Four Years with General Lee E-Book

Walter H. Taylor

• Herausgeber: Charles River Editors
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 269

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2018

Beschreibung

Four Years with General Lee, being a summary of the more important events touching the career of General Robert E. Lee, in the war between the States: together with an authoritative statement of the strength of the army which he commanded in the field , is a great look into Lee during the Civil War, written by his staff-officer Walter Taylor. Heraklion Press has included a linked table of contents.

Leseprobe

PREFACE.

IT was my peculiar privilege to occupy the position of a confidential staff-officer with General Lee during the entire period of the War for Southern Independence. From the time he assumed the duties of the position of general-in-chief of the Army of Virginia; through the campaign in the western portion of the State; during the time of his command in the Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida; while he was charged with the control of the military operations of all the armies of the South, at Richmond; and in all his campaigns, when in command of the Army of Northern Virginia—I had the honor to be at his side. Of necessity, therefore, some facts concerning him and the army movements which he directed are known to me, which are not of public record; and perhaps some value will attach to my statements in regard to those matters of fact which came under my immediate observation, and the recollection of which is still fresh in my memory. I propose to speak of these briefly and with entire candor. The manner of presenting these memoirs will necessarily be very imperfect. It accords neither with my tastes nor the consciousness of my unfitness for me to attempt a work of this character; and, moreover, the duties of my daily life are such as do not permit any continuous or steady devotion to such an under taking.

But the conviction that it is the duty of every one, in possession of material information relative to the late sectional conflict, to do what he can to insure a true understanding of that struggle, silences those personal scruples which would deter me, and impels me to give to the public the following pages. It will be at once seen that it is not my purpose to attempt a review of the military career of General Lee, nor a critical history of the army which he commanded in the field; this will devolve upon the future historian, mine is the more humble task of giving a summary of the more prominent events in the career of the great Confederate leader, together with a comparative statement of the strength of the Confederate and Federal armies that were engaged in the operations in Virginia. Having for a long time supervised the preparation of the official returns of the Army of Northern Virginia, and having been permitted to make a recent examination of a number of those returns, now on file in the archive-office of the War Department at Washington, I am enabled to speak with confidence of the numerical strength of the Confederate forces; my information concerning that of the Federal forces is derived from official documents emanating from the officers and authorities of the United States Government.

W.H.T.

CHAPTER I.

Organization of the Army of Virginia.—General R. E. Lee assigned to the Command of the State Troops.—Transfer to the Southern Confederacy.

ON the 2d day of May, 1861, in obedience to telegraphic orders from Governor Letcher, I repaired to Richmond, and was at once assigned to duty at the headquarters of the Army of Virginia. General Lee had been assigned to the chief command, and Colonel Robert’s. Garnett had been announced as the adjutant-general of the active State troops.

The utmost activity prevailed, and the general-in-chief and his indefatigable and most efficient adjutant-general devoted their entire time and energies to the very difficult task of organizing, arming, equipping, and putting into the field the volunteers, with and without partial organization, who responded with so much alacrity to the call of the State authorities. The first matter of importance was the discussion and decision of the question as to the period of service for which the troops should be received and mustered in. While the politicians, and indeed the vast majority of the people, anticipated but a very short and decisive struggle, General Lee took a different view, and stands alone, of all of those then known to me whose opinions were entitled to consideration, as having expressed his most serious apprehensions of a prolonged and bloody war: he, in an especial degree, seemed to appreciate the magnitude of the impending contest, and to realize the inevitable suffering, sacrifice, and woe, which would attend a determined and bitter conflict between the two sections of the United States, each animated by a traditional devotion to cherished institutions; each entitled by inheritance to those characteristic traits of the Anglo-Saxon race, the possession of which precludes the idea of a passive resistance or a mild aggression, when liberty and honor are involved; each falsely estimating the powers and temper of its adversary, and each confident of success.

