Tank Turret Fortifications E-Book

Neil Short

• Herausgeber: Crowood
• Kategorie: Fachliteratur
• Sprache: Englisch

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2011

Beschreibung

Tank Turret Fortifications traces the origins of the idea from the development of the first armoured turrets in the nineteenth century through to the present day. On the way it covers the inter-war period when the first turrets were used in this way, the Second World War, when tank turrets were used on every front in the European Theatre of Operations, and the post-war period, when tank turrets were used even more widely. The book also details the decline of the idea as countries reassessed the threats they faced and slowly dismantled all their fixed fortifications. Widely used during World War Two and since, tank turret fortifications deserve a history, and Neil Short has spent several years writing this, the first proper study.

Leseprobe

TANK TURRETFORTIFICATIONS

NEIL SHORT

THE CROWOOD PRESS

First published in 2006 by The Crowood Press Ltd Ramsbury, Marlborough, Wiltshire, SN8 2HR

www.crowood.com

This e-book edition first published in 2011

© Neil Short 2006

All rights reserved. This e-book is copyright material and must not be copied, reproduced, transferred, distributed, leased, licensed or publicly performed or used in any way except as specifically permitted in writing by the publishers, as allowed under the terms and conditions under which it was purchased or as strictly permitted by applicable copyright law. Any unauthorised distribution or use of this text may be a direct infringement of the author’s and publisher’s rights, and those responsible may be liable in law accordingly

ISBN 978 1 84797 367 2

Dedication

This book is dedicated to my beautiful little daughter, Amy Elizabeth, who entered this world on 17 May 2004. I hope Daddy doesn’t embarrass you too much with this strange interest!

Contents

Preface

Introduction

1. The First World War

2. Interwar

3. The Second World War

      Part 1 – Typology

      Part 2 – Locations

      Part 3 – Panther Turrets

4. Post War

5. Conclusion

Source Notes

Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

Sources and Bibliography

Index

Preface

In many ways the writing of a book is very similar to undertaking a long journey. You start out inspired and full of energy, but the going is often tough and the end seems so far away. Nevertheless, it is invariably fulfilling and it has been no different for me on this occasion, which is due in no small part to the many people who have helped me along the way.

For me the introduction to tank turrets, or panzerstellung,(1) and the start of my journey, came many years ago when reading a copy of AFV News, a small, privately run magazine for armour enthusiasts. Included in this edition was a short item about Panther tank turrets used as fixed fortifications. I soon traced the author of this article and a previous piece on the same subject and entered into a lengthy communication with Dottore Nicola Pignato, the renowned tank expert, and Denis Seguin. Over the years they have helped me immensely with my research, as has the founder of AFV News, George Bradford. Without their help I would not have embarked on this odyssey.

In the following weeks and months my research continued, largely confined to the Panther turret, with visits to the Bundesarchiv, Freiburg and to London in order to access the records held by the Imperial Museum and the Public Record Office (now the National Archive). The staff in these institutions provided invaluable help, especially so in Germany where Herr Loos and Frau Brüninghaus identified pertinent material on this most unusual subject. Subsequently, I entered into communication with David Fletcher, the librarian at the Tank Museum, Bovington, Krzysztof Barbarski at The Polish Institute and staff at both the Canadian and United States National Archives, all of whose efforts were very much appreciated.

My research on the Panther turret gradually broadened to encompass not just the technical specification of the weapon, but also its fighting record. This involved contacting many veterans of the Royal Armoured Corps who more than fifty years after the event were able to vividly recollect their experiences in Italy. Former members of 51st Royal Tank Regiment deserve particular mention and more especially G. Birdsall, G. Bradley, D. Featherstone and E. Hollands. I additionally tried to trace New Zealand veterans of the Italian campaign and although unsuccessful I did contact Jeff Plowman, a leading expert on New Zealand armour, who provided me with important details and photographs. While in the Antipodes, I would also like to thank J. Hornabrook, who scoured the New Zealand archives on my behalf, and the staff of the Alexander Turnbull Library and the Queen Elizabeth II Army Memorial Museum.

Aside from the major archives and museums, my research also brought me into contact with a number of other individuals who shared my interest in the use of Panther turrets. For their continued support I should like to thank Maciej Sledzinski, and Daniele Guglielmi.

This passing interest had turned into a vocation and I now began to research the origins of the idea of using tank turrets as fixed fortifications. I was given invaluable assistance in this quest by A. van Geeteruyen (Belgium) and staff at the ASBL Tank Museum, Brussels. E. Hitriak and I. Volkov, through their research on the Stalin and Molotov Lines, filled a huge void in my knowledge of the use of tank turrets in the Soviet border defences, and their evidence was supplemented by material from V. Kaminski and P. Lenfeld. I would also like to thank J-L. Burtscher and R. Klein for directing me to pertinent sources of information on the use of this type of fortification in the Maginot Line and for permission to use material from their respective Internet sites.

At the same time, the scope of my research grew to include all the tank turrets used in this way in the Second World War. This brought me into contact with a number of subject matter experts whose contribution to the finished article was inestimable. I would like to thank in particular: M. Airila (Finland); L. Bertelsen (Denmark); W. Brzoskwinia (Poland); M. Ginns (CIOS Jersey); A. Johansen (Denmark); D. Mouritzen (Denmark) E. Ritterbach (Germany), and O. Tønnesen (Denmark). A number of museums also provided valuable information: Dr Kunz at the Militärhistorisches Museum Der Bundeswehr (Germany) and the Sotamuseo (Finland).

