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Jean-François Lyotard was one of the most influential European thinkers in recent decades. He was a leading participant in debates about post-modernism and the decline of Marxism, and he made important contributions to ethics, aesthetics and political philosophy.
In this authoritative introduction, Williams tracks the development of Lyotard's thought from his early writings on the libidinal economy to his more recent work on the post-modern condition. Williams argues that despite the wide-ranging character of Lyotard's writings, they are animated by a long-standing concern to develop a new theory of political action. Lyotard's productive use of avant-garde art and the aesthetics of the sublime are interpreted within this context. In the final chapters some of the main criticisms that have been levelled at Lyotard's work are outlined and assessed.
A challenging but also accessible book, it will be welcomed by students and researchers in continental philosophy, literary theory and the humanities generally.
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LYOTARD
Towards a Postmodern Philosophy
James Williams
Polity Press
Copyright © James Williams 1998
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First published in 1998 by Polity Press
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Williams, James.
Lyotard: towards a postmodern philosophy / James Williams.
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1. Lyotard, Jean François. I. Title.
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For Claire
Key Contemporary Thinkers
Published
Jeremy Ahearne, Michel de Certeau: Interpretation and its Other
Peter Burke, The French Historical Revolution: The Annales School 1929–1989
Colin Davis, Levinas: An Introduction
Simon Evnine, Donald Davidson
Edward Fullbrook and Kate Fullbrook, Simone de Beauvoir: A Critical Introduction
Andrew Gamble, Hayek: The Iron Cage of Liberty
Phillip Hansen, Hannah Arendt: Politics, History and Citizenship
Sean Homer, Frederic Jameson: Marxism, Hermeneutics, Postmodernism
Christopher Hookway, Quine: Language, Experience and Reality
Simon Jarvis, Adorno: A Critical Introduction
Douglas Kellner, Jean Baudrillard: From Marxism to Post-Modernism and Beyond
Chandran Kukathas and Phillip Pettit, Rawls: A Theory of Justice and its Critics
Lois McNay, Foucault: A Critical Introduction
Philip Manning, Erving Goffman and Modern Sociology
Michael Moriarty, Roland Barthes
William Outhwaite, Habermas: A Critical Introduction
John Preston, Feyerabend: Philosophy, Science and Society
Susan Sellers, Hélène Cixous: Authorship, Autobiography and Love
David Silverman, Harvey Sacks: Social Science and Conversation Analysis
Geoffrey Stokes, Popper: Philosophy, Politics and Scientific Method
Georgia Warnke, Gadamer: Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason
James Williams, Lyotard: Towards a Postmodern Philosophy
Jonathan Wolff, Robert Nozick: Property, Justice and the Minimal State
Forthcoming
Alison Ainley, Irigaray
Maria Baghramian, Hilary Putnam
Sara Beardsworth, Kristeva
Michael Caesar, Umberto Eco
James Carey, Innis and McLuhan
Thomas D’Andrea, Alasdair MacIntyre
Eric Dunning, Norbert Elias
Jocelyn Dunphy, Paul Ricoeur
Graeme Gilloch, Walter Benjamin
Christina Howells, Derrida: Deconstruction from Phenomenology to Ethics
Paul Kelly, Ronald Dworkin
Valerie Kennedy, Edward Said
Carl Levy, Antonio Gramsci
Harold Noonan, Frege
Wes Sharrock and Rupert Read, Kuhn
Nick Smith, Charles Taylor
Nicholas Walker, Heidegger
Acknowledgements
1Introduction: Rethinking the Political
2Lyotard’s Materialism
Theory and practice
A critical defence
Questions of strategy
Limits of representation, events, absolute difference and the avant-garde
3States of Society: the Postmodern Condition
General features of the postmodern condition
The event in a postmodern context
Lyotard’s law and incredulity towards metanarratives
4States of Society: the Libidinal Economy
General features of the libidinal economy
The event in a libidinal context
Narrative and libidinal economy
Lyotard and Freud
Incompossibility and the ‘orienting zero’
Lyotard and Marx
Libidinal economy and capital
5Methodology
Methodological problems
Lyotard’s philosophy of language
Phrases, genres and the differend
The problem of reference
Presentation and situation
Incommensurability and heterogeneity
The sublime and the differend
The methods of libidinal economics
Conclusion
6Politics
Political acts
Testifying to the differend
Dissimulation in the libidinal economy
Conclusion
7Hegel, Levinas and Capital
Arguments against Hegel
Arguments with Levinas
Capitalism and the differend
8Critical Debates
Lyotard, Deleuze and Guattari
Critical approaches to The Postmodern Condition
Manfred Frank on Habermas and Lyotard
Lyotard and deconstruction
References
Index
I am grateful to the University of Dundee Research Initiative Fund for a grant towards my research on Jean-François Lyotard and French philosophy.
