Happy-People-Pills For All E-Book

Mark Walker

• Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Serie: Blackwell Public Philosophy Series
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 579

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2013

Beschreibung

Happy-People-Pills for All explores current theories of happiness while demonstrating the need to develop advanced pharmacological agents for the enhancement of our capacity for happiness and wellbeing. * Presents the first detailed exploration of the enhancement of happiness * A controversial yet rigorous argument that demonstrates the moral imperative for the development and mass distribution of 'happy-pills', to promote the wellbeing of the individual and society * Brings together the philosophy, psychology and biology of happiness * Maps the development of the next generation of positive mood pharmacology * Offers a corrective to contemporary accounts of happiness

Leseprobe

Table of Contents

Praise for Happy-People-Pills forAll

Title Page

Copyright

Dedication

Acknowledgments

Chapter 1: Introductory

1.1 The Ends: Greater Happiness

1.2 The Means: Pharmacology

1.3 The Biological Basis of Happiness

1.4 Therapy versus Enhancement

1.5 Signposts

Notes

References

Chapter 2: What is Living and What is Dead in Brave New World

2.1 Introductory

2.2 Brief Summary of Brave New World

2.3 Brave New World and Bioconservatives

2.4 Alcohol Stunting, Indoctrination, and Other Pernicious Means of Soul Crafting

2.5 Soma

2.6 A Tragic Dilemma or a False Dilemma?

Notes

References

Chapter 3: What Do We Mean by ‘Happiness’?

3.1 Two Senses of ‘Happiness’: Wellbeing and a Psychological State

3.2 Affective Theories of Happiness

3.3 Cognitive Accounts of Happiness

3.4 Counterexamples to Monism About Happiness

3.5 Methodological Remarks

3.6 Sensory Hedonism

3.7 Not Life Satisfactionism

3.8 Folk Psychology

Notes

References

Chapter 4: The Elements of the Good Life: It is a Very Big List

4.1 Three Theories of the Good Life

4.2 The Method of Difference

4.3 Refutation of Hedonism

4.4 Refutation of Perfectionism

4.5 A Very Big Objective List

4.6 Desire Satisfaction and the Big Objective List

4.7 Objections to the Big Objective List

4.8 Objections to the Method of Difference

4.9 Inventory and Indexing

Notes

References

Chapter 5: Wellbeing and Virtue

5.1 Gyges' Ring

5.2 Moral Virtue

5.3 The Method of Difference

5.4 The Sympathy Test

5.5 Upright, Unscrupulous, and Non-virtuous

5.6 The Immoralist Challenge

Notes

References

Chapter 6: Happiness Promotes Perfection

6.1 Huxley's Dilemma

6.2 Happiness Causes Achievement: the Common-Sense Case

6.3 Happiness Causes Achievement: Social Science Research

6.4 Measuring Happiness

6.5 Effect Size

6.6 Correlation Studies

6.7 Longitudinal and Laboratory Studies

6.8 A Causal Model: Broaden and Build

6.9 Why Don't People in the Brave New World Achieve More?

6.10 Can We Be Too Happy?

Notes

References

Chapter 7: Happy Pharmacology

7.1 Heritability Measures

7.2 Genetics of Happiness

7.3 Environmental Influences on Happiness

7.4 PGD and Genetic Technologies

7.5 Research Proposal: Happy-People-Pills

7.6 Antidepressants: the Healy Study

7.7 The Efficacy of Antidepressants on Healthy Volunteers

7.8 Side Effects of Antidepressants on Healthy Volunteers

7.9 Open-Source Mood Enhancement

Notes

References

Chapter 8: Arguments for Happy-People-Pills

8.1 Autonomy

8.2 Individual Wellbeing

8.3 Additive Wellbeing

8.4 Multiplicative Wellbeing: Virtue and Pro-social Behavior

Notes

References

Chapter 9: Ethical Objections

9.1 Emotional Inappropriateness

9.2 Instrumentalization

9.3 False Happiness

9.4 Inauthenticity

9.5 Loss of Identity

9.6 Too Easy

9.7 Just Distribution

Notes

References

Chapter 10: Happy-People-Pills and Public Policy

10.1 Liberty

10.2 Justice

10.3 The Liberty Versus the Justice Argument

10.4 Health Side Effects and Policy

10.5 A Social Experiment

10.6 An Apollo Push

10.7 Release the Hounds of Corporate Greed

10.8 Liberty and the Duty to Take Happy-People-Pills?

10.9 Concluding Unscientific Postscript

Notes

References

Index

Praise for Happy-People-Pills forAll

“A fascinating and provocative argument, beautifully made. This book challenges everything you believe about who deserves to be happy, and why.”