Later still I broadened the scope of my research further to consider the use of tank turrets in the postwar period. Once again this involved me seeking help from numerous institutions and museums including the Coast Artillery Museum (Norway) and the Heeresgeschichtliches Museum (Austria). In addition, I was able to rely on knowledgeable and importantly, generous, authorities on this period. They included: O. Filip (Czechoslovakia); T. Gannon (Israel); R. Gils (The Netherlands); P. C. van Kerkum, Brig Gen, retired (The Netherlands); B. Lowry (UK); S. Netrebenko (Russia); D. O’Hara (Indo-China); and T. Tsiplakos (Greece).

A number of individuals deserve special thanks for their help throughout my voyage of discovery. In particular I would like to thank Margaret Pinsent (of the Fortress Study Group) and Herbert Jäger who not only replied to my various questions but also actively sought information on my behalf. A special mention should also go to Joe Kaufmann (the creator of Site O – an Internet site dedicated to fortifications) who put me in touch with many of the individuals above and who also answered many questions himself. I would also like to thank Svein Wiiger Olsen whose encyclopaedic knowledge of fortifications provided me with much valuable information, particularly about tank turrets in Scandinavia. Latterly, Caspar Vermeulen provided me with a number of useful leads in my research into the modern use of this form of defence and Steve Zaloga, an authority on armoured fighting vehicles, provided a number of rare photographs of tank turrets and kindly answered my many and varied questions.

Along the way I contacted many other people who helped me in often small but significant ways. It would be impossible to name them all, but your help was very much appreciated.

As the reader will have gathered by now, my journey eventually took me to the four corners of the globe and in so doing I amassed a wealth of material. Most of this, not surprisingly, was written in languages with which I was not always familiar and had to be translated into English. This was achieved largely through the good offices of the Institute of Linguistics and in particular the following translators:

J. Calderbank (French to English); A. George (Dutch to English); Z. Fec (Russian to English); M. Jepps (Italian to English); I. Knill (Czech to English); A. Ladd (German to English); C. Leach (Italian to English); I. Pursiainen (Finnish to English); B. Snell (German to English); and M. Stanley (French/German to English). I would like to thank in particular Gill Hunwicks for her painstaking work in translating the sheaf of highly technical and sometimes incomplete papers that I brought back from my initial visit to the Bundesarchiv.

I also owe an enormous debt of gratitude to Tomasz Idzikowski who completed the detailed drawings that adorn this book.

Of course in any journey it is important to have a good start and this was provided by mother, father and sister. It is also vital to have a supportive travelling companion – a Passerpartout – and my wife, Nikki, has ably filled this role. She has been with me through the majority of my research for this book and it is no exaggeration to say that without her this book would not have been completed.

______

(1) The German word panzerstellung seems to best encompass the description of emplaced tank turrets and is used as a generic term throughout this book.

Introduction

In the immediate aftermath of the Great War there was an overwhelming desire for peace. Never again would Europe be plunged into a bloody war of attrition that would turn factory and field alike into a wasteland and lead to the death of millions more innocent men, women and children. To that end the Central Powers were forced to accept a punitive peace settlement. Germany, deemed by the victors to be the guilty of starting the war, was particularly harshly dealt with. Her armed forces were emasculated; an army of occupation was posted and huge reparations imposed. More positively, a League of Nations was created to resolve differences between countries, and there was a move towards universal disarmament, not least because the size of the standing armies after the war was crippling the economies of the victorious powers.

The initial burst of optimism engendered by these measures was soon replaced by gloom and despondency as economic crisis and weak leadership saw Europe fall into the grip of political extremists. Countries increasingly questioned the effectiveness of politics and the League of Nations to maintain peace and began to build bunkers and blockhouses rather than bridges. These fortifications, the like and scale of which had never and will never, be seen again, stretched from France in the west to the Soviet Union in the east and from Greece in the south to Finland in the north.

In the development of these defences many countries drew heavily on their experiences in the First World War. The thinking of the French High Command was strongly influenced by the bloody battle of Verdun and in particular the crucial role played by the forts around which the gallant defence of la patrie had been organized. Not surprisingly then, when work began on France’s border defences in 1929, later christened the Maginot Line,(1) their shape owed much to the perceived strengths of the forts at Verdun. As such a thin, but immensely strong line of defences was constructed along France’s northeastern frontier and along the border with Italy.

The German High Command drew very different conclusions from the fighting of the First World War. Despite the fact that the Siegfriedstellung (or Hindenburg Line as it was known by the Allies) had been breached, the senior staff believed that the idea of defence in depth was sound and Germany began to construct a chain of fortifications along her western border that utilized many of the principles developed in the war. A series of small reinforced concrete shelters, protected by a curtain of anti-tank obstacles, covering almost the whole length of the western border and built in considerable depth were constructed.

The First World War not only provided valuable lessons for future defensive strategies, it was also the proving ground for new ways and means of fighting. The devastating effect of high explosive and shrapnel shells and machine guns made it impossible for soldiers to survive in the open. Gradually the war of movement degenerated into stalemate as both sides ‘dug-in’ for the long haul. Trenches soon stretched from Switzerland to the North Sea and, as the war dragged on, they gradually became deeper, were built in greater depth and also became increasingly elaborate. Deep dugouts, often reinforced with concrete, protected the infantry from the enemy barrage enabling the defenders to emerge largely unscathed to meet the inevitable infantry assault. Later still the Germans developed reinforced concrete ‘pillboxes’ which were difficult to hit and were largely impervious to all but the heaviest shellfire. The idea was later copied by the Allies and after the war was widely used by engineers of many nations.