At this period there was a considerable display of bombastic rhetoric; the purifying process had not yet begun, which ultimately proved the metal of men: would-be and accustomed leaders, not yet stripped of their pretensions, misled the people; some without judgment discoursed flippantly about the sixty or ninety days war that we were to have, demanding only so much time to overcome the entire Yankee nation. Many who entertained views equally absurd were to be found in the North. Doubtless these patriots of both sections were content to retire from service at the expiration of their short terms, convinced that, if the war was not ended, it should have been, and would have been, had they had the direction of affairs. No wonder, then, that when the troops were to be mustered into service there was a decided sentiment in favor of a twelve months’ enlistment. Had General Lee’s wishes prevailed, they would have been mustered in for the war. It is not known how far he endeavored to have his views adopted, beyond the expression of opinion repeatedly made to those who consulted him in his office, in my hearing, in favor of the war enlistment. He contended that, if the conflict should terminate in twelve months, or less, the troops would be at once disbanded and no harm would result; but, if it should be prolonged beyond that period, then there would be a more urgent need for the troops than in the beginning; and the Government would have to deal with the very serious question of the disintegration and disorganization of the army, and the substitution of recruits for veterans, in the very face of the enemy. The civil authorities, however, were loath to believe that there could possibly be any need of troops beyond the period of twelve months, and accordingly the men were enlisted for that time. The same course had been pursued in the other States in their volunteer organizations; and thus was the first step taken toward creating the necessity for the law of conscription which was subsequently enacted by the Confederate Congress.

Under the direction of General Lee, with the aid of the extraordinary administrative ability of Colonel Garnett, the cordial support of the Governor, and the hearty cooperation of a most efficient corps of State officials, the Virginia volunteers were in a wonderfully short time organized, armed, equipped, and sent to the front: so that when the Confederate authorities assumed control of affairs after the State had formally joined the Confederacy, Governor Letcher was enabled to turn over to them the “Army of Virginia,” volunteers and provisional, thoroughly organized and ready for work, and around which, as a nucleus, was collected what afterward became the historic “Army of Northern Virginia.”The capital of the Confederacy was removed from Montgomery to Richmond, and the various departments of the Government immediately transferred to the latter city; the War Department carried on the process of organization and preparation; the functions of General Lee as general-in-chief of the Army of Virginia terminated, and he was created one of the five generals provided for by a law of Congress, in the Army of the Confederate States. Brigadier-General G. T. Beauregard1 and General J. E. Johnston, already in the field, were assigned to the command of the troops in Virginia the former having the “Army of the Potomac” (Confederate States Army) and the latter the forces then collected in the lower Valley of Virginia; these two armies were subsequently united and won the first battle of Manassas under General J. E. Johnston. General A.’s. Johnston had been assigned to the command of the troops raised in the West and Southwest, and which were concentrating in Kentucky and Tennessee.

Footnotes

1. General Beauregard was promoted to be General immediately after the first battle of Manassas.

CHAPTER II.

General Lee retained in Richmond as Adviser to President Davis.—Disaster to the Confederate Forces under General Garnett.—General Lee sent to Northwest Virginia.—Lamentable Condition of Affairs in that Department.

AFTER the transfer of the Virginia forces to the Confederate States, and there being then no suitable command in the field to which General Lee could be assigned, he was retained in Richmond by the President to give the benefit of his counsel and advice in all the important measures involved in the stupendous undertaking of suddenly transforming an agricultural people into a nation of soldiers, prepared for immediate war. During the month of July, 1861, in obedience to the orders of Mr. Davis, he made a personal examination of the troops and defenses around Norfolk, and also paid a visit of inspection to the Army of the Potomac (C.S.A.). At this period the President became very anxious concerning the condition of affairs in the western portion of Virginia. In the northwest the Confederate forces under Brigadier-General Robert’s. Garnett (who, when relieved as adjutant-general of the Army of Virginia, had been appointed brigadier-general in the Confederate army, and assigned to the command of the troops in this section) had suffered defeat, and the brave Garnett himself, while endeavoring to rally his troops at Carricksford, had received a mortal wound. Brigadier-General W. W. Loring had been assigned as his successor in the command of this department, and having collected the scattered remnants of Garnett’s little army, together with such reinforcements as the Government had been able to send to his relief, had taken position at Valley Mountain. In the southwest Brigadier-Generals Floyd and Wise were operating under great disadvantages; each having an independent command, and neither being disposed to act a part subordinate to the other. It was impossible, under such circumstances, to secure harmonious action or any united and spirited effort to resist the enemy. There was an evident and imperative need in this quarter for the personal presence of some one who could both restore confidence to the troops and compel the respect and subordination of commanders. General Lee, of all men the most fit for this duty, was also the most available. A battle, however, appeared imminent at this juncture between the two armies facing each other in the neighborhood of Manassas: it was a critical time, and the President suspended the execution of his designs as to Western Virginia until that crisis was passed; but immediately after the first battle of Manassas General Lee was dispatched to the scene of operations in that department to reconcile the differences between Brigadier-Generals Floyd and Wise, and to aid Brigadier-General Loring in the reorganization and recruiting of the shattered forces of Garnett, so that, with the aid of the reinforcements sent, the army there collected might be put in such condition as to prevent any aggressive movement of the enemy, and, if circumstances justified it, to take the offensive. Accompanied by two aides-de-camp Colonel John A. Washington and myself—he proceeded by rail to Staunton, and thence on horseback to Valley Mountain. Upon his arrival there he established himself near the headquarters of General Loring, with whom he maintained regular and constant communication. He never assumed immediate personal command of the army, although it was understood that Brigadier-General Loring was subject to his orders.

