My Third Journey to Ethiopia, 1899-1900 E-Book

Alexander Bulatovich

• Herausgeber: Seltzer Books
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch
• Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2020

Seitenzahl: 228

Beschreibung

Assembled from previously unpublished items in the Russian archives, this is a lively and detailed account of Bulatovich's travels, at the behest of Ethiopian Emperor Meneik II, in the northwestern border regions of the country, at a time when war with England seemed imminent. Bulatovich provides an insightful assessment of England's likely moves and what Menelik could do to block them, even including an invasion of the Sudan. Once again he provides previously unknown details about a critical time in Ethiopia's history. There's also a brief account of Bulatovich's fourth journey to Ethiopia in 1911, at which time he was a Russian Orthodox monk and sought to found a monastery at a lake to the south of Addis Ababa. This is a companion to Ethiopia Through Russian Eyes, about which the Kenyan journal Old Africa said, "... this is the most important book on the history of eastern Africa to have been published for a century."

Leseprobe

My Third Journey to Ethiopia, 1899-1900 by Alexander Bulatovich

edited by A. B. Davidson and I. S. Katsnelson

translated by Richard Seltzer

published in Russian in 1987

Ebook published by Seltzer Books

established in 1974, as B&R Samizdat Express

feedback welcome: [email protected]

About This Book by A. B. Davidson

This book consists of unpublished documents of Alexander Xaveryevich Bulatovich (1870-1919), an important Russian traveler in Ethiopia, and of archival material connected with his journeys.

The documents were found and prepared for publication by the well-known Soviet orientalist Isidor Savvech Katsnelson (1910-1981).

The basic field of his scientific interests was ancient Egypt and Nubia. He was well recognized in our country and elsewhere for his work, especially for the monograph "Napata and Meroz − The Ancient Kingdoms of Sudan" published in 1970.

He had wide and varied scientific interests. He did not limit himself to study of the ancient history of northeastern Africa. In the course of numerous and varied historical researches, he found new material about A. X. Bulatovich, published several works about him, and succeeded in conveying to readers his excitement about the unusual fate of this man.

In response to the first articles that I.S. Katsnelson published at the beginning of the 1960s, he got replies from people who had at their disposal unique information about the deeds and fate of A. X. Bulatovich. Among them was Bulatovich's sister, Mary Xaveryevna Orbleiani, who was living in Canada.

In 1971, the publishing house Nauka [Science] in Moscow published works by A. X. Bulatovich under the general title "With the Armies of Menelik II," which covered two of his journeys to Ethiopia, or, as it was then common to call that country, Abyssinia. It was prepared for publication by I. S. Katsnelson and was introduced by his article "A. X. Bulatoivch − Hussar, Explorer, Monk." That article contained new information about Bulatovich.

This book is the result of further archival research by I. S. Katsnelson. He wrote an introductory article for it. He was especially careful about everything that he published and would certainly have rewritten the introduction and edited the rest of the material. But, unfortunately, he wasn't able to do so.

This book is being published in the form in which I. S. Katsnelson left it. The names of people and the geographical names are preserved as in the spelling of A. X. Bulatovich. The frequent variants in his documents are also preserved. The reader will see unpolished commentary in both the introductory article and in the footnotes.

Almost all the documents relate to the period 1899-1900, to the third journey of A. X. Bulatovich − hence the title of this book. In addition, it includes one small document from 1911 relating to Bulatovich's fourth journey. I. S. Katsnelson intended to seriously study that journey as well but was not able to do so before his death.

In addition, I want to note the following:

It seems strange to us that the rulers of Ethiopia at the dawn of the twentieth century were so alarmed at the possibility of an English invasion of their country. A. X. Bulatovich considered this invasion absolutely unavoidable and wrote letters to Emperor Menelik with a detailed plan for armed resistance. But, as is now well-known, an Anglo-Ethiopian war never took place in the twentieth century. Hence, the fears of that time now seem unfounded to us.

However, there was a firm basis for his anxiety. In 1898, England, having smashed the Mahdists, adherents of the "envoy" of Allah, the Sudanese Madhi, established their rule in the Sudan and invited Egypt to jointly rule the Sudan. Hence English troops were on the western border of Ethiopia, the most extensive of its borders. And the subjection of Ethiopia, if not directly then indirectly, was considered by several English politicians as part of the then well-known Cairo-Cape City scheme − the idea of creating an unbroken zone of British possessions from Cairo to Cape City.

At the end of 1899 England was tied up in the war against the Boer Republics, especially against the Transvaal, headed by President Kruger, who resolutely conducted an independent policy. But from the end of 1899 to the beginning of 1900 few considered that this war would last as long as it did − more than two and a half years. It was thought that England would quickly finish with the Boers and would then have greater freedom for other action on the African continent.

