29,99 €
Mehr erfahren.
- Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
- Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
- Serie: The Blackwell / Brown Lectures in Philosophy
- Sprache: Englisch
Rationality Through Reasoning answers the question of how people are motivated to do what they believe they ought to do, built on a comprehensive account of normativity, rationality and reasoning that differs significantly from much existing philosophical thinking.
- Develops an original account of normativity, rationality and reasoning significantly different from the majority of existing philosophical thought
- Includes an account of theoretical and practical reasoning that explains how reasoning is something we ourselves do, rather than something that happens in us
- Gives an account of what reasons are and argues that the connection between rationality and reasons is much less close than many philosophers have thought
- Contains rigorous new accounts of oughts including owned oughts, agent-relative reasons, the logic of requirements, instrumental rationality, the role of normativity in reasoning, following a rule, the correctness of reasoning, the connections between intentions and beliefs, and much else.
- Offers a new answer to the ‘motivation question’ of how a normative belief motivates an action.
Sie lesen das E-Book in den Legimi-Apps auf:
Seitenzahl: 696
Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2013
Ähnliche
Table of Contents
The Blackwell/Brown Lectures in Philosophy
Title page
Copyright page
Dedication
Preface
1: Introduction
1.1 Motivation
1.2 This book
2: Ought
2.1 The meaning of ‘ought’
2.2 Normative and non-normative oughts
2.3 Owned and unowned oughts
2.4 Qualified and unqualified oughts
3: Objective, Subjective and Prospective Oughts
3.1 Sidgwick's View
3.2 The need to decide
3.3 Objective and prospective oughts
3.4 Valuing prospects
3.5 Summary
4: Reasons
4.1 Introduction and preliminaries
4.2 Pro toto reasons
4.3 Pro tanto reasons
4.4 Most reason
4.5 Ownership of reasons
5: Responding to Reasons
5.1 Rationality and responding to reasons
5.2 The quick objection
5.3 Attitudinal reasons
5.4 Sufficiency of reasons
6: Responding to Reason-Beliefs
6.1 The Enkratic Condition
6.2 Meeting your own standards
6.3 Responding correctly to P-beliefs
6.4 Conclusion
7: Requirements
7.1 Two sorts of requirement
7.2 Property requirements
7.3 Source requirements
7.4 Logic for requirements?
7.5 Ought
8: Conditional Requirements
8.1 Application and content
8.2 Conditional requirements of rationality
Appendix to Chapter 8
9: Synchronic Rationality
9.1 Introduction and method
9.2 Consistency
9.3 Deduction
9.4 Instrumental Rationality
9.5 Enkrasia
9.6 Bayesian requirements
10: Diachronic Rationality
10.1 Persistence of Intention
10.2 The rationality of doing as you decide
10.3 Diachronic requirements on beliefs
10.4 Basing prohibitions and basing permissions
11: Rationality and Normativity
11.1 The Normative Question
11.2 More on rationality and reasons
11.3 Is rationality derivatively normative?
11.4 Is rationality non-derivatively normative?
12: Higher-Order Reasoning
12.1 The reasoning process
12.2 Reasoning through an intention
12.3 Reasoning with judgement-sensitive attitudes
12.4 One more point
13: First-Order Reasoning
13.1 The reasoning process
13.2 Necessary and sufficient conditions for reasoning
13.3 Operating on contents
13.4 Reasoning as activity
13.5 Reasoning at the first order
13.6 The direction of reasoning
13.7 Correct belief reasoning
14: Practical Reasoning
14.1 Reasoning with attitudes other than beliefs
14.2 Correctness
14.3 Choosing a means
14.4 Hypothesizing
15: Explicit Reasoning
15.1 Markers
15.2 Bayesian and expressivist reasoning
15.3 Reasoning with absences
15.4 Theoretical and practical reasoning
15.5 Intention reasoning with other markers
16: Enkratic Reasoning
16.1 Enkratic reasoning
16.2 Humean objections
16.3 Conclusion
Bibliography
Index
The Blackwell/Brown Lectures in Philosophy
The Blackwell/Brown Lectures in Philosophy present compact books distilling cutting-edge research from across the discipline. Based on public lectures presented at Brown University, the books in the series are by established scholars of the highest caliber, presenting their work in a clear and concise format.
Forthcoming books by Philip Pettit
This edition first published 2013
© 2013 John Broome
Blackwell Publishing was acquired by John Wiley & Sons in February 2007. Blackwell's publishing program has been merged with Wiley's global Scientific, Technical, and Medical business to form Wiley-Blackwell.
Registered Office
John Wiley & Sons Ltd, The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, UK
Editorial Offices
350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148-5020, USA
9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK
The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, UK
For details of our global editorial offices, for customer services, and for information about how to apply for permission to reuse the copyright material in this book please see our website at www.wiley.com/wiley-blackwell.
The right of John Broome to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, without the prior permission of the publisher.
Wiley also publishes its books in a variety of electronic formats. Some content that appears in print may not be available in electronic books.
Designations used by companies to distinguish their products are often claimed as trademarks. All brand names and product names used in this book are trade names, service marks, trademarks or registered trademarks of their respective owners. The publisher is not associated with any product or vendor mentioned in this book.
Limit of Liability/Disclaimer of Warranty: While the publisher and author(s) have used their best efforts in preparing this book, they make no representations or warranties with respect to the accuracy or completeness of the contents of this book and specifically disclaim any implied warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. It is sold on the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering professional services and neither the publisher nor the author shall be liable for damages arising herefrom. If professional advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional should be sought.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
9781405117104 (HB)
9781118656051 (PB)
Broome, John, 1947–
Rationality through reasoning / John Broome.
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-4051-1710-4 (cloth) – ISBN 978-1-118-65605-1 (pbk.) 1. Reasoning. 2. Practical reason. I. Title.
BC177.B76 2013
153.4'3–dc23
2013012754
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
Cover design by Simon Levy Associates.
