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- Herausgeber: transcript Verlag
- Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
- Serie: Soziale Bewegung und Protest
- Sprache: Englisch
As Multilateral Development Banks increasingly gained influence in shaping global development, transnational social movements pushed to hold them accountable for their human rights impact towards communities. Leon Valentin Schettler presents a novel causal mechanism of movement advocacy towards MDBs, combining disruptive and conventional tactics. Systematically comparing the evolution of human rights standards and complaint mechanisms over the last three decades, he reveals how the combination of 1) declining US hegemony, 2) counter-mobilization by China and 3) movement cooptation by the World Bank bureaucracy led to a dilution of human rights accountability in the 2010s.
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Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2020
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LEON VALENTIN SCHETTLER
Socializing Development
Transnational Social Movement Advocacyand the Human Rights Accountability of Multilateral Development Banks
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Leon Valentin Schettler works as an advisor on human rights safeguarding and complaint mechanisms for Bread for the World (development cooperation) and Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe (humanitarian aid). His main research interests lie with global norm contestations, human rights, and the democratic legitimacy of global governance institutions.
Dissertation, 2019 1 University of Potsdam 2 Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700 – Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood
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Contents
Acknowledgements
The cover page of this book names me as the author. It is my conviction, though, that writing a book is bound to be a collective endeavor. Certainly, this work would not exist without the guidance of my mentors, the feedback and company of my colleagues and the backing of my family.
This book is based on my PhD and my work as a research associate at the “Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700 – Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood” funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG). I thank my first supervisor and chef, Andrea Liese, for her constructive, solution-oriented feedback from the beginning. Our regular conversations over the past four years formed this book in several constructive ways, while Andrea’s intellectual openness from the beginning allowed me to develop my own ideas and approach. It was due to her as a principal investigator in our SFB 700-D8 research project “‘Talk and Action’. How International Organizations respond to areas of limited statehood” that I developed a certain affection towards international organizations. I also thank Andrea for her careful attention to detail, clarity and focus when my project faced the risk of mission creep. Thomas Risse, my second supervisor, deserves special gratitude for giving direction to my work at critical junctures. Thomas’s own scholarship inspired much of my thinking about transnational social movement advocacy. As the founder and director of the aforementioned research center, it is thanks to him that I was able to work in an inspiring, interdisciplinary and supportive environment that has shaped not only this work, but also its author. I thank the DFG and, ultimately, all German taxpayers, for enabling our SFB 700 research center.
Before I started at the research center, Lars Brozus was an important mentor to me. Without him, I would most likely not have applied and I am very thankful for his guidance at the right time. Once at PhD work, David Hunter was very helpful, putting me in touch with several NGO and World Bank representatives, some of which became critical interviewees for my case studies. I also thank David for inviting me as a guest scholar to American University’s Washington College of Law and for providing legal advice regarding the human rights obligations of multilateral development banks. Among movement activists, Knud Vöcking, Bruce Rich, Chad Dobson and Jolie Schwarz were of immense help - I am grateful for their trust and time. I thank Nicole Deitelhoff for her crucial intellectual guidance as well. Her reading of and commenting on several excerpts (despite having no formal role as a supervisor) and the invitation to her and Christopher Daase’s colloquium in Frankfurt were of immense importance to this work and exceeded the (already ambitious) standard of “diffuse academic reciprocity” by far.
My colleagues and fellow doctoral students at the SFB 700, at Prof. Liese’s Chair of International Organizations and Public Policy in Potsdam and those at the Berlin Graduate School of Transnational Studies (BTS) accompanied and improved my work through their critical, yet always appreciative reflections. My special thanks go to Angela Heucher, my everyday sparring partner who certainly knows my work (as well as all preceding drafts along the way) best. Angela has an admirable talent to provide truly helpful feedback on thoughts and all sorts of text, including the entire final draft of this book. After four years sharing the same office every day (whether in Berlin or Potsdam) and together with our whole SFB D8 project team – Andrea Liese, Wiebke Balcke, Julie Habersetzer, Matthias Zeller, Levke Groher, Sascha Menig, Nadine Grimm-Pampe and Ciris Strasser – Angela also provided for my social home at work. Moreover, I thank Daniel Jacob and Cord Schmelzle for introducing me to the beauty of political theory, Felix Anderl for our mutual support and cooperation from the beginning in light of very similar research interests, Gregor Walter-Drop for his methodological advice on numerous occasions as well as Tillmann Scherf, Theresa Bergmann, Matthias Kötter, Luisa Linke-Behrens, and Pia Hesse for simply being fabulous colleagues.
I thank my parents, Paco and Susanne, as well as my brother Nicolas for their joint upbringing and education that put me in the position to even consider doing a PhD in the first place – a decade after I left my home in Cologne.
Above all, though, I thank Linda, my beloved wife, for her unconditional backing. You experienced all the sleepless nights first hand, my oscillation between joy and suffering, the manifold hopes to have developed a compelling theoretical approach, routinely followed by severe skepticism regarding that same approach. All the same, you provided the assurance and comprehension I needed to move on throughout the last four years. I thank Linda and Lou, our 17-month-old daughter, for putting this book in perspective at the time of writing it up. With this, I am ready to set a full stop now.
