargement in Rule-Based GovernanceThe Strategy: Geopolitics and BeyondThe “Dimensional Triad” of EU Enlargement

Introduction

The European Union’s (EU) enlargement, a cornerstone of European integration, represents a transformative phenomenon that transcends conventional understandings of institutional expansion. Enlargement is neither a mere procedural undertaking nor an isolated (geo)political event. It is a continuous interaction involving multifaceted institutional dynamics, national politics, and broader strategic imperatives, leading to multiple potential outcomes.[1] Contemporary scholarship has long moved beyond viewing enlargement as a one-time event of territorial expansion, instead recognizing it as a catalyst driving changes within the EU and the candidate countries.[2] This development signifies a fundamental shift in understanding and studying EU enlargement: emerging from an interstate bargaining process to a sophisticated policy instrument governed by EU institutions and rule-based frameworks[3] and currently (re)becoming a geopolitical strategic imperative.[4] This shift underscores a central tension in EU enlargement: balancing its normative commitments to rule-based governance and democratization with the security-based geopolitical imperative. While normative frameworks, such as the Copenhagen criteria, emphasize democratic consolidation and institutional reform, geopolitical imperatives often prioritize stability and strategic alignment over strict adherence to these norms.[5] For example, fast-tracking Ukraine and Moldova’s candidate status illustrates how security concerns can override normative benchmarks.

Enlargement is not a unidirectional expansion emanating from the EU. Instead, it is an “entanglement” where both “inside” and “outside” simultaneously shape and are shaped by each other.[6] This dynamic interplay emerges from the convergence of the EU’s internal dynamics, state-building challenges, and geopolitical imperatives.[7] Enlargement fundamentally shapes the EU’s development as a polity, prompting member states to continuously reassess the nature, purpose, and trajectory of their collective European project.[8] Beyond its institutional implications, enlargement has emerged as a crucial mechanism for promoting regional stability, democratic governance, and the EU’s geopolitical influence in an increasingly multipolar world.[9] Recent geopolitical developments, particularly the Russia-Ukraine war, have further elevated enlargement from a policy choice to a strategic necessity.[10] The increasing importance of security-geopolitical concerns in the EU’s enlargement logic underscores a shift from a primary focus on economic and democratization efforts to prioritizing (continental) security.[11]

The tension between integration and enlargement, often conceptualized as a choice between deepening and widening, has become particularly salient at critical historical junctures.[12] Events such as the end of the Cold War and the Ukraine-Russia War have brought this tension into sharp relief, raising fundamental questions about the relationship between territorial expansion and institutional cohesion. While some argue that extensive enlargement risks diluting the EU’s supranational character, others contend that deepening and widening represent complementary rather than competing processes.[13] This latter perspective emphasizes their combined potential for advancing peace, stability, and prosperity across Europe. These ongoing debates illustrate the complex interplay between the EU’s internal development and external engagement, highlighting enlargement’s central role in shaping the Union’s global position.

This analysis explores EU enlargement as a tripartite-dimensional phenomenon encompassing its procedural, normative, and strategic aspects. This approach enables a deeper understanding of enlargement as a political process, a policy instrument, and a positioning strategy.

The Process: Navigating the Path to Membership

Enlargement as a process refers to the series of actions, interactions, and stages through which aspiring states prepare for, negotiate, and achieve integration into the larger economic, political, and institutional framework of the Union. The EU Enlargement process encompasses key steps and stages, including meeting specific criteria, implementing reforms, and engaging in accession negotiations. It is structured around procedural milestones such as gaining candidate country status, opening and closing negotiation chapters, and signing and ratifying the Accession Treaty. Yet, the process extends beyond the mere act of becoming a full-fledged member state. The EU enlargement process involves gradual institutionalization and diverse interactions, allowing states to integrate economically and politically without necessarily achieving full membership.[14]

However, understanding the enlargement process solely through the lens of formal procedures and accession negotiations would be an oversimplification. A complex political, economic, and social interplay characterizes EU enlargement. It entails a profound transformation for both the aspiring candidate countries and the EU itself, shaping their respective policies, institutions, and identities.[15] EU enlargement, viewed as a process of “institutional becoming,” involves continuous and iterative adaptation and changes, requiring both the candidate countries and the EU to adjust their institutions, policies, and practices to meet the integration demands.[16]