For Derek Parfit
Preface
Long ago, Derek Parfit generously asked me to respond to a paper of his in a symposium at the 1997 Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association. Writing my response was the beginning of my work on the subject of this book. Traditionally, the two papers in a symposium were published in the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume under the same title. But sharp-eyed readers may have noticed that, whereas Parfit's paper was entitled ‘Reasons and motivation’, mine was entitled ‘Reason and motivation’. By that time, I had already concluded that rational motivation was less about reasons than many philosophers assume, and more about figuring out by reason what you ought to do and then coming through reason to do it.
The last stage brings a difficulty. If you come through reason to do a particular act, reason supports your doing it. But how could it support your doing an act unless it is one you ought to do? And it might not be one you ought to do; even if you have figured out by reason that you ought to do this act, you may have made a mistake. A solution came to me as I walked along Dag Hammarskjölds väg in Uppsala, one snowy day early in 1998. I was in Uppsala on the first of several long visits to the Swedish Collegium of Advanced Study. SCAS has always been exceptionally generous to me and given me the very best opportunities for working. Each visit has advanced my work on the subject of this book. That first time I realized that, when you come through reason to act, reason need not support your acting simpliciter. Instead, reason – rationality – requires of you that, if you believe you ought to do something, you do it. The condition is within the scope of what reason requires. Reason supports your making the conditional true, not your acting. This insight that the requirement of rationality has a ‘wide scope’ was not original; I soon discovered that Jonathan Dancy had mentioned it twenty years earlier in his paper ‘The logical conscience’. But it provided a foundation for this book. Later, a long correspondence with Niko Kolodny helped me to refine it.
Through the following years I slowly disentangled some of the relevant concepts. First, I disentangled rationality from normativity in general. Many philosophers think of rationality as a sort of enforcer for normativity: it is your rationality that makes you do what you have a reason to do, or at least what you believe you have a reason to do. I now think that rationality is much less tightly connected with normativity than that. Second, I disentangled reasoning, which is something a person does, from rationality, which is a property of a person and her mental states. During these developments, I benefited from many discussions with those of my research students who were interested in aspects of the subject: first Andrew Riesner and later Julian Fink, Stephen Kearns, Yair Levy, James Morauta, Toby Ord, and Gerard Vong.
The last five years of my work on the book have mainly been occupied with trying to understand reasoning. My account of reasoning has gone through several revolutions, each correcting an initial mistake of mine. At first I was deceived by a similarity between the contents of instrumental practical reasoning and the contents of theoretical reasoning by modus ponens. I thought that the two were somehow fused together. I have now concluded that their similarity is only superficial. A second mistake was to assume that, when reasoning is correct, it is made correct by requirements of rationality. I now realize that reasoning is made correct by permissions, not requirements. Correct reasoning is not reasoning you are required to do by rationality, but reasoning you are permitted to do by rationality. This seems intuitively obvious, but I understood it properly only as a result of facing up to an objection to my previous account of reasoning that was shown me by Kieran Setiya. A third mistake was to assume that reasoning – at least when it is conscious and something we do – has to be conducted in language. This may be true, but a discussion with Paul Boghossian persuaded me it is best not to assume it. Boghossian also made me realize I should take more seriously the well-known difficulties of rule-following, which are associated with my view that reasoning is a rule-governed operation.
I gave three Blackwell-Brown Lectures in 2003. I was honoured to receive the invitation. This book exists because of it. The lectures drew together my work up to that point. It turned out to be an earlier point in the development of the book than either I or my publishers had anticipated. Still, from then on I possessed a draft book.
I have been honoured by subsequent invitations that have given me the opportunity to garner advice from philosophers in different parts of the world. I want to mention three in particular. First, I gave four Wedberg Lectures in Stockholm in 2004, where I benefited from the commentary of the four excellent discussants, Lars Bergström, Torbjörn Tännsjö, Folke Tersman and Åsa Wikforss. Second, there was a conference on my work in Canberra in 2007, with valuable papers from Geoffrey Brennan, Garrett Cullity, James Dreier, Andrew Reisner, Wlodek Rabinowicz, Nicholas Southwood and Daniel Star. Third, I gave two Whitehead Lectures at Harvard in 2011, where again I received very useful comments.
Many institutions have supported me with their generosity during the long writing of this book. I have mentioned SCAS already. My visits there have alternated with visits to the Research School of Social Sciences at the Australian National University. Any philosopher who has spent time at the RSSS knows what wonderful stimulation is to be found there. My home universities – first St Andrews and now Oxford – have been very kind with the leave they granted me from teaching. For a whole three years, my research on this book was funded by a Major Research Fellowship from the Leverhulme Trust. Not only did the Trust finance me for all that time, but it has shown remarkable forbearance during the subsequent years while the book remained unfinished. I do hope it will think the result is worth the wait.
I have to express ironical thanks to another institution: the UK Research Excellence Framework. The REF is stupid in some ways. It demands that philosophy should have a demonstrable impact on society within fifteen years, whereas the actual impact of philosophy on society is wide and deep but takes decades or centuries to develop. However, the REF did have the merit of setting me a deadline. For its sake, this book had to go to press by the end of 2012. It went, with all the imperfections it still contains. I could have worked much longer on trying to eliminate each one. I am pleased I did not, and now I can even blame them on the REF.
Over the years I have been helped by a great number of philosophers who gave me their time. I am not adequately acknowledging my debts simply by including them in the great long list below. Many have sent me extensive comments and continued to do so for years. But when so many have helped me to a greater or lesser extent, what else can I do? I am worried, too, that I have probably forgotten to list some people whose contribution has been important. If you are one of those, please forgive my lapse of memory.
I have already mentioned Derek Parfit, who started me on this track, influenced the turnings I took, and also near the end sent me long comments about the whole book. Parfit's own work was the stimulus for mine. Several chapters of my book implicitly or explicitly engage with it. I often obstinately disagree with Parfit, but I hope he will recognize that I am much more on his side than against it. Really, he has always been my mentor.
I have also already mentioned my students at Oxford. I have learnt a great deal from them, and some have taken the trouble to comment extensively on my writing. More senior friends and colleagues, with whom I have had many conversations about topics in this book, include Gustaf Arrhenius, Michael Bratman, Geoffrey Brennan, Krister Bykvist, Roger Crisp, Jonathan Dancy, Brad Hooker, Douglas MacLean, Wlodek Rabinowicz, Nicholas Southwood, John Skorupski and Ralph Wedgwood.
