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- Herausgeber: Hémisphères Éditions
- Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
- Sprache: Englisch
... and Europe asserted itself in the face of a rapid acceleration of history.
In a world marked by profound geopolitical upheavals, the European Union is turning into a true global power. The challenges it faces are critical: what kind of security and defence instruments are needed to develop European sovereignty, as the Union stands between Russia, which is continuing its war on the continent, and the United States, which is withdrawing from its global responsibilities? How can competitiveness and growth be guaranteed in Europe and the necessary technological and digital innovations be achieved? What responses should be given to internal and institutional challenges?
The findings of the authors of the 19th publication of the Schuman Report on Europe are unequivocal: the European model must be defended on the international stage, which implies the emergence of a European Defence Union, promoting strategic autonomy with a European preference.
The European Union must simplify its regulations to strengthen its position as an economic power in a context of accelerated transitions and trade wars. Finally, to be able to act quickly and effectively, Member States must remain united and demonstrate political will, as the Union is facing numerous challenges: populist movements that are gradually closing in on power, its conflictual neighbourhood and the expectations of candidate countries knocking at its door.
The response is therefore clear and unanimous – at this historic moment, when challenges can be transformed into unique opportunities, the European Union is needed more than ever before. "The Schuman Report on Europe, the State of the Union 2025" brings together the most relevant contributions to major contemporary issues and gives a voice to those who shape and analyse Europe. With original maps and statistical data complete with commentary, this book is an essential tool to understand the challenges facing a Union in the midst of transformation.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
"Managing Director of the Robert Schuman Foundation. A former auditor of the 56th national session of the Institute of Higher National Defence Studies (IHEDN), Pascale Joannin is the director of the "Schuman Report on Europe, the state of the Union", published by Hémisphères, and co-editor of the "Permanent Atlas of the European Union", published by Marie B (5th edition), 2021. She is the author of "L'Europe, une chance pour la femme, Note de la Fondation Robert Schuman, n° 22", 2004. She has published numerous studies on European issues. "
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The State of the Union, 2025, Schuman Report on Europe is a collective work created on the initiative of the Robert Schuman Foundation within the framework of article 9 of law 57-298 of 11th March 1957 and article L.113-2 paragraph 3 of the Intellectual Property Code.
The opinions expressed in this book are the sole responsibility of the authors.
© All rights reserved, Robert Schuman Foundation, 2025
Original texts in English translated into French by Mathilde Durand
Layout: Nord Compo Cover design: Nord Compo Cover image: Lac Peïpous, Estonie, frontière orientale extérieure de l’Union européenne © Matjaz Corel/Alamy
© Hémisphères Éditions, 2025 3, Quai de la Tournelle 75005 Pariswww.hemisphereseditions.com
ISBN: 9782377010745
This digital document has been produced by Nord Compo.
Contents
Map contents
1957-2025: European integration
Territories of Europe
Women in Europe
1. New European geopolitics?
Start-ups in Europe
Artificial intelligence: means and dynamics
The digitisation of Europe
Investment in the space sector
2. A more competitive and efficient Europe?
The European Union budget
Trade defence instruments
The European Union in the world: trade agreements
The European Union’s overseas territories
Official development assistance
Agriculture
3. A Europe under challenge?
The Balkans: issues and strategies
Geopolitics of the Mediterranean
60 years of European Union enlargement
Prospects for European Union enlargement
4. Elections Monitor
Political Europe in 2025 (government)
Political Europe in 2025 (heads of government)
Populism in Europe
5. The European Union in statistics
Global growth prospects in 2025
Inflation in the European Union in December 2024
Geography of the eurozone
Demographics of the European Union Member States
Internal migration
Military spending worldwide (2023)
Support for Ukraine
The European Union’s extra-Community trade
Intra-Community trade
Europe and competitiveness
Research and development expenditure in the European Union
Taxation in Europe
Public debt
Pensions in the European Union
Nuclear energy: current situation and strategies
The origin of electricity in Europe
Critical raw materials
Author Biographies – Schuman Report 2025
Texts
Pascal AUSSEUR
Director of the Mediterranean Foundation for Strategic Studies (FMES), a think-tank specialising in the strategic challenges of southern Europe, in particular the Euro-Mediterranean area, the Middle East and Africa, Admiral (2s), Pascal Ausseur is an expert in the field of global maritime issues. He has held positions of responsibility in the surface forces and in the politico-military sphere, notably in the military cabinet of Hervé Morin and as head of the military cabinet of Jean-Yves Le Drian. He was also maritime prefect of the English Channel and the North Sea.