Abstract
Some of the most pressing challenges of our times – climate change, biodiversity, poverty, international peace and security - are of an inherently transnational nature. To address these challenges, states have increasingly delegated competencies to international organizations (IOs) over the last decades. Today, IOs are central actors in global governance that shape policy discourses, design and implement projects, but also develop, monitor and interpret global rules. Multilateral development banks (MDBs) are a species of IOs that have assumed particularly far reaching governance tasks in the field of global development, as they provide loans and financial assistance to developing countries and play a crucial role in implementing the most important global governance initiatives such as the Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement on climate change. The increasing governance functions of MDBs thus correspond with the notion that the “Anarchy Problematique” in International Relations has given way to the “Problematique of Rule”. Consequently, scholars and civil society member worldwide wonder, which standards MDBs should meet to be considered legitimate, whereby legitimacy is understood as a normative concept referring to “the right to rule” of a given political order or institution. In parallel to the growing competencies of MDBs, social movements increasingly joined forces beyond national boundaries to demand that MDBs adhere to human rights, that they govern in a transparent way and that they can be effectively sanctioned in case they violate human rights. In short, transnational social movements (TSM) demanded human rights accountability from MDBs.
Instead of simply assuming which standards MDBs should adhere to, this work begins with a philosophical reflection on the legitimacy of multilateral development banks in light of their increasing governance competences over the last decades. My argument is that MDBs should adhere to human rights accountability in order to be normatively legitimate. In a first step, I conceptualize accountability as a triad of a) standards, b) transparency concerning MDB activities and c) sanctions in cases of non-compliance. Departing from common notions of MDB accountability, I argue that those individuals affected by MDB governance are ultimately the relevant accountability holders. Then, I argue for human rights as the right standard of accountability, since human rights express each person’s equal moral status by guaranteeing the protection of basic human interests. In addition, the justification of human rights accountability as a standard for MDB legitimacy is grounded in already existing legal obligations of MDBs, as well as in a consideration of larger empirical trends in global governance.
Against the background of this normative reflection, this works turns to transnational social movements as actors that have pushed MDBs to institutionalize human right accountability, thereby socializing them into the community of legitimate governance actors. In doing so, TSM have used a variety of conventional and disruptive tactics towards MDBs under varying scope conditions and with differential success. To shed light on the effectiveness of movement engagement, this works asks how and under which conditions transnational social movements are successful in strengthening the human rights accountability of multilateral development banks? Drawing on the extensive body of studies on social movement tactics, I derive a causal mechanism of movement influence on MDBs which is already contained in the literature, but has not been theorized explicitly to date. Specifically, I argue that a sequence of disruptive tactics towards the MDB producing crisis (Part 1), followed by conventional tactics towards MDB member states aimed at persuading key decision makers (Part 2) then enables these member states to push for policy and institutional reform at the MDB Board of Directors (Part 3). At each step of the mechanism, the respective movement tactics are only effective under a set of distinct scope conditions relating to properties of the actor seeking change, the target organization, the issue and the discursive environment. To capture the dynamic interplay of movement action and MDB reaction, I theorize “counter mobilization” as a continuous scope condition along the process. Finally, I draw on rational choice and sociological institutionalism to explain the underlying dynamics of MDB socialization in terms of complementary, yet different ‘logics of action’ that dominate at different parts of the mechanism.
In a most-similar case study design involving two cases of transnational social movement activism toward the World Bank, I engage in process tracing to reconstruct the presence and vigor of my causal mechanism. The first case study (1988 – 1994) centers on the institutionalization of a quasi-judicial sanctioning body, the second case (2011 – 2016) centers on a comprehensive review of World Bank accountability standards. In both cases, TSM engagement followed the sequence of the theorized causal mechanism. However, while the TSM was successful to socialize the World Bank into comprehensive human rights accountability in the early 1990s, it failed to impede the adoption of only limited human rights accountability provisions in 2016. This outcome is puzzling at first glance, since several scope conditions remained constant (e.g. the organizational mandate, the distribution of shares among member states, the issue at stake) or even point to enhanced chances for movement success (e.g. the evolving norm that MDBs should adhere to human rights accountability, the increasing organizational resources and epistemic authority of the movement). My analysis reveals how subtle, yet effective forms of counter mobilization on behalf of the MDB bureaucracy interacted with indirect forms of counter mobilization by a Chinese-led group of emerging powers. By organizing an impressive multi-stakeholder consultation process, the World Bank was able to define the boundaries of critique, to divide moderate from more radical constituencies, and to engage the movement without integrating key demands. In parallel, counter mobilization by the Chinese-led coalition of member states primarily took the form of counter multilateralism: the indirect exercise of pressure by founding a new development bank – the AIIB. Together, both forms of bureaucracy and member state counter mobilization led to a breakdown of the causal mechanism. Today, three decades after the movement-centered socialization in the early 1990s, we now witness a decrease in World Bank human rights accountability: less binding and less precise human rights policies, a decrease in the scope of policy application across the World Bank portfolio as well as a weakened role of the quasi-judicial oversight mechanism (the World Bank Inspection Panel). Worrisome from a normative point of view is that this decline of human rights accountability at the World Bank entails dynamics that point to larger trends in contemporary global governance: first, the decline of US hegemony and the simultaneous emergence of authoritarian states (especially China) as major donors in development, and secondly, a challenge to multilateralism and the human rights script by these authoritarian states, but also from within established liberal democracies. To overcome these challenges, my study suggests several advocacy and policy implications for an alliance of progressive social movements and liberal democratic forces within MDB bureaucracies and member states.
