Terminus E-Book

Marco Della Luna

• Herausgeber: Edizioni Aurora Boreale
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2023

Beschreibung

We feel time flowing voraciously around our being and all things, inexorably corroding them until annihilation; we try to slow this process down with technique or to transcend it with faith in a perfect and immutable Being; overall, we tend towards nihilism and depression. But this feeling is deceptive, as is the remedy for it.
Terminus addresses in purely rational terms the basic questions of existence and time, of the relationship with the Infinite, reviews the great answers of ancient and modern philosophers, and opens, with a reversal of perspective, consciousness to becoming as a constituent internal to being, and co-eternal with it; and to being as pure positive, exempt from nothingness and from negation, but not from the Limit. While the perfect and immutable Being is an ontological nonsense.
In his essay Terminus, The Unconscious Godhead and the Statute of Being, Marco Della Luna not only explains Philosophy in its most intimate essence as a Sacred Science, but, most important, he demonstrates this pure essence when he states that «Philosophy arises from realizing that the conception of reality, i.e. the ontological conception, implicit in common sense, and presupposing a reality “made” in a certain way, does not stand up to a logical analysis, because it manifests contradictions» and furthermore when he states that one of the goals of this new work of his is «the demonstration of total logical inconsistency of all the constructs elaborated in this way and the unsustainability of the common conception of being».
Terminus is not an ordinary essay on Philosophy, as we can find on bookshelves, and it is definitely not a book for everybody, given its inevitable complexity: it is rather a book which teaches to see, discover and understand Philosophy in its most authentic light. A book that - and I say it without hesitation - can also help rewrite the concept of Ontology and the history of Philosophy itself.

Leseprobe

Τεληστήριον

MARCO DELLA LUNA

TERMINUS

THE UNCONSCIOUS GODHEAD

AND THE STATUTE OF BEING

Edizioni Aurora Boreale

Title: Terminus. The Unconscious Godhead and the Statute of Being

Author: Marco Della Luna

Series: Telestérion

With a preface by Nicola Bizzi

Editing by Nicola Bizzi

ISBN e-book version: 979-12-5504-386-7

Cover image:

Hans Holbein the Younger: Design for a Stained Glass Window with the God Terminus, 1525 (Basel, Kunstmuseum)

TERMINO DIVO DICATUS

Edizioni Aurora Boreale

© 2023 Edizioni Aurora Boreale

Via del Fiordaliso 14 - 59100 Prato

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www.auroraboreale-edizioni.com

All rights reserved

PREFACE BY THE PUBLISHER

What is mind? No matter. What is matter? Never mind.

(George Berkeley)

I feel particularly honoured and glad to present this new essay by my friend Marco Della Luna, a multifaceted author of great erudition and, above all, a man gifted with the uncommon ability to range between topics that are only apparently distant, but that are actually more interwoven than one might think, such as theoretical philosophy, social psychology and law.

In my soon-to-be-published essay, Into the Penetrals of the Temple: the relationship between Philosophy and Mysteric Tradition, which Marco got to preview and has repeatedly mentioned in the context of this new work of his, I focused my attention on the true essence of Philosophy, highlighting how, from the dawn of history and civilization onwards, some human beings possessed and handed down to their own community and posterity the awareness of being a thinking creature animated by a divine spark, and essentially a fragment of Eternity. Another focus of my essay was the feeling, I dare say the certainty, that some human beings had, not to be limited to a mere physical existence destined to end with the decay and death of their “shell”, but to be destined in some way to be reunited with those same creative forces that regulate the existence, the energy of the cosmos and the powerful and immutable dynamics of Nature. And, consequently - as countless archaeological finds and the very birth of religious sentiment and Philosophy attest – man has always placed in a prominent role his relationship with the Transcendent and has always asked himself crucial questions: What are we? Where do we come from? Where do we go?

In particular, the questions about our destination, meant as a metaphorical as well as a material path traced by the Fate, with a special focus on the afterlife, has stimulated the mankind's incessant need for answers, that since prehistoric times the human being has found by generating and developing a religious thought and, subsequently, the Philosophy.