It is useless to attempt to recount all the difficulties this little army encountered in that most impracticable, inhospitable, and dismal country; only those who participated in that campaign can ever properly estimate the disadvantages under which commanders and troops operated. The season was a most unfavorable one: for weeks it rained daily and in torrents; the condition of the roads was frightful; they were barely passable. It was very seriously debated whether the army could be fed where it was, and it was feared that it would have to retire to some point nearer the railroad. Time and time again could be seen double teams of horses struggling with six or eight barrels of flour, and the axle of the wagon scraping and leveling the road-bed; in other words, the wagons were hub-deep in mud, and could only be moved step by step, and then with the greatest difficulty. At the same time, and doubtless as a result of the excessive rains, the troops were sorely afflicted with measles and a malignant type of fever, which prostrated hundreds of each command; and, being entirely destitute of proper food and other supplies indispensable to the successful treatment of disease, it is not to be wondered at that medical skill failed to arrest the terrible scourge.

In the subsequent campaigns of the Army of Northern Virginia the troops were subjected to great privations and to many very severe trials—in hunger often; their nakedness scarcely concealed; strength at times almost exhausted—but never did I experience the same heart-sinking emotions as when contemplating the wan faces and the emaciated forms of those hungry, sickly, shivering men of the army at Valley Mountain! I well recall the fact that a regiment of North Carolina volunteers, under Colonel Lee, that reported with one thousand effective men, was in a very short time reduced to one-third of its original strength, without ever having been under fire. Though not to the same extent, the other commands were all seriously reduced by disease; and it is no exaggeration to say that one-half of the army was ineffective. Moreover, although some of our best and bravest men were from that section, there was great disaffection among that portion of the people who had not responded to the call of the State for troops. Spies lurked around every hill; our weakness, our embarrassments, and our every movement, were promptly reported to the enemy. With some honorable exceptions, there was an utter absence of sympathy on the part of the inhabitants who had remained at home, and, to all intents and purposes, we were in an enemy’s country. In the language of another who witnessed this deplorable hostility: “Northwestern Virginia has brought grief and shame to the State and to the South by her woful defection; but by none is that felt more keenly than by those sons of that section who have left their homes, and in many instances their wives and little ones, to battle for the right. They hear jeers and sneers thrown out, even at themselves, and endure them with apparent patience, but with an inward resolve to testify on the battle-field their fidelity to their country’s cause.”

How little was this lamentable condition of affairs in that department then appreciated by the public mind!

From the reputation which General Lee enjoyed, even at that date, much was expected of him when he took the field. The difficulties of his situation were not properly estimated, and the press and people of Virginia became, at first, impatient, then indignant, because the Federal army that had defeated the Confederate forces under Garnett and Pegram was not immediately assailed by him and driven out of the State.

To those who realized the situation it was an occasion of pain and mortification to learn from the journals of the day, that occasionally reached them, of the general dissatisfaction that found expression in scathing editorials, abounding in sneers and abuse, and which was both unjust to those charged with the conduct of military operations in that impracticable region, and well calculated to dishearten the men under their command, whose trials were already of no ordinary character.

No one felt this public judgment so keenly as did General Lee; and yet, on one occasion, when his attention had been directed to a fierce newspaper attack, as unjust in its conclusions as it was untrue in its statements, and he was asked why he silently suffered such unwarranted aspersions, he calmly replied that, while it was very hard to bear, it was perhaps quite natural that such hasty conclusions should be announced, and that it was better not to attempt a justification or defense, but to go steadily on in the discharge of duty to the best of our ability, leaving all else to the calmer judgment of the future and to a kind Providence.