—Daniel Gilbert, Harvard University, author of the bestseller Stumbling on Happiness

“A game-changing contribution to philosophical debates about happiness. Its arguments are ambitious, novel, and philosophically focused and its discussion wide-ranging.”

—Nicholas Agar, Victoria University of Wellington, author of Humanity's End: Why We Should Reject Radical Enhancement

“Happy-People-Pills is a great examination of the increasingly contentious issue of modifying our bodies and our moods through pharmacology. Laying out in precise detail the arguments for and against,Walker explains the importance of happiness for health, life, and love and gives a powerful case for using chemical technology to make more of it.”

—Patrick Hopkins, Millsaps College, author of Sex/Machine: Readings in Culture, Gender, and Technology

This edition first published 2013

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Walker, Mark (Mark Alan)

Happy-people-pills for all / Mark Walker.

pages cm

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-1-118-35738-5 (cloth : alk. paper)— ISBN 978-1-118-35747-7 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Medication abuse. 2. Pharmaceutical ethics. 3. Happiness. I. Title. II. Title: Happy people pills for all.

RM146.W35 2013

362.29′9— dc23

2012050383

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Cover image: © pepifoto / iStockphoto

Cover design by E&P

To Mardi and Alan (to whom I owe a great measure of my happiness)

Acknowledgments

Looking back I realize that I don't even know when exactly I decided to write a book on happy-people-pills. The idea percolated for some time; I'm just not sure when it metamorphosed into a “project.” Still, it is clear to me that the many debts I accumulated precede the actual writing of this book.

Long before I turned to normative issues, I had two wonderful PhD supervisors at the Australian National University. Huw Price provided some wonderful mentoring when I first arrived. Price eventually took a job in Sydney, citing the experience as my supervisor as his reason for leaving. Peter Menzies was next on the chopping block. Although they worked with me on metaphysical and epistemological issues, Huw and Peter left an indelible mark on how I think about and write philosophy. I am very grateful for their guidance and patience. Any errors in this manuscript are directly attributable to their mentoring and they should be blamed equally.

The dissertation that I submitted, “Becoming Gods,” argued that if we are to complete the grand project of philosophy, the unity of thought and being, we would need to attempt to enhance human beings to make them more godlike. It is a professional secret, because it is such a professional embarrassment, that philosophers have long compared favorably their cognitive abilities to that of gods. (Plato tells us that we must avoid the siren calls of the city and obey the imperative to realize the godlike part of ourselves. Hegel describes all of human history as a process whereby the first god-man is created at the end of history. The first god-man is Hegel himself—what are the chances? It is as incredible as Lou Gehrig getting Lou Gehrig's disease. This embarrassment is not just old-school: Donald Davidson says our cognitive abilities compare favorably with an omniscient interpreter. Who knew?) My dissertation was written in the conditional, because it seemed to me an unanswered question whether we ought to enhance humans.

I left academic philosophy for a time but I continued to think about the issue of human enhancement, and so my interests turned from “real” philosophy (as we used to say as graduate students)—epistemology and metaphysics—to ethics. My first thought was that the issue of human enhancement could be framed within perfectionist ethics. I soon ran into two problems. The first was that perfectionism is often (but not always) couched in terms of the perfection of human nature. To ask about enhancing human nature is to ask something that cannot even be asked within this version of perfectionism. I soon discovered the problem is endemic: one of the touchstones of most ethical theorizing in the history of philosophy is that ethical theory must be in accordance with human nature. Unfortunately, this means that most of the history of ethics can't help us with the most important question of this century: Should we enhance human nature? The second problem is that perfectionism seems to have little to say about happiness. The problem is not so much that perfectionism downplays happiness, although this too is a problem, but it doesn't tell us why happiness is not as important as the development of physical, moral, and intellectual excellence. The usual perfectionist answer to why physical, moral, and intellectual attributes ought to be perfected—because they are part of human nature—seems to me to apply equally well to happiness. In the end the only reason I could see for perfectionists ignoring the psychological state of happiness is that they have always done so.

It was about this time that I entered into email correspondence with David Pearce, probably the world's leading expert on the enhancement of hedonistic states. David was always generous with his time, answering questions about the pharmacology of happiness. His websites are a treasure trove of information for those thinking about the enhancement of happiness: www.hedweb.com. David is part of an academic underclass: an independent scholar. Those of us who are lucky enough to be paid for our scholarly activity don't do enough to acknowledge their work. So, let me go on record: thank you, David!