I know of several philosophers besides Parfit and my students who have read drafts of the whole book and sent me comments. They include Josée Brunet, Roger Crisp, Garrett Cullity, Mark Schroeder and Ralph Wedgwood. Each has contributed greatly. I must mention Brunet in particular. She spent a year in Oxford, during which she worked carefully through my draft and regularly gave me thoughtful advice. She was a great help.
Now the great long list. Besides those I have mentioned already, each of the following philosophers has helped me, mostly through written comments. Some have helped me a great deal: Norbert Anwander, Nomy Arpaly, Robert Audi, Dennis Badenhop, Thomas Baldwin, Sophie Botros, Selim Berker, John Bishop, Sarah Broadie, Anne Burkard, Erik Carlson, Ruth Chang, Matthew Chrisman, Ursula Coope, Louis deRosset, Malte Engel, Pascal Engel, David Estlund, Daan Evers, Nancy Cartwright, Garrett Cullity, Bill Child, Janice Dowell, Gerald Dworkin, Edward Elliot, Kit Fine, Antonio Gaitán-Torres, Jan Gertken, Margaret Gilbert, Katrin Glüer-Pagin, Kalle Grill, Dorothy Grover, Olav Gjelsvik, Caspar Hare, Anandi Hattiangadi, Tim Henning, Pamela Hieronymi, John Horty, Kent Hurtig, Nadeem Hussain, John Hyman, Benedikt Kahmen, Benjamin Kiesewetter, Christine Korsgaard, Richard Kraut, Arto Laitinen, Daniel Laurier, Leon Leontyev, Micah Lewin, Sten Lindström, Christian List, Errol Lord, John Maier, Julia Markowits, Cynthia MacDonald, Graham MacDonald, David McCarthy, Adam Morton, Kevin Mulligan, Jennifer Nagel, Carsten Nielsen, Sven Nyholm, Jonas Olson, Peter Pagin, Herlinde Pauer-Studer, Adam Perry, Philip Pettit, Christian Piller, Eugen Pissarskoi, Andreas Pittrich, Dag Prawitz, Robert Pulvertaft, Joseph Raz, Henry Richardson, Michael Ridge, Simon Robertson, Jacob Ross, Abe Roth, Kieran Setiya, Nicholas Shackel, Thomas Schmidt, Oliver Schott, François and Laura Schroeter, Nick Shea, Peter Simons, Holly Smith, Michael Smith, Nicholas Smith, Daniel Star, Daniel Stoljar, Bart Streumer, Jussi Suikkanen, Pär Sundström, Sigrun Svarvasdottir, Lucas Swaine, Sergio Tennenbaum, Judith Thomson, Teru Thomas, Valerie Tiberius, John Turri, Gijs van Donselaar, Bruno Verbeek, Jay Wallace, Clas Weber, David Wiggins, Dominic Wilkinson, Stephen Winter and Michael Zimmerman.
I am very grateful to Yair Levy for checking the proofs of this book with great diligence, and for creating the index.
I am especially grateful to my wife Ann for her forbearance. She has now patiently sat out the writing of seven books.
1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
When you believe you ought to do something, your belief often causes you to intend to do what you believe you ought to do. How does that happen? I call this ‘the motivation question’. I shall try to answer it in this book.
It is also true that, when you believe you ought to do something, your belief often causes you actually to do it. We could also ask how that happens. This question raises the mind–body problem. When you believe you ought to do some bodily act, and this belief causes you to do the act, a state of your mind causes a physical movement. One part of the mind–body problem is to understand how a state of mind can have a physical effect like that. I wish to set this problem aside, and I do that by focusing on your intention rather than your action. The motivation question is about your mind only. When your belief causes you to intend to act, your intention will in turn generally cause you to act, but that is not my concern.
The motivation question has an easy answer: most people are disposed to intend to do what they believe they ought to do, perhaps not every time, but often. They have the ‘enkratic disposition’, as I shall call it. This is a genuine answer to the question, and correct as far as it goes. It has a real content. It tells us that the explanation of why you often intend to do what you believe you ought to do lies within you: you are constituted that way. We can no doubt add that you have this disposition as a result of natural selection.
However, this easy answer is very thin. It leaves a lot to be explained. How does the enkratic disposition work, exactly? In what way does it bring about its effect?
One possible answer is that some causal process within people, whose details have no philosophical interest, tends to make them intend to do what they believe they ought to do. But this answer is unsatisfying. Some people have the enkratic disposition more strongly than others, and some may not have it at all; some are strongly disposed to intend to do what they believe they ought to do, and others are not. We can classify people accordingly. Let us call the ones who have the disposition strongly ‘sheep’, and the others ‘goats’. Unless we are Calvinists, we shall not be satisfied with merely classifying people. We should expect it to be at least partly up to people themselves whether they are goats or sheep. We should expect that people by their own efforts can actually bring themselves to intend to do what they believe they ought to do. And we should be able to explain how they can do so. It is not enough to say it just happens because of some causal process within them.
Rationality and reasoning
We can call in rationality to help answer the motivation question. We can say that rationality requires people to intend to do what they believe they ought to do, and that it requires them to be disposed to do so – to have the enkratic disposition. No doubt this is true, and it follows that the goats are not fully rational. This is a criticism to throw at the goats, but it is still ‘merely classificatory’, to use Thomas Nagel's term.1 It gives us an explanation of why rational people are disposed to intend to do what they believe they ought to do, which is that they would not be classified as rational if they did not. But it gives us no explanation of how, in rational people, this disposition works.
In Ethics and the A Priori, Michael Smith undertakes ‘to explain how it can be that our beliefs about what we are rationally justified in doing play a proper causal role in the genesis of our actions’.2 (Smith is interested in desires rather than intentions.) His explanation is that
In rational creatures … we would … expect there to be a causal connection between believing that it is desirable to act in a certain way and desiring to act in that way. … For the psychological states of rational deliberators and thinkers connect with each other in just the way that they rationally should.3
But this does not explain how our beliefs play a proper causal role in the genesis of our actions. It explains only why rational creatures are causally disposed to act in ways they believe are desirable. The explanation is that otherwise they would not count as rational.