Jean-Noël BARROT
Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs since September 2024, Jean-Noël Barrot was Minister Delegate for European Affairs from February to September 2024 and Minister Delegate for Digital Affairs (2022-2024). Before joining the government, he was, from 2017 to 2022, deputy for Yvelines, vice-president of the Finance Commission. An economist, he taught at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) (2013-2017), before being appointed lecturer at HEC A member of the Democratic Movement (MoDem), of which he was national spokesperson (2018) and then secretary general (2018-2022), he has been its vice-president since July 2022. He is a graduate of HEC Paris and holds master’s degrees from the Paris School of Economics, HEC and Sciences Po, as well as a doctorate from HEC.
Nathalie DELAPALME
Nathalie Delapalme is the Director General of the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, which she joined in 2010. She was Inspector General of Finance at the Ministry of the Economy and Finance (2007-2010). Prior to that, she was an adviser on Africa and Development in the offices of various foreign ministers (1995-1997 and 2002-2007). She was an adviser to the Senate Finance and Budget Committee, where she assessed fiscal and public policies (1984-1995 and 1997-2002). She is co-secretary general of the Africa-Europe Foundation and sits on the board of directors of the International Crisis Group and the advisory board of the IFRI (French Institute of International Relations). She is a member of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR).
Corinne DELOY
A graduate of Sciences Po and holder of a DEA (postgraduate diploma) in political sociology from the University of Paris I - Panthéon Sorbonne, Corinne Deloy was a journalist at Nouvel Observateur and secretary general of the Foundation for Political Innovation (Fondapol). She is a research fellow at the Centre for International Research at Sciences Po (CERI) and editor of the European Elections Monitor (OEE) of the Robert Schuman Foundation.
Jean-Dominique GIULIANI
Chairman of the Robert Schuman Foundation, Jean-Dominique Giuliani was chief of staff to the President of the Senate René Monory and a director at SOFRES. A former Special Adviser to the European Commission, he is Vice-Chairman of the Supervisory Board of Arte France. He has been Chairman of the General Assembly of Arte GEIE since 1 January 2025. He co-edited the Permanent Atlas of the European Union, Éditions Marie B (5th edition), 2021. He is the author of ‘Européen, sans complexes’, Éditions Marie B, 2022 and ‘La Grande bascule - le XXI e siècle européen’, Éditions de l’École de Guerre, 2019.
Benjamin HADDAD
Politician and expert in international relations, Benjamin Haddad has been Minister Delegate for Europe since September 2024. He has been an elected representative for Paris since 2022. A graduate of Sciences Po and HEC Paris, he taught international relations at Sciences Po, then worked for 7 years in think-tanks in Washington, notably as director of the Europe Centre at the Atlantic Council. Author of ‘Le Paradis perdu : l’Amérique de Trump et la fin des illusions européennes’ 2019), a plea for European sovereignty and strategic autonomy in the face of new geopolitical threats and American withdrawal.
Pascale JOANNIN
Director General of the Robert Schuman Foundation. A former auditor of the 56th national session of the Institut des hautes études de la défense nationale (IHEDN), Pascale Joannin is the editor of the ‘Schuman Report on Europe, the State of the Union’, published by Marie B, and co-editor of the ‘Permanent Atlas of the European Union’, published by Marie B (5th edition), 2021. She is the author of ‘L’Europe, une chance pour la femme’ (Europe, an opportunity for women), Note de la Fondation Robert Schuman, No. 22, 2004. She has published numerous studies on European issues.
Hervé JOUANJEAN
A former senior official of the European Commission, Hervé Jouanjean has successively held the positions of Deputy Secretary-General of the Commission and G7 Sherpa, then Director-General for Budget. Director of WTO and OECD Affairs at DG Trade after having been Deputy Ambassador of the Commission’s Permanent Delegation in Geneva to the International Organisations (WTO, UN), he was also chief negotiator of several free trade agreements between the European Union and certain third countries. Finally, he was responsible for EU/Latin America and Asia relations within what is now the European External Action Service. For the last ten years, he has been advising major international law firms on international trade issues.