List of Abbreviations
•ADB Asian Development Bank
•AfDB African Development Bank
•AIIB Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank
•AU African Union
•BIC Bank Information Center
•BoD Board of Directors
•BMZ German Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development
•CAO Compliance Advisor Ombudsman
•CODE Committee on Development Effectiveness
•CM Causal Mechanism
•CSO Civil Society Organization
•CIEL Center for International Environmental Law
•DFID Department for International Development
•EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
•ECB European Central Bank
•ECJ European Court of Justice
•ECOSOC UN Economic and Social Council
•ED Executive Director
•EDF Environmental Defense Fund
•EIB European Investment Bank
•EPA Environmental Protection Agency
•EU European Union
•FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
•FoE Friends of the Earth
•FPIC Free Prior and Informed Consent
•GIZ German Society for International Cooperation
•HRW Human Rights Watch
•IADB Inter-American Development Bank
•IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
•ICIJ International Consortium for Investigative Journalists
•IDA International Development Association
•IFC International Finance Corporation
•IFI International Financial Institution
•ILO International Labor Organization
•IMF International Monetary Fund
•IO International Organization
•IR International Relations
•MDB Multilateral Development Bank
•MDG Millennium Development Goals
•MIGA Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
•NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
•NBA Narmada Bachao Andolan
•NGO Nongovernmental Organization
•NRDC National Resource Defence Council
•NWF National Wildlife Fund
•ODA Official Development Assistance
•OED World Bank Operations Evaluation Department
•OCPS Operations Policy and Country Services
•SAP Structural Adjustment Programs
•SDG Sustainable Development Goals
•SMO Social Movement Organization
•TAN Transnational Advocacy Network
•TI Transparency International
•TSM Transnational Social Movement
•UN United Nations
•UNDP United Nations Development Program
•UNGA UN General Assembly
•UNHRC UN Human Rights Council
•UNSC UN Security Council
•WWF World Wildlife Fund
Introduction
Several of the most pressing challenges of our times – climate change, biodiversity, poverty, international peace and security - are of an inherently transnational nature. To address these challenges, states have increasingly delegated competencies to international organizations (IOs). Today, IOs are central actors in global governance that shape policy discourses, design and implement projects, but also develop, monitor and interpret global rules (Hooghe & Marks, 2018; Zürn, 2018). The increasing governance tasks IOs assumed over the last decades concurs with the observation that the anarchy paradigm no longer fits today’s international relations (IR). Instead of anarchy, international relations can be characterized by manifold and partially overlapping relationships of order and subordination based on power asymmetries. Following Robert A. Dahl’s (1957) canonical definition, “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” (p. 80). Within the framework of this formula, Daase and Deitelhoff (2015) argued that the “Anarchy Problematique” in International Relations has given way to the “Problematique of Rule” (p. 299), while others have conceptualized these power relations in terms of governance (Rosenau, 1992), hegemony (Lake, 2010, 2014), or authority (Hooghe, 2016; Zürn, 2018). What all these scholars agree upon, is that international organizations exercise power and that such increasing levels of influence require justification beyond reference to a consensus among IO member states (Nullmeier et al., 2012; Steffek, 2018; Zürn, 2018).
Among IOs, multilateral development banks (MDBs) exercise particularly high degrees of power (Zürn, 2018). MDBs can be defined as organizations that coordinate relations and activities among three or more states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct with the aim to enhance development. Standing out from other major IOs in their field (e.g. UNDP), MDBs have the capacity to provide loans and financial assistance to developing countries. While it is generally assumed that development promotes human rights by definition, experience with MDB governance over the last decades suggests a more nuanced picture. There are at least three structural reasons for that: First, “development” is measured on a macro-level. As a result, MDB-funded projects or policy reforms may have positive effects on macro-level indicators, but violate the human rights of particular groups or individuals (e.g. an infrastructure project that involves forced resettlement and health damages through environmental pollution). Secondly, MDBs work through the governments of benefitting countries, generally assuming that these governments rule in the best interest of the population. In several contexts, this assumption and a lack of adequate MDB risk assessments ignore that it is precisely the ruling elite posing the biggest threat to human rights and democracy. On several occasions, it could be shown that governments used the money of development cooperation to strengthen their position and to repress civil society (Human Rights Watch, 2010). Third, the predominant “technical” or “economic” view of development overlooks the inherently political nature of several governance initiatives. The implementation of MDB-funded projects without consulting those directly affected by them thus violates these people’s right to autonomy (Kämpf, 2015). As a result, it comes as no surprise that MDBs met strong contestation of their competencies by scholars, but also by the public (Zürn et al. 2012). At the core of this contestation is the question: Which standards and qualities should MDBs meet to be considered “legitimate?” if legitimacy is understood as a normative concept referring to “the right to rule” of a given political order or institution (Buchanan & Keohane, 2006; Estlund, 2007). Prominent proposals for such standards include inclusive procedures (Tallberg et al., 2013), deliberation (Dryzek, 2006; Steffek, 2018), transparency (Grigorescu, 2010), accountability (Scholte, 2011) and compliance with human rights norms (Buchanan & Keohane, 2006).
Even before the academic debate on the legitimacy of MDBs gained momentum, social movements from countries around the world joined forces to demand the adherence of very similar standards since the late 1980s. Such “transnational social movements” (TSM) can be defined as “collectivities with constituents in at least two states, composed of organized and non-organized actors that engage in sustained and intentional interactions with power-holders in at least one state other than their own, or against an international institution, to pursue shared social goals on the basis of shared values”. Since the 1990s, there is widespread academic recognition that such social movements (or Transnational Advocacy Networks) play a crucial role in shaping MDB governance (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Risse et al. 2013). Hence, this work takes place in the midst of an ongoing academic and public debate on the legitimacy of MDB governance and the role that transnational social movements may have in making MDBs more accountable.
