15,99 €
Mehr erfahren.
- Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
- Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
- Serie: Key Concepts in Philosophy
- Sprache: Englisch
In the social sciences and in everyday speech we often talk about groups as if they behaved in the same way as individuals, thinking and acting as a singular being. We say for example that "Google intends to develop an automated car", "the U.S. Government believes that Syria has used chemical weapons on its people", or that "the NRA wants to protect the rights of gun owners". We also often ascribe legal and moral responsibility to groups. But could groups literally intend things? Is there such a thing as a collective mind? If so, should groups be held morally responsible? Such questions are of vital importance to our understanding of the social world.
In this lively, engaging introduction Deborah Tollefsen offers a careful survey of contemporary philosophers? answers to these questions, and argues for the unorthodox view that certain groups should, indeed, be treated as agents and deserve to be held morally accountable. Tollefsen explores the nature of belief, action and intention, and shows the reader how a belief in group agency can be reconciled with our understanding of individual agency and accountability.
Groups as Agents will be a vital resource for scholars as well as for students of philosophy and the social sciences encountering the topic for the first time.
Sie lesen das E-Book in den Legimi-Apps auf:
Seitenzahl: 274
Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2015
Ähnliche
Table of Contents
Key Concepts in Philosophy Series
Title page
Copyright page
Preface and Acknowledgments
Dedication
Introduction
1: Group Belief
1 Defining Belief
2 Some Recent Accounts of Group Belief
3 Taking Stock
4 Suggestions for Further Reading
5 Discussion Questions
Notes
2: Group Intention
1 Defining Intention
2 Goal Accounts
3 Mode Accounts
4 Shared Accounts
5 Commitment Accounts
6 Taking Stock
7 Suggestions for Further Reading
8 Discussion Questions
Notes
3: Group Agency
1 Some Preliminaries
2 French on Group Agency
3 List and Pettit on Group Agency
4 Taking Stock
5 Suggestions for Further Reading
6 Questions for Discussion
Notes
4: Group Cognition
1 Functionalism
2 Extending the Mind
3 From Extended Mind to Group Mind
4 Coarse-Grained Functionalism, Supervenience, and Explanatory Superfluity
5 Group Cognition and Architecture
6 Taking Stock
7 Suggestions for Further Reading
8 Questions for Discussion
Notes
5: Interpreting Groups
1 Interpretivism
2 Groups as Intentional Systems
3 Taking Stock
4 Suggestions for Further Reading
5 Questions for Discussion
Notes
6: The Moral Responsibility of Groups
1 Some Reasons for Attributing Moral Responsibility to Groups
2 The Metaphysics of Group Moral Responsibility
3 Our Practice of Moral Appraisal
4 Lingering Concerns
5 Taking Stock
6 Suggestions for Further Reading
7 Questions for Discussion
Notes
Conclusion
References
Index
End User License Agreement
Guide
Cover
Table of Contents
Start Reading
Preface
CHAPTER 1
Index
Pages
ii
iv
vi
vii
viii
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
139
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
140
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
141
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
142
137
138
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
Key Concepts in Philosophy Series
Heather Battaly,
Virtue
Lisa Bortolotti,
Irrationality
Joseph Keim Campbell,
Free Will
Roy T. Cook,
Paradoxes
Douglas Edwards,
Properties
Bryan Frances,
Disagreement
Amy Kind,
Persons and Personal Identity
Douglas Kutach,
Causation
Carolyn Price,
Emotion
Ian Evans and Nicholas D. Smith,
Knowledge
Daniel Speak,
The Problem of Evil
Joshua Weisberg,
Consciousness
Chase Wrenn,
Truth
Copyright © Deborah Perron Tollefsen 2015
The right of Deborah Perron Tollefsen to be identified as Author of this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
First published in 2015 by Polity Press
Polity Press
65 Bridge Street
Cambridge CB2 1UR, UK
Polity Press
350 Main Street
Malden, MA 02148, USA
All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purpose of criticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.
ISBN-13: 978-0-7456-8483-3
ISBN-13: 978-0-7456-8484-0 (pb)
ISBN-13: 978-0-7456-8487-1 (epub)
ISBN-13: 978-0-7456-8486-4 (mobi)
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Tollefsen, Deborah.
