Russian Political Warfare E-Book

Anton Shekhovtsov

• Herausgeber: ibidem
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Serie: Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society
• Sprache: Englisch
• Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2023

Seitenzahl: 284

Beschreibung

Political warfare is a grey area between peace and war. It involves a diverse array of methods and instruments that go beyond traditional diplomacy and soft power but stops short of open kinetic conflict using nations’ regular armed forces. This collection of Anton Shekhovtsov’s essays delves into practices of Russian Political Warfare designed to advance Moscow’s strategic and tactical objectives in European countries and certain African states. It reveals how Russian state actors and pro-regime stakeholders meddled in elections, politicised and weaponised the COVID-19 pandemic, amplified religious conflicts, undermined democratic institutions, and corrupted political forces.

Leseprobe

ibidem Press, Stuttgart

To fallen defenders of Ukraine

Contents

Foreword

Acknowledgements

Abbreviations

1. Conceptualising Malign Influence of Putin’s Russia in Europe

2. Russian Election Interference in Africa The Case of AFRIC

3. Russian Malign Influence Operations in Coronavirus-Hit Italy

4. How to Fail a Malign Influence Operation The Case of Russian Aid to Serbia

5. Putin’s “Foot Soldier” in the Kremlin’s Political War against France

6. The Rise and Fall of a Polish Agent of the Kremlin Influence The Case of Janusz Niedźwiecki

7. The German Connection Far-Right Journalist Manuel Ochsenreiter in the Service of the Russian Propaganda Machine

Post Scriptum

Foreword

I started to hear about Anton Shekhovtsov’s work as early as 2020. Europe was facing the brutal surge of the COVID-19 pandemic and in parallel another unprecedented epidemic, the Infodemic, as it was rapidly being called by the few who really cared.

It was obvious that fear had allowed the weirdest of all conspiracy theories to circulate at full speed and that the massive development of social media, accelerated by the diverse episodes of lockdown, had allowed unverified opinions to spread faster than ever. All of this could have been spontaneous and mirrored the high level of anxiety among European public opinions. But there was more in it that needed some analysis: there was a deliberate effort to manipulate European audiences, coming from two state actors working in parallel and using similar narratives: China and Russia. On information manipulation, Russia was the master and China was learning, and learning fast.

This was the moment when the European Parliament decided to set up a special committee on foreign interferences in our democracies. I was already chairing the Subcommittee on Security and Defence, but decided to get involved as a whip for my political group, Renew Europe, in the new special committee as soon as it was established. For me, foreign interferences were simply another sort of warfare, a hybrid one, that was being fought against different countries, mainly democracies, by a handful of authoritarian regimes.

This warfare was taking many forms, approximately everything but direct military confrontation: manipulation of information was an obvious one, and interference in electoral processes was starting to be investigated both in the US and the UK. Elite capture had been going on for decades, through direct relations with both individuals and political parties. Cyberattacks were on the rise.

I met with Anton Shekhovtsov and rapidly discovered that we were interested by the same phenomena. Still, he had something that I was missing: a first-hand experience of Ukraine. His reasons to be fighting Russian influence in Europe were existential. He understood long before the Russian war of aggression of 2022 what hybrid warfare was able to achieve. From the Russian annexation of Crimea, to the blurring of the downing of the MH-17 flight, to the complacency of so many European politicians towards Russian propaganda, he had every reason to be concerned and to share his knowledge.

His knowledge was very significant. On the strong relations between the Russian regime and far-right political parties in Europe, he had documented contacts, links, trips, joint events. On unexpected aspects of Russian interference in Europe, he had brilliant research, such as on the role of the Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov in the aftermath of the assassination of a French schoolteacher, Samuel Paty. But his research was—and is—going much further and digging much deeper than hints and pieces of evidence related to Russian interference in Europe. Where some commentators only see anecdotes, Anton Shekhovtsov analyses patterns of influence and hybrid warfare. Where many in Europe still do not realise that the objective of manipulation is to weaken and divide our democracies, he knows from experience that Ukraine is a lab: what took place in 2014 was not met with sufficient reactions by the West. The reality is that we allowed the 2022 full-scale aggression against Ukraine to happen, because too many among us wanted to believe that the annexation of Crimea had taken place voluntarily and that the destabilising of Donbas was only the responsibility of Ukrainian separatists. All this was pure manipulation, but too many in Europe were ready to accept it at face value.