And then, as many then thought in Europe and in Africa, would come the turn of Ethiopia.

In 1901 a book by one of England's diplomats was published under the title "Modern Abyssinia." That book said that having finished with the Madhists and the Boer Republics, England could present its demands to Menelik II. "Fortunately for England, the Madhists can now be considered a thing of the past. Soon Krugerism will also be done with, and we will be able to take a stronger position with regard to Abyssinia. (1)

Of course, echoes of those plans and schemes reached Ethiopia and naturally caused concern there because in the last third of the nineteenth century there had already been an armed encounter between England and Ethiopia which the Ethiopians remembered well.

It is now evident that A. X. Bulatovich exaggerated the danger of a British invasion of Ethiopia. But to understand his frame of mind, it is necessary to keep in mind the extremely tense relations that existed between Russia and England in the period between the Crimean War and the formation of the Anglo-Russian alliance in 1907. During the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 (during the childhood of A. X. Bulatovich) England in every way impeded the actions of Russia. At the beginning of the twentieth century, England took a pro-Japanese position in the Russo-Japanese conflict. The tsarist government, on its side, sought to hamper the foreign policy of England, particularly in the Middle East.

Those facts shaped the perspective of A. X. Bulatovich which is so clearly revealed in the materials published here.

The last report to Minister A. A. Neratov, dated at the end of 1911 and relating to A. X. Bulatovich's fourth journey, stands apart from all this. In that document he appears not as a rotmister of the Life-Guard Hussar Regiment, but as Father Anthony. He had petitioned before for strengthening Russo-Ethiopian ties, but this time he did so from the perspective of church relations.

This report is especially interesting because A. X. Bulatovich , as it turned out, was one of the last Europeans who succeeded in meeting Menelik II face-to-face during his final years. The Emperor of Ethiopia had been gravely sick, and foreigners were not allowed in his presence. In Europe there were even rumors that he had been dead for years.

Footnote to About this Book

Introductory Article by I. S. Katsnelson

Having completed his second journey in Ethiopia, during which he accompanied the army of Ras Wolde Georgis, annexing to the empire of Menelik II lands near Lake Rudolph, (1) Alexander Xavierevich Bulatovich on June 5, 1898, returned to Addis Ababa, and eight days later, on June 14, set out for Petersburg, where he arrived on July 30. However, he did not stay there for long. Seven months later, he once again returned to Ethiopia.

During the short time spent in the Russian capital, A. X. Bulatovich accomplished much. Namely, he wrote the book "With the Armies of Menelik II," which saved his name from oblivion. (2) And on January 13,1899, at a general session of the Russian Geographical Society, A. X. Bulatovich delivered the lecture "From Abyssinia across the country of Kaffa to Lake Rudolph," (3) For this lecture, he was awarded the small silver medal of the Society.

At the end of 1898, Count M. N. Muravyev, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, directed to the War Minister a petition to once again place Rotmister of the Life-Guard Hussar Regiment A. X. Bulatovich under the command of the head of the Russian diplomatic mission to Addis Ababa P. M. Vlasov, because of his experience and knowledge of the language. In response, A. N. Kuropatkin, who at that time was head of the War Ministry, gave his permission. (4) On February 23, at the instigation of M. N. Muravyev, the Tsar sanctioned the journey and approved sending icons in travelling cases as gifts for Menelik. (5) In addition, A. X. Bulatovich brought medicine for the Russian medical detachment of the Red Cross − 106 packages weighing about 4 tons. (6)

About this journey, official notes as well as reports from A. X. Bulatovich to P.M. Vlasov were preserved in the archives.

Before his departure on March 7, 1899, A. X. Bulatovich was received by Tsar Nicholas II, who sent greetings to the staff of the mission by way of him. On the day before his departure from Petersburg, Count M. N. Muravyev gave him two instructions for P. M. Vlasov, which better than anything else characterize Russian policy toward Ethiopia. First, he expressed gratitude to the head of the mission for "skillfully throwing light on events and for providing a detailed account of Menelik's plans in connection with the policy of those powers that are most interested in African affairs." The Minister informed him because of the risk of armed conflict between the England and Ethiopia, since the English had put down the Mahdist uprising in the Sudan, it had been decided to prolong the stay of the Russian mission in Addis Ababa, to demonstrate to the Emperor, "Russia's benevolent relations to him and the concern we take in the fate of the government of the country he rules." It followed that P. M. Vlasov should render advice and moral support to Menelik, such that he be convinced "to what degree our goals and aspirations differ from of those the diplomatic agents of other powers in Abyssinia." For proof, he enclosed copies of dispatches from other countries, from London in particular. From those dispatches it followed that, "England is expanding its claims to several lands, including Ethiopia." (7)