The term Philosophy (Φιλοσοφία), which is composed by two words: φιλεῖν (phileîn), “to love”, and σοφία (sophía), “wisdom”, literally means “love of wisdom”. Modern dictionaries and encyclopaedias concordantly define the Philosophy as both a discipline and a field of study for questions and reflections about man and the ultimate reality, investigating the sense of human being and existence, attempting to define nature, and assessing the limits and possibilities of knowledge. But before becoming mere speculative investigation, the Philosophy also researched the goals of life and the ways to attain them in the concrete application of the principles deduced through reflection and thought. The beginning and foundation of philosophy in this original form are rightfully located in the wide geographical basin of ancient Greek settlements, which embraced not only Greece itself, but also Asia Minor and Magna Graecia (id est, the South of Italy). The formulation of an unambiguous definition of philosophy was made arduous also by the dissent (still today anything but resolved) between its protagonists and architects (the Philosophers) about the very object and boundaries of this discipline. However, this controversy is irrelevant from the historical point of view, because the first and most ancient Philosophers didn’t distinguish so clearly between the Love of Wisdom and the Sacred Knowledge. As Victor Magnien rightly pointed out, «Greek Philosophy comes from the Mysteries, at least according to the opinion of the Greeks themselves».

The simple translation of the Greek term (“Love of Wisdom”) would certainly not be sufficient to render the idea of what Philosophy was and how it was understood and perceived in ancient Hellenic world, also because in the cultural context of classical antiquity, in which man was closer to the Gods and the Gods were closer to man, the meaning of the term itself was enormously distant from the interpretations of Philosophy given in later times, from the Middle Ages to the Modern Age, completely different for cultural, religious and social characteristics.

If we do not get rid of the modernity that surrounds us, and above all the centuries-old conditioning that has influenced our way of living, perceiving and seeing ourselves and the reality that surrounds us, we shall not be able to fully understand the works of many undisputed Masters of thought such as Plato, Plotin, Porphyry, Proclus and several others. But Greek Philosophy, whether we understand it as Sacred Knowledge and love for Divine Wisdom, or as a school of life and training ground of reflection, meditation, introspection and elevation, is by no means supplanted or confined to the past: still today it is alive and pulsating and, despite the heavy and undeniable social conditioning due to two thousand years of Christianity that have altered and mutilated parts of its nature and intrinsic message, it still forms the very foundation of our mindset and cultural endowment.

In his book Terminus, Marco Della Luna not only explains Philosophy in its most intimate essence as a Sacred Science, but, most important, he demonstrates this pure essence when he states that «Philosophy arises from realizing that the conception of reality, i.e. the ontological conception, implicit in common sense, and presupposing a reality “made” in a certain way, does not stand up to a logical analysis, because it manifests contradictions» and furthermore when he states that one of the goals of this new work of his is «the demonstration of total logical inconsistency of all the constructs elaborated in this way and the unsustainability of the common conception of being».

Terminus is not an ordinary essay on Philosophy, as we can find on bookshelves, and it is definitely not a book for everybody, given its inevitable complexity: it is rather a book which teaches to see, discover and understand Philosophy in its most authentic light. A book that - and I say it without hesitation - can also help rewrite the concept of Ontology and the history of Philosophy itself.

Nicola Bizzi,

Florence, the 23rd of February, 2022.

«The God Saturn represented as Time devouring his children»

INTRODUCTION

THE COGNITION OF BEING

Man’s idea of reality and of himself is firmly grounded in a structural misunderstanding of what “being”, “becoming” and their relationship are. He is unaware of their abysmally problematic nature, which he hardly ever questions. Hence the primary question, Martin Heidegger's Seinsfrage: What is Being (Sein) in itself?1 But the German philosopher never worked out a rational and systematic theory on those issues: after opening his major works with his sweeping criticism, overarching insights and groundbreaking suggestions, he would proceed in an oracular and poetical fashion. What is being (to be, esse) with respect to the individual beings and to time? Whence do beings come into appearing and whither do they go upon disappearing? How can I come to know this and account for the being’s appearing all together yet as many and manifold at the same time?