Groups as agents / Deborah Perron Tollefsen.
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-7456-8483-3 (hardback : alk. paper) – ISBN 978-0-7456-8484-0 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Act (Philosophy) 2. Agent (Philosophy) 3. Social groups. I. Title.
B105.A35T65 2015
128'.4–dc23
2014036747
The publisher has used its best endeavours to ensure that the URLs for external websites referred to in this book are correct and active at the time of going to press. However, the publisher has no responsibility for the websites and can make no guarantee that a site will remain live or that the content is or will remain appropriate.
Every effort has been made to trace all copyright holders, but if any have been inadvertently overlooked the publisher will be pleased to include any necessary credits in any subsequent reprint or edition.
For further information on Polity, visit our website:
politybooks.com
Preface and Acknowledgments
In the social sciences and in everyday speech we often talk about groups as if they behaved in the same way as individuals, thinking and acting as a singular being. We say, for example, that “Google intends to develop an automated car,” “the US Government believes that Syria has used chemical weapons on its people,” or that “the NRA wants to protect the rights of gun owners.” We also often ascribe legal and moral responsibility to groups. But could groups literally be intentional agents? Do they have intentions and act on the basis of their beliefs? If so, should groups be held morally responsible? Such questions are of vital importance to our understanding of the social world, and these are the questions that motivate this book.
There are those who would argue that the answer to these questions is obviously “no.” For these philosophers, a book on group agency would consist in a listing of all the arguments against group agency. I haven't written such a book. It isn't obvious to me that the answer to the questions is “no,” and I find the possibility of a “yes” intriguing. I have chosen, therefore, to focus on recent attempts to argue for group agency and group responsibility. I see how far these accounts can go and in the end offer an alternative approach to the issues of group agency and responsibility. This approach inevitably leaves out a vast number of theories and thinkers who have contributed to the debate. It also inevitably sets aside certain positions without a thorough and detailed argument. My aim is to provide an introductory text for those interested in current debates on group agency while also introducing a novel approach. To this end, in addition to references throughout the main text, I have included further reading lists at the end of each chapter. What I have sacrificed in terms of detail and rigor has, I hope, resulted in a readable and thought-provoking book – one that leads my reader to delve deeper into the current debates.
This book could not have been written without the encouragement and support of the Polity Press staff, especially Pascal Porcheron and Emma Hutchinson. I am grateful to the referees who offered substantial comments on its content and structure. In addition, I would like to thank Stephan Blatti, Olle Blomberg, Margaret Gilbert, Bryce Huebner, and Somogy Varga. Each took the time to read drafts and provided me with helpful comments. A special debt is owed to Tailer Ransom and Kevin Ryan, who helped proofread, construct the index, and get the references in order. Thanks are due to all of the teachers, students, friends, family, and colleagues who have helped me think through these issues over the years. I wish I had the space to acknowledge them all individually. Some of the ideas here are drawn from previous published work. I would like to express my gratitude to the Journal of the Philosophy of Social Science, the Journal of Social Philosophy, Philosophical Explorations, and Cognitive Systems Research for their permission to use my work here. Finally, I would like to thank my husband and my children, whose love and encouragement sustain me.
To Mom and Dad
For your gifts of mind and heart
Introduction
In everyday contexts we often talk as if groups were agents with attitudes such as belief and intention. Consider the following passages picked from various news outlets on an ordinary afternoon:
In briefings earlier on Tuesday, the Israelis said they believed that the attacks March 19 involved the use of sarin gas, the same agent used in a 1995 attack in the Tokyo subway that killed 13. The Syrian attacks killed “a couple of dozens,” the military official said, in what Israel judged as “a test” by President Bashar al-Assad of the international community's response. He said the government had deployed chemicals a handful of times since, but that details of those attacks were sketchier. Israel, which is in a technical state of war with Syria, has been deeply reluctant to act on its own in Syria, for fear that it could bolster President Assad by uniting anti-Israel sentiment. (Rudoren and Sanger, 2013)
The conservatives called for the RNC to pass a resolution reaffirming its support for the 2012 platform. Among other things, the platform called for a constitutional amendment defining marriage as between a man and a woman. The committee reaffirmed its 2012 platform's “core values” on Friday, including the portion indicating that the committee believes “that marriage, the union of one man and one woman, must be upheld as the national standard.” (Sullivan, 2013)
Job growth was sluggish in January for the second straight month; the government said Friday in a report likely to heighten concerns that the economy and labor market recovery may be faltering again. The report could also give the Federal Reserve second thoughts about continuing to pull back on its stimulus program aimed at holding down long-term interest rates. The Fed has begun withdrawing its bond-buying stimulus on the thinking that the economy had finally reached a sustained level of improved growth, but a series of weaker-than-expected economic data of late – including figures on car sales, manufacturing and trade – have shaken confidence. (Lee, 2014)
In addition to ascribing a belief to a group, these passages contain a host of other attributions of attitudes that we would normally describe as “mental” – as belonging to beings with a mind. Groups are said to judge, have views, thoughts and values, and even fear.