For every innovation there is inevitably an attempt to develop a viable counter measure and this was true of the labyrinth of trenches that stretched across northern France and Belgium. The respective high commands desperately sought ways of overcoming the bloody stalemate of trench warfare and returning to a war of movement that had been anticipated prior to the outbreak of hostilities. The success of poison gas briefly offered the prospect of some success but the opportunity was lost and soon simple gas masks had been developed to neutralize the effects. More significant was the development of the tank, which had first been introduced by the British in battle of the Somme in 1916. At the outset the tanks were heavy, slow and unreliable and were equipped with fixed guns. However, in 1918 the French FT17 tank was introduced. This was a quick, light tank that had one very important difference to its British and German (and larger French) cousins – it had a traversable turret. This small tank, the brainchild of Gen Jean-Baptiste Estienne, was to revolutionize tank design and thereafter all tanks were fitted with turrets.

One of the many German concrete pillboxes that were used to strengthen the trenches on the western front in the First World War. This example now sits at the heart of the British Cemetery at Tyne Cot, Belgium. (Author)

By the end of the First World War the two key elements for the development of the panzerstellung were in place; the revolving tank turret and the concrete pillbox. The catalyst for their combination came during the increasing tensions prior to the outbreak of the Second World War.

The interwar period saw the pace of tank development quicken with new, faster and more powerfully armed tanks being produced. This presented something of a problem for the military since it left large numbers of outmoded tanks to be disposed of. In the Soviet Union, where industrialization was still in its infancy, the scrapping of perfectly serviceable turrets was deemed wasteful(2) and in 1931 the idea of using tank turrets as fixed fortifications was advanced. In the west France developed the tourelle démontable. This was a rotating armoured hood with an aperture for a machine gun that provided the crew with valuable protection against shrapnel and small arms fire. From 1935 these turrets were installed in fixed and temporary positions along the Maginot Line. At the same time the idea of using obsolete tank turrets was considered. During the 1930s the Renault FT17, for so long the backbone of the French cavalry, was gradually replaced by the Renault R35, Somua S35 and Hotchkiss models. Some FT17s were still in service when the Germans invaded in 1940, but a large number had been mothballed and a number were dug in to bolster the already impressive defences of the Maginot Line. France’s neighbour and ally Belgium also adopted this idea. In 1936 the Belgian army had taken delivery of a batch of French tank turrets and instead of using them for their original purpose they were mounted on concrete bunkers along the border with Germany and on the coast.

As it transpired, the French and Belgian defences, including the emplaced tank turrets, did little to stem the German advance in May 1940 and in only six weeks the rump of Continental Europe was under Nazi rule. The impressive defences that for so long had provided security, and on which rested the hopes for peace of the western democracies, were now subjected to a series of destructive tests to assess their effectiveness. Although spared this fate, German engineers made a detailed study of the various fortifications mounting tank turrets. However, with plans for the invasion of Britain still being finalized, this idea was simply noted and filed for future reference.

One of the tourelle démontable armoured hoods that were used in the Maginot Line. This example was installed in the Alpine section to a cover a bridge over the river Isère near Bourg St Maurice. (Author)

In 1941, Operation Seelöwe (Operation Sea Lion) –the invasion of Britain – was postponed indefinitely; Hitler turned his attention east and in June invaded the Soviet Union. Once again the Wehrmacht was confronted by a line of fortifications studded with emplaced tank turrets and once again these defences did little to slow the German advance; although this was largely the result of Stalin’s decision to concentrate his efforts on the Molotov Line(3) at the expense of the more advanced defences of the line that bore his name.

As they had in the west, German engineers made a detailed study of the Soviet defences,1 but by the time these reports were complete the dominant position of the Third Reich had begun to deteriorate. Already in 1942, in the seesaw battles in the Western Desert, the turrets of captured British Matilda turrets had been removed and incorporated in the German defences of the Halfaya Pass. More significantly, following a series of raids on the French coast – the most significant being the Dieppe landings of August 1942 – a decision was taken to fortify the coast of Continental Europe against any future raids or even a full-scale invasion and plans to utilize captured French tank turrets were considered.

A Soviet emplaced tank turret, or Tankovaya Ognievaya Totshka. This T18 turret was installed in the Stalin Line and was captured by the advancing German forces in 1941. (J. Magnuski courtesy of S. Zaloga)

By 1942 the French tanks captured in the spring of 1940 were deemed unsuitable for frontline action. Though heavily armoured they were poorly armed and were very slow, designed, as they were, to move at the infantry’s pace.(4) Accordingly, many of these tanks were consigned to second-line units guarding key military installations such as airfields, or were used in anti-partisan duties. Some were simply loaded onto armoured trains to provide added protection.(5) Others had their turrets removed and a new superstructure constructed on the tank chassis to mount more powerful anti-tank guns and artillery pieces, while others were simply used as ammunition tractors or as driver instruction vehicles.2 As a result the Germans were left with a large stockpile of seemingly useless tank turrets complete with their main armament. Rather than waste this valuable resource it was decided that they should be utilized in much the same way as France, Belgium and the Soviet Union had used them earlier in the war. Thus the French turrets were mounted on specially designed bunkers which were positioned all long the Atlantic Wall, but principally on the French coast.(6)

The number of turrets available for use in this role grew dramatically following the arrival on the battlefield of the superior Russian T34. Almost overnight this rendered obsolete the mainstay of the Panzer divisions (Panzer I and II and Czech 35(t) and 38(t) tanks) that had swept all before them during the invasion of Poland, France, the Low Countries and Scandinavia. These tanks were now either relegated to second line duties, or experienced the same fate as those tanks captured in France: the chassis used as improvised anti-tank or self-propelled gun platforms and the turrets employed as makeshift pillboxes. These tank turrets, however, were used more extensively than the captured turrets – perhaps reflecting the greater numbers available, or the relative ease with which ammunition could be supplied – and were installed all over occupied Europe.(7)