In the second document, in answer to inquiries of P. M. Vlasov, M. N. Muraviev broaches the question of "the establishment of the western borders of Abyssinia" and the acquisition of access to the open sea." In this regard, as before, Vlasov must keep Menelik from risky actions in connection with his declared desire to seize possession of territory lying between 2 degrees and 14 degrees north latitude and the right bank of the Nile, because that could lead to an undesirable clash with England that could ruinously affect the integrity of Ethiopia." The preservation of the independence of the country is important not only for Ethiopia itself, but also is desired by Russia. Further, Muraviev emphasizes that "aside from every political consideration of general and individual affinity, we absolutely are on the side of Abyssinia and support the further development of its independence, which circumstance is well known to Menelik who has more than once received from us indications of our sincerity and generosity." P. M. Vlasov was advised to strengthen the friendship with Ethiopia and emphasized that should Ethiopia succeed in coming to an agreement with the Italian government for obtaining a port on the Red Sea "the achievement of this goal can only help strengthen its political position ... we will be sincerely happy." In conclusion, he noted, "Perhaps in the current circumstances the Negus will get the desired result, putting the resolution of this question in connection with the general effort of establishing the western borders of Abyssinia, if only in general he finds it convenient to pursue this aim with the agreement of England but at the same time without the participation of England, even if indirectly, if it will be possible to avoid that, since the Roman cabinet will not act in accord with London with regard to African affairs." (8)

On the following day, March 10, 1899, A. X. Bulatovich set out for Odessa, planning to catch the steamship of the Volunteer Fleet "Tambov," which on March 15 was due to set sail for Aden. However, for a variety of reasons ship was late, and the vessel only began its voyage on March 22. A. X. Bulatovich reached Aden on April 4 and Zeila the following day. He had a lot of trouble dealing with the transfer of baggage.

In a report addressed to P. M. Vlasov on his arrival in Addis Ababa, A. X. Bulatovich describes in detail the situation in Zeila, Berber, and the surrounding area. On April 21 he crossed the border of Ethiopia in Gildessa to which he sent his cargo on two caravans of camels. Here he met the mission of Major Marchand which was going from Addis Ababa to the coast of the Red Sea after a failed attempt to gain a foothold in East Sudan. From conversations with Marchand and his fellow officers, A. X. Bulatovich got the impression that military conflict between Ethiopia and England was inevitable. According to Marchand, "England will never be at ease in the Sudan, as long as there is a warlike and strong Abyssinia on its flank." (9)

On April 22, A. X. Bulatovich arrived in Harar, where he was given a warm welcome. He stayed there until May 10, awaiting the arrival of the second caravan with medicine. Finally, on the morning of May 10, A. X. Bulatovich left for Addis Ababa. He was accompanied by just one Ethiopian servant. He had only two saddle mules. An indefatigable traveler, he, as he had during his previous two journeys, covered 500 versts [330 miles], from Harar to Addis Ababa, in 101 hours, of which 82 hours were on the road and 19 for stops, including only 9 hours of sleep. (10) On May 14, 1899, A. X. Bulatovich arrived in Addis Ababa. P. M. Vlasov sent a report to M. N. Muravivv by the first post. (11)

Given the bloody battle with the Madhists at Omdurman and the diplomatic defeat of the French at Fashoda, the English had possession of and had consolidated their hold on the Upper Nile. (12) Hence ,they persistently strove to bring to fruition a plan to build a rail line from Cape City to Cairo thanks to the consolidation of their supremacy in Africa. It is true that at the time of A. X. Bulatovich's arrival in Addis Ababa the English had not yet undertaken any openly hostile actions against Ethiopia, since it was but a short time after they gained a firm hold on the Sudan. At the same time, such a close neighbor appeared to be a serious potential threat, and secret plots went on non-stop. "England with the help of Italy somehow succeeded in drawing the Emperor into war with his vassals (13) (and by so doing diverted the best commanders and their armies for this war at a time when they were needed to consolidate the position they then occupied on the White and Blue Niles.) One must expect that England's long-term mission is to extend this war and in so doing to weaken the Negus." (14)