Elsewhere, Smith mentions ‘the capacity we have, as rational creatures, to have a coherent psychology’.4 This is getting somewhere. Exercising a capacity is something we do; it does not just happen. So Smith is suggesting that we may ourselves bring it about that we desire to do what we believe we ought to do. But we still need to be told how we do that.
Calling in rationality is definitely a step towards the explanation we are looking for. It points us towards reasoning. We know that people have a particular means of coming to satisfy some of the requirements of rationality, and that is reasoning. Reasoning is something we do. It is a mental activity of ours that can bring us to satisfy some of the requirements of rationality.
For example, suppose you believe it is raining and that if it is raining the snow will melt. Plausibly, rationality requires you to believe what follows by modus ponens from beliefs of yours – in this case that the snow will melt – at least if you care about what follows. Suppose you do care whether the snow will melt; perhaps you are planning to ski today. But suppose you do not yet believe the snow will melt. (You have just woken up. You have noticed the rain, and you know that rain causes snow to melt, but you have not yet thought about the snow.) So at present you do not satisfy this requirement of rationality. But you can bring yourself to satisfy it by undertaking a process of reasoning. This process will set out from your initial beliefs and it will conclude with your believing the snow will melt. In doing this reasoning you are mentally active, and you bring yourself to satisfy a requirement of rationality.
Now suppose you believe you ought to oil that squeaky hinge. I have already assumed that rationality requires you to intend to do what you believe you ought to do. You can bring yourself to satisfy this requirement, too, by a process of reasoning. The process will start from your initial belief that you ought to oil that squeaky hinge and conclude with your intending to do so. So reasoning can bring you to intend to do what you believe you ought to do.
Your ability to reason constitutes part of your enkratic disposition. No doubt you often intend to do what you believe you ought to do automatically, without reasoning. But this does not always happen automatically, and when automatic processes fail, sometimes you achieve the result through the activity of reasoning. I call this type of reasoning ‘enkratic reasoning’.
We have arrived at a more interesting answer to the motivation question. You have an enkratic disposition, and this disposition sometimes works through the philosophically interesting process. This process is enkratic reasoning, which is something you do. You have the ability to bring yourself, through reasoning, to intend to do what you believe you ought to do. I hope to justify this answer.
In one way, it is a very attractive answer to the motivation question, because it tells us that we can motivate ourselves by our own activity. But many moral philosophers will find it unattractive in a different way.5 In moral contexts, these philosophers think a truly virtuous person does what she believes she ought to do automatically and without thinking. She does not reason about it. Indeed, they think a truly virtuous person often does what she ought to do without even forming the belief that she ought to do it. I do not deny these views. I say only that we can motivate ourselves through reasoning. Those of us who are not truly virtuous may find we need to do it often when morality makes demands on us.
I also need to stress at the outset that I am not concerned particularly with morality. ‘Ought’ is not particularly a moral word, and I do not treat it as one. It is a general normative word; chapter 2 examines its meaning. The motivation question as I mean it is about how people are motivated by normative beliefs in general. It is not particularly about moral motivation.
1.2 This book
The task of justifying my answer to the motivation question is large. As part of it, I need to present an account of reasoning in general. Since reasoning is a means by which we can bring ourselves to satisfy some of the requirements of rationality, I need as a preliminary to investigate rationality. Rationality in turn has connections with normativity: with ought and reasons. This book therefore starts with an examination of normativity, goes on to rationality and concludes with reasoning.
My initial motivation in writing this book was to answer the motivation question. However, this question itself takes up only this short chapter and the last one. In between, there is a lot of argument that I hope may prove independently useful. I have tried to answer, or at least contribute to answering, quite a number of fundamental questions within the philosophy of normativity. What are reasons? What is their relation to ought, and to rationality? Is there a logic of ought? What is rationality? Is rationality normative? How is it connected to our process of reasoning? What is the process of reasoning? What is practical reasoning in particular? When is reasoning correct? And so on.
My answer to each question is no doubt contentious to some extent. Since my answer to the motivation question is built on all of these answers together, it is the most contentious thing in the book. So even if you doubt my answer to the motivation question, I hope you may nevertheless be persuaded by some of my subsidiary arguments.
Chapters 2–4 describe the fundamental features of normativity. Chapters 2 and 3 are about ought, which I take to be the most fundamental feature. They do not try to define ought. Instead they distinguish various meanings of the word ‘ought’ and pick out the one that I call ‘central’. This is the ought I consider most fundamental and the one that plays a role later in the book. I identify it through the principle I call ‘Enkrasia’: that rationality requires you to intend to do what you believe you ought to do. The central ought is the ought mentioned in this principle.
Chapter 4 goes on to reasons. It defines a reason in terms of ought. Indeed, it defines reasons of two sorts, which I call ‘pro toto reasons’ and ‘pro tanto reasons’.
Chapters 5–11 contain my account of rationality. They begin by rejecting in chapters 5 and 6 the common opinion that rationality consists in responding correctly to reasons or to beliefs about reasons.
My own account of rationality depends on the notion of a requirement of rationality. Next therefore, in chapters 7 and 8, I describe the nature and logic of requirements in general. Chapter 8 considers the vexed question of the logical scope of requirements.
Chapter 9 describes some synchronic requirements of rationality. It concentrates particularly on Enkrasia and the instrumental requirement that you intend what you believe to be a means to an end that you intend. Chapter 10 continues the description of rationality by describing some diachronic requirements. It concludes with a discussion of some particular permissions of rationality (negations of requirements) that I call ‘basing permissions’. These are crucial to my later account of correct reasoning.
Chapter 11 considers the question of whether rationality is normative: whether, when rationality requires something of you, that fact constitutes a reason for you to do what it requires. I believe rationality is normative, but the chapter explains that I cannot demonstrate that this is so.
