Robert Nozick E-Book

Jonathan Wolff

• Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Serie: Key Contemporary Thinkers
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 341

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2013

Beschreibung

Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia is one of the works which dominates contemporary debate in political philosophy. Drawing on traditional assumptions associated with individualism and libertarianism, Nozick mounts a powerful argument for a minimal `nightwatchman' state and challenges the views of many contemporary philosophers, most notably John Rawls.

Jonathan Wolff's new book is the first full-length study of Nozick's work and of the debates to which it has given rise. He situates Nozick's work in the context of current debates and examines the traditions which have influenced his thought. He then critically reconstructs the key arguments of Anarchy, State and Utopia, focusing on Nozick's Doctrine of Rights, his Derivation of the Minimal State, and his Entitlement Theory of Justice. The book concludes by assessing Nozick's place in contemporary political philosophy.

Leseprobe

Robert Nozick

Property, Justice and the Minimal State

JONATHAN WOLFF

Polity Press

Copyright © Jonathan Wolff 1991

First published 1991 by Polity Press in association with Blackwell Publishers Ltd

Reprinted 1996

Transferred to digital print 2003

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ISBN 0 7456 0603 2 (pbk)

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Contents

Preface

Acknowledgements

Note on References

Introduction

1   Nozick’s Libertarianism

Between Anarchy and the State

The Thesis of Self-Ownership

The Entitlement Theory of Justice

The Minimal State

A Framework for Utopia?

2   Libertarian Rights

Individual Rights vs Utility

Inviolable Rights

Natural Rights and John Locke

Kantian Foundations and the Meaning of Life

Self-Defence and Punishment

3   Defending the Minimal State

The Case for Anarchy

The Lockean Predicament

Consent Theory

Nozick’s Invisible Hand

Nozickian Methodology

The Rational Acceptability of the State

The Problem of Monopoly

Compelling the Anarchist

Risk and Procedural Rights

A Clash of Rights?

The Principle of Compensation

The Minimal State

4   The Entitlement Theory of Justice

Rights, Distributive Justice, and the Minimal State

Theories of Justice

The Entitlement Theory

Liberty and Patterns

The Disruption of Patterns

Voluntary Transfer

Patterns and Taxation

Two Conceptions of Liberty

Entitlement and Liberty

Rejecting the Entitlement Conception?

Justice in Acquisition

Locke on Property

The Lockean Proviso and the Nozickian Proviso

The Problem of Baselines

Justice in Rectification

Conclusion

5   Nozick and Political Philosophy

Nozick contra Rawls

Nozick contra Equality

Nozick contra Marx

Libertarianism and Utopianism

Libertarianism, Liberalism, Conservatism

The Lure of Libertarianism

Notes

Guide to Further Reading

Bibliography

Index

Preface

I first read Nozick as an undergraduate in 1980. At that time philosophy students usually reacted to Anarchy, State, and Utopia in one of two ways. Either they thought its conclusions so repugnant that it should not be taken seriously as political philosophy at all, or they thought its conclusions so repugnant that it was vital (but not very difficult) to show how it fails. Now, in 1990, as a teacher of philosophy, I still encounter these two reactions, but fairly often I also encounter a third: that, broadly speaking, Nozick is right.

My own initial entanglement with Nozick was slightly more complicated. Feeling a strong attraction to individual liberty, and being prepared to believe that a likely consequence of this might well be some form or other of anarchism, I had attempted some preliminary reading into anarchist theory. But I was both dissatisfied with the uncritical vagueness of anarchy’s defenders and annoyed by the crass, one-line dismissals of it by its opponents. So I welcomed the chance to read a book with ‘Anarchy’ in its title as part of my introduction to political philosophy. However, I had taken it for granted that the anarchy referred to would be socialist, or, at the least, egalitarian, and, as I read Nozick, I became increasingly concerned. What was money doing in the state of nature? And private property rights? And free enterprise? It had not even occurred to me that anarchy could be made to yield rampant capitalism. An initial commitment to liberty seemed to lead, not to equality, as I had assumed, but to inequality. Thus I was forced, for the first time, to face the question of whether I cared more about liberty than equality. I had no firm answer to that question then, and I have no firm answer now. However, as I aim to show here, Nozick, despite his best efforts, does not, in fact, succeed in demonstrating any important inconsistency between liberty and equality. So I can, at least for the time being, put off the question.