Alain LAMASSOURE
A graduate of Sciences Po Paris and ENA, Counsellor at the Court of Auditors, MP for Pyrénées-Atlantiques (1986-1995), Alain Lamassoure was Minister Delegate for European Affairs, then for the Budget (1993-1997). Founding president of the Bayonne-Anglet-Biarritz urban community and the Basque Eurocity of Bayonne-San Sebastián (1993-2000), he was a Member of the European Parliament (1999-2019). President of the European Observatory of History Teaching at the Council of Europe (since 2021), he teaches at Sciences Po Paris (since 2019). He chairs the Foundation’s Scientific Committee.
Peter MAGYAR
Member of the European Parliament (EPP, HU) since 2024, Peter Magyar is Vice-Chair of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs. He is a member of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development and also sits on the Delegation to the UK Parliamentary Partnership Assembly and the Delegation for Relations with the United States. President of the TISZA party, he was previously a company director general, head of the ‘European Union law’ department at the Hungarian Development Bank, and head of European Union legislation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. He is a graduate of Péter Pázmány Catholic University and Humboldt University.
Florent MENEGAUX
Managing Partner of the Michelin Group since 2018 and Chairman since 2019, Florent Menegaux is rolling out a strategic plan, ‘Michelin in Motion 2030’, which will create a new dynamic for growth and value creation. With this plan, and building on 130 years of innovation, Michelin aims to become a world-leading manufacturer of composites and experiences that change our daily lives. He joined the Group in 1997, taking on international responsibilities. A member of the Group’s Executive Committee since 2008, he became Deputy Managing Director in 2014. He has chaired the United Nations Global Compact Network France since 2023. Before joining Michelin, he held management positions at Price Waterhouse, Exel Logistics and Norbert Dentressangle. He is a graduate of the University of Paris Dauphine.
Kyriákos MITSOTÁKIS
Prime Minister of the Republic of Greece since 2019, re-elected in 2023, Kyriákos Mitsotákis has been Chairman of the NeaDemokratia party since 2016. Previously, he was Minister of Administrative Reform and E-Government (2013-2015). A Member of Parliament since 2004, he has been an active member of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Before entering politics, he worked for ten years in the private sector as a financial analyst. He holds a bachelor’s degree in social studies, summa cum laude, from Harvard University, a Master’s degree in International Relations from Stanford University and an MBA from Harvard Business School.
Besnik MUSTAFAJ
An Albanian writer and diplomat, Besnik Mustafaj was Minister of Foreign Affairs (2005-2007) and Albanian Ambassador to France (1992-1197). A founding member of the Democratic Party, he was elected MP in the first free elections in 1991. He founded the Albanian Forum for the Alliance of Civilisations and is a member of the Foundation’s scientific committee. He is the author of several books translated into French and published by Actes Sud, and is recognised for his literary contributions, his commitment to Albania’s accession to the European Union and the promotion of religious tolerance.
Xavier PASCO
Xavier Pasco, who holds a doctorate in political science from the University of Paris 1, is the director of the Foundation for Strategic Research. He has authored numerous study reports on strategic issues related to anti-missile defence and space activities for national and European public organisations. His academic research has formed the basis of nearly one hundred articles in national and international journals. His latest book, ‘La ruée vers l’espace, nouveaux enjeux géopolitiques’, was published in September 2024 by Editions Tallandier. He is an associate researcher at George Washington University (USA), an elected member of the International Academy of Astronautics and deputy editor-in-chief of the international journal Space Policy (Elsevier Science).
Hervé PILLAUD
A former breeder involved in the FNSEA, the Chambers of Agriculture and La Ferme Digitale, Hervé Pillaud has devoted 40 years of his life to modernising agriculture. An innovator in bovine genetics and water management, he went on to promote digitisation and collaboration within the sector. He chairs the group Les Établières in the Vendée. Author of ‘Vers un monde sans faim’ (Towards a World Without Hunger) (2024), he advocates sustainable and connected agriculture, combining innovation, entrepreneurship and collective commitment.
Oliver RÖPKE
President of the EESC since April 2023 Oliver Röpke has been a member of the same committee since 2009. He chaired the Workers’ Group and was rapporteur for numerous resolutions and opinions on employment and social policy, the single market and innovation. He headed the Brussels office of the Austrian Trade Union Federation (ÖGB) and has held several high-level positions, notably as ÖGB representative to the European Union institutions. He has a legal background and holds a law degree from the University of Vienna.
Simon SERFATY
Simon Serfaty is Professor Emeritus of US Foreign Policy at Old Dominion University (ODU) in Norfolk, Virginia, and holds the Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy at the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. His two most recent books are ‘America in the World from Truman to Biden; Play it Again, Sam’ (Palgrave/McMillan, 2022) and ‘Un monde nouveau en manque d’Amérique; Conjuguer le présent à tous les temps’ (Odile Jacob, revised edition, 2021).