Chapters 12–16 are about reasoning. Chapter 12 rejects the common view that reasoning necessarily involves a normative belief. More exactly, it rejects the view that reasoning necessarily involves the belief that you ought to have a particular attitude, such as a particular belief or a particular intention. No normative beliefs are involved in my first-order account of reasoning, which follows in the next chapter.
The basics of the first-order account are in chapter 13. This chapter argues that reasoning is a mental process in which you operate on the contents of your attitudes, following a rule. It explains how reasoning is an activity – something you do – and it identifies reasoning as correct if the rule it follows corresponds to a basing permission of rationality.
Chapter 13 uses theoretical reasoning as its example; chapter 14 extends the first-order account to practical reasoning. It examines correctness in more detail.
My account of reasoning does not assume that we necessarily reason using language. But there is a case for thinking that we do, so that we have to express our attitudes in language in order to reason with them. That condition places some constraints on our reasoning. Chapter 15 considers what they are.
Chapter 16 returns finally to enkratic reasoning. It explains that enkratic reasoning fits my account of reasoning in general. If my account is right, therefore, enkratic reasoning is indeed something we can do to bring ourselves to intend to do what we believe we ought to do.
Metaphysics
You will not find in this book any discussion of the metaphysical nature of normativity.
True, my answer to the motivation question does have a metaphysical motivation. Some philosophers find it puzzling that a person can be motivated by a belief, so they are puzzled about the enkratic disposition. They find it puzzling that you can be caused to intend some action by the belief that you ought to do it. Their puzzlement has led some of them to be noncognitivists about normativity. They have concluded that the belief that you ought to do something cannot be an ordinary belief. They think it must be some other sort of mental state, in which motivation is already embedded.6
In this book I shall try to account for the enkratic disposition in a way that is not puzzling. My account leaves it open whether or not the belief that you ought to do something is an ordinary belief, but it removes one reason for thinking it is not. So it is intended to remove one of the grounds for noncognitivism. This is a modest metaphysical aim.
It is true too that my language is metaphysically presumptuous; it is realist. For example, I shall say that one sort of reason is an explanation of a deontic fact, and by a deontic fact I mean the fact that someone ought to do something or other. ‘Fact’ and ‘explanation’ are realist words. But our normative language just is presumptuous in this way, and I see no point in being squeamish about it.
Part of the job of metaphysics is to account for what we know about normativity. In this book I aim to provide some data for metaphysics to account for, by identifying some of the things we know. If it should all turn out false, or true only in a fiction,7 so we do not know these things after all, that would be disappointing. But I trust the metaphysicians to do better than that.
Notes
1 Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism, p. 109.
2 p. 35.
3 p. 36.
4Ethics and the A Priori, p. 4.
5 See, for example, Rosalind Hursthouse's On Virtue Ethics and Nomy Arpaly's Unprincipled Virtue, pp. 51–63.
6 For example, in Allan Gibbard's noncognitivist theory, set out in his Thinking How to Live, the belief that you ought to do something is a sort of intention.
7 In Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, J. L. Mackie argues that all ethical statements are false. In The Myth of Morality, Richard Joyce agrees, but argues that they should be taken as fictional. I do not know of anyone who takes either view about normative statements in general.
2
Ought
2.1 The meaning of ‘ought’
‘You ought to look both ways before you cross the road.’ ‘Protesters ought not to be allowed to clutter up the streets of London.’ ‘Everyone ought to know her own name.’ ‘The plural of “mouse” ought to be “mouses”.’ ‘Grapefruits ought to be sweet.’ ‘John ought not to have said such cruel things.’ – The word ‘ought’ appears everywhere.
Along with its synonym ‘should’, it is our workaday normative word. It can have a solemn – sometimes even a moral – meaning, but more often we use it lightly. I once advised a guest that he ought to eat a mangosteen because mangosteens taste delicious. I was speaking correctly. ‘Ought’ is certainly not particularly a moral word.
‘Ought’ appears frequently in this book because I am writing about rationality, and one of my topics is the relationship between rationality and normativity. Already in chapter 1 I have described one feature of the relationship using ‘ought’: I said that rationality requires you to intend to do what you believe you ought to do. I shall start the book's work by clarifying what I mean by this word.
I shall not try to define its meaning;1 I assume you already know what ‘ought’ means. But its meaning varies with the context, and sometimes the word is ambiguous even within a single context. In this book ‘ought’ nearly always has one particular meaning, and I need to distinguish that one from others. That is the aim of this chapter and the next.
‘Ought’ differs from most English verbs in having no nominalization. Some authors use ‘obligation’ to play this role, but that is misleading: although you ought to look both ways before crossing the road, you have no obligation to do so. Still, I need a nominalization, and I shall give myself one by violating grammar. I shall use ‘ought’ as a noun as well as a verb. The noun means what the gerund ‘oughting’ would mean if it existed.
I aim to identify my meaning of ‘ought’, and I shall proceed by successively refining the meaning. I shall introduce successive distinctions among possible meanings: between normative and non-normative oughts, between owned and unowned oughts, between qualified and unqualified oughts and between objective and prospective oughts. Each time I shall locate my meaning on one side of the distinction. In the end it will be narrowed to my precise meaning.
I shall call this the ‘central’ ought. It is central in a number of respects that will appear in this chapter. In chapter 4 I shall define reasons in terms of this ought. This is to give it a central place in the philosophy of normativity as a whole.
These two chapters on ought are not just about meaning. In order to identify my particular ought, I have to survey some of the landscape of normativity, to sort out what different oughts there are. This involves some substantive normative theory at a very basic level. In particular, I shall identify one essential feature of ought as I mean it.
2.2 Normative and non-normative oughts
‘Ought’ is used both normatively and non-normatively. It is used normatively in the sentence
You ought to look both ways before crossing the road.
It is used non-normatively in the following sentences, at least when they have their most natural settings:
You might suspect there is some continuity between normative and non-normative meanings. In some sentences, ‘ought’ even seems to lie on a borderline between the two. An example is this:
Christine ought to know her seven-times table by the age of nine.