CHAPTER III.

Strength and Positions of the Opposing Armies in Northwest Virginia.—General Lee determines to take the Offensive.—Ineffectual Attempt to carry the Positions held by the Federal Troops.—Responsibility for the Failure.

BUT, to return to our narrative, despite the embarrassments heretofore alluded to, the command was finally brought to a sufficiently efficient condition to induce the general to take the offensive. On the 8th of September, and after full conference with Brigadier-General Loring, the order of attack was prepared; it was issued, however, in the name of the latter, and prescribed a line of operations which I will now attempt to describe. In order to a correct understanding of what is to follow, it is proper to make some remarks upon the character and prominent features of the immediate locality which was to be the scene of operations, and of the strength and positions of the two armies.

The advance force of the enemy held the Cheat Mountain Pass, where the Staunton and Parkersburg turnpike crossed the centre-top of Cheat Mountain range, about twelve miles east of Huttonsville. Just where the road crossed the mountain-top heavy defensive works had been constructed. Nature assisted in no small degree to render the position impregnable: the descent on both sides was very precipitous, and the surface of the earth was covered with a most remarkable undergrowth of laurel, so dense and interlocked as to be almost impenetrable. The Federals had cleared a considerable space around their intrenched position, constructed abatis and fosses around their entire work, and, having a garrison of three thousand men,1 might well have deemed themselves impregnable.

They also held a strongly-fortified position at Elk Water, on the road running from Valley Mountain through Tygart’s Valley to Huttonsville, at which latter place it intersected the Staunton and Parkersburg turnpike. The force in Tygart’s Valley was estimated to be five thousand strong. The reserve force was stationed at Huttonsville, and here also was their depot for supplies.

The two roads, mentioned as uniting at Huttonsville, were the only practicable routes by which that point could be reached from the east; both, as before explained, were protected by works of formidable aspect and difficult approach. General Reynolds was in command of the troops defending the passes of Cheat Mountain, and had an army estimated at from eight to ten thousand men. General Rosecrans commanded the entire Federal force operating in Western Virginia, embracing that under General Reynolds, and that operating in the Kanawha Valley, under General Cox.

One portion of the Confederate army was encamped at “Camp Bartow,” on the Parkersburg pike, near its crossing of the Greenbrier River. The force upon this line was under the immediate command of Brigadier-General H. R. Jackson, and consisted of the following organizations: First Georgia Regiment (Colonel Ramsay), Twelfth Georgia (Colonel Edward Johnson), Twenty-third Virginia (Colonel William B. Taliaferro), Thirty-first Virginia (Colonel Jackson), Thirty-seventh Virginia (Colonel Fulkerson), Forty-fourth Virginia (Colonel Scott), Third Arkansas (Colonel Rust), Hansbrough’s and Roger’s battalions of Virginia Volunteers, two batteries of artillery, and a few companies of cavalry—in all about twenty-five hundred effective men.

The other wing of the army, under General Loring, was camped at Valley Mountain, and consisted of a brigade (under General D.’s. Donelson) of one North Carolina and two Tennessee regiments; a brigade of Tennessee troops (under General Anderson); a brigade (under Colonel William Gilham) consisting of the Twenty-first and Forty-second Virginia Regiments, and the Irish Battalion (Provisional Army of Virginia); a small command under Colonel Burk; and a battalion of cavalry, under Major W. H. F. Lee.

These commands had been greatly reduced by sickness, and the total effective of this wing of the army did not exceed thirty-five hundred men.

Being without accurate maps of the country, and having no regular engineer-officer available, General Loring had to rely upon his scouts and a few citizens of that country, who acted in a volunteer capacity as guides, for all information as to the roads, and the movements and positions of the enemy. One of these citizen volunteers, a professional surveyor, having been informed that General Lee was particularly anxious to obtain accurate information of the nature and extent of the works of the enemy on the centre-top of Cheat Mountain, undertook the task of reaching such a point on the mountain as would enable him to take a deliberate and careful survey of the fortified position. He was also to ascertain and report if it was practicable to lead a body of infantry to the vicinity of that point, by any route which would prevent the disclosure of the movement.