The enlargement process is deeply intertwined with political realities. Shaped by a complex interplay of domestic, regional, and international factors, it involves a web of stakeholders from the EU institutions, member states, and candidate countries. Each actor plays a crucial role in negotiating terms, assessing progress, and addressing deficiencies. The success of the enlargement process depends on the ability, willingness, and commitment of both candidate countries and the EU (member states included) to overcome a range of domestic and external challenges.[17] Within candidate countries, issues such as corruption, organized crime, and democratic backsliding can hinder reform efforts and jeopardize accession, while socio-economic disparities and political instability further complicate the path to membership. Within the EU, “absorption capacity”[18] and “enlargement fatigue”[19]—characterized by the union’s capacity to absorb new members and the diminishing enthusiasm among member states—pose significant challenges. This “double-sided fatigue”[20] stems from concerns about the economic and social impact of new members, scepticism regarding the ability of candidate countries to meet accession requirements, and internal EU debates on institutional reform and integration, all of which threaten to undermine the momentum necessary for continued engagement in the enlargement process. Additionally, external geopolitical factors increasingly shaped the enlargement process. The emergence of new geopolitical realities, such as the Russia-Ukraine war, has reinvigorated discussions on the need for EU enlargement, prompting calls to accelerate accession for Ukraine and other candidate countries. These dynamics demonstrate how the intersection of domestic and external actors and factors creates a complex and dynamic environment that can significantly impact the trajectory of the enlargement process.

This complexity makes EU Enlargement not linear but a dynamic and iterative process characterized by continuous negotiation, assessment, and adaptation cycles. This dynamic is particularly evident in the Western Balkans, where the path to EU membership has been marked by significant delays, setbacks, and renewed momentum due to the changing geopolitical realities.[21] Despite the formal commitment to integration expressed at the Thessaloniki Summit in 2003, progress in the region has been uneven, hampered by a confluence of factors. The lack of political consensus within candidate countries, political instability, unresolved regional conflicts, and the emergence of new geopolitical challenges have significantly impeded reforms and progress.[22] Bureaucratic hurdles, slow advancement in the accession negotiations, and a lack of clarity regarding the accession criteria and the timeline have complicated the process further. The influence of external actors, including Russia, has exerted significant pressure on the region, undermining political stability and reform efforts.[23]

The Policy: Anchoring Enlargement in Rule-Based Governance

Enlargement as a policy encompasses the formal principles, frameworks, and instruments employed by the EU to govern the integration of new members. At its core, the EU’s enlargement policy is anchored in the Copenhagen criteria, the demands that set out the fundamental requirements for democratic stability, a functional market economy, and the capacity to effectively implement the EU acquis.[24] Initially designed for Central and Eastern European Countries, these criteria have become the standard accession conditions and the crucial reference points for any enlargement policy. They codified existing enlargement practices and constitutionalized the EU’s democratic values.[25] These principles represent a norm-based and structured approach to enlargement, guiding candidate countries to align with the EU’s standards and ensuring that new members share the EU’s core democratic values.

The EU’s enlargement policy operates through a structured framework with several key mechanisms, including annual Enlargement packages and progress assessments. The European Commission plays a central role in this policy framework. It conducts regular evaluations of candidate countries’ reforms and alignment with EU standards, publishing annual reports assessing their progress and identifying areas for improvement. These tools are designed to enhance objectivity and transparency in measuring candidate countries’ preparedness, ensuring a merit-based pathway to accession. Although the enlargement policy framework is relatively static, reflecting its principle-oriented nature, it has extended over time to include additional obligations known as the Copenhagen “Plus” Criteria.[26] Notable changes include the introduction of detailed administrative capacity criteria, emphasizing the importance of administrative and judicial structures, and the “Good Neighbourhood Conditionality,”[27] which focuses on regional cooperation and resolving border disputes. For example, Serbia’s accession has been closely tied to its normalization of relations with Kosovo, a requirement under the Brussels Agreement framework. The policy represents an institutional framework based on normative principles. It operates within a (positive) conditionality mechanism, where progress toward accession is contingent on meeting specific benchmarks. This “external incentives model” establishes links between reforms in candidate countries and their advancement in the accession process.[28]

However, despite its structured approach, the policy framework has faced criticism for being overly broad, inconsistent, and open to interpretation.[29] The flexible and all-inclusive nature of criteria, coupled with continuous adjustments, has added complexities and unpredictability. These issues and perceived biases in implementation have raised concerns about fairness and equity, potentially compromising the policy’s credibility as an effective framework for accession.[30] Uneven progress in cases like Turkey and the Western Balkans has fueled scepticism about the EU’s commitment to fair and objective enlargement.[31] Turkey’s prolonged candidacy serves as a striking example. Although it applied for EU membership in 1987 and was granted candidate status in 1999, negotiations have stalled due to concerns over democratic backsliding and human rights abuses.