Since 2022, we realise that hybrid warfare is just the first step in a serious confrontation. We have come to learn that new instruments can be used to try to blackmail developing countries, such as energy dependency, food safety or the weaponisation of migrants.

I am convinced that Anton Shekhovtsov still has a lot of research to carry out. But I am delighted that he managed to gather some of his most recent and interesting pieces into this book. I hope it will help bring about the necessary eye-opening of public opinion in Europe with regards to the war, which is hitting our continent hard, though with too little attention to the nature of Russian political warfare.

Nathalie Loiseau

Member of the European Parliament

Minister for European Affairs of France (2017-2019)

Acknowledgements

Most of the essays comprising this book were written over the course of my cooperation with two organisations, the European Platform for Democratic Elections (EPDE) and Free Russia Foundation (FRF).

The EPDE is an international association that supports experts and citizens standing up for transparent and equal suffrage wherever it is at risk in Europe. Together with the EPDE, we have strengthened the previously fragmented field of research into the use of biased election observation as part of authoritarian regimes’ political warfare against democracy in Europe and its neighbourhood. I am grateful to the EPDE’s team, namely Stefanie Schiffer, Adam Busuleanu and Kira Mössinger, for their enthusiastic support of my work.

The FRF is an international organisation founded by Russian citizens united by their vision of a free, democratic and peaceful Russia. In 2020, the FRF and I launched The Kremlin’s Influence Quarterly, a journal that provided analyses of attempts by the Putin regime and its accomplices to exert malign influence in Europe. I thank the FRF and, in particular, Natalia Arno, Grigory Frolov and Natalya Lunde for our fruitful cooperation in this important area.

I highly appreciate insightful conversations with Antoine Arjakovsky, Roland Freudenstein, Jacopo Iacoboni, Anastasia Kirilenko, Nathalie Loiseau, Pavel Luzin, Marian Madeła, Marie Mendras, Dirk Schuebel, Silvia Stöber and Nicolas Tenzer addressing various aspects of the developments discussed in this book.

I wish to thank Vladyslav Galushko and Open Society Foundations for their valuable support of my studies of Russian political warfare.

I am also grateful to Andreas Umland for his long-standing guidance and agreement to publish this volume in his critically acclaimed book series “Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society”.

Last but not least, I wish to express my deepest gratitude to my family and friends for their moral support during my work on this book.

Anton Shekhovtsov

18 July 2023

Vienna

Abbreviations

ABW

Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego (Internal Security Agency)

Poland

AfD

Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany)

Germany

AFRIC

Association for Free Research and International Cooperation

Russia

ANC

African National Congress

South Africa

BBC

British Broadcasting Corporation

United Kingdom

BRICS

Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa

International

CENI-M

Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante (Independent National Election Commission)

Democratic Republic of the Congo

CGTN

China Global Television Network

China

CIS

Commonwealth of Independent States

International

CIS-EMO

Commonwealth of the Independent States-Election Monitoring Organisation

Russia

DPR

“Donetsk People’s Republic”

Ukraine

DRC

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Democratic Republic of the Congo

ECAG

Europejskie Centrum Analiz Geopolitycznych (European Centre for Geopolitical Analysis)

Poland

ECDHR

European Council on Democracy and Human Rights

Poland

EFDD

Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy

European Union

ENEMO

European Network of Election Monitoring Organisations

International

EU

European Union

International

FDG

Foundation for Democracy and Governance

Belgium

FDNV

Foundation for the Defence of National Values

Russia

FPÖ

Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Freedom Party of Austria)

Austria

FRELIMO

Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Mozambique Liberation Front)

Mozambique

FSB

Federal’naya sluzhba bezopasnosti (Federal Security Department)

Russia

ICES

International Expert Centre for Electoral Systems

Israel

IFBG

International Foundation for Better Governance

Belgium

ISIS

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

International

LN

Lega Nord (Northern League)

Italy

LPR

“Lugansk People’s Republic”

Ukraine

MEP

Member of the European Parliament

European Union

MMA

Mixed martial arts

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

International

NBC

Nuclear, biological, and chemical

NGO

Non-governmental organisation

OSCE

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe

International

OSCE ODIHR

Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe

International

OSCE PA

Parliamentary Assembly of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe

International

OWP

Obóz Wielkiej Polski (Camp of Great Poland)

Poland

PACE

Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe

International

PoR

Party of Regions

Ukraine

PSL

Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (Polish People’s Party)