The author and publishers are grateful for permission to quote from the following works by Jean-François Lyotard: The Differend: Phrases in Dispute, trans. George Van Den Abeele, Manchester University Press and University of Minnesota Press, 1988, by kind permission of the publishers; Libidinal Economy, trans. Iain Hamilton Grant, Athlone Press and Indiana University Press, 1993, by kind permission of the publishers.
Introduction: Rethinking the Political
Jean-François Lyotard’s work is indispensable to any reflection on the most difficult problems of late twentieth-century society and culture. In his definition of the postmodern condition, he gives us an overview of these problems and one of the most important theories to draw them together. Lyotard reflects on the relation between the social fragmentation of contemporary societies and the global interconnection of markets and media. In fact, the concern with this relation, between radical differences and structures that attempt to bridge them, connects his account of the postmodern to his work as a whole. He tries to structure and decide upon the opposition of positive and negative reactions to fragmentation and globalization. Should we rejoice in differences drawn out of the end of unifying forces such as religion, nationhood, universal ideals? Or should we lament the passing of systems that legislate against conflict and difference in the name of greater progress and community? What are the political implications of fragmentation? How can we act with justice if there are no universal moral or legal norms?
A first response to these questions extends Lyotard’s influence to the arts. According to his philosophy, if we are to testify to difference and to fragmentation, then we must do so in art and literature. He is also, therefore, an all-important theorist of and apologist for avant-garde arts. His contribution there is as important as his political and social theory. In his work, we find new and influential ways of thinking about the avant-garde and the experience of art. The political and philosophical roles of aesthetic experiences and creativity are thought anew and in a manner consistent with the latest representations of society, language and individuals. This explains his ubiquity in works on the postmodern, whether at the level of politics, sociology, philosophy, literature or art. Where all these spheres are considered in unison, in terms of general theories of postmodernity, he is invariably one of the main protagonists. This does not mean that he is taken as correct. The contrary is more often the case: Lyotard is the main representative of a strain of divisive postmodern thought that many have sought to prove wrong or to decry. This is because he champions difference and division against reconciliation. But the role of villain does not detract from his importance. It is impossible to understand the resurgence of arguments on modern values without referring to his attack on them.
The great frequency of references to Lyotard’s work across a wide range of topics can also be explained by the pivotal role played by his writing in terms of schools of thought and influential debates. This role is best surveyed through an analysis of the main stages of his career, from his earliest postwar essays to his latest works. His first consistent set of essays (1956–63), collected in La Guerre des Algériens (1989) and translated in Political Writings (1993), brings together Marxist theory and a critical concern with a development of Marx in the context of the struggle for Algerian independence. These essays link him to Marxism, but also to theories on the development of Marxism by, for instance, Cornelius Castoriadis and Jean Baudrillard. His next main publication, Discours, figure (1971), connects poststructuralism, Marx and Freud in a critique of phenomenology through a study of art. In Économie libidinale (1974), Lyotard’s work rejoins the post-1968 rebellion against theory and turns towards materialist enactments of desire. This book connects him to Deleuze and Guattari and to the contemporary attempt to think beyond Marx and Freud.