I cannot, however, put off the questions of why it is I think Nozick is wrong, and why it is important to show that he is wrong. Fortunately, the second question, at least, has an easy answer. Nozick’s views have many affinities with the defence of laissez-faire capitalism which has been part of the ‘ruling ideology’ of the 1980s. It has not escaped my notice that during my entire university career – both as student and teacher – Margaret Thatcher has been Prime Minister of Great Britain, and ideas like those of Nozick have had, to put it mildly, a huge and destructive effect on the lives of a great many people. It is, perhaps, unlikely that showing the difficulties with those ideas will have much practical effect, yet the task is still worthwhile.

My intention has been to present my case by reason, not rhetoric. This accounts for much of the style and tone of this book. One easy way of writing about Nozick would be in the denunciatory mode of a political pamphlet, revealing outrage after outrage. I wanted to avoid that at all costs, for this is intended to be a work of political philosophy, not polemic. I have tried to set out Nozick’s views as fairly as possible – adding extra arguments where I can – and then to show, coolly and calmly, where Nozick is mistaken. Finally, this is a book about Nozick, not about me. Although I have grappled with Nozick partly as a means towards learning the truth for myself, the point of this book is not to display my own views, but to examine Nozick’s.

The opportunity to do this came when Mike Rosen suggested that I should write this book. The idea that someone should write a book on Nozick was John Thompson’s. I am very grateful to them both for setting me off on this project, and for their encouragement along the way. Lively discussions with Mike, and his perceptive comments on the penultimate manuscript, have also led to many improvements. Jerry Cohen, who first introduced me to Anarchy, State, and Utopia, and convinced me of its importance, also provided immensely helpful comments on the whole manuscript, and of course, his own work on Nozick has been a major influence on mine (as it has been on so many). Others who have read the work in various stages, and from whose suggestions and criticism I have profited, include Jonathan Dick, Chris Hull, Miles Sabin, Nick Zangwill, and, especially, Simon Evnine and Elaine Collins. I would also like to thank two anonymous publisher’s readers for their useful suggestions, and Malcolm Budd for his help and encouragement.

My greatest debt in writing this book, however, is to Bill Hart. We have spent innumerable hours talking about the issues discussed here, and at every stage Bill has provided detailed notes on draft after draft. So many of Bill’s suggestions have found their way into the final version that there is no doubt that his presence can be found on almost every page of this book. Perhaps the only thing that has resisted his influence is the title. And that came from John Thompson.

Acknowledgements

Excerpts from Anarchy, State, and Utopia are reprinted by permission of the publishers, Basic Books, Inc, New York, and Basil Blackwell, Oxford, and are copyright © 1974 by Basic Books, Inc.

Note on References

Numbers in parentheses in text, e.g. (56), refer to page numbers of Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Blackwell, Oxford, 1974). References in footnotes to John Locke’s Second Treatise are given by section number, rather than by page numbers of any particular edition.

Introduction

For almost two decades, debate in analytical political philosophy has been dominated by two highly contrasting works: John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, and Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Rawls, in 1971, presented the case for a form of liberal egalitarianism, while Nozick, in 1974, argued for libertarianism – the free market, absolute property rights, and the ‘minimal state’. A vast quantity of critical literature has been generated in response to both Rawls and Nozick, but unlike Rawls, Nozick has won few followers among academic political philosophers. Nevertheless, in practical political terms we have, in the last decade or so, seen a move away from the left-wing welfarism defended by Rawls. It is Nozick who seems closer to the political spirit of the present age.