Let’s go on: What is the ultimate reality of the World and of the I? What am I with respect to the Other, the not-I, and within the Infinity, within Eternity, and how does time flow? Is it possible to formulate a concept of God compatible with both logic and data of experience? And how can the finite man co-exist with the Infinite, to which, by essence, nothing can be external or added, and retain his standing as a separate being? And, to top it off, the great question by G.W. Leibniz, relaunched by Heidegger: «Warum gibt es überhaupt etwas und nicht vielmehr nichts?», or rather «Why is there something at all, instead of nothing?».

Nowadays few indeed ask themselves such questions or recognize a meaning and value in them, though the quality of life, our existential condition, depends largely on how everyone feels Being (esse, l’essere) and becoming, on one’s sentiment of Being as such and although it is precisely from the answers given or not given to those questions that ultimately derives our conception of the general properties of all things, of the reality that we strive to know, in which we live, on which we operate, and that includes ourselves.

The I and the World that is in front of it, the God who in our times even more fades into the unreal, the being and the things we feel to hold in hand, the time and space in which, together with them, we seem to extend and move, rise and vanish, are not easy to define and conceptualize in logical terms, without falling into fatal contradictions, although they seem obvious to those who do not reflect on nor pay attention to this issue, not even while engaging the most complex and daring operations on the world and on themselves. And who asks oneself those questions anymore? Nobody. But here, my unflinching reader, you indeed are that Nobody, who stares steadfastly into the eye of that cyclopean enigma, in search of the elusive ultimate reality and the hidden Statute of Being.

After a first part dedicated to setting the problem and a historical excursus on the solutions to it formulated by some philosophers, this essay elaborates, in its second part, a radically innovative theory of reality, on the Other, on the Infinite, on Becoming. With Terminus I address, first and foremost, to the scholar of the aforementioned philosophical area, to the one who deals with it by profession or vocation, and he will forgive me if I dispense some elementary explanation here and there, superfluous for him, but necessary for the other categories of readers; as a reward for his indulgence, he will find, in the second part, in addition to some strong original ideas, some other ideas of philosophers undeservedly neglected by the school teaching, of contemporary literature and debate, along with various psychological references as well as oriental conceptions and practices. Secondly, I turn to those who want to combine the path of anagogical search for truth with that of constructive self-discovery, of understanding and becoming, instead of acting like the common man, who blindly interacts with reality in the belief to be himself an active and free subject, without wondering what reality, subject, action and freedom actually are. In third place I turn to that scholar of psychology and to the lover of Eastern thought who aspire to acquire a rational foundation for his experience, teachings and practices, having grown aware that they do need such a foundation.

* * * *

The mind thinks and feels in many, different ways, not only Being and reality, but also itself as a being and as reality; that is, it thinks and feels in different ways the relationship between thought and being, subject and object, I and Nature. Reflecting through the heads of the ancient philosophers, at the beginning the mind conceived, with the Jonics, the idea that a quid, an origin or cause or principle generates or unifies all existing beings; later on, with Heraclitus, the mind became aware that reality is Becoming and conflicting Diversity, and that the mind, or logos, has no boundaries that can be reached – i.e. that you cannot get out of it. With Parmenides it also realized that thought is one with the things being thought, and that truthful knowledge must be internally consistent, because contradictory explanations are inherently fallacious.

Subsequently, philosophical reflection has noted that the possible meanings of “to be” are diverse; notably this occurred with Aristotle, who stated his famous “we say «to be» in various senses”, that is, not only in the existentive sense (i.e. when we state that something exists), but also in a predicative sense (when we state that something has a certain quality, attribute, or location, or quantity, or feature); and thereby it is legitimate to predicate relationships, quantity, quality, attributes, determinations to the essence: hence the miscellany of the world, as opposed to the static, monolithic and homogeneous eînai/on (to be/ens) of Parmenides, who does not admit differentiation, qualifications or becoming, even if he contradictorily tolerates, next to his undifferentiated and immutable being, the motley, changing and living world of the doxa. Here it must be reminded that, when we use the verb “to be” in the sense of existing (existentive sense), we almost always add the adverb “there”, while we do not add it when we use it in the predicative sense; instead, the Greek uses in both cases the nude verb “to be”, èinai, so that it is not graphically evident in which of the two senses that verb is being used in each case.