The current policy framework requires unanimous agreement among all member states for critical decisions at various stages of the accession process, such as opening or closing negotiation chapters. This stipulation has made it easier for individual member states to delay or block accession at any time through the veto power they (mis)use to push forward their national interests and resolve bilateral disputes to their advantage, impeding or slowing down the accession of specific candidate countries.[32] For example, the European Council, based on a veto, first by France and later on by Bulgaria over historical and cultural issues, has stalled and delayed the start of accession negotiations with North Macedonia (and Albania) despite the positive opinion by the Commission. This highlights the influence of bilateral disputes on the implementation of enlargement policy.[33] Moreover, the new methodology for EU accession negotiations introduces instruments for “phasing negotiations” and resolving “open issues” with member states. While intended to address challenges, these tools can introduce uncertainty and extend the accession timeline. Unlike previous rounds, it can act as a temporal device that can delay the process, making current negotiations open-ended with no guaranteed membership. Even though countries can open and close negotiations on different acquis chapters, the accession timeline remains unspecified, and other exemptions may restrict membership entitlement.[34]

Geopolitical developments like the Russia-Ukraine war have further questioned the current EU’s normative policy on enlargement.[35] While granting candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova reflects a strategic shift, it exposes the limitations of the current policy framework. Fast-tracking Ukraine’s accession may undermine the already established criteria followed by other candidate countries. This could create perceptions of unfairness and set a precedent that complicates future enlargement steps, making it harder to maintain consistent criteria and standards. Moreover, the EU must reconcile its strategic ambitions with the practical challenges of integrating a country at war.

The limitations of the current policy framework have spurred discussions on potential reforms. Addressing the challenges of unanimity, predictability, and perceived bias is crucial for maintaining the credibility and effectiveness of the policy. The EU’s policy framework necessitates recalibrations, including discussions on staged accession and differentiated membership.[36] The “staged accession” or “differentiated membership” proposal envisions a multi-tiered system where countries could gain partial membership with limited benefits and obligations, progressing towards full membership upon meeting all criteria.[37] Proponents argue that this model could incentivize reforms, restore trust in enlargement, and allow for greater flexibility in adapting to geopolitical realities. The “staged accession” could offer a path forward, allowing the EU to leverage enlargement to promote stability, democracy, and shared prosperity in its neighborhood.[38]

The Strategy: Geopolitics and Beyond

Enlargement as a strategy transcends the procedural steps of the process and the policy frameworks governing accession. It encompasses the EU’s long-term goals and a broader vision for the union. It recognizes enlargement as a powerful and deliberate tool to shape the geopolitical landscape, enhance regional stability, and advance economic and security interests.[39] This strategic dimension, often overlooked in discussions focused on accession criteria and negotiation processes, is crucial for understanding the long-term objectives and implications of EU enlargement on peace, security, and prosperity.[40]

At its core, the EU’s enlargement strategy aims for a “transformative regionalism,” wherein enlargement is leveraged to reshape political, economic, social, and security.[41] Through the prospect of membership, the EU can induce profound transformations in the neighboring regions. By aligning with EU standards in areas such as democracy, rule of law, and market economy, candidate countries are expected to undergo significant internal reforms, strengthening institutions and fostering a more stable and prosperous environment. This transformative potential is not limited to the candidate countries themselves. It also has a significant impact on the EU itself. By expanding its borders and integrating new states, the EU strengthens its internal market, enhances its geopolitical influence, and reinforces its position as a global actor. Furthermore, enlargement can contribute to resolving regional conflicts and enhancing security within the EU’s broader neighborhood. The post-Cold War EU strategy of uniting the continent aimed to address any potential negative externalities of non-enlarging, such as crises and instability in East European countries, and expand the EU’s zone of peace and prosperity.[42]

The strategic dimension of enlargement is inherently reactive and context-driven. Historical and contemporary examples illustrate how external shocks and geopolitical shifts significantly influence strategic decisions to enlarge.[43] The rapid inclusion of Central and Eastern European countries in the early 2000s was a response to post-Cold War dynamics, aiming to prevent the resurgence of authoritarianism and integrate these countries into the Western political and economic orbit, thereby enhancing security and stability in the region.[44] This enlargement was driven mainly by the need to consolidate democracy and market economies in Central and Eastern Europe following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the vision of the “re-unification of Europe.” The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine again shifted the geopolitical landscape. The EU’s swift granting of candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova underscored a strategic pivot to counter Russian aggression and stabilize Eastern Europe. While driven by exceptional circumstances, these decisions highlight the EU’s recognition of enlargement as a crucial tool for addressing geopolitical challenges and advancing its strategic interest at critical moments.