Later, Lyotard drifts away from this extreme materialism and his work takes a turn towards a combination of aesthetics, social critique and analytic philosophy of language, in the context of the postmodern. This work is announced in La Condition postmoderne (1979), but the key book is Le Différend (1983). He claims that this is his most philosophical work. It has become an important book for questions of justice and political action within the postmodern condition. Lately, Lyotard has contributed to debates on postmodern ethics and aesthetics in the collections L’Inhumain (1988) and Moralités postmodernes (1993). Lyotard’s pivotal role does not only reflect movements. He has entered into important debates with many of the most influential thinkers of his generation: Derrida, Levinas, Nancy, Lacoue-Labarthe, Habermas (by proxy), Rorty, Deleuze and Guattari. These debates and his original work on the postmodern also involve interpretations of key figures from the history of philosophy, notably Marx, Freud, Kant and Wittgenstein. Put together, his contribution to important debates, his position within key movements and his influential definition of the postmodern explain why future developments across many subjects will continue to depend on reactions to his work. Our contemporary desire to think ‘after’ the postmodern must refer back to Lyotard, not only for historical accuracy in terms of theory, but in terms of lessons to be drawn from his efforts to think ‘with’ the postmodern condition.
Thus, in a century when specialization has become the norm, the work of Jean-François Lyotard stands out for its range and variety. Few contemporary thinkers have had his ability and determination to cover and contribute to topics and subjects as disparate as art and aesthetics, politics and active political engagement, the philosophy of language, psychoanalysis, the interpretation of texts from the history of philosophy, literary criticism and critical analysis, and social critique. This richness is as rare as it is difficult to maintain, for the price of the division of his efforts could be that depth is achieved nowhere. This book seeks to show that, with Lyotard, philosophical range is accompanied by profundity, and what appears at first sight to be mere variety is in fact a variation and a deepening of thought across a wide area. Here thought reacts against the pressures which force philosophy towards specialization and away from an engagement with the complex connections which bring together the multiple aspects of modern life and societies.
My account of Lyotard’s philosophy depends on the isolation of a central concern that runs through most, if not all, of his work: a rethinking of the political. Here ‘political’ stands for all forms of action linked to change, or resistance to change, in our societies. Politics is not limited to political parties or institutions. In fact, these may be seen to be far removed from political action – for example, when financial markets are seen to control the future of nations. Yet a series of familiar political and philosophical positions can be used to justify acts within this broad definition of the political. In line with this broad view of the political, Lyotard develops a wide-ranging philosophy that allows him to discard established positions with regard to political action, values and institutions. These are then replaced by new forms of action in tune with a new way of thinking about how acts can bring about just or valuable outcomes. For example, his later philosophy runs against any appeal to universal rights as the basis for action. Instead, the just act involves a recognition of radical differences between individuals, cultures and systems. These differences cannot be bridged by an appeal to the universality of rights. Similarly, in the case of the dominance of financial markets as agents of change, Lyotard’s philosophy rejects the argument that claims that the greatest performance and hence the greatest well-being can be achieved in capitalist systems. Instead, he draws our attention to the necessary injustice of systems dependent on a criterion of performance that cannot be sensitive to radically different ways of living.
This disruptive and original way of thinking about political action depends on a teasing out of a set of recurring figures typical of Lyotard’s work: the idea of the limit, the event, absolute difference and the avant-garde. The central concern and the recurring figures are brought together in his dissatisfaction with established or traditional ways of thinking about the political dimension in art, philosophy and linguistics. Thus the figures provide a new frame of reference for thinking the political, for example in Lyotard’s turn away from totalization and towards fragmentation, which can be traced back to his awareness of the importance of limits and absolute difference. Thus, at the same time as political thinking undergoes a radical change through a reflection on different topics, the thought of the political in those topics is rebased and reinvigorated:
What I have to tell you is driven by a work that is neither linguistic, nor semiological, not even philosophical, but rather political. This, in a sense of political that is not institutional (parliament, elections, political parties …), nor Marxist, a sense too close to the one already dismissed – political in a sense that is not determined yet and that will always, must always, remain to be determined. (Lyotard 1973: 127)
The stress on a sense of the political which involves a duty to desist from final definitions and judgements, and which defeats the will to determine the political with any such finality, is characteristic of Lyotard’s approach to the political. For example, Bill Readings gives an illuminating account of this understanding of the political in the context of the modern–postmodern opposition (1993: xiii). Lyotard’s work reflects a suspicion of knowledge as a basis for action. There will always be limits to such knowledge and the task of philosophy can be seen as revealing them in and through art and language.