The supreme need to unify the multiple, in Plato rises above the very empyrean realm of immortal ideas, with the doctrine called henology (from hen, henòs, i.e. unum, unius), a doctrine that the great sage used to impart confidentially, as initiatory knowledge, but which transpires in part from the famous myth of the cave (myth and symbol, not mere allegory), in which the Sun symbolizes the One and the Good – a doctrine that Proclus, commenting on the Parmenides dialogue, interprets as a brilliant synthesis between the metaphysicians of the Magna Greece and the physicists of Jonia2. To understand concretely the original coincidence between philosophy and esoteric practice, I recommend the recent essay by Nicola Bizzi Into the Penetrals of the Temple: the relationship between Philosophy and Mysteric Tradition3.

The ways of thinking about Being, reality and the cave do have evolved over the history of philosophy. Analyzing them is to trace an evolutionary path of the cognition of Being, or rather of ontology, through his difficulties and towards the corresponding solutions. “Ontology” derives from on, ontos (ens, entis), the entity or being. Speaking of it, and reading the Greek texts or their translations, we need to take into account two important lexical differences of English with respect to the language of Hellas. Firstly, Greek lacks a word corresponding to “thing”, the Latin res, so, where we would say “all things” the Greek says «pànta (tà ònta)», that is “all beings”, which includes living beings and men. Secondly: while the verb “to become”, as well as (with rare exceptions) the German werden, means a change but not a genesis, the Greek uses the verb gìgnesthai, which, like the Latin fieri, means both “to become” and “to come into being” (fiat lux, es werde Licht).

As for the terminology of this book, unless differently specified, when I write “to exist” I simply mean “to exist” (“to be” in the bare, existential meaning), and not Heidegger’s existence as “standing out” nor that of Existentialism; when I write “to be”, I mean the intransitive verb “to be” and not the noun, as “a being”, “the beings”; when I write “the being”, I mean the totality of what exists; when I write “essent” or “entity”, I mean “what exists”, “anything that exists”, i.e. inanimate things and living beings and the mind, that is tà ònta; finally, when I use the words “experience” and “to experience”, these should be understood as Erlebnis and erleben respectively, two German words that involve the entire conscious psychic life, not just its cognitive side, but also the emotional, volitional and aesthetic one.

* * * *

The ontological investigation aims above all to ascertain and qualify what exists, i.e. Reality in itself. Structurally, to this regard we have three types of responses:

a) Immediate monism: reality, the whole, is the One. Heraclitus, Parmenides, Plato (with his henology), Spinoza, Berkeley, Fichte, Bradley, Gentile, subject to their respective peculiarities, are in this response pattern.

b) Mediated monism: the I (conscience, thought) and the world (nature, God) are separated in man’s immediate experience (Erlebnis - distinct from Erfahrung, which implies an elaboration), but they discover themselves to be united or they come together by the unifying action of thought or God.

c) Dualistic realism: is the response that currently prevails, separating mind and matter; it is winning in technique, but today it is largely questioned, as we shall see better, by the leading scientific research.

Typically, immediate monism goes into crisis in the face of the awareness of the ontological positivity of the multiple-diverse, apparently contradictory immediate experience, irreconcilable with immediate monism; it then seeks mediation, reintegration, typically postulating a god creator of the manifold or a source of illusion that creates the semblance of the manifold. Later, the mediation factor is in turn placed in crisis by reason on account of its metaphysical, not “verifiable” character. On the contrary, the I or the psyche on one side, and the world on the other, split up not only between them two, but each within itself in a plurality of aspects that tend to be chaotic, susceptible of only subjective, contingent, and relative knowledge, qualitatively opposite to the Supreme knowledge under which Plato would unify beings. Therefore the situation today appears to be no less hopeless for ontology than it is for the social body, flooded as this is by a malignant and debasing form of relativism.