Oana-Andreea STEFAN
Oana Stefan holds the Chair of European Law at King’s College London and is Director of the Centre for European Law. She has held posts at HEC Paris, the College of Europe and University College Dublin, as well as the Vincent Wright Chair at Sciences Po in Paris. She specialises in European Union law and governance and has written on competition and state aid, energy law, financial regulation, health and the rule of law. She co-directed the Jean Monnet European research network on soft law, which empirically evaluated the use of soft law by national administrations and courts in six countries and four legal areas. Her publications include Soft Law in Court, Kluwer 2013; EU Soft Law in the Member States, Hart 2021).
Ana VASCONCELOS
Ana Vasconcelos has been a Member of the European Parliament (PT, RE) since 2024 and is a member of the Environment and Transport Committees (ENVI and TRAN), as well as the Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA). She was vice-president of the Iniciativa Liberal party and responsible for coordinating its political research unit, iLab. She studied for a master’s degree in political science at the University of Oxford, was a Europaeum scholar and worked as a research assistant on the Dahrendorf Programme at Oxford. Previously, she studied law and political science at the Catholic University of Portugal.
Henna VIRKUNNEN
Executive Vice-President for Technological Sovereignty, Security and Democracy at the European Commission since December 2024, Henna Virkkunen was a Member of the European Parliament (EPP, FI) from 2014 to 2024. Previously, she was Minister of Transport and Local Authorities (2014), Minister of Public Administration and Local Authorities (2011-2014), and Minister of Education (2008-2011). Member of the Finnish Parliament (2007-2014). She was Vice-President of the National Coalition Party (2008-2014). She chaired the Jyväskylä City Council and was Vice-President of the Regional Council of Central Finland. She holds a Master’s degree and a Bachelor’s degree in Philosophy from the University of Jyväskylä.
Salomé ZOURABICHVILI
President of Georgia since 2018 (MEPs continue to recognise her as the legitimate president of Georgia), Salomé Zourabichvili defends a pro-European vision, unlike the current Russian-leaning government. A former French diplomat, she worked at the French embassy in Rome, then at the UN and NATO. In 2003, she was appointed French ambassador to Tbilisi. She joined the government of President Mikheil Saakashvili as Minister of Foreign Affairs. She created her own party, the Way of Georgia, which she led until 2010. She was elected as an independent member of parliament in 2016. She is a graduate of Science Po Paris.
Maps
DESTREM Lucas
A qualified geographer with degrees from the universities of Limoges, Geneva and Lille, Lucas Destrem specialises in critical toponymy and industrial heritage. As a cartographer, his work combines both conventional productions and original creations. He is also the author of a wide range of books and contributions on the promotion of regional heritage, the political naming of places and the legacy of industry.
Statistics
LENOIR Olivier
A graduate of the Ecole Normale Supérieure (economics) and a former student of the Collège des Ingénieurs, Olivier Lenoir is currently a writer and executive director at Orange. His European career has also taken him to La Sapienza, the International Labour Office and the French Human Rights Ombudsman.
Intro
Europe: Acceleration
Jean-Dominique GIULIANI
For several years, the European Community has been treading water. Not because it has not taken any action. No! It has developed a particularly large corpus of rules, to the point that it has sometimes gone too far. It has initiated new industrial and financial policies, even venturing into defence issues.
But political union has not really progressed and despite the energy and consistency of the President of the French Republic, despite the clouds that have gathered in the geopolitical landscape, Europe’s security and defence issues have not found answers within the European Community and Europe’s defence has suffered as a result.
It has taken two Russian invasions of Ukraine, an information and digital war waged by the Kremlin’s dictator and the election of an atypical American president for Europe to consider unprecedented progress.
The process of acceleration has been prompted by this combination of factors, but above all by the method that has been imposed.
Security and defence issues cannot easily be taken forward by initiatives from the Commission or the European Parliament. They can only really progress based on the will of the Member States once they are convinced of a need or, better still, an urgent necessity, because in these areas, initiatives from the common institutions most often give rise to tension and rejection within national administrations.
The Covid-19 health crisis and the Russian war in Ukraine have pushed Member States to seek common solutions to situations they do not feel they can face alone. These decisions have taken the form of coordinated actions or common policies, the management of which has often been delegated to the common institutions, which are now indispensable.