One of the many French tank turrets captured by the Germans in 1940. This FT 17 was used to strengthen the defences of Utah Beach at Sainte Marie du Mont. The turret is of a riveted design and sits on a non-standard bunker near the Musée du Débarquement. (Author)

By 1943 then the idea of using tank turrets in this way was accepted practice. However, because the guns mounted were small by the standards of the day, these turrets posed little threat to Allied tanks and often acted as little more than armoured observation posts. That was all to change in that same year, when the Germans took a new and far more radical step in the use of tank turrets. Up to that point only obsolete turrets had been used, but now a decision was taken to use Panther turrets in this role. These turrets, some specifically designed for the task, were mounted on concrete, steel and later wooden shelters and saw action in Italy, on the eastern front and as part of the reconstructed West Wall defences.

These positions took a heavy toll on Allied armour, but they were not able to stop the inexorable Allied advance and as the Germans retreated, positions earmarked for emplaced turrets were often overrun before they had been installed. As things became increasingly desperate the Germans were forced to use damaged tanks as improvised pillboxes and at the very end of the war guns from tanks were mounted on simple frameworks and installed in open pits.

One of the specially designed Panther turrets developed by the Germans for use as fixed fortifications. This example was positioned in the Gothic Line in Italy to cover a bend in the road leading to the strategically important Futa Pass. (Imperial War Museum)

With the defeat of Italy, Germany and Japan the peoples of the world looked forward to a period of sustained peace. Instead the world was plunged into a Cold War as communism battled capitalism for supremacy. On occasion this war of ideologies escalated into localized conflicts, but in Europe it developed into an uneasy stand off, as the countries of NATO and the Warsaw pact stood toe-to-toe and prepared for the ultimate showdown.

Post-war economic hardship, which resulted from years of war, meant that for most countries large armies were no longer sustainable and more cost effective security solutions had to be found. At the same time Europe in particular was awash with large numbers of tanks which, although serviceable, had often been rendered obsolete by the pace of military advances. These factors neatly dovetailed and saw the emergence of a new generation of fortifications that used tank turrets. This improvisation was seen not only as an effective way of defending a country’s borders and its key installations, but was also cheap. As such this type of fortification was widely used after the war. Of the western powers Italy, Greece, the Netherlands and Norway adopted this idea, while on the other side of the divide the Soviet Union and a number of her satellite states, including Finland, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia did likewise. Other states aligned with the Soviet Union, like Cuba, also used static tanks for defence against her nemesis the USA.

Squeezed between these great power blocs, the neutral nations also adopted this expedient. Switzerland, literally and metaphorically stuck between the two camps, turned the country into an impregnable fortress and employed tank turrets along its borders. Austria, when free from military restrictions imposed on her after the war, also used the idea, as did Sweden, which used tank turrets to defend her airfields and coastline.

The concept also spread to the Far East where European powers like France used them to protect key installations in its colonies as pro-independence revolutionaries fought to throw off the imperialist yoke. In the Middle East, Israel used tank turrets to protect its newly won territories while Jerusalem’s hostile neighbours, like Syria, used dug-in tanks.

Although few of these turrets saw action, they signalled a country’s intent to defend itself with whatever means were at its disposal and in that respect they were successful. However, with weapons becoming increasingly sophisticated the value of emplaced tank turrets diminished. Moreover, with the changing threat to national security, away from a traditional invasion to a more oblique and arguably more worrying threat of terrorism, traditional security measures have been reappraised and most fortifications have been mothballed or demolished, and this is also true of emplaced tank turrets. Most turrets, save for those in museums, have now been removed and the installation filled in or destroyed; a sad but understandable end to a fortification that belongs to a bygone age. This book will hopefully help to ensure that the use of tank turrets as fixed fortifications, although gone, is not quickly forgotten.

Greece also made use of this expedient. This Sherman turret was installed at Evzoni on the border with the former Yugoslavia. Many of the turrets were remodelled with the 75mm gun being replaced with an aperture to take a machine gun. (Courtesy of T. Tsiplakos)

After the Second World War the Soviets made extensive use of emplaced tank turrets. This IS2 turret was installed on border with China. In the foreground it is just possible to see the steel rods that were used to reinforce the concrete. (Sergei Netrebenko)

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(1)Named after the new Minister for War, André Maginot.

(2)And this philosophy continued well into the Cold War when obsolete tanks were mothballed or their turrets removed and used in fixed positions.

(3)Constructed further west after the partition of Poland.

(4) The Renault, Hotchkiss and Somua models mounted only 37mm guns and the Char B1 bis a 37mm gun in the turret and a fixed 75mm in the hull. In 1941 the Soviets introduced the T34 mounting a 76mm gun and in 1942 the Tiger entered German service with its 88mm main armament.

(5) This is covered in more detail in Chapter 3.

(6) Already in 1941 the idea of using a detachable turret had been considered by the Germans. However, the turret of the ‘Heuschrecke 10’, as it was known, mounted a light field howitzer and was primarily designed for indirect rather than direct fire support.

(7)Nor did the Germans stop there. Armoured trains complete with tank turrets were also used for security and anti-partisan operations.

1 The First World War

Even before the First World War tremendous strides had been made in the development of armoured turrets. The British navy had initially developed the idea as early as 1855 in order to protect guns and their crews from enemy fire and by the 1870s the concept had been adopted by all the major navies of the day. The potential for using this idea on land was soon recognized and despite initial concerns about the robustness of the structure, a decision was taken to mount a two-gun turret at Dover. This, like the turrets mounted on board ship, was little more than a covered circular box with ports for the guns.