The EU’s enlargement strategy operates through a comprehensive approach that integrates various integration elements, including democratic governance, economic alignment, and security cooperation. A core element is the emphasis on political conditionality, requiring candidate countries to meet stringent criteria related to democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. This focus on democratic values and fundamental freedoms is intended to ensure the long-term stability and sustainability of the enlargement process.[45] Economic alignment with the EU is another key dimension, as candidate countries are expected to adopt EU legislation in areas such as competition policy, agriculture, and environmental protection to ensure the smooth functioning of the internal market and prevent economic disruptions after accession. Enhanced security cooperation is an increasingly important aspect of the enlargement strategy. This includes cooperation on counterterrorism, organized crime, and cybersecurity. By integrating candidate countries into EU security frameworks, the EU aims to enhance regional security and address shared challenges.

Despite its strategic importance, the EU’s enlargement strategy faces significant challenges. Member states often hold divergent views on strategic priorities, with huge disagreements regarding the pace and scope of enlargement. Some member states are more enthusiastic about enlargement than others, leading to internal divisions and delays in decision-making. These internal disagreements can weaken the overall impact of the strategy and potentially lead to “strategic paralysis,” where competing national interests impede unified action and reduce coherence. Credibility remains a critical factor in the effectiveness of the EU’s enlargement strategy. Inconsistencies, delays, and a lack of clear timelines in enlargement can erode trust among candidate countries. This can undermine the transformative potential of enlargement and discourage necessary reforms. The EU’s response to the Russia-Ukraine war highlights this challenge. While candidate status was granted to Ukraine and Moldova, the lack of a clear pathway to membership and the absence of a concrete timeline for accession raise concerns about the EU’s long-term commitment to these countries. The EU offers a membership perspective to the Eastern Accession Trio as a peacebuilding tool without a clear strategy or timeline, similar to its strategy in the Western Balkans during the Yugoslav wars.[46] This approach creates an “ambition-capacity dilemma,” highlighting the constant tension between the EU’s strategic ambitions for enlargement and its institutional capacity to absorb new members, particularly for candidate countries engaged in a war. Concerns over the EU’s absorption ability to effectively integrate new members and the risk of overextension often hinder the execution of strategic enlargement plans. While the strategic enlargement approach aims to extend the EU’s geopolitical influence, it must balance this ambition with institutional capacity, addressing potential social and economic disruptions and maintaining the unity and integration pace. The EU’s enlargement strategy also faces significant external pressures from other geopolitical actors (e.g., Russia and China) actively seeking to influence developments in the EU’s neighborhood, challenging the EU’s influence and undermining its strategic objectives.[47] They utilize various tools, including economic incentives, political pressure, and disinformation campaigns, to weaken the EU’s position and discourage candidate countries from pursuing closer ties with the bloc. To address these challenges and ensure the long-term success of its enlargement strategy, the EU must enhance its strategic coherence and ensure that its actions align with its stated commitments, fostering trust and stability in its neighborhood.

The EU Enlargement strategy is more than just a political will; it is a powerful tool for shaping the geopolitical landscape, promoting stability, and advancing the EU’s economic and security interests. However, achieving these goals requires a comprehensive and strategic approach that addresses the challenges of internal divisions, institutional capacity, and external pressures. By maintaining credibility, enhancing strategic coherence, and ensuring that its actions align with its stated commitments, the EU can effectively leverage enlargement to promote peace, prosperity, and democracy in its neighborhood and reinforce its position as a global actor.

The “Dimensional Triad” of EU Enlargement

The European Union’s enlargement represents one of its most ambitious and transformative endeavors, encompassing various institutional, (geo)political, and normative challenges. To understand this complex phenomenon, we propose an analytical framework that conceptualizes enlargement as a “Dimensional Triad” encompassing process, policy, and strategy. Each dimension offers distinct yet interconnected aspects of the Union’s enlargement efforts, differing in focus, scope, nature, temporality, actors, and challenges faced.

The process dimension emphasizes the “how” of enlargement[48] through a multi-layered temporal approach. It encompasses the step-by-step actions and negotiations required for aspiring states to achieve membership. It operates across specific negotiations (micro-temporal level), phase-specific preparations (meso-temporal level), and an overall accession trajectory (macro-temporal level). It is dynamic and iterative, characterized by its procedural milestones, such as the opening and closing of negotiation chapters. The process dimension is action-oriented, involving various actors, from technical working groups and civil servants to national governments and civil society organizations, each playing crucial roles in different temporal phases. The complex accession trajectories of Western Balkan countries, including delays and postponements, illustrate the procedural fragmentation and bottlenecks of the multi-layered temporal approach in enlargement.