Theoretical Starting Point and Research Question
In their advocacy for justice, human rights accountability and democracy, TSM have used a variety of tactics towards MDBs, engaging them directly through demonstrations, consultations and media campaigns, but also more indirectly through writing reports and lobbying their national governments (O’Brien et al., 2000; Heupel et al., 2015; Zürn, 2018). While MDBs face several internal and external pressures for reform, this work focusses on the particular role of transnational social movements as a key actor seeking to “socialize” MDBs into the community of human rights abiding organizations. Socialization can be broadly defined as “a process of learning to behave in a way that is acceptable to society” (Oxford Dictionary, 2018). The soci‘ety of interest here is the community of human rights abiding public authorities, including states, IOs, but also non-state governance actors (e.g., traditional chiefs or courts). The empirical record suggests a mixed picture of TSM engagement. While their advocacy was certainly successful in some cases (e.g. the codification of “safeguards policies” across MDBs), they failed to achieve desired socialization outcomes in other cases (Park, 2017). Why and how exactly are TSMs successful in socializing MDBs? What accounts for their failure? Which tactics are more successful, or does a combination of different tactics in an overarching strategy1 lead to MDB socialization? In social movement literature, there is an old, but still ongoing debate whether conventional or disruptive tactics are more effective (Bosi, Guigni, & Uba, 2016; Button, 1978; Guigni, 2004; O’Brien, 2000). I adopt a “thin” definition of conventional and disruptive tactics as different means to pursue political goals, irrespective of the nature of these goals (e.g. reform or revolution). Specifically, conventional tactics refer to any kind of movement activity aimed at producing an effect on the target organization that proceeds through inside channels, involving direct interaction with decision-makers of that organization. Inside channels are those channels established by the target organization to interact with movement representatives, e.g., parliamentary hearings, meetings with decision-makers, joint conferences or workshops to share information on policy issues and constituency interests (Betsill & Corell, 2008). In contrast, disruptive tactics refers to any movement activity aimed at producing an effect on the target organization that proceeds through channels outside those established by the target organization. The interaction with decision-makers of the target organization is only indirect (see Daphi & Anderl, 2016; Dellmuth & Tallberg, 2017, for similar conceptualizations). Whereas several works in social movement literature emphasize the need to produce crisis in target organizations through disruptive tactics (O’Brien, 2000; Piven & Cloward, 1993; Uba, 2005), others fear that disruption might alienate decision-makers and the wider public. Particularly, scholarship on transnational advocacy networks (TAN) highlights the value of access and persuasion through conventional tactics (Busby, 2010; Checkel, 2001; Keck & Sikkink, 1998). Between both poles, a number of scholars theorize that a mix of both disruptive and conventional tactics (e.g., shaming and persuasion) is most effective (McAdam & Su, 2002; Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink, 2013). Insights from social movement studies influenced several important contributions dealing with the effectiveness of movement tactics on the socialization of states—either through national channels (Guigni, 2004) or by detour via international organizations (Keck & Sikkink, 1998) or liberal democratic states (Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink, 1999). Yet, few works deal with the effectiveness of movement tactics toward MDBs specifically.2 What is more, none of the existing accounts investigates the effectiveness of movement tactics and their relationship on MDB socialization by way of a systematic case comparison. Accordingly, we do not know when and under which conditions TSM tactics are actually successful. To fill this gap, I ask the following research question: How and under which conditions are transnational social movements successful in strengthening the human rights accountability of multilateral development banks? In line with previous work on socialization, focusing on causal mechanisms, the how part of this question refers to the process between a cause and its effect. Under which conditions asks about the scope of conditions that enable the mechanism to work (Zürn & Checkel, 2005).
Analytical Framework
Building on existing IR and social movement scholarship on movement tactics, I deduce a causal mechanism that combines different types of movement engagement. Specifically, I argue that a sequenced approach combining disruptive tactics vis-à-vis the MDB, with conventional tactics vis-à-vis decision-makers in MDB member states, leads to MDB socialization. First, TSMs need to engage in disruptive tactics toward the MDB to produce a certain degree of crisis. Such a crisis then causes important MDB member states to worry about the MDB’s reputation. Specifically, decision-makers3 in the relevant decision-making bodies of member states (e.g., ministries of finance, chairs of parliamentary committees and sub-committees) realize a need for MDB reform and perceive a simultaneous deficit on behalf of the MDB to deal with its problems alone as the MDB strives to mitigate critique without undertaking costly reforms. As a result, they open up toward movement representatives for reform ideas. At this point, the TSM needs to switch to conventional tactics via the state channel and persuade decision-makers of their demands. If persuasion efforts are successful and power-asymmetries on the Board of Directors sufficiently pronounced, influential member states are able to coerce the MDB into adopting reforms – typically by threatening to cut funds. Further, I postulate that this mechanism only works where a specific set of scope conditions, are present. The scope conditions include the resources of the actor demanding change, specifically its moral, epistemic and organizational resources. Second, properties of the target organization matter, including the degree of access, the capacity for counter-mobilization as well as the power (a)symmetries among decision-makers. Third, whether the issue at hand is specific and generalizable, as opposed to broad and only relevant to few matters for TSM success, as well as fourth, the quality of the discursive opportunity structure: does a sudden shock crisis open a window of opportunity for reform? How do MDBs in the organizational environment react to TSM activity? In sum, properties of the actor demanding change, properties of the target organization, the issue and the discursive environment are the four categories of relevant scope conditions theorized in this work.