On the continent, the Grüson company of Magdeburg, Germany in the 1860s had developed a technique for producing cast iron curved sections which could be ‘welded’ together to form a complete cupola which rotated on a turntable of rollers. One such turret, mounting two 16in guns weighing 120 tons, was used by Krupp to protect the Italian naval base at La Spezia.1 And it was not long before the wider possibilities of using such turrets were recognized. The Belgian General Brialmont was a keen advocate of the idea and proposed using both fixed and retractable turrets and in 1865 he installed an armoured turret in the reduit of Fort III protecting Antwerp. A little later, Maximilian Schumann, a Prussian army engineer and subsequently chief turret designer for Grüson, designed a series of increasingly sophisticated armoured turrets to improve the protection for the gun and its firing ability, his work culminating in the design for a retractable turret.

In France, Mougin, designer for the St Chamond gun-making company, also developed a number of armoured turrets, one of the best known being the cast iron turret mounting twin 155mm long-range de Bange guns. Twenty-five of these were built as part of the Séré de Rivière fortifications; a series of fortifications that stretched from the English Channel to the border with Italy.(1)2

Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century a number of companies were producing and selling armoured turrets. However, despite the fact the German company Grüson was one of the leading manufacturers of this technology, there was disagreement in the Imperial Army about how best to use armoured turrets in fortifications. What was clear though was that with the advent of the explosive shell open gun positions were no longer practical and some sort of protection had to be provided. In 1892 the first fort was built using armoured turrets. This included fixed and retractable turrets and additional firepower was also provided by the Grüson turret, or Fahrpanzer. This weapon is of particular interest because it was the precursor of the French tourelle démontable which formed part of the Maginot Line defences (and which is covered in more detail in the Interwar section of this book) and as such was arguably a forerunner of the Panzerstellung.3

During the First World War the Germans installed old naval guns along the coast. ‘Lange Max’ or ‘Long Max’ was located at Moere, about 8 miles from Ostend. The 38cm gun was used to shell Dunkirk. (Author)

The main body of the Fahrpanzer consisted of a cast-iron cylindrical base topped with a cupola that housed the main armament. It was 1,655mm (65in) high and 1,540mm (60in) round with 40mm (1½in) thick armour that provided the crew with adequate protection against shrapnel and small arms fire. A door at the rear gave the crew access to the fighting compartment.

The main body of the structure was set on four rollers some 60cms (24in) apart, which enabled the turret to be moved on tracks into a pre-prepared semi-circular concrete niche to augment the main armament of the fortification. When not in use it could be rolled back into a covered position for protection. These rollers also enabled the turret to be moved onto a specially designed carriage that allowed it to be moved more easily around the battlefield. This had four wheels – two larger wheels at the rear that bore the weight of the turret and weapon and two smaller wheels at the front on a pivot point to enable the carriage to be turned.(2) The wheels were somewhat unusual in that they were made of wood with a steel tyre, whereas the rest of the structure was constructed from iron. This arrangement may have been developed to smooth the ride, since the carriage had no suspension.

A seat at the front of the vehicle accommodated the driver who drove the three horses, which were attached to the carriage by a limber. A hand-operated wheel under the driver’s seat applied a brake to the larger wheels at the rear when the carriage was stationary.

The Fahrpanzer was arguably an early forerunner of the panzerstellung. This example was captured by the Greeks in the First World War and is now housed at the Greek War Museum in Athens. The cast-iron cylindrical base and the domed turret that housed the main armament are both clearly shown. (Author)

The Fahrpanzer could be mounted on a specially designed carriage. The access hatch to the turret is visible behind the driver’s seat. Just below the hatch it is possible to see one of the rollers that enabled the turret to run on tracks. (Author)

Inside the turret a pedestal was located centrally with three branches rising from the centre to support the cupola. This sat on the main body of the structure on a series of small wheels and was rotated using a large hand wheel that permitted a full rotation of the turret in 15 seconds. A simple mechanism enabled the turret to be locked in position so that it did not deviate when fired. Around the inside of the turret was a band marked in degrees, which enabled the crew to accurately rotate the cupola. Two simple seats were provided for the gunner and loader/commander, which were attached to the pedestal. The ammunition (circa 130 rounds) for the weapon was stored vertically in racks at the base of the structure.

An inside view of the Fahrpanzer turret that clearly shows the gun breech and elevating gear. The central pedestal is also visible as is the small vent at the top. (Author)

The main armament was mounted in the cupola above a shelf. The gun trunions were secured to the shelf and there was no recoil mechanism. The gun was fitted with a simple falling type breech with the breech handle on the right and the elevation mechanism on the left. This consisted of a vertically mounted screw thread affixed to the breechblock and the shelf of the turret. By rotating a hand wheel the gun could be elevated and depressed +10 to –5 degrees. This set-up allowed for some very fine adjustments to be made, but it was not suited to quick changes in the angle of depression or elevation when in combat.

The 53mm Schnelladekanone could fire either high explosive or case shot. Its maximum range with HE shells was 3,200m (10,000ft) and 400m (1,300ft) with the shot. The simple breech mechanism and the one-piece ammunition enabled the weapon to be fired very rapidly; the crew of two were capable of firing the weapon at 25–30 shots a minute. An opening in the top of the turret was fitted to vent the fumes, but when using rapid fire it is likely that this would have been insufficient and the doors would have to be opened to prevent the asphyxiation of the crew.