The policy dimension addresses the “what” of enlargement, providing the normative and institutional framework governing EU accession. Anchored in established principles such as the Copenhagen criteria—consolidation of democracy, rule of law, and market economy—this dimension ensures that candidate countries align with EU norms. The structured, rule-based nature of this dimension ensures continuity but also reveals significant rigidity. The EU’s inconsistent application of the Copenhagen criteria has led to a credibility gap, particularly in the face of uneven application and stalled progress. The credibility gap stems from the divergence between normative expectations and actual outcomes. The 2020 New Enlargement Methodology aimed to address these shortcomings by introducing greater flexibility.[49]

The strategic dimension focuses on the “whys” of enlargement[50] and the EU’s long-term objectives of stability, geopolitical influence, and normative commitments. Unlike the structured nature of the policy dimension, the strategy is inherently adaptive, responding to external shocks such as Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. It involves high-level (geo)political actors setting broader and strategic objectives. For example, among the priorities of the EU strategic agenda (2024-2029), the European Council has set a merit-based EU enlargement process with incentives, which will run alongside necessary internal reforms.[51] However, the “ambition-capacity dilemma” and internal divisions among member states often impede the realization of strategic objectives.

Table 1: Key Aspects of the Process, the Policy and the Strategy of EU enlargement. Note: This table summarizes the analytical key characteristics of the EU Enlargement process, policy, and strategy.AspectProcessPolicyStrategyFocusHow

(Multi-Temporal Layers)

What

(Normative, Institutional Framework)

Why

(Long-Term Objectives)

NatureMulti-layered, Iterative

(Action-Oriented)

Structured

(Principle- and Rules-based)

Adaptive, Flexible

(Goal-Oriented)

ScopeProcedural MilestonesGovernance FrameworksLong-term PositioningTemporalitiesShort- to Medium-termMedium-termLong-termActorsWide RangeEU institutionsHigh-level, GeopoliticalChallengesProcedural FragmentationInconsistency, CredibilityAmbition-Capacity dilemma

The interplay between process, policy, and strategy creates a dynamic “triad,” where each dimension influences and is influenced by the others. This interaction can be observed in the procedural milestones of the enlargement process (e.g., negotiations) being shaped by the policy framework (e.g., the Copenhagen criteria) and at specific times and cases being guided by the strategic imperatives (e.g., security and stability). For example, the strategic imperatives of post-Cold War European reunification shaped enlargement procedural and policy frameworks during the Central and Eastern Enlargement (2004-2007). The swift granting of candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova amid geopolitical tensions in 2022 also demonstrates how strategic imperatives can successfully drive process acceleration. However, challenges emerge when dimensions misalign, as evidenced in the Western Balkans, where strategic commitments have not always aligned with policy implementation and procedural realities (e.g., Serbia-Kosovo negotiations or North Macedonia’s stalled process). Misalignment between the dimensional triad (process, policy, strategy) can generate tensions and lead to inconsistencies, delays, and a loss of trust—both within the EU and among candidate countries. This enhanced understanding of the dimensional triad of EU enlargement suggests several implications. First, it highlights the need for more harmonized coordination between dimensions. Second, it emphasizes the importance of maintaining strategic flexibility while ensuring normative and procedural integrity. Third, prioritizing only one dimension may outpace the others, weakening the overall enlargement efforts.

Looking ahead, the EU’s enlargement approach must remain a dynamic “work-in-progress,” capable of adapting to new challenges and opportunities while steadfastly adhering to core principles and procedural milestones. Achieving success requires maintaining alignment across the EU Enlargement process, policy, and strategy while allowing for necessary adaptations and systemic learning, where experiences at one level inform adjustments across other dimensions. Ensuring balanced alignment across these three dimensions is crucial for the effectiveness, coherence, and sustainability of the EU’s enlargement agenda. The EU is currently employing a “strategic layering” approach, which balances its geopolitical ambitions with a step-by-step integration process that begins with geopolitically motivated negotiations and (should) advance to a transformative accession phase, aligning candidate countries with EU standards and policies.[52] However, the effectiveness of this approach hinges on the continued refinement of cross-dimensional coordination mechanisms and the development of tools for managing temporal alignment.

