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- Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
- Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
- Sprache: Englisch
In February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale military assault on Ukraine, aimed at re-establishing Russian control over the Ukrainian state, economy and society, similar in many ways to the Soviet period. This goal, however, was not achieved, and most likely will not be achieved in the future. Rather, the Russian “special military operation” has resulted in extraordinary disasters and losses for Russia, for Ukraine, and for the entire world.
This book examines the origins of the Russian assault on Ukraine and offers an explanation of why it has not achieved its aims. Why did Russian elites and leaders propose, prepare for and implement the assault on Ukraine in such a poorly prepared and heavily destructive way? In seeking to answer these questions, Gel’man focuses on Russia’s domestic agenda and its dynamics after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The personalist nature of the Russian authoritarian political regime, its vulnerability to bad governance, major misperceptions by the Russian elites and leadership, and reliance of the Kremlin upon previous experience of Russian impunity were all key factors that led to Russia’s fateful decision to attack Ukraine and have continued to shape Russia’s mistake-ridden conduct of the war since then. Gel’man also considers what lessons can be learned from Russia’s military assault for understanding the global agenda and for the study of domestic and international politics in the twenty-first century.
This book, written by a leading expert on Russian politics, will be of great value to students and scholars in politics and to anyone interested in Russia and in the causes and consequences of the war against Ukraine.
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Seitenzahl: 436
Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2025
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Table of Contents
Cover
Title Page
Copyright Page
Quote
Preface
Notes
1 February 2022: Why Russia Fails
The Sources of Russian Misconduct
What Went Wrong?
The Essence of a Pernicious Decision: The Argument in Brief
Alternative Explanations and Scholarly Perspectives
Plan of the Book
Notes
2 The Personalist Trap
Personalist Autocracies: Pitfalls and Perils
Russia: The Road to Regime Personalization
A Point of Comparison: Czechoslovakia 1968 versus Ukraine 2022
The Personalist Trap: Tentative Conclusions
Notes
3 The Well-Oiled Machine, Out of Control
Introduction: Why Bad Governance?
Reforms and Entrenchments of Russian Bad Governance
Bad Governance Goes to the Front
Circumventing Bad Governance: The Case of the Wagner Group
Concluding Remarks: When War Unmade the State
Notes
4 The Great Self-Deception
Causes of Misperceptions in Russia: Why?
Security Elites and Legacies: Organizational Culture, Generational Trajectory, and Groupthink
Claims, Desires, and Conspiracies
Russian Misperceptions, Ukraine, and Beyond: What Went Wrong?
Conclusion
Notes
5 The Victims of Previous Successes
Domestic Politics: from Offense to Offense
The International Arena: How Russia Became Unconstrained
Expanding the Spiral of Invincibility
Illusory Invincibility
Notes
6 Lost Illusions, Dashed Hopes, and Unlearned Lessons
The Deadlock: No Way Out?
Pernicious Consequences
Concluding Remarks: Lessons from Russia
Notes
Index
End User License Agreement
List of Illustrations
Chapter 1
Figure 1. Russian Elite Approval of the Use of the Russian Military (%) (from Rivera, ‘The...
Guide
Cover
Table of Contents
Begin Reading
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Russia’s Gamble
The Domestic Origins of Russia’s Attack on Ukraine
Vladimir Gel’man
polity
Copyright Page
Copyright © Vladimir Gel’man 2025
The right of Vladimir Gel’man to be identified as Author of this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
First published in 2025 by Polity Press
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All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purpose of criticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.
ISBN-13: 978-1-5095-5942-8
ISBN-13: 978-1-5095-5943-5(pb)
A catalog record for this book is available from the British Library.