Our practice of attributing mental states and processes – such as thinking and deciding – to groups is not found simply in everyday contexts. It is also found in the context of social scientific research. As Georg Theiner and Timothy O'Connor note in their comprehensive overview of group cognition (2010), economists and political scientists talk of group rationality; sociologists, historians, and anthropologists often appeal to the concept of a group's memory; social psychologists have embraced the idea of groups as information-processing units in order to understand the ways in which problems are collectively solved; organizational theorists study the ways that firms and organizations learn and remember; evolutionary theorists have introduced the notion of group selection and argued that groups evolve into cognitive units that promote the survival of the group; zoologists and biologists posit group decision-making mechanisms in order to explain the behavior of hives, swarms, and schooling fish; and the idea of distributive cognition has been used to study small task groups such as navigation teams.
What are we to make of this practice? Are groups agents like us? Do they act on the basis of reasons, judge, deliberate? Do they have minds? And, if they do have minds, can they be held morally responsible? These are the questions that motivate this book. These are not new questions. The nature of social groups, their relation to the individuals within them, and whether they constitute a form of agency that is distinct from individual human agency have been issues consuming the minds of philosophers for centuries. This book introduces readers to recent attempts to establish that groups are intentional agents and can be held morally responsible. It also introduces readers to the substantial objections that have been raised to these accounts.
What sorts of groups are potential agents? A basic distinction is that between aggregative groups (for instance, a collection of all red-haired women) and those that have a structure and a decision-making process – what I shall call corporate groups. It is the latter type of group that will be my focus. The paradigm case of a corporate group is a corporation, but governments, educational institutions, or research teams will also count as corporate groups insofar as they have a structure and a decision-making process. The corporate group need not be large. A standing committee that maintains its identity despite a change in membership and that engages in decision-making will qualify as a corporate group. The word “corporate” means united or bound into one. A central question in much of the literature on group agency is how and to what extent a group of individual subjects could be united in such a way as to form a unified subject – a corporate entity. For ease I will simply use the term “group” to refer to corporate groups.
It will be helpful here to distinguish the issue of group agency from another related issue – shared agency. Shared agency refers to the ability of individuals to engage in joint actions such as moving a table together, painting a house together, or playing a game of chess. Many philosophers working on this issue believe that, in order to understand joint actions, we need to understand the ways in which individual agents share intentions. We will discuss accounts of shared intention and how they might relate to the issue of group agency in chapter 2.
Now one might object to this investigation at the outset on the grounds that groups do not exist. If they do not exist we cannot even raise the issue of whether they are agents. This objection is often motivated by a commitment to ontological individualism. Ontology refers to the study of what reality is, what exists. According to the ontological individualist, groups are composed of individual human beings and do not exist as entities “over and above” these individuals. Most theorists agree with ontological individualism, and I am no exception. Groups are composed of individuals and they act via the actions of individuals. But this doesn't support the idea that groups don't exist. Human beings are composed of cells and are nothing “over and above” their physical make-up, but this doesn't mean they don't exist. Rodin's The Thinker is composed of bronze, but we don't thereby say that it doesn't exist. Likewise, just because groups are composed of individuals and do not exist “over and above” their members does not mean they do not exist.