In conclusion, the “Dimensional Triad” analytical framework offers a more nuanced understanding of the multifaceted nature of EU enlargement. By acknowledging the complex temporal, actor-based, and interactive aspects of each dimension (process, policy and strategy), it provides enhanced analytical tools for comprehending and managing contemporary EU enlargement.

Ikonomou H./Andry A./Byberg R., “Introduction: towards a new understanding of enlargement,” in Ikonomou/Andry/Byberg (ed.), European Enlargement across Rounds and Beyond Borders, Routledge 2017. ↵Schimmelfennig F./Sedelmeier U., “The Study of EU Enlargement: Theoretical Approaches and Empirical Findings,” in Cini/Bourne (ed.), Palgrave Advances in European Union Studies, Palgrave Macmillan 2006, 96-116. ↵Ikonomou/Andry/Byberg, 5. ↵Anghel V., “Why EU enlargement is a strategic necessity,” in EU enlargement dilemmas, The Loop, December 20, 2024. <https://theloop.ecpr.eu/why-eu-enlargement-is-a-strategic-necessity>/<http://www.eiz.unizh.ch/agr.html>. ↵Schimmelfennig F., “Differentiated membership’ would overcome the EU’s enlargement dilemma,” in EU enlargement dilemmas, The Loop. January 3, 2025. <https://theloop.​ecpr.​eu/differentiated-membership-would-overcome-the-eus-enlargement-dilemma/>. ↵Ikonomou/Andry/Byberg, 4. ↵Karjalainen T., “EU enlargement in wartime Europe: three dimensions and scenarios,” Contemporary Social Science, 2023 18(5), 637-656. ↵Sjursen H., “Enlargement and identity: studying reasons,” in Ikonomou/Andry/Byberg (ed.), European Enlargement across Rounds and Beyond Borders, Routledge 2017, 57-74. ↵Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2006. ↵Anghel 2024. ↵Góra M., “It’s security stupid! Politicisation of the EU’s relations with its neighbours,” European Security, 2021 30(3), 439-463. ↵Schimmelfennig F. “The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union.” International Organization, 2001 55(1), 47-80. ↵Kelemen R. D./Menon A./Slapin J., “Wider and Deeper? Enlargement and Integration in the European Union,” in Kelemen/Menon/Slapin, The European Union: Integration and Enlargement, Routledge 2016, 5-21. ↵Schimmelfennig F./Rittberger B., “Theories of European Integration: Assumptions and Hypotheses,” in Richardson J. (ed.), European Union: Power and Policy-Making, Routledge 2006, 73-95. ↵Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2006. ↵Jano D., “The whys and when enlarging EU to the western Balkans,” European Journal of Economic and Political Studies 2009 2(1), 61-77. ↵Jano D., “EU Enlargement Rounds and Dilemmas: The Successful, the Reluctant, the Awkward, and the Laggards,” in Costa, B. F. (ed.), Challenges and Barriers to the European Union Expansion to the Balkan Region, IGI Global 2022, 18-38. ↵“Absorption capacity” refers to “[t]he Union’s capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration”. See European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency - Copenhagen, June 21-22, 1993, SN 180/1/93 REV 1, p. 13. ↵Szołucha A., “The EU and Enlargement Fatigue: Why has the European Union not been able to counter enlargement fatigue?” Journal of Contemporary European Research 2010 6, 1–16. ↵The EU’s ‘enlargement fatigue’ can led to ‘accession fatigue’, that is the candidates` incapability in compliance with EU requirements. See O’Brennan J., “‘On the Slow Train to Nowhere?’ The European Union. ‘Enlargement Fatigue’ and the Western Balkans” European Foreign Affairs Review 2014 19(2), 221-241. ↵Jano D., “EU–Western Balkans Relations: The Many EU Approaches,” The Journal of the International University Institute of European Studies, 2008 2(1), 143 – 160. ↵Belloni R., “European Integration and the Western Balkans: Lessons, Prospects and Obstacles,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 2009 11 (3), 313–31. ↵Petrovic, M./Tzifakis, N. (2021) A geopolitical turn to EU enlargement, or another postponement? An introduction. Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 2021 29(2), 157-168. ↵The Copenhagen criteria, established by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 and strengthened by the Madrid European Council in 1995, set the accession requirements for EU membership including stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; a functioning market economy and the ability to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU; the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including the capacity to effectively implement the rules, standards and policies that make up the body of EU law (the “acquis”), and adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. See Accession criteria (Copenhagen criteria), EUR-Lex, Access to European Union law, available at <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/glossary/accession-criteria-copenhagen-criteria.html>; Accession criteria, European Commission – Enlargement, available at <https://neighbourhood-enlargement.​ec.​europa.eu/enlargement-policy/glossary/accession-criteria_en>.