One implication of this sentence is the non-normative one that Christine would know her seven-times table by the age of nine if her skills were to develop typically. On the other hand, the sentence also seems to carry some of the implications that go with the normative ought. It seems to imply someone is at fault – perhaps Christine or perhaps her teachers – if Christine does not know her seven-times table by the age of nine.
Even some of my examples of non-normative meanings can appear to lie on the borderline of the normative. The ‘mouses’ example could suggest a complaint against English grammar: that it is not as it normatively ought to be. Examples like this may suggest there is no sharp boundary between normative and non-normative oughts. But actually there is no continuity, and there is a sharp boundary. These examples are ambiguous rather than borderline cases.
Suppose you believe children ought not to be taught arithmetic till they are teenagers, so you think no one ought to know their tables till they are fourteen. You certainly do not think Christine ought normatively to know her seven-times table by the age of nine. However, suppose you know that Christine is going through a standard education. You know that, if her skills developed typically in those surroundings, she would know her seven-times table by the age of nine. You can agree that, in a sense, she ought to know her seven-times table by the age of nine; she would know it if she developed typically.
Suppose you glory in the idiosyncrasies of English. You recognize that the plural of ‘mouse’ would be ‘mouses’ if grammar were simplified in one way. So you can agree that the plural of ‘mouse’ ought in one sense to be ‘mouses’. But you do not think this simplification ought normatively to obtain, so in another sense you do not think the plural of ‘mouse’ ought to be ‘mouses’.
My description of these examples exhibits ‘ought’ used in two quite different senses, a normative one and a non-normative one. ‘The plural of “mouse” ought to be “mouses”’ and ‘Christine ought to know her seven-times table by the age of nine’ are ambiguous. The ‘ought’ in them may have either sense, or it may waver between one and the other sense. But it is not on any borderline.
I say ‘ought’ in one sense is normative, but I cannot give a rule for identifying this sense. I could not explain the term ‘normative’ except in terms of ‘ought’. ‘Normative’ means ‘to do with ought’, but this ought has to be a normative one, of course. So this definition gets us nowhere if we cannot already identify the normative ought. I simply have to assume you know a normative ought when you meet one. I do assume that: I assume that you, like most people, understand normative oughts well.
I could alternatively say that ‘normative’ means ‘to do with reasons’, and this may be helpful to many people. But there are normative and non-normative senses of ‘reasons’ too, and you have to be able to identify the normative ones. So this ultimately gets us no further forward. Moreover, in chapter 4 I shall define normative reasons in terms of normative oughts, so the definition of normativity as ‘to do with ought’ is more fundamental.
The terminology in this area is confusing because so many words have both normative and non-normative senses. Even the word ‘normative’ has a non-normative (in my sense) sense. For instance, it may be used to mean ‘to do with norms’, where ‘a norm’ refers to an established practice or alternatively to a rule or requirement.2 When I need to make the distinction, I shall tendentiously call normativity as I mean it ‘true normativity’. I think it is what ‘normativity’ means to most moral philosophers, if not to some other philosophers and to many non-philosophers. True normativity does not necessarily stem from morality. I shall mention other potential sources of normativity in section 2.4.
‘Ought’ as I use it is normative. The central ought is a truly normative ought.
Natural normativity
True normativity can be confused with other sorts. In her Natural Goodness, Philippa Foot introduces the concept of natural normativity. She introduces it in the context of natural history. She says:
We are, let us suppose, evaluating the roots of a particular oak tree, saying perhaps that it has good roots because they are as sturdy and deep as an oak's roots should be. … Oak trees need to stay upright because, unlike creeping plants, they have no possibility of life on the ground, and they are tall, heavy trees. Therefore oaks need to have deep, sturdy roots: there is something wrong with them if they do not. … The good of an oak is its individual and reproductive life cycle, and what is necessary for this is an Aristotelian necessity in its case. Since it cannot bend like a reed in the wind, an oak that is as an oak should be is one that has deep and sturdy roots.3
Foot takes the notion of ‘Aristotelian necessity’ from Elizabeth Anscombe: an Aristotelian necessity is ‘that which is necessary because and in so far as good hangs on it’.4 Foot says the good of an oak is to complete its life cycle: to survive for a few hundred years, acquire nutrition, reproduce, and so on. For this it needs deep, sturdy roots. So an oak should have deep, sturdy roots. If I understand Foot right, ‘A should F’ in this sense simply means that Fing is necessary for the good of something of A's species.
Foot more often uses ‘should’ where I use ‘ought to’, but these expressions are generally synonymous. In deference to her, I shall switch to ‘should’ in this discussion of her argument.
Foot uses the term ‘natural normativity’ for what is referred to by ‘should’ in ‘An oak should have deep, sturdy roots’. I cannot object to her use of this term. An oak's having deep, sturdy roots could fairly be called ‘a norm’, and that is enough to justify the term ‘normativity’. However, in the context of an oak, natural normativity is not what I call true normativity. To say an oak should, in the sense of natural normativity, have deep, sturdy roots is only to say it needs deep, sturdy roots to complete its life cycle. This is not a truly normative statement. You might agree that an oak should in this sense have deep, sturdy roots, but you might nevertheless think that, in the truly normative sense of ‘should’, it is not the case that an oak should have deep, sturdy roots. There is no inconsistency in that.
Foot uses ‘should’ with the same meaning when speaking of human beings: ‘a human being should F’ means that Fing is necessary for the good of a member of the human species. Whereas the good of non-human living things is to complete their life-cycle, human beings have a much broader and more complex good. It includes living cooperatively, in caring relationships with each other. Being virtuous is necessary for this good. Each human being should be virtuous, therefore, where ‘should’ has the same meaning as it has in ‘an oak should have deep, sturdy roots’.
Foot hopes to derive the conclusion that each human being should be virtuous, where ‘should’ is truly normative. But this conclusion cannot be drawn. Her premise is that each human being should be virtuous, where this is a matter of natural normativity. This means simply that being virtuous is necessary to the good of human beings. No truly normative conclusion follows.