Poland

RPF

Russian Peace Foundation

Russia

RT

Russia Today

Russia

SADC

Southern African Development Community

International

SD

Sverigedemokraterna (Sweden Democrats)

Sweden

SVR

Sluzhba vneshney razvedki (Foreign Intelligence Service)

Russia

UMP

Union pour un mouvement populaire (Union for a Popular Movement)

France

UN

United Nations

International

UNGA

United Nations General Assembly

International

WHO

World Health Organisation

International

1. Conceptualising Malign Influence of Putin’s Russia in Europe

Influence and power in international relations

Influence, as the Cambridge Dictionary defines it, is “the power to have an effect on people or things”,1 and it would not be an exaggeration to say that all states, to one degree or another, try to exert influence on other states.2

As its definition implies, influence is closely linked to power which represents the ability to influence how someone or something behaves, develops or thinks, or to cause someone to change their behaviour, belief or opinion when that would not have occurred otherwise. In the context of international relations and on the basis of the close connection between influence and power, Joseph Nye introduced the concepts of hard power and soft power.3 Hard power is the ability to exert influence over other nations through coercion that implies using military threats, sanctions and/or bribery. In turn, soft power is the ability to influence through affinity and attraction with resources such as a nation’s political values, culture, and foreign policies.

In recent years, as authoritarian regimes increasingly challenged the democratic West, experts developed new terms in an effort to identify those aspects of power and influence that made the challenge of authoritarian regimes especially distressing.

In 2013, elaborating on Nye’s concept of soft power in relation to Putin’s Russia, James Sherr argued that, when discussing the country’s influence abroad, a better way would be to talk not of soft power but rather of soft coercion. Sherr defined the latter as “influence that is indirectly coercive, resting on covert methods (penetration, bribery, blackmail) and on new forms of power, such as energy supply, which are difficult to define as hard or soft”.4

Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig also found it difficult to identify particular influence techniques used by authoritarian regimes such as Putin’s Russia and Xi’s China as related to either hard power or soft power. Therefore, they wrote of sharp power to characterise malign, aggressive, and manipulative aspects of influence operations of authoritarian states in democratic societies. Unlike soft power, sharp power “is not a ‘charm offensive,’ nor is it an effort to ‘share alternative ideas’ or ‘broaden the debate.’ It is not principally about attraction or even persuasion; instead, it centers on manipulation and distraction”.5

Mimetic power is another useful concept to employ in discussions about the approaches of authoritarian regimes to wield influence in the democratic West. Mimetic power can be defined as the ability to influence Western nations by creating the impression that authoritarian regimes are normal members of the international community and emulating what authoritarian regimes perceive as Western soft power techniques.6 The idea behind mimetic power is that, for example, Putin’s Russia is no better and no worse than any other Western country: even if Moscow behaves in an apparently questionable way, it is still normal because Western capitals allegedly do the same.

Another power-related concept that is useful for analysing influence of authoritarian regimes in democratic societies is dark power. The term appeared in 2007,7 but was not properly conceptualised until very recently. Mark Galeotti offered arguably the most significant contribution to the conceptualisation of dark power:

“If soft power is the ability of a state to get its way by attraction and positive example, then dark power is the capacity to bully. [...] If you are going to be a bully, then be a fearsome and formidable one. That way, rivals are deterred from challenging you, and are inclined to pacify you with deals and exemptions”.8

Drawing on the discussions of dark power by Galeotti and ourselves,9 we can define it as the ability to influence preferences and behaviour of other nations through projecting an image of a state inherently antagonistic to their political values. Wielding dark power is about producing an image of a country that opposes the “Western hypocrisy” of liberal democracy, has the right to behave irresponsibly on the international stage, and is able to corrupt democracy in other countries.

The above-mentioned interpretations and definitions of sharp power, mimetic power and dark power suggest that these concepts are related to deception as an instrument employed by authoritarian regimes in their relations with democratic states. Hence, it seems natural that these types of power can be linked to specific forms of what the Soviet forces called maskirovka, “a set of processes employed during the Soviet era designed to mislead, confuse, and interfere with anyone accurately assessing its plans, objectives, strengths, and weaknesses”.10 One Soviet military dictionary argues that these forms include concealment, imitation, simulation, demonstrative actions, and disinformation.11 Although the Soviet forces originally applied the concept of maskirovka only to particular aspects of kinetic warfare, they would later use it to describe political, economic and diplomatic measures. In the context of this paper, we can argue that mimetic power corresponds to such forms of maskirovka as imitation and simulation, while sharp power and dark power draw upon disinformation and demonstrative actions.