Nick Agar commented upon Chapters 3 and 4. I have also benefited from a number of conversations with Nick about issues of human enhancement. I owe debts of gratitude to a couple of colleagues in my department. Professor Jean-Paul Vessel was kind enough to provide detailed comments on Chapters 3 and 4. (Professor Vessel, incidentally, may be one of the hyperthymic that I discuss extensively in this work. I say “may” because I am assuming his exalted hedonic states are au naturel.) Professor Danny Scoccia was kind enough to provide detailed comments on Chapters 3, 4, and 5. Professor Jamie Bronstein, one floor down in the history department, generously commented on a first draft of the manuscript. The style and substance are much improved as a result of her efforts. Thanks, Nick, JP, Danny and Jamie!

The folks at Wiley-Blackwell are wonderful. Lindsay Bourgeois and Jennifer Bray are great to work with. Glynis Baguley did heroic work as copy-editor. (If paid by the correction, she should be fabulously wealthy.) Jeff Dean is a great editor: he is quick to respond to emails and offers great advice. Thanks, Jeff!

Last but not least is my debt to my family. I owe my children, Chantal and Danielle, for making me realize the urgent need in this world for happy-people-pills. (I can hear them already: “Ha, ha, very funny dad.”) I would be terribly remiss if I did not thank my wife, Dawn Rafferty, who has helped with every facet and stage of this book. (Helping me with this book has made her realize the urgent need in this world for happy-people-pills.) Finally, as for my parents, Mardi and Alan, I dedicate this book to them as a small token of my debt.

Chapter 1

Introductory

The title of this book, Happy-People-Pills for All, is not offered as some bait and switch tactic. So, yes, to put it bluntly, I am arguing for a future where there is a cheap and readily available supply of happiness-boosting pills for everyone. Having spoken and written on this subject for a few years now, I know all too well that many readers, at least initially, will be skeptical. Indeed, some will even recoil in horror at the idea. However, I hope to show in this introductory chapter that the idea is at least worthy of consideration. By the end of the book I hope you will be asking where you can obtain your dose of happy-people-pills.

1.1 The Ends: Greater Happiness

The happy-people-pills for all project has both a means and an end. The means is to use pharmacology; the end is to increase our happiness. Surely the end or goal is innocent enough. The desire for happiness seems unquestionable; we are all accustomed to hearing testimony as to the importance of happiness in our lives. The refrains “I just want you to be happy,” “I just want my children to be happy,” “I'm not looking to be rich or famous, just happy” are common. There seems to be no reason to doubt the sincerity of such sentiments, and they seem to attest to the utmost importance of happiness in our lives.

Colloquially we might refer to our slightly tipsy colleagues at the staff party as getting ‘happy,’ but I am not proposing intoxication for all (at least not in this work). Rather, by ‘happy’ I mean what I take people to mean when they make the remarks we just noted, e.g., “I just want my children to be happy.” To be sure, I'm not suggesting that the nature of happiness is transparent—far from it. The meaning of happiness figures prominently in this work; indeed, there is an entire chapter devoted to the subject. But even at this preliminary stage it may help to say something on the topic.

The term ‘happiness,’ I argue in Chapter 3, has both an affective and a cognitive component. The primary affective component is that of positive moods and emotions. In this sense, you are happy if your moods tend to be described by such terms as ‘joy’ or ‘contentment.’ A person who experiences frequent positive moods and emotions we would say is a happy person. The cognitive aspect is related to being pleased. So, for example, if walking my dog pleases me, then I may be said to be happy. Happiness in this sense is cognitive because it says something about my view about walking my dog: I find it pleasing. Of course there are many things that we may find pleasing; there are a huge number of ways to fill in the blank in “I am pleased that ______.” The cognitive component of happiness is that the fact that I have a certain mental state—“being pleased,” happiness—is not the object that fills in the blank. If one enjoys a cold beer on a hot day, it would be wrong to say that happiness is a cold beer. Happiness is to be understood as being pleased by the cold beer. The beer is the cause of the pleasure, not the pleasure itself. Thus, the happiest amongst us are those most often in a positive mood and who are frequently pleased with the things they are thinking about. The unhappiest are those who experience sadness and other negative emotions, and who take little pleasure in what they are thinking about. As noted, we will discuss happiness in more detail below; the hope here is to have sketched it sufficiently to see that I am attempting to capture what we mean by ‘happy’ in claims such as, “I just want my children to be happy.” It is the wish for them that they generally be in a positive mood and take pleasure in their lives. The wish for happiness for our loved ones is not for a life of intoxication.