Hitler's Siegfried Line E-Book

Neil Short

• Herausgeber: The History Press
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2007

Beschreibung

Built by Nazi Germany between 1936 and 1938, over 500,000 workers were involved in its construction. This book gives a detailed historical background to the Siegfried Line, and a guide to what is left to see of it today. The line was not designed to thwart a full-scale offensive, but rather to delay any attack sufficiently to allow the German reserves to mobilise. In the 'phoney war' (1939-40) it was effective enough to prevent the French from launching a pre-emptive strike when German forces were heavily engaged in Poland. Certain sections of the defences saw some of the fiercest fighting of the Second World War. Much has since been dismantled, but some still remains today. This, the first English-language guide to the Siegfried Line, is fully illustrated and will appeal to anyone interested in the rise and fall of Hitler and Nazism, or in the Second World War in general.

Leseprobe

HITLER’SSiegfried Line

Neil Short

First published in 2002

The History Press The Mill, Brimscombe Port Stroud, Gloucestershire, GL5 2QGwww.thehistorypress.co.uk

This ebook edition first published in 2013

All rights reserved © Neil Short, 2002, 2013

The right of Neil Short to be identified as the Author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyrights, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

This ebook is copyright material and must not be copied, reproduced, transferred, distributed, leased, licensed or publicly performed or used in any way except as specifically permitted in writing by the publishers, as allowed under the terms and conditions under which it was purchased or as strictly permitted by applicable copyright law. Any unauthorised distribution or use of this text may be a direct infringement of the author’s and publisher’s rights, and those responsible may be liable in law accordingly.

EPUB ISBN 978 0 7524 9609 2

Original typesetting by The History Press

Contents

Preface

Introduction

Maps 1–6

Chapter 1.

D

ETERRENT

Chapter 2.

D

ILEMMA

Chapter 3.

D

ECLINE

Chapter 4.

D

ESPERATION

Chapter 5.

D

EFEAT

The Gamble

–

Roll Again

–

Last Chance

–

Interregnum

–

Winner Takes All

–

Relief

Chapter 6.

C

ONCLUSION

Postscript

Timeline

Typology

Bibliography

WE’RE GONNA HANG OUTTHE WASHING ON THE SIEGFRIED LINE

Mother, dear, I’m writing you from somewhere in France, Hoping this finds you well, Sergeant says I’m doing fine ‘A soldier and a half’ Here’s what we’ll all sing, It’ll sure make you laugh:

Chorus

We’re gonna hang out the washing on the Siegfried Line, Have you any dirty washing, Mother dear? We’re gonna hang out the washing on the Siegfried Line, ’Cos the washing day is here. Whether the weather may be wet or fine, We’ll just rub along without a care, We’re gonna hang out the washing on the Siegfried Line, If the Siegfried Line’s still there.

Second Verse

Everybody’s mucking in and doing their job, Wearing a great big smile, Everybody’s got to keep their spirits up to-day! If you want to keep in swing, Here’s the song to sing!

Lyrics by Jimmy Kennedy, music by Michael Carr

Preface

In the summer of 2000 I was invited by Jonathan Falconer of Sutton Publishing to discuss a proposal for a book that I had. After a short meeting and a very pleasant lunch in a public house in the historic town of Stroud, tucked away in the Cotswolds, I returned to my home in Somerset with a commission, not for a book based on my original idea but a book on the Siegfried Line. Disappointed that my initial idea had been rebuffed, but delighted with the commission, I began to turn over ideas in my mind and the more I considered the subject matter the more I realised that this subject, at least in terms of English language texts, has been very much overlooked.

I should stress at this point that although I did not plan to write a book on the Siegfried Line, and had not specifically researched the subject, I had, over a number of years, carried out a lot of research on different aspects of the defences and the commission by Sutton enabled me to draw a lot of these threads together. As such I am deeply grateful to Sutton Publishing, and in particular Jonathan Falconer, for giving me the opportunity to write this book. Without his vision I would not have considered writing about such a seemingly vast topic.

Clearly, the sheer diversity of the subject necessitated contacting numerous bodies and individuals as I gathered the material to complete my research. In particular, I would like to thank the staff at the Imperial War Museum, especially the Departments responsible for Documents, Printed Books and Photographs. I should also like to thank the staff at the Public Record Office who processed my seemingly endless requests for files. The staff in the photographic department at the Bundesarchiv, Koblenz were also most helpful, especially as they patiently tried to understand my schoolboy German.

Special thanks are also due to a number of veterans I contacted in the course of my research. In particular I would like to thank Bob Kingsbury (94th Division) and Robert Herman (5th Armored Division).