Indeed, some sort of original Damnation hangs over speculation that deals with being as such: if thought is by nature ideal (in the sense of representative of other than itself, that is the World), and if this ideality is insurmountable (i.e. if we cannot get out of it, because thought cannot get out of itself), then thought will never be able to rebuild the unity with reality that went lost when thought viewed itself as other than reality, a mere representation and ideal reproduction of it; and its purpose to ideally reproduce the real fact from which the idea was abstracted is doomed to remain impossible, and its toiling to be a Sisyphean one. Questions such as «What is it, that exists? What is existence? What is reality “made of”?» will remain unanswered. But we will see that this is true only as long as thought (the intellect) abstracts from the totality of the immediately manifest, from the immediate unity of feeling-experience, and construes ideas as something other than reality, thus opening up a fracture in the original, immediate unity. The most radical embodiment of that Condemnation to ultimate, inescapable contradiction and helplessness that thwarts ontology can be found in the conclusions of the metaphysical thought of an almost contemporary London philosopher, F.H. Bradley, who is the most consistent theorist of the subject in question, which is why I will use the arguments of his high metaphysical thinking to unfold, expound and prove my theorems, which are nonetheless opposed to his in their conclusions.

In the first part of his opus magnum Appearance and Reality, published in 1893, he proves that the very conceptions of reality (of the world, of the I) based on appearance and entertained by the common thought, the scientific one, the metaphysical one are all entirely fallacious and delusional because logically contradictory. From the observation that appearance is contradictory, he infers the logical necessity, by virtue of principle of non-contradiction, that there is an absolute Reality, non-contradictory, which includes limited and contradictory experiences of appearance, and transfigures them rendering them free of contradiction. But this entails that such experiences - which, in their specificity of contradiction and limitation, constitute something positive, existing - are excluded from existence, or relegated to a relative existence. So, as will be explained in the second part of the book, the conclusion of Bradely’s metaphysics is the final ontological contradiction, the irreconcilability of being with itself: in its relationship to the Absolute, that positivity of being which consists in limited experience-Erlebnis and the limited conscience having such experiences, in their specificity, at the same time exist and cannot exist. This contradiction is rooted in a frankly Parmenidean conception of the real being as absolutely non-contradictory and therefore excluding from itself the multifarious and changing Relative, which Parmenides understood as a conjunction of the positive and negative. Significantly, Bradley acknowledged that such conception crashes onto his own metaphysical construction, invalidating it. Indeed, its setting leaves no way out. But he took the fallacious path when he was just a few steps from the goal, to attain which he had only to turn the corner and perform a double recognition, a recognition which is precisely the cornerstone of this essay of mine.

According to Bradley’s gnoseology, we indeed experience, or better, we “feel” a given and incontradictory reality, and this happens in the immediate feeling that witnesses the variety of the positive: a solid miscellany devoid of relationships, as he will clarify at the beginning of his opus magnum. But soon the thought, that is the intellect, distinguishing and analyzing, that is by placing relationships into the “felt”, renders the representation of reality (the idea, in the sense indicated above) a tangle of contradictions. Ultimately, the thought tries to get rid of contradiction by resorting to a meta-empirical inference, that is an extra-experiential, metaphysical one, which refers to an uncontradictory Absolute; but, in doing so, it runs into the above-mentioned aporetic outcome. «So it is about going with Bradley, over Bradley», aptly says one of his most recent students, Andrea Pontalto [p. 167 and ff.]. And to do this, a basic restructuring of the cognition of existence will be indispensable – a renovation which will be expounded in the second part of this book.