The two works are strikingly different in style, as well as in content. Few would say that Rawls is an easy writer to read, and A Theory of Justice is written in a careful, qualified manner which makes it, by Rawls’s own admission, ‘a long book not only in pages’.1Anarchy, State, and Utopia, on the other hand, is selfconsciously ‘flashy’ and deliberately provocative. Nozick seems always to find the brilliant example, the memorable turn of phrase. Part of his declared purpose is to unsettle the reader, and depending upon one’s mood Anarchy, State, and Utopia can often be amusing or annoying to read. But it is always engaging.

Perhaps significantly, Rawls’s project in political philosophy is clearly his life’s work. Not only did he publish a number of important papers leading up to A Theory of Justice, but in the last twenty years he has continued to publish substantial developments and further defences of his views, taking up and answering or acknowledging the most important criticism. For Nozick, however, political philosophy has taken up only a few years of his academic life. Since Anarchy, State, and Utopia he has barely returned to the subject, and so his critics remain unanswered. Nozick’s attention has, more recently, been given over to many other topics, some of which are represented in his huge and eclectic Philosophical Explanations, published in 1981. This work ranges over problems in the philosophy of mind, ethics, epistemology, and metaphysics, and the sections of the book on knowledge and scepticism have in particular received a great deal of critical attention. Subsequently Nozick has worked on topics such as Indian philosophy, spiritual leaders, and the nature of wisdom. Only in his most recent book, The Examined Life, published in 1989, has Nozick discussed again some of the themes of Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Here Nozick briefly indicates that he has modified his views, and no longer considers himself a libertarian. For now, however, in so far as political philosophy is concerned, the words ‘Nozick’ and ‘libertarianism’ remain inextricably linked.

In this work I shall concentrate on an examination of Anarchy, State, and Utopia, although Nozick’s other writings will be discussed where they are relevant to his political philosophy. Part of my task will be to reconstruct Nozick’s arguments and conclusions to make them as coherent as possible. This is not always a simple matter, for Nozick’s intellectual enthusiasm shows itself in a tendency to take up at length any interesting side issue, and thus it is not always clear what is the argument and what the digression.2 Further, vital premisses of arguments can be scattered over many pages, or missing entirely, and Nozick makes little attempt to summarize or clarify his arguments, or, often, even to show how the separate parts are related. This is partly a consequence of Nozick’s decision to present a ‘philosophical exploration of issues’ rather than a full-scale philosophical treatise. Thus he offers only an outline of his theory; an outline which, in many respects, still remains to be filled in. Thus I shall try to clarify Nozick’s reasoning and make good the gaps where necessary and possible, so that we might appreciate the force of the arguments, and subject them to rigorous examination. One cost of this approach is that, inevitably, many of Nozick’s fascinating contributions to moral and political philosophy, such as his case for vegetarianism, and his assault on the deterrence theory of punishment, must remain undiscussed here. However, I hope the benefits of a clear view of the main arguments make this sacrifice worthwhile.

To understand the significance of Nozick’s project it is necessary to set it against competing approaches to the problems of political philosophy. One task of the political philosopher is to take values appropriate to the political sphere, such as liberty, equality, happiness, and freedom from need, and to examine their inter-relations. Are these values compatible or do they exclude each other? Does the achievement of one bring with it the achievement of another? What should we do if and when these values conflict? Some political theorists, like the utilitarians, claim that one value is fundamental, and the other values are at best secondary or derivative.3 Other theorists argue for a plurality of ultimate values, and these plural theories come in two forms. Some allow a hierarchy of values, so that, even where independent values clash, there will be a determinate answer to the question of which one, politically, should be preferred. Rawls, for example, admits the independent value of both civil liberty and economic equality, but he argues that any conflict between them should be dealt with by giving civil liberty priority. On the other hand, some theorists judge that there can be ineliminable conflicts of value.4 These ‘conflict’ theorists suggest that sometimes there simply is no determinate answer to the question of what should be done when certain values collide.