A number of individuals who volunteer their time and energies to the furtherance of knowledge of fortifications also contributed in no small way to the production of this book. Margaret Pinsent of the Fortress Study Group has provided immeasurable assistance in my research over the years, as has Herbert Jäger, who provided many useful contacts and avenues of research. Frank Klar and the other volunteers at the Westwall Museum, Niedersimten, kindly showed me around their museum and allowed me to use material relating to the Gerstfeldhöhe.

At this juncture I would also like to thank Mike Yared who provided me with details of a number of pertinent texts and the staff at Nailsea Library who attempted, but sadly could not always trace these rare, specialist publications. Your efforts were nevertheless very much appreciated.

I should also like to express my special thanks to the staff at the Abbey Wood Library, in particular Mr Frank Pritchard, who efficiently processed my numerous requests for texts and politely notified me when they were overdue! I should also like to thank the staff at the MoD Whitehall Library who diligently traced the obscure titles that I ordered from their extensive holdings, many of which had not been borrowed for some considerable time.

Finally, I would like to thank my family. During my formative years my parents and sister tolerated the unusual interest I had in things military and subsequently supported me during my time at university. More recently my wife has not only helped me to draft and translate numerous letters and documents but has also kept everyday interruptions to a minimum so that I could concentrate on my writing and research – so important when trying to write and keep down a full-time job. She also showed immense patience and forbearance when we were on holiday; for, while the average family enjoys a beach holiday in Spain or Greece, I have dragged her around the battlefields, museums and archives of Europe and beyond. I hope the sacrifice was worthwhile!

This book is dedicated to the memory of Elizabeth Annie Bastin (15 May 1899 – 17 November 2000), who witnessed the monumental events of the twentieth century from its dawn to its close.

Introduction

The voice of his fate was stronger than the supplications of his parents: ‘Stay with us, please. One day you will inherit the royal crown!’ But he was not to live long enough. The father lived longer than the son. However, on the other hand, glorious splendour still surrounds the name of the young hero.

From the Rhine Saga ‘Siegfried and Kriemhilde’

It may seem somewhat strange in a factual work such as this to admit at the outset that the title of the book is ‘technically’ incorrect. That is, the fortifications constructed on Germany’s western border were officially called Der Westwall or the West Wall, rather than the Siegfried Line. The anglicised version was adopted by the western powers soon after work began on the defences and was derived from the name given to a German defensive line of the First World War that ran along a similar axis.1 However, it is unclear whether it was renamed because of a genuine belief in the similarities of the two or whether it was an attempt to belittle Hitler’s ‘impregnable’ defences, the predecessor being a much shorter and less impressive position. Whatever the reasoning behind the name it stuck, helped in no small part by a song penned in the early days of the war – ‘We’re gonna hang out the washing on the Siegfried Line’. The song was written by the British songwriters Jimmy Kennedy and Michael Carr and was popularised in London by Ambrose and his orchestra. Ubiquitous during the Phoney War, the song lost a little of its appeal after the defeat of France when Hitler largely abandoned the West Wall and concentrated his efforts on the construction of fortifications along the coast. This confused the matter of names still further with the coastal defences being referred to as the ‘New West Wall’. However, this name was rarely used and instead the more widely accepted title – ‘The Atlantic Wall’ – was adopted. After the war English language texts on the subject generally referred to the Siegfried Line, while in Germany the reverse was true with references to the original, official nomen-clature. For the purposes of this book, however, the two terms are used synonymously.

In the First World War the Allies had similarly renamed the Siegfriedstellung as the Hindenburg Line as a mark of respect to the man attributed with its design and construction. In fact the Chief of Staff of the German First Army, Colonel Fritz von Lossberg, was the principal architect. He was concerned about the ability of the Siegfriedstellung, as envisaged, to defeat the anticipated Allied offensive. Although undoubtedly strong – the defences were to include forward and rear trenches, reinforced with concrete pillboxes sited to cover the approaches and barbed wire laid in front of the defences in such a way as to channel the attacking troops into pre-prepared killing zones – they were only to be constructed in a relatively narrow band. Von Lossberg planned to create a defensive system that would consist of numerous zones each stronger than the last which would gradually slow and ultimately stop the enemy attack. By building the defences in depth the attacking infantry would soon outreach its supporting artillery, making further progress all but impossible. Moreover, the attackers would become increasingly isolated from their own forces and thus vulnerable to counter-attack by reserves held in the rear, safe from the preliminary bombardment, and earmarked for the purpose.