Research Design, Case Selection and Main Findings
Since I seek to reconstruct the presence and explanatory value of the causal mechanism sketched above, I engage in “theory testing process tracing” (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). The aim of theory testing process tracing is to test and potentially refine a specific theorized causal process. To be able to control for relevant scope conditions, I compare two cases of TSM engagement in a most-similar case-study design (George & Bennett, 2005). In a most-similar case-study design4, researchers compare two cases which are largely similar, but differ in only few important respects as well as in their results. George already clarified in his earlier work that in practice, two cases are rarely that similar to draw firm conclusions regarding cause and effect. Moreover, the comparison in itself is ill-equipped to deal with equifinality - a constellation where the same outcome can arise through different pathways (George, 1982). To deal with these limitations, George and Bennett developed the method of “structured, focused comparison”, whereby researchers systematically specify the research question, the hypothesized causal relationship including all relevant variables and their operationalization and ask the same set of questions to each case under study (George & Bennett, 2005). In addition, a systematic reconstruction of the causal pathway increases the confidence in a specific causal relationship. Beach and Pedersen (2013) offer a hands-on approach to test the individual steps in a theorized causal chain in practice. While different factors may still lead to the same outcome (“equifinality”), the claim is not to test the only causal explanation possible, but instead to test the strength of a specific causal chain.
From my universe of cases, I trace my theorized causal mechanism among two cases involving the World Bank - the most relevant MDB in terms of lending volume and norm-setting qualities to date5. In my first case, taking place in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the TSM was successful to socialize the World Bank into establishing an independent and citizen-driven Inspection Panel (IP) with responsibilities to review breaches of World Bank policies regarding social, indigenous people, resettlement and environmental. This Inspection Panel thus greatly enhanced the human rights accountability of the organization. Against the odds of IR theories placing sovereignty as the primary concern of states, the World Bank’s Inspection Panel provided project-affected communities with direct legal standing in front of an IO, without the involvement of the borrowing state. After two decades of sharpening the accountability regime, and particularly after the adoption of human rights accountability policies and organizational subunits became part of a global script for IOs (Heupel & Zürn, 2017), the World Bank’s review of its human rights policies from 2011–2016 (Case 2) undermined its earlier achievements by replacing specific rules with vague principles, by introducing alternative dispute resolution bodies and by reducing the scope of application of the human rights standards. There also is an empirical puzzle here: Why was the movement’s socialization strategy successful at a time when no other international organization (much less other MDBs) possessed a human rights accountability mechanism in the early 1990s, yet failed at a time when human rights accountability was an established organizational script among MDBs more than two decades later? I collected the relevant data by combining semi-structured interviews, official documents, minutes of executive board meetings and parliamentary debates as well as notes from participant observation. To analyze the data, I relied on qualitative content analysis, which I conducted with help of the computer software program MAXQDA.
My analysis reveals how subtle, yet effective forms of counter mobilization on behalf of the MDB bureaucracy interacted with indirect forms of counter mobilization by a Chinese-led group of emerging powers. By organizing an impressive multi-stakeholder consultation process, the World Bank was able to define the boundaries of critique, to divide moderate from more radical constituencies, and to engage the movement without integrating key demands. In parallel, counter mobilization by the Chinese-led coalition of member states primarily took the form of counter multilateralism: the indirect exercise of pressure by founding a new development bank – the AIIB. Together, both forms of bureaucracy and member state counter mobilization led to a breakdown of the causal mechanism. Today, three decades after the movement-centered socialization in the early 1990s, we now witness a decrease in World Bank human rights accountability: less binding and less precise human rights policies, a decrease in the scope of policy application across the World Bank portfolio as well as a weakened role of the quasi-judicial oversight mechanism (the World Bank Inspection Panel).
Basic Assumptions and Normative Relevance
Though my work is first and foremost of an empirical nature, it also bears normative relevance. Convinced that empirical studies cannot be void of an inherent normativity due to the paradigm adopted, the type of research questions asked and the use and definitions of concepts, I seek to make my normative background assumptions explicit and situate my work in the wider debate regarding the legitimacy of international organizations. Specifically, I take sides in this debate about the legitimacy of MDBs. In the first chapter, I argue that we have strong moral and legal reasons to agree on human rights accountability as a necessary (albeit not the only) minimum standard of MDB legitimacy.
To make this point, I proceed in four steps. First, I show empirically that MDBs belong to the kind of IOs that exercise a considerable degree of power shaping the fate of states and their citizens. Then, I elaborate on my conception of accountability as direct accountability - an accountability vis-à-vis those affected by MDB actions. In agreement with Keohane (2011), I define accountability as: (a) a set of standards, (b) transparency, and (c) sanctions in cases of noncompliance. Departing from common notions of MDB accountability, I argue that those individuals affected by MDB governance are ultimately the relevant accountability holders. I further argue for human rights as the right standard of accountability, since human rights express each person’s equal moral status. Against the background of a large debate on the right understanding of human rights, I agree with those arguing for a basic interest conception. To make the broader claim that MDBs should institutionalize and respect human rights accountability, I complement the moral arguments for human rights as a minimum standard of legitimate governance with an analysis of already existing legal obligations that MDBs have in virtue of existing international law, the human rights obligations of their member states and – in the case of the World Bank – the status as a UN organization. Moreover, I draw on current empirical trends to substantiate the claim that accountability is a necessary, albeit not the only, ingredient of MDB legitimacy, as they cannot be fully controlled by their member states, while currently we also lack a realistic option for some transnational authority enforcing standards of moral decency. These empirical trends suggest that the only viable option in the midterm future is a model of cosmopolitan pluralism, whereby MDBs (and other IOs) adopt the necessary policy and institutional reforms to realize certain standards of legitimacy. In sum, then, I conclude that social movement engagement to socialize MDBs into human rights accountability concurs with what is normatively required from MDBs in the first place.
My Contributions
This work makes five overarching contributions. To begin with, my first chapter goes beyond sketching the social relevance of my work. Though I do not claim to make an original contribution to the field of political theory (e.g. by developing arguments that have not been made before), I link existing philosophical and legal scholarship in a novel fashion to form a comprehensive and hopefully coherent argument for human rights accountability as a minimum standard for MDB legitimacy against the background of wider empirical trends.