↵Kochenov D., “Behind the Copenhagen fac¸ade: The meaning and structure of the Copenhagen political criterion of democracy and the rule of law,” European Integration Online Papers 2004 8; Thomas D. C., “Constitutionalization through enlargement: the contested origins of the EU’s democratic identity,” Journal of European Public Policy 2006 13, 1190 – 1210. ↵The Copenhagen accession criteria have evolved from broad principles to include highly detailed and specific requirements, demonstrating a shift towards a more demanding and scrutinized path to EU membership. See Jano D. “EU Accession Criteria and Procedures: Up for the Challenge?” EuZ - Zeitschrift für Europarecht 2024 4. ↵Basheska, E., The Good Neighbourliness Condition in the EU Enlargement, Contemporary Southeastern Europe, 2014 1(1), pp. 92 – 111, p. 99. ↵Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2020. ↵Grabbe, H., European Union Conditionality and the “Acquis Communautaire”, International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale de Science Politique 2002 23(3), 249 – 268. ↵Kochenov, D., Behind the Copenhagen fac¸ade: The meaning and structure of the Copenhagen political criterion of democracy and the rule of law, European Integration Online Papers, 2004 8. ↵Saatc¸ioğlu, B., How closely does the European Union’s membership conditionality reflect the Copenhagen criteria? Insights from Turkey. Turkish Studies 2009 10(4), 559-576. ↵See Marić, S., Let’s set things straight: Accession talks do not equate EU membership promise, Euractiv, 24 June 2019, available at <https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/opinion/lets-set-things-straight-accession-talks-do-not-equate-eu-membership-promise/>. ↵For a critical analysis of making EU membership conditional on the settlement of bilateral disputes with concrete examples of issues in the Western Balkans, see Basheska, E., EU Enlargement in Disregard of the Rule of Law: A Way Forward Following the Unsuccessful Dispute Settlement Between Croatia and Slovenia and the Name Change of Macedonia. Hague J Rule Law 2022 14, pp. 221 – 256. ↵Ugur M., “Open-ended membership prospect and commitment credibility: Explaining the deadlock in EU-Turkey accession negotiations,” Journal of Common Market Studies 2010 48(4), 967–992. ↵Schimmelfennig 2025. ↵Delcour L./Wolczuk K., “Ukraine and the EU at the Time of War: A New Paradigm.” LibMod Policy Paper 31 January 2023. <https://libmod.de/en/ukraine-and-the-eu-at-the-time-of-war-a-new-paradigm/> ↵On differentiated membership, see Schimmelfennig 2025, and on the staged accession proposal, see: Emerson, M./Lazarevic, M./Blockmans, S./Subotic, S., A Template for Staged Accession to the EU, European Policy Centre and Centre for European Policy Studies, October 2021.; and the revised version Mihajlović, M./Blockmans, S./Subotić, S./Emerson, M., Template 2.0 for Staged Accession to the EU, Revised proposal - August 2023, European Policy Center. ↵Delcour/Wolczuk 2023. ↵Anghel V./Jones E., The Geopolitics of EU Enlargement: From Club to Commons, Survival, 2024 66(4), 101-114, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2024.2380203 ↵EU institutions refer to the strategy of EU enlargement as a means to promote democratic and economic reforms, thereby enhancing stability and prosperity in Europe. This strategic dimension is emphasized in various documents and policies. For example, the European Council among the priorities of the EU strategic agenda (2024-2029) include “a merit-based EU enlargement process with incentives, to run in parallel with necessary internal reforms.” (Consilium, n.d.). EU strategic agenda 2024-2029 <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/strategic-agenda-2024-2029/#secure>; Additionally, the European Commission’s enlargement policy underscores how the prospect of EU membership fosters democratic and economic reforms, contributing to peace and stability in neighboring regions (European Commission, n.d.). EU enlargement policy <https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/eu-enlargement_en>. ↵Börzel T. A./Schimmelfennig F. “Coming together or drifting apart? The EU’s political integration capacity in Eastern Europe.” European Union Enlargement and Integration Capacity. Routledge, 2017. 122-140. ↵Schimmelfennig 2001, 50; Anghel, V./Jones, E. Three lessons from the 2004 “Big Bang” enlargement, Politics and Governance 2024 12, <https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.8358>. ↵Delcour/Wolczuk 2023. ↵Zielonka J., “Europe moves eastward: Challenges of EU enlargement.” Journal of democracy 2004 15(1), 22-35. ↵On a critical assessment and the limited success of the previous EU’s strategy to use political conditionality to enforce both security and democracy, see Richter S., “Two at One Blow? The EU and its Quest for Security and Democracy by Political Conditionality in the Western Balkans.” Democratization 2012 19(3), 507–534. ↵Anghel V./Džankić J., “Wartime EU: Consequences of the Russia – Ukraine War on the Enlargement Process.” Journal of European Integration 2023 45(3), 487–501. ↵Petrovic/Tzifakis 2021. ↵Jano 2009. ↵European Commission, Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans. COM (2020) 57 final. Brussels, 5 February 2020. <https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/enlargement-methodology_​en.​pdf>. ↵For a more theoretical understanding of the “whys” behind enlargement, including security-geopolitical concerns, economic incentives, and normative-identity claims as explanatory factors see Jano 2022. ↵Consilium, n.d. ↵Schimmelfennig 2025. ↵