The only route other than the turnpike by which this point of the range of mountains could be reached was by pursuing a course along and up the precipitous and ragged sides of the mountain, through undergrowth and trees, over rocks and chasms, and with nothing save the compass or the stars to indicate the direction of the summit. The quasi engineer: officer made the ascent successfully, and obtained a complete view of the enemy’s works. On a second reconnaissance he was accompanied by Colonel A. Rust, of the Third Arkansas Regiment, who was very enterprising, and appeared to be most anxious to make a personal observation. Together they made the ascent of the mountain, and again complete success crowned their efforts. A full, unobstructed view of the entire line of works occupied by the enemy was had without discovery. On their return they made their report to General Lee, and represented that the works were of such a character as to justify the hope of being carried, if attacked from the direction of the point reached by them, from which they could plainly see all that was going on within; and on which flank the enemy appeared to have be stowed but little attention. The only difficulty was, to reach this point with a body of troops without attracting the attention of the enemy, so that he might be surprised and the more readily captured. Of the successful accomplishment of this, however, Colonel Rust was sanguine, and enthusiastically asked to be permitted to lead a column in an assault upon this position. General Lee decided to give battle. A column of infantry twelve hundred strong, consisting of the Twenty-third, Thirty-first, and Thirty-seventh Virginia Regiments, the Third Arkansas Regiment, and Hansbrough’s Virginia battalion, was selected to assail the works of the enemy on Centre-top. Colonels Taliaferro and Fulkerson, who were senior in rank to Colonel Rust, magnanimously waived the question of rank, and acquiesced in placing themselves at the head of their respective regiments and under Colonel Rust’s command.

The order of battle directed General H. R. Jackson to advance, with the balance of his command, by the turnpike, and to threaten the enemy from this direction—this was especially designed to divert attention from Rust’s flank-movement.

The third column, under Brigadier-General Anderson, was to advance to the third or west top of Cheat Mountain, secure possession of the turnpike at that point, and be in position both to take the enemy in rear and prevent any escape; as also to resist any effort that might be made to re-enforce Centre-top with any troops that might be in reserve.

The rest of the army was to move down the valley of Tygart’s River upon the enemy there stationed; but, as will appear more fully hereafter, the movements of this column were made to depend upon the success which should attend the assault upon the fortified position on Cheat Mountain. The plan of attack was carefully and maturely considered, and was communicated to the commanders in the following order:

[CONFIDENTIAL.]

HEADQUARTERS, VALLEY MOUNTAIN, September 8, 1861.

[Special Order No. 28.]

1. General H. R. Jackson, commanding Monterey division, will detach a column of not more than two thousand men under Colonel Rust, to turn the enemy’s position at Cheat Mountain Pass at daylight on the 12th instant (Thursday).

During the night preceding the morning of the 12th instant, General Jackson having left a suitable guard for his own position with the rest of his available force, will take post on the eastern ridge of Cheat Mountain, occupy the enemy in front, and cooperate in the assault of his attacking column should circumstances favor. The march of Colonel Rust will be so regulated as to attain his position during the same night, and at the dawn of the appointed day (Thursday, 12th) he will, if possible, surprise the enemy in his trenches and carry them.

2. The “Pass” having been carried, General Jackson, with his whole fighting force, will immediately move forward toward Huttonsville, prepared against an attack from the enemy, taking every precaution against firing upon the portion of the army operating west of Cheat Mountain, and ready to cooperate with it against the enemy in Tygart’s Valley. The supply-wagons of the advancing columns will follow, and the reserve will occupy Cheat Mountain.

3. General Anderson’s brigade will move down Tygart’s Valley, following the west slope of Cheat Mountain range, concealing his movements from the enemy. On reaching Wyman’s (or the vicinity) he will refresh his force unobserved, send forward intelligent officers to make sure of his further course, and during the night of the 11th (Wednesday) proceed to the Staunton turnpike where it intersects the west top of Cheat Mountain, so as to arrive there as soon after daylight on the 12th (Thursday) as possible. He will make dispositions to hold the turnpike, prevent reënforcements reaching Cheat Mountain Pass, cut the telegraph-wire, and be prepared, if necessary, to aid in the assault of the enemy’s position on the middle top of Cheat Mountain by General Jackson’s division, the result of which he must await. He must particularly keep in mind that the movement of General Jackson is to surprise the enemy in their defenses. He must, therefore, not discover his movement, nor advance—before Wednesday—night beyond a point where he can conceal his force. Cheat Mountain Pass being carried, he will turn down the mountain and press upon the left and rear of the enemy in Tygart’s Valley, either by the old or new turnpike, or the Becky Run road, according to circumstances.