Library of Congress Control Number: 2024946045
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Quote
“Whoever exalts himself will be humbled” (Matthew, 23:12)
PREFACE
In the early morning of August 19, 1991, a telephone call woke me in my parents’ Leningrad apartment. During the conversation, I learned that the conservative leaders of the Soviet Union had launched a coup d’état aimed at restoration of the political order established by the Communists over seventy years earlier. At that time, I expected that they would easily reach these goals after the declared deposal of the Soviet president and the announcement of a state of emergency. In the most far-reaching scenario, the potential success of the coup could, in my view, result in the full-scale restoration of Communist rule, with its worst institutions and practices. However, I was completely wrong – the coup was poorly prepared, and the resistance led by the Russian President Boris Yeltsin ruined the plans of the putschists over the next three days. Instead of the restoration of the previous Soviet political, economic, and societal order, the coup had quite the opposite outcomes. The Communist Party was eliminated and the Soviet Union dissolved,1 although most probably such eventualities could have happened anyway due to the multiple changes initiated under Mikhail Gorbachev’s rule of the Soviet Union since 1985, regardless of the failed coup.
More than thirty years later, early in the morning of February 24, 2022, another telephone call woke me in my St. Petersburg apartment. During the conversation, I learned that the Russian President Vladimir Putin had announced the launching of a major assault, a “special military operation,” aimed at “denazification” and “demilitarization” of Ukraine, and at placing this country, which had gained independence during the Soviet collapse, under the full-scale political, military, and international control of Russia. At that time, I expected that the Russian leadership would easily reach these goals after a massive assault through the extensive use of arms, and probably take over the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv, during the next three days or so. In the most far-reaching scenario, the potential success of the “special military operation” could, in my view, result in the restoration of the Soviet-style empire, with its worst institutions and practices. However, I was completely wrong – the “special military operation” was poorly prepared and implemented, and the Ukrainian resistance, led by the President Volodymyr Zelensky, ruined the plans of the Russian leaders over the following weeks and months. Instead of the restoration of the Soviet-style empire and imposition of the Russian political, economic, and societal order onto Ukraine and beyond, the “special military operation” had quite the opposite outcomes, and it is still very far from its conclusion. The highly risky venture of the restoration of a Soviet-style empire looks unfeasible, and since February 2022, Russia has faced enormous domestic and international problems, although most probably such problems could have arisen due to the multiple changes initiated and endorsed by the Russian elites under Putin’s rule, regardless of the assault on Ukraine.
The fateful decision to launch the highly risky “special military operation,” which soon turned into a full-scale protracted war, provoked many responses and reactions both domestically and internationally. Apart from numerous statements by politicians, policy-makers, activists, artists, writers, and ordinary citizens, political analysts, scholars, and experts also expressed their views on the ongoing changes in Russia, Ukraine and beyond after February 2022. The large-scale assault on Ukraine was largely unexpected, and not predicted by most international scholars and experts. The very research sub-field of Russian studies (and Ukrainian studies, too) faced a major exogenous shock.2 Initially, the first reaction of many scholars of Russia to this exogenous shock was very emotional, and contributed to numerous petitions, op-eds, interviews, and the like. However, now the time is ripe to transform these scholarly responses to current events into more in-depth research into the causes, mechanisms, effects, and implications of the Russian assault on Ukraine. This is the primary task of my book.
The core of this study is an analysis of the domestic origins of the Russian assault on Ukraine and an explanation of why this “special military operation” has not achieved its goals. As often happens in the study of any complex phenomenon, these questions have no simple and unidimensional “correct” answer: the study of global politics presupposes the coexistence of different competing explanations for the same processes. I do not claim that my approach to these issues is the only possible way of explaining the Russian military assault on Ukraine in February 2022 and its aftermath. What is presented in this book is an approach based upon three cornerstone principles unlike those of other possible explanations. First, it is less oriented around normative ideals and mostly related to positive analysis. I believe that for an understanding of the political processes, in Russia and elsewhere, it is important to discuss less how things should (or should not) be, but to concentrate more how they really are. This is the essence of the framework of analysis offered here. Instead of blaming anyone for wrong ideas and/or destructive deeds, I ask the question “why?”: why did Russian elites and leaders propose, prepare for, and implement the assault on Ukraine in February 2022 in such a poorly prepared, outstandingly inefficient, and heavily destructive way? The second principle is an almost exclusive focus on Russia as the key actor in the ongoing international conflict, which emerged well before February 2022 and dramatically developed after that to a new stage of violence. It is obvious that other international actors, such as the United States, the European Union and its member states, China and, of course, Ukraine, played important roles in this conflict. However, it was Russia that launched this assault, and this is why explaining its motivations and performance before and after 2022 is essential for our understanding of the ongoing military conflict; at least, this is a necessary, though probably insufficient, condition for any in-depth analysis. Third, my book is addressed to domestic political developments within Russia: following the approach developed by George F. Kennan during the early years of the Cold War,3 I aim to explain Russia’s behavior in the international arena through the lenses of an analysis of its domestic politics. This is why I focus on the ideas, interests, and identities of Russian elites and the logic of their expectations, perceptions, and misperceptions, which formed before the launching of the “special military operation” and greatly affected its preparation, elaboration, and implementation. Readers may judge from this book to what extent these cornerstone principles are useful for a convincing explanation of the Russian assault on Ukraine in February 2022.