Lyotard’s most famous book, The Postmodern Condition, attempts to reflect on the political aspects of modern science and knowledge in terms of their claims to validity. Where claims to truth in science would appear to be above the raw competition more readily associated with politics, he shows that they involve conflicts that can only be understood as power struggles at the boundaries of different social practices. Thus, although different social practices (science and art, for example) involve quite legitimate rules when they operate within their proper spheres, these rules fail at their limits. There are valid tests of the validity of a scientific hypothesis; however, when this hypothesis is used in a social application then it enters into competition with other rules from other practices. For instance, it is possible and legitimate for medicine to determine the best form of treatment for a given illness, but that ‘best’ treatment becomes involved in a further struggle when financial and ethical considerations come into play. There may be best treatments from many different points of view: the most effective, the most economical, one that saves more valuable lives (the young, for instance). Lyotard’s work in The Postmodern Condition is a rethinking of the political because it insists on the political element that enters into any discussion once claims from different spheres come into contact with one another.
This also explains how the book fits into Lyotard’s work as a whole. It is a particular instance of his thought on the way specific philosophical problems become part of practical political struggles. In The Postmodern Condition, the incommensurability of language games (that is, the way rules from different spheres are inconsistent) throws all action at the boundaries between spheres into a power struggle. Lyotard’s philosophy is characterized as the effort to understand and guide this struggle across a wide range of topics and issues.
In no way, though, does my decision to focus on a central concern imply a lack of interest in Lyotard’s analysis of society, his theories of language, or in his studies of law and morality. On the contrary, these are the most interesting and influential facets of his philosophy, alongside his work on aesthetics and modern art. It is more that these facets are best understood when they are seen as leading to a rethinking of the effort to bring about change in society through a political act. Though this does not imply that Lyotard has always wanted to act ‘for society’, or even less ‘for a new society’. He has advocated utterly rebellious acts that break the organization of society and turn to individual or group desires and interests. The consideration of the political act allows us to make sense of the models of society found in his works, but that consideration can only be felt with full force in those models. The rethinking of the political also allows us to appreciate Lyotard’s understanding of the fabric of the world, his rules for moral practice or his attacks on such rules, his aesthetics, his theory of language and his study of avant-garde art. Again, these aspects of Lyotard’s philosophy can be studied alone, but never to the same effect as when an eye is kept on the evaluation and critique of the political acts they entail. For example, it will be shown that the sense of ‘avant-garde’ is fully political in art, but also that the sense of ‘political’ is revolutionized by avant-garde art. The deepest sense of the political comes with the avant-garde, as it disturbs established knowledge and laws, and turns our attention to the constant possibility of further disturbances.
Lyotard’s most extended study of art Discours, figure, his well-known articles on the figure, the libidinal and the sublime in art, as well as his studies of individual artists like Duchamp, show this application of philosophy to art in terms of revolutionary acts. Here, the shock value and innovation of the work of art take on a political significance as acts that disturb an established status quo and force us to think anew. Artists can show the limits and flaws of set ways of thinking and acting. They can return us to more fundamental sensations that have become hidden under elaborate forms of thought. Lyotard’s influence among artists and aestheticians can be explained by this philosophical engagement with the work of art as a motivator of revolutionary action and thought.
The political act or, more accurately, the planning of such an act sets a series of awkward and inhibiting questions in motion: questions as to the best course of action to take, as to the most just course of action, as to why any action is necessary or even possible, questions as to where to act and as to what is sought as an end to the action. All are pushed to the fore as soon as we plan anything. Experience, often painful, teaches us to be wary of acts. There is a deep fount of wisdom on the dangers and pitfalls of idealist action, perhaps expressed most famously by Robert Burns in ‘To a mouse’ (1990: 72):
The best-laid schemes o’ Mice an’ Men Gang aft agley,
An’ lea’e us nought but grief an’ pain, For promis’d joy!
However, the counterbalance to this wisdom born of experience is equally persuasive: what is the point of thought and feeling if it does not lead to action? Aristotle shows us the real sadness of Burns’s lesson: ‘so those who act win, and rightly win, the noble and good things in life’ (Aristotle 1925: s. 1099 a.). The role of a philosophy of action, of a philosophy aimed at a political commitment within society, is to answer the questions raised at the outset of action. It is to resolve the conflict of two forms of wisdom, wisdom born of painful experience and wisdom aware of the futility of an action-free existence – scepticism against commitment and commitment against scepticism. The questions arising at the outset of an action are the expression of that scepticism, but also, the fact that these questions have been raised at all is testament to a commitment, a will towards action in the world. Lyotard thinks on the cusp of this commitment and of the questions put forward by the sceptic, the voice of experience. In his early works on Algeria and in his works around the postmodern, he attempts to resolve the tension between political optimism and scepticism. His libidinal philosophy is more of an effort to ignore their debilitating effects. This depends on the argument that the effects come to bear only on certain forms of political action, in particular those that depend on negative critique or on utopian ideals.