75 years after the Schuman Declaration on 9 May 1950, the method remains the same: ‘... By concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity...’
And what about the context?
Historians have shown that the insistence and audacity of Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman stemmed from the fear of seeing the Cold War rapidly degenerate into open conflict. Are we so far from that today?
As we have often demonstrated, in Europe we have long since moved beyond the terms of old debates on the form and purpose of European integration.
The European Union is more federal than the most ardent federalists could have ever dreamed of in terms of the policies entrusted to it; it is more intergovernmental than the most ardent sovereigntists could have ever dreamed of because of the powers that it has not been granted.
Co-operation in the fields of defence and security to preserve peace under threat is therefore a considerable step forward, enabling Europeans to reconcile, to strengthen and to express themselves as a united force. Faced with the return of war to the continent, the United Kingdom has joined them, the States have decided to rearm, heads of state and government are speaking out strongly alongside Ukraine and have even entrusted their chiefs of staff with the task of implementing their decisions.
Faced with the Russian challenge and American abandonment, Europeans find themselves almost naturally in a common fight: it is as much cultural as it is political.
For the rule of law, democratic and social practice, openness to the world, the place of culture and education, a European model exists that must be assumed through pride in belonging and the will to promote it.
We are not America, certainly not Donald Trump’s America.
We are not Russia, certainly not Vladimir Putin’s Russia.
The gulf that exists between us and these two self-proclaimed empires is very deep. It concerns the firm belief, translated into law, that respect for the human person is central to everything and must be the main value around which society is organised.
And the unrest that can affect us through domestic free protest or foreign manipulation does not seem to weaken the support of European citizens for this premise, which is shared by many peoples far from our borders.
The long term is the only judge of civilisations.
It is not the dangers of the moment that should obscure what Europeans have managed to build over millennia, with so many upheavals and doubts. On the contrary, they must strengthen them in a necessary effort to avoid reliving the worst moments of their history.
To overcome the current difficulties, Europe has no choice but to reform, strengthen and assert itself. It seems to have realised this as a matter of urgency. A real acceleration process is at work, not only in history, but also in Europe and in terms of its integration.
The contributions contained in this book offer many reflections and concrete avenues to achieve this.
1New European geopolitics?
Greece’s contribution to European defence and the way forward
Kyriákos MITSOTÁKIS
We live today with a new world of geopolitical uncertainty and upheaval. Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine and the existential threat it poses to Europe; the conflict in the Middle East; the physical and virtual threats that whether manifest or dormant, are undermining our collective defence and security. These are the new dangers that make the strengthening of European defence capabilities ever more urgent and indispensable.
Greece has been and will continue to be at the forefront of the collective efforts to find a direct response to all current threats and challenges, with the aim of preserving peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area.
Greece: A long-time contributor to European defence and security
Greece has a long-standing commitment to the defence of the continent through its membership of NATO and the European Union, whether by participating in European Union missions and operations or through its significant contribution to NATO operations. Moreover, Greece is playing a leading role in safeguarding maritime security in the Red Sea, through its participation in the EU Maritime Operation “ASPIDES”. It has provided a seat for its Operational Headquarters in the city of Larissa and has dispatched a frigate in the area.
Greece has also been at the forefront of partnering with NATO, the EU and other countries regarding the use of various military facilities. And it has been an active participant in trilateral and quadripartite military cooperation with EU/NATO member states, and also non-member states such as Serbia and Armenia, and non-European countries, including Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and the UAE.
Furthermore, Greece, working closely with its EU partners and other allies, is contributing to European Security by focusing its efforts on five key strands:
(1) stabilizing the Western Balkans, which is an integral part of the European single security space;
(2) contributing to European energy security by significantly investing in the regasification infrastructure in Northern Greece;
(3) protecting Europe’s borders through the efficient management of irregular migratory flows;
(4) safeguarding against disruptions of global and European supply chains through the contribution of its merchant fleet, with 23% of world shipping now owned by Greek companies;
(5) deepening its strategic relationship with countries in the south of the Mediterranean and the Middle East in view of contributing to stabilization efforts in those regions.
Finally, Greece is actively supporting European initiatives related to defence such as PESCO, and is playing a constructive role in shaping the way ahead for stronger European Strategic Autonomy in defence and security.
The steps for stronger European Strategic autonomy in Defence and Security
Our goal should be to develop our own defence capacity and industrial production, within the EU, so as to strengthen our strategic autonomy. Equally, we need to reduce imports of military equipment from third party suppliers. If we merely subsidize the defence sectors of third countries, we will end up perpetuating dependencies and outlaying our resources, without maximizing our own security capabilities. We must instead take collective action on two fronts:
First, the financing of increased defence and security spending.