The practical application of von Lossberg’s ideas saw the construction of a series of defences in front of the main position. Forward of the first trench was the outpost zone which was designed to slow the enemy attack. If the enemy pierced this first line of defence it would enter the battle zone which was chequered with little forts, machine gun nests and strong points. These positions were all mutually supporting providing fire for their own defence and cover for the flanks and rear of the adjacent units in the so-called ‘Hedgehog’ (Igel) pattern of defence. Behind this zone were the defences of the Siegfried Line proper which was now known as the Siegfried Zwischenstellung (or to the British as the Hindenburg Support Line). With work on these positions complete, von Lossberg set about creating another line built on the same principles to the rear which was named the Siegfried II Stellung. More defensive lines further to the rear were also contemplated. Thus to describe this position as a ‘line’ was a misnomer; it was a defensive system built in depth (in fact some 6 – 8,000 metres).

The Hindenburg Line was eventually breached, but this was largely the result of German exhaustion and the arrival of fresh American soldiers rather than frailties in the defensive system developed by von Lossberg. In the postwar period as the German High Command sought to understand the reasons for Germany’s defeat it would have been easy to overlook this fact, but it did not. The senior staff believed that there was still merit in the defensive strategy and tactics adopted in the war and in particular the idea of defence in depth. However, the Versailles diktat meant that it would be difficult to meaningfully employ any of the lessons learned and the newly formed Reichswehr2 was obliged to bide its time. As the years passed and the restrictions placed on the German military were eased, removed or simply ignored, Germany began to construct a series of fortifications along her western border that utilised many of the principles developed in the First World War. A series of small reinforced concrete shelters, protected by a curtain of anti-tank obstacles, covering almost the whole length of the western border and built in considerable depth, were constructed. Again, the idea was to slow the invader’s advance, sucking it into a bloody battle of attrition as the enemy forces fought their way deeper and deeper into the defensive system. As they became weaker and increasingly detached from their own lines they would be vulnerable to a counter-stroke that would be launched at the critical moment.

Nor was this the only similarity between the defensive system of the First World War and the West Wall. Many of the structures were built to standard patterns (although not on the same scale as those in the West Wall) enabling the mass-production and pre-fabrication of many of the parts. Larger strong points, called werke,3 were also built and although less elaborate and not as strong as their successors they were nevertheless the precursor of the later West Wall structures that bore the same name. In addition, civilian contractors were employed to construct the concrete bunkers and pillboxes just as they were to be in the construction of the West Wall. The authorities also made use of forced labour from Belgium and France and used Russian prisoners of war, as was the case in the latter stages of the Second World War.

In marked contrast to its German counterpart, the French High Command drew very different conclusions from the fighting of the First World War. Its thinking was strongly influenced by the bloody battle of Verdun and in particular the crucial role played by the old but immensely strong forts around which the gallant defence of la patrie had been organised. Unable to maintain an army of occupation in Germany indefinitely, it was decided to build a series of defences along the border to prevent future German aggression and, not surprisingly, the design of the defences owed much to the perceived strengths of the forts at Verdun.

The Maginot Line, as the defences were christened,4 was begun in 1929 and over the next seven years a thin line of powerful forts was constructed along France’s northeastern frontier. The completed fortifications were undeniably impressive and the ideas and expertise were exported to France’s friends and allies, principally Czechoslovakia, but also Belgium and to a lesser degree Holland and Poland, so that eventually a concrete collar ringed Germany. Hitler used the construction of these fortifications, albeit defensive in nature, and the failure of the western powers to disarm as justification for his flagrant contravention of the terms of the Versailles peace settlement. Firstly, Germany rearmed and then remilitarised the Rhineland. Unchallenged, Hitler was now free to construct his own border defences, but his motives were far from peaceful. Unlike his neighbours, Hitler planned to use the defences as a bulwark to deter the western powers while he sought to extend his Reich eastward.

Work on the West Wall began in 1936 and made slow but steady progress until the first quarter of 1938 when Hitler introduced the first of a series of orders for the acceleration of the building programme that continued until the outbreak of war. The completed defences were immensely strong, but they were not impregnable, as Hitler would have had everyone believe. The western powers had gathered an immense amount of detail on the defences and were well aware of their shortcomings. Equally, the likely casualties that would accrue should they launch an offensive against Germany perturbed them. Unwilling to countenance such an attack they prevaricated and allowed both Czechoslovakia and Poland to be overrun by Hitler’s forces. Britain and France now awaited the inevitable German assault confident that the forts of the Maginot Line would stymie any attack, but their confidence was misplaced. When Hitler attacked he circumvented the main defences of the Maginot Line, striking through neutral Belgium. The German blitzkrieg unhinged the Allies’ defence and forced the British Expeditionary Force to withdraw from the Continent, its tail between its legs, leaving France to fight on alone. Recognising the situation was hopeless the French Government sued for peace.