Second, I draw on different strings of social movement and IR literature and combine central insights to deduce and explicate a comprehensive causal mechanism of movement-centered MDB socialization. The literature on transnational advocacy networks and social movements is at a point where we have detailed accounts of the effects of disruptive and conventional tactics respectively. In addition, several studies point to the value of mixed tactics involving both, disruptive and conventional movement tactics. However, it remains largely unclear how exactly these should be combined, whether in parallel or in sequence and if the latter, which sequence. My contribution is to systematize these studies, to deduce a logically coherent sequence of tactics and thus to explicate the causal process implicit in several existing works.
Third and most importantly, this work provides a rigorous test of the nature and relevance of the theorized causal mechanism involving a sequence of disruptive and conventional movement tactics towards MDBs. Specifically, my application of Beach and Perdersen’s process tracing method allows me to test each step of the causal mechanism within both cases in a rigorous fashion. This process tracing is embedded in a most similar case study design, which allows me to compare movement tactics in relation to MDB counter mobilization across both cases, holding additional scope conditions (e.g., mandate, membership, voting shares) largely constant. My thorough analysis of World Bank bureaucracy and member state counter mobilization contributes novel insights into the dynamic interplay between movement “repertoires of action” and corresponding MDB “repertoires of reaction”. At the same time, my findings point to further valuable research to comprehend these dynamics in light of changing power dynamics in contemporary international relations.
Fourth, I make an empirical contribution. While several studies exist on movement advocacy for human rights accountability at the World Bank in the 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s (Clark et al., 2003; Heupel, 2017; Kapur et al., 1997; Nelson, 1997; Rich, 1994; Udall, 1998), there are no studies yet on the reform of World Bank safeguards policies in autumn 2016. Due to my manifold interviews, participant observations and document analysis throughout this latter reform process, my work presents a compilation of new empirical material on a case of great relevance to scholars doing research on the World Bank.
Finally, the findings of this work have practical implications for social movement representatives, but also for policy makers and MDB bureaucracies. Worrisome from a normative point of view is that this decline of human rights accountability at the World Bank entails dynamics that point to larger trends in contemporary global governance: first, the decline of US hegemony and the simultaneous emergence of authoritarian states (especially China) as major donors in development, and secondly, a challenge to multilateralism and the human rights script by these authoritarian states, but also from within established liberal democracies. To overcome these challenges, my study suggests that movements should invest in the (re-) mobilization of liberal democratic MDB member states, strategically expand their networks to emerging powers and bolster strong regional networks to exchange information and unburden movement hubs in Western capitals. Crucially, though, movements should also engage management and staff in MDB secretariats. The twin challenge for social movements ahead then is to defend MDBs as manifestations of multilateralism while simultaneously continuing to advocate for their enhanced human rights accountability.
1 In the following, I refer to “tactics” to designate the actual means that movements use to reach certain objectives, while the term “strategy” refers to the overarching and more long term campaign plan that may involve several tactics at different stages.
2 Notable exceptions include the works by Bruce Rich (1994, 2013) and the edited volumes by O’Brien et al. (2000) and Fox et al. (2003).
3 Joshua Busby refers to such important decision-makers with the ability to slow down or even block reform proposals as “gatekeepers” (Busby, 2010, p. 60).
4 This method is also referred to as “Mill’s method of difference” (George & Bennett, 2005). Depending on the perspective the researcher takes, the emphasis is either on the similarity of the majority of variables (“most similar”), or the difference of those variables that ultimately matter (“method of difference”). From here onwards, I will adopt the more prominent designation from George and Bennett (2005), calling the method “most similar” case study design.
5 Cp. Annual Reports 2016 of all major MDBs. See Chapter 8 for an overview of the lending volume of all MDBs.
1Human Rights Accountability as a minimum threshold of MDB Legitimacy
Different disciplines study human rights from varying angles. For instance, lawyers engage in debates regarding the legal status and interpretation of human rights, scholars of cultural studies may debate what human rights mean within different cultural contexts and sociologists are concerned with the social conditions for their realization. In the following, I adopt the perspective of a political theorist and seek to ground the demand for human rights from a normative point of view. Yet, I do not aim to discuss human rights detached from our empirical surrounding. Instead, I situate the normativity of MDB human rights accountability obligations, within our empirical world.
This chapter begins by introducing and defining MDBs as a special type of an international organization (Section 1.1). Then, I sketch the transfer of responsibility (and power) from states to international organizations, focusing especially on the augmenting competencies of MDBs. An important takeaway of that section is the insight that MDB activities have autonomous and direct effects on the circumstances and fate of people (Section 1.2). As a result, MDBs need to justify their actions toward the people whose life they affect. As a rule of the thumb, the threshold for MDB legitimacy raises the more governance they exercise. Throughout this work, I understand legitimacy as the “right to rule” (Buchanan & Keohane 2006; Estlund 2007). Two perspectives on legitimacy are commonly differentiated – an empirical and a normative one. While the former – empirical legitimacy - captures the empirical belief among governance addressees that a governor possesses the right to rule (Weber’s famous “Legitimitätsglaube,” Weber, 1978), the latter is concerned with the actual moral properties of a political order (Beetham 1991; Simmons 1999). It is well-established among political scientists that empirical legitimacy is of paramount importance to secure stable and effective governance (Levi, Sacks & Tyler, 2009). In my work, however, I am concerned with the normative legitimacy of MDBs, as only normative legitimacy is capable of grounding movement activism in morality1. I thus build on the following core assumption: Like all international organizations, MDBs are not valuable in themselves. Instead, they derive their ‘raison d’être’ from their instrumental value in serving human interests. This, in turn, is only possible if they adhere to human rights accountability. To substantiate this claim, I first elaborate on my conception of accountability as a set of standards, transparency and sanctions in section 1.3. Then, I argue for human rights as the relevant standard of accountability in Section 1.4, grounding this claim in moral (section 1.4.1) and legal (section 1.4.2) arguments. Yet, I do not stop here, but also situate the normative requirement in the context of larger empirical trends in global governance, adopting the perspective of non-ideal (vs. ideal) political theorist. Specifically, I discuss three proposals for a global order that place human rights protection at their center: (a) an intergovernmental model of well-ordered states, (b) a model of cosmopolitan democracy, and (c) constitutional pluralism (Section 1.4.3). Given the current empirical developments, I argue that only the third model is a realistic option, which implies that MDBs need to assure human rights accountability themselves2.