In expecting more of political philosophy than the conflict theorists, hierarchical pluralists have the additional task of explaining how there can be more than one fundamental value, without these ever issuing in insoluble conflicts. Single-value theories seem in a way more elegant and more powerful, promising a decision procedure to cover every situation, basing every decision on fundamentally the same grounds. Given these advantages, it is not surprising that the burden of establishing a single-value theory is a heavy one. The selected value has first to be shown to be of overwhelming fundamental importance, and second, must not itself generate insoluble conflicts. So, for example, the utilitarian argues that happiness is the sole good, and that we should be interested only in maximizing quantities of happiness.

Part of the argument of this book is that we should see Nozick as presenting, at root, a single-value political philosophy, based, not on happiness, like the utilitarian, nor on liberty, as one might expect from a libertarian, but on absolute property rights: rights of ownership over oneself and over things in the world. No one has the right to interfere with your person or your possessions unless either you have consented, or you have forfeited your rights by violating the rights of others. Your right to liberty is simply a consequence of this right to self-ownership. This, Nozick seems to suggest, is enough to settle all disputes that properly fall within the political sphere. If Nozick can show that property rights deserve the importance they are given within his theory, and that they do not themselves issue in irresolvable conflicts, then he will have given us everything we could hope for in a political philosophy. He will have established a simple, single decision procedure to cover every political problem.

In order to locate Nozick’s views within the broader context of political philosophy we can think of him as following a tradition of political thought, best referred to as the natural-rights individualist tradition. Locke is often taken to be the first major advocate of this type of view, and Locke’s influence on Nozick runs deep. It is not absurd to see Nozick’s project as an attempt to rehabilitate what he regards as the rational core of Locke’s political philosophy. But this is not to say that Nozick takes over Locke entire: there are many important modifications and some major disagreements. At some of these points Nozick finds help from other broadly individualist writers, and so in explaining Nozick’s views it will often be illuminating to look at the writings of allies and opponents from both inside and outside the individualist tradition. In so doing we will be able to appreciate Nozick’s work as a development of an established, but until very recently, largely neglected, political theory; indeed one so neglected that Richard Tuck has recently written that ‘With the exception of Robert Nozick, no major theorist in the Anglo-Saxon world for almost a century has based his work on the concept of a right.’5 One of the many merits of Nozick’s work is that it has put this approach to political philosophy back into the mainstream of philosophical debate.

Nozick’s project is to defend the libertarian minimal state – akin to the ‘nightwatchman’ state of classical liberalism – which exists purely to safeguard the personal and property rights of individuals. The enterprise falls into three stages. First, against the Anarchist, Nozick puts the case that a state at least as extensive as the minimal state is justified. Second, against the defender of the extensive state, Nozick argues that the minimal state is the most extensive form of legitimate state. From these claims, of course, it follows that the minimal state is the only justified form of state, and the third stage of the project is to show that this should not be a cause of regret, for the minimal state is ‘inspiring’ as well as right.

In Chapter 1, I shall present an overview of Nozick’s libertarianism, while the view of rights sustaining that theory is examined and elaborated in Chapter 2. Here I have tried to be more systematic than Nozick himself, by attempting to delineate the structure of his view and its possible foundations. Chapter 3 examines Nozick’s defence of the minimal state against the anarchist, and Chapter 4 assesses Nozick’s theory of justice, which is perhaps the most important element of Anarchy, State, and Utopia. It is by means of this theory that Nozick is able to argue that no more than the minimal state is justified. Finally, in Chapter 5 we look at the idea of the minimal state as a ‘framework for utopia’, and, more generally, at Nozick’s place in political philosophy. I hope, by then, to have explained not only the attractions of Nozick’s view, but also its limitations.

1

Nozick’s Libertarianism

Between Anarchy and the State

‘If the individual has the right to govern himself, all external government is tyranny’.1 The case against the state has rarely been put so trenchantly as by Benjamin Tucker, the nineteenth-century American anarchist. So seriously does Nozick take arguments of this type that much of is an attempt to show that, despite the plausibility of the anarchist’s case, a state can exist without violating rights.