Pluralism E-Book

Peter Lassman

• Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 355

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2013

Beschreibung

The problem of value pluralism permeates modern political philosophy. Its presence can be felt even when it is not explicitly the central topic under investigation. Political thinkers such as Max Weber, Isaiah Berlin and Stuart Hampshire derive pessimistic, sometimes tragic, conclusions from their reflections upon pluralism. On the other hand, there is a more optimistic view represented by John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas that sees value pluralism as a problem that is easier to live with. This book presents the first accessible overview for both post- and undergraduate students of the way in which this problem has been understood and responded to by modern political thinkers.

Leseprobe

Table of Contents

Cover

Title page

Copyright page

Acknowledgements

1 Pluralism

1 The Problem

2 Disagreement

3 Modernity and Disenchantment

4 Two Concepts of Pluralism

5 An Outline of the Argument

2 Pluralism and Pessimism

1 Weber’S Values

2 Isaiah Berlin: Pluralism and the Cosmic Jigsaw Puzzle

3 Stuart Hampshire: Pluralism and Pessimism

4 John Gray: Pluralism and Modus Vivendi

Conclusion

3 Reconciliation and Public Reason

1 John Rawls: The Idea of a ‘Realistic Utopia’

2 Reconciliation through Public Reason

3 Kantian Republicanism and Political Liberalism: The Debate with Jürgen Habermas

3 History and Theory

4 Pluralism: Reconciliation and Disagreement

Index

Copyright © Peter Lassman 2011

The right of Peter Lassman to be identified as Author of this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

First published in 2011 by Polity Press

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Cambridge CB2 1UR, UK

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ISBN-13: 978-0-7456-1617-9

ISBN-13: 978-0-7456-1618-6(pb)

ISBN-13: 978-0-7456-3725-9(Single-user ebook)

ISBN-13: 978-0-7456-3724-2(Multi-user ebook)

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Acknowledgements

Writing this book took much longer than I, or probably anyone else, expected. Along the way I learned much from discussions with colleagues in the Theory Group of the Department of Political Science and International Studies of the University of Birmingham. Steve Buckler, Jethro Butler, Cecile Hatier, Jeremy Jennings, Jamie Reed, Richard North, Alan Shadforth and Richard Shorten were all long-standing participants. I must also thank the two Richards for putting up with my continual and uninvited interruptions to their working day. I, of course, take full responsibility for all the shortcomings and deficiencies on display here. Despite the destructive policies that have resulted from the occupation of English universities by the forces of a philistine and crude form of utilitarian managerialism, I remain firm in my, perhaps, utopian conviction that the study of political theory can continue to operate as a form of intellectual resistance.

Some of the material here appeared in an earlier form in Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, Etica e Politica, History of Political Thought, and Max Weber Studies.

Special thanks go to Sue, Daniel, Amy, Ellen, Sue, Nathan, Mila and Ruby.

1

Pluralism

1 The Problem

The problem of value pluralism is a central topic in modern political theory. Its presence is discernible even when, at first sight, its significance is not immediately apparent. There are two important questions here. The first is to ask what kind of problem it is. The second is to inquire why it is that political theorists have come to think of it as a problem. In answering these questions, we have to recognize that there is some ambiguity regarding the way in which the term ‘value pluralism’ has come to be used. Pluralism can be understood either as a description of one aspect of the social condition of modern western societies or as a controversial philosophical thesis about the nature of value. If it is defined as the latter it is a philosophical theory that does, many would argue, have political implications. It is also a fact, as Bernard Williams has pointed out, that the modern world has become particularly conscious of value pluralism in both senses.1

The idea of ‘pluralism’ has become so pervasive that, for example, according to Richard Flathman, almost every modern political theorist seems to be a pluralist. He sees the core of pluralism in a broad sense as ‘the recognition of a multiplicity of persons and groups … A commitment to pluralism, however transitory or transitional, as a descriptive/analytic theory involves the belief that, here and now, such a multiplicity cannot be explained away’.2 In his discussion of pluralism, Flathman admits that although most are pluralists to some degree, for others it is a superficial and trivial idea that conceals the deeper truth of its opposite, monism. Of course, there are many different things other than values about which one can take a pluralist attitude.

Although the concept of pluralism can be used in this rather general manner, the most significant and puzzling form of pluralism that concerns modern political theorists is the version generally known as ‘value pluralism’. The debate about value pluralism has become increasingly complex. Unfortunately, there is often a lack of clarity both about the claims made and their implications. First, it is not always clear what philosophers and political theorists mean when they talk about ‘values’. For example, one could point to a distinction that is frequently made in discussions of the pluralism of moral values, between a view that sees value as residing in goods or ends, while others see value in terms of rules and principles.3 However, despite what is often a lack of conceptual clarity in the political literature, the point of these discussions is usually fairly clear. Most discussions of value pluralism among political theorists take a view of value in terms of the realization of public goods, such as liberty, equality, or justice.

Not everyone is happy with the kind of talk about values that pervades much modern political thought. For instance, some theorists working within a broadly Aristotelian tradition argue that its generally accepted vocabulary – in which concepts of rights, autonomy, and value pluralism play a central role – is deeply deficient. They argue that the modern language of ‘values’ and, therefore, of value pluralism is itself ‘a pathological feature of modern moral experience’. All talk of ‘values’ is regarded as unnecessarily subjective. The language of plural values underwritten by a fear of a monism of values, it is argued, functions to rule out any constructive consideration of the question of a strong sense of the human good that is a presupposition of all political theories. It is true that much neo-Aristotelian theory does present an important and powerful antidote to many of the assumptions of the predominantly liberal forms of modern Anglo-American theory. It is also true that not all who work within a broadly conceived Aristotelian tradition are completely hostile to the idea of value pluralism. Although they accept the truth of value pluralism, they do not accept the conclusions that are drawn from it by liberal political philosophers often inspired by Kant. However, for the moment, it is probably sufficient to agree that in ordinary usage, for better or worse, the language of values used is generally intelligible without it necessarily having the pathological and subjective implications for which it has been charged.