The impetus for writing this book emerged almost immediately after the launching of Russia’s “special military operation,” as it became clear that a swift Russian takeover of Ukraine was not feasible. However, the development of the argument and turning my ideas into a book took a while, and several individuals and organizations contributed to this venture in one way or another. First and foremost, John Thompson from Polity Press persuaded me to formulate a book proposal, enthusiastically endorsed it from the very beginning, and supported my plans through its long journey. The Center for International Studies at Sciences Po, Paris, thanks to Emilija Pundziute-Gallois, offered me an opportunity to present an early draft of the first chapter at the international seminar in May 2023, and this discussion encouraged me to pursue this project further. My home institution, the Aleksanteri Institute at the University of Helsinki, was and remains the main venue of my research, and the discussion of the key ideas of this book at the INREES summer school it organized in August 2023 was a milestone for its further development. Other seminars, held by the European University Institute and Malmö University, were very useful in terms of discussions and development of ideas. The exchange of ideas with numerous colleagues in various countries allowed me to develop my arguments and support them with the use of various sources. In particular, I would like to thank Luca Anceschi, Sergei Guriev, Mark Kramer, Tomila Lankina, Dmitry Lanko, Alexander Libman, Andrey Makarychev, Kirill Rogov, Andrey Scherbak, Gulnaz Sharafutdinova, Konstantin Sonin, Anne de Tinguy, Dmitry Travin, and Pavel Usanov for sharing their thoughts and offering their comments on various occasions. My Aleksanteri colleagues, especially Kaarina Aitamurto, Sari Autio-Sarasmo, Markku Kangaspuro, Markku Kivinen, Katalin Miklóssy, Katri Pynnöniemi, Veli-Pekka Tynkkynen, and Margarita Zavadskaya, as well as many others, provided a highly productive environment for the exchange of ideas, some of which were used in this book in one way or another. Irina Busygina, Ilia Nadporozhskii, and Evgeny Roshchin carefully read the early version of the manuscript and offered me their outstandingly important suggestions and recommendations. The friendly, detailed, and nuanced linguistic assistance provided by Alexei Stephenson was essential for making the manuscript readable. Last but not least, my wife Oxana is the main and outstanding source of support in everything I do. I could never have completed this book without her love, patience, and encouragement.
The process of writing of this book unfolded against the background of the ongoing military assault on Ukraine, which has caused many military and civilian casualties among Russian and Ukrainian citizens. The vast number of such casualties is one of the tragic consequences of the processes that are analyzed in my book. I dedicate this book to the memory of those who fell victim to this assault.
Helsinki, July 2024
Notes
1
Among the voluminous literature on the Soviet collapse see, in particular, Stephen Kotkin,
Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970–2000
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Yegor Gaidar,
Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007); Vladislav Zubok,
Collapse: The Fall of the Soviet Union
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2021).
2
See Vladimir Gel’man, “Exogenous Shock and Russian Studies,”
Post-Soviet Affairs
, 39, nos. 1–2 (2023), 1–9.
3
See George Kennan (X), “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,”
Foreign Affairs
, 25, no. 4 (1947), 566–82.