Second, a fit-for-purpose transformation of the European defence industry
The financing of increased defence and security spending
On financing, we must ensure that the necessary fiscal space exists to allow for the added expenditure needed for our defence and security. Due to acute external security problems, Greece has for several decades been allocating a higher share of its national income than most to defence and is one of the few NATO countries to spend over 3% of its GDP on this. Greek defence spending remains substantially higher than the EU average. In the context of its “2030 Agenda” for the modernization and streamlining of its armed forces, Greece, over the next 12 years, will continue spending at least 3% of its GDP for defence and allocating at least 20% of that amount for research, development and acquisition of equipment.
The new European fiscal framework attributes a special status to defence investment in its corrective arm. But there is a problem. Given the substantial increase in defence spending necessary to comply with the current and any future targets and requirements, this is likely to trigger what are known as Excessive Deficit Procedures or EDPs, which might be the case for Greece. This is inefficient and potentially very costly. If the European Commission approves increased defence spending ex-post, launching EDPs will only result in unnecessary market volatility and reputational costs.
There is a simple way to overcome this problem. We should exclude defence expenditure from fiscal targets ex-ante. This will allow member states to spend more on defence while preserving fiscal credibility and favourable financial conditions. There is also another consideration to be taken on board: if defence-related EDPs are launched and then revoked, the EDP will be interpreted as a signal to encourage market-driven fiscal sustainability. My proposal addresses this risk.
More national fiscal space will increase our defence and security capabilities, yet it will not be enough. At some point, markets may add defence premiums to our sovereign bond yields. In addition to increased fiscal costs, this could discourage defence spending and result in disproportionate burden sharing among the EU’s Member States.
The inclusion of security and defence in the European Investment Bank’s list of strategic priorities is a welcome development which I strongly support. On its own, however, it will cover only a fraction of our investment requirements.
This is why in acknowledging that defence and security is a common European good, based upon the positive market experience of the EU Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), I propose the creation of a new European instrument to finance our collective defence requirements. That instrument should be no less than 100 billion euro in size. This will be catalytic - rapidly closing our defence investment gaps, while minimizing fiscal costs and preserving favourable financial conditions.
A fit-for-purpose transformation of the European defence industry
Increasing the size of our spending should go hand-in-hand with increased efficiency for our money. This is where a fit-for-purpose transformation of the European defence industry is required. As mentioned in the Draghi and Letta reports, this industry remains fragmented, lacks scale, and needs further consolidation and deep specialization to create poles of excellence.
Recognizing that developing complex next generation defence systems requires investment exceeding the capacity of any Member State alone, together with my Polish counterpart, Donald Tusk, we submitted, in May 2024, an ambitious proposal for the creation of a European air defence shield, as a credible deterrent against all possible aggressors.
There would be clear benefits in announcing and financing such a major European initiative, and following it up swiftly with other flagship projects, such as unmanned vehicles of all types to deal for example with threats against our undersea infrastructure, cyber defence, space, and other critical defence and security domains. Such initiatives would:
> Allow individual Member States, and the EU as a whole, to address crucial weaknesses in their defence capabilities;
> Strengthen Europe’s technological and industrial base, transforming the EU into a global leader in defence technologies;
> Visibly increase Europe’s contribution to NATO and strengthen transatlantic cooperation;
> Send an unmistakable signal that Europe is united and determined, a global power to be reckoned with.
The fact that the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, included the idea of flagship European Defence Union projects, starting with a European Air Shield, in the Political Guidelines of her second term is welcome.
The Way Ahead
We look forward also to the upcoming White Paper on the Future of European Defence, as well as the Preparedness Union Strategy, to set the stage for creating a European Defence Union.
One of the basic assumptions should be that the territorial integrity of every Member State is inextricably linked with that of other Member States, and the EU as a whole. This was also mentioned in the recent Niinistö report on Strengthening European Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness. Therefore, a key priority should be further operationalization of Articles 42.7 TEU, our Mutual Defence Clause, and 222 TFEU, our EU Solidarity Clause, to strengthen their credibility and operational value as expressions of a European spirit of solidarity and mutual assistance.