Not only did P. M. Vlasov understand this, since he was well versed in the intricate politics of the colonial powers and he had often warned Menelik in advance of the intrigues of the English, but also the Emperor himself, who undeniably had intelligence, insight, and strength of will, understood it too. It is also well known that for more than a year, up to the victory of Kitchener over the Mahdists, Menelik in order to strengthen the western and southwestern borders of his country sent out three military expeditions: Ras Tesemma from the lower reaches of the Sobat River to the White Nile (Colonel L. K. Artamonov who was attached to P. M. Vlasov's mission took part in that expedition), (15) Ras Makonnen in Beni-Shangul, and Ras Wolde Georgis to Lake Rudolf (A. X. Bulatovich went with him). (16) Understanding that in the current situation France was less dangerous than England, the Emperor, choosing the lesser of two evils, used the rivalry between them and helped French expeditions that set out across Ethiopia to the White Nile to meet Marchand with the aim of establishing French dominion on the upper course of that river. (17) Moreover, already before the fall of Khartoum, Menelik strove to establish if not friendship then in any case neighborly relations with his former enemies the Mahdists. With this aim, he went into secret correspondence with the Caliph Abdallah correctly suggesting that England was threatening both of them and that in the changed circumstances of the Sudan, it would be easier to organize to repulse England. (18) Therefore, before sending the detachment of Ras Tesemma, he warned the Caliph on December 15, 1897 about his intentions and about the designs of the colonial powers who were striving to drive a wedge into his possessions and to separate them from one another. Thus Menelik, in essence, betrayed to Abdallah the French plans, recommending in veiled form that in case of the arrival of the Bonchamps expedition "to dispatch it peacefully... and to not listen to rumors (to be more exact to 'gossip') about me. My only intent is to strengthen our friendship with you and to protect our countries from enemies." The letter was intended to suggest to the Caliph that he was not threatened from the side of Ethiopia and therefore should not divert his strength from the struggle with England. (19) The military successes of the English in the Sudan continued to worry Menelik, and at the end of 1898 he sent significant forces to Metama. (20) The English while not undertaking forceful operations all the same tried, as P. M. Vlasov reported at the beginning of 1899, "to strengthen the positions they held in Kalabat and Godaref, on the right bank of the Atbar River, to support with the help of military gunboats their authority at the mouth of the Sobat River and to bring forward advanced posts from Rozeyros on the Blue Nile on the south to the side of Beni-Shangul, with the aim of joining the inhabitants of that territory in an attempt to draw them to their side." (21) Dajazmatch Demissew already had his army in Beni-Shangul. Menelik had prudently sent him to that territory to strengthen it for Ethiopia. As for the lower Sobat and the banks of the Blue Nile, Ras Tesemma did not succeed in gaining a foothold there. He only planted the Ethiopian flag, after which his advanced unit returned. (22)

After the defeat of France at Fashoda (which definitely become clear at the end of 1898), the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Delcassé had to order Marchand to return home. That made it known in the relationship between France and Ethiopia that whereas before Ethiopia "considered France with open trust, now they turned their back on France." One of the reasons for this was the French had disappointed them by not supporting them against England, whose actions on the borders of Ethiopia were very troubling to Menelik.(23) News came to the capital that a detachment of Anglo-Egyptian troops had occupied Metama and despite the protests of Ethiopia had planted the Anglo-Egyptian flag there. Kitchener assured them that "England does not have any aggressive aims against Ethiopia, values its friendship and peace with it, and only occupies territory that is in the sphere of influence of the Sudan, which has always belonged to Egypt, except for when it was temporarily torn away by the Mahdists." The Emperor could not rest easy. Based on long experience, he knew the value of such statements, all the more so because Harrington, the English representative in Addis Ababa, behaved rudely and demandingly. (24) In that same report, P. M. Vlasov informed M. N. Muraviev that he had met with Menelik on January 20 and 22, and Menelik had complained to him about the intrigues of England, France, and Italy and asked for his opinion of related actions and intentions of England. Explaining that he could only share his personal thoughts, and not the opinions of his government, the Russian diplomat told the Emperor approximately what follows:

Not having consolidated its power in the Sudan, which would take time (only a year and a half had passed since the capture of Khartoum, Great Britain was trying to avoid conflict with Ethiopia. Therefore, Ethiopia could show firmness and persistence in trying to realize its goals. The occupation of Rozenros, the upper reaches of the Atbara, sending gunboats to the mouth of the Sobat and a reconnaissance detachment to Beni-Shangul − all of these acts of England amounted to no more than an extension of the Sudan expedition, since all these areas were formerly controlled by the Sudan. Situation was not worth the risk war with England, especially since from the economic point of view these areas had no great value, and the odds of success were slim. Because the English controlled the Sudan and Egypt, if Ethiopia kept some parcel of land on the Blue Nile, at any moment England could cut off the way north and thereby cut off its way to the sea which Ethiopia so much wanted. Wouldn't it be better to negotiate with the English about exchanging a piece of territory on the Blue Nile for a port on the Red Sea, such as Zeila or Berber?