The real question is not whether groups exist but how we should explain group actions and properties and whether social phenomena require appeal to group properties, group actions, and group attitudes for their explanation. Methodological individualism is the view that groups and their actions can be explained solely in terms of the psychological states and processes of group members and the relations between them. Unlike its ontological sister, methodological individualism is hotly contested. Methodological collectivism argues that there are irreducible group-level properties and processes which need to play a role in the explanation of group phenomena. This book weighs in on the side of methodological collectivism by arguing for the controversial view that certain groups are genuine intentional agents that can be held accountable for their actions.
The book is organized in the following way. In chapter 1 I survey some accounts of group belief. The starting point for many of these accounts is our practice of ascribing beliefs to groups, and the aim of the accounts is to provide the conditions under which such ascriptions are true. I focus, in particular, on the work of Margaret Gilbert and Raimo Tuomela, whose writings on group belief and other group mental states form the foundation for a growing area of research called collective intentionality. Although current accounts offer us a number of insights, we are left wondering why group belief should be considered a species of belief at all.
In chapter 2 I turn to the issue of group intention. The literature on group intention is motivated, in part, by the phenomenon of joint action. According to many theorists, joint action requires for its explanation shared intentions or “we-intentions.” The issue of whether a group can be the bearer of an intention is touched upon only indirectly, as something to be avoided. Whatever intentions are had or shared are in the heads of individuals. This is particularly clear in the work of Michael Bratman and John Searle. Nonetheless, their accounts of shared/joint intention are extremely important in the field of group intentionality and will provide us with some understanding of the reasons for wanting to ascribe an intention to a group at all.
Our discussion of theories of group belief and group intention will highlight an ambiguity in the literature. Some philosophers are interested in explaining the ways that individuals can share intentional states such as belief and intention. These accounts, then, serve as a foundation for a theory of shared agency (Bratman, 2014). Other philosophers are interested in group agency, the ability of a group itself to engage in purposeful action. Although group agency may involve shared agency, there is more to group agency than shared agency. When two people take a walk together they are engaged in a form of shared agency, but in doing so they do not form a unified agent to which we attribute beliefs, goals, and intentions. The connection between group agency and shared agency is not always clear in the literature. It is one of my aims here to introduce some clarity.
In chapter 3 I consider the issue of group agency directly. I consider two of the most well-defended accounts of group agency on offer and the objections that have been raised to those theories. If we are to settle the question of whether groups can have mental states and thus be intentional and moral agents, we need ask some prior questions: What are intentional agents and what are mental states? Like the theories of group belief and group intention we surveyed in chapters 1 and 2, these accounts don't really address the issue of how groups could have mental states such as belief and intention and how groups could engage in the sorts of cognitive processes that are characteristic of intentional agency (for instance, decision-making and memory). This seems to be the crux of the issue. In chapter 4 I turn, then, to theories of mental states and cognition in the philosophy of mind and consider recent attempts to extend a functionalist theory of mind to groups. Research on distributed cognition suggests that models of human cognition can be applied to groups and that doing so is explanatorily powerful.
The approaches surveyed in chapters 3 and 4 start from a theory of mind and intentional agency and see how groups might meet the criteria laid out by these theories. In chapter 5 I develop an alternative approach by suggesting that we start with our practice of making sense of others and seeing what sorts of assumptions have to be in place in order for this practice to be successful. This approach allows us to make sure that our theory of intentional agency is grounded in practice. Our practice reveals that mental states such as belief and intention are not internal states of a system or agent, as the functionalist would have it, but are states of whole systems. When I attribute a belief to an individual, I attribute it not to their head or brain but to the whole person. I argue that, if we view mental states as dispositional states of systems rather than internal states of systems, we can make sense of how groups can have mental states. Further, if we embed this dispositionalism within an explanatory theory called interpretivism, we get a more powerful explanation of our practice of making sense of others, both groups and individuals, than that offered by the functionalist approaches surveyed in chapters 3 and 4.
If certain groups can be intentional agents, the natural question to ask is whether groups can be moral agents. But that certain groups exhibit features of intentional agency is not enough to establish that they can be held morally responsible. Animals and young children are intentional agents, but they are not held morally responsible. In chapter 6 I consider recent attempts to establish that certain groups are morally responsible. I argue that, although groups may not meet the conditions for the sort of moral responsibility we find in adult human beings, they can be held accountable for their actions.