Amidst the new geopolitical realities, our Economic and Monetary Union must be complemented with a strong Defence Union. Few will dispute the necessity to act, or the cost of failing to do so. What is needed is the leadership, the vision and the political will necessary for its creation in the years ahead. I have long been a proponent of greater European Strategic Autonomy in terms of defence and security. If our Union is to remain a pole of peace and stability, we must deliver a robust, unified and credible deterrence capability. Our commitment to contribute to an ambitious, albeit indispensable, defence-led future must rise to the occasion. The time to act is now.
February 17, 2025
The Georgian challenge, one for Europe
Salomé ZOURABICHVILI
In the shadow of the Russian war in Ukraine and the debates on the possible outcomes of the conflict and the looming geopolitical realignments, Georgia seems to have fallen off the radar and been relegated to the background of Europe’s priorities.
Since gaining independence more than thirty years ago, the country has been forging ahead with determination and boldness on the road to European integration. Since 1991, Georgia has completed all the stages: Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (1999), European Neighbourhood Policy (2004), Eastern Partnership (2009), Association and Free Trade Agreement (2014), visa liberalisation for the Schengen area (2017), inclusion of the objective of European integration in the Constitution (2018), official application for membership of the European Union (2022) and obtaining candidate status (2023). This path has been travelled without pause or reflection, and without hesitation even when Russia, by means of war (1992/1993, 2008) or occupation of parts of the territory, sought to erect obstacles to this progress. This orientation has benefited from the outset and continuously from the support of an immense majority of the population. This majority is based on the conviction of Georgian citizens that only the European and Euro-Atlantic bloc could ultimately ensure the nation’s security and independence from its historical enemy. Having completed the stages of the association agreement, Georgia rose to the rank of host power of the Petra Summit (2021), thus launching the trio of Associate Members of the European Union with Ukraine and Moldova and under the auspices of the President of the European Council.
Over the last twenty years, in turn as Minister for Foreign Affairs, leader of the political party ‘The Way of Georgia’, member of parliament and then head of state, it has been my responsibility to participate in, support or directly inspire this pro-European path. It is therefore all the more painful to see that, on the verge of accession, Georgia is not only gradually falling behind its two associated partners, but the authorities of the ‘Georgian Dream’ are turning their backs on the required reforms and looking increasingly towards their Russian neighbour. The breaking point was reached when the prime minister - elected in a vote that was not validated or recognised - decided unilaterally and without any political consultation on 27 November 2024 to halt the process leading to accession negotiations. And thus, placing itself in open breach of the Constitution, which, in Article 78, stipulates: “All the institutions of the country must do their utmost to facilitate and support the process of European and Euro-Atlantic integration.’
Isolated from its European partners, facing an internal crisis in which the pro-Russian ruling party has been unable to stop the demonstrations or to govern a country that has been de facto paralysed for five months, and which is becoming more and more repressive with each passing day, Georgia faces an existential challenge. This time it is not a military challenge, but one that takes us back to the Georgia of 1921, democratic and already fiercely European, whose independence and sovereignty were cut short by the invasion of the Russian army... for seventy years! The invasion was not military, but its outcome could be equally tragic for a country whose resolve for independence and for Europe is beyond doubt for anyone familiar with the situation.
This current challenge is first and foremost an attack on the very idea of democracy. In a country where all our Western partners have invested heavily to support the building of democratic institutions, which has taken giant steps in this institutional process over the last thirty years, with the support of a vast majority, it defies reason that it should be so easy to systematically unravel the institutional fabric. And this to the point where there is no longer any independent institution in the country – no justice system, parliament, central bank, electoral administration, local municipalities, regulatory commission or public broadcaster. Henceforth, the single party controls everything and appoints all the key officials in all public sector jobs. The politicisation of the public service is total. Only representatives of the ruling party sit in Parliament, which was elected through heavily rigged elections. There is no debate about the adoption of laws whose sole objective is to strengthen the repressive arsenal and control of civil society. The government has only a symbolic existence, since the executive applies the instructions of a single man, Bidvina Ivanishvili, in whom all powers are concentrated.
Thus, in the blink of an eye, Georgia, once known as a ‘beacon of democracy’, has been transformed into a Russian-style regime, in which the vertical concentration of power is strictly inspired by the Russian model of power. All the principles set out in the Constitution are now being flouted: freedom of expression, freedom of speech, the right to demonstrate, individual freedoms. The personal data of every Georgian citizen has been exposed and, in all likelihood, exploited in the massive fraud that the 2024 elections have been.