Remember that ‘the good of human beings’ is to be understood in the same way as ‘the good of an oak’. The good of an oak is completing its life-cycle; it is not a truly normative notion. The good of a human being is more complex but nevertheless a matter of the way human beings live their lives. It is not a truly normative notion either. So the claim that being virtuous is necessary to the good of human beings is not truly normative.
That human beings should in the sense of natural normativity be virtuous leaves it an open question whether they should in the truly normative sense be virtuous. The answer to the question is no doubt ‘yes’, but this conclusion cannot be derived from Foot's natural normativity.
Foot intends to exhibit a continuity between the non-normative and the normative. I think she fails in her intention. Her ‘should’ starts with a non-normative definition, and never becomes truly normative.
2.3 Owned and unowned oughts
Compare the sentences
Intuitively, these sentences differ in their logical structure. As I put it, the first ascribes ownership of an ought to Alison, whereas the second does not ascribe ownership of an ought to Alex. I cannot accurately describe the sort of ownership I am referring to.5 I could use other words. I could say that Alison is responsible for her getting a sun hat, or that she is at fault if she does not get a sun hat, but the words ‘responsible’ and ‘fault’ have various connotations that might lead you to misunderstand me. I could say that getting a sun hat is required of Alison; this is perhaps the most accurate way of conveying the idea of ownership.
The word ‘owned’ has irrelevant connotations, but I hope they are so obviously irrelevant that this word will not be misleading. I hope you will just recognize the way in which oughts can be owned. It is well recognized within philosophy. In deontic logic, owned oughts are commonly referred to as ‘personal obligations’.6 In a valuable discussion, Lloyd Humberstone identifies ownership as a special sort of agent-relativity, which he calls ‘agent-implicating’.7
Some ‘ought’ sentences ascribe ownership and others do not, but we cannot tell which from their grammar. The Alison and Alex sentences have exactly the same grammar, yet one ascribes ownership and the other does not. Indeed, grammatical English does not provide any unambiguous way of ascribing ownership of an ought, except by some roundabout sentence that says explicitly whom the ought is owned by. This is a weakness in English grammar.
Its source is the fact that ‘ought’ is an auxiliary verb. This means it combines with a lexical verb to form a single, compound verb; in both the Alison and Alex sentences, the compound verb is ‘ought to get’. A consequence is that constructions using ‘ought’ do not offer as many argument-places as we logically need for expressing ownership. We need places for two terms: one to denote the owner of the ought and one to be the subject of the lexical verb. But we are supplied with only one place, because a compound verb has only one subject. ‘Ought’ has no subject of its own, distinct from the subject of the lexical verb. Consequently, only the context set by the surrounding words tells us that ‘Alison ought to get a sun hat’ ascribes ownership but ‘Alex ought to get a severe punishment’ does not.
It may be good enough in ordinary life to rely on the context, but not in philosophy. I shall need to make ownership explicit, and I shall do so by once more inflicting some violence on English grammar. I shall treat ‘ought’ as a lexical verb rather than an auxiliary. The sentences:
differ in their grammar, because ‘ought’ is an auxiliary whereas ‘expects’ is a lexical verb. But I shall treat the first as having the same grammar as the second.
‘Expects’ can be used in various constructions. ‘Alison expects to get a sun hat’ has the same meaning as:
We would not in practice say these things because we do not repeat a name unnecessarily, but they are grammatical sentences. Parallel sentences containing a second, different subject are common. For instance:
Alison expects Alex to get a severe punishment.
Alison expects that Alex will get a severe punishment.
In all the ‘expects’ sentences above, the subject of ‘expects’ is Alison. For that reason, each sentence, including ‘Alison expects to get a sun hat’, ascribes ownership of the expectation to Alison.
I shall make ‘ought’ follow the model of ‘expect’. I stipulate that all of
are sentences, and that they all have the same meaning. The second and third sentences are ungrammatical in English, but they conform to my deviant grammar in which ‘ought’ is a lexical verb. I shall use the ‘ought that’ construction frequently. In all three sentences, ‘Alison’ is the subject of ‘ought’, and I stipulate that all these sentences ascribe ownership of the ought to Alison. In general, I stipulate that the subject of ‘ought’ always names the owner of the ought.
I am able to make this stipulation because my artificial grammar makes available a second argument-place for the subject of the verb that follows ‘ought’. In the examples above the same name occupies both places, but that is not necessary. For instance, I can say:
The judge ought that Alex will get a severe punishment.
My stipulation implies that the sentence I started with,
Alex ought to get a severe punishment,
ascribes ownership of the ought to Alex. That is not part of the sentence's meaning in English, so my stipulation changes the meaning of some sentences. But having made this stipulation, I shall stick to it throughout this book, except where I explicitly cancel it. This should not cause confusion, because I shall avoid sentences of this form that might plausibly be understood not to ascribe ownership.
The ordinary meaning of ‘Alex ought to get a severe punishment’ is expressed in my language by:
Some\one ought that Alex will get a severe punishment.
(‘There is a person N such that N ought that Alex will get a severe punishment’ – I assume the ought is owned by someone.)
The propositional ought
An expectation is a relation between the owner of the expectation and a proposition. Treating ‘ought’ on the model of ‘expects’ implies that an owned ought is a relation between the owner and a proposition. This is a by-product of my stipulations. Is it desirable?
So as not to be distracted by grammar, let us use symbols. Let ‘O’ denote the owned ought relation as I conceive it. Call this relation the ‘propositional ought’. The sentence ‘NOp’ says that this relation holds between N as owner and the proposition p. ‘Alison O that Alison will get a sun hat’, for example.
Some authors have assumed that when an ought is a propositional operator it must be unowned.8 That was a confusion. An owned ought may be a propositional operator that is indexed to a person. So please do not assume that a propositional ought must be unowned. Indeed, I have just defined a propositional ought as a sort of owned ought.
An alternative is to treat an owned ought as a relation between an owner and a property.9 Let ‘Ø’ denote this relation. Call it the ‘property ought’. The sentence ‘NØF’ says that this relation holds between N as owner and the property F. ‘Alison Ø the property of getting a sun hat’, for example.