Malign influence

Nye wrote that a nation is more likely to produce soft power or, in other words, to implement the ability to influence other societies through affinity and attraction “when a country’s culture includes universal values and its policies promote values and interests that others share [...]. Narrow values and parochial cultures are less likely to produce soft power”.12 From this we can conjecture that influence emanating from soft power is normatively positive: when a state tries to influence the behaviour of another state by appealing to shared universal values and common interests, it effectively strengthens the universal value system thus contributing to the building of a global culture of human rights and achieving long-term balance and stability in international relations.

In contrast, authoritarian regimes based on non-democratic value systems use soft coercion, sharp power, mimetic power and dark power with the intent to mislead and confuse democratic nations and their leadership, hence the influence emanating from these approaches is inevitably negative in the normative sense and is termed here as malign.

We define malign influence in the European context as a specific type of influence that directly or indirectly subverts and undermines European values and democratic institutions. We follow the Treaty on European Union in understanding European values that are the following:

human dignity

freedom

democracy

equality

the rule of law

respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.13

Democratic institutions are guardians of European values, and among them we highlight:

representative political parties that aggregate, organise and articulate citizens’ political demands, translate these demands into policy proposals, engage citizens in the democratic process, provide the basis for coordinated legislative activity, and advance government accountability;

free and fair elections in which voters should be able to form opinions independently and free of violence or threats of violence, compulsion, or manipulative interference of any kind;

an impartial justice system free of discrimination or favouritism;

free, independent and pluralistic media that provide objective and accurate reporting, guarantee access to diverse views and meaningful opinions, monitor public officials, foster democratic debate, and encourage active involvement of citizens in political and social life;

a robust civil society that holds public institutions accountable on issues of democracy and human rights, helps preserve democratic vibrancy, presents opportunities for collective action, builds community cohesion, and helps citizens articulate their interests and demands.

The main effect of malign influence is erosion and decline of European values, as well as deepening distrust of democratic institutions.

Before discussing motifs, agents, and instruments of malign influence of Putin’s Russia in Europe, one caveat is in order. The fact that this authoritarian regime wields malign influence does not mean that Russia cannot produce soft power in Europe. Russia’s major source of soft power is its high culture that comprises of literature (especially humanist writings), classical music, ballet, etc., and Russia has doubtlessly made an important historical contribution to world culture. The problem for Putin’s regime is that it has only limited access to this source, because the Kremlin’s activities and behaviour in the international arena compromise the positive effects of Russia’s traditional soft power. One dramatic example here is the sharp decline of Russia as a sport superpower after the disclosure of the massive state-sponsored doping program that led to several temporary bans from the most important international sport events.

Malign influence as an effect of political warfare

It seems appropriate to discuss Russian malign influence in Europe in the framework of a political war that Putin’s regime wages against Europe. Although the term “political warfare” was first introduced by the British forces during the Second World War, it was George F. Kennan, a leading American diplomat during the Cold War, who elaborated on the concept of political warfare in 1948: “political warfare is the employment of all means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives. Such operations are both overt and covert. They range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures (as ERP [i.e. Economic Recovery Plan, better known as The Marshall Plan]), and ‘white’ propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of ‘friendly’ foreign elements, ‘black’ psychological warfare and even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states”.14 According to Paul A. Smith, “political war may be combined with violence, economic pressure, subversion, and diplomacy, but its chief aspect is the use of words, images, and ideas, commonly known, according to context, as propaganda and psychological warfare”.15 Today, political warfare is seen as a grey area between, on the one hand, regular political, diplomatic, economic and other interactions, and, on the other, high-order war, i.e. “intense, declared conventional or nuclear war between the armed forces of two or more nation-states”.16

The framework of political warfare is useful for understanding malign influence and delineating its meaning. In times of peace, authoritarian regimes build their relations with democratic societies predominantly on the basis of traditional and public diplomacy, trade and cultural exchange, which implies the employment of soft power on the part of authoritarian regimes no matter how limited their access is to it. However, in a situation of crisis, nations tend to “deform” all areas of cooperation they enjoyed during peace time. Traditional and public diplomacy are poisoned by the downgrading of communications and projections of hard power, routine trade is crippled by sanctions and trade wars, and soft power degenerates into dark power, mimetic power and/or sharp power. If the crisis is not resolved quickly, political warfare emerges.17 As an effect of political warfare, malign influence does not belong to the areas of cooperation in times of peace, but—while it is not a repercussion of high-order war—it can be observed throughout such war. Table 1 demonstrates the forms that power and influence take during times of peace, political warfare, and high-order war.