Its purpose seemingly served, the West Wall was now mothballed. Weapons and equipment were removed and inhabitants who had been evacuated from the war zone returned to their homes and attempted to rebuild their lives as Europe enjoyed a peaceful interlude, albeit an uneasy one. Hitler now concentrated his efforts on extinguishing the Bolshevik menace and, with the cancellation of the planned invasion of Britain, the construction of coastal defences from Norway to the Spanish border which he hoped would act as a deterrent to Britain and later the United States. As it transpired neither of Hitler’s aims were realised. Stalin’s Russia proved a much more resilient foe and gradually the tide of the war in the east turned. In the west the Anglo-American forces stormed Hitler’s ‘Fortress Europe’ and by September 1944, exceeding even the most ambitious forecasts, the Allies stood on the German border. Abandoned for four years the defences of the West Wall would surely present few problems to the all-conquering Allied armies. Certainly General Eisenhower and his staff thought so. Events were to prove them horribly wrong. Restricted by logistical difficulties and with deteriorating weather making movement on the ground difficult and curtailing air support the Allies spent the final months of 1944 involved in a series of bloody battles as they advanced literally pillbox by pillbox through the line.

In December the optimism of the summer was finally shattered when the Germans launched a massive counter-offensive. The Battle of the Bulge, although finally stopped well short of its target, saw the Germans recapture many of the Siegfried Line positions that had been so dearly bought in the previous months. The prospect of attacking these positions again filled the Allies with foreboding, although in the end it proved to be a less daunting undertaking than initially envisaged. The German winter offensive turned out to be Hitler’s last throw of the dice. With reserves of men, equipment, fuel and ammunition dwindling the once mighty Wehrmacht could do little to stem the Allied advance and soon the Siegfried Line was broken and the Americans were across the Rhine. The Allies could at last hang out their washing on the Siegfried Line, but they had paid a terrible price in casualties.

Notes

1. In the First World War the Imperial German Army generally designated their defensive lines after mythical gods and heroes such as Wotan, Hagen and Siegfried. The Siegfried Line or Siegfriedstellung was conceived in September 1916 (although not manned until the spring of 1917). It was some 90 miles long and ran from Arras to St Quentin and on to Soissons on the Aisne.

2. The name given to the standing army during the Weimar Republic and the early years of the Third Reich.

3. For example, the Hanseatenwerk.

4. Named after the new Minister for War, André Maginot.

CHAPTER 1 – THE WEST WALL

CHAPTER 2 – THE FRENCH SAAR OFFENSIVE – SEPTEMBER 1939

CHAPTER 3 – THE GAMBLE – FIRST US ARMY’S OFFENSIVE – SEPTEMBER 1944

CHAPTER 4 – THE ALLIED OFFENSIVE OF OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 1944

CHAPTER 5 – THE ALLIED OFFENSIVE OF DECEMBER 1944

WINNER TAKESALL CHAPTER 6 – THE ALLIEDOFFENSIVE OF FEBRUARY/MARCH 1945

CHAPTER 1

Deterrent

JANUARY 1919–SEPTEMBER 1939

After a superhuman fight he had succeeded in killing a dragon on the Drachenfels, a rock where dragons used to live . . . . The blood of the monster immediately congealed, where it came into contact with his body, into an impenetrable, horny skin. Consequently, he took a bath in the blood and became invulnerable.

From the Rhine Saga ‘Siegfried and Kriemhilde’

GENESIS

To anyone reading the articles of the peace settlement imposed on Germany at the end of the First World War it would be difficult to comprehend how the Siegfried Line came to be built. Not only was the Rhineland declared a demilitarised zone, which meant that Germany was not allowed to station any troops on her western border, but Germany was also specifically and indefinitely prohibited from building fortifications in the area. Furthermore, the Rhineland was to be occupied by Allied troops for fifteen years and a series of Commissions created which were tasked with ensuring that Germany complied with all the restrictions placed on her. Yet only twenty years after the peace treaty was signed, Germany had constructed a series of fortifications that stretched some 350 miles (560 kilometres) from the Dutch border to the border with Switzerland. To understand how this remarkable turnaround came about it is necessary to take a more detailed look at the terms of the peace settlement agreed at Versailles and the extraordinary series of events thereafter.