A philosophy professor of mine once said that philosophers are like defense lawyers. Instead of defending people they defend ideas. This book is an attempt to defend the idea of group agency. I have taken on a very difficult client. I suspect some readers will find that I haven't made my case but, in defending the idea, I hope to have shed light on the nature of agency, mind, and moral responsibility. Groups, like animals, robots, aliens, and earthworms, can be useful heuristics for thinking about what, if anything, makes human agency unique. If I have failed to persuade you of the strength of my client's case, I hope you will have seen the utility of trying to make it.
1Group Belief
This chapter surveys recent attempts to answer the specific question of whether groups have beliefs. The accounts on offer are attempts to identify what is going on “inside” the group, or among and between individuals in the group, in order for our ascriptions of belief to the group to be true. Whatever the merits of these accounts, a pressing question remains: What is it about the phenomenon in question that makes it a case of belief?
1 Defining Belief
Before we move on to consider these accounts, it might be helpful to say a bit more about the concept of a belief. There are various theories of what a belief is, and I will discuss many of these in chapter 4 when I turn to the philosophy of mind and the nature of cognition and mental states. Some of these views, such as the view that beliefs are brain states, seem to preclude the idea that groups can be believers. There are, however, some general things we can say here that are accepted by philosophers regardless of their views about the nature of belief.
Beliefs are propositional attitudes. Consider the following belief ascribed to my son Finn. Finn believes that hamburgers are served for dinner every Friday night. In believing this, my son takes a certain attitude, the attitude of believing, toward a proposition – the proposition “Hamburgers are served for dinner every Friday night.” Now he could take a different attitude toward this proposition. He could, for instance, hope that hamburgers are served for dinner every night (indeed, he does take this very attitude). Or he could retain the same attitude but direct it toward a different proposition. He probably has all sorts of other beliefs involving hamburgers. He believes, for instance, that hamburgers are the best food in the world and that they should be served for breakfast, lunch, and dinner. Finn's sister also has attitudes towards propositions about hamburgers. Anya fears that “Hamburgers are served for dinner every Friday night.” I intend that “Hamburgers be served on Finn's birthday.”
This foray into the minds of my children highlights the following: propositional attitudes involve a subject, a content (or proposition), and an attitude (belief, intention, fear, hope). In the examples above, the subjects were Finn, Anya, and me. The content of the attitudes that Finn, Anya, and I have are captured by propositions such as “Hamburgers are served for dinner every Friday night.” The attitudes are those of belief, intention, or fear.
Beliefs have truth conditions – conditions under which the belief is true or false. Finn's belief that hamburgers will be served every Friday for dinner is false (much to his dismay). His belief that hamburgers are made (largely) of ground meat is true. Intentions, on the other hand, have success conditions. Although it may be true that I have the intention of serving hamburgers for Finn's birthday, my intention in itself is neither true nor false; rather, it is satisfied or unsatisfied depending on whether I succeed in serving hamburgers on Finn's birthday.
Belief is thought to be a unique attitude in that it conforms to the world, or tries to conform to the world. When we believe something truly, our mind conforms to the world. Our belief matches the state of affairs out in the world. False beliefs, though they fail to do so, attempt to conform to the world. Intentions, on the other hand, aim at getting the world to fit with our mind. My intention to make hamburgers for Finn's birthday is satisfied or fulfilled only when the world (with me in it) conforms to that intention. Intentions have what John Searle calls a world-to-mind direction of fit, whereas beliefs have a mind-to-world direction of fit (Searle, 1983).
This is where the consensus on the nature of belief ends. Debates rage about the subject of propositional attitudes. For instance, philosophers debate whether animals have propositional attitudes. There are also debates about the nature of belief. Some philosophers argue, for instance, that beliefs are brain states, others that beliefs are functional states to be defined in terms of the role they play and that these roles could be realized by other things besides brains (computers, for instance), and yet others that beliefs are best thought of as social statuses which make sense only against the backdrop of various social practices. Finally, there are debates about the content of propositional attitudes. Some philosophers think that the content is determined by factors internal to the subject, and others that the content is determined by factors external to the subject.