Table 1. Power and malign influence during times of peace, political warfare, and high-order war

Peacetime

Political war

High-order war

Soft power

Projections of hard power

Hard power

Mimetic power

Sharp power

Dark power

Traditional influence

Malign influence

For example, disinformation may imply different things depending on the particular context. In times of peace, disinformation may be created for profit (mercenary fake news) or for purposes of humour (satirical fake news).18 Publishing false orders about diversionary landings or movements of troops is considered disinformation in times of war. Spreading manipulated pictures in order to confuse and disrupt a nation’s opponents can be considered disinformation as part of political warfare or high-order war. In none of the cases can we talk about malign influence, unless disinformation is produced to manipulate public sentiment which leads—in the European context—to subversion of European values and/or undermining of democratic institutions. Likewise, neither corporate espionage nor money laundering necessarily produces malign influence despite the unwelcome nature of these criminal activities. Only when crime appears to be part of political warfare (for example, used to wield political influence or carry out targeted political assassinations19) can we talk about malign influence deriving from crime.

Furthermore, the relationship between political warfare and malign influence allows us to solve the question of whether this type of influence is an offensive or defensive measure. Any warfare implies both, so—in the context of Putin’s Russia and Europe—the aggressive subversion and undermining of European values and democratic institutions is mirrored by the Kremlin’s willingness to defend from Western influence what it considers as its own values and institutions. This echoes how some experts and practitioners understand information warfare, namely as “actions taken to preserve the integrity of one’s own information system from exploitation, corruption, or disruption, while at the same time exploiting, corrupting, or destroying an adversary’s information system and, [in] the process, achieving an information advantage in the application of force”.20

Strategic and tactical goals of Russian malign influence

Elaborating on their concept of sharp power, Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig argue: “powerful and determined authoritarian regimes, which systematically suppress political pluralism and free expression in order to maintain power at home, are increasingly applying the same principles internationally to secure their interests”.21 This insight helps us conceptualise the major motifs of Russian state or non-state actors wielding malign influence in Europe, as it was Russian society that was the first victim of malign influence operations conducted by the Kremlin and its loyalists. In other words, before they started to wage a political war against the West in general and Europe in particular, the pro-Kremlin actors first undermined and subverted European values and democratic institutions at home.

Starting from Putin’s first presidential term, the (pro-)Kremlin actors increasingly:

took away freedoms and liberties from the Russian people;

destroyed the rule of law replacing it with the rule of political considerations, cronyism, and nepotism;

degraded human rights and practices aimed at their defence;

put pressure on civil society and NGOs;

clamped down on political opposition;

undermined the free and fair character of electoral processes.

All of these actions were needed in order to do away with democratic principles—no matter how weak they were during Boris Yeltsin’s rule—to establish control over all Russian political institutions, and to enervate Russian society, thus securing the unlimited rule of Putin’s authoritarian and kleptocratic regime. The Kremlin has projected its domestic agenda of subverting democratic values and institutions onto Europe in its political war against the West. From this perspective, one can concur with James Sherr who argues that the overarching aim of Putin’s Russia is “the creation of an international environment conducive to the maintenance of its system of governance at home”.22

It must be stressed, however, that there are different degrees of assertiveness in influencing the international environment, and—as argued before—it is natural that nations are, to different extents, involved in the process of influencing other states. For example, strategies of public diplomacy in times of peace can be based on engagement or shaping. In the case of engagement, nations aim to “inject new thinking and ideas”, “create shared resources”, “promote dialogue” and/or “fashion a common language”.23 In the case of shaping, the task is to reframe debates between nations by creating fresh perspectives, developing new concepts, changing the language of the debates, promoting rule of law and human rights.24

But there are disruptive and destructive public diplomacy strategies too, and nations resort to using them when engagement and shaping strategies do not seem to be effective. A disruptive strategy of public diplomacy is employed when a nation faces an unwelcome consensus. The aims of this strategy are—as Alex Evans and David Steven put it—to probe points of weakness, exploit wedge issues, redefine the terms of the debate, create a counter-narrative, galvanise allies, and divide, co-opt, or marginalise opponents.25 A destructive strategy of public diplomacy is used when a nation does not see there to be an opportunity for further debate with what it considers its adversaries. Public diplomacy informed by this strategy aims “to sow confusion, fear and panic” through disinformation, “encourage dissention and defection” and “isolate enemies”.26 It is these strategies of public diplomacy that produce malign influence as an effect of political warfare conducted within the circumstances of a perceived crisis.