To understand Lyotard in this way is to respond to his own political commitment, again in the widest sense of a reflection on the acts designed to change society or to change specific elements in society, rather than in the narrow sense of a deliberation on the government of society. This commitment can be found in his earliest works, for example in an essay for Jean-Paul Sartre’s Temps Modernes, ‘Nés en 1925’, written when Lyotard was twenty-three. (In 1948 the French review Temps Modernes commissioned three students born in 1925 to record their observation on life after the war; Lyotard was one of them.) The essay strives for an appropriate response to the horror of the Second World War and to the implication of prewar politics and ethics in the horror (a preoccupation that was to stay with Lyotard for the rest of his life, recurring in the name Auschwitz):
We will come out of war, the Twentieth Century’s most concrete product, with a monstrous poverty of thought and morals. We are twenty years old when the camps disgorge that which they have had neither the time nor the appetite to digest. Those hollow faces plague our thinking: in the camps, Europe has assassinated its liberalism, three or four centuries of Greco-Latin tradition. (Lyotard 1948: 2053)
Political commitment is found in its more traditional form in Lyotard’s militant phase, in his writings for the militant journal Socialisme ou Barbarie on Algeria, collected later in the book La Guerre des Algériens (as a young man Lyotard taught in a lycée in Constantine, Algeria). He argues there on the side of the Algerian and French working classes and works for a just overcoming of French colonial rule in Algeria. What is sought is a just resolution for all Algerians, not only for a surrogate ruling class still in the pay of Gaullist France and the USA or for a totalitarian resolution plummeting Algeria into misery and tyranny: ‘the problem posed by this deep decomposition of activities and ideals is exactly to know where, by what means the revolutionary project can be expressed, organized, fought.’ Yet even here a problematic situation calls for a rethinking of the political against a prevalent militant ideology:
A certain idea of politics is dying in this society. For sure, the ‘democratization’ of the regime called for by out-of-work politickers, or the creation of a ‘great unified socialist party’ that would only be the regrouping of the scraps of the left, will not bring that idea back to life. All that is without perspective, tiny when compared to the size of the crisis. Now is the time for revolutionaries to size up to the revolution we need. (Lyotard 1989a: 196)
Lyotard’s political commitment is developed in his two major books Libidinal Economy and The Differend, where he puts forward philosophies offering an alternative to, or a critique of, the traditional conception of the political. In particular, these offer the possibility of a political act that does not depend on universal measures and values. Such universality is seen to be dependent on types of representation that seek to account for all aspects of society in a general theory: totalizing discourses and metanarratives. According to him, these are suspect because they threaten to cancel the differences they seek to describe and incorporate. A legal system based on universal human rights may be unjust because its definition of the human may be inconsistent with some of the people or individuals it is applied to. If a standard Western set of practices and values is taken as the template for universal human rights this may lead to great injustice when it is applied to individuals who do not share that Western religious, cultural and economic basis. Lyotard’s philosophy reminds us of the fundamental importance of difference in the face of totalization. It also seeks to spur us into action on the side of difference and against the unjust application of universal standards and values. Finally, it sets about these two aims in the most appropriate manner: a rich and multifaceted enquiry into science, art, politics, language and ethics where no field dominates and all contribute to our feel for difference.
Lyotard’s Materialism
Theory and practice
Very few acts serving to change or preserve the world escape doubt. Each action can fail in the most miserable and unforeseen manner. Often the very injustice that we seek to set right returns as a consequence of our actions. This risk is all the stronger where a radical philosophy of action is put forward. How can Lyotard’s rethinking of the political escape such risks and doubts? Has he taken the right approach? Is his politics just, as he sometimes claims (and sometimes denies)? Is it realistic? Does it conform to the facts?