Moving from these problematic areas concerning the cognition and unity of being, this essay deals with ontology, that is with being, therefore necessarily also with infinity and eternity (infinity in time) - ideas that are almost inseparably interconnected; and it also deals with some of the various ontological views more or less explicitly formulated by man. It treats the problems of the multiple in unity, that of becoming and non-contradiction, that of the presence of the Not-I. And furthermore, that of the personification, indeed of the personified hypostasis, both sentient and agent, of the infinite, that is, of what we mean as God, proving that the latter, whether we like it or not, cannot exist, simply because its concept is absolute negation of existence. Other forms of the divine, such as the subabsolute ones, may exist, as well as an unconscious God, the Deus absconditus, which Terminus shows to be, actually: a Deus sibi absconditus.

* * * *

The proper purpose of ontology is «to get at reality»4, where the verb “get” does not mean at all “to arrive at reality starting from outside it”, but rather a “turning on themselves (within it)”, also because that reality is me too, because everything (infinity) is reality. “Get at reality” should be intended in the sense of describing, defining, conceptualizing demonstrably and coherently the real, because obviously and in the first place, I myself am real; and my experiences, like such, also are reality. And everything that is present to me, everything appearing, is that. As we will see, the opus ontologicum will consist rather and above all in a methodical demolition of endeared conceptual constructions, stratified, fallacious and incoherent (like, for example and to begin with, the one who thinks that ontology should deal with a realm “beyond”, that it therefore constitutes “meta-physics”), one which casts shadows of contradiction on the virginity of the immediately manifest. The demolition has to go up to the very root of the fallacy. It will consist, first of all, in a systematic, unsparing demolition of constructions obstructing or warping perception and intuition - that is, in the assessment of what it is not, of what cannot be real, even before making positive statements about what reality actually is. Indeed, before affirming something positive on being, much must be refuted and eliminated of what has been said and thought about it and of the ordinary way to talk about it. And also this negative work constitutes a part the opus ontologicum, and indeed the part in which philosophy has been most successful, while the pars construens, i.e. ascertaining what reality is, still waits for a formulation that “holds up”.

Allow me a psychological remark: the basic mood of everyone, the quality of one’s existential condition, does not depend much on the contingencies of life, but it is rather an expression of one’s ontological consciousness – I mean, of how each one, in his deepest, feels Being (esse), one’s own as well as everybody’s and everything’s – on whether he feels it as frail, insignificant and randomly, or else secure, important and purposeful. Ontological reflection can lead to a coherent, or less inconsistent, conceptualization of reality, and to a better awareness and experience of it, therefore also of oneself, above all by clearing the field of consciousness from constructions conceptually fallacious and misleading, and at the same time acknowledging certain cornerstones of knowledge and being, as opposed to widespread of para-philosophical ideologies, that are blatantly and purposefully degrading, which take pride in denying the awareness of the possibility of such cornerstones. I say this without any pretension to construct a priori, by way of deduction, the entire universe together with its history, and then “discover” that it magically corresponds to that explained a posteriori, on empirical data, from the science of time – like in other eras Descartes and Hegel did, to name two distinguished examples. Ontology, on the contrary, in order to get out of the hypothetical, must rely on what exists, on empirical data, taken as phenomenically immediate (not obtained by judgments, deduction or by procedures of natural sciences), starting with “I am and I think”. Yet it needs to be based not only on them, but also on logic, namely on the principles of identity and non-contradiction. Ontology is defined as “first philosophy” because its object is as general or universal as possible: being as being (ὂν ᾗὄν, in Latin ens qua ens, as Aristotle said), all that is, the Real, the All, including the consciousness of the being (“of” both subjective and objective, of course). Each branch of thought descends, more or less implicitly, from some one or some other ontological conception.