While the malign influence of Putin’s Russia subverts and undermines European values and democratic institutions, these are not necessarily the primary targets of Russian influence operations. There is a difference between the effects of malign influence in our perspective and the aims of Putin’s Russia.

We identify two major strategic goals of Putin’s Russia when it engages in political warfare that produces malign influence.

The first goal is to protect Russian society from Western ideological, political, cultural, and other influences believed to undermine the grip on power held by Putin’s regime. This goal is attained by discrediting European values and democratic institutions in the eyes of the Russian people. To this effect, Putin’s regime pushes the idea that Europe is only interested in promoting European values in order to acquire advantage in geopolitical competition with Russia: narratives about democracy and rule of law are needed to denigrate the Russian authorities and pit Russian citizens against the regime; narratives about equality and human rights are directed at subverting Russian traditional, conservative values. The bottom line here is that European nations themselves care neither about democracy nor freedom nor human rights—they only weaponise these values against Russia.

The second goal is to advance the political, economic and security interests of Putin’s Russia on the international stage. The Kremlin and pro-Kremlin actors strive to attain this goal through shaping the international environment in the image and semblance of Putin’s regime, and—to this end—seek to corrupt major democratic institutions such as political parties, elections, justice systems, media and civil society.

Putin’s regime and pro-Kremlin loyalists try to achieve these two strategic goals by meeting various tactical objectives. These objectives include, but are not limited to, weakening of Europe’s transatlantic contacts, poisoning of bilateral relations between European states, spreading disorder on the international stage, retaining former Soviet states in the Russian sphere of influence, hindering modernisation of democratising European states, undermining trust in the EU and NATO, etc.

Areas, tools, and operators of Russian malign influence

It is important to distinguish between tools of political warfare (and malign influence) and areas of their application, although at times the difference between them is vague. An analysis of existing literature on Russian foreign policy and political warfare27 helps us identify thirteen sometimes overlapping major areas in which actors of Putin’s Russia conduct political warfare and, thus, produce malign influence:

politics

diplomacy

military domain

business

media

cyber domain

civil society

academia

religion

crime

law

health

environment

At the same time, we identify the following tools of Russian malign influence (the list, however, is far from exhaustive):

political alliances

interference in elections

agents of influence

front organisations

international organisations

public relations and lobbying

energy politics

economic subversion and sanctions

shell companies

intelligence operations

cyber warfare

cyber crime

lawfare, or corrupt misuse of the legal system

public diplomacy

think-tanks

diaspora groups

propaganda and disinformation

corruption

conditional military aid

paramilitary groups

organised crime

religious politics

historical revisionism

Thus, techniques and combinations of techniques used by state and pro-Kremlin non-state actors in the framework of political warfare thus producing malign influence are innumerable. For example, the Kremlin may interfere in elections in Western nations by building alliances with particular political forces, providing funding through shell companies, and supporting them with the help of disinformation and cyber-attacks against their opponents. Or Russian pro-Kremlin actors may attempt to drive wedges between social and cultural groups in European nations through simulated “civil society” groups funded through organised crime. Or those actors may hack European think-tanks that aim to counter the Kremlin’s malign influence operations, and discredit them by publishing sensitive, non-public information. Or Russian intelligence services may provide training for paramilitary groups in European societies that could later be used for radicalising peaceful democratic protests.

There are eight major categories of Russian state and non-state operators that are engaged in political warfare in Europe and thus are exercising malign influence: siloviki (institutions of force), official structures, political forces, business community, state-sponsored media, social media propaganda networks, think-tanks/foundations, and the traditionalist bloc. Table 2 provides non-exhaustive examples of operators belonging to these categories.