The turret was not fitted with an optical sight. A small hole in the dome with aiming point above and to the right of the gun and a sight fitted outside on the barrel enabled the crew to aim the weapon. Additionally a number of vision slits were provided to give the crew greater visibility. These could be covered with armoured plates when not in use. A small rain guard above the weapon prevented any precipitation entering the turret.

Production of the Fahrpanzer began in 1889 and in total some 200 were produced (although other sources state 322). The turrets were exported to a number of countries and were employed by the Central Powers in the First World War.(3)4

By the turn of the century armoured turrets had been sufficiently refined that they were capable of being fitted to armoured cars. The Austrians installed a turret on the Austro-Daimler armoured car of 1904 (and the modified 1905 version) and the FrenchCharron car from roughly the same period also had a turret. During the war all of the major belligerents used armoured cars with turrets. The Italian Lancia armoured car of 1915 was even fitted with a smaller turret atop the main turret. In that same year the Canadian Russell armoured car entered service. This was the first vehicle to have a turret basket that rotated with the turret.5

By the outbreak of the war the technology behind armoured turrets was well established. However, the first tanks that were developed were all fitted with fixed guns. For some time before the war experiments had been conducted to assess the effectiveness of caterpillar tracks. These peacetime trials led to the development of simple farm tractors. But with the outbreak of war these experiments were given added urgency as the British actively pursued this idea as a possible solution to the stalemate on the Western Front. An armoured vehicle fitted with tracks, it was hoped, would be able to advance across the broken terrain and engage enemy positions that had survived the preparatory bombardment and together with supporting infantry might offer the prospect of the thus far elusive breakthrough.

In Britain, somewhat unusually, the research was undertaken by the Royal Navy with the full support of the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill. The first prototypes of the ‘tank’(4) were tested in September 1915 and were introduced on the Western Front in the latter stages of the Battle of the Somme in September 1916. In the spring of the following year the French fielded some 130 so-called ‘assault cannons’ in the action at Chemin des Dames.

A First World War British tank knocked out at Langemarck. The initial British and French designs were not fitted with turrets. (Author)

The results were disappointing. There were too few tanks available to be decisive, they were unreliable and despite their armour, they were vulnerable to artillery fire and as such they were unable to deliver the hoped for strategic surprise. The abject failure of tanks on the Somme and in later battles convinced the German High Command that such armoured vehicles had little merit. Only in November 1917 was their first prototype ready for tests. The A7V, as it was known, was a lumbering monster of a machine armed with one front mounted 57mm gun and six machine guns. It was not particularly effective and continuing disputes about the value of the weapon meant only twenty were ever completed.

Unperturbed by the disappointing results, the British and the French pushed ahead with the development of their respective tank programmes. In France, Gen Jean-Baptiste Estienne, who had already been instrumental in the development of French armour, pressed for the introduction of a light tank, and Renault developed the FT17, which had the distinction of being the first tank to include a fully revolving turret. The turret could be fitted with either a short 37mm gun or a machine gun. It revolved on a ball race and could be rotated by hand with little difficulty. If necessary it could be locked in place with a hand brake. Several thousand of these tanks were produced before the end of the war and would no doubt have had a key role to play in the operations envisaged for 1919, but the armistice was announced in November 1918 and the plans were shelved.(5)

Of course for the majority of people the most memorable feature of the First World War is not the introduction of the tank, but the trenches. All too often these have been referred to in general terms, ignoring the major strides that were taken in the development of fieldworks and reinforced concrete blockhouses or pillboxes. The so-called ‘race to the sea’ which saw the opposing armies trying to outflank the enemy and achieve a decisive breakthrough eventually resulted in the creation of a line of trenches on a scale never before seen, extending from the North Sea to the border with Switzerland. As the respective high commands struggled to find a solution to this bloody stalemate, the trench system was expanded. The main trench, or ‘fire trench’ that faced the enemy, was made deep and wide with a fire step and loopholes. Like all the trenches it was dug in a zigzag pattern to lessen the impact of shells and prevent a clear line of fire should the enemy occupy the position. Some 100m (110yd) to the rear a support trench was dug where the reserves were held and later a third trench line was added – ‘the bombing trench’. This was between the fire and support trench and was used when the line was under attack by the enemy. In this eventuality soldiers particularly competent in the use of grenades, which were stockpiled in the trench, would occupy this intermediate position and throw the bombs into the forward trench to repulse any foray. Linking all the lines of trenches together were communication trenches that led to the rear.

As the war progressed the individual trenches also became increasingly elaborate and included dugouts that provided shelter for the infantry or could be used as makeshift command posts and first aid stations. But as the trenches and dugouts became deeper the military engineers were confronted with the age-old problem of water. This was particularly the case in and around Passchendaele where the water table meant that it was difficult to dig trenches. The German solution was to build concrete pillboxes.(6)(7) These miniature forts not only solved the problem of flooding but also provided more effective protection against the heavy barrage that preceded British and French attacks. The pillboxes did not adhere to any formal design because they were often built by troops in the field, albeit under the supervision of military engineers. Nevertheless they generally measured circa 9m (30ft) along the front and were about 3m (10ft) wide.

Concrete pillboxes were extensively used by the Germans in the Siegfriedstellung or the Hindenburg Line, as it was know to the Allies. This was begun in September 1916 and was originally envisaged as a relatively narrow band of defences. The ability of these defences to defeat the anticipated Allied offensive concerned the Chief of Staff of the German First Army, Col Fritz von Lossberg. He planned to construct a defensive system that would consist of numerous zones each stronger than the last, which would gradually slow and ultimately stop the enemy attack. By building the defences in depth, the attacking infantry would soon outreach its supporting artillery making further progress all but impossible. Moreover, the attackers would become increasingly isolated from their own forces and thus vulnerable to counter-attack by reserves held in the rear, safe from the preliminary bombardment, and earmarked for the purpose.