1.1Multilateral Development Banks – A Definition
The term multilateral development bank (MDB) consists of three components, each of which requires specification. First, they are multilateral organizations comprised of the ‘many sides’. In contrast to bilateralism involvingonly two parties, multilateralism is “an institutional form which coordinates relations among three or more states (emphasis added) on the basis of ‘generalized’ principles of conduct” (Ruggie, 1992, 598). For decades, the World Bank was the only MDB of global membership and reach. Recently, the landscape of MDBs underwent some change. In particular, the New Development Bank (or “BRICS Bank”) led by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa was founded in 2014. Only two years later, in 2015, the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) came into being. Both aspire to present alternatives to the World Bank (Lewis and Trevisani, 2014; Reuters, 2014). Most MDBs are, however, regional in character: the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the European Investment Bank (EIB), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), and the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB). Moreover, there are several subregional development banks, such as the Caribbean Development Bank (CBS) and the Andean Development Corporation (ADC). The International Monetary Fund (IMF), whose mandate is to ensure international financial stability (and not development), is not an MDB (for a more detailed account on the IMF, see Breen, 2013). Then, MDBs are multilateral organizations whose aim, in virtue of their mandates, is development. While MDBs belong to the group of international financial institutions (IFIs), they are thus of a distinct kind and differ from other IFIs whose aim is macroeconomic stability (e.g., the International Monetary Fund [IMF]). For instance, Article 1.1 of the World Bank’s Articles of Agreement states that the purposes of the Bank are “to assist in the reconstruction and development of territories of members” (World Bank, 1989). Similarly, the mandate of the ADB states in Article 1 entitled “Purpose”, that “the purpose of the Bank shall be to foster economic growth and co-operation in the region of Asia and the Far East […] and to contribute to the acceleration of the process of economic development of the developing member countries” (ADB, 1966). Third, MDBs differ from other multilateral development organizations (e.g. the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)) in that they are banks. In concrete terms, this means that MDBs provide financial assistance to developing countries, by funding projects and providing loans tied to reforms by the receiving government. Typical infrastructure projects involve the construction of roads, ports, or power plants; but also social projects, e.g., aimed at improved health services. Policy-based loans can also provide budgetary support conditional to the implementation of financial or economic policies. Another powerful tool at the disposal of MDBs is to provide concessional assistance (including grants and loans) to low-income countries at below-market interest rates. Multilateral development banks make money autonomously through buying and selling on international capital markets as well as through interest and loan repayments. This provides them with a certain degree of financial autonomy. Yet financially, MDBs ultimately depend on capital subscriptions (shares) from their member states (Park, 2017).
Looking at the broader organizational family, MBDs are a sub-type of the class of international organizations (IOs). According to Archer’s canonical definition, an international organization is “a formal, continuous structure established by agreement between members (governmental and/or non-governmental) from two or more sovereign states with the aim of pursuing the common interest of the membership” (Archer, 1988, pp. 34-35). As noted above, MDBs involve at least three states, their members are exclusively governmental, and their common interest is per definition development. In parallel to other IOs, MDBs consist of different parts that can be analytically separated. The most important analytical differentiation is that between the IO’s executive body on the one hand and its bureaucracy (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004), administration Liese & Weinlich, 2006) or secretariat (Biermann, 2017) on the other3 (for a good overview of this debate, see also: Bauer, da Conceição-Heldt & Ege, 2015). While country representatives with executive functions on IO governing bodies are controlled by their respective country governments, IO secretariats are made up of bureaucrats that are loyal to their superiors, but (largely) independent of country affiliations (Liese & Weinlich, 2006). As a consequence, IO and hence MDB secretariats possess autonomy which they can use to exercise influence, but also “pathologies” (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004). According to Barnett and Finnemore, international bureaucracies
“are often the actors empowered to decide if there is a problem at all, what kind of problem it is, and whose responsibility it is to solve it [and they] thus help determine the kind of world that is to be governed and set the agenda for global governance” (Barnett & Finnemore 2004, p. 7).
The degree of autonomy of a MDB secretariat is in turn contingent on the issue at stake and the degree of member state involvement. Where member states have a salient interest, the main task of secretariats is to assist the governing body technically, logistically, and administratively. Thus, while it would be mistaken to understand MDBs (or IOs at large) as only passive or neutral arenas of states, the influence of member states remains considerable given that they possess financial leverage and care enough (Park, 2017). Hence, while member states remain influential, IOs increasingly exercise power autonomously, too. Importantly both, governing body and MDB secretariats are an integral part of the MDB as a whole. Whether it makes sense to look at them separately, or on the level of the MDB as a collective actor, in turn depends on the research interest at hand.