Impact of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine on the Accession of Ukraine to the EU

Roman Petrov

The Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 posed an existential challenge for Ukraine and the EU. On one hand, it tested the EU’s resilience and political autonomy. On the other hand, it questioned the existence and territorial sovereignty of Ukraine – a country deeply committed to integrating into the EU that has already sacrificed part of its territory and the lives of thousands of Ukrainians for the right to sign the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement in 2014. Nevertheless, the EU and its Member States remained reluctant to even acknowledge the perspective of Ukraine’s membership in the EU for the indefinite future.

Suddenly, this ambiguous status quo was shattered when on 28 February 2022, President Zelensky triggered Article 49 TEU by Ukraine. Very few people expected President Zelensky and his government to even think about EU membership amidst the avalanching invasion of the Russian army on a scale comparable to the operation “Barbarossa” in 1941. President Zelensky proudly signed the formal application to the EU while Russian army troops were staying just about 20 kilometres from his office in Kyiv. The long-cherished dream of the Ukrainian nation to apply for EU membership suddenly took place in the most critical and mortal moment of its history.

The EU institutions quickly realised that the momentum of a mortal danger for the Ukrainian state required immediate and resolute actions. It only took a week for the EU Council to activate the procedure of Article 49 TEU and invite the European Commission to issue its Opinion on Ukraine’s application bid. The European Commission acted swiftly, too, and assessed Ukraine’s ability to join the EU by 17 June 2022.[1]

Finding that “Ukraine is a European State that has given ample proof of its adherence to the values on which the European Union is founded”, it recommended to the Council that the country “should be given the perspective to become a member of the European Union”, and to the European Council that it should be granted the (much sought after) “candidate status” – a label that is not formally envisaged by the procedure of Article 49 TEU, but which has de facto become a milestone in the accession process. While confirming that Ukraine’s accession would be based on “established criteria and conditions”, including the so-called “Copenhagen criteria”, the Commission also requested urgent reforms in Ukraine’s most critical sectors.[2]

In the meantime, the accession process of Ukraine is in standby mode, which implies that the accession negotiations will be triggered in 2023, once Ukraine would be able to show the progress in providing reforms in the sectors specified by the European Commission.

In parallel with the accelerating speed of Ukraine’s accession, the EU was searching for new forms of political cooperation to strengthen its resilience and ensure mutual solidarity in times of intimidating security and economic crises in Europe. Eventually, it encapsulated those ideas in the European Political Community (EPC) initiative proposed by French President Macron in May 2022 at the time of its presidency of the EU Council. The French government outlined its vision of the EPC as a new political platform that would be “open to European States that share a common set of democratic values, whether or not they are members of the Union and regardless of the nature of their current relationship with the European Union” with the overall purpose to “strengthen the political, economic, cultural, and security links between its members”. It may cover the cooperation within “foreign and security policy issues, climate change and the supply of energy and other raw materials, food security, infrastructure development and interconnection, mobility, migration, the fight against organized crime, relations with other geopolitical actors”. Overall, the EPC would “provide a forum for coordination, decision-making and cooperative projects to respond in a concrete way to the challenges facing all countries on the European Continent”.

The European Council supported the French initiative at its June 2022 summit. Straight away, the blurring purpose of the EPC initiative was perceived with a degree of suspicion by some third countries. Some candidate countries feared that the EPC could undermine or even implicitly serve as an alternative to their ultimate EU membership, like the European Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership did before. However, the French government importantly underlined that “[t]he European Political Community would not be an alternative to EU membership and would not be a substitute to the enlargement process. For European States wishing to join the European Union, it would, on the contrary, allow for the strengthening of links with EU Member States prior to accession”.