One of the many concrete blockhouses built by the Germans all along the western front. This example was located at Lomme, near Armentieres and was destroyed by a mine. (Author)

The practical application of von Lossberg’s ideas saw the construction of a series of defences in front of the main position. Forward of the first trench was the outpost zone which was designed to slow the enemy attack. If the enemy pierced this first line of defence it would enter the battle zone that was chequered with concrete blockhouses. These positions were all mutually supporting, providing fire for their own defence and cover for the flanks and rear of the adjacent units in the so-called ‘Hedgehog’ (Igel) pattern of defence. Behind this zone were further trenches (and more defensive lines further to the rear were also contemplated) so that the defensive system was some 6–8,000m (19–26,000ft) in depth.

By the end of the First World War the value of reinforced concrete shelters had been established as had the importance of armoured turrets in protecting their crew against explosive shells, small arms fire and shrapnel. In the interwar period these technologies were combined and lead to the development of some of the most elaborate fortifications ever constructed with huge casemates mounting armoured turrets. At the same time, but on a less grand scale, the first steps were taken in the development of what the Germans were to later christen the panzerstellung, with tank turrets mounted on concrete shelters for the first time.

As well as pillboxes, the Germans also developed armoured cupolas. This steel observation post with concrete apron was installed on the Western Front. (Imperial War Museum)

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(1)One of Mougin’s fixed turrets armed with twin 155mm guns was installed at Fort Barbonnet in 1887. It was still effective in the Second World War when it was instrumental in inflicting heavy casualties on the Italian attackers.

(2)Railway wheels were also developed which meant the turret could be moved short distances on purpose built tracks or transported longer distances along the mainline.

(3)The Greeks captured two Bulgarian turrets. These were manufactured by Krupp at the Grüsonwerk, Magdeburg-Buckau in 1894 and are now on display at the Greek War Museum in Athens.

(4)So named to deceive the enemy and because it was not dissimilar to a large water tank.

(5)The Germans also developed the LKI Light Tank with a revolving turret but few were produced.

(6)The term ‘pillbox’ was used by the British soldiers because the reinforced concrete construction was the same shape as the boxes in which chemists supplied tablets during the war.

(7)Interestingly, the British built very few pillboxes. The official reason was that ‘such works were not worth the labour or the cost’, but the real reason was more likely that the High Command feared that if the troops had such solid defences they would be less offensively minded.

2 Interwar

The First World War cast a huge shadow over the interwar period. In the immediate aftermath, there was a determination to prevent a repeat of the death and destruction that for four long years had held the countries of Europe in its thrall. Initially this found its expression in a desire for peace founded on disarmament; swords would be beaten into ploughshares if only to save the economies of Europe from financial meltdown. Preliminary negotiations were instigated and conferences convened, but economic crisis and the rise of political extremism, particularly in Germany, meant that the discussions foundered and many countries, disillusioned by the lack of progress, steadily began to rearm. This rearmament was principally defensive in nature and was aimed at deterring an attack from the country still deemed to pose the greatest threat to European peace –Germany. Although the fledgling democracy had shown no aggressive intent, it was clear that it had taken the first tentative steps towards rearmament. The pace and scale of this build up quickened after Hitler’s accession to power and Germany’s neighbours reacted in kind.

In 1929 France began work on the Maginot Line and over the next seven years a thin line of powerful forts was constructed along France’s north-eastern frontier. At much the same time and often with the aid of French expertise, her allies: Belgium, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia and Poland did likewise, so completing Germany’s encirclement.(1) Further east, the Soviet Union fortified her western frontier against her traditional enemies: Poland and Germany.

Paradoxically, the construction of these defensive lines was paralleled by the development of a weapon that was to demonstrate its awesome offensive potential in the Second World War – the tank. The lumbering behemoths of the Somme and Cambrai had been replaced with much quicker, more agile and above all turreted models that were to transform the face of the battlefield. The pace of change was such that many countries were left with a number of obsolete tanks that would have to be scrapped, stored or consigned to museums. Instead three countries: Belgium, France and the Soviet Union, used these tanks as improvised fixed fortifications. France used this expedient to supplement the defences of the Maginot Line and Belgium used them to bolster her border defences and protect her exposed coastline, while the Soviet Union used tank turrets to strengthen both the Stalin and later the Molotov lines, which protected her western border.

The use of tank turrets in this way was undoubtedly a valuable addition to the main fortifications providing extra firepower while at the same time protecting the crew from enemy fire. But although Belgium, France and the Soviet Union clearly recognized the benefits of using turrets in this way it is unclear whether they developed the idea independently – certainly the different designs developed by each country bear little resemblance to each other – or whether there was an exchange of information (either voluntarily or through espionage). What is clear is that by the outbreak of the Second World War, significant numbers of turrets had been installed and were encountered by German forces in 1940 and 1941.

SOVIET UNION

The first country to adopt the idea of using tank turrets as an extemporized fixed fortification was the Soviet Union. Following the November revolution of 1917 the Bolsheviks under Lenin seized control of Russia. However, their effective sphere of influence stretched little further than the two great cities of St Petersburg (Leningrad) and Moscow. Elsewhere, control lay with anti-Bolsheviks, or ‘White Russians’ who quickly formed armies with a view to overthrowing the new revolutionary government. They were supported in this aim by Russia’s former allies (principally Britain and France) who were not only keen to prevent a ‘world revolution’ but more importantly they wanted Russia to remain in the war not least to ensure that Russia repaid her debts.