Table 2. Russian state and non-state operators of political warfare

Siloviki

Defence Ministry, Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, Foreign Intelligence Service, Federal Security Service, Wagner Group

Official structures

Presidential Administration, Foreign Ministry, Committee on International Affairs of the State Duma

Political forces

“United Russia”, Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, Communist Party

Business community

Gazprom, Rosneft

State-sponsored media

RT, Sputnik

Social media propaganda networks

Internet Research Agency, Russian web brigades

Think-tanks/foundations

Rossotrudnichestvo, Valdai Discussion Club, Dialogue of Civilisations, Katehon

Traditionalist bloc

Russian Orthodox Church, anti-LGBT organisations

Although these operators of malign influence can be broken down into categories, it is important to stress that at the time of a particularly acute crisis in the relations between Putin’s regime and the West, all these operators can be momentarily mobilised and function as a single unit, no matter whether they are state or non-state entities.

Russian operators of malign influence do not function in a vacuum: in the majority of cases, they are linked to Western and, in particular, European facilitators of the Kremlin’s political warfare. The concept of facilitators is close to what the authors of one insightful work call “enablers”, defined as entities (sometimes even countries) that “allow the Kremlin to achieve its end [...] and avoid some of the consequences of its behavior. [...] Crucially, by allowing Russian economic influence to cycle through their systems, enablers actively participate in the weakening and discrediting of their own democratic structures”.28 However, while the concept of enablers—at least as defined above—is economical in nature, facilitators operate in any area identified above thus helping Russian state and nonstate operators (see Table 2) achieve objectives that lead to the implementation of the Kremlin’s strategic goals. Table 3 gives examples of facilitators of pro-Kremlin malign influence in Europe.

Table 3. Facilitators of the Kremlin’s political warfare in Europe

Siloviki

Transnational organised crime, paramilitary groups, biker gangs

Official structures

Agents of influence, friendly academics, experts and journalists, consulting firms, celebrities, producers

Political forces

Friendly foreign political actors, front organisations

Business community

Business partners of Russian companies

State-sponsored media

Websites amplifying Russian pro-Kremlin narratives

Social media propaganda networks

Far-right, far-left and conspiracy theory Internet activists

Think-tanks/foundations

Friendly academics, experts and journalists

Traditionalist bloc

National Orthodox churches, ultraconservative and anti-LGBT organisations

Investigating Russian malign influence

When investigating Russian malign influence, one needs, first of all, to establish the context. Malign influence emerges during a crisis between nations, which is perceived to move them into a situation inconsistent with peacetime relations when they would try to change other nations’ behaviour or opinions by employing engagement or shaping strategies, rather than disruptive or destructive ones. In other words, malign influence is a product of the grey area of political warfare and cannot emerge during peacetime (see Table 1).

Understanding the context of malign influence is helpful to understand why the Kremlin and pro-Kremlin actors are strategically engaged in political warfare against the West in general and Europe in particular. These actors seek to minimise Western influences perceived as threats to Putin’s regime and, at the same time, to advance various interests of the regime in the Western environment considered as unfavourable due to a crisis in relations between Putin’s Russia and the West.

It is also important to assess vulnerabilities of European states because the Kremlin and pro-Kremlin actors are most likely to exploit those. Major vulnerabilities to Russian malign influence are shown in Table 4.

Table 4. Major vulnerabilities to Russian malign influence

Corruption

Pro-Kremlin actors use corruption as a lubricant for malign influence operations

Anti-system parties

Anti-system parties, whether of far-right or far-left conviction, amplify societal divisions and make societies more vulnerable

Economic dependence

A country’s economic dependence on Russia is yet another lubricant for malign influence operations

Social inequality

High levels of social inequality make European societies more vulnerable

Historical links

Religious and cultural connections to Russia may make countries less resilient to pro-Kremlin propaganda

Weak democracy

Weak or defective democratic institutions facilitate Russian malign influence operations

Weak media

Weak independent media imply weak social control over state officials and a distorted picture of developments in a country

Next, we need to identify the operators of malign influence, i.e. Russian state and non-state pro-Kremlin actors, that are engaged in political warfare in Europe and thus produce malign influence (Table 2). Furthermore, with regard to operators, we also need to identify the area(s) of their operation, the tools these operators use, and whether they also use any facilitators in Europe (Table 3).

After identifying operators, their tools and, possibly, their facilitators, as well as establishing the areas affected, we need to consider whether the malign influence operations helped the Kremlin achieve any tactical objectives that help the Kremlin achieve its strategic goals.