To sum up, MDBs are organizations that coordinate relations and activities among three or more states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct with the aim to enhance development. MDBs may have either global or regional membership/reach. In contrast to other multilateral development organizations, MDBs provide loans and financial assistance to developing countries. Finally, MDBs consist of different parts, involving the MDB governing body as well as a partially autonomous secretariat with actor hood in its own right. With this definition in mind, I now describe the trend toward increasing responsibilities among IOs generally and of MDBs in particular.
1.2The Growing Responsibilities of Multilateral Development Banks
Globalization describes the increasing political, social, economic and cultural interconnectedness of contemporary societies, due to the transnational movement of money, people, technology, information, goods, and services (James, 2005). As a result, people interact globally on an unprecedented scale. At the same time, global interdependencies increase. Today, it is a commonplace that trousers and telephones involve labor in several countries around the globe before they are sold in a specific location. Also, we become increasingly aware of global common pool resources—in short, “global commons” (UNEP, 2017). The earth’s natural resources including oceans or the atmosphere are well-known examples. Unlike global public goods whose consumption does not reduce the quantity available to other actors (e.g., knowledge), global common pool resources are limited (Ostrom, 1990). The degree of interconnectedness is perhaps most evident with regard to climate change. In addition, though, several policy challenges today—from organized crime, over financial stability to trade and development—have a significant global dimension. Where the scale of interactions and interdependencies increase, people become very aware of the dangers connected with uncoordinated, individually motivated behavior that risks producing a global “tragedy of the commons” (Ostrom, 1990). For instance, locally bound processes such as coal mining in Germany or deforestation in Indonesia and Brazil have a direct impact on the global climate. To avoid such detrimental effects for our collective well-being worldwide and to respond to global challenges, there is widespread consensus among scholars and academics that we need institutionalized forms of global governance (Rosenau, 1992). In particular, academics, politicians and the general public assign IOs a critical role in solving global governance challenges, primarily due to their expertise (Liese et al., IPA Projekt) and because of their ability to enable cooperation among states (Keohane, 1984). Already a decade ago, a majority of the German population believed that the G8 / G20, but also IOs such as the United Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank possessed greater influence in world politics than the German government (Mau, 2007). Despite current trends to openly challenge the very idea of multilateral cooperation through international organizations even among established Western democracies (U.S. withdrawal of support for the UN, the World Trade Organization (WTO), or NATO), empirical trends indicate that IOs have steadily gained in importance—throughout the last decades and especially since the end of the Cold War (Heupel & Zürn, 2018). To recall, I conceptualize IOs generally, and MDBs in particular as partially autonomous actors (see Chapter 1.1). To sketch the level playing field, I briefly address the increase of IO power (with a special focus on MDB bureaucracies) along stages of the policy cycle, including: (a) knowledge-creation and agenda setting, (b) decision-making, (c) monitoring and rule interpretation, (d) rule enforcement, and (e) evaluation (Avant et al., 2010).4
First, international organizations play an increasingly important role in creating knowledge (e.g., shaping core concepts of the respective policy field) and agenda setting. Several IOs, including the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), have developed research capacities that surpass those of most states in the world. As a result of these growing research capacities, IOs develop transnational guidelines that provide guidance to a variety of public and private governance actors. Secondly, IOs are increasingly tasked with decision-making themselves, rather than only facilitating compromise among states. In a recent, comprehensive study, Hooghe and Marks collected data on 74 IOs over the period from 1950–2010, looking at the delegation of tasks from states to IO bodies. Specifically, they looked at the responsibilities of IO bodies to access or suspend members, to reform their own mandate, allocate budgets and to engage in autonomous policy making. Their standardized delegation index shows a steady increase in responsibilities of IO bodies, especially among larger and more complex organizations where increasing IO autonomy promises to reduce the transaction costs of cooperation (Hooghe & Marks, 2015). Moreover, majoritarian decision-making has replaced a strict consensus requirement and in consequence vastly increased the ability of international institutions to act. Today, roughly two thirds of all IOs with membership of at least one major power have the opportunity to take majority decisions and thus the ability to cancel vetoes (Blake & Payton, 2008). Third, IOs increasingly perform monitoring tasks and rule interpretation. As the number of international treaties is growing, there is a concomitant need for actors who process and publicize information on treaty compliance. Treaty regimes empower international organizations to conduct such oversight (e.g., the IMF for the financial system; Siebenhüner & Biermann, 2009). Relatedly, the task of rule-interpretation has increasingly shifted to quasi-judicial bodies. While there were only 27 such bodies in 1960, there were 97 in 2004 (Alter, 2012). Rule enforcement remains rare in international politics, but is increasing, too. A first example is the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which exercises considerable power over the UN’s member states and explicitly claims a right to rule. Both its actions and its claim to authority, however, are limited in scope to the prevention of war and, more recently, the protection of human rights (Hurd, 2008, p. 185). International transitional administrations may temporarily claim the right to assume the role of a state government (Jacob 2014) while the International Criminal Court constitutes an instance of centralized political authority with a right to issue commands that are binding for all states that have submitted themselves to the court by signing the Rome statute (Bogdandy & Venzke, 2012, p. 18). The few number of institutions tasked with rule enforcement contrasts with the extensive amount of international organizations that evaluate policies and institutions through rating and rankings. For instance, rating agencies such as the International Accounting Standards Board (Büthe & Mattli, 2011), the International Panel for Climate Change or the PISA studies of the OECD have gained in relevance (Zürn, 2018). In sum, the scope and depth of international organization’s governance is on the rise among all dimensions of the policy cycle.
Among all international organizations, MDBs are of a special kind. In short, MDBs are member state organizations that seek to enhance development by engaging in knowledge-creation and agenda setting, decision-making, monitoring and evaluation. Specifically, their core activity consists in providing loans and financial assistance.5