As for the southern borders, the threat there was more serious. The lands newly united with Ethiopia in the region of Lake Rudolph and Lake Stephanie where Ethiopia's influence was very weak, immediately bordered on the English possession of Uganda. Here it was necessary to reinforce garrisons and to with humane treatment secure the favor of the tribes who lived there.

Thus, since it was the sincere desire of Russia to protect Ethiopia from danger, P. M. Vlasov gave Menelik well-meaning advice concerning the security of the borders of his country.

At that time, both Anglo-Egyptian and Ethiopian armies were advancing to meet one another. Because there was no road, the news of that advance arrived at Addis Ababa after a significant delay. Hence on February 18, 1899, Harrington informed P. M. Vlasov that an Anglo-Egyptian detachment took Fasokl on the Blue Nile, southwest of Rozeyros. This action impeded Ethiopian progress to the Blue Nile and threatened Beni-Shangul, to which at the end of 1898 Dajazmatch Demissew had advanced. The English could now directly communicate with the Moslem population and set them against the Christian Ethiopians. (25)

As for Dajazmatch Demissew , he succeeded in going to the northern limits of Beni-Shangul, that is to the Blue Nile, a little south of Famaka, where he ran up against the Anglo-Egyptian detachment. Here a very important incident took place. This is known of from a letter from Demissew to his father, Afe-Nygusu-Nesibu, who was on the Ethiopian Supreme Court. We reproduce that letter in the account of P. M. Vlasov. The English commander of the detachment demanded a meeting with Demissew. In answer to the question of where the Ethiopian army was heading, Demissew answered that it was going to find the flag that was planted in 1897 by Ras Makonnen on the border of this country. The English officer declared that he had that flag. Demissew demanded that he return the flag to its former place. The English brought the flag and suggested to him that they would raise it, but Demissew would not agree, saying "We planted the flag of our own volition, and now we should raise it again ourselves." Then the English reinforced the Ethiopian flag, saluted it, and went south.

P. M. Vlasov drew from this incident the conclusion that "the English in view of the significant superiority of Abyssinian arms and the obvious risk of being beaten decided not to join battle with them in open conflict and abided by the Ethiopian demand." However, he didn't know if this fact was a sufficient guarantee of English recognition of the rights of Ethiopia to Beni-Shangul. (26)

And there were reasons for doubt. It was a month after the aforementioned report was sent that the incident became known and Harrington asked Menelik − on what basis are Ethiopian armies advancing to Fasokl? The Emperor answered decisively. He told the British government that "the region of Beni-Shangul was subject to his force of arms. It belonged to him, and he would defend it with arms in hand." Harrington declared that if in the near future he did not receive an explanation of the intentions of Ethiopia with regard to the valleys of the White Nile and the Blue Nile, a delineation of English borders on the northwest, west and south, he would abandon Addis Ababa. (27) Such conduct of the British diplomat greatly irritated the Emperor.

However, the English government considered it was not a good time for an open break with Ethiopia and therefore ordered Harrington to explain to the Emperor that he should consider he had the borders he desired in disputed regions on the west and in regions for which he had proofs of his possession. P. M. Vlasov believed and subsequent events confirmed that it was for the most part true that the English "by right of conquest had the whole right bank of the White Nile and the Sobat and Juba Rivers... and had no objection to offering the Emperor the territory of Hedaref and Kalabatwit the upper reaches of the Atbar River to the Tomat and the country of Beni-Shangul with the middle course of the Blue Nile to Rozeyros.

Conceding this piece of Mahdist territory to Ethiopia, England gained the possibility of "sowing among the Mahdists irreconcilable hatred for Ethiopia for an extended time, and always being at the ready for starting an uprising against the government of Ethiopia." If Menelik refused the English terms, P. M. Vlasov didn't rule out the outbreak of war. (28)

At this time of his return trip from Fashoda to France, Marchand and his fellow travelers stayed a month in Addis Ababa. He strove to win over the Emperor to help France and at the same time to harm England, but he considered war between England and Ethiopia and England's victory in that war inevitable. Marchand had stationed on the Baro River two gunboats with two guns each, and ammunition for them, a quarter million cartridges and seven boats. He gave all these possessions to Menelik. The guns were set up at strategically advantageous positions, and the people of Tesemma were taught how to use them. In addition, French officers consulted with Tesemma regarding measures necessary for the defense of the territory he ruled. (29)