Philosophers writing on group belief haven't really concerned themselves with these debates in the philosophy of mind. This is partly because many have adopted methodological individualism and think that group belief ascriptions can be explained in terms of individuals' beliefs (or some other attitude), and they have left the nature of individual belief to philosophers of mind. In what follows, we will consider three accounts of the nature of group belief – the summative account, the acceptance account, and the commitment account. We will return to the nature of belief at the end of the chapter, where I will suggest some reasons for thinking that those interested in group belief ought to look more closely at debates in the philosophy of mind concerning the nature of mental states.
2 Some Recent Accounts of Group Belief
(a) Summative Accounts
According to the summative view of group belief ascriptions, when we attribute a belief to a group we are really just saying that all or most of the group members believe this. The truth of these ascriptions, then, rests on whether or not all or most of the members believe whatever we have attributed to the group. This is the view espoused by Anthony Quinton in “Social objects” (1976):
To ascribe mental predicates to a group is always an indirect way of ascribing such predicates to its members. With such mental states as belief and attitudes, the ascriptions are of what I have called a summative kind. To say that the industrial working class is determined to resist anti-trade union laws is to say that all or most industrial workers are so minded. (1976, p. 17)
We might formalize the summative account in the following way, where “p” stand for a proposition:
Group G believes that p if and only if all or most of the members of G believe that p.
For instance, consider the following attribution made in the context of a department meeting: “The Assessment Committee believes that our students are able to identify patterns of valid and fallacious reasoning.” According to the summative view, in order for this attribution to be true, all or most of the members of the committee must believe that the students in the program are able to identify patterns of valid and fallacious reasoning. But imagine a case where each individual believes that p but no member knows that other members have such a belief. Perhaps each person keeps it a secret that they believe that p. Would it be appropriate in this case to attribute a group belief? These sorts of cases have suggested that the summative account needs to be augmented with a condition that specifies that members know of the existence of others' beliefs. In technical terms, there must be “common knowledge” among the members. The notion of common knowledge has been analyzed in a variety of ways, and we don't have space here to peruse all of its variations.1 The idea is that members of the group must be aware that the belief is shared and that this awareness itself is manifest to all. If we add common knowledge to the summative account, then we have something like the following:
Group G believes that p if and only if all or most of the members of G believe that p, under conditions of common knowledge.
Now there are certain cases that the summative account seems to fit. Consider the following ascription:
Americans believe that Mojitos are delicious.
Such an ascription is purely distributive. That is, it aims to distribute the belief that Mojitos are delicious to all or most Americans. The summative account seems to make sense of this sort of ascription quite well. But there are other cases where ascriptions are non-distributive. The belief is attributed to the group as a whole. Attributions of beliefs to groups such as committees, boards, corporations, and teams are often such cases.
There are a number of reasons to be skeptical about the adequacy of summative accounts to handle these sorts of ascriptions. For one, it seems a bit too strong to require that all or most of the members of a group believe that p in order for there to be a group belief that p (or for our ascription of a group belief to be true). Imagine a hiring committee of ten people that issues the following statement through its committee chair:
We believe candidate X is the most qualified candidate.
Suppose only two members believe that candidate X is the most qualified. The rest of the committee either doesn't believe it or doesn't have a view of the matter at all – perhaps they didn't do any work and just went along with whatever candidate the two diligent committee members supported. All the committee's actions up to that point and going forward suggest that it believes candidate X to be the best candidate, and yet not all of the members believe this to be so. Therefore, requiring that most or all of the members believe something in order for group belief ascriptions to be true seems too strong.
Could a group believe that p if no member of the group believed that p? Intuitions are not as strong here. Many people would reject the idea that a group believes that p even in cases where no member of the group believes it. At least someone in the group has to believe it. Let's consider an example by returning to one of the passages with which I began the introduction:
The conservatives called for the RNC to pass a resolution reaffirming its support for the 2012 platform. Among other things, the platform called for a constitutional amendment defining marriage as between a man and a woman. The committee reaffirmed its 2012 platform's “core values” on Friday, including the portion indicating that the committee believes “that marriage, the union of one man and one woman, must be upheld as the national standard.” (Sullivan, 2013)