4. General Donelson’s brigade will advance on the right of Tygart’s Valley River, seizing the paths and avenues leading from that side to the river, and driving back the enemy that may endeavor to retard the advance of the centre along the turnpike, or turn his right.

5. Such of the artillery as may not be used on the flanks will proceed along the Huttonsville turnpike, supported by Major Munford’s battalion, followed by the rest of Colonel Gilham’s brigade in reserve.

6. Colonel Burk’s brigade will advance on the left of Tygart’s Valley River, in supporting distance of the centre, and clear that side of the valley of the forces of the enemy that might obstruct the advance of the artillery.

7. The cavalry under Major Lee will follow, according to the nature of the ground, in rear of the left, Colonel Burk’s brigade. It will watch the movements of the enemy in that quarter; give notice of, and prevent, if possible, any attempt to turn the left of the line, and be prepared to strike when opportunity offers.

8. The wagons of each brigade, properly parked and guarded, under the charge of their respective quartermasters—who will personally superintend their movements—will pursue the main turnpike, under the general direction of the chief quartermaster, in rear of the army and out of cannon-range of the enemy.

9. Commanders on both lines of operations will particularly see that their corps wear the distinguishing badge, and that both officers and men take every precaution not to fire on our own troops. This is essentially necessary, as the forces on both sides of Cheat Mountain may unite. They will also use every exertion to prevent noise and straggling from the ranks, correct quietly any confusion that may occur, and cause their commands to rapidly execute their movements when in presence of the enemy.

By order of General W. W. LORING:

CAKTER L. STEVENSON,

Assistant Adjutant and Inspector General.

On the same day that General Loring issued the order of march and attack to his army, General Lee issued the following:

HEADQUARTERS, VALLEY MOUNTAIN, September 8, 1861.

[Special Order No. –.]

The forward movement announced to the Army of the North west in Special Order No. 28, from its headquarters, of this date, gives the general commanding the opportunity of exhorting the troops to keep steadily in view the great principles for which they contend, and to manifest to the world their determination to maintain them. The eyes of the country are upon you. The safety of your homes, and the lives of all you hold dear, depend upon your courage and exertions. Let each man resolve to be victorious, and that the right of self-government, liberty and peace, shall in him find a defender. The progress of this army must be forward.

R. E. LEE,

General commanding.

Inasmuch as Rust’s column had the most difficult part to perform, and it was impossible to estimate accurately the time which would be consumed in reaching his point of attack, he was started in advance of the other columns, and it was determined and ordered that they should await the signal of his attack, before doing anything more than securing positions from which they could readily and quickly advance to the work to which they had been respectively assigned. All were ordered to take every precaution to prevent their movements from being discovered, as the success of the whole undertaking depended on taking the enemy on Centre-top by surprise. Although the several tops of the mountain were in a direct line, not very distant from each other, it was necessary to make a considerable circuit in riding from one to the other; and as Rust’s musketry could be more readily and promptly observed than any other signal, the general attack was made to depend upon it.

The several commands, being in every respect prepared for the anticipated battle, moved forward at the time mentioned, and in the several directions indicated, in the order of march and attack.

All progressed satisfactorily. Anderson reached and occupied the turnpike at its crossing on the third or rear top of Cheat Mountain. So unsuspecting was the enemy, and so silently was Anderson’s movement made, that his men captured an engineer-officer of Rosecrans’s staff, and others, quietly and confidently pursuing the road toward their rear.

General Jackson had his command well in hand, prepared to engage the enemy in front.

General Donelson’s brigade rested the latter portion of the night not far from the camps of his enemy on Tygart’s Valley River.

Morning found everything just as the most confident could have hoped, with the exception that the night had been a very rainy, disagreeable one, and the men were consequently quite uncomfortable; this, however, would soon be forgotten in the excitement of battle and the promise of certain victory. All was ready, and Bust’s attack was anxiously awaited. General Jackson worried the enemy considerably by attacking his advanced guard on the first top of the mountain, only awaiting the signal from Bust to press forward earnestly with his entire command. Hours passed, and no signal was heard! What could have happened? Enough time had elapsed to enable the troops to reach Centre-top, unless prevented by some unexpected impediment.

Would Bust never attack? Alas! he never did!