In December 1917 the Bolsheviks agreed an armistice with Austria and Germany and although they initially balked at the peace terms on the table they eventually relented and in March 1918 signed the Treaty of Brest Litovsk. Lenin could now concentrate his efforts on the disparate forces ranged against him. Under the leadership of Trotsky, the Red Army, taking advantage of the good communications around its power base and the failure of the counter revolutionary forces to coordinate their attacks, managed to gain the ascendancy and by 1920 the Bolsheviks hold on power had been secured. Although still viewed with suspicion by the international community (and certainly the Western democracies) the new Bolshevik state was under no immediate threat of invasion and the government set about introducing wide-ranging reforms. Principal among these was defence, and soon the Soviet Union began to develop its own tanks and started to build border fortifications.

Fortifications

During the Civil War, ‘The Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army (Robochiy Krestyanskaya Krasnaya Armiya – RKKA)’ or simply the Red Army, in its desperate attempts to safeguard the new revolutionary government, created a series of fortified areas, or ukreplinnyje rajony (UR), which were to be used not only for defence but were also to act as jumping off points for offensive operations. With little in the way of raw materials and no industrial base to build permanent fortifications, these positions were generally little more than field works and were built using the one resource they did have – manpower.

As the threat from the foreign backed ‘White Russians’ diminished and eventually disappeared, plans were drawn up to build a major set of fortifications along the western border. Almost immediately work began at the Engineering Research and Development Institute of the Military Engineering Academy in Moscow to develop a series of reinforced concrete pillboxes. But to construct such shelters all along the border would require huge amounts of material, which the weak Soviet economy could not sustain. When work began in 1926 it was therefore decided to concentrate the defences in the Polotsk and Karelian URs(2) (north and north-west fronts) where the greatest threat of attack was deemed to lie.

Agricultural and industrial reform saw the Soviet economy strengthen and grow and this gathered pace after the introduction of the first Five Year Plan in 1928. This coincided with a decision to extend the defences to include a further eleven fortified regions: Kingisep UR, Pskov UR, Minsk UR, Mozyr UR, Korosten UR, Novograd-Volynski (Zwiahel) UR, Leitchev UR, Mogilov-Yampolsky UR, Rybnitsk UR and Tiraspol UR. One further UR was built around Kiev. In 1938 work on a further eight new URs was begun. The main part of this work was concentrated in the Ukraine with the creation of the Shepetovka, Staro Konstantinov, Ostropol and Kaments-Podolski URs. Three further URs were created to plug perceived gaps in the line. The Ostrov and Sebezh URs closed the gap between the Pskov and Polotsk URs while the Slutsk UR extended the line from the old UR of Minsk to the Pripet Marshes.

In all, the front stretched over 2,000km (1,242 miles) from the Baltic to the Black Sea and consisted of more than 3,000 positions. These included larger forts, sometimes with subterranean facilities, machine gun and anti-tank positions, artillery blocks, and observation and command positions. These tended to be concentrated at key points with field works used to fill the gaps. These more traditional fortifications were supplemented by the addition of emplaced tank turrets or Tankovaya Ognievaya Totshka (TOT). Obsolete T18 and T24 tanks were buried in the ground so that just the turret was visible and old T26 turrets were mounted on specially prepared bunkers and used in the same way.

In the interwar period the Soviets used tank turrets, or Tankovaya Ognievaya Totshka, in the Stalin and Molotov Lines. This T26 armed with a 45mm gun was installed in Minsk Fortified Region (Byelorussian Military District). It clearly shows the concrete shelter that it was mounted on. (Vladimir Kaminski)

The actual work on the defences was coordinated by the Military Labour Directorate which oversaw separate labour directorates, each responsible for a single UR. They assigned engineers and supervised the construction. But despite the highly centralized organization of the work, the results were less than satisfactory. Workers were poorly paid and had to contend with difficult conditions and although Soviet propaganda tried to portray otherwise, the workers were not inspired by the revolutionary zeal of their leaders. More critically, military engineers, many of whom had been the victims of Stalin’s purges, were in short supply, leaving unqualified civilian engineers to oversee the work.

By the time of the outbreak of the Second World War, the defences of the Stalin Line, as it became known, were largely complete. However, after the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland in October 1939 and the signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact the threat in the west had seemingly disappeared. The defences were also now too far behind the new Soviet border to be of any use as a potential springboard for an offensive. As a consequence the positions of the Stalin Line were mothballed. Stalin, however, was cautious and took steps to create a new defensive line inside Poland to ensure the integrity of the new Soviet border against any possible volte-face by Hitler.

The new border defences, which came to be known by the name of the Soviet Foreign Minister, Molotov, were to be built in much greater depth than the Stalin Line – up to 10km (7 miles) in places and were to have a much greater preponderance of antitank guns. Equipment was stripped from the Stalin Line and engineers and labourers who had previously worked on the defences were sent west. Winter prevented any serious work beginning before the summer of 1940 and only 25 per cent of the positions had been completed by the time of the German invasion in June 1941 but this did include a number of emplaced T18 turrets.

Tanks

Having defeated the counter-revolutionary forces and foreign armies in the civil war, the Red Army was demobilized and the make-up of the country’s armed forces reappraised. The tank arm had consisted of little more than captured enemy vehicles and a few indigenous examples that were simply copies of foreign vehicles, principally the French Renault FT.

T18 (or MS1 – Malyi Soprovozhdieniya or Small Infantry Support Tank)