The first step towards a resolution of the doubts that plague the philosopher of action is the classification of the questions of the sceptic or doubter into those which are fundamental and those which follow on from them: which obstacles or objections need to be tackled and which can be ignored? For example, is it more important to know what a just action is, or what actions will be possible? Is it more important to know what it is to be good in all cases, or is it more important to know how a specific society operates? The key will be to answer the fundamental questions and to show how then the secondary ones fall by the wayside. The difference between the philosopher of action or commitment and other activists is in the efforts of the former to seek out and answer the fundamental questions. What is sought, therefore, is the greatest degree of certainty as opposed to conviction. This is the philosophical desire to know the outcome, the justice and the justification of an act at the outset, or at least to know that no greater knowledge of them is possible for a given set of circumstances. This arrogance and determination of the philosopher in the face of events determines the individuality of philosophy, as opposed to religion or party politics. How this determination comes to take shape in the writing of a given philosopher serves to define an individual philosophy.
With Lyotard, philosophy of action and commitment finds a new form and a new relevance through a reference to the events which have come to mark his time. He brings the political act up to date and matches it again to the events and society of the second half of the twentieth century. The merit and value of Lyotard’s philosophy lies in a timely approach to the philosophical resolution of the sceptical, wise or doubting objections to political action. He is one of the rare philosophers to live up to the new demands of this century. He does so by formulating a new classification of the fundamental and the secondary questions to be addressed and answered by the philosopher of action. The innovation is one of form and of content, that is, he alters how philosophy operates and what is said through the operation.
For example, first, the form of political action is changed by focusing philosophy on the actual state of the society we live in, independent of any prior philosophical theory as to the state it should be in or could be in. Lyotard is not interested in ideals or abstractions but in the matter at hand. In this he can be called a materialist as opposed to an idealist.
Second, the content is altered in so far as the particular description of this state is itself an innovation. Lyotard gives our society new names which overthrow the modern understanding of human and progressive states regulated according to universal values and laws, and replaces them with a feel for states where irresolvable conflicts and differences appear and disappear according to inhuman drives and processes. For example, he calls the world ‘libidinal economic’, where society is defined as an economy exploiting and releasing desires and feelings – a fitting description of a capitalist society. He is also one of the first to call society ‘postmodern’ where the description corresponds to a fractured society with no single common aim – thereby capturing our lack of direction and the proliferation of ends in our society of interest groups with no common interest. The content of Lyotard’s philosophy involves a new understanding of society in terms of the possibility of political action in it. The terms libidinal economic and postmodern describe it in the light of the will to rethink the values and norms of modern political action.
Why is it such an innovation to concentrate on the actual state of society at a given time in order to be able to formulate political acts within the society? How does Lyotard’s turn towards the accurate description of the operation of our society introduce a crucial change in the way we think of political action? After all, it is perhaps more surprising to think of philosophers planning political acts without taking the place where they are to act as fundamental. How can we know how to act, or even understand what action could be, without a reference to the terrain on which the action must take place and due to which action is necessary or desirable?
In fact, few philosophers speak of action without reference to the terrain, to the society where the action must take place, but many do not take that reference as fundamental. Though a commitment to political action is often a central concern in philosophy, it is not the case that this concern holds sway over all others. Where politicians and activists have a direct involvement in the matters of their day, philosophers work in a more abstract context (though this does not mean that they cannot be political activists or active in politics). Thus a concern with political action can be seen as related to other philosophical pursuits that are not directly to do with the actual state of society. The search for the meaning of truth and absolute certainty can be seen as a more properly philosophical concern than an immediate commitment to a given matter at hand. Furthermore, it may be of more value in the long term to determine the way to certainty in action in the abstract than it is to act in accordance with a description of a given matter at hand.
Thus, according to this last view, the questions ‘What is certainty?’ or ‘What is truth?’ take sway over the question ‘What is going on?’ The possibility of a more fundamental field of enquiry than the terrain, than the matter at hand, has now been raised. The study of the actual state of our society will now be considered to be fundamental and primary only if certainty or truth comes to be based on that study. If other fields promise greater dividends in terms of certainty, then they will be taken as the fundamental areas of study and the reference to an actual state of society will come later and will be conditioned by the findings in that primary field.