Nothing is less determinate as being (the verbal participle is also used as a noun), and in turn every determination is. In fact, by definition, there cannot be an excess with respect to being. On the other hand, every determination-meaning-perception-experience is: existence is not added to it, it is not a predicate, an attribute: it is one with it: we distinguish the meanings of words being, experience, conscience, but this is a distinction merely due and confined to the words chosen and put together by us, because indeed those three “things” are reality, they are inseparable. Ontology is philosophia prima also in the sense that it does not presuppose to itself its own object as given, defined and bounded in a certain way, unlike e.g. entomology, which presupposes the idea and existence of “insects”. Ontology does not deal with particular, individual, specific determinations of the being; it keeps in mind that these are the being (ens, essent), and that distinction between the former and the latter is made only by way of notional abstraction. We must therefore be aware that when we introduce pure “esse” (to be) without determinations, or “non esse” (not to be), or even non-A with respect to A, this is done only verbally, notionally - it is not so, that any of the three “things” above has been “made” or “posed” (except in the sense of “to posit”) or positively ascertained pure esse without determinations, or non esse, or non-A, etc. Moreover, unlike the particular sciences and mathematics, ontology, as first philosophy, is not based on assumptions, postulates, axioms which lack demonstration, but on such principles, as are undeniable (and therefore unquestionable) because their negation, as we shall see soon, would negate both itself and immediate evidence. Only principles that neither can nor need be demonstrated can be taken as closing standards. In philosophy of law we speak of positive law, in the sense of jus positum, that is, placed, set, created by some legislator, as opposed to natural law, that is, a law inherent in nature. So, it is clear that whenever this book uses the words “positive” and “positiveness” in an ontological sense, it simply means an existing quid and by no means something created or set by anybody.

This generally applies whenever one says that one “poses” this and then “poses” or “negates” that and discovers that something doesn’t add up, that a contradiction peeps out within what one has thus “posed”: it peeps out within the propositional, phraseological domain, within its formulations, but by no means in that of being itself. In particular, if I say “I pose the nothing”, it does not absolutely happen that, by saying this, I demonstrate the positive existence of the Nothing or Negative, nor do I have “manufactured” it in an alchemical athanòr, or crucible; nor do I have some-how created an interaction, a relationship with the Nothing or the not being, whether in absolute terms, or as referring to a specific entity; I have just combined certain words into a sentence, thus obtaining a certain overall meaning, more or less contradictory - even if these words and their individual meanings and the overall meaning - all, as such, do exist. But I cannot infer from them that I have discovered that being itself is contradictory. If I say, or “pose”, that the dolphin is a fish, and I add that it is a placentate and then I note that there’s a contradiction between “fish” and “placentate”, this contradiction is internal to my speaking about the dolphin, not at all in the dolphin itself, which will continue to swim like a fish and reproduce as a mammal, unaffected by that contradiction. I’ll return to similar verbal illusions in the continuation.

* * * *

We know that psychology, compared to other sciences, has the peculiarity of applying also to the subject who is cultivating it, and at the very act of cultivating it. But, as a result of the all-encompassing nature of ontology, there is a unique relationship between ontology, the subject that cultivates it, and its matter: the saying and the said of the ontology are included in its very matter. For the same reason, the three of them converge, indeed they are truly one, so that they are distinguished between them only by verbal abstraction, on the plane of wording, while otherwise and ultimately, they coincide. Furthermore, unlike scientific psychology (as it is understood in modern sense), ontological reflection can not have tools (means, apparatuses) of investigation between itself and its object, since such tools would be identical to this object, in that they exist.

We are at the opposite of the naturalistic paradigm, which rests on the ontological separateness between the investigating subject, its external object, and the science that is produced, mostly with the help of instrumental means interposed between the subject and the object. Furthermore, ontology is a solitary speculation, not a team’s business, in the sense that, in order to be consistent with its own statute of reasoning, i.e. presupposing nothing at all, it does not even presuppose interlocutors and dialoguing partners. In this sense, every true book on ontology voyages in a bottle entrusted to the ocean.

The kind of knowledge at which ontology aims, finally, is not particular, not sectorial, which is the knowledge of sciences and philosophies-of-specific-branches of knowledge or of praxis: moral, political, anthropological philosophy; philosophy of history, science, law, religion, gender, etymologies...

* * * *

In Terminus I will be using the words “idea”, “ideal”, “idealism”, according to the contexts, in the very different senses in which they were used by the thinkers I take into examination: Plato’s idea is not that of Plotinus nor that of Kant nor that of Hegel; I trust that the reader knows or will get acquainted with these different senses, which I will hereinafter outline in their aspects pertaining to this essay.