This challenge to democracy is, of course and above all, a challenge for Georgia, which has thus seen itself robbed not only of its elections, but also of its past, with the democratic development of the last thirty years, its experience of democracy in the years 1918-1921, as well as its centuries-old European aspirations, and also its future, with its historic prospect of joining the European family. The most obvious manifestation of this is evident in the massive and persistent response of the Georgian population, which has been observed day after day since October 2024.
But it is also a challenge for Europe itself.
A challenge to the European Union’s democratic project
How can Europe be so committed to the democratic construction of its partners without having adequate instruments to defend its own representatives first? The ambassadors of the European Union have been personally attacked and insulted in turn, then the collective image of the European Union has been called into question while the authorities of the beneficiary country have accused it of having become the ‘party of war’, and finally the achievements of its decades-long commitment, that is to say the institutions, have been undermined. How can we trust the instruments of soft power, which are rightly the pride of the European Union, if they cannot prevent the usurpation of power in a small country of 3.7 million inhabitants? Here, Russia is not challenging Europe with its military power, but with its propaganda tools (oligarchs, hidden finances, electoral manipulation). It is up to each of us to imagine the consequences of a defeat of the Western powers on a terrain that was and remains that of Europe par excellence.
A geopolitical challenge.
The resignation in the face of what is a Russian takeover of Georgia via its intermediaries (Ivanishvili and his party) will have consequences for the more strategic issues facing the European Union: firstly, the issue of enlargement, which appears extremely fragile if a government determined to do everything it can to stay in power and to reject the recommendations of the European institutions to end the process is enough.
Enlargement is no longer to be considered solely from the point of view of the benefits expected by Georgia, but from the point of view of the political needs of the European Union. A powerful Europe, which appears increasingly to be an absolute necessity, depends on its ability to expand its geographical base, to secure its place in the Black Sea, its access to the Caspian Sea and to the resources of the Black Sea and Caspian Sea basins and of Central Asia. However, one only has to look at the demands of the Trump administration regarding access to raw materials to understand that the European power of tomorrow will also depend on its own access to essential resources. Yet this powerful, enlarged and self-confident Europe is being challenged, if it can be so easily ousted - without recourse to military force - from one of the areas of its natural expansion.
Georgia occupies an important place in this geostrategic situation. Already in the 19th century, Russian strategists considered control of Georgia to be essential: ‘Whoever controls Tbilisi controls the Caucasus,’ said General Alexis Yermolov. This axiom remains: the diversification of the Caucasus and its opening up as a transit zone, the Azerbaijani-Turkish rapprochement, but also Armenia’s rapprochement with Europe, all presuppose an independent Georgia that has not fallen back into Russia’s orbit. The plans of the leaders of the ‘Georgian Dream’ to install China on the Georgian shore of the Black Sea, in parallel with the Russian plans for a new military base in occupied Abkhazia, are all challenges to the European Union’s infrastructure projects on and under the Black Sea. The de facto eviction of European and NATO fleets from the Black Sea following the war in Ukraine could become permanent if the western and eastern shores are not secured, i.e. Romania, Bulgaria and Georgia. And if NATO and the European Union do not jointly review their security and cooperation strategy in the Black Sea.
An economic and strategic challenge
The lack of transparency that now characterises the actions of the Ivanishvili regime poses a new kind of threat to the economy and governance of the European Union. A grey area is forming that allows Russia to circumvent sanctions, a circumvention that is also becoming a source of income for the increasingly isolated Georgian economy, deprived of its traditional resources such as tourism. The range of measures taken includes, on the one hand, the Central Bank directive exempting Georgian citizens from the application of sanctions, subject to validation of the evidence supporting the decision by the Georgian courts; on the other hand, the offshore law allowing Georgian citizens to repatriate assets held in other offshore companies without paying either import duties import duties or taxes on profits until 2030 and, of course, without any control over the origin of these assets.
This creates a de facto (with the connivance of the local authorities) and de jure (by virtue of the laws adopted) grey area which can then allow the easy passage of various trafficking operations to or from Europe. Instead of fulfilling its role as a hub for energy and trade between Europe and Central Asia, Georgia is being diverted from its historical function and used to consolidate Russian domination in the region and beyond. The existence of such a grey area at the gateway to Europe also harbours other threats, particularly their use by terrorist groups.
Russia’s hybrid strategy
The experience of the war against Ukraine has shown Russia the limits of military strategy: despite its presumed superiority in human and material resources, Russia has been unable to achieve its war objectives in three years. The cost incurred in terms of prestige, human