As a formal matter, owned oughts could be expressed either way. However, I prefer the propositional ought because it covers a wider range of deontic situations. For every property F there is a corresponding proposition FN, that N has the property F. Any sentence expressed in terms of the property ought therefore has an equivalent expressed in terms of the propositional ought. Instead of ‘NØF’, we may say ‘NO (FN)’, meaning just the same. But not every proposition has a corresponding property. For example, no property of the judge corresponds to the proposition that Alex gets a severe punishment. So ‘The judge O Alex gets a severe punishment’ has no equivalent expressed in terms of the property ought.
Authors who prefer the property ought think that the generality provided by the propositional ought is spurious. They think there are no genuine deontic situations that cannot be described in terms of the property ought. ‘The judge O Alex gets a severe punishment’ could not describe a genuine situation, they think.
They think a situation like this may seem genuine only because a different, genuine situation is mistaken for it. The supposedly genuine situation is often described in English using the formula ‘see to it that’. In the example:
The judge ought to see to it that Alex gets a severe punishment.
This could be put in terms of either the propositional ought or the property ought, by either
So the propositional ought is not required.
This trick with ‘see to it that’ does not always work convincingly. Suppose the minister of education is responsible for the proper running of the schools, but she spends her days on the golf course and pays no attention to the schools. Suppose, however, that civil servants in the education department make sure that the schools are properly run. In that way, the minister's responsibility is discharged.10
What is her deontic situation? Is it that the minister ought to see to it that the schools are properly run? No, because she sees to nothing of the sort and yet her responsibility is discharged. Perhaps the situation can be correctly described only in terms of the propositional ought:
The minister O the schools are properly run.
This sentence has no equivalent in terms of the property ought.
This example suggests that the propositional ought cannot be dispensed with. But that is not the end of the argument. Judith Thomson has a different account. She would describe the deontic situation by saying that the minister ought not to let it be false that the schools are properly run.11 If she is right, the situation can be described as follows in terms of the property ought:
The minister Ø the property of not letting it be false that the schools are properly run.
The minister does indeed have the property of not letting it be false that the schools are properly run, so if this is what she ought to achieve, she achieves it.
Perhaps Thomson's formula ‘not to let it be false that’ can be successfully applied to any owned ought. Perhaps, ‘N ought that p’ is always equivalent to ‘N ought not to let it be false that p’. If so, any owned ought could be treated as a relation between the owner and a property. Whenever it is the case that NOp, there would be a property F such that p is the proposition that the owner N has the property F. The generality of the propositional ought could be reproduced with the property ought.
This may be true but it requires further testing. I remain cautious, and in any case I do not see what is gained by this manoeuvre. It is no objection to the propositional ought, and for safety I prefer to stick with the propositional ought.
Some authors hold the theory that an owned ought can always be treated as a relation between an owner and an act-type.12 An act-type – for example, buying a sun hat – is a property of the actor. So this theory can be seen as a special case of the theory that an owned ought can always be treated as a relation between an owner and a property.
The more special theory is clearly false as it stands. Clearly, you ought never to commit murder, yet never committing murder is not an act-type. The theory must be extended to include non-act-types, such as never committing murder, along with act-types.
Even with that extension, the theory is implausible. It seems that any of the following claims could be true: you ought not to believe in fairies; you ought to be at work by nine; you ought not to prefer your own lesser good to your greater; you ought to believe in God; you ought to know your own name; you ought to intend to keep a promise when you make it; and so on. In none of these cases is what you ought an act-type or a non-act-type.
You might say that actually none of these claims could be strictly true. The strict truth must be different, and always involve an act. For example, the strict truth might be that you ought to get to work by nine rather than that you ought to be at work by nine. The strict truth might be that you ought to bring it about that you believe in God rather than that you ought to believe in God. And so on.
I doubt that a manoeuvre like this is always possible. For example, it seems it could be false that you ought to bring it about that you believe in God (because, say, God punishes anyone who brings it about that she believes in God), but nevertheless true that you ought to believe in God (because, say, there is strong evidence of God's existence). In any case, the mere possibility of this sort of manoeuvre does not show that the original claims cannot be true.
But suppose it could not be true that you ought to F – where this ought is owned by you, remember – unless there was something you could do to achieve your Fing. Even if that were so, it still would not follow that all those claims above are false. For instance, it would not follow that it is false that you ought not to believe in fairies. It would follow only that this is false if there is nothing you can do to bring it about that you do not believe in fairies.
I know no satisfactory arguments against those claims above. I therefore do not assume that, when you ought to F, your Fing must be an act. I assume there are things you ought to believe, or not believe, or know, or intend, or hope for, and so on. At this point I place no restriction on ‘F’; it might be any verb phrase. Of course, any substantive deontic theory will make restrictions. It will specify what each particular person ought to achieve.
Unowned oughts
Some ‘ought’ sentences in English appear to refer to oughts that are not owned by anyone. When a disease strikes a person down in her prime,13 we sometimes say
Life ought not to be so unfair.
This sentence does not conform to my stipulation that the subject of ‘ought’ is always the owner. It is plainly not meant to ascribe ownership of the ought to life. If it describes an owned ought, there must be someone who ought that life is not so unfair. Who would that be? God seems the only candidate; yet even an atheist might sincerely say ‘Life ought not to be so unfair’.
This example suggests we have the concept of an unowned ought. I do not insist this is so; it does not matter for my argument. But I shall allow for the possibility of unowned oughts. I shall make an unowned ought explicit by using a construction of the form
It ought to be the case that life is not so unfair.
(This construction violates my stipulation that the subject of ‘ought’ is the owner. I waive that stipulation for this one particular construction.) As I did with an owned ought, I take an unowned ought to be a property of a proposition. ‘It ought to be the case that life is not so unfair’ ascribes this property to the proposition that life is not so unfair.
Although I do not insist there are unowned oughts, I do insist there are owned ones. In ‘Ought and moral obligation’, Bernard Williams denied that. At least, this is the interpretation he himself later put on this paper.14 I shall assume it is the correct interpretation.
Under this interpretation, when Williams wrote ‘Ought