In January 1919, the leaders of the victorious nations gathered at Versailles to thrash out the terms of the peace settlement. The issues they faced were many and complex, but one aim was clear – never again should people have to endure the horrors of modern warfare. To this end Germany, who in the eyes of the victorious powers was responsible for the outbreak of hostilities, was to be prevented from waging war in the future. This was to be achieved by imposing on the fledgling democracy a series of conditions, the most significant of which was the emasculation of Germany’s armed forces.

The job of formulating the terms of the treaty relating to arms reduction was passed to a military commission under Marshal of France Ferdinand Foch, who in the First World War was Chief of the General Staff and later Supreme Commander on the Western Front. He was deeply affected by the enormous French losses and was keen to impose a ‘Carthaginian Peace’ on the Germans.1 This became all too evident in March 1919 when, after only two months of deliberations, the commission finalised the terms of the German disarmament. The army was to be a volunteer army with officers serving for 25 years and other ranks serving for 12 years and it was to be only 100,000 strong. It was prohibited from having tanks, artillery and poison gas and the General Staff, which devised and implemented German strategy in the war, was abolished. The navy was reduced to little more than coastal defence force, with only six obsolete battleships, six light cruisers, twelve destroyers and twelve torpedo boats. It was denied submarines and dreadnoughts. To cap it all the German air force, was scrapped.

Germany was also forced to demilitarise the west bank of the Rhine, and the east bank to a depth of 50 kilometres.2 This encompassed not only the stationing of soldiers and equipment but also fortifications. These were specifically covered in Article 42 of the Political Clauses for Europe which stated that: ‘Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometres to the east of the Rhine.’3 And was expanded in Article 180 of the Military, Naval and Air Clauses which stipulated that: ‘All fortified works, fortresses and field works situated in German territory to the west of a line drawn fifty kilometres to the east of the Rhine shall be disarmed and dismantled.’

‘Within a period of two months from the coming into force of the present Treaty such of the above fortified works, fortresses and field works as are situated in territory not occupied by Allied and Associated troops shall be disarmed, and within a further period of four months they shall be dismantled. Those which are situated in territory occupied by Allied and Associated troops shall be disarmed and dismantled within such periods as may be fixed by the Allied High Command.

‘The construction of any new fortification, whatever its nature and importance, is forbidden in the [demilitarised] zone’.

Significantly, the Allies did not stipulate how long these restrictions should stay in place.4

To ensure that Germany complied with the terms of the peace settlement the victorious Allies felt that some kind of leverage was required. It was therefore agreed that the left bank of the Rhine would be occupied and only if Germany met her obligations would this army of occupation be removed; troops from the most northerly zone after five years, those from the middle zone after ten years and those from the most southerly zone after fifteen years.5

In spite of this measure, in January 1923, French and Belgian soldiers occupied the Ruhr, the industrial heart of Germany, in order to extract reparations after Germany had defaulted on deliveries of timber.6 Forbidden from fortifying her border and with no army to speak of the German government could do nothing to stop the French and Belgian troops entering the country let alone forcibly eject them. Instead the German authorities adopted a policy of passive resistance. This not only prevented the French and Belgians from extracting raw materials in lieu of reparations, but also sent the German economy into decline as industrial production ground to a halt. The result was hyperinflation and a rise in political extremism.

France too suffered politically and economically; her actions were criticised by Britain and the French Franc weakened. Under enormous pressure, France (and Belgium) eventually withdrew her troops and thereafter the French government worked to contain Germany using both military and diplomatic measures.

Militarily, France decided to construct a series of fortifications along her eastern border; the so-called Maginot Line. To the French the First World War had demonstrated that fortifications still had an important part to play in modern warfare. As such they conducted a number of studies to identify what defences would be most suitable to protect the border with Germany when the army of occupation left the Rhineland. These studies generated a lively debate. Some argued that a continuous line of defences should be constructed while others favoured a series of strong points. Other arguments raged about whether strong defences should be built like those at Verdun, or lighter more flexible defences in depth. In the end it was decided to construct a thin line of strong fortifications all along the border with Germany. Work began in 1929, under the new Minister for War André Maginot, and was expected to be completed by 1935 when the French forces occupying the Rhineland were scheduled to complete their withdrawal. Despite the injection of enormous amounts of money and the increased urgency caused by the decision to withdraw the army of occupation in 1930, the defences were not in a position to be manned until 1936.

Diplomatically, France worked to engineer a political solution to the question of Germany’s western border. This culminated in a conference held in Locarno, Italy in September 1925 where a number of agreements were made. One of the key conditions was the pledge by Germany, France and Belgium to uphold existing frontiers and Germany’s acceptance of the demilitarised status of the Rhineland. Moreover, the signatories also pledged not to resort to force to alter the territorial settlement.