There are two classic examples of such cases: the appeal to reason and the appeal to conscience as the fundamental aspects of any act within society. In the first case, what is noted is that any consideration of the question arising prior to the political act is based on our thought, the thinking process we go through in order to come to conclusions regarding action. Therefore, certainty must be sought first in the way we think – our reason. If the way we think can provide us with guidelines for achieving the greatest degree of certainty, then it must be there that philosophy concentrates its efforts. The form taken by our thought will determine how we are to act with the greatest degree of certainty, the principle will be what it is rational to do in any case (our standard use of the principle of applying a pseudo-logical ‘common sense’ fits this model well). The terrain on which we have to act will become a secondary matter because we will have overriding principles that provide for the greatest degree of certainty independent of where they have to be applied.
Similarly, a philosophy taking conscience as its foundation has asked the question of why we are seeking to act. It has come up, say, with the answer ‘To do good’. The fundamental question then becomes ‘What is the good?’ Again, if an answer can be found to this question independent of specific situations, then the philosophy will have fundamental principles at its disposal. The principle, for example, that the good is dictated by our conscience in all cases could then override the consideration of a given terrain, that is, no given state of society could render the principle of following our conscience invalid. Therefore, the philosophy taking the good as determined by conscience or the true as determined by reason as its basis offers a theory and foundation for our consideration of action prior to a given material state of society.
Lyotard’s philosophy is in direct opposition to this position. It puts the terrain first and, consequently, any philosophical thought on political action is a practical study of what is and is not possible and what is and is not good and just on the given terrain. There are no universal principles here, there is no transcendent idea, no idea independent of an experience of the good or the true rising above specific cases but applicable to them. The theoretical study of conscience or rationality is replaced by a practical philosophy that starts with the study of the society or terrain in which it must operate, only then to pass on to the study of the possible, the true and the good within that society.
It is important, though, to realize that this matter is not a familiar commonsense view of society. Rather, Lyotard stretches the definition of society to include it in a much stranger underlying matter. In one case, the matter is libidinal; in another, it is linguistic. The form of Lyotard’s philosophy is therefore antifoundational, in the sense that it is opposed to the search for certain foundations (ideals and principles) for action independent of a given state of affairs. Instead, we are given a materialist philosophy where the emphasis is on the state of society now, the matter at hand. Thus Lyotard’s materialist accounts of society will be the first topic to be focused on in this study, in chapters 3 and 4. In these chapters, his accounts of the postmodern state and the libidinal-economic state will be presented and explained as the terrain in which political action must take place.
A critical defence
It is not enough, though, merely to put the study of a given state of society first. Two strong and related objections can be raised against such an approach; both are formal philosophical objections and they accuse the approach of being itself unphilosophical. The first, specific, objection raises the point that there are foundations that come prior to the study of this matter at hand and these are the proper first topic for philosophy. This objection asks the question ‘How can you be certain that the study of the terrain is the primary way towards the greatest certainty in action?’ The second, general, objection raises the point that the study of the matter at hand must itself necessarily be based on a foundation independent of it; objectors ask the question ‘How can you be certain that the way you study the terrain is the most certain way?’
The arguments turn on the demand for philosophy to search for the maximum degree of certainty before passing on to the consideration of political action. They argue that for a philosophy to take any relative state as the key topic of study is to bypass the search for certainty. This, then, implies a lack of difference between a philosophy taking the matter at hand as its primary study topic and those political pursuits, such as party politics, that avoid the search for the maximum degree of certainty. This is a strong accusation: on an emotive basis, it raises the risk of the end of philosophy brought on from within philosophy itself through its dissolution into other subjects – an act of treachery; on a logical basis, that is, on the basis of a demand for consistency, it raises the problem of how the term philosophy can be used if it cannot be differentiated from mere party politics or political opinion. These objections carry considerable force against some aspects of Lyotard’s philosophy.
In particular, The Postmodern Condition can be interpreted as merely a weak – though timely – study of a particular historical moment. According to this view, the book would fail as an objective survey, because it does not pay adequate attention to the many areas implicated in its wide-ranging hypothesis. On this count, critics could point to deeper and more specialized studies of a given topic. For example, though it addresses the problem of the legitimation of science, The Postmodern Condition
